Transforming bailiff action - consultation response.pdf

Response to:

Transforming bailiff action – Consultation paper

Local Authorities – Council Tax Liability Order applications

Bailiff Malpractice

April 2, 2012

Contents

1 Transforming bailiff action 1

1.1 Clarifying the law – Forced entry 1

1.2 Costs of Enforcement related Services – Staged approach 1

1.3 Regulatory Regime 2

1.4 Remedies and Complaints handling 3

2 Local Authorities – Council Tax Liability Order applications 7

2.1 Councils and the courts profiteering 7

2.2 Example 8

2.3 Vulnerable Residents 8

2.4 Unlawfully Profiting 9

3 Bailiff Malpractice 12

Consultation paper – Response 1

1 Transforming bailiff action

1.1. Clarifying the law – Forced entry

It may be in order for a complete rethink about the way some debts are handled, especially in the

case of council tax collections. Far too many innocent people are having bailiffs levying their

goods, with the subsequent risk that they may force entry to their homes.

Council tax orders obtained through the Magistrates’ courts are unreliable. They therefore should

not be relied upon by enforcement agents, as evidence that stated amounts of outstanding debt

are accurate or that debt even exists. It is reckless then, that bailiffs are allowed to use these

liability orders to enforce alleged debt.

These court orders are unreliable because applications are not monitored by councils applying for

them and magistrates’ courts are rubber stamping applications without any meaningful review of

the complaints. This is causing many orders to be passed for enforcement, where those residents

pose no threat of defaulting.

The problem is apparently escalated largely due to the lack of human involvement in the process.

The need for council staff to be engaged in monitoring the procedure is obvious, but the reason

this appears not to happen is probably down to the assumption that an automated operation can

and should be relied upon to function autonomously. As evidence confirms in the number of these

blunders, such an assumption is very misguided.

Because of the cavalier approach to issuing court orders, in certain cases, bailiffs may be pursuing

debtors for outstanding amounts equal only to the escalating enforcement fees. This scenario can

arise for example, if a debtor has settled outstanding debt with the council by the time a bailiff has

been instructed to the case. By this stage, the intransigent council staff or the same from an

outsourced agency would refuse to take any interest in the circumstances of the enquiring taxpayer

and insist the matter be taken up with their enforcement agent.

It has to be remembered that these council tax liability orders can too easily be obtained from the

court, however, reversing them is not so straight forward. Reform of the applications process is

necessary, which should include more stringent monitoring to reduce the ease with which councils

can obtain orders. Allowing this chaos, expense and waste of everyone’s time will undoubtedly

continue if nothing is done to address these issues.

1.2. Costs of enforcement related services – Staged approach

It is proposed in the consultation paper that the staged approach would remove possible financial

incentives for the bailiffs taking unnecessary enforcement action. In theory this seems feasible, and

with the proposed fees, when compared with those currently allowed, increasing by 600 per cent

for pre-levy stage enforcement there’s no argument that the bailiff would be recompensed for the

work undertaken. What there is clear evidence of though, is the input from those influencing the

revised fee proposal who have a vested interest in boosting their profits.

It could be viewed that implementing such an inflated scale of fees might be the only way to

prevent fraudulent charging. If this is deemed to be the only measure to control the criminal


element residing in the private enforcement industry, then it suggests that those working for these

bailiff firms are not the type of people, a responsible government would want doing this job.

The current commission based fee arrangement, presumably functions to engage enforcement

agents in the high volume of cases requiring bailiff action, with the financial reward being the carrot

intended to incentivise the undertaking of the job.

Rewarding enforcement agents with such extreme financial incentives as proposed, may have a

detrimental effect on the volume of collections made on behalf of local authorities. If by introducing

these higher fees, the incentive is lost to clear current volumes, this must impact on what is

essentially the primary concern of councils, which is to carry out a “conveyor belt” style operation of

these collections.

1.3. Regulatory Regime

The Government does not consider it appropriate that a statutory independent regulator is created.

