Tragedy and Ethical Sublime in Fragility of Goodness

8/13/2019 Tragedy and Ethical Sublime in Fragility of Goodness

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tragedy-and-ethical-sublime-in-fragility-of-goodness 1/18

TRAGEDY AND THE ETHICAL SUBLIME IN "THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS"Author(s): Allen DunnSource: Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 72, No. 4, A SYMPOSIUM ON: TheFraglity of Goodness (Winter 1989), pp. 657-673Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41178497 .

Accessed: 19/01/2014 01:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Soundings:

An Interdisciplinary Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 41.227.124.104 on Sun, 19 Jan 2014 01:35:43 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=psup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/41178497?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/41178497?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=psup



TRAGEDY AND THE ETHICAL SUBLIME INTHE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS

AllenDunn

Дт the conclusion of TheFragilityfGoodnessarthaNuss-baum recounts hesufferingfEuripides'Hecuba and her

violent lindingfPolymestors revenge orhismurderfherson. Hecuba's single-mindedommitmento thisbloodyven-geancedeprives erofherhumanity,nd as if nrecognitionfthis, hegods transformer from woman nto a dog, ananimalwhichwasfor heGreeks mblematicf ndifferenceo

humanaw. InNussbaum's eading f theplayHecuba'strans-formations implicitestimonyotheprecariousnessfhumanvirtue, virtue hatNussbaumocatesbetween he "self-suffi-ciency f thedivine" nd the"self-sufficiencyfdoggishness."As she summarizeshispredicament,thehuman eing, s so-cial being, ivessuspendedbetweenbeast and god, definedagainstbothof theseself-sufficientreatures y tsopen andvulnerable ature, he relational haracter f its most basicconcerns"416). The vulnerabilityfthismiddleground s a

constituentndnot an accidental eaturef humangoodness;her rgumentests n the ssumptionhat thedaring ndex-posed pursuit f transientaluemay ctually e an essentialingredientnthebest ife" 420).

The spectacleof sufferingnd extremity hichtragedypresents unctions,hen, ccording o Nussbaum's rgumentbothas a reminder f the imits f humanvalues, heir ime-bound, rtificialragility,ndan invocationfthebeauty fthis

AllenDunn is AssistantProfessor fEnglishat The UniversityfTennessee.His most recentworks nclude"Forgetting o Remember Paul de Man: The-oryas MnemonicTechnique in de Man's Resistance toTheoryand Derrida'sMémoires,*'Southern umanities eview,Fall 1988, and "The Indian Boy'sDream Wherein EveryMother's Son Rehearses His Part: Shakespeare'sAMidsummerightsDream" Shakespearetudies, 988.

Soundings2.4 (Winter1989). ISSN 0038-1861







658 SOUNDINGS AllenDunn

fragility.f theHecuba he

says,the

possibilitiesfthis

playstand nnature: s markersf theboundaryfsocialdiscourseand as warningsgainst atastrophebut also as pledgesorguarantors f a specificallyuman excellence" (421). Ofcourse, he thrust f Nussbaum's rgument ere s notagainstdoglike animality, hichargumenthas fewdefenders, utagainst hegodlike ision fmoral utonomy hich he findsnthe rationalizedthicsof philosophersike Plato and Kant.Moreprecisely,he s arguing hat hetragic ision andespe-

ciallyAristotle's

eadingf that

ision)an

provide perspicu-ous alternative o an ethics that claims to have a rational,systematicnity.Nussbaum'srgumentalls nto uestionnotonlythespecific laimsof conventionalmoral rgumentsutalso theveryhapewhich hese rgumentsake, heverbalme-dium nwhich hey represented.Tragedy andmoregener-ally all literature),he argues, is more adequate to thecomplexitiesf the socialworld, o thecontingent,elationalrhythmfactivityndpassivityhat haracterizesuman ocialinteraction,hanmoreformal

rgumentation.he moment f

tragic athos s,afterll,an implicitndictmentf thehubristicpresumptionf reason.

Although ussbaum's ssumptionsbouttragedyeemrea-sonable, hey re not sharedby manynfluential odernthatis, Enlightenment/Post-Enlightenment)nterpretersf litera-ture, ndamong hosewho embrace distinctlyifferentiewof thegenrefrom hat f Nussbaums,notsurprisingly,anthimself. ontraryo whatNussbaummplies, antian thicss

supportedy,fnot

dependent pon, veryomplex esthetic,andKant ikeNussbaum lacesa special mphasis n themoralimplicationsftragedy.n Kant's esthetics, owever,heex-perience ftragicimitationffirmslmost xactlyheoppositeof whatNussbaum inds here.Where he finds call to re-spectthefragilityfcommunity,ritics ikeBurke,Kant, ndSchiller ind hevindicationf human utonomy, vindicationwhich snot, obe sure, ased on the utonomyfrational elf-reflectionutuponthe oy and terror fdiscoveringhat heself omehow urvives nd transcendshe destructionf com-munity,he onfusion freason, ndeventhepotentialbliter-ationof thebody.Following urke nd othernfluential8th-







