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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ONFUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

MISSION REPORT

CAGLIARI, NAPLES ANDROME, ITALY

28-30 OCTOBER 2015

www.nato-pa.int 25 January 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. A delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee (DSC) observed Trident Juncture Exercise (TRJE 15) on 28 October 2015 in Sardinia, Italy. Trident Juncture Exercise was a key test of the newly reconfigured NATO Response Force (NRF) and its ability to deploy NATO forces to any corner of the Alliance in 48-72 hours. The delegation’s visit to the exercise was part of a broader parliamentary mission to Italy to assess the diverse and complex challenges facing NATO’s southern flank.

2. Trident Juncture was NATO’s largest exercise in over a decade and focused on testing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), an essential component of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The RAP was a key outcome of the Wales Summit in September 2014 to adapt NATO forces in response to the evolving European security environment, which currently faces a range of threats emanating from both its eastern and southern flanks. The RAP was the principal subject of study of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) in 2015. The Committee’s report on the subject, NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Assurance and Deterrence for the Post-2014 Security Environment [167 DSCFC 15 E bis], is available on the NATO PA website.

3. Delegation members continued their parliamentary visit after observing Trident Juncture with visits to NATO Joint Force Command–Naples (JFCNP), the Italian Parliament, and Naval Fleet Command Headquarters (CINCNAV) in Rome. The visit consisted of meetings with high-level representatives of both NATO and the Italian government, covering a range of issues affecting Mediterranean security, with a particular focus on the growing refugee and migrant crisis. Raymond Knops (Netherlands) led the delegation of 13 parliamentarians from 6 different NATO member states throughout the visit.

4. This mission report will progress thematically. First, it will review the changed European security environment driving NATO’s most recent adaptation. It will follow with a description of Trident Juncture Exercise and a brief overview of the delegation’s visit to the exercise in Sardinia, Italy. It will then examine the evolving role of NATO’s JFCNP in the new European security environment, with a particular emphasis on southern flank threats. It will then examine the political and security dimensions of the Mediterranean immigration crisis from the broader European level as well as the specific impact it is having on Italy. The report will close with an overview of the mandate of CINCNAV.

II. NATO READINESS POST-2014

5. In particular, the European security environment is undergoing a sea change. In early 2014 the Alliance witnessed the renewal of strategic competition with Russia after its brazen seizure of Crimea. By the summer, ISIS (or Daesh) launched a surprising military operation into Iraq, capturing large swathes of territory and urban centres, announcing to the world the challenge 21st

century non-state armed groups can pose at the regional and global levels - the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, almost into its 5th year, have added even more layers of complexity to the European security arena. Pressed by diverse and complex challenges to the east and south, the transatlantic security community has been forced to adapt.1

6. NATO’s first big step toward adaptation was taken at the Wales Summit in September 2014, when member states decided to revamp the existing NATO Response Forces (NRF) in an effort to reduce the time needed to move Alliance forces to any corner of member state territory in

1 The Defence and Security Committee has written about many aspects of the evolving European security environment through its various mission and committee reports since 2014. For reference on any specific parliamentary mission or committee report covering new threats to NATO and its subsequent adaptation, please see www.nato-pa.int

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response to significant threat. The ability to reduce the time to alert, stage, and deploy capable forces across the Alliance is essential to what became known as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). Another key outcome of the Wales Summit was the Defense Spending Pledge, which called upon all member states to halt defence budget cuts and to move toward dedicating 2% GDP toward their defence industries (with at least 20% dedicated to new equipment and R&D) over the coming decade.

7. The logic behind each of these principal outcomes of the Wales Summit was readily apparent: the Alliance needed to be able to react quickly to new symmetrical and asymmetrical challenges along its eastern and southern flanks in Europe – the RAP is a step in this direction, but it must be sustained over the long-run, a challenge in an environment that has seen drastic defence cuts throughout the Alliance since 2008.

8. The reorganization of the NRF is purported to expand the NRF from its previous size of 13,000 personnel to 40,000. To enable the NRF’s ability to bring firepower and manoeuvre to any corner of the Alliance, the NRF acquired a ‘spearhead force’, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The spearhead is slated to be a 5,000-strong brigade deployable within 48-72 hours. In a crisis, the VJTF will be followed by two brigades as a part of the Initial Follow-on Forces Group (IFFG). As the NATO-Russia Founding Act precludes the permanent stationing of combat forces in Eastern Europe, the VJTF is to conduct regular exercises in the eastern part of the NATO Alliance regularly.

