Turkish Islam and National IdentityAuthor(s): Sami ZubaidaSource: Middle East Report, No. 199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State (Apr. -Jun., 1996), pp. 10-15Published by: Middle East Research and Information ProjectStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012885Accessed: 24/09/2010 10:00

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Kemalist secularism, with its history of controlling religion, continues to influence the formation of Turkish

national identities. Yet, a relaxation of the secularist stances of the state, during Turgut Ozal's leadership in the

'80s, has led to the admission that Islam, too, is an essential component of Turkish national identity.

Turkish Islam is tied up with Turkish nationalism in

a unique fashion, the product of Turkish history and

identity. Turkey's brand of Islamist ideology challenges the secularist components and the European identification of

Kemalism, historically the dominant form of Turkish na?

tionalism, but retains the central core of Turkish nationalism and statism.

Probably a majority of Turks do not perceive a contra? diction between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist

symbols, viewing both as integral to national identity1 Strikingly, a recent survey found that 41 percent of those who voted for the Islamist Welfare (Refah) Party (RP) de? clared themselves laik (secular) which is a Kemalist identification.2 Those same voters regarded Ataturk as the first among the great men of all time, even before the

Prophet.

Sami Zubaida is Reader in Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London and a contributing editor of this magazine..

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The army is the strongest symbol of the state?another association with Kemalism. Kemalist secularism, with its

history of controlling religion, is a major factor making Is? lam in Turkey different from Islam elsewhere. In a general survey, 85 percent declared confidence in the army, 71 per? cent in the police, 60 percent in the courts, 54 percent in

parliament and only 49 percent in the government.3 This underlines a deep sense of Turkish identity and unity based

upon the Republican state and Kemalist symbols. These attitudes are attested to by strong popular support for the

military's repressive policy towards the Kurdish insurgency. RP leader Necmettin Erbakan accordingly has toned down his earlier criticisms of these policies, risking the loss of his Kurdish constituency in the process.

The ingredient of Islam nonetheless provides one dimen? sion of modern Turkish political identity, as illustrated by the debate about the civil war in Bosnia. This issue has stimu? lated great resentment at all levels of Turkish society, and

Middle East Report ? April-June 1996

Bosnia featured prominently in the RP's campaign for the

municipal elections of March 1994. RP supporters argued in streets and cafes that Bosnian Muslims are racially and

linguistically identical to their Serb neighbours, differing only with respect to religion. This shows, so the argument goes, that a Christian Europe remains deeply hostile to

Muslims, and that Turks who think they can be Europeans are deluded. While many educated Turks, including Islam?

ists, do not see the issue in such stark terms, there is

widespread fear of an "orthodox alliance"?Russia, Serbia and Greece, historical enemies of the Ottomans and oppres? sors of their Muslim populations?allied on regional and international issues, of which Bosnia is but one.

The Political Field

A crucial feature of the Turkish political system is its plu? ralism: political parties alternate in government through elections, and the RP is fully integrated into this system. This may account for the marginality of violent Islamist

groups, as compared with the vigorous, armed opposition in

Egypt and the revolutionary forces in Iran. The fact that Turkish parties are engaged in real electoral contests leads them to seek constituencies of support. As in other political systems, this support is often clientalistic, based on commu? nal and regional networks. In many parts of Turkey these constituencies are socially conservative and religious. As a

result, the mainstream center-right parties (at present, the True Path Party, DYP; and the Motherland Party, ANAP) have always contained significant Islamist elements, includ?

ing deputies in the parliament. This Islamist presence became more open and active in the relatively permissive atmosphere of the Ozal era, in the 1980s.

Ozal's liberal reforms included a relaxation of Kemalist and secularist stances of the state, and public admission of Islam as an essential component of Turkish identity. The

party he formed, the ANAP, did not hide its strong connec? tions to the Nakshibandi religious order. During this period, Muslim associations, foundations and charities flourished, making use of economic liberalization to pursue extensive activities and enrichment. A thriving "print capitalism" also had a strong Islamist presence. Most importantly, deregu? lation of broadcasting brought into being two channels with Muslim orientations. By contrast, in the Arab world and Iran broadcasting remains firmly under state control.