Tragedynd theEthicalSublime 659

centuryritics,Kant names this momentof

paradoxicalself-af-

firmationn theface ofdanger the sublime.1An Aristotelian ublime is, of course, an anachronism, nd

the concept mightthereforebe assumed to be of little rele-vance to Nussbaum's patientreconstruction f Aristotle'spo-etic ethics. I will argue, however,that the pathos of tragedy,includingAristotle'sdescriptionof thatpathos, is more ethi-

cally mbiguous thanNussbaum's account mpliesand that he-ories of tragic ublimityikethose ofBurke, Kant,and Schiller

address this ambiguityby suggestingthat the discoveryandempowerment f an ethical dentitys both threatened nd fa-cilitatedbycommunity.The sublimeindicatesfirst f all thatthe vulnerability f human practices is not easily separatedfrom heseeminglynvulnerable nd oftenoppressivesocial in-stitutionswhich upportthosepractices.The rageof thetragichero is directedas muchat thecapriciousnessof social institu-tionsas it s at ironiesof fate. There is,accordingly, paradox-ical mixtureof elation and sorrowat the destructionof the

institutionalmeans of human goodness. This ambivalence isreinforced ytheaestheticdistance nherentntragic pectacle.Nussbaumargues thatthe emotionsofpity nd fearoperate in

tragiccatharsis clarification,s she translates he term) n thesame waythattheymight perate in forensics r everydayife.That is, theycementa bond of immediatesolidarity etweenlike ndividuals, etweenthesufferernd an observerwho real-izes that she is vulnerable to the same suffering.However,

leavingaside the vexed questionofwhatAristotlemightmean

bycatharsis, think hattragicemotionsdo not simply r im-mediately ffirm solidarity ased on a mutualrecognitionofhumanfragility. he plotoftragedynvitesus to participatenbothhuman imitation nd god-like nsight, n insight nto the

logic of eventsthat s, as Aristotle ellsus, deeper thananyin-

sightfoundin historytself.Tragedy leaves its audience withtheambivalenceof a doublysplitperspective:that s, the audi-ence both shares and transcendsthe tragichero's limitation,and from heperspective f the sublime texperiencesthat im-

itation s both athos and empowerment.Nussbaum s undoubtedly ight o read tragedy s an implicitrepudiationof the godlike self-sufficiencyspired to byPlato,but the real social tensions that it addresses arise not as the








resultofphilosophers

who secede from hecommunity

ut as aresult of the demand fordifferentiation,ndividuation, s thesociologistswould say,within he community. t is thispres-sure thatproduces thequintessential^modern and potentiallytragicdemand thatthe individual hould be in thecommunity,situatedby its contingent nd relational structures, s Nuss-baum puts it, but at the same timenever reducible to thesestructures,lways n excess of them. The tragicvision of the

fragilitynd artificialityf humanmeaning,ofhumanculture,is sublime to the extent that it addresses both of these de-mands. The essential ambiguityof the tragic evidence ofhuman contingency s illustratedby modern theoristsof thesublime such as Jean-FrancoisLyotard.

Lyotardbegins withthe same premise as Nussbaum does:humanpracticesare heterodox,contingent, iverse: they an-not be either described or prescribedbya unified ogic, by a

singlerule,since even their nternal rinciples re contingentlyappropriate rather than necessarilytrue. Lyotard,however,

drawsdramatically ifferentonclusionsfrom hispremise. Heconcludes that truecommunitys impossibleand that the illu-

sorycommunities owhichwe commit urselvesare alwaysop-pressiveto the extent o whichthey onceal their ontingency.2Since Lyotard's ethics of contingencyis supported by a

postmodernaesthetics of the sublime,an aestheticswhich is

painfullyware of itsown impossibility,he difference etween

Lyotard'sand Nussbaum's ethical visionsmayprovideanotherinstance of sublime incommensurability.Mypoint is not that

Nussbaum must enter Aristotle n the current debates overpostmodernismn order to make her argument ontemporarybut thatherethics n so far s it drawssupportfrom readingoftragedymustdeal with heambiguities here, specially incethese ambiguitiesfigure o largely n the modernreceptionofthatgenre.

♦ * *

AlthoughNussbaum reads theconclusionof the Hecuba s aninvocation of community ased upon a mutualrecognitionof

human fragility,ublime criticswould surelyread the samescene as the triumph f autonomous individuality.Here theheroine,sated withrevenge,mocksher blinded betrayerwho

grovelsbefore her in animalhelplessness. She has achieved a








provisionalmasteryver the reversalsof

fortune,nd she can

finallywelcome death witha godlike indifference, hile de-manding,no longerbegging,the ustice thathas been so longdenied her. In responsetoPolymestors' rophecy hat he willbe transformednto a bitch withblazing eyes, she replies,"What do I care howI die? I havemyrevenge."and, finally,I

spityourpropheciesback. Use them on yourself."This free-dom is seductive. A romantic critic ike Schillerwould un-

doubtedly describe Hecuba's empowermentas her triumphover the

contingenciesof sensuous existence. He would see

herdefiance s evidence of a supersensuouswill whichdisdainsnotonlyexternal dversity ut the blandishments fher moth-erly nstincts nd her own instinct orself-preservation.t isthis ame self-opposition,chillerclaims,thatmakesEuripides'Medea such a sublimefigure. In hermurderofher own chil-dren she gives us evidence of an absolute freedom,of a willwhich s not bound bycustom, nclination, abit,or self-inter-est (173).

