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TRANSPORTATION DIGEST SPECIAL LAWS IN TRANSPORTATION (B) A.M.+D.G.TRANSPORTATION Atty. Abao

In the instant case, it was Hongkong United Dockyards Ltd. whichoriginally possessed a maritime lien over the vessel M/V Asian Liberty byvirtue of its repair of the said vessel on credit. The provisions of thecontract agreement indubitably show that credit was given to the vessel

M/V Asean Liberty by Hongkong United Dockyards ltd. and as a result, amaritime lien in favour of Hongkong United Dockyards Ltd. wasconstituted.

It is the contention of China Bank that it ultimately acquired the maritimelien of Hongkong United Dockyards Ltd. over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty.In the documentary evidence presented by China Bank, it is clear thatChina Banks claim is predicated on the payment it made to Citibank byvirtue of the Irrevocable Letter of Credit it established in the latters favor.

In short, China Bank was a guarantor of the loan extended by Citibank toPISC. It was Citibank, which advanced the money to PISC. It was onlyupon the failure of PISC to fulfil its obligations under its promissory note toCitibank that China Bank was called upon by Citibank to exercise its dutiesunder the Standby Letter of Credit.

It is the holding of the appellate court that China Bank stepped into theshoes of Hongkong United Dockyards Ltd. by legal subrogation and thusacquired the maritime lien of the latter over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty.On this point, petitioners argue that the entirety of the documentaryevidence of China Bank does not show that the latter actually paid off themaritime lienholder for the repair of M/V Asean Liberty as required bySection 21 of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1978.

The Federal Maritime Lien Act of the United States, like our Ship Mortgage

Decree of 1978, provides that any person furnishing repairs, supplies,towage or use of drydock or maritime railway, or other necessaries, to anyforeign or domestic vessel on the order of the owner of such vessel, or of aperson authorized by the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorizedby the owner has a maritime lien on the vessel which may be enforced bysuit in rem.

As held by the public respondent Court of Appeals, those who providecredit to a master of a vessel for the purpose of discharging a maritimelien also acquire a lien over the said vessel. Likewise, advances to

discharge maritime liens create a lien on the vessel, and one advancingmoney to discharge a valid lien gets a lien of equal dignity with the onedischarged.

Under these doctrines, a person who extends credit for the purpose ofdischarging a maritime lien is not entitled to the said lien where the fundswere not furnished to the ship on the order of the master and there wasno evidence that the money was actually used to pay debts secured by thelien. As applied in the instant case, it becomes necessary to prove thatthe credit advanced by Citibank to PISC was actually utilized for the repairand conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. Otherwise, Citibankcould not have acquired the maritime lien of Hongkong United Dockyards,Ltd. over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty.

Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the records are replete withdocuments that show that the proceeds of the loans were used for therepair and conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. It is clear that theamount used for the repair of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty wasadvanced by Citibank and was utilized for the purpose of paying off theoriginal maritime lienor, Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd.

China Bank, as guarantor, was itself subrogated to all the rights ofCitibank as against PISC, the latters debtor.

(2) In the case at bench, petitioners mortgage lien arose on September25, 1979 when the said mortgage was registered with the Philippine CoastGuard Headquarters. As such, in order for the maritime lien of China Bankto be preferred over the mortgage lien of petitioners, the same must havearisen prior to the recording of the mortgage on September 25, 1979.

It is the contention of petitioners that China Banks maritime lien under itsStandby Letter of Credit arose only on March 30, 1983 when China Bankactually paid off the outstanding obligation of PISC to Citibank.Considering that its mortgage lien arose on September 25, 1979,petitioners thus conclude that its lien is preferred as against China Banksmaritime lien.

a maritime lien constitutes a present right of property in the ship, ajus inre, to be afterward enforced in admiralty by process in rem. From the

3B Digest Group SY 09-10

Ad Deum Per Excellentia


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moment the claim or privilege attaches, it is inchoate, and when carriedinto effect by legal process, by a proceeding in rem, it relates back to theperiod when it first attached.

