Trade union democracy and individualisation: the cases of Denmark and Sweden

Industrial Relations Journal 27:2 ISSN 0019-8692

Trade union democracy and individualisation: the cases of

Denmark and Sweden Morten Madsen

Combining central concepts of individualisation and trade union democracy with empirical results from Swedish and mainly Danish surveys, this article analyses how the tendencies towards individualisation in the membership affects union democracy. The analysis indicates that the individualisation affects union democracy negatively. However individualisation is a relative concept.

Within the research tradition on industrial relations, the role and function of trade unions in developed capitalist societies has been much discussed in recent years[l]. One commonly held thesis is that because of (a) conjunctural problems with economic stagnation and recession (b) fundamental changes in the occupational structure together with changes in management stra- tegies and in the organisation of production (c) cultural, institutional, ideological and political development trends, the working class has become fragmented and disaggre- gated[2]. One result of these changes is said to be shifts in the attitudes of union members from collective orientation towards individualisation and, subsequently, falling levels of support for the labour movement.

In a number of countries, the labour movement has experienced a decrease in membership in the 1980s (eg. France and the USA). Whereas the 1970s has been rightly called ’the decade of unions’, the 1980s were, gener-

0 Morten Madsen is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

ally, a period of decline. However, signal exceptions to this trend are the cases of Denmark and Sweden, where there have been continuously high rates of union organisation right up to the present-particularly in Sweden, where the union organisation rate from 1980 until 1990 increased from 80% to 85’/0[3]. When increasing individualisation in these countries does ,not result in union resignation, how then does it affect the unions?

There is no question that changes and fragmentation of the traditional lines of class cleavage have occurred in developed capitalist countries which fundamentally challenge the labour movement’s role and function in modern society. But precisely how the tendency towards increased individualisation affects the labour movement’s current organisation and mode of interest representation, currently we have very little specific knowledge.

The purpose of this article is to throw light on this obscure gap in union research by focusing on the members’ relationship to their union. More explicitly, to discuss

0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142, USA.

Trade union democracy in Denmark and Sweden 115

how the tendencies towards differentiation/ individualisationhn the traditional value sets of the members which were based on solidarity and common interests affect union democracy. The starting point of this analysis is the Confederation of Trade Unions (Lands Organisation, hereafter LO) in Denmark and Sweden, which represent unions of blue collar workers and clerical workers in both the public and the private sector. The main emphasis is on the Danish LO.

The choice of union democracy as the point of departure is deliberate. Despite the fact that union policy is usually decided at the central organisation level-democracy is the backbone in the unions’ representation of interests. It is through the internal organisational democratic structures that, in principle, the members’ interests and demands are aggregated. It is through the internal democratic organisation, that the leadership ensures the members’ support for its actual policy and ideology. Furthermore an upgrading of union democracy is an indispensable precondition for a renewal of interest representation and, in a wider sense, a precondition for ensuring the common values and influence of the organisation on working life.

The analysis will draw on two types of empirical data. That there has in fact occurred a spread of individualist values among union members is confirmed by time- series data from the Danish Constituent Behavior Surveys. The main emphasis is, however, on a cross sectional analysis on the basis of a comprehensive study of members of unions affiliated to the Danish LO from 1992 - ’The employee perspective on working life and politics’, hereafter referred to as the APL-study[4]. In order to differen- tiate and give greater meaning to the cross sectional analysis, a comparative perspective is added in the form of the Swedish Citizens Survey of 1987 and the Swedish LO’S study of its members (’Opinions on union and job’) from 1988 and 1993[5].

The first two sections of this article present a theoretical framework. In part a closer examination of the issue of to what extent one can confirm an increased individualisation among the members of the LO labour movement-primarily in Denmark-and also an operationalisation of the concept of individualisation for the empirical analysis. In the other part, via a brief discussion of the classic approaches to the study of union

democracy and the delimitation of analytical fields. The actual empirical analysis consists of three parts: The members’ participation in union democracy; the degree of representivity in union democracy, and the legitimacy of union democracy. By way of conclusion, the results of the analysis are summated and the consequences discussed.

Collective and individualised orientations

The discussion of the challenge of modem society to such collectively based mass organisations as the labour movement and the political parties must initially focus on the concept of ‘individualism’ and ‘individualisation’. The limits of this article do not allow a longer discussion of the concepts’ contents and use, but one must agree with eg. Valkenburg[6] that the concepts in question are difficult to determine exactly and that they often are used to give far too determinist predictions about the approaching ’death’ of mass organisations.

There is hardly any doubt that a fragmentation or disaggregation of the working class has occurred. A way to illustrate this development is to examine how the members of the LO labour movement, who traditionally have been the working class, over time have changed their class identification. Danish surveys from the 1970s on (1979, 1984 and 1990*), indicate that during recent decades significant changes in the members’ percep- tion of their class identity have occurred. The proportion of members with a working class identification has been relatively stable but from 1979 to 1990 there has been a slide from none or uncertain class identification to middle class identification. In 1979 only 17% of the members unambiguously saw themselves as belonging to the middle class, in 1990 it was 40%.