Thisis,

ofcourse, ust

thetype

ofreading

which Nussbaumwarnsus against. She directs ur attentionnotto Hecuba's he-roic self-affirmationut to her loss ofhumanity.AccordingtoNussbaum, this is a loss which she shares withPolymestor.Ratherthanelevatingher,herrevengereduces her to his level,a level below the threshold fhumancommunity.NeitherHec-uba nor Polymestor an "endure to be human,withtheopen-ness to risk hat hat onditionrequires. Doggishnessarrives sa welcomegift, release. Theyembrace t. Ifwefind tfoul,weare forced to ask what human life could be

happier" (416).Althoughshe seems to admit thatgodlike revenge maybe a

temptation,Nussbaum assumes thatwe willfind uch behaviorfoul and thatas a resultwe willbe obliged to reconstruct ndaffirm world of shatteredhuman values, a world of love,friendshipnd trust.Our choice, as Nussbaum presents t,iseither to embracethefragilegoodness whichgiveshuman en-deavor its excellenceor to seek refuge n a spuriousgodhood(or doghood) whichwillprotectus fromrisk t thecost of iso-

latingus from

humanity.fwe choose to embrace

fragilehu-

manity,we must do so not just in spite of its contingency,internal ontradiction,nd artificialityut because of this.








Ironically,however,t is

onlyfrom he

perspectivef a

god-like distancethatwe can evenimagineeither ffirmingr deny-ing the contingentnature of human values. In order toconstruct stage upon whichthe vulnerablecommitmentshatinform veryday ifeappear exceptional and heroic,we must

occupy,at least temporarily, positionof godlikedetachmentand contemplate heways nwhichwe are notbound bycontin-

gency, heways nwhichwe have a choice. The construction falternativeworlds s a godlikeactivityhat s made possiblebya

recognitionf the

waysnwhichwe are not constrained

byne-

cessity. It is the savingalienationimplicit n tragicextremitywhich allows us, for instance,to rediscoversuch "ordinary"commitments s friendship nd motherhoodas heroic acts.The sublime moment thus worksnot as the alternative o thehuman worldbut as itsnecessarydouble, a momentof theatri-cal displacement nd distancein which the humancan find t-selfagain.

Yet, even within hisdynamicof loss and recovery, he hu-

manitywhich s destroyedbytragicpathos is neverthe same asthehumanitywhichwe recoverand reconstruct.Tragic pathosis so paradoxicallywelcome because it releases us fromhumanbonds thathave been corrupted nd distortedbymodern secu-larized social institutions.t is important o separatethevicissi-tudes of these institutions rom the fluctuations,leatoryordivine, of a more abstract fate. In Hecuba,for instance,wemourn not ust the loss of trust nd friendship,f nomoss thefoundationsof social order are identifiedn the play: we la-

ment the loss of a heroic societywhereinthese relationshipswould be valued ina waywhich hey re notamong the tents fthe Greeks. We are continually emindedthat the values forwhich Hecuba stands are the values of royalty;her sense ofhonoris contrastedwith hecrowd-pleasing ragmatism ftheGreek rulers such as Odysseus and Agamemnon and the

greedy reacheryfPolymestor.Her supplicationofOdysseus,in fact, ets the termsfor the conflictswhichwillfollow. TheChorus informsus that the Greek assemblywas undecided

about whether it should sacrificePolyxena until Odysseusspoke, "that hypocritewithhoneyed tongue, that hypocriteOdysseus," as the Chorus calls him. When Odysseus appearsto takePolyxenaforsacrifice,Hecuba remindshimofthe time








she saved his lifewhen heappeared

inTroydisguised

as abeg-gar. Now that theirfortunes are reversed,Hecuba argues,

Odysseus should act as she did and free her daughter. She

comparesOdysseus' debt of honor to her withhisobligationtothe "mob" at the assemblyand prays"O gods, spare me the

sightof this thanklessbreed, these politicianswho cringeforfavorsfrom screamingmob and do not care what harmtheydo theirfriends, roviding hey an please a crowd " She thenturns to demand of Odysseus, "Tell me, on what feeble

groundscan

you justifyyourvote of death? Political neces-

sity?" Hecuba's speech moves the Chorus, but Odysseus re-mainsgrotesquelyunmoved. His response is a masterpieceofforensic uibbling. He insiststhathe feelskindly owardHec-uba and thathe is willing o honor his debt bysavingHecuba'slife,but he excuses himselfby clingingto the letter of theircontract nd not itsspirit: "But note: I saidyourife,notyourdaughter's ife."