I don’t believe that a regulator, described as independent, or otherwise would operate

autonomously, and definitely not in the interest of the public. I have seen no evidence of any so

called independent bodies acting in anyone’s interest than either government departments or large

corporations.

Even though the government has no immediate plans to introduce a regulator, it is likely to be

unpopular and inappropriate if it were to consider proposals, put forward by the British Parking

Association, to act as the industry’s independent regulator.

The proposals make this appear suspiciously like a profit making opportunity for BPA. The

reference to the DVLA’s ‘Accredited Trade Association’ status for instance, makes one wonder if

they intend to exploit members of the public, by selling their personal details to whichever

members qualify and are willing to pay for the privilege.

The message conveying the extent of independence is not overly convincing when the proposals

state that: “overall responsibility to the Privy Council would ensure a degree of independence from

central and local Government”. There are concerns also that a regulation formed by statute would

have engineered into it, a complaint process, severely limiting the scope for investigation, thereby

rendering it ineffective for the person complaining. A system that processes and determines

complaints as "unfounded" would carry on the tradition to what we have become accustomed. Like

most other regulatory organisations it would probably function as indemnity cover taken out to

insure against malpractice, with the added bonus that the insurance premium is paid by the

taxpayer.

Within their regulation proposals, the BPA’s appeals and complaints procedure follows a

recognisable pattern, being that a number of stages must be actioned before a complaint can be

ridden out of the system.

It would begin with the initial complaint being turned down, after which an aggrieved person would

then be permitted to appeal to an independent Adjudicator, whose decision would be final and

binding on both parties.

The complaints body, in the words of the BPA would have to be seen to be independent, hence,

appointing Ombudsmen or Adjudicators. After the final decision – expectedly negative from the

aggrieved person’s perspective – the complaint would then be successfully ridden out of the

system, unless of course, their decision was challenged through judicial review. Something, again


in the words of the BPA, would be extremely rare, indicated by existing Adjudication models;

presumably as such action would be prohibitively expensive for the aggrieved person.

If its complaint procedure were to be formed by statute, it is likely such a scheme set by law, would

have legislation written so the odds are stacked against the complainant. This has found to be the

case with organisations having Statutory Complaint Procedures such as the LGO, ICO and IPCC.

As an example, the LGO state in their reports, that where a body has acted with maladministration,

the Ombudsman may only uphold a complaint if certain criteria has been met. In other words they

can not provide a satisfactory service for the complainant as their hands are tied because of

legislation and what the law says. An investigating officer has no discretionary powers to use

common sense or his own judgment. In far too many cases a complaint will be thrown out because

the law won’t allow it to be investigated. A complaint body like this, which dictates to a person what

they can, and cannot be aggrieve by, is quite obviously a sham and effectively useless.

1.4. Remedies and Complaints handling

It is an indication that those forwarding the proposals are not acknowledging the seriousness of the

situation by suggesting the problems are so trivial that the industry should be self regulating and

grievances be dealt with in-house. It also indicates that they are probably aware that an

independent body, if it was truly allowed to act independently, would expose the truth in a very

short time, bringing the entire enforcement industry into disrepute.

To put forward a suggestion that "in the first instance redress should at least be attempted with the

enforcement agent involved" cannot be in anyone's interest but the enforcement agent. In many

instances, a complainant would be highlighting a bailiff's attempt to defraud them. A bailiff knowing

that if he wished, he could prevent a complaint going any further – either by duping an uninformed

debtor, or, on detecting a savvier customer admitting that he'd made an error – is effectively given

the green light for him to chance his arm.

It is worth noting that this is all academic, as complaints concerning bailiff fraud getting the

attention of the Police are not taken seriously, fobbed off and never investigated.

The point made in the proposals regarding there already being effective avenues of complaint, is

pushing it to say the least. There may be avenues of complaint but there is little evidence that

these are effective.

I doubt the average person being pursued by the local authority would be aware that the Council

Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 exist, let alone know that within them can

be found regulations governing how bailiffs should operate. Similarly it is doubtful they would be

aware of the distress for Rent Rules 1988 which also, theoretically, provide a means of redress.

