TTCVR1126 - Threat Convergence - Factsheet - South Asia (11D)

Factsheet Series

Threat Convergence in South Asia

October 2011

The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that

works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through

research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and

developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early

warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create

practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

Copyright © 2011 The Fund for Peace.

All rights reserved.

This program description is proprietary to The Fund for Peace.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.

The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats

Threat Convergence Fact Sheet Series Editor

Patricia Taft

Report Written by

Ryan Costello

Ed Nagle

The Fund for Peace Publication FFP : TTCVR1126 (Version 11D)

Circulation: PUBLIC

The Fund for Peace

1720 I Street NW

7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20006

T: +1 202 223 7940

F: +1 202 223 7947

www.fundforpeace.org

2 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org

Introduction & Contents

Revelations from the 2004 exposure

of the A. Q. Khan network have highlighted

the importance of this region in global

nonproliferation efforts. While terrorism is by

no means constrained to the Afghanistan/

Pakistan border, the confluence of intent,

knowledge and materials is found in this

region. It remains uncertain if all nodes of the

Khan network have been identified. Other

leading Pakistani scientist s have

demonstrated a willingness to share nuclear

knowledge if not material capabilities. The

diversity of suppliers in quantity, location

and specialty has made confirmation

tentative at best. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

program is extensive and ongoing. The

infrastructure that enabled Khan’s prolonged

success remains in place. In addition, the

intentions of individual members of

Pakistan’s intelligence and military

leadership have been called into question as

a result of revelations regarding Bin Laden’s

death.

Northwest Pakistan remains essentially

ungoverned, providing a dangerous

opportunity to potential proliferators. The

region combines nuclear knowledge, material

capabilities, hostile actors and a fluid,

ungoverned border. The division between

Afghanistan and Pakistan is largely

unrecognized by the local population;

allowing terrorist groups to move freely

between the two countries. The central

government of Afghanistan has historically

been unable to exercise effective authority

over the roughly 75 percent of the

population living in rural areas. Within this

vacuum, drug cultivation and smuggling have

been pervasive for decades. Given the

potential for terrorism, long standing drug

trafficking and ungoverned regions in close

proximity to the capital of and nuclear sites

in Pakistan,1 the international community

should enhance and coordinate international

efforts to increase the effectiveness of

civilian government authority in both

countries and pursue policies to safeguard

nuclear material.

For a more detailed analysis of Pakistan’s

nuclear facilities and safe guards, see Costello,

Ryan. “Threat Convergence in Pakistan.” The

Fund for Peace. February 1st, 2011

Maps 4

Significant Proliferation Incidents 5

Terrorism Overview 6

Terrorist Organizations 7

Indicators 12

Conclusion and Recommendations 13

Endnotes 16

About The Fund for Peace 19


Threat Convergence

Overview

Maps

South Asia

China

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan Turkm

enistan

Iran

Afghanistan

Pakistan

India

Nepal Bhutan

India

Bangladesh

Myanmar

Sri Lanka

Maldives

Arabian Sea Bay of Bengal

I N D I A N O C E A N

South Asia Pakistan

Balochistan

Sindh

Punjab

NWFP

India

Afghanistan

Tajikistan

China

ISLAMABAD

QUETTA

KARACHI

HYDERABAD

LAHORE



Section I

Significant Proliferation Incidents

Dr. A. Q. Khan’s network remains the

most extensive and damaging example of

nuclear proliferation to date. Although

originally established by Khan with Pakistani

governmental approval and involvement

during the 1970s, it would transform from

the 1980s onward into an international

organization involved in nuclear proliferation

worldwide. What was originally a network for

domestic procurement, transformed into an

organization capable of purchasing,

manufacturing and transporting key nuclear

components around the globe. Khan and his

associates distributed material and technical

information to Libya, Iran and North Korea in

addition to approaching Iraq.1

After the network’s exposure in early 2004,

former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf

insisted that no government or military

officials were involved but ruled out IAEA or

western access to the documents and

available evidence. Neither U.S. officials nor

any foreign government agency have had

access to Khan for questioning. In the wake of

the former President’s declaration,

substantial evidence has surfaced that calls

into question such assurances. In 1998, a

North Korean woman was shot at near-point

blank range yards from A. Q. Khan’s home just

ten days after Pakistan tested its first atomic

bomb. Pakistan’s reaction to the death is

telling. No official investigation into the

death was undertaken, yet unofficial sources

in both Pakistan and India have stated that

her murder was motivated by alleged

contacts with American intelligence. While

Pakistan’s military has insisted that it knew

nothing of Khan’s centrifuge deal with North

Korea and that it was completely separate

from missile purchases from the same

country, the handling of the death would

seem to indicate otherwise.2

Khan himself has since renounced his

confession in which he accepted full

responsibility and in addition declared that

there was no government involvement in his

proliferation efforts.3 He was released from

house arrest in February 2009.4 In July 2011,

a letter Khan provided to a British journalist

during the course of his house arrest was

published by The Washington Post. The letter5

is addressed to Khan from a senior North

Korean official. It details the completion of an

arrangement whereby North Korea would pay

a top Pakistani General (and former military

chief) US$ 3 million and a second General

half a million dollars along with jewels in

order to facilitate overdue payments for

North Korean missile technology. According

to Khan, this kickback only served to whet the

appetite of the generals who asked Khan to

approach the North Koreans for more payoffs.

It was then, according to Khan, that North

Korea broached the idea of several additional

million dollar payments in exchange for

centrifuge technology. Both Generals have

denied the allegations. They have stated that

Khan is “attempting to shift the blame to

others” and called the letter a fabrication.

Another unnamed Pakistani official claimed

the letter is a fake because it lacks an official

letterhead and “bears no seal.” U.S. officials,

however, who deny having previously seen

the letter, believe that it is in fact genuine.

They contend that the signature on the

document is consistent with that of the

purported author and confirm that verified

information contained in the letter would

only be known to a hand full of people in

Pakistan, North Korea and The United States.

A former IAEA investigator of Khan has stated

that he has heard similar accounts, while at

the same time confirming that the letter is

very similar to others he has received, which

lack a letter head or a seal.6 These

revelations, combined with confirmed

accounts of other proliferation transfers and

attempts by Khan, raise serious doubts

regarding Pakistani officials’ commitment to

non-proliferation.7

In October of 2001, two Pakistani nuclear

scientists (with connections to Khan) were

arrested based on suspected ties to the

Taliban and divulgence of state secrets. After

questioning by Pakistani officials, two of the

scientists confessed to having direct

correspondence with the Taliban, Al Qaeda

and Osama Bin Laden. The Washington Post

has reported that senior Pakistani officials

confirmed the discussions focused on

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. A

lead scientist and former director of one of

Pakistan’s nuclear reactors failed multiple

polygraph examinations (which he has

blamed on a bad heart). The detail and extent

of support provided remain unclear, although

they are believed to have at least provided a

road map for developing a nuclear weapon in

addition to offering technical expertise in

constructing radiological and chemical

weapons. After being detained for several

months, both he and another less senior

scientist who is an expert in nuclear fuel,

were released in early 2002. Although the

U.S. has pressed for further detentions and

interrogations of four other Pakistani nuclear

scientists (also based on suspected ties to

terrorists and the Taliban), to date none have

been detained or questioned officially.8

Section II

Terrorism Overview

The list of Specially Designated

Nationals (SDN),9 controlled by the U.S.

