Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat …Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terr 2 orism Terrorism Regrettably so, the same question yielded an astonishingly

Turkish Societal Perceptions

Concerning Combat against

PKK Terrorism

Dr. Salih AKYÜREK

Mehmet Ali YILMAZ

WISE MEN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

REPORT # 51

SEPTEMBER 2012

Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism

Questionnaire and Results Analysis: Dr. Salih Akyürek

Consultant and Statistical Support: Prof. Dr. Cengiz Yılmaz

Documentation: Dr. Salih Akyürek, M. Ali Yılmaz, Erdem Kaya

English Translation and Interpretation: Cihan Erkli

Front Page Design: Kaan Tuğcuoğlu

BILGESAM PUBLICATIONS

Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies

Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi No: 10 Celil Ağa İş Merkezi Kat: 9 Daire: 36 Mecidiyeköy / İstanbul / Turkey Tel: +90 212 217 65 91 Faks: +90 212 217 65 93 Atatürk Bulvarı Havuzlu Sok. No: 4/6 A. Ayrancı / Çankaya / Ankara / Turkey Tel : +90 312 425 32 90 Faks: +90 312 425 32 90 www.bilgesam.org [email protected] Copyright © BILGESAM SEPTEMBER 2012 All publishing rights reserved. Publishing this report, either on paperback or electronic, is prohibited without the permission of BILGESAM.

Questionnaire Design From: Teorem Research and Consulting Ltd.

http://www.bilgesam.org/

mailto:[email protected]

Foreword

The Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) closely follows the issues pertaining

to the Kurdish Question, combat against PKK terror and the democratic opening process. In

this regard, BILGESAM has tried to compensate the general lack of empirical data on matters

relating to any of the issues mentioned above. To this end BILGESAM, instead of relying on

the discourses of the actors speaking on behalf of the Kurds, has resorted to polling the

Kurdish population and their thoughts on these topics and problems. Field research was

conducted to attain the data presented within this report.

During 2008-2009, BILGESAM conducted a thorough research in which 8,607 were polled

from 17 different eastern and south-eastern provinces, along with a relatively high number

of migrants of these regions in Istanbul and Mersin, and this research was presented under

the title, “A Sociological Analysis of the South-eastern Question”. Later, results from this

inquiry were incorporated into the, “What are the Kurds and Zazas thinking about?

Perceptions on Common Values and Symbols” report and this report was presented to the

public. Concerning the democratic opening process was BILGESAM’s publication of (Ret.)

Ambassador Özdem Sanberk’s analysis, “Democratization, Political and Social Solidarity

Opening for the Solution of the Kurdish Question” and the Wise Men Board report, “The

Democratic Opening and Social Perceptions”. During the 2009-2010 period and within the

eastern and south-eastern parts of Anatolia where a majority of Kurds resides, BILGESAM

conducted a survey in 19 provinces and migrant-heavy Mersin, along with 5 provinces in the

western part of Turkey, where 192 people in total were interviewed as to establish a

comprehensive sampling as possible. Consequently, these interview results were published

within the book, “Kurds in Turkey and Social Perceptions”.

In order to ascertain the ethnic/religious composition of regional neighborhoods where

Kurdish majorities reside, BILGESAM published the 2010 report, “The Ethnic and Religious

Identity Composition of 19 Turkish Provinces in the Eastern and South-eastern parts of

Anatolia”. BILGESAM, trying to partake in the resolution of the Kurdish Question has

developed a comprehensive strategy that takes into consideration four different dimensions

of the issue. This strategy was encapsulated in a Wise Men Board report and its contents

made available for the public and decision-makers’ benefit in 2011 with the title, “Turkey’s

Counter-Terrorism Strategy against the PKK”. Following up this report, and to complement

its religious/ethnic lines of argument, was the “Conflict Resolution Approaches and the

Kurdish Question in Turkey” report.