Council Tax Regulations provide for complaints to be made to the Magistrates' court in relation to

appeals in connection with distress. The aggrieved person makes a complaint to the court, and

requests that a summons is directed to the authority to appear before the court to answer to the

matter. Apart from it being unlikely that aggrieved persons will be aware this action is open to

them, it is unlikely councils nor bailiff firms would make them aware. Time limits mean that unless a

complaint is made within 6 months from the time the matter of complaint arose, the aggrieved

person would be time barred from bringing the proceedings before the court under section 127 of

the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. There is however, another obstacle in that unless the

complainant qualifies for a concession, there is a fee of £200 for making the application.


The distress for Rent Rules provides another means of redress. Those aggrieved by bailiffs can

submit a complaint (form 4) to the County court which issued the bailiff’s certificate. This is a direct

complaint against an individual bailiff, so the enforcement firm is out of the firing line.

Unfortunately, decisions found in favour of complainants would likely result in the bailiff having to

forfeit the security which he is required to lodge in court and/or loosing his certificate. This is

something a Judge would want to avoid as it would leave the bailiff without employment and

undermine the court which allowed the issue of the certificate.

So, if the avenues of complaint mentioned in the proposals, refer to the above, then there has been

some misunderstanding as these are clearly not effective as far as the aggrieved person is

concerned.

It should in theory be possible for a debtor to resolve any dispute with the creditor. This however, in

the case of local authorities is a hopeless battle. In practice, council staff dealing with enquiries are

often obstructive and routinely refuse to deal with members of the public about matters relating to

their contracted bailiffs. Instead they refer them to the individual bailiff who has been instructed the

case.

Councils assume that

i) the recovery is at a stage where responsibility is no longer theirs,

ii) their system is perfect, so appointing bailiffs has been the correct course of action, and

iii) bailiffs should, as far as possible, be self financing.

It is unlikely a council, given the job of investigating itself, would find in favour of a formal complaint

against its appointed bailiff contractor. So this too, is another procedure which fails the aggrieved,

as the authority’s objective will be to always cover-up malpractice and side with their contractor.

The option open to an aggrieved resident to involve the Local Government Ombudsman gives little

incentive for the authority to conduct its investigations impartially. Very few complaints are

investigated and almost none are upheld. Apparently because either it is the organisation’s

function or its hands are tied because the law doesn’t allow it to investigate matters considered

outside its remit, thus imposing severe limitations on its role.

So it would seem the authorities are confident, very few formal complaints which are progressed to

the Local Government Ombudsman, will have any consequences for them.

Debt Recovery Strategies within councils will likely mean that authorisation is only given to certain

officers within debt recovery sections who are able to intervene in dispute situations arising from

their bailiff contractors. This being a probable contributing factor fuelling the obstruction which

members of the public are met with by council staff. That, and aggrieved residents wishing to raise

concerns, are having telephone enquiries diverted, and dealt with by contracted-out corporate call

centres. This is a service many councils are outsourcing, causing the prevention of malpractice to

be highlighted. Consequently, it is allowed it to continue, without being brought to the attention of

the relevant managers, who should, if they had authorisation to do so, investigate the complaint.

Police

Sections 2 to 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 provide legislation needed to protect the public from much of

the malpractice you are likely to encounter with bailiffs. Unfortunately though it seems not to be

policy of the Police to recognise these sections of the Act in instances where bailiffs have

defrauded or attempted to defraud alleged debtors. Either this or their hands are tied.


Contrary to the commonly held view of the Police that fraud committed by bailiffs can be dismissed

as ‘CIVIL’, a response to Lord Lucas of Crudwell & Dingwall from the Home Office Minister of State

Baroness Scotland of Asthal in the House of Lords suggests otherwise.