The tragic ublime liberatesus from he letterof the law so

thatwemayrecover tsspirit.It destroyswhat s merely ormalor institutional n human relationships. It removes humancommitments romthe contingenciesof a public discourse,adiscourse ofcompromise,negotiation, uibblingand rhetoricalseduction. Thus, as several criticshave noted, Agamemnon,Odysseus,and Polymestor epresentvarying egrees of ethical

opportunism. Polymestor s in manyways Odysseus' double,disguisinghis betrayalof Hecuba in proclamationsof friend-

ship and then laterattempting o excuse his treachery n the

groundsthat t was dictatedbyhis loyalty o theGreek state.Hecuba's revengeand the udgmentscene which tprecipitatesare satisfyingecause theyput ustice beyondthe treachery fwords,beyondtheplace where t can be argued,distorted nd

adapted to thedemands of a crowd. Her violenceimpliesthather aristocratic ode ofhonor is beyondtherationalizing forrators and politicians and, one would assume, critics nd phi-losophers), ultimately afe fromcompromise implicit n anypublic forum.

When, as Nussbaum suggests,we begin to reconstruct hehappierworldin whichHecuba's goodness mightflourish,weare liable to envision nachronismswhich re less trivial hanatfirst heymight eem. For Hecuba and, I think, orEuripides








thathappier

world s anaristocracy

nwhichpublic

discourse snot vulnerable to the distortions f crowdpleasers likeOdys-seus. David Ko vacs has recently rgued that Hecuba s organ-ized around the confrontation etween Trojan dynastsandGreek democrats. "The Trojan women," he claims, "are thesurvivors f a vanished world of wealth,dynasticpower, andtraditionalmorality, world wherethegods stood forthe sanc-

tity fthebasic human emotions ofpity,gratitude nd honor"(84). (Here he explicitly rgues againstNussbaum'snotion of a

purelyhuman

nomos.)Bycontrast,he characterizes heGreeks

as relentlesslyecular and publicminded: "Theywill not allowanyprivatemotivesor feelings o influence hepublic and im-

personal pursuitof theirnational interest" 82).Whetherwe accept this argumentor not, it demonstrates

that ven the most basic humanrelationships annotbe under-stood independently f largersocial considerations. We can-not construct morevirtuousworldwithoutmakingdecisionsabout thevalue of specific nstitutions.Hecuba's commitment

to herfamilys indistinguishable romher commitmento themonarchythat gives her family ts identity.Yet Nussbaumtends to overlook Hecuba's frequentrecitationof the gloriesthat were hers when she was queen ofTroy. Nussbaum treatsthe virtuousbehavior of Hecuba and Polyxenaas if t were in-

dependentof the fact hatthey ontinueto think f themselvesas royalty,s ifsuch virtuemightust as easilybe found n themore secular and utilitariandemocracyof the Greeks. Hec-uba's sublime ndependence,however, s an indictment f ust

such a democratic ompromise; tplaces herabove thepoliticsofnegotiation.Hecuba's royaltyhusbecomes a symbolof allthat s suppressed in such negotiation.The modernaudienceis likelyto share Hecuba's nostalgia but unlikelyto think

through hepolitical mplications fherlongingforthe returnof theTrojan monarchy.From a modernperspective hismon-

archy merelyrepresentsa world in whichpublic institutions,assemblies, and courts of law have not turned ustice into a

sophistry iddled withquibbles and technicalities.However,

the factthat suchmoderninstitutions re condemnedin favorof a purer,more elemental form f ustice is a necessary,not a

contingent, eature of Euripides' vision. Tragic sublimityn-vokes a worldbeyondpolitics,a worldin which both law and








personalidentityre

protectedfrom

ompromisingationaliza-

tion. We do not have to translate Hecuba's claims into the

crowd-pleasing iscourse ofdemocracy. Her assertions of her

queenly prerogativedo not have to be weighed againsta dis-course ofpublic good.

Kovacs presentshis reading of the Hecuba as an explicitlyanti-modern reconstructionof a mythicworld view "shot

throughwith the status-determined alues of an essentiallyanti-egalitarianociety" 120). Euripidean scholarship s indis-

array,he claims, because critics have insistedupon makingcomplex and unsubstantiatedassumptions about Euripides'modernity.They have assumed his secularism,his moral rela-tivism, is interestn abnormalpsychology,nd his democratic

sympathies.While I find much of Kovacs' historical recon-struction ompelling,thereis an importantwayin which thestructureftragedytself nvites nd even compels the kindsofmodernreadingswhichhe assails. That is, the resentment nd

sufferingf an aristocratic eroine likeHecuba is emotionally

powerful ecause itprovidesa vehicleforother

typesof resent-

ment,because itprovidesa voice for ll who feel excludedfromthenegotiatedustice of public life. Hecuba's dual identitys

queen and slave aligns two social extremes gainstthe middle

ground where public mediation is possible. She representsboth thehighest nd the lowest social classes, and she is a wo-man in an avowedlymasculinist ulture;her status as outsideris triplyonfirmed.This intensifies hepathosof hersituation,but it also magnifiesher gestures of heroic independence.