Department of the Treasury, is extensive in

South Asia, especially with regard to Pakistan

and Afghanistan. For a complete and updated

list by country, please refer to the Specially

Designated Nationals (SDN) Resource

Center.10

Additionally, Executive Order 1332411 grants

The State Department the ability to designate

and attempt to block all transactions with

persons who commit, threaten to commit or

support terrorism. It is far more selective and

represents the individuals and groups that

the U.S. government assigns the highest

priority. The complete list (including

Executive Order 13324) can be found in the

Specially Designated Nationals list (SDN).12

The UN 1267 Consolidated List13 comprises

(and distinguishes between) all individuals

and groups belonging to or associated with

The Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Osama bin Laden

as agreed upon by the UN committee

members.


Terrorist Financing & Sanctions

Terrorism remains a major threat to

the entire region of South Asia but the

organization, planning, leadership and

motivations are increasingly derived from the

largely ungoverned region between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are several

terrorist groups operating within Pakistan’s

borders that have demonstrated enhanced

cooperation. Thus, distinctions between the

groups are not clearly defined. This growing

nexus of terror has challenged and weakened

the Pakistani state in particular.14

Pakistan has experienced a steady rise in

terror attacks since 2001. In 2007, the U.S.

Director of National Intelligence asserted that

there were more deaths resulting from

Islamist militancy in Pakistan that year than

during the previous six years combined.15 In

2009 there were 89 suicide bombings and

over 3,000 terrorist-related deaths, which

was another record year for terrorist attacks

and civilian casualties.16 By comparison, there

were only two suicide bombings in Pakistan

in 2002.17 Unofficial totals based on news

reports indicate that over 1,700 Pakistani

civilians were killed in 2010. Over 1,600

civilians were killed in 2011 as of August

7th.18

Other countries in South Asia also face a

significant threat from terrorist organizations

operating from within their country. As the

past bombing in the Maldives in 2007 and the

Mumbai attacks of 2008 clearly

demonstrated, terrorist activities in the

ungoverned regions of Pakistan and

contested regions of Afghanistan can easily

lead to attacks in neighboring countries.

The following terrorist groups are a serious

threat and could potentially target Pakistan’s

nuc lear weapons and mater i a l s .

Understanding the threat these groups pose

is essential to ensuring the security of those

weapons and materials.

Terrorism Profile


Section III

Terrorist Organizations

Following the September 11th, 2001

attacks and the subsequent American

invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and many

of its Afghan Taliban allies fled their former

safe haven and reconstituted themselves

across the border in the mountainous, semi-

autonomous Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and its

affiliates have used FATA, in addition to

sections of Baluchistan and the North-West

Frontier Province (NWFP) in West Pakistan, as

a safe haven in order to launch local, regional,

and international attacks.19 Analysts believe

that top al-Qaeda leaders are continuing to

hide within Pakistan’s tribal areas.20

A great deal of the rising tide of violence in

Pakistan can be attributed to al-Qaeda and its

efforts to unite its affiliate groups against the

Pakistani government. Many experts believe

that al-Qaeda has trained or is training most

of Pakistan’s extremist groups in terror

tactics. For example, they are believed to

have introduced suicide bombings to the

Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban,

one of al-Qaeda’s affiliate groups (for more

on the TTP see below).21 Al-Qaeda has rallied

support against the Pakistani government by

“serving as a mediator and coalition builder

for militant groups,” providing technical

expertise to assist in terrorist attacks, and

casting their efforts as part of a religious

struggle.22 Apparently, al-Qaeda realizes that

it can rely on more legitimate local militants

in order to achieve its regional goals.23

Al-Qaeda’s stated regional objectives include

toppling the Pakistani state, undermining

American efforts in Afghanistan, and driving a

wedge between the United States and

Pakistan.24 These regional objectives are part

of al Qaeda’s global fight to eliminate

American and Western influence in the

Islamic world and replace the governments of

Muslim countries with religiously

fundamentalist regimes.25 Al-Qaeda has also

indicated a desire to obtain nuclear weapons.

Osama bin Laden described the task of

obtaining a nuclear weapon as a “religious

duty,” and several al-Qaeda operatives have

attempted to purchase a weapon or gain

nuclear expertise. Before the September 11th

attacks, two Pakistani nuclear scientists met

with bin Laden and senior al-Qaeda members

and provided them with a “rough sketch” of

how to make a nuclear weapon.26 Sultan

Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of the Pakistani

scientists, believed that Pakistan’s nuclear

weapons belonged to the worldwide Muslim

community, or ummah.27

The threat of al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates

obtaining a nuclear weapon or nuclear

materials should not be underestimated.

Many reports have indicated that terrorists

could fashion a crude nuclear device with the

right materials, though, it seems that this has

not yet happened. Nuclear materials could be

seized from poorly secured nuclear facilities,

intercepted during transport, or obtained

from the black market. The International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has indicated

that there have been 18 confirmed cases of

theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU)

or plutonium to date.28 It is likely that there

are many more unconfirmed cases of loss or

theft which have resulted in nuclear

smuggling, which is extraordinarily difficult

to prevent given the weakness of state

borders and the difficulty of detecting small

quantities of radioactive material.29

Al Qaeda


The formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban

(TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban,

under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in

late 2007 has also been instrumental to the

recent upsurge of violence in Pakistan.30 The

TTP formed as an umbrella organization,

incorporating 13 former militant groups from

the tribal areas of Western Pakistan that had

lent support to the Afghan Taliban and al-

Qaeda. Members of the TTP, which are

expected to number between 30,000 and

35,000, come from all of FATA’s seven

agencies as well as several frontier provinces

in the NWFP.31 The TTP has sought to unite

pro-Taliban groups within the country, assist

the Afghan Taliban in its conflict across the

border in Afghanistan, and establish an

Islamic state in Pakistan based on the model

of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan.32 According to U.S. ambassador-

at-large for counterterrorism Daniel

Benjamin, the TTP cooperates with al-Qaeda

and acts as a “force multiplier” for the

terrorist network.33 The group has been

accused of the December 2007 assassination

of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in

addition to many other terrorist attacks

across the country which have killed

thousands of Pakistanis.34

Recent attacks have demonstrated that the

TTP targets the United States and seeks to

export terrorism beyond Pakistan’s borders.