With this new survey report, BILGESAM is continuing to follow the developments around the

Kurdish Question. To understand and quantify the societal perception of the Turkish state’s

counter terror operations and the democratic opening process, BILGESAM surveyed 2922

people via an online poll and is presenting its findings now in the “Turkish Societal

Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism” report. This report tried to be as

thorough as possible and many sub-layers of analysis were entertained for achieving a

holistic analysis as possible. Among some of the sub-sections were: the desire for Turks and

Kurds to live together in Turkey, the KCK arrests, the democratic opening process, counter

terrorism and state policies, military operations against terrorism, foreign support for the

PKK, the effects of terror acts in the regions and societal perceptions on solution proposals

of Kurdish Question.

The report “Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terrorism” was

originally published in Turkish and presented to the public through a press conference that

took place at BILGESAM headquarters in September 2012. This copy is an abridged version of

the original report and includes only the major tables and graphs.

We hope that this study and its results will be informative and useful for the general public

and those within the decision making process and academia. We would like to extend our

gratitude to Şikayetvar for providing us the means online to gather the data, Dr. Salih

Akyürek and Mehmet Ali Yılmaz for authoring and co-authoring this report, Prof. Dr. Cengiz

Yılmaz for his consultation support and all those who contributed to the publication of this

report at BILGESAM.

Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı

President of BILGESAM

Abbreviations

AKP Justice and Development Party

BDP Peace and Democracy Party

CHP Republican Peoples’ Party

KCK Kurdistan Communities Union

The PKK terrorist organization formed the KCK system in 2007 in order to move to the

state-building phase of its strategy by directing pro-Kurdish political parties and

controlling all Kurdish nationals across Turkey and within the Middle East. KCK has a

state-like structure including legislative, executive, and judiciary branches along with

an armed wing –HPG: People’s Defense Forces- and a contract comprising 47 articles

which define a new citizenship status based on KCK membership. The KCK is

organized in municipalities of the eastern and south-eastern Anatolian provinces,

various nongovernmental organizations, national and local media, trade unions and

at universities. The KCK, in the first stage, aspires to be a parallel state within Turkey

through seemingly democratic organizations while gaining ability to use force in cities

and aims finally to establish an independent confederation of Kurdistan over the

territories of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In 2012, the Turkish Supreme Court ruled

that the KCK is an armed terrorist organization by ratifying the verdict issued by the

Van Criminal Court in 2011.

MHP Nationalist Movement Party

MIT National Intelligence Organization

PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party

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The Common Desire of Turks and Kurds to Live Together

One of the main purposes of this study was to assess whether or not Turks and Kurds wish to

live and mold a common national future together and, depending on their answer, to what

degree. In other words, their social attitudes towards each other were assessed. To this end,

four main research questions guided the entire study.

Perhaps surprising, while 70% of the Turks indicated that they wished to live together with

Kurds, this figure was roughly 90% with the Kurds that desire to live together with Turks.

Kurds, in this sense, seemed more receptive to at least living together with Turks within the

same borders.

The Common Future of Turks and Kurds in Turkey

This study also sought to measure the societal gap between Turks and Kurds via a different

set of questions and approach. With regard to the conclusions derived from this approach,

statistics indicated that Turks whom consented to living together with Kurds—at least as

approving them as neighbors or possible familial relatives—was around 24%. This figure was

the same when asked to Turks that did not desire to live with the Kurds. However, and from

a wider perspective, Kurds seemed again more receptive and accommodating to living with

Turks. This fact was indicated with their low rate disapproval figure (only 2.4% of Kurds

wished to live apart from Turks) while Turkish participants indicated that 24% of Turks

desired to live apart.

Nearly 78% of Kurds consented to living with Turks or becoming relatives with them. This

overwhelming approval rate is truly surprising. From this same group, nearly six out of seven

(67%) indicated that they would like to marry a Turk and thus become relations with them.

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Regrettably so, the same question yielded an astonishingly low figure from the Turks. Here

nearly one out of four Turks disapproves of intermarriage or of becoming a relative with a

Kurdish person. Disapprovals, especially when quite high like this, firmly cement societal rifts

between the two ethnicities.