This change in class identification can only partly be explained by the fact that in the period there has been a change in membership from blue collar workers to clerical workers, or that the connotation of ’middle class’ has changed toward a more positive one. The tendency for ever more

* The data referred to here has been made available by Hans Jsrgen Nielsen (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science) and are in general described in Nielsen[7].

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members of the LO labour movement to move towards a middle class identification is an expression of underlying, fundamental changes in the processes by which individual identity is formed. Given the development of the welfare state; the fragmentation in borderlines between social classes; the development in mass communication, con- sumerism etc; decisive changes have occurred in the identity and socialisation pattern of society. In brief, personal identity is less and less shaped by experiences and mutual similarities but increasingly by mul- tiplicity and different experiences[8].

For earlier generations, the individual’s life cycle and hence identity was more or less given from birth. Despite the possibility for social climbing, the principal rule was that children of workers became workers, children of white collar workers became white collar workers etc. Likewise, the pattern of economic demand focused more unequivocally on the satisfaction of material needs. The individual was, so to speak, locked into a relatively stable life cycle with its pertinent individual identity. The basic security as to primary material needs brought about by the welfare state means however an increased individual orientation toward new non-material needs[9]. The collective foundations for traditional working class culture find more individual expression. The firm pattern disintegrates in favour of an apparent ’pluralism’ or multi- formity, in which the individual to a greater extent ’chooses’ or is ‘drawn’ toward a life style or individual identity.

Identity is something one chooses or is drawn towards - especially through the choice of work - not something one is pushed toward; something which no longer develops after the end of adolescence. Val- kenburg describes the individual process of identity formation as a project in constant development[lO].

A decisive precondition for the individual to have the chance to form his or her own identity is the existence of a collective, secure framework for existence. In Western Euro- pean countries in general-and especially in the Scandinavian countries-it is the development of the welfare state, the ensuring of material welfare needs, the high level of education and so on which in reality is the take-off for individualisation. Researchers such as Helfert[ll] actually regard the fundamental security of welfare needs in the

welfare state as a paradox. The welfare state, and hereby the labour movement, has become a victim of its own success because the population has developed new interests and orientation patterns which are critical of collective solutions. Helfert also has an important point concerning the new generations’ lack of experience of the hard struggle for rights and reforms. They, therefore, have a tendency to take individual opportunities for granted more often than the older gener- ation, for whom the development of the welfare state was a meaningful political project.

That the individual person, to a far greater extent than previously, is drawn to an identity that is not definitive but rather a project in constant development involving a rising pluralism of values is, however, not synony- mous with the demise of collective frames of actions. Individualisation must be understood as a relative concept. Individual acts in some contexts are guided by self-interest eg. towards better opportunities for personal development. But, in other contexts, the same individual can show solidarity and support common values eg. in the form of attitudes demanding that the opportunities for personal development should be available to all.

In order to analyse how individualisation more precisely influences the unions through organisational democracy, an index for measuring value orientations is included. The index is based on a number of questions which classify the members’ value orientations on a scale involving approval of common interests and a fundamental view of solidarity against approval of self-interests and a fundamental view of individualism (hereafter c-i orientation). For analytical pur- poses, the members are logically categorised into three groups of nearly the same s i z e the ’collective’ orientated, the ’neutral’ and the ’individual’ orientated[l2].

However, this categorisation cannot be used to say anything about the actual distribution of collective and individual orientations among LO members in Denmark and Sweden as such a quantification is determined both by the available possibilities for operationalisation and by the partially arbitrary way in which the categorisation has been made. However in the case of the APL-study-Denmark 1992-the foundation is solid on account of the inclusion of a significant number of questions and the use

0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. Trade union democracy in Denmark and Sweden 117

of factor analysis as a guide for the actual operationalisation[l3]. This is not the case in the Swedish analysis where an attempt has been made to measure the members’ c-i orientation on the basis of a single question. On the other hand, the value of the categorisation is the possibility of seeing how the tendencies in the fundamental value orientation that are present in the membership relate to their level of activity in the union and to attitudes toward the unions’ representation of interests.

On the study of union democracy

Whether the union movement can be characterised as a democratic organisation or not is the aspect of unions’ mode of operation that perhaps has been subject to the most research. However some vagueness on the very concept of democracy prevails in these studies. The early investigations of union democracy from the 1950s were typically inspired by Michels’ sociological studies of the internal democratic organisation of parties and unions from the beginning of this century[l4]. In ’Zur Sociologie des Partei- wess in der Modernen Demokratie’, Michels formulates the theory of ’the iron law of oligarchy’, in which the main point is that in mass organisations there is a general tendency toward developing a rule of the few - an irremovable, professional oligarchy[l5]. As an example Lipset et al. in their analysis of the International Typographical Union in the USA emphasised the presence of an organised opposition, which at all times is willing to take over the leadership, as a decisive condition for the maintenance of democracy[l6].