9. Conceived in response to the growing perception of a possible Russian threat, but also understood to be adaptable for crisis response to the south, the VJTF is currently being supported by countries volunteering to be framework nations. While Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands provided troops throughout 2015 for the VJTF’s interim capabilities, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the UK will assume responsibility for the force in the coming years.

A. TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015

10. Trident Juncture Exercise rolled out across Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, as well as in Belgium, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands from October 3 to November 6, 2015. The exercise involved over 36,000 personnel from 30 Allied and Partner nations. The exercise sought to demonstrate NATO’s new readiness level as outlined by the RAP – meaning the Alliance’s increased ambition in joint modern warfare to meet today’s security challenges. In addition to armed forces, 12 different international organizations (such as the EU and AU), aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations also contribute to the exercise in an effort to lend a comprehensive approach.

11. As briefers noted to the delegation, TRJE 15 was a computer-assisted, command post exercise followed by a two-week live exercise. The Joint Warfare Center (JWC) developed a fictitious training scenario “SOROTAN” to establish the conditions necessary to exercise NATO’s ability to meet projected operational challenges through 2020. JWC endeavored to develop a scenario presenting a complex and unstable environment to encompass a hypothetical setting beset by rising political instability, ethnic tensions underscored by persistent socio-economic challenges, ultimately resulting in the invasion of one state’s territory by another. As a result of the fictitious invasion, a UN-mandated and NATO-led, non-Article V Crisis Response Operation was to deploy in a region far from NATO’s home territory. The SOROTAN scenario included a range of conventional and unconventional threats to challenge NATO forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic warfare levels.

12. Throughout the over month-long exercise, military and civilian staff refined their collective ability to coordinate their air, land, maritime, and Special Forces in complex environments as a means of improving their full spectrum capabilities. The test was the largest ever of the NRF’s ability to counter contemporary security threats and assess future needs. In addition, the scenario

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was designed to facilitate the application of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and the Comprehensive Approach to crisis management by both military and civilian organizations.

B. LIVE EXERCISE DEMONSTRATION – TEULADA MILITARY TRAINING AREA

13. On the morning of 28 October, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation from the DSC drove out to the Teulada Military Training Area on the southern coast of Sardinia for a two-hour live-fire demonstration conducted by NATO forces. After the successful completion of the morning’s live exercise, the delegation visited with the troops and toured the training area’s command and control facilities.

14. The delegation was welcomed to the military training area by the commanders in charge of the exercises taking place in Southern Sardinia: Lieutenant-General Alberto Primicerj, Italian Operational Land Forces Commander; Brigadier General Arturo Nitti, “Sassari” Brigade Commander; and, Major-General Salih Sevil, Chief of Staff, NATO Land Command. After a drive into the training area, Lieutenant-General Primicerj briefed the parliamentarians on the scenario, scope, scale, and goals of the day’s exercise, which was referred to as Shardana Exercise 2015. The generals and their staff engaged with the parliamentarians in a running discussion during the course of the exercise.

15. In his address to the troops upon the exercise’s completion, Mr Knops noted that in the increasingly complex and menacing security environment surrounding the NATO’s eastern and southern flanks, he was “proud to have such capable forces on the frontlines, defending our common interests and values.” DSCFC Chairman-elect, Xavier Pintat (France), who authored the sub-committee’s report on the RAP noted that the morning’s exercise “was a great success, proving the successful organization and testing of the new NRF posture within the timeframe drawn up after the Wales Summit.”

C. ARTILLERY BRIGADE HQ AND UNEXPECTED MIGRANT ARRIVAL

16. After observing the live-fire two-hour exercise, the parliamentarians received a briefing at the Artillery Brigade Headquarters. The parliamentarians learned about the role of the Italian Field Artillery Headquarters in peacetime and its subsequent adaptation to take part in the exercise (logistical and tactical organizational needs to be able to achieve the exercise’s mission).

17. During the visit to the artillery HQ, the scheduled artillery fire demonstration was called off very unexpectedly. The reason for the cancellation of the live fire demonstration was the arrival of a migrant raft off the shore of the peninsula; within immediate vicinity of the military training area, and, therefore, in the line of fire of the artillery guns. It was reported to the delegation that the raft had been intercepted and the migrants helped ashore to begin the process of asylum application.