In the case at bench, the maritime lien over the vessel M/V AseanLiberty arose or was constituted at the time Hongkong United Drydocks,Ltd. made repairs on the said vessel on credit. As such, as early as March12, 1979, the date of the contract for the repair and conversion of M/VAsean Liberty, a maritime lien had already attached to the said vessel.When Citibank advanced the amount of US$242,225.00 for the purpose ofpaying off PISCs debt to Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd., it acquired theexisting maritime lien over the vessel. Thus, when private respondent CBCchose to exercise its right to the maritime lien during the proceedings inthe trial court, it was actually enforcing a privilege that attached to theship as early as March 12, 1979.

The maritime lien of private respondent CBC thus arose prior in time to the

recording of petitioners mortgage on September 25, 1979. As such, thesaid maritime lien has priority over the said mortgage lien.

MANUEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Private respondents were passengers of an International Harvester ScoutCar (Scout Car) owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila forCamarines Norte with respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver ofthe vehicle.

There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car, which was

then negotiating the zigzag road of Bo. Paraiso, Sta. Elena, CamarinesNorte, was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitionerEmiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwardsagainst a protective railing. Were it not for the railing, the Scout car wouldhave fallen into a deep ravine. All its ten occupants, which included fourchildren were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physicalinjuries

Manuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multiple physical injuriesthrough reckless imprudence. As he could not be found after he ceased

reporting for work a few days following the incident, the privaterespondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict.

TC rendered judgment against petitioners. The court ordered them to pay,

jointly and severally, the amount of P49,954.86 in damages torespondents. CA affirmed the decision.

Petitioners Contention: It was Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout car, whowas at fault. He was also only 19-years old at the time of the incident anddid not have a driver's license. Also, the sketch made by the policeinvestigator showing the skid marks of the bus, is inadmissible as evidencebecause it was prepared the day after the incident and the alleged "tell-tale" skid marks and other details had already been obliterated by theheavy downpour which lasted for at least an hour after the accident

ISSUE

W/N there was enough proof to show liability of the petitioners YES

RULING

While it may be accepted that some of the skid marks may have beenerased by the "heavy downpour" on or about the time of the accident, itremains a possibility that not all skid marks were washed away. Thestrong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty erases,in the absence of evidence to the contrary, any suspicions that the policeinvestigator just invented the skid marks indicated in his report. Also, thefinding of the CA that the collision took place within the lane of the Scoutcar was supported by other conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of brokenglass which was scattered along the car's side of the road, whereas thebus lane was entirely clear of debris

Furthermore, the fact that the Scout car was found after the impact at restagainst the guard railing shows that it must have been hit and thrownbackwards by the bus. The physical evidence do not show that theSuperlines Bus while traveling at high speed, usurped a portion of the laneoccupied by the Scout car before hitting it on its left side. On collision, theimpact due to the force exerted by a heavier and bigger passenger bus onthe smaller and lighter Scout car, heavily damaged the latter and threw itagainst the guard railing.




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The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who wasnot duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of theaccident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they wereparties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane

Be that as it may, this Court has followed a well-entrenched principle thatthe factual findings of the Court of Appeals are normally given greatweight, more so when the findings tally with the findings of the trial courtand are supported by the evidence

VILLANUEVA vs. DOMINGO

FACTS

On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a green traffic

light, Priscilla Domingos silver Lancer car with Plate No. NDW 781 91then driven by Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middlelane of South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south.Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201 91 driven byRenato Dela Cruz Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street towards the SouthSuperhighway directly into the path of NDW 781 91 thereby hitting andbumping its left front portion. As a result of the impact, NDW 781 91 hittwo (2) parked vehicles at the roadside, the second hitting another parkedcar in front of it.

Per Traffic Accident Report prepared by Traffic Investigator Pfc. PatrocinioN. Acido, Ocfemia was driving with expired license and positive for

alcoholic breath. Hence, Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Oscar A. Pascuarecommended the filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting todamage to property and physical injuries.