The other center-right party, the True Path Party (DYP), until recently the ruling party, also contains Islamist ele? ments and deputies in parliament. Its leaders, President

Suleyman Demirel and former Prime Minister Tansu (filler, protest their secular credentials and loyalty to Kemalist

principles, but they are keen to be seen in public as pious Muslims, depending on the occasion. In this they resemble some Arab leaders, as in Egypt, who underline their secular credentials to their Western allies while emphasizing their

piety and Islamist identity for internal consumption. Turk? ish leaders, though, face the added constraint of powerful and vocal secularist opinion at home.

Middle East Report ? April-June 1996

The RP, then, while an openly Islamist party, does not

enjoy a monopoly on Islam in the political arena. At the same

time, unlike some counterparts in the Arab world, it has to contend with a dominant Kemalist ideology whose banish? ment of the sheriat {shari'a in Arabic) was one of the founding acts of the secular republic. Powerful sectors of the Turkish

bourgeoisie view the sheriat as a threat to their lifestyles, and advocacy of its restoration remains highly fraught. While

many Islamists are convinced of the justice and desirability of the sheriat, the leadership is often evasive and restates the reassuring formula that the sheriat is merely a general program, a path, and that democracy and pluralism pre? clude forcing its precepts on people.

At the same time, the RP leadership must cater to their constituencies by maintaining a strongly critical stance

against secularism, Western orientations and educational curricula. Positions taken on these issues depend on the time and place of the pronouncements. The recent electoral cam?

paign, and subsequent negotiations between the RP and the other center-right parties to form a coalition, displayed this vacillation between moderation and anti-secular rhetoric. The pressures of electoral contests seem to produce a degree of moderation and compromise not seen in the Islamist

groups operating under more repressive regimes in neigh? boring countries. This flexibility, however, is limited by the views and aspirations of the core Islamic constituencies.

Given that the most distinctive element of Islamist advo?

cacy elsewhere?the application of the sheriat?is blunted in the Turkish case, what remains of the RP platform? Its economic program is not unlike that of Islamists elsewhere: neither capitalism nor socialism, but promotion of social jus? tice, ending slavish dependence on the West, fostering cooperation with the Islamic world, protecting the national

economy, and so on. It is not so much a concrete program as it is a critique of government corruption and the failure to achieve economic development and social justice?in the words of one critic it amounts to lafzoloji, the art of pronun? ciation. The Islamists are not supported so much for their

program as for their air of virtue and cleanliness. Islamists everywhere are distinguished by their penchant

for community work: charities, schools, clinics, cooperatives and so on. In Turkey, the RP combines these communal works with electoral canvassing. The other parties mount high- powered media campaigns, enlisting glamorous personalities to support them in public meetings, but they are distinctly deficient in campaigning and canvassing at the grass-roots level. They rely on local party machines involved in clientalistic networks. The RP partakes in high-profile pub? lic and media events but also undertakes extensive and

energetic campaigns at the local level. This is especially sig? nificant for the vast numbers of gecekondu (shantytown) inhabitants who are marginalized and neglected by the po? litical system.

In its grassroots approach, the RP fields a devoted body of cadres from all walks of life. In Istanbul one is impressed by the enthusiasm, friendliness and optimism of the many young men and women who have established networks in

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the localities and work through them. Candidates accompany local cadres on home visits. They offer advice on how to deal with complicated bureaucracies, provide support during fam?

ily celebrations and crises, such as weddings and funerals

and, for the religiously devout, offer help with haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) trips. Women cadres play particularly important roles in gaining access to homes and estabHshing female net? works. Similarly, Kurdish RP members work in Kurdish

neighborhoods of major cities, addressing their particular prob? lems and frustrations in Kurdish.

In municipalities controlled by the RP, this ethos of com?

munity service has been reinforced by the establishment of halk meclisi (people's councils), through which people can

present problems and grievances to local leaders. RP sup? porters cite these as instruments of direct democracy. Opponents contend that RP local politics are based on politi? cal favoritism and clientalism in employment and

services?practices just as corrupt as those pursued by the other parties.

Official Islam is represented in the Directorate of Religious Affairs, one of the largest and best financed government de?

partments, which controls mosques, religious education, foundations and charities. Oppositional Islam, often hostile to this body, nonetheless benefits from its many dispensa? tions.