On December 30th, 2009, a Jordanian born

double agent working for the Pakistani

Taliban, who professed to have knowledge of

the whereabouts of senior al-Qaeda

members, set off a suicide bomb outside

Forward Operating Base Chapman near Khost,

Afghanistan, killing the base chief, six other

CIA employees, and two Blackwater

contractors.35 Additionally, the TTP has

claimed responsibility for the failed Times

Square bomb plot in May 2010. On

September 1, 2010, the United States

formally declared the TTP a terrorist

organization and charged their current

leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, with conspiracy

to murder American citizens.36

Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistani Taliban)

Analysis: Terrorist Organizations

While there are a number of

organizations with fluid, informal

collaborations, three main organizations can

be identified: Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM),

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and Lashkar-e-

Taiba (LeT). LeT was founded in 1991 by a

Pakistani cleric with the stated goal of

achieving independence for Kashmir.37 The

Indian government alleged that the LeT was

responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks

which killed 174 people.38 Evidence has also

surfaced that at least one officer within the

ISI was instrumental in planning the attack.39

An attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001

(which India attributed to the LeT) led to both

nuclear armed countries massing troops

along their common border. Pakistan formally

declared the LeT a terrorist organization in

2002 as part of an effort to ease tensions.

Experts have asserted that the LeT has

historically been the preferred terrorist

organization of Pakistan’s Directorate for

Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) because of its

common ethnic makeup. Of the Kashmir

connected terrorist organizations, the LeT is

believed to have the most extensive

international reach. According to the U.S.

State Department, a senior Al Qaeda

operative was captured in a LeT safe house in

2002, strongly supporting suspicions of close

collaboration at the highest levels of each

organization.40

The LeT continues to operate within

Afghanistan against coalition forces and has

also been alleged to maintain a presence in

Chechnya with diverse funding sourced from

both the Middle East and Europe.41 Regional

experts maintain that although the ISI was

instrumental in the creation of the

organization, it is no longer dependent on

direct management, financing, or instruction

from the ISI in order to undertake terrorist

operations.42 While the Pakistani government

has demonstrated a willingness to restrict the

public face of the LeT (know as Jamaat-ud-

Dawa) it has maintained a policy of passive

support for the overall organization because

of its utility against India. Analysts have

speculated that the results of the 2008

Mumbai attack have helped increase

recruiting numbers and fund raising efforts

both domestically and internationally. While

their priority continues to be India, Western

interests have also increased in prominence

with plots involving the LeT identified in

Denmark and Bangladesh.43

Terrorist Organizations in and around Kashmir


The Tamil Tigers officially admitted

defeat in mid March 2009 after a 26 year civil

war which claimed over 70,000 lives since

large scale violence broke out in 1983.44 The

Buddhist Sinhalese majority has finally been

able to occupy and exercise control over all

Tamil minority areas in northern Sri Lanka,

though fears of a renewed insurgency

abound. Tamil minority areas in the northern

part of the island remain heavily occupied by

army troops dominated by the Sinhalese

majority. The Tamil minority is divided

between Muslims in the north east and

Hindus in the north west of the country.

Although the LTTE has used suicide bombing

tactics since the early 1980’s they have no

confirmed ties to other terrorist groups in

South Asia.45 While the threat of violence

pervaded the most recent national elections

in 2010, terrorist violence has virtually

ceased since the official declaration of defeat

by the leadership of the LTTE in 2009.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The June 28th, 2011 attack on the

Intercontinental Hotel, which killed 12

people in Kabul, arguably marked the first

time the network gained substantial

international notoriety in the western media.

Compounding the complex and evolving

allegiances between insurgent and terrorist

groups is the fact that very often the Taliban

will claim credit for a Haqqani operation,

despite the fact that they are two

independent organizations.46 While the

Taliban initially claimed credit for the attack,

U.S. officials quickly identified the Haqqani

network as responsible. Its relative obscurity

in the West stands in stark contrast to the

historic and current decisive impact it

exercises in the region. The Haqqani network

has been an integral part of insurgent

operations from the 1980’s to the present

day.47 Maulvi Haqqani (its founder) rose to

prominence during the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan.

North Waziristan, (the area controlled by the

network and its tribal allegiances) proved to

be vital territory in the fight against the

Soviets because of its accessibility to key

cities in southeastern Afghanistan. That has

proven to be the case yet again in the current

conflict. The vast majority of drone strikes

from 2004 to the present day have been

targeted within the area dominated by the

Haqqani network in North Waziristan.

Fourteen of the thirty drone strikes in 2008

were targeted there; with three out of four

drone strikes in 2007 being targeted at one

of North Waziristan’s major towns. The well

documented dramatic increase in drone

strikes in 2009 and 2010 were similarly

focused on North Waziristan,48 with 99 out of

112 air strikes in Pakistan being targeted

within the territory in 2010.49 In the last

three months of 2010, 1,784 raids were

carried out across Afghanistan with one third

of those targeting the Haqqani network.50

The reasons for this intense focus can be

traced to the ties developed by the network’s

founder. During the Russian invasion, Maulvi

Haqqani capitalized on his key strategic

location and willing support from the United

States, Pakistan’s intelligence service (the ISI)

as well as wealthy Arab sponsors.51 Haqqani

excelled at coordinating and organizing not

only local fighters but also foreign fighters

from all over the Muslim world. His

organization came to be one of the key

outlets for American arms, supplies and

money, distributed by the ISI. Former

Congressman Charlie Wilson referred to him

as “goodness personified.”52 Haqqani was so

indispensable to the American effort during

the Soviet invasion, it has been widely

rumored that he visited the White House

during Ronald Reagan’s administration.53

Haqqani continued to maintain the

connections made during the near decade of

conflict with the former Soviet Union through

the 1990’s. Although the details are unclear,

at some point during the same decade,

Haqqani agreed to come into the Taliban fold,

eventually achieving the position of Interior

Minister.54 Prior to the U.S. invasion of

Afghanistan after 9/11, the U.S. and Pakistan

held meetings with Haqqani in Pakistan in an

attempt to break his allegiance with the

Taliban. He refused.55 Additional overtures

have been made to Haqqani and his sons

since Karzai’s administration came into being.

They were also turned down.56

The near decade that has passed since the

U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has seen The

Haqqani network’s ties with other terrorist

groups deepen substantially. The territory

comprising North Waziristan has arguably

become the most important safe haven for Al

-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri

groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and

The Haqqani Network



Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan (IMU) as well as others. In

essence it has become the major nexus for

international terrorism.57 The network is also

responsible for the capture of the only

American solider currently held captive.