The original complaint was amended twice: first, impleading Auto PalaceCar Exchange as commercial agent and/or buyer-seller and second,impleading Albert Jaucian as principal defendant doing business under thename and style of Auto Palace Car Exchange.

Except for Ocfemia, all the defendants filed separate answers to the

complaint. Nostradamus Villanueva claimed that he was no longer theowner of the car at the time of the mishap because it was swapped with aPajero owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. For her part,Linda Gonzales declared that her presence at the scene of the accident

was upon the request of the actual owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer (PHK201 91) for whom she had been working as agent/seller. On the otherhand, Auto Palace Car Exchange represented by Albert Jaucian claimedthat he was not the registered owner of the car. Moreover, it could not beheld subsidiary liable as employer of Ocfemia because the latter was off-duty as utility employee at the time of the incident. Neither was Ocfemiaperforming a duty related to his employment.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner liable and ordered him to payrespondent actual, moral and exemplary damages plus appearance andattorneys fees.

ISSUE

May the registered owner of a motor vehicle be held liable for damagesarising from a vehicular accident involving his motor vehicle while beingoperated by the employee of its buyer without the latters consent andknowledge? YES

RULING

We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle isdirectly and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it isbeing operated. The rationale behind such doctrine was explained wayback in 1957 in Erezo vs. Jepte.

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with

vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the rightto assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual ownerthereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions thatthey may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles beingnegligently operated if the public should be required to prove who theactual owner is. How would the public or third persons know againstwhom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfers of thevehicles? We do not imply by his doctrine, however, that the registeredowner may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of hisliability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold,




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assigned or conveyed the vehicle.

Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if notused for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or

to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is beingdriven on the highways or streets. The members of the Court are inagreement that the defendant-appellant should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter because of the negligenceof the driver, even if the defendant-appellant was no longer the owner ofthe vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it toanother.

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act bywhich ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear anyessential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs.Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation

of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, asamended). The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify theowner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury iscaused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefore canbe fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances arenumerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents orinjuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification ofthe owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is toforestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest ofthe determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries causedon public highways.

The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly ofthe responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident orconsequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evaderesponsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it wouldbe easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape saidresponsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one whopossesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage orinjury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usuallywithout means to discover or identify the person actually causing the

injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to theregistration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner.The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusorywere the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by

disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced andcarried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove thecontrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that athird person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby berelieved of the responsibility to the injured person.

A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has therecourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought againsthim to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee ortransferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justificationfor relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays forfailure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.

Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner isirrelevant to determining the liability of the registered owner whothe law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury ordeath caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual ownerbefore the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the verypurpose why motor vehicle legislations are enacted in the first place.

METRO TRAFFIC vs. GONONG

FACTS

The original complaint was filed by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed

that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the MetropolitanTraffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questionedthe petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegallyparked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or lawauthorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanentlyenjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writof preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Gonong issued a temporary restraining order and the writ ofpreliminary injunction .The parties also agreed to submit the case for




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resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinanceauthorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not

empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motorvehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merelyauthorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to freepassage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate,he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendanthad not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any cityordinance to justify the questioned act.

LOI 43, entitled Measures to Effect a Continuing Flow of Transportation onStreets and Highways, was issued on November 28, 1972, with thefollowing pertinent provisions:

Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways,

streets and sidewalks, shall immediately be removed bytheir owners/users; otherwise said vehicles shall be dealtwith and disposed in the manner stated hereunder;1. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked

vehicle shall be removed, towed and impounded at theexpense of the owner, user or claimant;

2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registryplates of the vehicles shall be confiscated and theowner's certificate of registration cancelled.

PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers

Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for OtherPurposes) was issued, also by President Marcos, on November 21, 1978,and pertinently provides:

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall havethe power to impose fines and otherwise discipline driversand operators of motor vehicles for violations of trafficlaws, ordinances, rules and regulations in MetropolitanManila in such amounts and under such penalties as areherein prescribed. For his purpose, the powers of the Land

Transportation Commission and the Board ofTransportation under existing laws over such violationsand punishment thereof are hereby transferred to theMetropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty

to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver'slicense or certificate of public convenience, theMetropolitan Manila Commission or its representativesshall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. Thesuspended or revoked driver's license or the report ofsuspension or revocation of the certificate of publicconvenience shall be sent to the Land TransportationCommission or the Board of Transportation, as the casemay be, for their records update.