Islamists have built strongholds in the Ministries of Edu? cation and Interior, where high officials are able to select

supporters and sympathizers for key jobs and staff positions. Islamist dominance in the education ministry is reflected in

policies, textbooks and teacher selection. In April 1994, fol?

lowing the RP success in municipal elections a month earlier, secularists vociferously denounced sheriat education officials said to be collaborating with Islamists. As a result, 15 top ministry officials were sacked, accused of distributing pro- sheriat materials to schools and of leaking confidential materials to rightist and religious parties. The press suggested at the time that these officials were fired at the instigation of the National Security Council, in which the military is heavily represented. Pro-Islamist parliamentary deputies in the rul?

ing DYP strongly attacked the Minister of Education for

victimizing patriotic officials and favoring foreign influences.4 It is widely believed, however, that the sackings were only a

gesture and that the education system is still deeply infil? trated by Islamists.

Personnel of the Interior Ministry, the police and the secu?

rity services are widely believed to be sympathetic to the ultra-nationalist right and to the Islamists. It was reported that 700 of the 1,600 key ministry executives, provincial gov? ernors and other functionaries are believed to be RP

supporters.5 Of the 76 provincial governors, 24 had performed the pilgrimage in the last few years at the invitation of the Saudi authorities. In 1994, the minister did not permit 20 more governors to accept such invitations. The police are bru?

tally zealous in suppressing unauthorized demonstrations by leftists and trade unionists, yet were remarkably friendly to the unauthorized massive Islamist demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul in April 1994.

12

Sufi Orders and Social Islam

Turkey's Sufi orders, still today one of the main manifesta? tions of the particularity of Islam in Turkish society, were dissolved in 1925, their wealth confiscated, and any reorga? nization prohibited. Deeply rooted in Turkish social and

religious life, these orders went underground and cemented their secret networks and solidarities. The secularization of foundations {vakiflar, from the Arabic awqaf) made them suit? able vehicles for Muslim social activism. Both these processes contributed to the formal and public institutionalization of Muslim activism in Turkey.

The liberalization of state policy from 1950 allowed for a wide range of religious expressions and associations but did not end the formal ban on Sufism. At the same time, it did allow the orders to enhance their networks and activities, spawning a variety of charities, publications and educational and cultural activities, including the famous Mevlevi "whirl?

ing dervish" ceremonies in Konya and Istanbul. Two religious orders in particular have played central parts

in the flourishing field of social Islam. One, led by Fethullah

Gulen, is the order of the Fethullahcilar, the richest and most

important offshoot of the Nurcu movement.6 The other, led by Professor Mahmut Esad Cosan, is known as Iskender Pasha (the name of a mosque) and is one of the various offshoots of the Nakshibandi.

The Fethullahcilar have their own vakif (foundation) and

engage primarily in publishing: they own the influential daily Zaman, operate a TV channel, and publish magazines, books, cassettes and videos. They are also involved, like all other Muslim organizations, in education, both in Turkey and in the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. Fethullah him? self is well connected with political and public figures. While not formally committed to any political party, the Fethullahcilar are known to support the DYP and to have influential connections within it.7

Like that of the Fethullahcilar, the great wealth of the Nakshibandi organization is channeled through its Hakyol (true path) foundation, founded in 1980. The first Islamist

party under Erbakan in the 1970s, the National Salvation

Party, is said to have originated in this Nakshi milieu, blessed

by Cosan's predecessor and father-in-law Mehmet Zahid Koktu. Subsequently, Erbakan fell out with the new leader, and the links between the two organizations consisted in their

overlap of membership. Korkut Ozal, the brother of the late President Turgut Ozal, was part of the Nakshibandi group, and exerted great influence within the party and the govern? ment during Turgut's leadership of the government and of ANAP. Turgut's death in 1993 ended the association, and the Nakshi community remains formally uncommitted to any political party.

In the 1970s, and especially in the 80s, vakiflar were the vehicles through which many Islamist associations, includ?

ing the orders, organized themselves and their activities.8 Turkish legislation in 1967 and 1983 enabled the formation of new vakiflar?established for a variety of purposes, not

just religious. The law stipulates that foundations should not

Middle East Report ? April-June 1996

have political objectives, but in practice the political parties registered support organizations as vakiflar, and religious as? sociations and orders have made extensive use of this

legislation to organize educational, religious and charitable activities based on clientalistic networks.9

These groups and many others in the Islamist sector have exercised their influence primarily in the field of education and in the formation of a new generation of Islamist public functionaries, professionals and cultural leaders. The central educational focus of the Islamic foundations have been the

imam-hatip schools established by the government for the

training of mosque imams and preachers. Their number in? creased dramatically from 72 in 1970, to 374 in 1980, to 389 in 1992.10 The Islamic foundations have played a crucial part in the operation of these schools by providing scholarships, running residence halls and clubs, publishing books, and the like. Their curricula, by no means confined to religious sub?

jects, offer a full range of secondary education. Only a small number of graduates go on to work in religious professions. Many proceed to higher education at the main universities and find employment in public service, with the help of con? nections and networks established by the Islamic foundations.