Taken in June of 2009, he last appeared on

video in May of 2011.58

Events of the last two years point to an

increasing strain between the United States

and Pakistan over how to deal with the

Haqqani network. In late 2010, Admiral Mike

Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

described North Waziristan as “the epicenter

of terrorism … where Al-Qaeda lives.”59

Crucially, he did not limit the threat in the

territory to Al-Qaeda but implicitly

acknowledged the broader threat posed by

other terrorist organizations operating

cooperatively. In an April 2011 visit to

Pakistan, Mullen went on to publicly state

that Pakistan’s intelligence service continues

to maintain “a relationship” with the Haqqani

network; citing it as “at the core that I think is

the most difficult part of the relationship.”60

Pakistan’s current Army Chief once referred

to Haqqani as a “strategic asset,” in an

intercepted phone call.61 The raid on Bin

Laden’s compound has only exacerbated

already strained ties between the Pakistan

and the United States. The current military

leadership is under extreme pressure from

mid-level officers and enlisted men to take a

much harder line with the U.S., particularly

with regard to military intervention in the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas and

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.62 The same

areas from which all loosely affiliated

insurgent groups operate, including the

Haqqani network.

Pakistan launched an offensive in 2009 into

South Waziristan63 which forced many

militant groups north. While there are still

insurgents in South Waziristan that target

both the Pakistani government and Afghan

coalition forces, they operate far less freely

than in North Waziristan, although the

northern part of South Waziristan remains

outside the control of the Pakistani military.

This area, along with North Waziristan is

dominated by the Wazir tribe, from which the

Haqqani family and many of its followers are

tied.64 In addition to this territory, Kurram has

become an increasingly important base of

operations for the network.

The Haqqani network’s senior commander

and facilitator of the June 28th attack on the

International Hotel, was killed in Paktiya

providence in Afghanistan,65 which is located

to the immediate west of Northern Kurram

but is separated from North Waziristan in the

south by Khost province.66 This tribal area,

which lies to the north of North Waziristan,

has recently seen military operations by the

Pakistani army beginning on July 4th,67 and

has displaced thousands of families thus

far.68 The offensive marks the tenth such

engagement by the Pakistani army into

Northwest Pakistan. The country’s security

forces have conducted operations into

Kurram as far back as 2009 but this operation

appears to be the largest yet according to

reports.69 Combined with a neighboring

offensive to the east of Kurram in Orakzai,70

militants are increasingly being concentrated

in North Waziristan and Kurram, where they

remain able to operate relatively freely.

The already extremely complex and fluid

environment in Federally Administered Tribal

Areas is compounded by the fact that the

Pakistani Army and intelligence services if

not the civilian government (in nominal

control) have consistently differentiated

between militant organizations which

threaten and augment their interests.71 This

has been a long standing challenge for the

United States as Pakistan’s offensive in the

tribal regions have largely been focused on

the Pakistani Taliban or TTP. As discussed

above, while the TTP has been responsible

for attacks in Afghanistan and a botched

attempt in New York City, it has focused the

majority of its efforts towards destabilizing

the Pakistani government. Its ultimate goal is

the establishment of an Islamic state in

Pakistan modeled on the former Taliban

regime. The TPP has been blamed for more

than 4,500 deaths since 2007, largely as a

result of suicide bomb attacks.72 Pakistan’s

offensives in the tribal areas have largely

been determined by where these threats are

based. South Waziristan, the Swat valley and

to a lesser extent central Kurram are key

examples of this.73

Recent and current peace deals and

negotiations between Shia and Sunni tribes

in Kurram have been decisively impacted by

the involvement of the Pakistani government

and Haqqani Network. Two of the elder

Haqqani’s sons allegedly participated in

peace talks with Sunni and Shia tribal leaders

from Kurram, first in Peshawar and later in

Islamabad in October 2010.74 Southern

Kurram is predominantly Sunni while

northern and central Kurram are a mix of

Sunni and Shia.75 The strategically vital

infiltration routes into Afghanistan are

located in central and northern Kurram.

In response to Pakistan’s most recent and

reportedly largest scale offensive in Kurram,

the TTP’s appointed local leader (Fazal Saeed)

cut ties with the organization and formed a



new independent group which will explicitly

focus on targeting the American-led coalition

in Afghanistan.76 His organization is located

in central Kurram. While a retired Pakistani

brigade commander who served in the FATA

has pointed toward Saeed’s lack of financial

contributions to the larger TTP organization77

as the cause for the defection, some locals

have pointed toward Pakistan’s then

impending offensive into Kurram.78 The

army’s goal of eliminating groups targeting

Pakistan itself would have necessarily

included the local faction of the TTP in the

Kurram Agency.

The Haqqani network appears to have

achieved free passage into central and

northern Kurram from the areas Shia tribes;

providing it addition safe haven and eventual

access to crucial infiltration routes into

multiple provinces in Afghanistan. The

territory of Kurram provides the shortest and

most direct access to Kabul as well as being

surrounded by Afghanistan on three sides. It

also provides terrorist organizations and

Afghan insurgent groups crucial room to

maneuver should the U.S. be successful in

pressuring Pakistan to conduct ground

operations in North Waziristan. While the

Pakistani Army has undertaken operations in

Kurram, it remains to be seen if its objectives

are to secure Shia controlled northern areas

in order to enforce the peace agreement or if

its objectives extend south into Sunni areas

aligned and supportive of The Haqqani

network. Pakistani officials have refrained

from specifying the targets of the operation,

at least at the start, referring only to

“terrorists,” as opposed to identifying either

the TTP or The Haqqani network.79

NATO’s deliberate correction80 of earlier

reports that the Taliban had claimed

responsibility for the International Hotel

attack on June 28th is likely a result of a

desire to increase pressure on Pakistan to

deal with the Haqqani network. Pakistan

Army officials have downplayed the threat in

North Waziristan. On June 1st, a Pakistani

Lieutenant-General in charge of operations in

the tribal regions near North Waziristan, Asif

Yasin Malik, ruled out an impending offensive

in North Waziristan. He stated that North

Waziristan was “calm, peaceful and stable …

as it was weeks ago.”81 Adding that, “for the

Army there is no difference between the

Haqqanis, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or

the Afghan Taliban. The Army acts against all

those militants who are a threat to

Pakistan.”82 Noticeably absent in his remarks

were any explicit statements that militants

attacking in Afghanistan or against the U.S.-

led coalition would also be targeted. While

the Pakistani Army currently has 30,000

troops stationed in North Waziristan83, they

appear to have had little impact on The

Haqqani network or other affiliated

international terrorist groups.

Unofficial Pakistani government statements

in late May and early June spoke directly to

Pakistan’s position on North Waziristan. One

Pakistani official, on condition of anonymity,

stated that “we have been trying to convince

the U.S. that the Haqqani network can be

brought to the negotiating table.”84 One

senior security official was quoted as saying

that the primary target of any offensive

would be “white al Qaeda and their Arab and

local handlers. But the Haqqanis be spared at

this stage.”85 The network’s long standing ties

to multiple international terrorist

organizations are not likely to be sacrificed in

any negotiation as international financing is

crucial to its strength.


Stability Indicators

The following tables show a

breakdown of independent stability rankings

and foreign assistance statistics for

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,

Nepal, Bhutan, India and Maldives. Please

note that the Failed States Index and

Freedom House lists are based on 2011

reporting. The Corruption Perceptions Index

is based on 2010 data as 2011 information

was not released at the time of this

publication.