Social Gap and Level of Segregation between Turks and Kurds

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Among party lines, the most receptive constituents of pro-Turkish/Kurdish intermingling and

co-habitation belonged to AKP supporters and voters. The least welcoming were those that

voted along the MHP-BDP lines. As far as education is concerned, the least receptive

group—on all sides—were those that had only finished or were doing their secondary

education (mostly high school level). Unexpectedly, Kurds and Turks that lived in or near

conflict zones turned out to be more sympathetic towards living with one another.

It is important to stress, however, that well over 70% of both Turks and Kurds wish to live in

and share common borders. This seriously undermines the arguments of those seeking to

distance Turks and Kurds away from one another and those actively promoting nationalistic

causes. These statistics will force them to rethink and re-evaluate their causes and

arguments—much to their chagrin no doubt.

As far as common norms and symbols are concerned, both Turks and Kurds alike have

indicated that they share common societal values—such as the national flag and anthem. In

fact, well over 90% of those that were polled indicated as such. Only among the BDP party

constituents did their numbers drop; 76% approved of the current Turkish national anthem

as their own and 59% indicated that they approved and identified with the Turkish national

flag.

Views on Common Values and Symbols (Turkish Flag and National Anthem)

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When all the results are aggregated, this study can decisively conclude that most Turks and

Kurds do indeed wish to live together and believe they have a common future with each

other. The only outstanding exception and slightly confounding variable in this study has

been the higher rate of Turks wishing not to live together with the Kurds than the other way

around as initially expected. Perhaps the increased PKK attacks of late have effectively

disenchanted some Turks and have provoked them to refrain from welcoming a Turkish-

Kurdish common future and co-habitation.

The results of this study reaffirm and are congruent with many other research study results

BILGESAM has produced within the last three years. Results ascertained have directly and

positively demonstrate how flawed some researchers and academics that advocate the

‘Kurds wish to live apart’ thesis are. These claims had never been substantiated and, with

this study, we can safely conclude that their hypothesis were unsound and have been

rendered invalid. If anything, results here have proven quite the contrary: Kurds wish and

strive to live together with Turks—perhaps even more so than Turks themselves! High rates

of approval even from nationalist parties like the MHP and the BDP illustrates just how

unfounded and irrelevant these manipulative claims had been. Now these claims are

undermined and can be effectively refuted.

KCK Arrests

The KCK arrests and their effects were measured with two different questions. With regard

to the belief that arrested KCK members are, in fact, PKK or KCK operatives question got an

88% approval rate among Turks and a 71% from Kurds. Whether the KCK arrests were

warranted or not question received an 83% yes from Turks and 61% from the Kurds. Hence,

with these results in mind, this report concludes that most of Turkey’s population approved

of the KCK arrests and deemed them warranted.

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Turks that supported the KCK arrests came mostly from the AKP and MHP party supporters

(90% approval rate). This figure dropped to around 70% amongst the CHP party constituents.

Results were similar with the Kurds. Pro-AKP Kurds supported the arrests (80%) while pro-

CHP Kurds were divided in the middle at 50%. BDP voters overwhelmingly resisted the

arrests and only 10% of them indicated that the arrests had been warranted. In terms of

regions, Kurdish participants that reside in the conflict zones supported the arrests much

less than those that lived elsewhere. Pro-arrest supporters were significantly higher more

present among the ranks of the Sunni Muslims than in the Alawite sect.

The Democratic Opening Process

Six different questions pertaining to the 2009 initiated and ongoing democratic opening

process were incorporated into this study and asked to its participants.