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Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and

regulations, committed within a twelve-month period,reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shallsubject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00for the first offense, P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver'slicense for the fourth offense, and a revocation of thedriver' license for the fifth offense: Provided, That theMetropolitan Manila Commission may impose higherpenalties as it may deem proper for violations of itsordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certainpublic roads, streets or thoroughfares in MetropolitanManila.

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Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's licenseshall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall beimmediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed bythe Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state theviolation committed, the amount of fine imposed for theviolation and an advice that he can make payment to thecity or municipal treasurer where the violation was




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committed or to the Philippine National Bank or PhilippineVeterans Bank or their branches within seven days fromthe date of issuance of the citation ticket.If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the

period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan ManilaCommission or the law enforcement agency concernedshall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriateproceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with thecompetent traffic court, city or municipal court.If at the time a driver renews his driver's license andrecords show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver'slicense shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine andcorresponding surcharges.

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Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is

concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules andregulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith arehereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasissupplied).

ISSUE

1. Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.2. Whether or not private respondents license can be confiscated.

RULING

1. Yes. The petitionerits insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite theissuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency betweenthe two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehiclesanywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation ofthe flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.

Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605,which specifies all the sanctions available against the various trafficviolations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal andconfiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of

them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine andsuspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of publicconvenience, etc. He claims that removal and confiscation of the licenseplate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license

plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawfuldeprivation.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motorvehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntarycause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of thetraffic laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removaland confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is notamong the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan ManilaCommission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and"impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it mayimpose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are hereinprescribed."

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but atraffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violationimports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driverleaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visibleprohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punishillegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those thatinvoluntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such asengine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. Thevehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic,but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact,even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between

a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggestsa different treatment for either. "The first means one which stoppedunnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped toaccomplish something, including temporary rest.

2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As ithas not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle hadstalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, noless importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequenttime, confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43.




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And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearlyprovides that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license shallnot be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If atall, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and

subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of thedecree.

MALLARI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passengerjeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondentBulletin Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for brevity) along the NationalHighway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.

Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway

and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before hepassed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent BULLETIN coming fromthe opposite direction.

It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The sketch of the accident showed thatthe collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiatinga curve in the highway.

The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left sideresulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes whoeventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for

damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against AlfredoMallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driverFelix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company.

trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was thenegligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, consideringthe fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by FelixAngeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepneydriven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN, the

insurance company and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally ClaudiaG. Reyes.

It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo

Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr.

The appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the solenegligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediatelybefore the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, heovertook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen thevan driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. The Court of Appealsordered petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to compensate Claudia G.Reyes.

It absolved from any liability respondent BULLETIN, Felix Angeles and N.V.Netherlands Insurance Company.

ISSUEWas the Court of Appeals correct in reversing the decision of the TC? Yes(petitioners contend there was no evidence showing their negligence)

Is the owner of the jeepney liable? Yes

RULING

The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the sketch and spot reportof the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that thecollision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehiclein front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act ofovertaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136

as amended, otherwise known asThe

Land Transportation and Traffic

Code which provides:Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) Thedriver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of thecenter line of a highway in overtaking or passing anothervehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such leftside is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for asufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking orpassing to be made in safety.




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(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or passanother vehicle proceeding in the same direction whenapproaching the crest of a grade, nor upon a curve in thehighway, where the drivers view along the highway is

obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet aheadexcept on a highway having two or more lanes formovement of traffic in one direction where the driver of avehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle:

The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purposeof overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to seeto it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is specialnecessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does nothave the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time toturn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comesinto view.