Throughher

revengeshe is able to translateher

systematicx-

clusion fromthe institutions f power into an assertion of a

provisional nd yet ublime momentofautonomy. Her actionsshift ur focus from xcluded classes ofpeople to the excludedindividual.LikeAntigone he manages to be in societybut notdetermined y t. Both heroinesact in solidaritywith missingfamily, familywhich is denied representationand conse-

quentlywhose blood bonds providea conspicuous alternativeto mediatedpublic morality.Antigone spurns smene because

Ismene proposes compromiseand negotiation;her bond withher dead brother,by contrast, s safe from such negotiation.Similarly,Hecuba's infanticide estroysPolymestor'sfamilyn








order to assert thesanctity

f her ownmotherhood,

her own

missingfamily.The tragicheroine's momentof sublime detachment nd her

ambiguous social statusthus make herrelationshipwith he au-dience of tragedymore complex thanNussbaum implies,buttheverymode of tragicrepresentation lso adds to this com-

plexity.For Nussbaum,tragic ufferingmoves the audience to

pity nd to identify ith he heroicsufferer,nd in thismomentof identification he sees a solidaritywhich affirms common

(and, she implies,universal)humanity.Accordingly, er read-ing ofAristotle'sPoetics ocuses on Aristotle's levationof ac-tion or plot (muthos)ver character ethe) nd upon the functionofpity nd fear s tragic motions. Aristotle levatesplotovercharacter, he argues, as an implicitrebuttal of the platonicnotion that an individual charactermightpossess a goodnessthat is exempt from the vicissitudes of time and human

relationships.Nussbaum is surelycorrect n assertingthat Aristotle nsists

on thetragic haracter'svulnerabilityo time, nd thismayex-plainwhyhe rankstragicplot above tragic haracter althoughI amnot sure what t would mean to applythisranking o other

typesof nontheatrical epresentations).Nussbaum is notclear,however,about how the audience of tragedy hares and doesnot share thisvulnerability,nd she omitsanymentionof Aris-totle's lengthydiscussion of the well-made plot. The well-made plot, Aristotle nsists,has an organic unitywhich links

beginning,middle and end with logic of causal necessity;t s

"unified,"not "random" or "confusing," nd above all it has apleasing proportion ince "organic structuresmust have a cer-tainmagnitude"(2322). Nussbaum presents plot or actionasthetragicheroine must ee it. In herperspective vents ppearas pure contingency,s capriceoffate, nd this makes her suf-

fering unpredictable and undeserved. From the audience's

point of view, however, there is an order and necessitytoevents. Aristotletells us that this necessity s based upon a

logic of probabilitywhich s more general and therefore ruer

than the ogic/causalitywhich s actually bservable n the acci-dents of real historical vents. The dramaticpower of tragicanagnorisisor revelation, ccordingtoAristotle,s that t com-bines the perspectivesof audience and character. Here "inci-








dents have thegreatest

effect n the mind whenthey

occur

unexpectedly nd at the same time as a consequence of oneanother" 2323). Plotsgiveeven chance events theappearanceofdesign.

Thus, theperceptionftragedy, s opposed to theexperienceof the tragicheroine, nvolvesboth a god's-eyeview of the ac-tion and a sympathyor characterwhocannotshare thatpointofview,and, as I have alreadyargued,this ncongruityfper-spectivesgives us a double view of the tragicvictimwhich s

parallel to but not identicalwiththe victim's wn viewofher-self as both determinedby and yetfree from the determina-tions of fateor, more precisely, n the termsof the tragedieswhichNussbaumdiscusses,freefrom rationalized nd there-forecompromiseddiscourse of social meaning. Paul Ricoeurhas argued thatthe paradoxical conjunctionof necessity nd

surprise, ontroland reversal, s constituent eatures f tragicplot is a reflection f a moregeneraltensionwhich s found nall narrativemimesis, n all emplotment 50). Whetheror not

this s true n all narrative, think hat t s thisdouble perspec-tive that ccounts for thepleasure thatAristotle inds n tragicmimesis. "Not everykind ofpleasure should be requiredof a

tragedy,"Aristotleinsists, "but only its proper pleasure.""The tragicpleasureis thatofpity nd fear, nd thepoet has to

produce itbya workof imitationmimesis]" (2326). Pity ndfear re notnaturally leasurable: it s representationhatren-ders themso, or more specifically,t is representationwhich

protects nd distancesus from hevery motionswhich t en-

genders. Incidentally, his s one place where Kant and Aris-totle might agree; Schiller and Kant both insist that theexaltationof the sublime results not fromdanger itself butfromthe representation f danger. Representation althoughnot necessarily eason) providesthe space for a stagingof theautonomous self.

Ifpoeticmimesismakespity nd fearpleasurable, t also dis-

tinguishes hese emotions n thetragic pectatorfrom hesimi-laremotionsevokedina publicassemblyor trialwhere there s

no apparentplot in theproceedingsand therefore o chancefor a similardistance and double perspective.Nussbaum's ac-count of tragicpitydraws heavily upon the Rhetoric, hereinsuchemotionsare described n terms f a practicalrather han








an aestheticpsychology.