From Parliament publications, 20 April 2007:

“Crime: Fraud

Lord Lucas asked Her Majesty’s Government:

Whether a bailiff who repeatedly charges for work that has not been done commits a fraud

within the meaning of Sections 1 to 5 of the Fraud Act 2006; and, if so, which sections of

the Act apply; and whether it would be right for the police to claim that such an action is a

civil and not a criminal matter. [HL2743]

20 Apr 2007 : Column WA94

The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Scotland of Asthal): A bailiff or any other

person who dishonestly charges for work that has not been done will be committing an

offence under the Fraud Act 2006. Section 1 of the 2006 Act contains the new general

offence of fraud.

One means by which this offence can be committed is set out in Section 2, on fraud by

false representation. This section applies where a person dishonestly makes a false

representation and intends, by making the representation, to make a gain for himself or

another, or cause a loss to another, or expose another to a risk of loss. It is also possible

that, where a bailiff repeatedly charges for work that has not been done, this conduct will

amount to fraudulent trading either under Section 9 of the 2006 Act or under the provisions

on fraudulent trading in company legislation.”

However, despite the above response and the view of the Police that bailiff fraud is a civil matter,

the Home Office seem uninterested in issuing guidance to police forces on the application of the

provisions of the Fraud Act 2006 to bailiff operations or local authority officials, employing private

bailiff companies. It considers decisions on whether and how to investigate a crime rest solely with

the police and that such operational issues are the ultimate responsibility of the chief officer of the

force concerned.

Information Commissioner

Similarly the Data Protection Act 1998 is in place to protect the public against breaches of

confidentiality. The Information Commissioners Office should step in where bailiffs have breached

this with alleged debtors, but it seems they let it go and are not interested in formally dealing with

them.


Statutory Complaint Procedures

As detailed in the previous section, statutory complaint procedures such as the LGO, IPCC etc, are

legislated so the system is heavily weighted in favour of the organisation at fault. This at best

leaves the aggrieved person frustrated at the injustice of a system that doesn’t bother investigating

concerns that the complainant thought serious enough to take the time to bring to the attention of

the organisation. At worst, because of the inherent inflexibility in the system, maladministration,

crime and malpractice all go unchallenged and are allowed to continue because the investigator,

free to ride the next complaint out of the system, has done his part in identifying that the law won’t

allow him to investigate.


2 Local Authorities – Council Tax Liability Order applications

2.1. Councils and the courts profiteering

Excessive costs are being incurred by far too many residents because of unnecessarily high

volumes of Council tax liability order applications. If more attention was focussed on reducing the

numbers needlessly passed over for recovery action, the figures which represent problem

payers would be much truer. As it now stands the situation is massively exaggerated because of

council's over enthusiasm to maximise income generated with court applications.

It seems departments are mistaking their role, which is to process the recovery of outstanding

debt, and not exploit court action for a source of revenue. To councils, these are merely numbers,

with each account progressed to court generating income of up to 10 percent on top of taxpayer’s

bills. Unfortunately it is householders caught-out, who are paying the price with inflated council tax

and often bailiff fees, as a result of this target culture.

Decisions prompting court action are not taken by council staff but are in fact initiated by a soul-

less computer system, whose input data – having met the required criteria – is subsequently

triggered to generate 'en masse', the requisite computer printouts, admissible as evidence that the

householder has defaulted.

However, this doesn’t excuse recovery staff from involving themselves in monitoring and updating

cases to reflect additional payments or new information. In many cases this would prevent

unnecessarily progressing cases for recovery. It isn’t good enough for staff to withdraw their input,

purely because of technological advancement and to blindly process applications through the

court.

The disproportionate number of resident's accounts being progressed to court and subsequently

incurring these costs, may well be as a result of manipulation rather than negligence of councils

and court staff reviewing these cases.

Councils have a minimum amount of outstanding debt, below which, recovery departments should

not progress for court action. Data obtained from Freedom of Information requests suggests

hundreds of thousands of cases, below these minimums, make up complaint lists which councils

deliver to the court. Evidently these lists are not – in any meaningful way – being reviewed by court

staff, with applications just being rubber stamped (sometimes thousands with respect a single

application) giving the councils the go-ahead to post out summonses, sometimes for as much as

£200 a time. Where there's evidence of authorities making liability order applications for only a

penny, and being granted by the court, this more than indicates maladministration exists both at

councils and magistrates' courts.

