19
Trust in the fisheries scientific community Helen Glenn a,n , Diana Tingley a , Sonia Sa ´ nchez Maron ˜o b , Dennis Holm c , Laurence Kell d , Gurpreet Padda d , Ingi Runar Edvardsson e , Johann Asmundsson e , Alexis Conides f , Kostas Kapiris f , Mintewab Bezabih a , Premachandra Wattage a , Sakari Kuikka g a Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth, St. George’s Building, 141 High Street, Portsmouth, United Kingdom b Instituto Tecnolo ´gico Pesquero y Alimentario, Fundacio ´n (AZTI) - Tecnalia, 48395 Sukarrieta (Bizkaia), Spain c The Research Center for Social Development, Va ´gsvegur 48, Post-box 18, 800 Va ´gur, Faroe Islands d Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS), Pakefield Road, Lowestoft, Suffolk, United Kingdom e Faculty of Natural Resource Science, University of Akureyri, The University of Akureyri, Nordurslod 2, 600 Akureyri, Iceland f Institute of Marine Biological Resources, P.O. Box 712, 19013 Anavissos, Attiki, Greece g Environmental Research Centre, Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Helsinki, PO Box 65 (Viikinkaari 1), 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland article info Article history: Received 7 March 2011 Accepted 20 March 2011 Available online 15 April 2011 Keywords: Trust Fisheries management Europe Fisheries science abstract This paper explores the issue of ‘‘trust’’ in the fisheries science community, a key corollary of effective risk communication. It presents the findings of a survey undertaken in Iceland, Greece, Spain, United Kingdom and Faroe Islands during 2008. The findings reveal differing levels of trust and mistrust in the fisheries science community between countries and between stakeholder groups, demonstrating areas for future attention in the interests of improving fisheries science and management. As this paper explores, unfortunately the ‘‘trust’’ necessary for effective stakeholder cooperation and participation within current fisheries science is currently somewhat lacking. The cited reasons behind this lack of trust include: a lack of soundness, credibility, responsiveness, flexibility and stakeholder involvement, flawed data and weak science, poor communications and political and lobby group interference. Notable from the results is a lack of consensus on the existence of a common language and vision. It is evident, however, that certain aspects of fisheries science are strong contributors to trust and that there are opportunities for improvement. & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Sustainable fisheries management is contingent on the coop- eration and participation of all stakeholder groupsboth in terms of communicating information and knowledge into the science process and responding to and acting on the communications, policies and regulations arising from that process. Failures in either undermine the effectiveness of management and consequently effective communication is a key component of effective fisheries’ management. However, as illustrated by discussions held during sessions of, for example, the North Pacific Symposium on Inverte- brate Stock Assessment in 1998 interactions between managers, scientists and fishers have traditionally not always been founded on effective communications, understanding or trust [1]. This was classically summed up by Lorne Clayton (Sea Cucumber Harvesters Association, Canada) during the Symposium: It was not too many years ago, that if you asked a fisheries manager to define fishermen one answer might be: ‘‘those people whose main purpose is to take all the fish until there is nothing left, and then they become loggers’’. If you asked a fisherman to define what fisheries managers were one answer might be: ‘‘those who prevent fishers from making a living harvesting fish’’. If you asked either what a scientist is, they might collectively agree that a scientist is the one who makes all the mistakes if anything goes wrong with the fishery [1: 451]. Within the current management regime, fishermen are still often ‘‘seen as objects of management as opposed to active actors in the process of marine stewardship’’ [2: 833] and as a result understanding, engagement and trust is undermined among stakeholders ‘‘sidelined’’ by the management process. One of the earliest or most basic manifestations of which is the risk of non- compliance. For example, in a survey reported in 2000, a sample of Norwegian fishermen referred to mistrust and insecurity in stock estimates and their associated quotas as one of the most Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol Marine Policy 0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2011.03.008 n Corresponding author. Tel. þ44 23 92848506; fax: þ44 23 92848502. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Glenn), [email protected] (S. Sa ´ nchez Maron ˜ o), [email protected] (D. Holm), [email protected] (I. Runar Edvardsson), [email protected] (A. Conides), sakari.kuikka@helsinki.fi (S. Kuikka). Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72

Trust in the fisheries scientific community

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Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy

0308-59

doi:10.1

n Corr

E-m

ssanche

ire@una

sakari.k

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Trust in the fisheries scientific community

Helen Glenn a,n, Diana Tingley a, Sonia Sanchez Marono b, Dennis Holm c, Laurence Kell d,Gurpreet Padda d, Ingi Runar Edvardsson e, Johann Asmundsson e, Alexis Conides f, Kostas Kapiris f,Mintewab Bezabih a, Premachandra Wattage a, Sakari Kuikka g

a Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth, St. George’s Building, 141 High Street,

Portsmouth, United Kingdomb Instituto Tecnologico Pesquero y Alimentario, Fundacion (AZTI) - Tecnalia, 48395 Sukarrieta (Bizkaia), Spainc The Research Center for Social Development, Vagsvegur 48, Post-box 18, 800 Vagur, Faroe Islandsd Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS), Pakefield Road, Lowestoft, Suffolk, United Kingdome Faculty of Natural Resource Science, University of Akureyri, The University of Akureyri, Nordurslod 2, 600 Akureyri, Icelandf Institute of Marine Biological Resources, P.O. Box 712, 19013 Anavissos, Attiki, Greeceg Environmental Research Centre, Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Helsinki, PO Box 65 (Viikinkaari 1), 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 7 March 2011

Accepted 20 March 2011Available online 15 April 2011

Keywords:

Trust

Fisheries management

Europe

Fisheries science

7X/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd.

016/j.marpol.2011.03.008

esponding author. Tel. þ44 23 92848506; fax

ail addresses: [email protected] (H. Glen

[email protected] (S. Sanchez Marono), dennis@so

k.is (I. Runar Edvardsson), [email protected] (A. C

[email protected] (S. Kuikka).

a b s t r a c t

This paper explores the issue of ‘‘trust’’ in the fisheries science community, a key corollary of effective

risk communication. It presents the findings of a survey undertaken in Iceland, Greece, Spain, United

Kingdom and Faroe Islands during 2008. The findings reveal differing levels of trust and mistrust in the

fisheries science community between countries and between stakeholder groups, demonstrating areas

for future attention in the interests of improving fisheries science and management. As this paper

explores, unfortunately the ‘‘trust’’ necessary for effective stakeholder cooperation and participation

within current fisheries science is currently somewhat lacking. The cited reasons behind this lack of

trust include: a lack of soundness, credibility, responsiveness, flexibility and stakeholder involvement,

flawed data and weak science, poor communications and political and lobby group interference.

Notable from the results is a lack of consensus on the existence of a common language and vision. It is

evident, however, that certain aspects of fisheries science are strong contributors to trust and that there

are opportunities for improvement.

& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Sustainable fisheries management is contingent on the coop-eration and participation of all stakeholder groups—both in termsof communicating information and knowledge into the scienceprocess and responding to and acting on the communications,policies and regulations arising from that process. Failures in eitherundermine the effectiveness of management and consequentlyeffective communication is a key component of effective fisheries’management. However, as illustrated by discussions held duringsessions of, for example, the North Pacific Symposium on Inverte-brate Stock Assessment in 1998 interactions between managers,scientists and fishers have traditionally not always been foundedon effective communications, understanding or trust [1]. This was

All rights reserved.

: þ44 23 92848502.

n),

cdev.fo (D. Holm),

onides),

classically summed up by Lorne Clayton (Sea Cucumber HarvestersAssociation, Canada) during the Symposium:

It was not too many years ago, that if you asked a fisheriesmanager to define fishermen one answer might be: ‘‘thosepeople whose main purpose is to take all the fish until there isnothing left, and then they become loggers’’. If you asked afisherman to define what fisheries managers were one answermight be: ‘‘those who prevent fishers from making a livingharvesting fish’’. If you asked either what a scientist is, theymight collectively agree that a scientist is the one who makes allthe mistakes if anything goes wrong with the fishery [1: 451].

Within the current management regime, fishermen are stilloften ‘‘seen as objects of management as opposed to active actorsin the process of marine stewardship’’ [2: 833] and as a resultunderstanding, engagement and trust is undermined amongstakeholders ‘‘sidelined’’ by the management process. One of theearliest or most basic manifestations of which is the risk of non-compliance. For example, in a survey reported in 2000, a sampleof Norwegian fishermen referred to mistrust and insecurity instock estimates and their associated quotas as one of the most

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 55

important factors in their decision-making with respect to com-pliance versus non-compliance [3].

However, as studies into the role of trust (hereinafter reported)have revealed trust has wider connotations for management thanpurely compliance and itself is characterised by multiple compo-nents. These components vary in their contribution and impor-tance within different trust contexts [4]. Trust has been foundparticularly valuable in situations where people feel that theyhave little personal control over the hazards and decision-makingstructures they are exposed to [5,6], a characteristic often exhib-ited by fishers and their representatives. This paper and theresearch that underpins1 it draws on this body of knowledge toestablish whether working to develop trust within fisheriesscience and management could offer opportunities for improve-ments therein within Europe, with the overall aim of improvingsustainable fisheries management in the long term.

