Turan UnstableStability Jun16

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2016| No. 128

I was recently asked to write a short piece or a hand-book on the meaning o political stability. Writingor a lay audience, I began by noting that stability asused in politics was a multi-dimensional concept, andthereore it might be useul to speciy which dimen-sion we had in mind beore talking about it. I identi-fied six underlying dimensions that might come underthe umbrella o political stability:

1. Governmental stability- whether the govern-ment team stays in office or long or is insteadexpected to change requently;

2. Performance stability- whether the governmentcan achieve its goals or whether this realization islimited;

3. Policy stability- whether the governmentchanges policies requently or pursues policieswith consistently;

4. Stability of the rule of law- whether the govern-

ment abides by the general principles o law andthe specific laws o the land;

5. Regime stability- whether the particulararrangement through which a country is ruled iswidely accepted or whether change is expected;and

In Brief: An analysis of the

dimensions of political stability in

Turkey, it appears that in the pursuit

of some dimensions of stability that

the president and the government

argue are not well achieved

under the current system, other

dimensions of stability are not now

being served. The focal institution

that has triggered this discussion of

political stability is the presidency.

The largely discreet battle on who

would determine policy, and by how

much, sometimes became visible.

On some occasions, the president

publicly criticized the government,

pressuring it to change policies,

generating uncertainties on how

the government should proceed.

Eventually, President Recep Tayyip

Erdoan concluded that he needed

a government more accommodating

to his preferences. ContemporaryTurkish politics, though stable, is

becoming destabilized by the drive

to replace the current parliamentary

with a presidential system at

whatever the cost, resulting in an

unstable stability. The outcome is

difcult to predict.

From Unstable Stability

to Stable Instability:

Turkeys Travails

by lter Turan


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6. Stability of political geography- whether theterritorial unity o the country is assured.

I one were to use the above in analyzing contempo-rary urkish politics, the ollowing synopsis wouldemerge: Alleging that parliamentary governmentsare inherently unstable (governmental stability),urkeys governing Recep ayyip Erdoan, AKPartyunder the guidance o its previous leader and now thepresident, wants to change the regime to a presiden-tial system (regime stability). He has recently orceda change o government (governmental stability)whose perormance he had constrained (performancestability) and sometimes orced to change by askingthat his policy choices rather than those o the primeminister be implemented (policy stability). Te activepolicy role the president ollows deviates rom whatis outlined in the constitution (stability of the ruleof law). o persuade the public that regime changeis necessary, he has targeted the Peoples DemocracyParty, which he argues is the agent o the PKK, aterrorist organization pursuing ethnic Kurdish sepa-ratism (stability of political geography). It appearsthat in the pursuit o some dimensions o stability that

the president and the government argue are not wellachieved under the current system, other dimensionso stability are not now being served.

The Presidential System Debate

Te ocal institution that has triggered this discus-sion o political stability is the presidency. Under thecurrent constitution, the urkish presidency is anoffice above party and daily politics, responsible oroverseeing the harmonious unctioning o the politicalsystem. Until 2012, members o parliament elected thepresident. Afer 1989, this arrangement came underchallenge as incumbent prime ministers wanted tomove into the most prestigious political job in thecountry while retaining prime ministerial powers.Both urgut zal and Sleyman Demirel initiatedinconsequential debates about changing to a presi-dential system that, they argued, would bring greater

stability (governmental) and effectiveness (perfor-mance and policy).

Te topic returned to the countrys political agendaunder ortuitous circumstances. In 2007, opposi-tion parties successully prevented the election oAbdullah Gl as president because his wie wore aheadscar. A constitutional amendment was enacted,subject to approval in a public reerendum, to makethe office publicly elected. In the meantime, newnational elections were held with results that allowedGl to become president. It would have been possibleto suspend the pending reerendum but the govern-ment proceeded to hold it. Te amendment passedwith a comortable margin; many voters elt that Glhad been treated unairly. Beore Gls term expired in2014, Erdoan announced his intention to seek the job.He received more than 52 percent o the vote in thesubsequent election.

The Road to De Facto Presidential System

Te constitutional amendment had changed only themethod o electing the president but not the definitiono the job or the powers that came with it. From thebeginning, however, Erdoan argued that having beenpopularly elected, he represented the national will,and the constitution should be changed to reflect thisreality.

Since the restoration o civilian politics ollowingthe 1980-83 military intervention, there had beenan intensiying desire to enact a new constitutionthat better served the needs o a democratic society.Te AKParty had promised to achieve this goal. Its

Erdoan argued that having

been popularly elected, he

represented the national will,

and the constitution should

be changed to reect this

reality.


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insistence that the presidential system be a part othe package, an idea opposed by all other parties, hasstood in the way o progress. Te AKParty, on theother hand, does not have the qualified majority thatwould allow it to change the constitution directly orthrough a reerendum.