18. The arrival of the migrant raft into the firing range served as a poignant reminder of the growing complexity of the European security environment, as the challenges and variables emanating from both the east and south are becoming increasingly intertwined. When asked if such an event had occurred previously during the exercise, an American soldier said no. Several parliamentarians noted that the occurrence served as a stark reminder that the problem of migrant crossings in the southern Mediterranean persisted and that all member states needed to think of new ways to address the problem.

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D. VISIT TO JOINT FORCE COMMAND-NAPLES (JFCNP)

19. On the morning of October 29, the delegation arrived in Naples, Italy for a briefing on the mission and core tasks of JFCNP. JFCNP’s Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Alain J. Parent (CA) and Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Leonardo Di Marco (IT) welcomed the delegation.

20. NATO’s Joint Force Command – Naples is one of two Allied Joint Headquarters in the Alliance command structure, the other being JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands. As briefers told the delegation during its morning visit to JFCNP, the mission and core tasks of the Allied Joint HQ in Naples, Italy is to “prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to preserve the peace, security, and territorial integrity of Alliance member states and freedom of the seas and economic lifelines throughout SACEUR’s Area of responsibility and beyond.” As such, JFCNP has three essential core tasks and four lines of effort.

21. JFCNP’s core tasks encompass the principal defensive efforts of the Alliance: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. To execute its mission, the delegation learned that JFCNP has the following four lines of effort: assigned operations and missions; command of the NRF; conduct objective-based engagement; and, NATO’s strategic direction south. Respectively, this means the following:

- JFCNP is specifically assigned to oversee NATO’s ongoing operation in Kosovo (KFOR), review other missions (principally train, advise, and assist for integration into the Euro-Atlantic security community) in the Balkans; implementation of the Readiness Action Plan; and, working on partnership capacity through cooperation with the African Union.

- JFCNP was assigned lead command of the NRF in 2015, which entailed the testing and exercise of the interim-VJTF.

- JFCNP’s objective-based engagement tasks focus on contributing to defence and security in the southern regions (e.g. Mediterranean and MENA), and furthering Allied-Partner cooperation.

- JFCNP’s final line of effort is its responsibility to focus on the evolution of security threats from the south: including the implementation of necessary adaptation measures; maintain a constant level of situational awareness through the evaluation of near and long-term threats; and, MENA assistance options.

22. After the general command briefing, members of the defence committee asked several questions. The main questioning revolved around the current personnel and resources dedicated to JFCNP, the command’s ongoing operation in Kosovo and the status of security in the region, as well as the command’s level of cooperation with the African Union.

E. NATO’S STRATEGIC DIRECTION SOUTH (NSD-S): THREATS AND CHALLENGES

23. The briefing covering NSD-S defined the area as “the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel, and Sub-Sahara Africa and adjacent areas, waters and airspace.” The broad overview noted that there were six principal threats and challenges to NSD-S: First, competing states in the region, which were defined as states with competing national objectives with the potential to descend into an openly adversarial relationship with the Alliance; second, irregular threat networks, which are defined as state-sponsored and ideologically-inspired sub-national organizations (e.g. AQAP and al Shabab); third, hybrid threats, defined as actors capable of applying a broad spectrum of complex and integrated military and non-military instruments, which are easily adaptable (e.g. Hezbollad, Daesh, etc.) [The DSC did a comprehensive study of hybrid threats and warfare throughout 2015 – the report can be found on our website;] fourth, local armed groups organized around tribal, clan or village interests functioning either in opposition to or in concert with local governments; fifth, broad-based criminal networks. The sixth and final threat and challenge was

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identified as crisis spillover into NATO territory. Briefers noted that this sixth challenge “overmatch governments’ ability to respond to crisis [sic] creating large flows of displaced persons and refugees.”

24. Each of the threats and challenges were discussed in more detail by the briefer and a lively exchange of views between the parliamentarians and JFCNP command staff ensued, particularly over the growing threat presented by Daesh, and the broader spillover challenges posed by the Syrian civil war specifically, and the broader problem of expanding conflict and weak and failing states in the MENA region.

25. JFCNP command stressed several key events and documents that underscored the efforts of the Alliance toward the southern flank explaining the adaptation measures needed for appropriate response and strategic guidance. The principal themes stressed were the ongoing evolution of the strategy toward the south as a coherent means of coordinating and integrating Alliance activities in the region and enhancing NATO’s regional defence capabilities. All of this, they noted, a general need to improve understanding of the regional at all levels. They also noted a desire to create a working forum to share this information and to leverage cooperation. Undergirding Alliance efforts would be a broader push to support and develop Partners’ abilities for ever more enhanced partnerships and relationships with both regional state actors, international organizations, and other agencies.