As indicated above, discussion on the issue of trust in fisheriesmanagement is not new. It has particularly attracted attentionwithin the context of developing co-management arrangements infisheries, whereby resource users and other stakeholders areincorporated within fisheries management arrangements [7]. Co-management encompasses a variety of decentralised and collabora-tive management arrangements that have developed as a reactionto the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ and have potential benefits suchas more adaptive management, greater compliance, reduced trans-action costs, greater equity and stewardship and more effective andefficient management [8–11]. The realisation that resource usersmay have much to offer in the process of fisheries management isalso manifest within inter alia Principles 2,2 11 and 12 for ecosys-tem-based management of the Convention on Biological Diversity,which are increasingly seeing elaboration within fisheries manage-ment [2]. Alongside the development of appropriate institutionalarrangements for such greater resource user involvement, both theliterature and practical experience highlight the critical role of trust[7,12,13], which applies as much to hierarchical approaches ofmanagement as to co-management arrangements.

Within European fisheries management, recent work addres-sing aspects of trust includes that of Birgit de Vos and hercolleagues on the trust relationships between fishers and govern-ment in the Dutch fishing industry [14,15], that by Paulo Nunesand his colleagues on the role of trust in the regulation of fishingactivities in the lagoon of Venice, Italy [16], and the researchundertaken as part of the EU 6th Framework funded PRONE(Precautionary Risk Methodology in Fisheries) project hereinreported. The MariFish network3 of major European funders ofmarine fisheries (including many national governmental agen-cies) has also undertaken a study of current practices relatingto the communication of research needs and results and theeffectiveness of generating evidence for marine fisheries policy-

1 This paper has been produced as an output of the EU 6th Framework funded

Policy Orientated Research (SSP) Project no. 022589 – PRONE: Precautionary Risk

Methodology in Fisheries, 2006–2009.2 Principle 2 supports the decentralisation of management to the lowest

appropriate level and the involvement of all stakeholders and the balancing of

local interests with the wider public interest, facilitating the sense of responsi-

bility, ownership, accountability, participation, and use of local knowledge.

Principle 11 stresses that the ecosystem approach should consider all forms of

relevant information, and all sources including scientific and indigenous and local

knowledge, innovations and practices. All relevant information should be shared

and assumptions checked with stakeholders and actors. Principle 12 further

stresses that the ecosystem approach should involve all relevant sectors of society

and stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international level, as

appropriate, and scientific disciplines to address the complexity and many

interactions of biological-diversity management (Principles, Convention on Biolo-

gical Diversity 2007).3 MariFish is an ERA-NET supported by the European Union’s 6th Framework

Programme.

making and management, addressing trust. Trust was identifiedas a key factor in good practice requiring cultivation, not onlywith resource users, but also between fisheries managers andresearch staff [17]. It is evident that ‘‘trust’’ in fisheries manage-ment currently features within both the European academic andpolicy arenas, albeit possibly not to the level of detail encounteredin other trust contexts.

Addressing the question of trust between the various stake-holder groups within European fisheries science and the contribu-tions of the different components of trust, this paper iscorrespondingly timely. It reports on a study conducted during2008 targeting five countries within the European sphere: Iceland,Greece, Spain, United Kingdom and Faroe Islands and four majorstakeholder groups: fishers, fishers’ representatives and organisa-tions, scientists and policy-makers. It addresses in so doing levelsof trust and mistrust, the different components of trust and theirimportance, the differences in trust between stakeholder groupsand countries and the underlying contributory issues. Given thechoice of case study countries, in addition to identifying anynational variability or consistency the study examines trust withinseveral different fisheries management systems.

Fisheries management in the UK and Iceland is based upon asystem of setting total allowable catches (TACs) and some form ofindividual quota allocation (i.e. individual transferable quotas(ITQs) in Iceland and fixed quota allocations (FQAs) in the UK).In Spain officially there is a system of non-transferable licencesand quotas, with tradable fishing days for limited specified fleets.In the Faroe Islands management is based upon a system ofindividually transferable effort quotas (ITEQs) while in Greecetotal allowable catches (TACs) are not generally set and so quotasystems are not generally in use. The unifying theme behind thevarious case studies is that each of the countries is directly orindirectly connected with the International Council for theExploration of the Sea (ICES), which is the prime source ofscientific advice on marine fish and shellfish stocks to govern-ments and international regulatory bodies that manage the NorthAtlantic and adjacent seas. The advice itself is based on informa-tion collected by a network of marine scientists from the 20 ICESmember countries. It is this ICES scientific community and itsinter-relationship with fisheries management that forms both thefocus of the study and its recommendations and the basis forinter-nation comparison.

The following sections of the paper firstly explore the conceptand definition of trust, its components, development and mea-surement before moving on to the survey design and delivery andsubsequent analysis and results. The paper subsequently con-cludes by drawing out from the findings the key conclusions,observations and recommendations pertinent to improving trustfor enhanced fisheries management in Europe.

2. Review of trust

Trust has been noted as important to the effective functioning oforganisations in society, with that functioning dependant on theextent to which people trust these organisations [18]. It has alsobeen conceptualised as one of six bi-polar components of humannature: Trustworthiness, Altruism, Independence, Strength of Willand Rationality, Complexity, and Variability [19]. The first four ofwhich Wrightsman found to be modestly inter-correlated, whilethe last two were independent. Trust has also proven important foreffective risk communication – the interactive exchange of infor-mation and opinion on risk among assessors and managers of riskand other interested parties – which requires the recipient orparticipant to ‘‘trust’’ the source of any information or advice [20].

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7256

Risk is a multi-faceted term here which relates to many dimensionsof resource assessment, use and management, including fisheries.

There is a growing body of organisational and managementliterature on trust, with the following notable key articles: Mayeret al. [21], Robinson [22], Whitener [23], Kramer [24]. This body ofliterature draws from different disciplines, resulting in competingconceptualisations and definitions of trust [25,26]. Dietz andHartog [26] in reviewing the literature and the enclosed defini-tions of trust (Table 1) identified three component parts to trustdrawing on the distinctions cited by McEvily et al. [27: 558]:‘‘trust as a belief [about a party trustworthiness and one’srelationship thereto], as a decision [to actually trust that party,the intention to act], and as an action [of trust]’’. It is noted thattrustworthiness and trust are two separate qualities, one of thetrustee and the other held by the trustor [21]. A genuine state oftrust requires both the expectation of trustworthy behaviour andthe intention to act thereon [28,29]. The ultimate confirmation oftrust, however, is the follow through on this intent by engaging in‘‘trust-informed risk-taking behaviours’’ [26:559].

The literature has explored many aspects of trust, notably thepropensity to trust (an individual’s disposition to trust) and the

Table 1Common definitions of trust.

Definition Author

The conscious regulation of one’ dependence on

another.

Zand [33]

The extent to which one is willing to ascribe good

intentions to and have confidence in the words

and actions of other people.

Cook and Wall [34]

A state involving confident positive expectation

about another’s motives with respect to oneself

in situations entailing risk.

Boon and Holmes [35]

The extent to which a person is confident in , and

willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions

and decisions, of another.

McAllister [36]

The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the

actions of another party based on the expectation

that the other will perform a particular action

important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability

to monitor or control that other party.

Mayer et al. [21]

The specific expectation that an other’s actions

will be beneficial rather than detrimental and the

generalised ability to take for grantedya vast

array of features of the social order.

Creed and Miles [37]

Confident positive expectations regarding

another’s conduct in a context of risk.

Lewicki et al. [38]

yreflects an expectation of belief that the other

party will act benevolently

Whitener et al. [23]

A psychological state comprising the intention to

accept vulnerability [to another] based upon

positive expectation of the intentions or

behaviour of another.

Rousseau et al. [25]

CommonLanguage

The extent to which the knowledgeunderstand each other and use simterminology

CommonVision

The extent to which a knowledge sshared goals, concerns and purpo

Discretion The extent to which a knowledge skeeping sensitive source informatio

Receptivity The extent to which the knowledgelistener

Strong Ties The extent to which the knowledgeconverse frequently with each otherelationship

Fig. 1. Significant attributes that influ

strength and component parts of that trust, with some studiesinvestigating the former before evaluating the latter. Work hasalso focused on the intention to trust, identifying as contributoryfactors the perceived characteristics of the trustee and thepredisposition of the trustor. Mayer et al. [21] found that anindividual’s intention to trust was largely determined by per-ceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee. In termsof the propensity to trust, Gill et al. [30] observed a correlationbetween the propensity to trust and the intention to trust,although this was conditioned by the clarity of the trustworthi-ness of the trustee, being stronger when trustworthiness wasunclear. While the component parts of trust are investigatedwithin this paper, the propensity to trust falls outside its scope.

It should be noted that trust is not absolute, it varies along acontinuum of intensity [31], which Lewicki and Bunker [32] andDietz and Den Hartog [26], with reference to Rousseau et al. [25],dissect into five different trust experiences: ‘‘deterrence-basedtrust’’, which involves no trust only sanction and force inspiredcompliance; ‘‘calculus-based’’ trust, which is the product of cost–benefit analysis albeit accompanied by remnants of distrust;‘‘knowledge-based’’ trust in which suspicions give way to knowl-edge-inspired positive expectations (as to motives, abilities andreliability); ‘‘relational-based trust’’, which arises from the qualityof relationships over time (rather than behaviours); and ‘‘identi-fication-based trust’’, which sees ‘‘both parties assume a commonidentityy[such that] each party can represent the other’s inter-ests with their full confidence’’ [26: 564]. There is a threshold oftrust between ‘‘calculus-based trust’’ and ‘‘knowledge-basedtrust’’, with the latter the first positive trust experience.