One out of 3 Turks and Kurds supports and has greeted positively the democratic opening

process and its influence on changing the public officials’ attitudes. Nearly 40% of both Turks

and Kurds believe that the democratic opening has furthered cultural and ethnic rights of

minorities in Turkey. 20% of Turks and 41% of Kurds concurred with a statement concerning

how the democratic opening has positively helped the state gain credibility in the eyes of its

populace. However, and contrasting sharply, 84% of Turks believe that the democratic

opening has aided terrorist causes and that discussions with its captive leader, Abdullah

Öcalan, was wrong. 52% of the Kurds concurred with Turks regarding the same question. In a

similar enquiry, 83% of Turks and 51% of Kurds believed that the democratic opening vastly

disadvantaged the state and helped the PKK and KCK gain societal traction. However, a vast

majority of Kurds (75%) believed the opening to be necessary while only 36% of Turks joined

this belief.

This vast difference in support demonstrates an important rift in perception along ethnic

lines; while many Kurds believe in the democratic opening to be necessary and pressing, an

overwhelming number of Turks do not. Though improved in many regards, the democratic

opening initiated in 2009 has apparently done little to further the state’s reassurance and

amiability in the eyes of its population. Little in improving rights, freedoms and good

governance has been accomplished according to Kurds and Turks within this process. If

anything, terrorist organizations and the KCK have stood to gain from it the most.

Major factional rifts exist on party lines concerning the democratic opening subject. While

AKP voters believe the process to be a positive one (50% approval rate), voters of the other

three mainstream Turkish parties believe it to be highly counterproductive with only 3-30%

support for it at most.

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It is mostly among CHP and MHP party supporters that believe the democratic opening

efforts aided terrorist organizations (90%). This figure is significantly lower among AKP

voting Kurds (50%) and AKP voting Turks (65%). This means, in essence, those two out of

three AKP voting participants believes the democratic opening to be highly disadvantageous

for Turkey. The only major party to not agree to the premise that the democratic opening

supported the PKK or KCK is again the BDP and its constituent participants. This figure, in

sharp contrast to others, is only at 25%.

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Turks and Kurds that live in or near conflict zones alike showed a greater interest in the

democratic opening process. They have a more amenable intake of its contents than do

Turks and Kurds that live further away from these areas. The same could be said regarding

the religious sects in Turkey: Sunni Muslims are more receptive of the process than the

Alawites.

State Counter Terrorism Policy

The state’s counter-terrorism policy was assessed with five questions. The isolation and

imprisonment of Öcalan, for example, garnered a 64% Turkish approval rate and 56%

Kurdish support. However, and again sharply contrasting, only 21% of Turks wished to see

their state coordinate efforts and relations with Barzani of Iraq. Contrary to this low figure,

roughly 61% of Kurds desired Turkey to continue cooperating and working with Barzani.

Regarding negotiations and dealing with Öcalan, only 14% of Turks believed in this policy

while 53% of Kurds stood opposite this number. That being said, nearly a majority of both

Turks and Kurds alike believed that the state was doing a poor job at countering terrorism

and failing to garner international pressure and policy (15-21% approved and only 18-23%

believed the state strategy was of the right kind).

Unlike previous polls, a party/voter differentiation did not exist with regard to the perceived

state counter-terrorism strategy. 25-43% of pro-AKP voters approved and CHP/MHP voters

had only 4-13% of their samples believe the state counter-terrorism strategy was along the

right course of action. Within these distinctions, however, an important observation stands

out: nearly 53-67% of Kurds voting for the AKP approved of direct negotiations with Öcalan

and continued cooperation, relations with Barzani. Kurds from the main opposition party—

the CHP—did not exhibit an anomaly as such. And, like previous times, the BDP fell directly

contrary to mainstream voting behavior; nearly 97-100% voted in favor of talks with Öcalan

and only 4-20% approved of the state’s current counter-terrorism strategy.

A general assessment of all these conclusions can allow one to soundly infer that the AKP

government has been perceived as lacking and/or downright failing with regard to its

counter-terrorism efforts. Accepting the unanimous congruence of approved for isolating

Öcalan, most Kurdish participants were more approving and receptive towards the AKP

counter-terrorism strategy. As before, people living in the conflict regions and Sunni Muslims

rather than the Alawites, were more welcoming of the state’s counter-terrorism policy.