Section IV

Stability Indicators


Failed States Index Corruption Perceptions Index Rank

(of 178; 1st = best)

Freedom House Score

Score (of 120; Low = best)

Rank (of 177; 1st = worst)

Political Rights (of 7; 1= best)

Civil Liberties (of 7; 1= best)

Status

Afghanistan 107.5 7th 176th 6 6 Not Free

Bangladesh 94.4 25th 134th 3 4 Partly Free

Bhutan 85.0 50th 36th 4 5 Partly Free

India 79.3 76th 87th 2 3 Free

Nepal 93.7 26th 146th 4 4 Partly Free

Maldives 75.6 90th 143rd 3 4 Partly Free

Pakistan 102.3 12th 143rd 4 5 Partly Free

Sri Lanka 93.1 28th 91st 5 4 Partly Free

Foreign Aid

The Foreign Aid data below displays

information from both the World Bank and

the U.S. State Department. The second and

third columns display Congressional Budget

Justifications (CBJs) for U.S. Foreign

Operations and U.S. Nonproliferation, Anti-

Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs

(NADR).

ODA as % of GNI, 2009

Afghanistan N/A

Bangladesh 1.3 %

Bhutan N/A

India 0.2 %

Nepal N/A

Maldives 6.7%

Pakistan 1.7 %

Sri Lanka 1.7 %

U.S. Foreign Operations Enduring Actual (CBJ) FY 2010 (in US$)

2,802,435,000

167,905,000

N/A

126,653,000

1,203,000

62,226,000

1,911,617,000

29,903,000

U.S. NADR CBJ, FY 2010 Estimate (in US$)

57,755,000

4,200,000

N/A

3,200,000

N/A

900,000

22,150,000

450,000


Threat Convergence in South Asia

Conclusion

It is tempting to view the root cause

and thus the solution to extremism in

Afghanistan and Pakistan as being limited to

the remote areas of both countries. Pakistan’s

chronic sense of insecurity has been

sustained from the very origin of both itself

and India. The partitioning of both countries

saw the death of hundreds of thousands. An

estimated 15,000 soldiers died in the three

wars and countless skirmishes that have

occurred between the two countries since

1947. Finally, estimates range from 40,000-

100,000 deaths from the insurgency in

Kashmir.86 Although far from the minds of

many western observers, casualties in

Kashmir have continued. In 2010, one

hundred and twenty school children died in

clashes with Indian soldiers; not to mention

deaths from other violent exchanges.87

Recommendations and Observations

Currently Pakistan is deploying a recently–

developed short range nuclear missile with a

miniaturized warhead. Its small size and

design would allow it to be deployed without

the near certainty of nuclear fallout returning

to Pakistan; in addition to calling into

question the chain of command for launch

authorization.88 The stand off between the

two countries in the wake of the 2001

Parliamentary attacks caused hundreds of

thousands of troops to be massed on their

common border and the nuclear armed forces

of both states to be readied.89 Although

averted, it ended up costing Pakistan 1.79%

of its annual GDP, or 1.2 billion dollars.90

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has not led to the end of a preoccupation with India; although it has led to the perception that their nuclear deterrent is

the ultimate guarantor of their survival.

Its existential search, as it is often called

(including by former President Pervez

Musharraf),92 for strategic depth is in fact the

underlying cause of its continued

di f fe rent i at ion between te rror i s t

organizations poised to attack internally or

externally. The Haqqani network in particular,

because of its organizational strength,

strategic location and substantial

independence from the majority of Taliban

affiliated tribes in the South, is seen as a

means to guarantee continued influence

inside Afghanistan. Ongoing negotiations

between Afghan coalition forces and the

Taliban in the south93 have been seen as

threatening to Pakistan because they have,

for the most part, been left out of the

negotiations. A Pakistani diplomat confirmed

in late June 2011 that “we have told the

Americans that we are not happy with this.”94

Based on past decades of collaboration with

the United States, particularly with respect to

U.S. actions after the end of the Soviet

invasion, Pakistan regards its relationship

with the U.S. as essentially “transactional.”95

The prioritization of offensives into the Tribal

regions is largely reflective of this. In the

past, high ranking Taliban officials that were

captured in Pakistan were often quickly

released, without the U.S. having the ability

or time to interrogate them. While this finally

changed in early 2010 with the capture of

Mullah Omar’s deputy, it is by no means a

clear indication of a shift in Pakistani

strategic thinking. It could simply be an

attempt to earn a position at the negotiating

table in any future political settlement

between the Taliban and former Northern

Alliance forces.96

Trust between the Pakistani military

establishment and the United States is

strained to say the least. In May of 2011,

Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. addressed

Pakistan’s National Defense University.

During his discussion, he asked the

assembled officers what the principle

national security threat to the country was,

providing three options: “from within

[Pakistan], India and the United States.” A

plurality identified the United States.97

Similarly, a Pakistani newspaper, Dawn,

reported on a briefing by a senior military

Pakistan’s strategic priorities in Afghanistan, the tribal regions and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa providence are dominated not by considerations of

international terrorism, but instead by fears that Indian-aligned, former Northern Alliance forces will exercise increasing control over

Afghanistan and potentially areas inside Pakistan.91

official who proceeded to state that the

Pakistani military saw the U.S. as a force

attempting to sustain “controlled chaos”

within Pakistan in addition to being

determined to “denuclearize” the armed

forces.98

Based on Congressional Research Service

analysis, from 2002 to 2010, the U.S.