2.1. Components of trust

In 2002 the IBM Institute for Knowledge-Based Organizations(IKO) studied the role of trust in knowledge sharing, to address aperceived lack of systematic evidence in the literature about why thisactually promotes effective knowledge transfer. The study revealedthe importance of trust in enabling effective knowledge sharing andhighlighted a number of key components of trust, notably: compe-tence, benevolence, strong ties, common language, common vision,discretion and receptivity. It highlighted that trusting people’s bene-volence is important but that trusting people’s competence is moreso, especially where there is a lack of knowledge [4]. This trust doesnot necessarily require regular contact or ‘‘strong-ties’’, albeit desir-able. It can also form between people with ‘‘weak’’ and infrequentties, drawing on different experience or knowledge bases [4]. Bydisaggregating the components of trust the same research alsoidentified several factors as contributing to the aforementionedcomponents of trust: common language, common vision and discre-tion in respect of competence-based trust and receptivity and strongties in respect of benevolence-based trust (Fig. 1).

source and seeker ilar jargon and

base

d tru

st

Impa

ct o

n be

nevo

lenc

e-ba

sed

trust

ource and seeker has se

ource is viewed as n confidential

source is a good

seeker and source r and have a close

Impa

ct o

n co

mpe

tenc

e-

ence trust of a knowledge source.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 57

Another key paper exploring the components of trust alsoraised competence and benevolence, but further added integrityto the mix [39], identifying each of them as components of trustbut also as strong predictors of knowledge sharing behaviour.Integrity based trust is based on perceptions that the trusteeadheres to a set of principles acceptable to the trustor [21] andhas as its components: compatibility of values, credibility ofreputation and consistency of past behaviour [39]. They note thatthe dimensions of trust buttress each other, being empiricallyinseparable although theoretically distinct. Usoro et al. [39]usefully also provided a sample set of trust statements for usein the measurement of trust.

The review by Dietz and Den Hartog [26] also looked at thecontent of trust, and drew out from what they regarded as watersmuddied by contrasting standpoints and emphases, four attributesof the trustee as the most salient and commonly cited in theliterature: ability, benevolence, integrity and predictability. Bene-volence they defined as ‘‘reflect[ing] benign motives and a perso-nal degree of kindness toward the other party, and a genuineconcern for their welfare; competence refers to the other party’scapabilities to carry out [their] obligations (in terms of skills andknowledge); integrity involves adherence to a set of principlesacceptable to the other party, encompassing honesty and fairtreatment, and the avoidance of hypocrisy and predictabilityrelates specifically to consistency and regularity of behaviour’’[26: 560]. Each of these components is considered fundamental totrust, with trust potentially failing on the loss of any one, althoughthe combination is specific to the trustor and the circumstanceand the trustor may offset weaknesses in one with strengths inanother [26,38].

2.2. Development of trust

Trust has been highlighted as particularly important wherepeople consider that they have little personal control over thehazards they are exposed to [6]. As Ropeik and Gray [5] andSiegrist and Cvetkovich [40] note people tend to be less afraid ofrisks that come from places, individuals, or organisations that theytrust, and are more afraid if the risk comes from a source they donot trust. Where there is conflicting expert opinion, trust becomeseven more central to an individual’s perception of risk. This trust isin turn influenced by people’s expectations of the intentions of anorganisation, with positive expectations potentially increasingtrust in the organisation. Maeda and Miyahara [41], for example,cite positive expectations of an organisation (e.g., the idea that theorganisation is open and honest in communicating on an issue) aspotentially inducing people to trust this organisation. Anotherillustration is found in research on the effect of organisationalreputations on trust (e.g., [42,43]).

The motives perceived to lie behind an organisation’s actions arealso a factor, with individuals being willing to trust some organisa-tions more based on inferences about such motives, the perceivedhonesty of those motives and the value they personally place onthose motives [44,45]. There are two principal types of motivesrecognised within the literature, albeit variously titled: society-serving (altruistic) motives reflecting organisational concern forsocietal welfare and benefits outside the organisation and organisa-tion serving (egoistic) motives referring to a focus on the maximisa-tion of benefits for the organisation itself [44,46–49]. Interestingly,trust may be best served by a combination of these two forms ofmotives given that the influence of motives is qualified by theperceived genuineness of those motives and intent [45,49,50].

In terms of practical moves to develop and maintain trust,Frewer [6] identifies the following as key aspects in the riskmanagement decision-making process: institutional reactivity topublic concerns, public involvement and institutional transparency.

These elements are also highlighted by other authors. Kaspersonet al. [51: 179], for example, endorses public involvement – ‘‘thesharing of power, that is the empowerment of risk bearers, in themanagement of the risk or the facility’’ – as the ultimate solution todistrust. Heath [52: 265] adds that participation avoids ‘‘forcingcognitively involved members of the community to a confronta-tional stance’’. Involvement in the process addresses trust head on.Hance et al. [53] reaffirms the requirement for responsiveness inthe building of trust, but also adds credibility to the list ofrequirements. The third key aspect raised by Frewer [6], transpar-ency, is also emphasised by Grunig and Hunt [54]. Transparency isthe degree to which organisational actions and decisions areascertainable and comprehensible to interested parties [54]. AsGrunig and Huang [55] note, transparency is not purely a matter ofinformation; it is a process of active participation in acquiring,sharing and creating knowledge which is essential to effectiverelationships between stakeholders. Hon [56: 61] adds that ‘‘failureto disclose breeds suspicion that an organization has something tohide’’, while Bowen [57] likewise stresses that trust and perceptionsof credibility are built through transparency. It should be noted,however, that transparency does not equate to extensive informa-tion transfer between stakeholders, as the latter have limitedinformation-processing capacities and more information does notequate with greater trust and credibility [58]. Having a right ofaccess to information (in accordance with legal and voluntaryprovisions) with external verification of the standards of disclosuremay in part satisfy the requirement for transparency, trust andcredibility [59].

2.3. Measurement of trust

The last major observation pertinent to this review of theliterature in respect of trust is the measurement thereof. Dietzand Den Hartog’s [26: 565–6] paper on measuring trust insideorganisations provides a useful guide, noting among other thingsfive requirements of a trust measuring exercise:

1.

The identification of which form of trust is to be measured(belief, decision or behaviour). More than purely belief isadvisable [21].

2.

The identification of the content of the belief. 3. The clarification of the sources of the belief (i.e. the character-

istics of the trustee and trustor along with relationship and thebroader situational constraints).

4.

The identification of the referent (who is to be trusted?). 5. The provision of additional cues, as in the analysis of supple-

mentary comments.

To these five points they also added the following advice:

the need to recognise that trust and distrust are not poles onthe continuum, with any automatic assumption that lowdistrust equates with high trust [38]; � positively worded items have been found to be usually more

accurate and reliable [60]; and

� the word trust should not itself be used, noting that it can be

taken as an emotive challenge [61,62].

These are notable advisories, to supplement the many findingsfrom the literature in informing the enclosed survey on trust.

3. Methods

As previously noted, this study aimed, inter alia, to examinetrust in the fisheries science community alongside its corollary

Table 2Trust statements.

Theoretical structure of trust

General (T1–T3)

T1 Fisheries science produced by the ICES scientific community is

relevant, responsive, sound and credible and concerns marine

ecosystems and their relation to humanity.

T2 ICES can be relied upon to produce the scientific information and

advice that decision-makers need.

T3 I would accept and abide by management decisions (and associated

regulations) based purely upon fisheries science produced by the

ICES scientific community, even if I felt they were not entirely

supportive of my own interests.

Competence (T4 and T5)

T4 The ICES scientific community is a competent and effective source

of scientific information and advice.

T5 The ICES scientific community performs its role of providing

information and advice that is relevant, responsive, sound and

credible and concerns marine ecosystems and their relation to

humanity very well.

Common language (T6 and T7)

T6 Stakeholders, fisheries managers and the ICES scientific community

share a common understanding of key terms and words.

T7 The ICES scientific community communicates key results in an

easily understood manner.

Common vision (T8)

T8 Stakeholders (e.g. fishing industry, environmental groups, etc.),

fisheries managers and the ICES scientific community share a

common understanding of the type of information and advice

required to make fisheries management decisions.

Benevolence (T9 and T10)

T9 The ICES scientific community acts in the best interests of all

fisheries stakeholders, including the fishing industry.

T10 The ICES scientific community is interested in the sustainability of

the fishing industry as well as the sustainability of living marine

resources and protecting the marine environment.

Receptivity (T11)

T11 The ICES scientific community is willing to consider alternative

ideas about and sources of fisheries ‘‘knowledge’’ (e.g. those from

the fishing industry or environmental groups)

Strong ties (T12 and T13)

T12 Non-governmental organisations (e.g. the fishing industry,

environmental groups, etc.) are able to access and interact with

ICES scientists.

T13 Inclusion of non-governmental organisations (e.g. the fishing

industry, environmental groups, etc.) in the ICES science process

improves transparency.

Integrity (T14 and T15)

T14 The scientific information and advice produced by the ICES

scientific community is objective and has integrity.

T15 In general, members of the ICES scientific community would use

any information provided to them in confidence in the manner for

which it was intended.

Predictability (T16)

T16 The ICES scientific community carries out its work in a consistent,

reliable and predictable manner.