The case between "Regina v. Brentford Justices, Ex parte Catlin" made a point that "a decision by

magistrates whether to issue a summons pursuant to information laid, involves the exercise of a

judicial function, and is not merely administrative."

Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery stated that:

"....before a summons or warrant is issued the information must be laid before a magistrate

and he must go through the judicial exercise of deciding whether a summons or warrant

ought to be issued or not. If a magistrate authorises the issue of a summons without having


applied his mind to the information then he is guilty of dereliction of duty and if in any

particular justices' clerk's office a practice goes on of summonses being issued without

information being laid before the magistrate at all, then a very serious instance of

maladministration arises which should have the attention of the Authorities without delay...."

There clearly then, exists in these liability order applications, at least a dereliction of duty, when so

many are granted for insignificant amounts. Many of which would likely have originated from

administration errors or oversight rather than non-payment. Whatever the cause, these small debts

certainly don't warrant being grossly inflated by council's court costs and bailiff fees.

2.2. Example

The following details the level of income for both Magistrates' courts and councils which can be

generated as a consequence of these liability order applications. This, being just one council tax

liability order hearing, held on the afternoon of 2nd June 2011 at Grimsby Magistrates court in

respect of applications made by North East Lincolnshire council.

3,361 Summonses were sent out with in connection with NNDR and council tax debts. These

included Joint and Several Residents, the Council posts letters to each individual, so the costs

related to 2,602 householders incurring £70 for being summoned – costs are only added once to

each account. However, this still meant the MoJ was entitled to £7,806 of its share of the profits

where court time amounted to only half an hour for the two defendants from the 3,361 summoned

who were heard in the courtroom.

This meant North East Lincolnshire Council was entitled to collect the remaining £174,334 of the

£182,140 costs granted by the Magistrates' court.

2,297 liability orders were granted, a figure lower than the 2,602 accounts liable for summons costs

because of accounts being settled or payment plans being set-up in advance of the hearing.

Though agreements between the authority and taxpayer will have been made in relation to a

number of accounts, these will have incurred full costs, including those for obtaining a liability order

because of the growing trend for local authorities to load costs for obtaining the order onto the

costs imposed earlier for the summons. This is squeezing more revenue out of residents, and it is

not permitted in the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992.

2.3. Vulnerable Residents

Councils neglect checking the status of alleged debtors, as well as pursuing trivial amounts, when

appointing cases to bailiffs i.e. they may be classed as vulnerable and in those cases, the bailiffs

should not be instructed.

The council, in these circumstances, will pass on responsibility and rely on the bailiff to determine

cases where debtors are vulnerable. It is obviously not in the bailiff’s interest to determine a status

as vulnerable. As far as the enforcement agent is concerned he will have been given instructions to

collect whatever is on the liability order. So, if the council’s recovery section functions as it should,

and the Court’s judicial procedure is not in question, then the bailiff would be satisfied that the

validity of the order would not be in doubt. However, high volumes and the automated nature of

these applications, tend to unnecessarily implicate innocent and the vulnerable. Unfortunately

reversing an order, is not as straight forward as obtaining it in the first place.


2.4. Unlawfully Profiting

Disregard for any judicial procedure in these liability order applications however, is not the whole

story. There is another side to councils, aggressively pursuing revenue through them. Having gone

through no proper judicial process, the rubber stamping of the bulk applications brings into

question the whole legality of the process.

The council tax regulations state that only costs reasonably incurred by the authority up until

obtaining the order can be included in the costs they impose on the taxpayer. The regulations do

not provide for councils to profit from them.