In the Rhetoric ristotle nsists that

pity s a relationship etweenequals, betweenpeople ofsimilarsocial station and similar nterests; hisperceptionof equalitypromptsthe observerof anotherperson's sufferingo realizethat he is vulnerableto the same typeof misfortune.Accord-

ingly, Nussbaum argues that tragic identificationmust be

promptedbya similarperceptionof similarity. ragic heroesmustbe good enoughbut not too good: "theymustbe good ina representative ot an idiosyncraticway,"and their mperfec-tionsmust"enhance our identifications"

386-87).Nussbaum

speculates that Aristotlefindstragicnarrative uperiorto his-toricalnarrative ecause tragic haracters re less idiosyncraticthan historical haracters.Yet, is AlcibiadesmoreidiosyncraticthanPhiloctetes?

No doubt all humansympathys dependentupon a percep-tionof shared human traits ncluding haredvulnerability,uteven beyondtheformaldistance mposedbya well-madeplot,sympathywithtragic sufferingannotbe accounted forbyas-

sumingthatthetragichero is simplydenticalwithhiscommu-nity.The kind ofpitydescribed n theRhetoric,hekind ofpitywhich ways court of aw or an assembly, s precisely he emo-tion that tragedyresists. In such public deliberations,pityworksto produce social homogeneity, o integrate hesuffererinto thecommunity,nd in doing so it affirmsheadequacy of

public discourse,public deliberation. Yet Hecuba remainsaninstance of irreducibleheterogeneity; dysseus makes it clearto her that he has no place among theGreeks, nd she herself

disdains the hypocritical oney-tongued ratoryof the Greekassembly. We identify ecuba as someone who is compelledtostand outside of the communitynd who has managed to turnherpositionof weakness nto a kind ofstrength.Furthermore,our pityhere is indistinguishable romour admiration. Hec-uba's momentofdefiance,not ust hersuffering, akes her ex-

ceptional and, by definition,diosyncratic,n individualapart.We can identify ithherindependencebutonlyas individuals,not as a community,nd certainly ot as judges, not as mem-

bers of social institutions.Our identifications preservedfromanytaint fnegotiation.We can thusoin inthe condemnationof the bad communitywhichthetragicheroinerejectsbecausewe both are and are not members of thatcommunity.








Thesolidarity

ffirmedytragicpity

s thusronically

asedon both a shared resentment f faulty uman institutionsndan affirmationf an ideal humanity, ne that s somehow be-

yond the historicalparticularityf those institutions nd canthus somehow resolve the tension whichexists between indi-vidual and community.The sublime moment of heroic defi-ance places the tragic heroine forever outside of human

community.AfterHecuba's revenge,theGreekassemblyandall itswrangling eem merely rrelevant:we do not imagineanewand better

ssemblywhere ruined

queensare treatedwith

more respect. We remember instead what such assembliesmustalwaysomit: theunrepresentable laimsofthe ndividualwho stands on the social periphery.Nussbaum's description f

tragicpity uppressesthistensionbetween ndividual nd insti-tutionby nsisting hatthetragicheroine s always alreadyoneof us, that the happiness of which she has been deprived isnone other than thehappinesswe all desire. At themomentofutmostsocial difference,lienation,and individuation,Nuss-

baumfinds he most evidenceof sharedhumanity.This shared

humanity esides in the integrityf the various incommensu-rateand vulnerablepracticeswhichtragedyhas displaced,andit is preciselybecause theyhave been displaced, preciselybe-cause theyhavebeen found mpossible na particular istoricalsituation, hattheyhave such a transhistoricalppeal. In themomentofpitywe imaginethese vulnerablerelationalgoods,as Nussbaumcalls them,but we imaginethem s partof a com-monhumanitynd not as partofthe trammeled ontingencyf

a flawedsociety.Thus, inNussbaum's readingoftragedy, ragicpity unctionsas an apodictic,as an invocationofwhat s missing nd there-foremustbe presumedto have been present. In thetragicde-structionof specific human relationships Nussbaum finds

positiveevidence of universalpracticeswhichexceed theirhis-toricaloccasion. Like Aristotle, he can welcome contingencyand thepity tengendersbecause theydo not threaten he fun-damental assumptionswith which she begins her argument.

These include theassumptionof a non-rationalizable niversal-itywhichprecludes any version of moral relativism: she be-lieves that if "we are each led individually hroughthe best

procedures of practicalchoice, we will turn out to agree on








mostimportant

matters, n ethics as in science" (lln). Thecorrelativeto this stand against epistemological relativismstherejectionofanyhistoricaland, one assumes,cultural)rela-tivism. "The problemsof human life,"she asserts,"have notalteredverymuchover the centuries" 15n).

Having made these assumptions,Nussbaum feels free todedicate herargument o an attackon thepresumption frea-son and,morespecifically,n thepresumption f a rationalizedmoral autonomy. Her faith n the transhistoricalnd self-evi-

dent value of certain human practices,however, eads her tooverlook the moredisquieting mplications fthetragicvision.