Credibility (T17 and T18)

T17 The scientific information and advice produced by the ICES

scientific community is fully independent and impartial.

T18 The ICES scientific community acts in an independent and impartial

manner.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7258

risk communication, with a survey undertaken during 2008 infive countries: Iceland, Greece, Spain, UK and Faroe Islands. Thesurvey employed standardised face-to-face semi-structured inter-views. The questions were designed to allow for the interviews tobe tailored to make them relevant to each nation and stakeholdergroup (ensuring well-founded answers), while maintaining com-parability among the essentials. For example, provision was madefor references to the ‘‘ICES scientific community’’ or the relevantfisheries scientific community in each country. Trust wasincluded as Section 2 of the survey instrument, with Section 1addressing risk communication, and Section 3 general questionson the respondents.

Section 2 of the survey instrument targeting ‘‘trust’’ was basedon ICES’ stated aims of fisheries science [63], which weretranslated into a series of 18 statements (Table 2) in accordancewith the theoretical disaggregation of the components of trust asdrawn from Dietz and Den Hartog [26], Levin et al. [4] and Usoroet al. [39] and presented in Fig. 2. These statements, whileinspired by ICES, equally apply to the other fisheries sciencecommunities. Note that ‘‘trust’’ as a word is not explicitlymentioned within the statements, being a composite thereofand likely to skew responses by its use.

In the preamble to the survey this section was introduced astargeting the respondent’s views of the fisheries science commu-nity. The section correspondingly requested the interview respon-dents to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the 18statements presented on a Show Card using a 7 point scale from 1‘‘strongly agree’’ to 7 ‘‘strongly disagree’’. They were also requestedto indicate verbally why they answered as they did (their answerbeing recorded).

The Likert item approach was chosen to permit inter-statementcomparison and summation into a Likert scale. While five orderedresponse levels are often used, many psychometricians advocateusing seven or nine levels. A recent empirical study [64] foundthat data from 5-level, 7-level and 10-level items showed verysimilar characteristics in terms of their mean, variance, skewnessand kurtosis after the application of a simple transformation, so tobalance the preferences for greater detail and ease of responseseven-levels were chosen. This also avoided the forced responseissue attached to an even numbers of levels. In combining thestatements with the Likert-levels attention was given to the threetypes of bias associated with Likert scales: central tendency bias(the avoidance of extreme response categories), acquiescence bias(the agreement with statements as presented) and social desir-ability bias (the presentation of themselves or their organisation ina more favourable light). Fortunately, the nature of the subjectmatter and the questions mitigated the potential for bias, a viewsubstantiated by the results.

Section 3 of the survey included questions about the back-ground of the respondent, primarily to provide a profile ofrespondents and potentially add to the analysis of trust responses.Questions as to gender, age, highest academic qualification andoccupation were supplemented by questions clarifying for fishers,what type of fisher they are and for all respondents, their lengthof service in the occupation. A further, final question asked howmuch contact they had with other fisheries stakeholders (fishers,scientists, government/regulators, fishers’ representatives, andother interest groups—e.g. environmental groups, recreationalsector, etc.) in terms of frequency.

3.1. Survey delivery

The first task in each survey was to translate and localise thequestionnaire and show cards. For example, the Icelandic fisheriessystem, while linked into the ICES systems, is autonomous anddifferent from that of the EU. The accumulation of data and the

decision-making process among other things are different. The finaldecision on total allowable catch (TAC), for example, rests in thehands of the Minister of Fisheries who is obliged by law to base thedecision on recommendations from the Marine Research Institute(MRI). The TAC’s for some migratory species are in contrast decidedin interstate agreements. This system was reflected in the localisa-tion of the survey instrument. Greek fisheries also do not falldirectly within the scope of ICES consequently the survey was

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3Strongly disagree

Strongly agree Question - UK Responses

Fig. 3. Bar chart representation of Likert item responses by respondent.

General general (ICES stated) aims of fisheries science (T1-T3)

Component parts of trust

competence(T4,T5)

benevolence(T9,T10)

integrity(T14,T15)

Explanatory factors of component parts

common language (T6,T7) credibility(T17,T18)

common vision (T8)

discretion - linked to credibility

receptivity (T11) strong ties (T12,T13)

predictability (T16)

consistency - linked to predictability

Fig. 2. Components of trust.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 59

translated and localised in this instance to target the ‘‘national’’scientific community. In the Faroese case study ICES was replacedwith the Faroese Fisheries Laboratory. This is the organisation thatlocal fishers, ship owners, government advisors know and accept asthe advisory institution for fisheries in the Faroe Islands, eventhough the Faroese Fisheries Laboratory works closely with ICES.

The interviews themselves were conducted during the summerand autumn of 2008 and targeted fishers, fishers’ organisations/representatives, policy-makers (including a few non-governmentalorganisations) and scientists. The Icelandic participants were drawnfrom different spheres of Icelandic fisheries, as were the UK andFaroese participants. The Greek participants came principally fromThessaloniki, Volos, Corfu (Kerkyra) and the Saronikos Gulf areas,while the Spanish participants drew primarily from the Bay ofBiscay anchovy and tuna fisheries. Reflecting the availability ofwilling participants in each country and the number that completedthe survey in full, the following number of respondents feature inthe analysis and results reported hereafter: Iceland—5 fishers,4 scientists; Greece—10 fishers, 5 policy-makers, 5 scientists;Spain—4 fishers, 3 fishers’ organisations, 3 policy-makers, 3 scien-tists; UK—9 fishers, 5 fishers’ organisations, 7 policy-makers,5 scientists; Faroe Islands – 7 fishers, 3 fishers’ organisations,2 policy-makers, 3 scientists. While the total number of interviewsis not high, this is part reflects the small number of institutions inseveral of the stakeholder categories (notably policy-makers andfishers’ representatives), and as such the results are likely to be veryrepresentative for these categories.

4. Analysis

The analysis of the survey returns in terms of trust employedthree main approaches reflecting the nature and quantity of datacollected: the analysis of Likert scales and their component Likertitems; Correlation coefficients; and Issues analysis and incidentmatrices.

4.1. Likert scale analysis

The 18 trust statements, constituting the Likert items, weretreated as largely ordinal in format and their analysis followedaccordingly. Although symmetry of response levels was inferredwithin the question format, one cannot assume that the respon-dents perceived all pairs of adjacent levels as equidistant. Conse-quently, an assumption of ordinality was deemed appropriate andwith the limited sample size offered more robust analysis.

When treated as ordinal data, Likert responses can be collatedinto bar charts, central tendency measures, dispersion summarisedby the range across quartiles or analysed using non-parametrictests suitable for small and unequal sample sizes, as with the

Chi-square test. The first two of these and the latter were primarilyused here. The graphic presentation using bar charts (Fig. 3)involved the numeric manipulation of the likert scores into anegative, positive and neutral component, permitting greater visualinterpretation of the results. The central tendency measure usedwas the mean, which represented a more useful measure than themedian or mode in this instance, especially given the sample size.This was supplemented for presentation purposes with the percen-tage of respondents that recorded positive responses (i.e. agreementwith the statement rather than disagreement or indecision). TheChi-square test was used to assess whether the observed frequen-cies deviated significantly from the average level of frequencies.

Given the ability to produce summative Likert scales from theindividual Likert items as all the questions used the same scale,this analysis apart from the Chi-square test was applied to thestatements individually, within their trust categories, and aggre-gated. The Chi-square test was only undertaken at the individualstatement level. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, theabove mentioned charts were supplemented by incident matrices(as noted below), especially in respect of the pan-nationalanalysis.

4.2. Correlations

The trust data was also analysed using correlation coefficientsto establish the strength and direction of a linear relationshipbetween the variables (i.e. linear dependence). Each was analysedfor any significant correlation with (a) the other variables fromwithin the same part of the survey, (b) the responses to the othermain section and (c) the frequency of communication withstakeholder groups.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7260

There are a number of different coefficients used for differentsituations; with the best known being the one used here, thePearson product–moment correlation coefficient, which isobtained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by theproduct of their standard deviations. The use of the standarddeviation in the calculation would imply that the use of thecoefficient requires one to assume that the variables are normallydistributed. However, as Rodgers and Nicewander [65] note, thecoefficient is fully defined without reference to such assumptionsand has value in a broad range of uses. The analysis gives a valuesomewhere between þ1 and �1 inclusive, with stronger correla-tion and linear dependence marked by coefficients closer to eitherþ1 or �1. þ1 indicates an increasing linear relationship and �1a decreasing linear relationship between the variables.

As Cohen [66] observed the interpretation of the correlationcoefficients is somewhat arbitrary depending on the context andpurpose. A coefficient close to þ1 for example, may be regardedas high in some contexts and not in others. Consequently,attention was paid in the design of the analysis to the bandingof coefficients appropriate for the context of this survey, ulti-mately determined as

0 to 70.3 little or no association � 70.3–70.7 weak or medium association � 70.7–71.0 strong association

These bands were used throughout the analysis.It should be noted that while Pearson’s correlation indicates

the strength of a linear relationship between two variables, itsvalue alone is insufficient to completely define the relationship,especially if the assumption of normality is incorrect or there is apossible third variable affecting the relationship. Consequently,while a useful summary statistic aiding interpretation, its useshould be supplemented with the individual examination of thedata (a caution reflected in the analysis combining a number ofapproaches in the testing for trends in the data). An additionalpoint to note is while a value close to either �1 or þ1 indicates aclose relationship between the two variables concerned and thereis even potential for causality to exist, correlation cannot confirmcausality. It can only indicate that a close relation exists, eitherpositive or negative.