Liability order hearings are typically scheduled to take place at Magistrates’ courts, several times a

year. Council officers conduct the event in a hired room, making a mockery of a court hearing,

which should be a judicial process. The bulk nature of the applications, brings into question the

profit local authorities are making with respect an hour or so's visit to the Magistrates court which

means costs incurred by householders far exceed those which the authority incurs, obtaining the

orders. Profits are compounded due to the automated nature of reminder, final notices and

summonses which are printed and sent out en masse. Operational costs are further minimised as

this part of the recovery process is geared around set dates in the system, which, if no payment

activity is detected, triggers dispatchment of the relevant notices.

Examples of local authorities incriminating themselves over unlawful costs can be found even on

their own websites. Perhaps most blatant have been Cabinet reports for Westminster City Council

where publicly available records show that from 2003 to 2010, court costs which it charges for

alleged non payment of Council Tax and NNDR increased by 158% and 354% respectively.

In one of the reports, the council admitted the administrative processes for Council Tax

and NNDR Liability Order applications were identical and as such would be difficult to prove a

difference in administration costs. It therefore decided that an application to the Court to increase

costs may require a breakdown of administrative costs and decided they’d play safe by keeping

costs the same for both Council Tax and NNDR.

It had also decided against increasing the NNDR charges to a higher level than that set for Council

Tax in the hope that it would function as a deterrent against non payment of the lager sums

involved for NNDR. It was on the basis the cost of issuing a summons should only take into

account the administration involved and not a “deterrent” element, as there is nothing in the

legislation to support an increase in costs on this basis.

However, in the subsequent review to increase these costs, Westminster council identified that

some local authorities had a higher level of court costs for NNDR than Council Tax. This had

apparently been accepted by their local courts and was more in keeping with the larger sums

involved for NNDR, therefore more of a deterrent.

Alarmingly, it proposed to increase NNDR costs to a higher level than that set for Council Tax

because it perceived that the Court would be likely to accept the increase without additional

supporting evidence due to neighbouring boroughs setting this precedent. It also anticipated that

the proposed increase in court cost would act as an incentive to the borough’s Council Tax and

NNDR payers to ensure that their instalment payments were kept up to date.

Bizarrely, the council no longer considered that the cost of issuing a summons should only take

into account the administration involved. It was now exploiting the “deterrent” element, something it

was previously reluctant to do.


It seems they’d intuitively known what they could get away with. Sensing that the Magistrates' court

would approve these unreasonable and unjustified price hikes without requesting additional

supporting evidence. Costs imposed on taxpayers were no longer considered the administration

costs incurred by the authority, but an amount they could get away with or an amount the Legal

Forum of London allowed other councils.

Despite costs having to be reasonably incurred by the council for those they impose on the

taxpayer, cabinet reports reveal those other than administration costs involved in the recovery

process are being paid for by taxpayers caught out with these penalties.

They revealed in three consecutive court cost reviews that the proposed increases would generate

annually additional revenue of approximately £320,000, £300,000 and £130,000 respectively.

References in the reports were made to generating additional revenue or income on around 14

separate occasions. Other references made it obvious they were preoccupied with either what

neighbouring boroughs were charging, or what incentives, increasing court costs would have on

taxpayers to ensure their instalment payments were kept up to date.

The council had made it clear that its main objective was to offset these inflated cost imposed on

its residents against the overall cost of the administration of Council Tax and Business Rates,

therefore maintaining a low Council Tax.

These increases obviously don’t represent a corresponding increase in recovery costs. It is clear

that Westminster council view these penalties as a financial mechanism which they can

conveniently tweak whenever the need arises to increase revenue. It seems calling upon them has

become second nature. With no opposition, the authority must believe it can carry on profiteering

indefinitely.

Confirming this, another statement in one of their reports highlighted that failing to increase court

costs or increasing to a level below that set by neighbouring boroughs would result in the Council

not maximising its potential income.

Haringey council, in a scrutiny panel review of income collection stated that the review panel

recommended “that the Benefits and Local Taxation Service ensure the maximum possible is

charged for Court Costs and that the charge be reviewed at regular intervals subject to any

guidance/legislation governing Court Costs.”