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Security Forces and Counter-Terrorism

Assessment of the security forces and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) were

done with three questions. Only 26% of Kurds and 33% of Turks believed that the Turkish

Armed Forces had been successful in combating terror. Slightly better, but in no real way

successful, was the Turkish police and their own counter-terrorism strategy—37% of Kurds

and 36% of Turks rated them positively. Performing the most dismal of all these three

institutions was the Turkish intelligence. The MIT was rated with only a 33% approval rate by

the Kurds and 21% by the Turks.

Regardless of the minor differences, all three institutions seemed to have failed in the

public’s eyes. No real or noteworthy difference was observed between Turks and Kurds with

regard to this section. Instead, these 3 institutions need to be contextualized within the

government-policy-institution triangle, for security forces mirror the political will to execute

operations—both in scope and intensity. Therefore, it is only normal that within a period of

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diplomatic/civilian democratic efforts—in which even the terrorists organized via the civilian

KCK—that the armed forces are viewed in a negative light.

Contributing to these lowered perceptions and context were some scandalous and

downright fraudulent publications aimed at the Turkish Armed Forces mostly for political

interests. These articles, comments and insidious attacks all undermined the popular

confidence in the Turkish Armed Forces and their effects when trying to understand these

low figures is important to remember.

The police, relatively perceived with more confidence (56-53% approval rates) from both

Turks and Kurds alike, have apparently outclassed the armed forces and the national

intelligence. Here party preferences mattered somewhat: pro-AKP participants voted more

in favor of the intelligence organization, while pro-MHP tended to vote up the armed forces.

The CHP party supporters voted along similar lines, no matter if Turk or Kurd. According to

them, the armed forces deserved a better reputation than the intelligence organization or

the police. The BDP voting participants eschewed all three institutions and voted hardly in

support of them at all.

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The pattern of ‘better approval’ as to where the participants lived continued here: these,

especially Turkish, living in the conflict regions voted in approval of all three institutions

more so than those living further away. Kurds living in the region, however, were less

receptive to the institutions than their fellow neighbor Turks. Interestingly though were sect

differences; though support for the armed forces was relatively similar from all sects, while

the policy and intelligence had a significantly higher approval rate from Sunni Muslims than

the Alawite minority.

As far as military or police operations against the PKK are concerned, nearly 94% of Turks

and 64% of Kurds were in favor of having them continue. These high approval rates from

both Turks and Kurd alike demonstrate the necessity and perceived warranting welcome it

receives from all aspects of Turkish society. All three main parties’ constituents highly

approved of these operations---with AKP at 97%, MHP at 94% and the CHP voters at 91%.

Kurdish pro-AKP supporters backed and even welcomed the operations with an 80%

approval rate while CHP supporting Kurds were measured in at 64%. BDP party sympathizers

were the only ones disapproving of operations against the PKK: only 14% of them rated the

operations as a positive development.

An important sub-question of the military operations research was that concerning the

deaths of the smugglers at Uludere. While two out of three Kurds perceived the event as a

mistake of the Turkish and state forces, Turkish—two out of three—did not consider it as a

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truly deplorable incident, though certainly tragic. Among the Turks, especially, only 47% of

the CHP voters believed the event at Uludere was a deplorable incident. Pro-AKP and MHP

voters only measured in at 26% and 14% dissenting rate to the event among the Turks.

Kurds, on the other hand, lamented the incident and reacted strongly to it with 93% of BDP

voters deploring it while 86% of CHP and 53% of AKP voters believing it to be deplorable.

*This question was formulated so that responders can have more than one selection.