4.3. Issues analysis and incident matrices

The final analytical approach used qualitative issues analysisand summary matrix presentation formats. Issues analysis andincident matrices were employed to distil out the issues raisedfrom the verbal comments given during the survey. The formerinitially extracted from the comments the issues raised in asimplified textual form to provide additional insight to thediscussion of the risks and trust statements, while incidentmatrices (with a possible magnitude component) were used toidentify consensus among respondents over these issues duringthe pan-national and pan-stakeholder comparison.

5. Results

The discussion now moves to explore the findings of the 18trust statements developed from ICES’ stated aims of fisheriesscience [63] and the theoretical disaggregation of the componentsof trust as drawn from Dietz and Den Hartog [26], Levin et al. [4]and Usoro et al. [39] and presented in Fig. 2. The discussioninitially explores the level of trust, followed by the issues statedas undermining trust.

5.1. Level of trust

To facilitate the interpretation of the complex results a summaryrepresentation of the findings is presented in Fig. 4. The results arepresented by country and stakeholder group and represent theaverage scores for each group of respondents colour coded inaccordance with the key to the figure. The hashed scale indicatesa negative average, with the darker hash indicating strongerdisagreement with the statement. The solid grey scale indicates apositive average, with the darker greys indicating stronger agree-ment. White cells reflect a zero average.

The underlying analysis provided insight into the relativestrength of individuals’ agreement and disagreement. From thatanalysis it is evident whether, for example, a small numericalaverage arises from either strong but contradictory responses thatcancel each other out or from uniform but weak agreement.Unfortunately, this complexity cannot readily be represented inthis format. However, the figure effectively draws out the netresponse for each group.

One of the main observations to be drawn from the analysis isconsensus among the respondents that a common language andvision is lacking between the fisheries scientific community andthe stakeholders, with the majority of stakeholder groups (withthe notable exception of the scientists from three countries)disagreeing with the three component statements:

T6—‘‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmentalgroups, fisheries managers, etc.’) and the ICES scientific com-munity share a common understanding of key concepts andterms’’ (Common language and vision) � T7—‘‘The ICES scientific community communicates important

results in an easily understood manner’’ (Common languageand vision)

� T8—‘‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmental

groups, fisheries managers, etc’) and the ICES scientific com-munity share a common understanding of the type of informa-tion and advice required to make fisheries managementdecisions’’ (Common language and vision)

There was also broad disagreement recorded for the second ofthe competence trust statements – ‘‘The ICES scientific communityperforms its stated role very well (that is, providing informationand advice that is relevant, responsive, sound and credible andconcerns marine ecosystems and their relation to humanity)’’ – andto a lesser degree with the first of the benevolence trust statements– ‘‘The ICES scientific community acts in the best interests of allstakeholders, including the fishing industry’’. In respect of the firstof these, the fishers in disagreeing were largely at odds with thescientists who demonstrated fairly strong agreement. The otherstakeholders swayed between the two camps. The second state-ment attracted more of a nation specific pattern, with agreementbetween multiple stakeholder groups in Greece and the UK.Another statement attracting negative national consensus was thereceptivity statement – ‘‘The ICES scientific community is willing toconsider alternative ideas and sources of fisheries ‘‘knowledge’’ (e.g.those from the fishing industry or environmental groups)’’ – forIceland, with which both stakeholder groups disagreed.

In terms of consensual agreement, the following trust state-ments attracted the largest consensus across all of the stake-holder groups, with only one or two groups disagreeing with thestatements:

T2—‘‘ICES can be relied upon to produce the scientific informa-tion and advice that decision-makers need’’ (General). � T10—‘‘The ICES scientific community is interested in the

sustainability of the fishery as well as the sustainability of

Net agreement or disagreement, equating to the average of scores for each groupof stakeholders:

Strong disagreement Unde tnemeergagnortSdedic

-2.01 to -3 -1.01 to -2 -0.01 to -1 0 0.01 to 1 1.01 to 2 2.01 to 3

F = Fishermen, O = Fishermen’s Organisations, P = Policy-makers, S = Scientists

Trust Statements Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S T1 - ‘Fisheries science produced by the ICES scientific community is relevant, responsive, sound and credible and concerns marine ecosystems and their relation to humanity’

Gen

eralT2 - ‘ICES can be relied upon to produce the

scientific information and advice that decision-makers need’ T3 - ‘I would accept fisheries management decisions based upon science produced by the ICES scientific community, even if I felt the decisions were not always in my own interests’ T4 - ‘The ICES scientific community is a competent and effective source of information and advice’

Com

pete

nce

T5 - ‘The ICES scientific community performs its stated role very well (that is, providing information and advice that is relevant, responsive, sound and credible and concerns marine ecosystems and their relation to humanity)’T6 - ‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmental groups, fisheries managers, etc’) and the ICES scientific community share a common understanding of key concepts and terms’

Com

mon

Lan

guag

e

T7 - ‘The ICES scientific community communicates important results in an easily understood manner’ T8 - ‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmental groups, fisheries managers, etc’) and the ICES scientific community share a common understanding of the type of information and advice required to make fisheries management decisions’

Vis

ion

T9 - ‘The ICES scientific community acts in the best interests of all stakeholders, including the fishing industry’

Ben

evol

ence

T10 - ‘The ICES scientific community is interested in the sustainability of the fishery as well as the sustainability of living marine resources and protecting the marine environment’

T11 - ‘The ICES scientific community is willing to consider alternative ideas and sources of fisheries 'knowledge' (e.g. those from the fishing industry or environmental groups)’ R

ecep

tivity

T12 - ‘Non-governmental organisations (e.g. the fishing industry, environmental groups, etc’) are able to access and interact with ICES scientists satisfactorily’

Stro

ng T

ies

T13 - ‘Inclusion of non-governmental organisations (e.g. the fishing industry, environmental groups, etc’) in the ICES science process improves transparency’ T14 - ‘The information and advice produced by the ICES scientific community is objective and has integrity’

Inte

grity

T15 - ‘In general, members of the ICES scientific community would use any information provided to them in confidence sensitively and only in the manner for which it was intended’

T16 - ‘The ICES scientific community carries out its work in a consistent, reliable and predictable manner’ Pr

edic

tab

ility

T17 - ‘The scientific information and advice produced by the ICES scientific community is fully independent and impartial’

Cre

dibi

lity

T18 – ‘The ICES scientific community acts in an independent and impartial manner’

Fig. 4. Net agreement and disagreement with the trust statements by stakeholder group.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 61

living marine resources and protecting the marine environ-ment’’ (Benevolence).

� T15—‘‘In general, members of the ICES scientific community

would use any information provided to them in confidence

sensitively and only in the manner for which it was intended’’(Integrity).

� T16—‘‘The ICES scientific community carries out its work in a

consistent, reliable and predictable manner’’ (Predictability).

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7262

Other statements also saw the majority of groups agreeing, withonly three or four stakeholder groups disagreeing, including the

other integrity trust statement and the two strong ties statements.If a national perspective is taken, there are a large number of thestatements that also attracted a consistent response from particularcountries, as among the Icelandic stakeholder groups for the twointegrity trust statements, to name just one example.

Standing back and taking a broader national perspective, thereare a number of other marked trends evident within the dataworthy of particular mention, notably: the almost universal nega-tive stance taken by UK fishers and fishers’ organisations and thegenerally positive stance taken by the UK policy-makers and thescientists. The latter group almost universally recorded the highestagreement of any of the UK respondents. Faroese scientists andpolicy-makers also recorded far stronger agreement for the state-ments than the Faroese fishers and fishers’ organisations. The lattergroups were, however, generally positive towards the general,benevolence, integrity, predictability and credibility statements.The other countries displayed less marked trends, although wherenet disagreement was noted it was generally less so for thescientists, who on occasions even took the opposing view.

5.2. Trust related issues

The next foci of the discussion are the issues that underminetrust. Given the volume of comments registered during thesurvey, a number of figures have been produced to summarisethe comments made by the country and stakeholder groups.These figures identify whether at least one individual from aparticular group mentioned one of the listed points within each ofthe trust categories. It should be noted that there were alsocomments made reaffirming the truth of many of the statements.These are reflected in the numerical summary given above andthe discussion of the comments below.

The ‘‘general’’ trust category statements (T1–T3) receivedexpress agreement from several fishers’ organisations, policy-makers and scientists, but from the remainder of these groupsand the fishers a broad range of concerns were raised in thecomments (as evident from the lists in Table 3). However, only oneor two of these comments were mentioned by more than a coupleof stakeholder groups. In respect of the first statement – ‘‘Fisheriesscience produced by the ICES scientific community is relevant,responsive, sound and credible and concerns marine ecosystemsand their relation to humanity’’ – seven groups (including all UKgroups and two from Greece) had a least one respondent high-lighting that fisheries science lacked soundness and credibility,followed by three noting that it was unresponsive. For the secondstatement—‘‘ICES can be relied upon to produce the scientificinformation and advice that decision-makers need’’ four of therespondent groups agreed that flawed data and weak scienceundermined the production of appropriate scientific informationfor decision-makers. Issues over data and methods also under-mined the willingness of respondents from seven stakeholdergroups (including all Greek stakeholder groups) to accept fisheriesmanagement decisions based upon science produced by thescientific community, even if they felt the decisions were notalways in their own interests (the third general trust statement).The fishers and fishers’ organisations were notably unlikely toaccept fisheries management decisions without question. It isevident from the level of agreement for these concerns and therange of others noted that there is considerable room for improve-ment in trust in these areas, particularly among the industry.