Only military academies have remained closed to imam-hatip graduates, although there have been many rumors of Islam? ist attempts at infiltration.

The result of these activities has been the production of

large numbers of well-educated Muslim intellectuals, profes? sionals and government functionaries. Their networks and

Middle East Report a April-June 1996

organizations are not clandestine or conspiratorial, but mostly public and open. They provide an Islamist platform of moder?

nity that effectively challenges the hegemony of Kemalist secularism and the Western orientation of Turkish educational and political culture.

The Kemalist state's suppression of Sufism seems to have facilitated preservation of its networks and solidarities, se?

cretly and informally, so that it could emerge, at the

appropriate moment, into activism and renewal. The secu? larization of the vakiflar, moreover, made them into suitable vehicles for Muslim social activism. These two processes con? tributed to the formal public institutionalization of Muslim

activism, in contrast to the informal and communalistic op? erations in Egypt and elsewhere.

Associational Life

Islamists everywhere have been active in trade unions, pro? fessional associations and chambers of commerce. In Egypt they have scored remarkable successes in the control of pro? fessional associations through election to their ruling bodies. What distinguishes Turkey in this sphere is its pluralism. While Egypt has only one federation of trade unions, operat? ing within the ambit of government, Turkey has several. In the 1970s each political party had its own trade union organi? zation, the most prominent being Turk-Is, associated with the government, and DISK, linked with the parties of the left. In the 1980s another federation with Islamist creden-

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tials, Hak-Is, came to prominence. With the decline of the

left, Hak-Is has displaced DISK as the radical union, and now includes some leftist militants. Links with the RP or other

political parties are not allowed by law, but it seems to coop? erate with municipalities controlled by RP and with Islamist

businesses, which in turn favor its members. Unlike in Egypt, the main professional associations in

Turkey do not seem to be arenas of political struggle: the secu? lar intelligentsia appear secure in these areas. At the same

time, there are many local and regional associations of pro? fessionals, and given the increasing prominence and influence of an organized Islamist intelligentsia, Islamist challenges to secular hegemony in the professions are quite likely in the future.

Business associations are prominent in Turkish public life.

TUSIAD, the mainstream national association, includes the

largest corporations and uses its extensive resources for re?

search, publications and public relations. MUSIAD, the Muslim business association, seems to act as a club and a network for mostly small- and medium-sized businesses. Members observe Muslim rituals by not serving liquor at their

dinners, for example, and by celebrating the Muslim festi? vals. In dealings with non-Islamist businesses and banks, their guidelines advise that normal interest rates should ap? ply. They have no formal links with political parties or with Hak-Is trade unions, but informal cooperation and accommo? dations are reported.

Intellectual Currents

Mainstream modern political Islam, whether promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World, by Iranian revo?

lutionaries, or by the main Islamist trends in Turkey, has

explicitly accepted the science and technology of the West

(while rejecting its cultural values) and implicitly adopted modern models of the state as centralized, bureaucratized nation-states. Indeed, in Egypt and elsewhere, the ranks of the Islamists are dominated by engineers, technicians and medical professionals. This is also true for a good part of the Turkish Muslim intelligentsia. There is, however, a promi? nent and influential group of Muslim intellectuals who stand

apart from these positions. Ali Bulac, Ismet Ozel, Rasim Ozdendoren and Dhan Kutluer?all graduates in the humani? ties and social sciences?are the prominent figures in this trend.

Bulac and the others are fully acquainted with the main trends in Western thought and draw upon it extensively. The references in Bulac's works to Western writers are wide-rang? ing.11 These are not obscurantist reactionaries, but well-informed and thoughtful "post-modernists" (in the lit? eral sense of the term rather than in espousing post-modernist theories). Their critical themes recall Marxist discussions of "fetishism" and the Frankfurt School notion of "instrumental reason" as the ultimate form of domination. They read like a combination of Adorno and Sayyid Qutb.