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Turks, unlike Kurds, believe the PKK terrorist organization receives support and funding from

abroad. Regardless, however, both Kurds and Turks think alike as to which countries provide

this kind of support: Israel, the US and the northern Iraqi-Kurdish authorities were all

shortlisted by the polled—with a nearly 71-82% approval rate. Other highly likely supporters

of the PKK and their perceived order of relevance were: Assad’s Syria 65-70%, European

states 58-64%, Russia 49-52% and Iran with 44-51%. Only 5.8% of Kurds and 2.1% of Turks

believed the PKK was not getting any form of support from these states.

Of a worthy mention is how Iran is perceived to be in support of the PKK with nearly a 50%

confirmation rate of this thesis. However, this number is likely to go up since this poll was

conducted in August 29 2012—before the capture and arrest of an Iranian spy in Iğdir of

Turkey. This spy was caught in negotiations with PKK terrorists.

Poll results illustrated that the more educated both Turkish and Kurdish participants are, the

more they believe that terrorism in Turkey receives foreign support and funding. Along party

lines, pro-AKP or MHP party constituents registered a higher approval rate of this believe,

while pro-CHP voters registered less. Pro-BDP voters were again the anomaly and they

registered the least in terms of believing whether or not terrorism in Turkey had foreign

backing. This result only confirms that the BDP perceives the PKK to be an independent actor

and, thus, how legitimate it really is.

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Grand operations conducted against the PKK and how these were perceived was assessed

with three different questions. Military operations against PKK camps and safe havens in

northern Iraq received a 90% approval rate from Turks and 65% from Kurds. Both ethnicities

believed conducting operations against the border PKK camps was especially important—

even more so than operations aimed at PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq.

AKP and MHP voters tended to support these operations more so than their CHP

counterparts. Of the BDP voters, only 7-12% approved of military operations. However,

Turks living in the region were more supportive of these operations while Kurds of the

region were less receptive of them. Sunni Muslims supported these operations substantially

more than the Alawite minority.

This study also sought to inquire and measure the effects of terrorism with regard to how it

curtails or derails economic and social growth. 95% of Turks agreed to the premise of

terrorism’s negative influence while 88% of Kurds thought the same. In terms of terrorism’s

stunting influence on Kurdish rights, 85% of Turks and 83% of Kurds thought the same.

Therefore, one can safely conclude that both Turks and Kurds believe that the PKK does

nothing but hinder progress and development--especially where it is needed the most. AKP

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voting and higher educated participants agreed with this conclusion, while most BDP voting

participants disagreed.

These results demonstrate how many Kurds in Turkey believe that the PKK does not look out

for their interests; if anything, the PKK seems to be a tool piece of others, fighting for their

cause more than that of the Kurds. Moreover, results—especially those of the Kurdish

participants—demonstrated how many believe the KCK organization had, in essence, a

Baath party-esque design armed at goading the Kurdish population. After all these

conclusions, the most important final assessment regarding this section can be made: the

PKK terror problem and the Kurdish issue are two different matters and the Turkish/Kurdish

people agree almost unanimously.

Resolving the Kurdish Question

The Turkish state’s resolve, determinate and measures in its quest to resolving the Kurdish

Question were assessed with 5 different questions. 50% of Kurds and 44% of Turks believed

the Turkish state’s honest determination to resolving this issue. In terms of whether or not it

can resolve it, 51% of Kurds believed it could while only 33% of Turks believed it would if it

could.

Generally speaking, both ethnicities seem quite disillusioned as neither party believed over

50% that this issue could and will be resolved. Kurds, however, were a bit more optimistic

than their Turkish counterparts. Turks seem relatively disparate and tired while Kurds have

retained a bit of optimism and determination.

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AKP supporting participants believed that the issue could be resolved more so than other

party constituents—regardless of ethnicity. With the results in mind, this study can conclude

that, along party lines, state measures are often associated with the policy government and

support for them is pursuant and dependent on it.

Those residing in the conflict zones, both Turks and Kurds alike, believe with steadfast

determination of the state’s resolve and determination in addressing this issue, more so

than those that live further away. Sunni Muslims—no matter Turkish or Kurdish—approve of

the state’s policy and believe it can resolve this issue more than their Alawite counterparts.