Unable to change the constitution, Erdoan hasdecided to assume an activist role in giving directionto his ormer party, its government, and policies. Tathe went to the national convention o his party aferhe had been elected president but not yet taken officeand played a determining role in identiying whoshould become the party chie and thereore the primeminister, against convention and perhaps the law, wasin indication o how he would conduct politics. Hedesignated Ahmet Davutolu as his heir, intereredactively in deciding who would be given ministerialportolios, and took an interest in appointments tohigher ranks o bureaucracy. On occasion, he criti-cized the policy pronouncements o the governmentand asked, successully, that they be changed. Teseactions were tantamount to a de acto changing o theconstitution, undermining the stability of the rule of

lawas well as governmental stability.

The Secret War

Despite the act that Erdoan had hand-picked theprime minister and had a big say in the selection oministers, Prime Minister Davutolu proved to betoo independent, rustrating the presidents desire tobe the chie policymaker. Te reasons or the uncom-ortable relationship between the two leaders wereboth structural and personal. On the personal side, itseems that Davutolu was not deeply committed to theestablishment o a presidential system. His thinking oneconomics was also more conventional than that o thepresident, who elt, or example, that high interest ratescaused inflation rather than the other way around.Furthermore, Davutolu elt that he had policy preer-ences he could implement without first submittingthem to the approval o the president. Structurallythere were two problems. First, the president could not

be always consulted on the daily operations o govern-ment, but sometimes the president did not like whatwas done. Second, legally the prime minister and hisgovernment were responsible or what the governmentdid, leading them to conduct their affairs with thatconsideration in mind.

Te largely discreet battle on who would determinepolicy, and by how much, sometimes became visible.On some occasions, the president publicly criti-cized the government, pressuring it to change poli-cies (policy stability), generating uncertainties onhow the government should proceed (performancestability). Eventually, Erdoan concluded that heneeded a government more accommodating to his

preerences. He asked Davutolu to resign, a demand

that the prime minister did not have enough powerto resist. A hastily gathered party convention electedthe ormer minister o transport, Binali Yldrm, anErdoan loyalist, as the new party chie. Te presi-dent then asked him to orm the new government.Te new prime minister appears to be exceptionallyaccommodating to the president; he has identified theestablishment o a presidential system as the first itemon his agenda. Whether, under the constraints o lawsand political exigencies, he will satisy the president oralso be asked to leave in time is a matter o conjecture,but the act that the president can make and unmake

governments at will does not bode well or govern-mental stability.

Ethnic Polarization as a Strategy

for Constitutional Change

Shortly beore he became president, Erdoan scrappedthe so-called Peace Process, a policy o reaching an

The new prime minister

appears to be exceptionally

accommodating to the

president.


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Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentaryare the views o the author alone.

About the Author

lter uran is an emeritus proessor o political science at

Istanbuls Bilgi University, where he also served as president

between 1998-2001. His previous employment included

proessorships at Ko University (1993-98) and Istanbul

University (1964-93), where he also served as the chair o the

International Relations Department (1987-93), and the direc-

tor o the Center or the Study o the Balkans and the Middle

East (1985-93).

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about

urkeys current political situation and its uture. GMF pro-

vides regular analysis bries by leading urkish, European, and

U.S. writers and intellectuals, with a ocus on dispatches rom

on-the-ground urkish observers. o access the latest bries,

please visit our web site at www.gmus.org/turkey.

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF)

strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national,

and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit o the

Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and

institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening

leaders and members o the policy and business communities,

by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics,

and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition,

GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democra-

cies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organiza-

tion through a gif rom Germany as a permanent memorial

to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence

on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquartersin Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels,

Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has

smaller representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

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accord with the PKK. errorism that was on tempo-rary hold during the Peace Process quickly returned,this time using a new policy o taking over sectionso towns in urkeys southeast as a prelude to estab-lishing political authority. Law enorcement personnelhave been clearing these towns o PKK irregulars,but public buildings, homes, and stores have beendamaged, and many people have had to evacuate theirhomes.

Policy, as pronounced by the president has beenuncompromising. He has said that terrorists wouldhave to seal their weapons in concrete. He has askedpublic prosecutors to initiate procedures against theHDP (Peoples Democracy Party) deputies whomhe sees as accomplices o the PKK. Finally, he hasmanaged to bring about a constitutional amendmentremoving the parliamentary immunity o deputiesthat courts had asked or permission to try. Te HDP,a mainly Kurdish party, had been the intermediaryin the negotiations between the government and thePKK. Although there are many other deputies thatwould also go to court under this provision, the HDPdeputies are the real target. Te president is expected

to ask the parliament to rescind their membershipafer their conviction, and then call or a by-electionin which his party would likely win enough additionalseats to reach the number needed to change the consti-tution in avor o a presidential system and submit thisor approval in a public reerendum. Until that processis completed, the policy o ethnic polarization is likelyto continue.

urkeys politics are in flux. Te unstable parlia-mentary system or which the presidential system isoffered as a cure reers to pre-2002 period o unstable

coalition governments. During that time, politics wasperhaps characterized by a persistent and thereorestable instability. Contemporary urkish politics,though stable, is becoming destabilized by the drive toreplace the current parliamentary with a presidentialsystem at whatever the cost, resulting in an unstablestability. Te outcome is difficult to predict.
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