Books by these writers share the theme of cultural cri?

tique.12 They discuss modernity in politics, culture, urban

14

life, sexuality and so on, diagnosing in each case the mala? dies and problems of modern Western life. In their critiques, modern life is alien and contrary to the way in which God conceived that man as his khalifa (steward) should live. Western cultural values and economic systems are not sepa? rate from the West as a scientific and technical civilization. In their view, it is precisely the deification of reason and the

objectification and exploitation of humankind that are at the root of modern industrial civilization. The objective of continuous economic growth disrupts community and de?

stroys the environment. Knowledge and science cannot be distinct from revelation and the Qur'an.

The critique and rejection of the nation state is perhaps the most important difference between Bulac and main? stream political Islam. The model of the Islamic Republic in Iran and the programs of the Muslim Brotherhood make it clear that the Islamic state envisaged is a modern, central? ized bureaucratic state with all the institutions, including the repressive apparatus, of other modern states. For Bulac this is the mirror-image of the secular state, not a departure from it.

God's will on earth, according to Bulac, is expressed through a community (jumma), not a state. Modernity transformed the umma into a state, and therein lie all the problems. Iran, Sudan and other Islamic states have not solved this problem but perpetuated it. The solution lies in the self-assertion of civil society, in the form of multiple communities that develop their own institutions of law, education, economic forms and culture. The individual, or rather the "human" (insan) must be freed from the clutches of the state, not in accordance with liberal theory viewing the individual as a separate entity but in accordance with the Islamist view that the human being is

always part of a community. This community can protect the human against the state. The atomized individual of liberal

theory, by contrast has no defense against the hegemonic state. This theory has spawned the notion of multiple law com?

munities, which has political appeal as a recipe for pluralism. These ideas have been taken up by some Islamist politicians as a means of combining the sheriat for Muslims with liberal

pluralism for others. Autopian notion that ignores the intrin? sic connections of law to social power and struggles, it forms an appealing slogan for politicians seeking to establish their liberal credentials while championing Islam.

The Secular Response

The Islamist current has elicited resistance from secularist forces in all the countries in the region. Much of this resis? tance comes from the Westernized bourgeois elites. The fact of the matter is that, despite the liberal rhetoric emanating from mainstream Islamist leadership in recent years, there is an inherent thrust in political Islam towards social authoritarianism. At the very least, this takes the form of a censorious watchfulness toward art and literature and other fields of intellectual production. The cases of censorship and intimidation in Egypt have been well publicized: the assassi? nation of Farag Fuda in 1992, the attempt on Naguib

Middle East Report ? April-June 1996

Mahfouz's life, the bizarre case against Nasr Abu Zayd to divorce him from his wife on the grounds of apostasy, and al- Azhar's efforts to censor music, books and films. Turkey has seen fewer and less important examples of Islamist censor?

ship, the most notable being removal of nude statues from

public places in 1994 by Ankara's RP mayor, who angrily de? clared "If this is art, I spit on it."

This social authoritarianism threatens to extend to the liberties and lifestyles of many social groups with regard to restrictions on women, segregation of the sexes in public places, limitations on public entertainments and celebrations, access to theaters, bars and cafes, and the like. In Turkey, the RFs control of major cities following the 1994 municipal elections raised fears that the new mayors would introduce restric? tions in these areas. After a few gestures in these directions, however, they have left well alone, except in the case of the censored Ankara sculptors. Secularists believe that this re? straint is part of a stratagem for national electoral success; if the RP were to assume control nationally, they would show their true colors.

Secularist resistance to political Islam in most parts of the

region is defensive and often compromising. Given the weak? ened state of the left and the crisis of ideology, secular intellectuals are without clear vision or policies. Democracy and human rights have become their ultimate refuge. Even these arenas are contested by Islamists, and in some cases secularists do make common cause with liberal Islamists

against government violations. In the case of Egypt, the gov? ernment oppresses Islamists on the security and political fronts, but indulges Islamist ideological assertions and at?

tempts at censorship in order to establish its own Islamist credentials.

While Turkish secularists suffer from a similar malaise, they are much more assertive and vociferous in their resis? tance to Islamism, and this is largely due to Kemalist ideology. Much of the intelligentsia, the old urban political and busi? ness elites, and the press are predominantly in the secularist

camp. The newspaper Cumhuriyet is ever-watchful for lapses in secularist principles, and uncovers and denounces sheriatcis in high places. Political leaders of the main parties, though they harbor Islamists within their own ranks, join with the secularists against the RP.