26. JFCNP Command and the delegation then engaged in a discussion about the future orientation of the Command. The lively interaction spurred both the military commanders and parliamentarians to think about how to engage in a future that would surely continue to present a range of complex security challenges populated with a range of state and non-state actors. A particular point stressed by JFCNP command was the need to push the Alliance and, therefore, all of its member states to think collectively about a more comprehensive approach to the security challenges they face through a real application of the whole-of-alliance power they are able to draw from at the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and legal levels – the so-called DIME-FL. Commanders noted the need for a better level of interaction and communication between the political leadership and the military commands. Parliamentarians stressed the vital role that can be played going forward by NATO member state parliaments as they serve as a unique link between populations and member state governments. This link, it was discussed, is increasingly important as a mechanism to explain policy decisions and to have parliaments question the direction of the investment of national resources.

27. During the visit to JFCNP briefers and parliamentarians also discussed the myriad reassurance measures currently being undertaken and envisaged by the Alliance in the wake of the dual shocks on the eastern and southern flanks on the Alliance in Europe. Specifically, 18 different reassurance measures currently underway by NATO air, land, and maritime forces were discussed. JFCNP commanders noted that these reassurance measures fall under a STRATCOM framework that can be divided into four pillars: training and exercises, operations, plans, and high-level talks. The discussion subsequently moved on to the sustainment of these efforts over the long run in what had been framed throughout the day as a fundamentally different security environment for the Alliance than only a few years before. JFCNP commanders then discussed the different areas that were priorities for implementation.

F. THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION CRISIS

28. During the briefings and the subsequent day at the Italian Parliament and Italian Naval Fleet Command Headquarters (CINCNAV), the issues related to the ongoing migrant and refugee crises were discussed at length. The briefing at JFCNP updated the delegation on the key developments, challenges, and likely future scenarios emanating from the European migrant/refugee problem.

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29. The JFCNP briefing noted that there were several key takeaways to think about regarding the mixed migration problem into Europe: first, the crisis would continue and likely amplify; second, the most popular route shifted from the central Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean route over the year; and, third, there were clear push and pull factors encouraging the evolution. The push factors in MENA, the Sahel, and beyond, such as war and instability, will continue to be strong root causes of migration, and the pull factors of stability, asylum and potential economic opportunity will continue to pull migrants and refugees from current host countries. Complicating it all, it was noted, are the dynamic criminal networks facilitating the migrant routes.

30. The eastern route crosses the Agean Sea from Turkey up through the Balkans and into Central and Northern Europe and is filled principally by Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Pakistanis. The flow of refugees and migrants is proving to be resilient and adaptive to barriers placed along the way in places like the Balkans. The growing flow of refugees is encouraging the growth of existing and new European-based criminal networks exploiting the situation, and heightening domestic friction in Europe at all levels.

31. Finally, the JFCNP briefing noted that the current flows would continue to exceed the EU’s set quotas and strain an already overburdened asylum process. The fact that the majority of the refugees are from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan will pose longer-term integration challenges to the EU, with several member states particularly affected. Adding to the challenge, it was noted, is the fact that, as most asylum applicants to the EU from the Balkans are rejected, there was an opportunistic wave of Balkan refugees seeking to exploit the increased wave of legitimate refugees and take advantage of the surrounding confusion. The continued strain of the refugees and migrants will certainly continue to pose greater and greater security challenges.

32. Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and Special Advisor to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, gave a briefing to the delegation at the Italian Parliament, entitled: “A Global Strategy for the European Union.” Ms Tocci told the delegation that considering migrant issues as a foreign affairs issue is a recent occurrence; it had previously been the exclusive domain of Interior Ministries. The blending of internal and external security questions has changed the playing field. To tackle the migrant problem at its sources, she continued, European states need to have the instruments of foreign policy in a complex, multi-layered approach. The EU, she continued, needs not only better coordination between its member state interior ministries, but their Foreign Ministries as well. This must then be reinforced by more effective policy on the part of Frontex.

33. Ms Tocci noted that while the long-term solution to the migrant/refugee crisis certainly must involve smart thinking about foreign security policy, it must also incorporate a fourth layer, the complexities of international development aid to address many of the root push and pull problems. She noted that such a policy is urgent, as the security challenges in Europe will only become more complex and pressing. The only solution is to move beyond simply regional approaches, she stressed, to a global, whole-of-government approach utilizing all of the resources that can be martialled by the European Union.