Several reasons can account for this low morale and apparent hopelessness with the state’s

efforts and policy for the Kurdish issue: for one, recent terror attacks could have sapped the

public’s morale and, more importantly, the now awry political will at confronting this issue

by the political parties.

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Six more questions were asked on this Kurdish Question and what the supposed obstacles to

resolving it were. Among those that replied, only 2.3-5.7% fully or partially saw a federal

solution to this problem (in other words, whether or not federalism could resolve it). The

popular statements of the BDP, those that seemed to have at least gained a popular

traction, were all proven false with the low approval rate of the autonomous argument—

only 11.9% of the polled believed this to be a viable solution. Only 20% of the Kurds, and

more surprisingly, only 40% of the BDP party voters concurred with the greater autonomy

arguments.

Of the more popular solutions, the more comprehensive ‘equal citizenship’ alternative

gained a 33.5% approval rate (one out of three) among the Kurds while the ‘strengthened

local administration’ solution offer only 14.8%. Only 31.9% of the Kurdish participants

believed current ‘more-rights’ indicated to be sufficient for resolving this issue. On the other

hand, of the Turks polled, 79.2% of them believed that the current ‘improved rights’ for the

Kurds were sufficient enough to resolving this matter. The equal citizenship rights and the

strengthened local administration solutions only garnered 12.3% and 5.3% approval rates,

respectively. The lowest argument to gain approval from the Turks, with only a 3.3% rate,

was the federal/autonomous Turkey/Kurdistan proposal.

As far as political parties were concerned, 92% of pro-MHP and 80% of the pro-AKP

participants believed enough rights had been given as to resolving this issue. 72% of the pro-

CHP participants concurred with them. Among those living in the region, 88% agreed while

only 77% believed elsewhere. Sunni Muslims were again more compliant with an 82%

approval rate over the Alawite Muslims polled (53% approved). Among these high rate

approvals, more increased rights and the option of equal citizenship were quite unpopular.

With a 12% approval rate, most Kurdish participants opposed the ‘democratic autonomy’

option. Even among the pro-BDP party members polled only 41% opted for this option. 5.7%

of Kurdish participants wanted to see a federal Turkey, while only 11% of BDP party voting

participants desired this option. The desire for a fully independent Kurdistan was quite

unpopular; only 2.3% of Kurdish participants indicated that they wanted this and just 7.4% of

BDP voting Kurds agreed. Thus, of all the Kurds polled, only 20% believed in extreme

solutions and even within BDP voting groups this number is just at 59.2%

Among the topics polled was the often debated and polemical topic of Öcalan’s and other

PKK members’ absolutions and release. The radical proposal of forgiving and releasing

Öcalan was able to only gain a 7.7% approval rate from amongst the Kurdish participants.

The more the participants were educated, the higher this rate was. Among the most

educated, for example, only 14.3% approved of this suggestion. This figure was around 39%

of the BDP voting participants. The house-arrest of Öcalan proposal gained a 17.4% approval

rate from the Kurds and a 54% approval rate from pro-BDP voting participants.

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* This question was formulated so that responders can have more than one selection.

The general amnesty of PKK members proposal gained roughly around 28% support from

Kurdish contributors. This figure reached a staggering 77% approval rate from the pro-BDP

voting Kurds. Oddly enough, this figure improved as the participants’ education levels

increased. For example, highly educated and post-secondary school participants approved of

this proposal with a 38% approval rate.

With these results in mind, it is safe to conclude that general amnesty among Kurds is a

more popular choice than granting amnesty to just Öcalan. However, it is important to note

that one out of every four Kurds wishes to see PKK members granted such an amnesty.

Lastly, but extremely worthy to note, is how only 50% of BDP voting participants believed

Öcalan or any other PKK member should be granted amnesty—a figure initially expected to

be significantly higher.