The second category of trust statements pertaining to ‘‘com-petence’’ (T4 and T5) attracted similar comments, such that thecomponent statements are combined within Table 4. From the

perspective of the different stakeholder categories, each group(including the scientists) noted room for improvement, althoughthe scientists and policy-makers broadly agreed that the fisheriesscientific community is competent. The two statements in ques-tion here were:

‘‘The ICES scientific community is a competent and effectivesource of information and advice’’. � ‘‘The ICES scientific community performs its stated role very

well (that is, providing information and advice that is relevant,responsive, sound and credible and concerns marine ecosys-tems and their relation to humanity)’’.

The concerns registered by the stakeholder groups for these twostatements were more numerous than for the general trust state-ments and included: data issues and poor science and the poorcommunication of recommendations, each cited by respondentsfrom six stakeholder groups. Insufficient knowledge, political andlobby group influence, and lack of stakeholder involvement andknowledge were also noted by respondents from four groups forthe first and three groups for the latter two. Notably, Greek fishersand policy-makers raised three of the highlighted concerns. Amongthe other concerns raised, there is evidently national variation.

Of all the trust categories, the ‘‘common language’’ trustcategory (T6 and T7) received the most negative responses andthe broadest agreement over the underlying issues (Table 5). Thetwo component statements were:

‘‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmental groups,fisheries managers, etc.’) and the ICES scientific communityshare a common understanding of key concepts and terms’’. � ‘‘The ICES scientific community communicates important

results in an easily understood manner’’.

All of the stakeholder categories acknowledged that a commonunderstanding was lacking and that significant improvementswere needed in this area. In terms of the individual stakeholdergroups, ten groups noted different understanding among thestakeholders as an issue, including representatives from allcountries (including both Icelandic groups). Nine stakeholdergroups also noted three other concerns: the different interestsand agendas of the stakeholders, lack of effective disseminationand listening, and communicated results that are difficult tounderstand. Each of these concerns was noted by all the Greekinterest groups, with: the first also mentioned by two groupsfrom Spain, the UK and the Faroe Islands; the second alsomentioned by three Faroese groups and two Spanish groups;and the third also mentioned by both Icelandic groups and threeSpanish groups. Among the other comments raised, an overlytechnical presentation style, stakeholder exclusion and differentperspectives among stakeholders were also noted by four or fiveof the stakeholder groups, including all of the Greek groups forthe first two comments. The Greek stakeholder groups also agreedon a further concern, the lack of training in scientific concepts.Each of these areas offers opportunities for targeted improve-ments, especially where these issues have a national emphasis.

‘‘Common vision’’ (T8) also attracted a generally pessimisticview from the stakeholders, with almost all stakeholder groupsnoting it as lacking. A range of potential reasons for this negativeview were included in the respondent’s comments to the state-ment ‘‘Fisheries stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmentalgroups, fisheries managers, etc.’) and the ICES scientific commu-nity share a common understanding of the type of informationand advice required to make fisheries management decisions’’,summarised in Table 6. The most commonly cited explanationwas the general lack of common understanding which was

Table 4Summary of comments for the competence trust statements.

Competence trust statements Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T4 and T5 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

Insufficient knowledge X X X X

Data issues and poor science X X X X X X

Poor knowledge of stocks X

Lack of holistic view of the fishery X

Questions over flexibility of methods and expertise X X

Ecosystem approach given little time X

Inappropriate time lags in the science X

Questions over scientific community’s competence and credibility X X

Questions over scientific community’s trustworthiness X

Information and advice lacks management relevance X X

Advice lacks credibility X X

Political and lobby group interference X X X

Scientists have own agendas X X

Lack of stakeholder involvement and knowledge X X X

Science is ignored during decision-making X

Institutional inefficiency X

Poor communication of recommendations X X X X X X

Negative consequences of previous advice X X

Table 3Summary of comments for the general trust statements.

General trust statements Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

T1Science is weak

Science is unresponsive X X X

Science is unreliable and untrustworthy X X

Lacks soundness and credibility X X X X X X X

Science process is questionable X

Lack of data continuity X

Numerous variables to consider X

Only work on general issues not fishery specific issues X

It is out of touch with the industry X

Does not respect industry knowledge and issues X X

Does not consider marine ecosystems X

Science is biased and politically influenced X X

Scientists have their own agendas X

Not all information is included in the advice X

Relevance is questioned X X

Not all the required information is produced X

T2Flawed data and weak science X X X X

Underestimation of risks X

Lack of socio-economic information X

Insufficient investment in research X

Science is inconclusive X

Science is unreliable X

Out of data scientific methods X

Not all information is included in advice X X X

Mis-presentation X

Not all the required information is produced X

Questions over goal setting process X

Mis-matched time scales between science and management X

Lack of responsiveness X

Politically influenced X X

Biased in favour of stakeholders X

Biased in favour of funding agencies X

Insufficient attention to industry X

Scientists have their own agendas X

T3Advice is not always correct X

Issues over data and methods X X X X X X X

Bias in favour of certain stakeholders X

Decisions rarely favour fishermen X X

Advice generates problems for the fishing sector X X X

Poor decision-making X

Administrators lack objectivity X

Require evidence of good underlying science X

Require meaningful solutions X

Require evidence that will have positive effect X

Require it to be well justified X X

May require economic compensation X

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 63

Table 5Summary of comments for the common language trust statements.

Common language statements Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T6 and T7 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

Different interests and agendas among stakeholders X X X X X X X X X

Different understanding among stakeholders X X X X X X X X X X

Different perspectives among stakeholders X X X X

Different definitions tend to confuse X

Different language used by stakeholders X

Results and concepts are politically manipulated X

Lack of training in the concepts X X X

Hampered by stakeholder exclusion X X X X

Lack of effective dissemination and listening X X X X X X X X X

Fisheries stakeholders often lack opinions that could be incorporated X

Compounded by the media X

Inconsistent results X

Communicated results are not easy to understand X X X X X X X X X

Presentation style is too technical X X X X X

Presentation style used hide the reality X

Lack of risk communication X

Lack of standardisation X

Table 6Summary of comments for the common vision trust statement.

Common vision statement Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T8 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

General lack of common understanding X X X X X X X X

Different language among stakeholders X

Different interests among stakeholders X X X X

Different perceptions of requirements X

Lack of understanding over information required and scientific process X X X

Lack of common scientific training X X X

Controversy over research methodologies X X

More complex dynamic models needed X X

Only one source of information X

Solutions are not provided with the advice X

Lack of socio-economic advice X

Lack of communication between stakeholders X

Exclusion of stakeholders X X X

Lack of appreciation of each other’s issues X

Negative response from fishermen undermines willingness to involve them X

Political and lobbing group influence X

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7264

mentioned by respondents from eight stakeholder groups includ-ing all the Faroese groups. Other than this, divergent interestsamong stakeholders, different perceptions of information require-ments and scientific processes, and the exclusion of stakeholderswere mentioned by three or four groups of respondents. Whilemost of the mentioned issues have the potential for address, thedivergent interests among stakeholders was noted by the scien-tists as being particularly challenging in the development of anycommon vision.

The next component of trust, ‘‘benevolence’’ (T9 and T10)(Table 7) attracted some interesting comments, with on the onehand several scientists stating that it was not ICES job to act in thebest interests of stakeholders and policy-makers commentingthat ICES should be independent and only act in the interests ofstakeholders through being independent. On the other hand,many of the fishers and fishers’ organisations noted benevolenceto be lacking, especially in respect of benevolence towardsstakeholders. The respondents generally noted that there wasgreater benevolence towards the second of the statements—‘‘TheICES scientific community is interested in the sustainability of thefishery as well as the sustainability of living marine resources andprotecting the marine environment’’, which is more biologicallydefined, than the first aimed at the socio-economic actors (‘‘The

ICES scientific community acts in the best interests of all stake-holders, including the fishing industry’’).

In terms of agreement among the stakeholder groups overspecific issues, only the first statement demonstrated more than acouple of groups noting any of the comments. Four groups notedthat ICES should be independent and not act in stakeholderinterests, with a further three supporting this by noting that thefisheries science community acts in the interests of stocks notstakeholders. There was also agreement (notably among theGreek groups) that political influence and lobbying, and thescientists own agendas were issues, with a further three groupsstating that benevolence was undermined by stakeholder exclu-sion. Whether or not benevolence should fall within the mandateof the ICES and national scientific community, it is evident thatthere is a perception among a number of groups that it is lacking,particularly in respect of the stakeholders.

The ‘‘receptivity’’ trust statement (T11) – ‘‘The ICES scientificcommunity is willing to consider alternative ideas and sources offisheries ‘‘knowledge’’ (e.g. those from the fishing industry orenvironmental groups)’’ – received comments conveying a rangeof perceptions (Table 8). Some policy-makers felt that the scien-tists were willing, but that there were a variety of reasons why itdid not happen in practice, while scientists noted willingness and

Table 7Summary of comments for the benevolence trust statements.