provided $13.3 billion in total military aid

and $6.3 billion in total economic aid to

Pakistan.99 The military aid provided to

Pakistan since 9/11 has in many cases gone

toward very different objectives than its

original allocation. In 2009, former Prime

Minister and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf

admitted that money from the U.S. was used

to bolster defenses against India, although he

did not specify the amount. Pakistan had

previously denied a New York Times report in

2007 that US$ 5 billion had been diverted

from U.S. funds to strengthen defenses

against India.100

Current U.S. aid plans to target education and

make military aid contingent on actual

operations represents a marked improvement

in policy. Other countries in the region

remain vulnerable to violent influence from

ungoverned regions as shown by the 2007

terrorist attack in The Maldives. The

government of The Maldives maintains that

the planners and facilitators of the attack

departed back to Pakistan prior to or

immediately after the attack took place.101

Pakistan’s armed forces account for 16

percent of the overall national budget while

education accounts for just 1.2 percent. The

percentage of madrasas espousing violence

has long been debated. Given that Pakistan

alone has over 12,000 madrasas, the problem

of violent religious education is far more

likely to be based in particular areas or with

particular schools rather than as a

characteristic of the schools themselves.102

Recent analysis has bolstered this view

point.103 The few Madrasas responsible for

promoting radicalization and violence are

largely isolated to the tribal areas, much as

they were during the course of the Soviet

invasion.104 Less than 10 percent of

Pakistan’s total student population is

educated in Madrasas. The largest increase in

the educational sector has been seen in the

creation of new private schools, not public

schools or Madrasas, indicating that there is

clear demand for comprehensive education

in Pakistan. U.S. and international efforts to

directly aid in improving the education

system in Pakistan show promise in fostering

sustainable development based on

quantitative and qualitative research

covering both Pakistan and the rest of the

developing world. However, providing

targeted education funding must over-come

substantial, chronic obstacles, which have

hampered education reform in Pakistan for

decades. Ghost Schools, absent (and often

untrained) teachers, entrenched political

patronage distributed in large part through

the education system and a number of

distinct language groups will pose massive

challenges to both governmental and non-

governmental aid.105

The Army has held power for more than half

of Pakistan’s history and has remained the

dominant force behind the scenes when not

in nominal control.106 The press has

historically remained diverse and largely

independent although Musharraf did crack

down extensively on dissent prior to leaving

office.107 More recent developments have

called into question the future independence

of not only the press but also Pakistan’s civil

society. In late May 2011, the body of a

leading Pakistani journalist was found dead

and showed signs of torture. In the wake of

the killing, suspicion immediately fell on

Pakistan’s intelligence service, known as the

ISI. Subsequently, other journalists have

come forward alleging that they too had been

threatened by the ISI.108 The journalist’s

death was seen as a response to repeated

publications highlighting the extent to which

radical groups had succeeded in infiltrating

Pakistan’s military. It marked the 37th

journalist killed in Pakistani since September

2001. A U.S. official commented, “Every

indication is that this was a deliberate,

targeted killing that was most likely meant to

send shock waves through Pakistan’s

journalist community and civil society.”109

Blunt statements by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, that

Pakistan’s government “sanctioned” the

killing in addition to leaked U.S. intelligence

that directly implicates the ISI are a crucial

aspect of a broader South Asia policy.110 Civil

society and an effective free press are co-

dependent and essential specifically for a

revitalization of civilian control in Pakistan. A

vibrant and independent free press will also

be needed to address the rampant corruption

that has plagued Pakistani government for

The international community should continue to focus on sustaining and building not only Pakistan’s educational system and civil society but

also those of the other South Asian states.


Recommendations

decades. The government and more

specifically the military have demonstrated

that they are in fact responsive to public

opinion. The ground offensive in the Swat

Valley did not occur until domestic and local

public opinion had decidedly turned against

the locally aligned Taliban.111

Within the Tribal Areas themselves public

opinion appears to be strongly against drone

strikes by the United States, although

conflicting polling exists;112 the challenges of

accurate statistical sampling and the

potential for intimidation by accompanying

Pakistani security not withstanding. Yet in

addition, it appears that neither does

significant support exist for the Taliban or

other insurgent organizations. The most

recent available poll (in 2010) concluded that

75 percent of FATA (Federally Administered

Tribal Areas) oppose the presence of Al-

Qaeda, over 66 percent oppose the Pakistani

Taliban and 60 percent oppose the Afghan

Taliban. Roughly 70 percent of respondents

in both the 2010 and 2009 polls would rather

see the Pakistani military take the lead in

pursuing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the

tribal areas. Yet what is most striking is that

polling in 2009 showed that 64 percent of

respondents identified education as the most

pressing need. In 2010, a lack of jobs and

schools ranked as the first and second most

important problem respectively. Demand for

healthcare also placed prominently in both

polls. In 2010, 68 percent of respondents

indicated that U.S. support for school

construction and teacher training would

improve their opinion of the U.S.113 Clearly

there is substantial evidence that foreign

governmental and nongovernmental aid in

education and healthcare would have a

tremendous impact.

An analysis of the spread of Taliban control in

the tribal region points toward the existence

of a feudal class structure and lack of equal

justice as crucial determining factors. Poverty

alone failed to account for successes and

failures of the Taliban. Swat, a relatively

wealthy area based on hospitality trade fell

under the control of the Taliban (until a

Pakistani Army offensive) while poorer Buner

just to the south was far poorer but lacked

feudal remnants and remained out of

reach.114 The expansion of the U.S. drone

program in the tribal areas is an indication of

a worsening of cooperation between the U.S.

and Pakistan, not a sign of improved

relations. The suspension of US$ 800 million

in military aid to Pakistan by the U.S. was

ostensibly in response to Pakistan’s

expulsion of U.S. military trainers and a

tightening of visa approvals for U.S.

personnel.115 North Waziristan has largely

been absent from both official discussions of

the aid suspension as well as analytical

reporting, yet it holds an increasingly

prominent role in the Afghan insurgency.

An Indian troop reduction in Kashmir coupled

with greater autonomy is far easier said than

done, but is a necessary development for the

long term stability of South Asia. Former

President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf

claimed to have been within reach of a

preliminary deal with India to accomplish just

that.116 The recent U.S. India nuclear deal

should increase U.S. leverage in this effort.117

Effective cooperation with regard to water

sharing presents an opportunity to begin

such a gradual process. A former Director

General of Pakistan’s Federal Investigations

Agency (FIA) recently argued that water

sharing was the most important issue for

both Indian and Pakistan leaving terrorism in

second place.118 International cooperation on

this issue could become the basis for future

progress.

Negotiations with the Taliban have been

loudly rejected by many within the current

Afghan government. Yet U.S. troop

withdrawals will make a political settlement

necessary. There are a number of options

being discussed by diplomatic and scholarly

communities: a share of political power in the

capital, control over territory, economic

concessions, and guarantees of U.S.

withdrawal.119 Any settlement reached with

the loosely affiliated Taliban led by Mullah

Omar that excludes Pakistani considerations

is likely to be derailed. Pakistan has clearly

hedged their bets with the Haqqani network

(among others) and has carefully chosen the

location and timing of army operations in the

tribal areas. The international community has

the potential to play a pivotal role in

alleviating the root causes of Pakistani

insecurity. Bolstering Pakistani civil society,

press and education will all be crucial in this

effort.

In addition to supporting Pakistani civil society, free press and free elections, the international community needs to focus on reducing tensions

between India and Pakistan.


Recommendations


1. For a detailed analysis of the A. Q. Khan network, see David Albright and

Corey Hinderstein. “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation

Networks.” The Washington Quarterly. Spring 2005.

2. Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Death of N. Korean Woman Offers

Clues to Pakistani Nuclear Deals.” Los Angeles Times. March 1st, 2004.

3. “Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were Shipped.” The Associated

Press. July 5th, 2008.

4. Warrick, Joby. “Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed from House Arrest.”

The Washington Post. February 7th, 2009.

5. “Letter From North Korean Official to A.Q. Khan.” The Washington Post.

Documents. July 6th 2011.

6. Smith, Jeffrey. “Pakistan’s Nuclear-Bomb Maker Says North Korea Paid

Bribes for Know-How.” The Washington Post. July 6th, 2011.

7. For an in depth investigation of future nonproliferation trends, see Nagle

Edward. “Voluntary Principles and Nuclear Proliferation.” The Fund for

Peace.