All results obtained indicate to a very important grand conclusion: the problems vexing

Turkey do not stem from Kurdish or generally ethnic issues, but originate from that of a

modern state’s challenging narrative. As the participants have mostly indicated, Turkey is

not in need of short-sighted ‘ethnic’ solutions, but rather must draft a modern and relevant

constitution in which modern legal and normative values can be institutionalized to

guarantee permanent and lasting solutions to social problems. It is only through such an

approach that a modern, pluralistic society can establish viable solutions and peace at home.

In summation, the results obtained within this study suggest—without a doubt—the

importance of not allowing security concerns to endanger or derail the democratic opening,

the well-being of Turkey’s citizens, rights and freedoms. Equally at risk is the economic and

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social well-being of Turkey. The participants have all had the foresight to see and perceive

these issues in this regard. Some positive results have been obtained as well: the PKK terror

problem and the Kurdish Question are now decoupled and are two different issues. With

this, Turkey needs to ensure the continuation of peace and prosperity in the highly sensitive

areas of conflict. Finally, and this report cannot stress this enough, combatting the PKK

needs to be done within the framework of human rights and this issue needs to stand above

partisan politics and gains. The speedy resolution of this matter is more telling than it ever

has been.

Regarding the democratic opening process, Turkey needs to continue with the enthusiasm

and resilience it initially displayed at its earlier stages. This can only be done within the

framework of a modern state system—coincidently, the problems of it stem from the same

framework. Turkish sensitivity and disillusionment on the matter needs to be taken into

account and sincere measures as to resolving the initiated process need to be implemented.

To this end, European Union (EU) reforms and devising a new constitution can only help

within this greater process of democratization and modernization.

19


Terrorism

BILGESAM PUBLICATIONS (in English)

Books

China: A New Superpower? Dimensions of Power, Energy, and Security

Edited by Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI

Turkey’s Strategy in the Changing World

Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI

Turkey’s Today and Tomorrow

Ret. Minister/Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN

Middle East Policy of the Republic of Turkey

Ret. Minister/Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN

Reports

Perception of Nationalism and Independence in Turkey (Report # 8)

Assoc. Prof. Ayşegül AYDINGÜN

Democratization, Political and Social Solidarity Opening for the Solution of Kurdish Problem

(Report # 20)

Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK

Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy (Report # 21)

Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK

Alevi Opening: Deepening of Democracy in Turkey (Report # 22)

Assoc. Prof. Bekir GÜNAY-Gökhan TÜRK

Republic, Modern Democracy and Turkey’s Transformation (Report # 23)

Prof. Sami SELÇUK

Turkey-Armenia Relations (Report # 25)

Wise Men Board Report

Assist. Prof. Fatih ÖZBAY

What are Kurds and Zazas Thinking About? Perceptions on Common Values and Symbols

(Report # 26)

Dr. Salih AKYÜREK

20


Terrorism

The Democratic Opening and Social Perceptions (Report # 30)


Dr. Salih AKYÜREK

Armed Forces and Democracy (Report # 33)

Prof. Ali L. KARAOSMANOĞLU

Iran, Shia Crescent and the Arab Spring (Report # 35)

Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Emin SALİHİ

Expectations of the Turkish Society from the New Constitution (Report # 35)

BILGESAM

Iran at the Center of Chaos Scenarios (Report # 40)

Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Bilgehan EMEKLİER

Possible Effects of the Iranian Crisis on Turkey (Report # 47)


Assoc. Prof. Atilla SANDIKLI, Bilgehan EMEKLİER

Journals

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 1, Fall 2009

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 2, No 2, Spring 2010






Wise Talks

Wise Talk- 3: Nuclear Iran

Interview with Ret. Minister-Ambassador İlter TÜRKMEN

Elif KUTSAL

Wise Talk- 6: Turkey-Israel Relations in the Last Period

Interview with Ret. Ambassador Özdem SANBERK

Merve Nur SÜRMELİ

Documents

Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat …Turkish Societal Perceptions Concerning Combat against PKK Terr 2 orism Terrorism Regrettably so, the same question yielded an astonishingly