Benevolence trust statementsIceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

T9Should be independent X X X X

Acts in the interests of stocks not fishermen X X X

Questions whether acts in best interests of ALL stakeholders X

It is the manager’s job to take on stakeholder interests X

Political and lobbying influence X X X

Serves scientists own agendas X X X X

Serves the agendas of fund holders X X

Undermined by stakeholder exclusion X X X

Alienates the industry

The benefits to the fishery are indirect X

The system is a ‘‘mess’’ X

The theoretical basis of the science is lacking X

Based on flawed data X

T10Evidence that ICES is not committed to sustainability X

No direct interest in exploitation of stocks X

Interested but going about it the wrong way X X

Interested but does not always pan out X

Not part of ICES’ job description X

Requires independence X

Undermined by fisher exclusion X

Undermined by systems’ error X

Disagreement on the approach X

Research is biased and influenced X X

Biased towards conservation X

Limited funding, biased in favour of the agendas of the funding agencies X X

Scientists work mainly for financial and personal interests X X

Lack of common ground or shared concerns among stakeholders X

Just reflects current trends X

Table 8Summary of comments for the receptivity trust statement.

Receptivity trust statement Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T11 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

ICES considers but does not agree with the alternatives X

Not willing to listen or consider alternatives X X X X

Undermined by decisions being the preserve of politicians X X

Inflexible approaches X X X X X

Almost exclusive use of biological data & analysis X

Undermined by stakeholder exclusion X X X

Constrained by funding agency dictate X

Scientific rigour and integrity of the alternatives needs substantiating X

Depends on the individual scientist X

Takes a long time to integrate new approaches X

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 65

reluctance depending on the individual. The fishers generallynoted that fisheries scientists were not willing to consider alter-natives. In terms of the specific comments raised: five stakeholdergroups cited inflexible approaches within the scientific commu-nity as a problem, including two groups from Greece and the UK;four groups (including both Icelandic groups) cited that the fish-eries science community was not willing to listen to or consideralternatives; and three noted that receptivity was undermined bystakeholder exclusion.

The two ‘‘strong ties’’ statements (T12 and T13)—‘‘Non-gov-ernmental organisations (e.g. the fishing industry, environmentalgroups, etc.’) are able to access and interact with ICES scientistssatisfactorily’’ and ‘‘Inclusion of non-governmental organisations(e.g. the fishing industry, environmental groups, etc.’) in theICES science process improves transparency’’ received differentcomments from the participants. These two sets of comments

have, therefore, been separated within Table 9. It was broadlyacknowledged that inclusion improved transparency, noted byrespondents from seven stakeholder groups (including two fromGreece, Spain and the UK). There was also a general impressionthat transparency could be improved, notably through greaterstakeholder involvement although this itself introduced chal-lenges. Four groups, including two from the UK cited stakeholderexclusion as currently undermining transparency. Following onfrom these observations, the comments to the first statementsupport the observation that inclusion could be improved, withthree groups noting that scientists are reluctant to cooperate, fournoting that it depends on individual scientists and a further threenoting that access and interaction is best where there is acommon scientific background between the two parties. Thereis an evidently stronger tie between certain combinations ofstakeholders than others, which may explain suggestions of bias

Table 9Summary of comments for the strong ties trust statements.

Strong ties statementsIceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

T12Access is a problem X

Questionable whether interaction is meaningful X X

Scientists are reluctant to cooperate X X X

Not in relation to the industry X

Unwilling to utilise fishermen’s knowledge X

Undermined by divergent interests and foci X

Communication gap between scientists & stakeholders X

Lack of common language X

Exists where there is joint involvement on projects X

Better where there is a common scientific background X X X

Depends on individual scientists X X X X

NGO don’t make an effort to interact

Stakeholders have own agendas and choose to work separately X

Undermined by aggressive stakeholder attitudes X

T13Inclusion improves transparency X X X X X X X

Inclusion would assist a common understanding X

More transparency is needed X X

Transparency results from pressure group action X X X

Scientists are reluctant to cooperate X

Current stakeholder exclusion undermines transparency X X X X

Undermined by political influence X

Undermined by lack of common understanding of the science X

Inclusion can result in too many involved X

Harder to focus on main points and remain independent X X

More hope than experience X X

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7266

and political influence in the comments to the other truststatements. There are also certain barriers revealed that need tobe overcome before the ties can become inclusive, as with theexclusion of stakeholders.

The two ‘‘integrity’’ trust statements (T14 and T15) alsoattracted different comments, which are correspondingly sepa-rated out in Table 10:

‘‘The information and advice produced by the ICES scientificcommunity is objective and has integrity’’. � ‘‘In general, members of the ICES scientific community would

use any information provided to them in confidence sensi-tively and only in the manner for which it was intended’’.

Marked among the comments for these statements is anexpressed hope that they be true, which implies that while therewas a widespread belief of integrity among the respondents, somehoped rather than new it to be true. The scientists took a similarstance, noting that they saw no reason to doubt the scientificcommunity’s integrity, but recognised that there are always goingto be exceptions to the rule. In terms of the specific concernsraised only the first of the two statements attracted commentswith agreement from more than a couple of groups, with fivegroups (including two from Greece) noting bias and politicalinfluence as undermining integrity and four noting a lack ofintegrity per se. In terms of the second statement, the commentsinfer a potential for the misuse of confidential information that islargely circumstance and individual specific. The issues associatedwith the second statement may be down to improved datahandling procedures and greater transparency, while the con-cerns associated with the former statement are more challengingto resolve if true, but the preserve of improved communication ifarise out of mis-perception.

The predictability trust statement (T16)—‘‘The ICES scientificcommunity carries out its work in a consistent, reliable andpredictable manner’’ attracted a range of responses, with generalagreement from most groups of respondents (Table 11). However,while the work was cited as consistent and predictable this waslargely attributed to inflexibility within the scientific process,which may not be seen as a positive attribute. The othercomponent of the statement, reliability, attracted more criticism,with political influence and bias and the poor quality of thescience being noted as undermining reliability (each highlightedby three groups of respondents). There were also a number ofother causes of unreliability cited by the respondents, pertainingto the approaches used and institutional inefficiencies. Interest-ingly, most of the issues cited were by Greek stakeholder groups,which might focus attention for the scientific community in thiscountry.

The last group of trust statements – the ‘‘credibility’’ truststatements (T17 and T18) – attracted similar comments, such thatthey are combined in Table 12. Each of the stakeholder categoriesgenerally saw the ICES scientific community to be credible, bothin terms of the scientific information and advice it produces andin its actions. However, they also acknowledged that it is notperfect despite the scientists’ efforts, with fishers and fishers’organisations showing less conviction than the other two groups.In terms of the individual comments, there are four commentsthat were cited widely by the stakeholder groups: seven groups(including all four Greek groups) noted political and lobby groupinfluence as compromising credibility; six groups (including threefrom Spain and two from the UK) noted lack of independence andimpartiality in the fisheries science community’s actions and afurther five (primarily the Spanish groups) noted the same inrespect of their information and advice. The last point withagreement was also along the same lines, notably the influenceof concealed interests, which was cited by both Icelandic groups

Table 10Summary of comments for the integrity trust statements.

Integrity trust statementsIceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

T14Undermined by weak science X X

Lack of objectivity in the advice X X

Lack of integrity X X X X

Biased and politically influenced X X X X X

Undermined by concealed interests and system’s error X

Scientific objectivity is lost in management decision-making X

More hope than experience X

T15Information not always used as expected X

Mis-use of information X

Instances where not kept confidential X

Depends on the circumstances X X

Depends on the person X

Not reliable X

Issue on how to present confidential data X

Stakeholders are rarely approached for information X

Lack of trust undermines cooperation X

More hope than experience X X

Table 11Summary of comments for the predictability trust statement.

Predictability trust statement Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T16 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

ICES’ work lacks consistency X

There is much bureaucracy X

Reliability undermined by:

�political influence and bias X X X

�poor quality of science X X X

�inflexible methods X X

�data uncertainty being ignored X

�institutional inefficiencies X

Undermined by poor previous decision-making and negative impacts X

Consistent but not in favour of fishermen X

Depends on the individual scientist X

Depends on the circumstances X

Its more hope than experience X

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 67

and Greek policy-makers. It is evident from these comments thatthe lack of independence is a principal reason for the perceivedlack of credibility in the work and outputs of the scientificcommunity.

5.3. Correlation results

Moving to the last notable area of analysis undertaken inrespect of trust, the correlations, the discussion explores theextent of linear relationships between the various trust state-ments. The analysis employed Pearson’s product–moment corre-lations across the data produced by each country and group ofstakeholders to produce correlation matrices, also known assimilarity matrices, which while not permitting causal relation-ships to be concluded, do identify linkages and potential associa-tions between variables to assist in targeting risk communicationstrategies. It is evident from the results that there are bothpositive and linear relations between the responses to differentcomponents of the survey. These, however, generally differbetween the categories of respondents, with some countries andstakeholder categories showing more and stronger significantcorrelations than others.

Taking first the participants’ responses to the trust statementsaggregated into the four main stakeholder groups (fishers, fishers’organisations, policy-makers and scientists) (Fig. 5), it is evidentthat there is broad agreement between the groups in terms oftheir agreement and disagreement with the trust statements, asall the correlation coefficients are positive. The strongest correla-tion is between scientists and policy-makers (r¼0.854), a resultwhich possibly reflects the role that scientists play in fisheriesregulation and management and their often close involvementwith the policy process. It is also interesting to note that in thedetail behind these aggregate scores there is close agreementbetween scientists from different countries over their perceptionsof certain components of trust and evidence that scientists andpolicy-makers are similar in regard to their perceptions of trust.The remaining associations in contrast proved not to be so strong.