8. For a detailed overview of Pakistani nuclear scientist’s assistance to Al

Qaeda and the Taliban, see Albright, David, and Holly Higgins. “A Bomb

for the Ummah.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. March/April 2003.

9. URL located at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/

t11sdn.pdf

10. URL located at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN

-List/Pages/default.aspx

11. URL located at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/143210.htm

12. URL located at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/

t11sdn.pdf

13. URL located at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/

consolidatedlist.pdf

14. Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror,” Foreign Policy, June 10,

2010.

15. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research

Service, February 6, 2009. Pg 7.

16. Gul.

17. Kronstadt, 7.

18. “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011.” South Asia

Terrorism Portal. Accessed 8/11/11.

19. Don Rassler, “Al Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, June 2009,

Vol. 2, Issue 6. Pg 1.

20. Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, “al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida),”

Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, December 30, 2009.

21. Ibid.

22. Rassler, 1.

23. Ibid, 3.

24. Rassler, 4.

25. Bajoria & Bruno.

26. Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials

in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2010. Pg. 13-14.

27. Ibid, 14.

28. Ibid, 16-17.

29. Ibid, V, 5.

30. Baitullah Mehsud was killed on August 5, 2009 by a U.S. Predator drone

strike. See: Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker, October

26, 2009.

31. Bajoria, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists.”

32. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the political entity formed by the

Afghan Taliban in the mid-1990s, lasting until the U.S.-led invasion of

Afghanistan in 2001. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 10.

33. Spencer S. Hsu & Greg Miller, “U.S. Government Charges Pakistani Leader

Hakimullah Mehsud in CIA Attack,” Washington Post, September 1, 2010.

34. Mayer.

35. Hsu & Miller.

36. Hsu & Miller.

37. Ansari, Massoud, and Damien McElroy. “Mumbai Attacks: Lashkar-e-

Taiba, India’s Chief Suspect.” The Telegraph. November 30th, 2008.

38. “Surviving Mumbai Gunman Convicted Over Attacks.” The BBC. May 3rd,

2010.

39. Burke, Jason. “Pakistan Spy Agency’s Alleged Role in Mumbai Terrorist

Attacks to be Revealed.” The Guardian. May 9th, 2011.

40. Bajoria, Jayshree. “Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure).” Council on

Foreign Relations. Jan. 14th, 2010.

41. Tellis, Ashley. “Bad Company – Lashkar E-Tayyiba and the Growing

Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan.” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. Congressional Testimony before US House of

Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 11th, 2010.

42. Ibid.

43. Tankel, Stephen. “LeT was Emboldened by the Success of Mumbai

Attacks.” Carnegie Endowment. March 11th, 2010.

44. Bosleigh, Robert and Jeremy Page. “Tamil Tigers admit defeat after

battle reaches 'bitter end.’” The Sunday Times. March 18, 2009.

45. Bhattacharji, Preeti. “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” Council on

Section I: Significant Incidents

Section II: Terrorism Profile

Section III: Terrorist Organizations

References

Endnotes


Foreign Relations. May 20th, 2009.

46. Brown, Vahid. Interview with, “Morning Edition.” National Public Radio.

September 3rd, 2009.

47. For a brief historic overview of the Haqqani network, see Anand Gopal,

“The Most Deadly US foe in Afghanistan.” The Christian Science Monitor.

June 1st, 2009.

48. Dressler, Jeffrey, and Jan Reza. “The Haqqani network in the Kurram.”

Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute. May

9th, 2011.

49. Schmitt, Eric. “Taliban Fighters Appear Blunted in Afghanistan.” The

New York Times. December 26th, 2010.

50. Ibid.

51. Gall, Carlotta. “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face of Rising Afghan

Threat.” The New York Times. June 17th, 2008.

52. Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US foe in Afghanistan.” The Christian

Science Monitor. June 1st, 2009.

53. Georgy, Michael. “Haqqani: From White House Guest to Staunch U.S.

Enemy.” Reuters. May 31st 2011.

54. “Return of the Taliban.” Frontline. Martin Smith. PBS. October 3rd,

2006.

55. Ibid.

56. “Part 3: Through the Eyes of the Taliban.” Asia Times Online. May 5th,

2004.


58. Miller, John. “Bowe Bergdahl’s Father Seeks Pakistan’s Help for Son’s

Return.” The Associated Press. May 7th, 2011.

59. Dressler, Jeffrey. “The Afghan Insurgent Group That Will Not Negotiate.”

The Atlantic. October 25, 2010.

60. “Top US Military Officer Accuses Pakistan’s ISI of Links with Haqqani

Militants.” The Telegraph. July 11th, 2011.

61. Arnoldy, Ben. “Why Admiral Mullen is Talking Tough with Pakistan Over

Haqqani Militants.” The Christian Science Monitor. April 21st, 2011.

62. Perlez, Jane. “Pakistan’s Chief of Army Fights to Keep His Job.” The New

York Times. June 15th, 2011.

63. Shah, Saeed, and Daud Khan. “Pakistan closes in on Taliban leader’s

South Waziristan Strongholds.” The Telegraph. October 18th, 2009.

64. “The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus.” BBC News. Last Update:

December 1st, 2009.

65. Roggio, Bill. “ISAF Airstrike Kills Senior Haqqani Network Commander

involved in Kabul Hotel Attack.” The Long War Journal. June 30th, 2011.

66. For a more detailed map of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, see the

Institute for the Study of War. Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Force

Disposition.

67. “Pakistan Begins Offensive in the Kurram Tribal Region.” BBC News. July

4th, 2011.

68. Khan, Javed. “Pakistani Army Advances into Kurram Agency.” Central

Asia Online. July 5th, 2011.

69. Sayah, Reza. “Pakistan Launches Military Offensive in Tribal Region.”

CNN.com July 4th, 2011.

70. “Pakistan Begins Offensive in the Kurram Tribal Region.” BBC News. July

4th, 2011.

71. For one example of this distinction, see Kugelman, Michael. “Why We

Shouldn’t Push for a Pakistani Offensive in North Waziristan.” The

Huffington Post. June 24th, 2011.

72. “Taliban Commander Fazal Saeed Leaves TTP.” Dawn.com. June 27th,

2011.

73. Sappenfield, Mark. “Why South Waziristan Offensive Won’t Help US in

Afghanistan.” Christian Science Monitor. October 18th, 2009.

74. The Dawn.com (a Pakistani newspaper) first reported the meetings on

October 21st 2010. They were later included in Dressler and Reza, “The

Haqqani network in the Kurram” cited above.


Pg. 1

76. “Taliban Commander Fazal Saeed Leaves TTP.” Dawn.com. June 27th,

2011.

77. Munir, Asad. “Explaining Fazal Saeed’s ‘Defection’ in Kurram.” The

Express Tribune. July 8th, 2011.

78. Khan, Zia. “TTP Split in Kurram Agency: Taliban Commander Defects.”

The Express Tribune. June 28th, 2011.