34. Luckily, she noted, the European audience is far more receptive to having a real conversation about the security arena and necessary actions – a stark contrast from the 2003 Iraq invasion for example. The rise of the Russian challenge has pushed Europeans farther down the road of understanding the complexities of the 21st century security environment. She concluded by noting that Foreign Affairs may actually be a means of reconnecting EU citizens, rather than be a largely external, esoteric challenge.

35. After Ms Tocci’s presentation, Hon. Gennaro Migliore, Chairman of the Italian Parliament’s Committee on Refugee Processing started by noting the “extraordinary and exceptional” flow of refugees and migrants will not be solved quickly; there is no silver bullet. Italy, he noted, is seeing less war refugees from Syria than economic migrants from the Sahel and beyond in Africa. Europe

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is a bit late in waking up to the domestic challenges such a refugee flow presents – it is dividing countries of the EU by their response, mainly from East to West.

36. At the beginning of the crisis, several years ago, he continued, Italy was relatively alone in dealing with the migrant flow challenges. He continued by noting the success of Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation was clear by the initial missteps of the EU’s Triton operation, which placed the abilities of the EU to act collectively in the security realm in stark contrast.

37. A huge problem in tackling the migrant problem, Mr Migliore noted, is the thriving black market of criminal networks supporting it that has cropped up. These networks run from deep into Central Africa all the way up through to Northern Europe, he continued. This large and growing black market is a secondary, but crucial challenge associated with the migrant crisis that is often not considered enough.

38. Regarding Italian migrant reception centers, Mr Migliore noted that in 2015 over 50% of the migrants in Italian reception centers could not be identified. This caused significant administrative problems for processing and subsequent attempts to integrate the migrants. He noted that this was improving steadily and that Italy would be able to attempt to redistribute the migrants throughout the EU according to the quota system, which he concluded was overburdened due to unnecessary hurdles to action.

39. A vibrant question and answer session between the delegation and the briefers ensued. Questions revolved around the future of Schengen, the complex nature of the root problems of the crises, and the obligations of international law vis-à-vis refugees. Everyone noted that longer-term solutions still remained far off into the future, but that immediate action was needed.

G. VISIT TO CINCNAV

40. The delegation’s visit to CINCNAV permitted Defence Committee members the ability to have a thorough overview of the Italian Fleet Command’s activities. Led by Vice-Admiral Foffi, the briefings touched upon the mission of CINCNAV, its available assets, an overview of its recent maritime security operations, as well as its maritime situational awareness capabilities. The visit ended with a visit of the HQ’s facilities. A particular focus of the discussions between Vice-Admiral Foffi and the parliamentarians was near and long-term threat perspective, as well as the direct security challenges of terrorism and migrant/refugee flows in CINCNAV’s area of responsibility.

41. CINCNAV guarantees force readiness (naval, air, submarine, and marine), deploys assets where needed, and exerts operational control over all assets assigned to missions. The fleet currently consists of 91 surface ships, 6 submarines, and 75 air-mobile assets; all manned by a total of 18,500 personnel.

42. After years of contributing to both Mediterranean security and international peacekeeping operations, CINCNAV has been focused almost exclusively in the Mediterranean in the post-9/11 era. Of particular focus, due to the surge in Mediterranean migrant flows, CINCNAV’s activities in the Central Mediterranean were highlighted. There have been a steady progression of operations to interdict smugglers and rescue migrants, from Operation Constant Vigilance in 2004 to Mare Nostrum (October 2013-October 2014) to Operation Triton currently under the command of the EU (EUNAVFOR).

43. Vice-Admiral Foffi stressed that Italian efforts to increase security in the Central Mediterranean focused along three central lines of effort: first, deterring and countering illegal activities in the Area of Responsability; second, security for SAR operations and offshore installations (in international waters, but facing Libya); and, third, information gathering on terrorist and criminal organizations. Italy’s specific efforts for EUNAVFOR are to “undertake automatic

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efforts to identify, capture, and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.” Vice-Admiral Foffi noted that, at the time of the delegation’s visit, CINCNAV had contributed to 20 SAR events, assisted 4,336 migrants, and arrested 16 human smugglers at sea. Briefers then overviewed the HQ’s ISR capabilities prior to taking the delegation on a tour to understand how they were put into action.

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