In Fig. 6 the aggregation of scores is by country (Faroes, Greece,Iceland, Spain and UK), and again all the correlation coefficientsproved positive. However, there is rather more variation in thepattern of results, with the strongest correlation between the FaroeIslands and Iceland (r¼0.785) and the lowest between Greece andIceland (r¼0.390). These correlations demonstrate trends that crossthe national borders. Behind these aggregate figures, while each

Table 12Summary of comments for the credibility trust statements.

Credibility trust statements Iceland Greece Spain UK Faroes

T17 and T18 F S F P S F O P S F O P S F O P S

ICES Information and advice is not all independent or impartial X X X X X

ICES actions are not all independent or impartial X X X X X X

Biased towards conservation X

Political and lobby group influence X X X X X X X

Concealed interests at work X X X

Political corruption of advice (despite independent science) X X

Advice serves administrators not the industry X

Affected by funding priorities X

Undermined by pre-determined ICES approaches X

Its more hope than experience X

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18

General Competence Common language Vision Benevolence Receptivity Strong ties Integrity Predictability Credibility

FIS

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10 ** * ** ** * ** * * ** ** ** ** *11 * * * *12 * **13 * * ** ** ** ** **14 ** ** * ** * ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **15 * ** * ** * * ** ** ** **16 * * * ** * ** * ** ** ** ** *17 * * ** ** **18 * * ** ** ** * **

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Notes:* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

- Negative correlation

Shading:Dark = strong correlation (r = 0.7 to 1.0)

Light = weak correlation (r = 0.3 to 0.7)

Fig. 5. Strength and significance of correlations coefficients between the trust statements–stakeholders.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7268

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18

General Competence Common language Vision Benevolence Receptivity Strong ties Integrity Predictability CredibilityIC

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Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). - Negative correlation Shading:Dark = strong correlation (r = 0.7 to 1.0) Light = weak correlation (r = 0.3 to 0.7)

Fig. 6. Strength and significance of correlations coefficients between the trust statements–nations.

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 69

country exhibited patterns of correlations specific to themselves, allthe case study countries and stakeholder categories demonstratedstrong correlations between the ‘‘general’’ trust statements and the‘‘competence’’ trust statements and between the ‘‘integrity’’,

‘‘predictability’’ and ‘‘credibility’’ statements. In addition, respon-dents from the UK, Iceland and the Faroe Islands (and to a lesserextent Greece) demonstrated correlation between the responses tothe ‘‘general’’ and ‘‘competence’’ statements and those for the latter

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H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–7270

three groups. These correlations convey that greater agreement/disagreement in one of these areas of trust is matched by greateragreement/disagreement with the other. Evidently these areas oftrust have broad alignment in the minds of stakeholders to thefisheries science process.

Table 13 shows the respondents’ scores aggregated intosmaller groups, defined by both sectional interest and country,giving a more fine-grained picture of the perceptions of trust. Inthe matrix, correlation coefficients between r¼0.7 and up tor¼0.8 have been shown in italics and those of r¼0.8 or abovein bold. The pattern is revealing, and shows that there is relativelyclose agreement amongst scientists of different countries over theimportance of particular components of trust. There is againevidence that scientists and policy-makers are similar in regardto their attitudes. The strongest correlations in that section of thematrix are r¼0.874 (Faroese scientists and UK policy-makers) andr¼0.879 (Faroese scientists and Faroese policy-makers).

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6. Discussion and conclusions

It is evident from this study, albeit limited, that there is a lackof trust in the fisheries science community, notably among certaingroups of stakeholders, primarily fishers (particularly those fromthe UK and Faroe Islands), with whom the scientists have limitedcontact. In contrast, the scientists recorded the strongest trust, aswould be expected, albeit with caveats. The other groups exhibitvarying degrees and forms of trust.

In terms of the components of the trust diagram (Fig. 2), ittended to be the right hand side of the diagram—integrity,predictability and credibility that attracted the greatest agreement,along with the more biologically defined benevolence statement.The left hand side of the diagram raised greater issue among manyof the stakeholder groups. It is evident that in these areas there aretrust issues that may well warrant attention through, for example,improved communication and reaching out to the stakeholders.

Notable from the results is the lack of consensus on theexistence of a common language and vision, and in respect ofthe second competence trust statement pertaining to whether thescientific community performs its stated role well. To a lesserdegree there is also marked disagreement with the benevolencestatement addressing whether the scientific community acts inthe best interests of all stakeholders. With regard to the latter,multiple respondents noted that the scientific community neededto be independent and not act in the interests of stakeholders,while fishers noted their frustration at not seeming to beconsidered within the science and subsequent decision-making.

In contrast to these statements, there was broad consensus overa number of the other statements with only one or two groupsdisagreeing with each, notably:

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0.1

48

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17

0.4

64

0.5

01

0.3

58

0.2

57

0.3

81

0.3

52

0.4

79

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31

0.5

87

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35

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68

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39

0.5

65

0.3

96

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T15—‘‘In general, members of the ICES scientific communitywould use any information provided to them in confidencesensitively and only in the manner for which it was intended’’(Integrity).

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T16—‘‘The ICES scientific community carries out its work in aconsistent, reliable and predictable manner’’ (Predictability).

In terms of the issues noted as undermining trust, a wide rangewas extracted from the comments registered by the respondents

H. Glenn et al. / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 54–72 71

for each of the trust statements. However, only one or tworeceived broad agreement, notably: a lack of soundness andcredibility, unresponsive and inflexible, flawed data and weakscience, poor communications, political and lobby group inter-ference, and lack of stakeholder involvement. Many of theseissues were cited in response to more than one of the truststatements, reinforcing their significance. In terms of the twotrust categories that attracted the broadest disagreement –common language and common vision – there were particularissues raised: divergent understanding, interests and agendasamong stakeholders, inappropriately technical presentation stylesand stakeholder exclusion. The first of these was noted as aparticular challenge in any development of a common languageand vision, while the latter in many respects seems to be at oddswith the widely cited need for the scientific community to beindependent, unless one uses another term cited—‘‘impartial’’.

When these findings are supplemented with the outputs of thecorrelations undertaken it is evident that several stakeholdergroups exhibit common attitudes to the components of trust.However, there is also diversity therein and a large number ofundermining issues at work, particularly with respect to specificcountries, stakeholder groups and respondents. There wouldappear to be no correlation evident between the responses andthe fisheries management regime adopted by a country, so issuesof trust are challenges for all regimes, although one could drawinconclusive inferences between some of the issues and responsesraised and particular national characteristics.

Given the role played by trust in engaging cooperation andparticipation in fisheries science and management, the trustissues raised represent both constraints and opportunities forthe desired improvements in fisheries science and management.Where there is broad agreement with the trust statements, theissues raised offer opportunities for marginal improvement.Where there is disagreement with the statements, the issuesshould focus the minds of the scientific community. While someof the issues may appear intransigent, such as opposing stake-holder interests and agendas, the resolution for others may liewith improved communications along the lines of participativedecision-making [67] and the exchange of information andrecognition of institutional and cultural contexts within which‘‘risk messages’’ are created [68]. The vast majority of thecomments recorded in connection with the ‘‘trust statements’’represent factors introducing risk into the fisheries scienceprocess, and consequently subjects of risk communication.As Bostrom [67:563] notes, risk communication ‘‘can changemental models of risks by correcting errors, shifting emphases,filling in gaps, and providing details to specify vague or generalbeliefs’’.

It is not all down to increasing the level of communicationhowever. When the frequency of communication with differentstakeholder groups is correlated with the responses to the truststatements it is evident that the level of communication is apotential contributory factor therein, being shown to have arelationship to the respondents’ trust in fisheries science. How-ever, while specific to individual countries, with some demon-strating a broader range of significant correlations than others,the relationship is not always one of increasing trust withincreasing frequency of communication. Notable observationsinclude that where there is a significant correlation with thefrequency of contact with scientists in Greece, the UK and theFaroe Islands, the correlation tends to be negative conveyinggreater trust. For the Faroe Islands and UK the same is true forsignificant correlations with the frequency of contact with ‘‘other’’stakeholders. The majority of other significant correlations, incontrast, are positive (with a few exceptions), indicating greaterdisagreement with more frequent contact. It is evident here that

the manner and content of communication and stakeholderparticipation is as important as the level of communication.

While ‘‘education’’ and ‘‘top-down’’ communications may beviewed as satisfactory for a number of the issues raised, theirdiversity would indicate that a more all-encompassing approachis relevant, to develop the common understanding and vision sonotably missing and yet fundamental and to build on the othercomponents of trust. Participative decision-making, two-waydialogue and the exchange of information and recognition ofinstitutional and cultural contexts serve a number of the needs offisheries stakeholders, thereby warranting further exploration. Itcan provide for greater stakeholder involvement, correct mis-perceptions, build relations, enhance mutual understanding, andhelp to resolve conflicts and encourage cooperation. This processneeds to be ongoing. Unfortunately, institutions, processes, agen-das, issues, personalities, challenges and perceptions evolve andchange, consequently communication needs to be flexible andresponsive, evaluating and evolving in response. Unfortunately, asthe comments in this survey note, flexibility and responsivenessis not a strong point of the fisheries scientific community.

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