79. Abbot, Sebastian. “Pakistan Launches Operation near Afghan Border.”

The Associated Press. July 5th, 2011.

80. Nordland, Rod. “Airstrike Kills Insurgent Suspected in Planning Kabul

Attack.” The New York Times. June 30th, 2011.

81. Gul, Ayza. “Pakistani Military Denies Plans for Offensive In North

Waziristan.” VOAnews.com. June 1st, 2011.

82. Yousaf, Kamran. “Waziristan Operation: ‘Media Hype’ Dismissed.” The

Express Tribune. June 2nd, 2011.

83. Gul, Ayza. “Pakistani Military Denies Plans for Offensive In North

Waziristan.” VOAnews.com.

84. Yousaf, Kamran. “Waziristan Operation: ‘Media Hype’ Dismissed.” The

Express Tribune.

85. Ibid.

Endnotes


86. “The World’s Most Dangerous Border.” The Economist. May 19th, 2011.

Vol. 398, Issue 8934.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ramana, M.V., and Zia Mian. “The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia.”

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook

2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

90. “India, Pakistan Standoff Cost $3 Billion.” The Financial Express.

December 27th, 2004.

91. Serwer, Daniel. “A Political Solution to the Afghan War.” The Atlantic.

July 7th, 2011.

92. Comments by former President Musharraf during, “The State of the U.S.-

Pakistan Relationship: A Discussion with Pervez Musharraf.” Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars. July 21st, 2011.

93. Thompson, Ginger. “Gates Acknowledges Talks with the Taliban.” The

New York Times. June 19th, 2011.

94. US Shuns Out Pakistan From Afghan Taliban Talks.” Indian Express.com.

June 27th, 2011.

95. Yochi, Dreazen. “Friends like These.” National Journal. May 14th, 2011.

See also, “Inside Pakistan’s ISI.” The Middle East Institute. June 13th,

2011.

96. Ghosh, Bobby. “Taking It to the Taliban.” Time. February 25th, 2010.

97. Zakaria, Fareed. “The Radicalization of Pakistan’s Military.” The

Washington Post. June 22nd, 2011.

98. Ibid.

99. “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to

Pakistan, FY2002-2012.” The Congressional Research Service. May 6th,

2011. For an alternate timeline of aid, see “About Those Billions.”

Newsweek. October 21st, 2009.

100. “Musharraf Admits US Aid Diverted.” BBC News. September 14th, 2009.

101. Heath, Michael. “Maldives Terrorist Attack Suspects Flee to Pakistan,

Police Say.” Bloomberg. November 8th, 2007.

102. Blanchard, Christopher. “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas:

Background.” CRS Report for Congress. RS21654. January 23rd, 2008.

103. Winthrop, Rebecca, and Corinne Graff. “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the

Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan.” The Brookings

Institution. The Center for Universal Education. June 2010.

104. Ibid. See “Key Findings,” on page 48 or the section on Madrasas starting

on page 16.

105. Ibid.

106. Hathaway, Robert M. “Planet Pakistan.” Wilson Quarterly. Winter 2010.

Vol. 34, Issue 1. See also, Zakaria, Fareed. “Musharraf’s Last Stand.”

Newsweek. Vol. 151, Issue 3. January 21st, 2008.

107. Zakaria, Fareed. “Musharraf’s Last Stand.” Newsweek. Vol. 151, Issue 3.

January 21st, 2008.

108. “A Pakistani Journalist’s Murder.” The New York Times. Editorial. July

7th, 2011.

109. Perlez, Jane, and Eric Schmitt. “Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of a

Journalist.” The New York Times. July 4th, 2011.

110. A Pakistani Journalist’s Murder.” The New York Times. Editorial. July

7th, 2011.

111. “Inside Pakistan’s ISI.” The Middle East Institute. June 13th, 2011.

Comments by

112. For results released in late 2010 see, “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal

Regions.” New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow Public

Opinion Survey. September 2010. For results from 2009, see “Hating

the Taliban, Hating the United States: Trajectories of Pakistan’s Anti-

Americanism.” American Foreign Policy Interests. 31: 376-388, 2009.

113. “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions.” New America Foundation

and Terror Free Tomorrow Public Opinion Survey. September 2010.

114. Abbas Zaidi, Syed Manzar. “Understanding the Appeal of the Taliban in

Pakistan.” Journal of Strategic Security. 2010. Vol. 3, No. 3. Pg. 5-6

115. Schmitt, Eric, and Jane Perlez. “U.S. Is Deferring Millions in Pakistani

Military Aid.” The New York Times. July 9th, 2011.

116. Comments by former President Musharraf during, “The State of the U.S.-

Pakistan Relationship: A Discussion with Pervez Musharraf.” Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars. July 21st, 2011.

117. “The World’s Most Dangerous Border.” The Economist. May 19th, 2011.

Vol. 398, Issue 8934.

118. “Seeking a Silver BulLeT: Key Challenges in India-Pakistan

Normalization.” United States Institute of Peace. May 26th, 2011.

Comments by Tariq Parvez during the panel discussion.

119. Serwer, Daniel. “A Political Solution to the Afghan War.” The Middle

East Institute. July 7th, 2011.

Endnotes

Conclusion & Recommendations

About

The Fund for Peace

The Fund for Peace is an

independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-

profit research and educational organization

that works to prevent violent conflict and

promote sustainable security.

We promote sustainable security through

research, training and education, engagement

of civil society, building bridges across

diverse sectors, and developing innovative

technologies and tools for policy makers.

A leader in the conflict assessment and early

warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on

the problems of weak and failing states. Our

objective is to create practical tools and

approaches for conflict mitigation that are

useful to decision-makers.

The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of

initiatives focused on our central objective:

to promote sustainable security and the

ability of a state to solve its own problems

peacefully without an external military or

administrative presence. Our programs fall

into three primary thematic areas:

• Conflict Early Warning and Assessment;

• Transnational Threats; and

• Sustainable Development, Sustainable

Security.

Conflict Early Warning and Assessment

Transnational Threats

Sustainable Development, Sustainable Security

After three years of project work, in January

2009, The Fund for Peace established its

program on Threat Convergence to explore

the linkages among the three biggest threats

to global security: fragile states, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), and terrorism. The program aims to:

• raise the profile of the challenges in

vulnerable, fragile and ungoverned regions

on the nonproliferation agenda;

• explore how these regions may serve as

enabling environments for nuclear

terrorism;

• promote more coherent and strategic

policy approaches to nuclear terrorism and

illicit nuclear trafficking; and

• become a hub for threat convergence-

related analysis.

The program encourages innovative and

fresh approaches to the issue by convening

experts, performing extensive field research

in some of the world’s most difficult

environments, and by partnering with

international and regional organizations to

explore how the threat of catastrophic

terrorism emanating from weak and failing

states can be prevented.

About Threat Convergence

www.fundforpeace.org/tc

www.fundforpeace.org

The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats

FFP : TTCVR1126