Specifically,s I have been arguing,she overlooksthewayinwhichtragedy's ndictmentf rational utonomygivesrise to asublime visionofpatheticutonomy, n autonomyof sufferingwhich translates he frustrationf reason and desire into the

proofof a selfhoodwhich exceeds eitherof thesemomentsoflimitation.

Most contemporary heoristsof the sublime renounce any

notion of a transcendental elf,but theyembrace the sublimenotion thatanypublic discourse on values is implicated n anhubristicattempt to represent the unrepresentable. Theymaintain that even the most provisionaldiscourses about themost limitedof humangoods cannotassume or demand con-sensus withoutviolently uppressinga knowledgeof contin-

gency. According to Lyotard, for instance, no personrespondingto a demandforustice can knowthe ustice of herown response. The adequacy of our responses to thevictim's

complaint annot be representednlanguage,sincethere xistsbetween victim nd societypermanentdissonance, an incom-

mensurabilityf discourses. Whereas Nussbaum findsan in-

commensurabilityetween discrete ethical)practices,Lyotardfinds similar ncommensurabilityn language itself.

Nussbaum's ethicalnaturalism epends heavilyupon organicmetaphorswhich ikenmoral and social harmony o thebiolog-ical functioningf living organisms, nd whilepoststructural-ists ikeLyotard ttackwhatthey ee as thebogus metaphysical

assumptionsof such notions of naturalunity, heclassical dis-tinction etweenbeautyand sublimity epends upon it. Theo-rists ike Burkeand Schillerdescribebeauty s a stateof edenic

harmonywhichblurs the distinction etweennaturalorder and







Tragedynd theEthicalSublime 67 1

humanpurposiveness,

nddespite

the factthat such theoristsstressthe role whichreasonplays nmakingpossible this nter-dependence of the human and thenatural, heirdescriptions f

beautyas a kind of ecological balance resemble Nussbaum's

metaphorsfor humangoodness. They differ romNussbaum,however, n their nxietyover the obliviousness,over the lackof self-consciousnesswhichsuch an edenic state implies. Forthemthe sublime provides a corrective o such amnesia. Byfrustratingeason with spectaclebeyondhumancomprehen-sion (as in Kant's mathematical ublime) or

byfrustratinge-

sire with a spectacle of nature's danger and indifference,hesublimewakes thehumansubject fromthe bliss of an unself-conscious unity nd promptsa painfulbut stimulatingelf-re-flection. Nussbaum's stress on organic contiguity eems to

suppressthe exhilaration f this moment.Both versions of the moral naturalist'smetaphor suppress

the specifically ocial and institutionalmalaise that threatenmoralharmony.Nussbaumcontrastsher versionof the"agentas

plant,child,female

(orwithelements of both male and fe-

male)" withthe conventionalnotion of the moral agent as a

"purelyactive"hunter, rapper,male. The plant incorporatesa rhythmf"passivity nd activity"whichmakes the two states

contiguous. The agent as plant can admit that the externalworldhas powerwhile theagentas hunter spiresto "uninter-

ruptedactivitynd control nd seeks to eliminate hepowerofthe external." Nussbaumconcludes herargumentwith n evo-cative plea for an "art thatencourages our souls to remain

plantlikeand

fragile, placesof

glancing lightand

flowingwater" 421). This is a lovely mage,but it blursthedistinctionbetweenan elementalfate and the caprice ofRealpolitik.t is

pleasant to imagineyieldingto and being cultivatedbyearth,water,wind, nd sun butmuch ess pleasantto imagineyieldingto bureaucraticnstitutions.Contemporary olitics re difficulttoromanticize,nd yetthey re the elementsthat mpingemost

dramaticallyupon the individual; theyare the elements towhichwe mustyield fyieldwe must. It is much easier for theflower o inclinetoward he sunthanfor hemodernHecuba toinclinetowardthetents f theGreeks n thehopes ofobtainingjustice. I am not advocatinga brute,male mastery;nstead,








amsuggesting

hatthere s a virtue n the momentof discrimi-

natingdisengagement hat discoversdistance and difference.Like Nussbaum and unlikeLyotard, believe thatthrough

moral exemplification e can achieve provisionalbut very m-

portantmomentsof ethical consensus. Stagingthese momentsofexemplification,owever,turnsout to be no simplematter,as our differenteadingsof tragedymake clear. Such stagingrequiresthat we takeseriously he self-contradictionsfmod-ern secular society,take seriouslythe ways in whichspecificethical

practicesmay require,or

necessarily ntail,resistance

to consensus, a productivemisunderstanding.The most im-

portant thicaldebates todayare stagedacross cultural, exualand even historicalboundaries,and in manyof these debateswe have as much nterestnpreserving ur sublimedifferencesas we do in findingways n which to agree.