It is impossible for the council or the court to know the level of costs with respect each liability order

application. The number applied for will vary, and therefore so should the costs. The higher the

number rubber stamped at the bulk hearing will correspondingly reduce the costs attributable for

each individual. Therefore it should not be possible for the summons to state on it a fixed amount

of costs. Furthermore, the summons is merely a means for giving a defendant notice of the

proceedings. It should not then be possible for the council to state an amount with regards costs on

the summons document.

Clearly there should be no reference to any agreed fixed cost on the summons document. This

should be determined at the court hearing where the council should have to itemise the time and

effort expended on each element of the case. Magistrates should then use their discretion to award

an appropriate amount of costs. This would essentially take into account the number of defendants

incurring the costs. It would therefore be unlikely the sum requested would be awarded, as it would


be identified as inappropriate profit and costs which would be incurred in any event would be

disallowed leaving only those specific to the claim being made.

Newham council, in reviewing the level of charges for summons and liability court costs, introduced

measures it thought would act as an incentive to keep council taxpayer’s instalment payments up

to date. Its approach was slightly more subtle than just hiking up the fees. It identified that

changing the composition of the summons and liability court costs by front loading the charge

would deter customers from defaulting at this stage as a higher charge would affect the taxpayer at

the summons stage. This example is another clear illustration that councils have no obligation to

provide a breakdown of administrative costs to the Magistrates’ court.

Other evidence, where a Magistrates’ court negligently awarded costs to North East Lincolnshire

council has been uncovered by a Freedom of Information request. The request was sparked off

because a 23% overall increase in the penalty had been implimented to generate a forecasted

additional £752,000 over a four year period. All costs were also front loaded to the summons.

The council’s correspondence was not so much a request, backed up with a breakdown of

additional administrative costs, but a letter informing the Magistrates’ court that it had taken the

decision to do this.

“Dear Mr ......

Court Costs for Council Tax and National Non Domestic Rates

I am writing to advise you that North East Lincolnshire Council has taken the decision to

increase the court costs which it charges to tax payers for the non payment of Council Tax

and National Non Domestic Rates.

The costs to be charged for a summons for Council Tax and National Non Domestic Rates

will be £70.00. There will be no additional costs for the liability order. The increase will take

effect from 1st April 2011.”

These are just a couple of examples where councils flout the Council Tax (Administration and

Enforcement) Regulations by manipulating the composition of the summons and liability order

court costs to squeeze more revenue from them.

In many cases, councils are front loading the entire costs on to the summons so that the costs

incurred for obtaining the liability order are payable at the summons stage. Therefore, in these

circumstances, councils are unlawfully collecting penalties from debtors who settle their accounts

prior to any court action.

It states in the Council Tax Regulations that these fees must be incurred independently – first,

when the summons is issued, and secondly, when the liability order is granted. And as previously

mentioned, these costs should be reasonably incurred by the authority.


3 Bailiff malpractice

Bailiff malpractice will be at unacceptable levels as long as councils and government bodies deny

the fact that a conflict of interest exists where private enforcement firms are contracted to collect

debt on behalf of the government. These private bailiff firms are in business to make money and

are using local authorities as a vehicle to this end. Evidently they’re getting away with malpractice

by relying on the expertise of councils, Police and other government bodies to conceal evidence

and silencing complainants.

The public might take some persuading that a serious attempt is being made by the MoJ to stamp

out this malpractice in the bailiff industry, especially when such a cozy arrangement exists between

the offending bailiff firms and the MoJ.

For instance, Julie Green-Jones the chief executive of Rossendales has been involved in helping

the Ministry of Justice shape new legislation under the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act.

When proposals include a 600% hike in the fee structure, it’s obvious why she would want to work

closely with the MoJ and influence legislation. But what is unlikely to go down well with the public is

why the head of an enforcement firm, well publicised on TV and in the press for its unlawful

practices, would be a suitable candidate for holding discussions with the MoJ.