By his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETINdelivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to considerthe speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morningmindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front ofit at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collisionresulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was thesole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner AlfredoMallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane whereovertaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the CivilCode, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a persondriving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap hewas violating a traffic regulation.

Negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney isbinding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of thepassenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact thatin an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make anexpress finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order tohold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger.Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry thepassengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using

the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all thecircumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case ofdeath or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to havebeen at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed

extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code,it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligenceor willful acts of the formers employees.

Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by MallariSr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to theirdestination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regardfor all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be sufferedby its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence ofthe carrier.

AMERICAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS*SEE COGSA DIGESTS, IT IS THERE

AIR FRANCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

On 1970, the late Jose G. Gana and his family, numbering nine (theGANAS), purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels,Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent, nine (9) "open-dated" airpassage tickets for the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. The GANASwere booked for the Manila/Osaka segment on AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for8 May 1970, and for the Tokyo/Manila return trip on AIR FRANCE Flight187 on 22 May 1970. The aforesaid tickets were valid until 8 May 1971,the date written under the printed words "Non valuable apres de

(meaning, "not valid after the"). The GANAS did not depart on 8 May1970.

Sometime in January, 1971, Jose Gana sought the assistance of TeresitaManucdoc, a Secretary of the Sta. Clara Lumber Company where JoseGana was the Director and Treasurer, for the extension of the validity oftheir tickets, which were due to expire on 8 May 1971. Teresita enlistedthe help of Lee Ella Manager of the Philippine Travel Bureau, Ella sent thetickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of AIR FRANCE. The tickets werereturned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible unless




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the fare differentials resulting from the increase in fares triggered by anincrease of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Philippine peso andthe increased travel tax were first paid. Ella then returned the tickets toTeresita and informed her of the impossibility of extension.

In the meantime, the GANAS had scheduled their departure on 7 May1971 or one day before the expiry date. In the morning of the very day oftheir scheduled departure on the first leg of their trip, Teresita requestedtravel agent Ella to arrange the revalidation of the tickets. Ella gave thesame negative answer and warned her that although the tickets could beused by the GANAS if they left on 7 May 1971, the tickets would no longerbe valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then haveexpired on 8 May 1971. Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS tomake the arrangements. With that assurance, Ella on his own, attached tothe tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, one a JAL. stickerand the other an SAS (Scandinavian Airways System) sticker.Notwithstanding the warnings, the GANAS departed from Manila in the

afternoon of 7 May 1971 on board AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for Osaka,Japan. There is no question with respect to this leg of the trip. However,for the Osaka/Tokyo flight on 17 May 1971, Japan Airlines refused tohonor the tickets because of their expiration, and the GANAS had topurchase new tickets. They encountered the same difficulty with respect totheir return trip to Manila as AIR FRANCE also refused to honor theirtickets. They were able to return only after pre-payment in Manila,through their relatives, of the readjusted rates. They finally flew back toManila on separate Air France Frights on 19 May 1971 for Jose Gana and26 May 1971 for the rest of the family.

ISSUE

Whether or not AIR FRANCE is liable to the GANAS for breach of Contractof Carriage?

RULINGNO. Pursuant to tariff rules and regulations of the International AirTransportation Association (IATA), an airplane ticket is valid for one year."The passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey bydeparting from the last point at which he has made a voluntary stopbefore the expiry of this limit. That is the time allowed a passenger tobegin and to complete his trip. A ticket can no longer be used for travel if

its validity has expired before the passenger completes his trip. Tocomplete the trip, the passenger must purchase a new ticket for theremaining portion of the journey" From the foregoing rules, it is clear thatAIR FRANCE cannot be faulted for breach of contract when it dishonored

the tickets of the GANAS after 8 May 1971 since those tickets expired onsaid date; nor when it required the GANAS to buy new tickets or have theirtickets re-issued for the Tokyo/Manila segment of their trip. Neither can itbe said that, when upon sale of the new tickets, it imposed additionalcharges representing fare differentials, it was motivated by self-interest orunjust enrichment considering that an increase of fares took effect, asauthorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in April, 1971.



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Transpo+Digest+IATA