NOTES

1 Nussbaumpresents tragedy

s the immediateconfirmationf commu-nity. am usingthe term sublime" here (in an admittedlyoose way)torefer o a typicallymodern readingof tragedy hat stressesfeaturesoftragicdrama that Nussbaum overlooks. From a sublime perspective,tragedys a fortunate all from pleasantbutpotentiallytupifyingtateofharmony;n the momentof crisis thetragicprotagonists deprivedofher rapportwith nature and withsocietybut is recompensedwith thediscoveryof a self that exceeds either social or natural determination.Thus, theorists f the sublime find evidence for a Kantianfreedom atprecisely hepointat which Nussbaumfinds n affirmationf social de-pendence. I am arguingthatthesublime,bothas it is reflectedn Athe-nian tragediesand in modern readings of those tragedies,reflects

paradoxical need to be both included in community nd yet distin-guished from t. Nussbaum's account of tragic exemplification ails toaddress this predicamentwhich is characteristic f modern secularsocieties.

Burke and Schillerputmore stressupon the social implications f thesublime than does Kant. Theyemphasizethe relief hat ublimity ringsfrom hecompromisesofpublic life,from hehypocrisyfhabit, nd, asBurke in particular tresses,fromthe contemptthatfamiliarityreeds.Bycontrast,Kantemphasizesthe sublime'sability oengendera sense ofsupersensibledestinythrough itherthe frustrationf appetite (in thedynamic ublime)or the confusionofunderstandingin the mathemati-cal sublime). Kant,however, lso observes thatthe sublimedestroyshy-

pocrisy nd sentimentality. ll threetheorists escribe the sublimeas anextensive categorywhich (potentially) ncludes tragedyas one of itsmoments.

See Kant's "The Analytic f the Sublime" in TheCritiquefJudgement,Burke'sA Philosophicalnquirynto heOrigin four deasofthe ublimend








Beautiful,nd Schiller's "On the Sublime" and "On the Pathetic." For

the classic historical verview f theaesthetics fthesublime, ee SamuelH. Monk's TheSublime.

2. Lyotardargues thatthe experience of modernitys essentially ublimebecause modernsocietyhas lost themetaphysical oundations hatonceprovideda model forconsensus. Without uch foundations r metanar-ratives,he claims,we mustperpetuallyrediscover the sublime incom-mensurability f various assertions of moral and political authority.UnlikeNussbaum,he sees no hope forarguing or a limitedconsensusbased on the limited utonomyof specific ocial/ethicalpractices, incesuch argumentswould inevitablymplynormative nd implicitly ran-scendental notions of humanagencyand intersubjectivity.

See Lyotarďs/ш/ Gaming, hePostmodernondition,nd TheDifférend.

WORKS CITED

Aristotle.Nicomacheanthics. Trans. W. D. Ross. TheCompleteWorksfAris-totle. Vol. 2. Ed. JonathanBarnes. Bollingen Series LXXI. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1984.

. Poetics.Trans.J. Bywater.TheComplete orksfAristotle. ol. 2. Ed.JonathanBarnes. BollingenSeries LXXI. Princeton: PrincetonUniver-sityPress, 1984.

. Rhetoric. rans.W. RhysRoberts. TheComplete orksfAristotle. ol.2. Ed. JonathanBarnes. Bollingen Series LXXI. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityress, 1984.

Burke,Edmund. A Philosophicalnquirynto heOrigin four deasof he ublimeandBeautiful. d.J.T. Boulton. Notre Dame: Universityf Notre DamePress, 1958.

Euripides. Hecuba. TheCompletereek ragedies. ol. III. Ed. David GreneandRichardLatimore. Trans. WilliamArrowsmith.Chicago: UniversityfChicago Press, 1956. 488-555.

Kant, mmanuel. Critiquef udgement.rans.J.H. Bernard. NewYork: Mac-millan,1951.

Kovacs,David. TheHeroicMuse: Studiesn theHippolytus

ndHecubaofEuňpi-des. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University ress, 1987.

Lyotard, ean-Francois.TheDifférend:hrasesnDispute.Trans. Georges VanDen Abbeele. Minneapolis: Universityf MinnesotaPress, 1989.

. JustGaming.Trans. Wlad Godzich. Theorynd History fLiterature.Vol. 20. Minneapolis: Universityf MinnesotaPress, 1985.

. The Postmodernondition: Report n Knowledge. rans. GeoffBen-nington nd Brian Massumi. TheoryndHistoryfLiterature,ol. 10. Min-neapolis: Universityf MinnesotaPress, 1984.

Monk,Samuel H. TheSublime:A Study fCritical heoriesnXVIII-Centuryng-land. AnnArbor: UniversityfMichiganPress, 1960.

Nussbaum,MarthaC. TheFragilityfGoodness: uck nd Ethics nGreek ragedyandPhilosophy. ambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress, 1986.

Ricoeur, Paul. Time nd Narrative.Trans. KathleenMcLaughhnand DavidPellauer.Vol. 1. Chicago: UniversityfChicago Press, 1984.

Schiller,Friedrich on. NaiveandSentimentaloetrynd On the ublime.Trans.JuliusA. Elias. New York: FrederickUngar, 1966.

Documents

Tragedy and Ethical Sublime in Fragility of Goodness