Then you have former employees at the ministry jumping ship and taking managerial positions at

these questionable firms. Christine Sharples joined Rossendales from the MoJ, as compliance

manager, while former MoJ Policy Advisor, Chris Bell joined the Shergroup enforcement company

providing advice directly to the Chief Executive, Claire Sandbrook.

An ITV documentary exposing the true horrors of Rossendales revealing shocking footage of

bailiffs was aired, after a two week postponement, on October 31, 2011. In light of the evidence

revealed in this exposé it seemed the government displayed utter contempt for the public when

Rossendales were subsequently awarded the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission

contract in November to enforce liability orders on behalf of the Child Support Agency. Concerns

raised in this TV programme must have been known before it was awarded the contract, as would

those revealed in the national press. This is a kick in the teeth, especially for anyone who has been

scammed by Rossendales, to see millions of pounds being put in the hands of Ms Green-Jones.

Common among private bailiffs are the fees they charge related to phantom visits. Often the first of

a series of attempts to defraud the alleged debtor, where no evidence exists of any visits being

made. It was confirmed in the House of Lords on the 20 April 2007 that for dishonestly charging for

work which is not carried out, it is an offence under the 2006 Fraud Act. However, it is commonly

stated by the Police that such fraud is not a criminal offence, but a civil matter. This malpractice

then, is clearly abetted by Police.

In charging debtors for visits that have not been made, they would be unaware of any charges

accumulating. Consequently there would also be a breach of the National Standards for

Enforcement Agents. Its code of practice states that: “Enforcement agents will on each and every

occasion when a visit is made to a debtor’s property which incurs a fee for the debtor, leave a

notice detailing the fees charged to date, including the one for that visit, and the fees which will be

incurred if further action becomes necessary...”

As visit fees can be charged for a maximum of two calls only to a debtor’s home, there is no

financial gain for them to make/charge for any further visits.


Assuming the firm is going for its full compliment, once the debtor unknowingly incurs fees for the

phantom visits, the next action will require the bailiff’s status to take a transformation from one who

merely calls (or doesn’t as the case may be) to one who arrives in what may technically be

described as a van – a “van bailiff”.

A van bailiff would typically add more than £100 to the fees for turning up in a vehicle. Ideally

though, without itemising charges, so the debtor remains in the dark. Of course, this charge is to

cover expenses for hiring a vehicle to remove goods which have previously been levied, subject to

say, a breached payment arrangement. If no previous visits had been made, it is likely neither a

levy nor payment arrangement would exist.

However, this may not stop the bailiff levying on items outside so the debtor is unaware of

mounting charges. A vehicle, for example, may or may not belong the debtor. If a bailiff’s interests

were only to add another charge for levying, whether goods were owned by the debtor is not

important to him if there is no intention of taking them.

If levied items were thought not to belong the debtor, it would be beneficial for the bailiff to keep

details from the debtor. This would involve failing to leave a Notice of Seizure of Goods and

Inventory. It states though, in the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992,

that details of the levy must be handed to, or left at the premises where the distress is levied.

There are certain bailiff firms which, have systematically been charging debtors a fee for

advertising the sale of levied goods, where in the majority of cases, there has been no such

advertising. Seemingly this has been allowed to go on unchallenged.

The fee, listed under header “H” in schedule 5 of the Council Tax (Administration and

Enforcement) Regulations is to cover out of pocket expenses in relation to advertising. The fee

carries a minimum £24.50 charge, or, the actual costs up to a maximum of 5% of the amount in

respect of which the liability order was made.

For this to be lawful, another condition must be met. Levied goods must have also physically been

removed. To get this overcharging into perspective, it states on private bailiff firm Rossendale’s

website that goods are actually removed by bailiffs in only 1% of cases nationally.

Council’s are often complicit with bailiff firms in allowing that in all cases, they charge this fee. It is

likely that in such circumstances, the bailiff firm will have duped the council into believing this

charge is for releasing levied goods or some other such fabrication.

Documents

Transforming bailiff action - consultation response.pdf