The electoral success of the RP is sharpening these con? flicts. These divisions, moreover, are superimposed on class and regional conflicts. Islam is associated with Anatolian

migrants?shantytown inhabitants?whom secular urban? ites blame for the deterioration of their beloved cities and for

threatening their culture and lifestyles by voting for the Wel? fare Party.

Turkish secularists, however, are not all in one camp. Hu? man rights activists, mostly from the political left, make common cause with Islamists fighting an authoritarian Kemalist state. Economic liberals and libertarians in the Ozal mold?some calling themselves "Second Republicans," some

following Cern Boyner's now defunct New Democracy Party? are mostly highly Westernized secularists but identify the authoritarian state as the main problem for Turkish democ-

racy. Islam in Turkey is distinguished by considerable diver?

sity, both in ideational content and in institutional forms. In

political expression and organization, Islam is not restricted to one party and, as Bulac observes, it is even more developed socially and culturally than it is politically. Turkish Islam is

distinguished by a high degree of institutional differentiation from secular counterparts in separate trade unions, business

associations, foundations, educational and media activities. Some Muslim cultural and intellectual milieus display a high level of vitality and innovation, compared to the stereotypical products of much of political Islam.

Oriented as it is to electoral contest, Turkey's mainstream Islamist leadership is more open to political pressure and com?

promise than its counterparts elsewhere. This flexibility, however, is limited by the need to satisfy its core constitu?

ency. The question is whether pressures towards liberal moderation in the political sphere can hold back the social authoritarianism inherent in Islamist ideology and social eth? ics. An encouraging sign in this respect is the growth and

vigor of a modern Muslim intelligentsia who may be expected to share some of the cultural horizons and lifestyle aspira? tions of their secular counterparts.13 ?

Author's note: The research upon which this article is based was carried out in Turkey in 1994, supported by grants from the Nuffield Foundation, London and Birkbeck College, London. I also enjoyed the stimulating hospitality of the sociology department at Bogaziqi University, Istanbul.

Endnotes 1 See Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "'Thank God We're Secular!' Aspects of Fundamentalism in a Turkish Town," in Lionel Caplan, ed., Studies in Religious Fundamentalism (London: Macmillan, 1987), 51-78: and Michael E.Meeker, "Oral culture, media culture, and Islamic resurgence in Turkey," in E. P. Archetti, ed., Exploring the Written: Anthropology and the Multiplicity of Writing (Scandinavian University Press), 31-62.

2 Fer hat Kentel, "LTslam, carrefour des identites sociales et culturelles en Turquie: Le eas de Parti de la Prosperite," Cahiers d'etudes sur la Mediteranee orientale et le monde turco- iranien (CEMOTI) 19 (Jan-Juin 1995), 211-227.

3 Ibid., 218.

4 This episode was widely reported, in particular in Cumhuriyet April 20,1994, and Turkish Daily News, April 28, 1994.

5 Turkish Daily News, May 3, 1994, quoting Cumhuriyet.

6 Strictly speaking this is not a Sufi order. Members of the Nurcu movement are the followers of Said Nursi (1873-1960) who maintained a Muslim opposition to Kemalist secular reforms and developed novel modern ideas of Islam. See Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).

7 Rusen Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan: Turkiye'de Islami Olusumlar (Istanbul: Metis, 1990/93).

8 Foundations are, of course, a feature of all Muslim societies. Modern governments in many countries, including Turkey, took over the administration ofawqaf, and incorporated them usually into ministries of religious affairs.

9 This account of vakiflar is drawn from Faruk Bilici, "Sociability et expression politique islamistes en Turquie: Les nouveaux vakifs," Revue francaise de science politique 43:3 (June 1993), 412-434.

10 Ibid., 425.

11 They include Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Barrington Moore, Deleuze, Lyotard, Illich, as well as modern Iranian and Arab Islamists, including Shari'ati and Al-Ahmand. Ali Bulac, Din ve Modernizm (Istanbul: Beyan, 1992).

12 For accounts of these intellectuals and their ideas, see: Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), and Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt against Industry and Technology" in M. Heper, A. Oncu and H. Kramer, eds., Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993).

13 See Nulifer Gole, "Laicite, modernisme et islamisme en Turquie," CEMOTI 19 (1995).

Middle East Report ? April-June 1996 15