These approaches to the study of union democracy have been criticised for having an oversimplified model of the forms of government in the labour movement, and that one cannot, uncritically, project concepts of democracy developed on the level of the societal structure-’the big democracy’- down to the internal organisation structures(l71. It is hence essential to keep in mind that, while democracy at the societal level is the framework of many different minor or major conflicts, union democracy is, at one and the same time, party to conflicts at the level of society, in which it is the purpose to represent the interests of a well- defined member group, and is also the

framework for conflicts involving internal differences of interests and conflicts among the membership. This leaves union democracy with certain special, historically specific conditions in which to function.

In the formulation of ’the iron law of the oligarchy’ Michels used the ideal of direct democracy as a ’mirror’, that is an ideal based on the participation of all involved on equal terms, an equal distribution of power and two-way communication vis a vis the oligarchy with absolute power to the leadership and-if any-one-way communication. However a more fruitful approach to understand union democracy is a ‘median form’ of the polyarchy as designated by pluralists[l8]-termed by others delegation democracy[ 191.

Delegation democracy is based on partici- patory democracy at the organisation’s ground level-in the workplace, clubs and in the local union-where all members can attend and express their opinion and (directly) elect representatives to attend to their interests in the workplace, in the community and further up in the hierarchy of the organisation. Above ground level, in the federations of unions, delegation democracy is based on the principle of representative democracy. Experienced members are elected indirectly to attend to interest representation at the levels of the organisation all the way to the very top. Where, at the ground level, there is a high degree of control over the elected representatives, control at the higher levels is of a more formal nature. Thus ideally, delegation democracy is founded on the notion that the leadership and the active members hold each other in a relative stable balance of power by means of the rules of democracy. In reality, the stability of the system is dependent on the extent to which active members at the organisations’ ground level are capable of interpreting the opinions, ideas, needs and interests of the passive or inactive members, who do not participate in the democratic decision-making process through two-way communication in the workplace and in the local union. The analytical approach outlined here can be summed up as in Figure 1.

In the words of van de Valls, the active members constitute the core of the organisation: the larger and the more active this group are, the closer one is to the ideal of polyarchy[21]. The fewer this group are in number and strength, the more the organis-

118 lndustrial Relations Journal @ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996.

Democracy Delegation democracy Oligarchy

Member activity: High, direct activity Active minority groups Low member activity Power distribution: Member power Balance of power Boss rule Communication structure: Two-way, direct Two-way, indirect None or one-way

Figure 1: Features of the conceptualisation of organisation in studies of union democracy. Note: Inspired by Karlsen[20]

ation moves in the direction of oligarchy. In empirical as well as in theoretical stud-

ies of union democracy it is thus important to grasp and sustain that the labour movement is a ’combat organisation’ with historically specific contents and modes of operating. Organisational democracy cannot narrowly be measured according to ideal types of democracy, but must, on the contrary, be viewed in the context of the unions’ relations to their environment and must comprehend the link between the unions‘ representation of interests of the members in developed capitalist society which historically is tied to the control of the sale of labour through entering into collective agreements.

As organisations fighting for workers’ interests, union democracy has clearly been subordinated to an efficiency rationale[22]. The aim of the representation of interests is therefore relatively limited and narrowly defined. It has always been the concrete results which mattered and as long as the interests of the members were limited to obvious and ‘narrow‘ material demands such as fewer working hours, holidays and higher wages, a distant (and for that matter irremovable) professional leadership could have high legitimacy as long as it ’delivered the goods’[23]. A strong sense of community based on solidarity was more or less given. The labour movement’s fundamental resource of power was a high rate of membership, competent leaders and an ’iron’ discipline on the assumption: ’internal solidarity gives external strength’. A direct democracy open to spontaneous currents of opinion could objectively be ruinous to the nationwide discipline that strikes, blockades and other means of combat required. This was the practical experience of both the leadership and the members. Were the labour movement to give too much priority to member democracy it could result in the weakening of strike power in relation to the employers and the state[24].

Figure 2 illustrates delegation democracy in an environment of a community with homogeneous life expectations and class positions and the resulting common interests in overcoming the obvious injustices to which members collectively were subject in working life and in society in general. That the significance of such a ‘community’ must be incorporated in the conceptualisation of union democracy is also stressed in Lewin‘s analysis of democracy and organisational form in the Swedish LO[25].

As discussed above, decisive disaggregation of the traditional lines of class cleavage has occurred since the beginning of the labour movements at the end of the last century. The structures of interests have become fragmented which indicate that common interests and objectives no longer are clear and unambiguous. New patterns of socialisation and processes for developing identity have brought about an increased individualisation among union members, trends which challenge the ’exterior walls’ of the community of former times.

In order to evaluate how this fragmentation of traditional common values and interests-the ’community’-affects union democracy, the empirical analysis will focus on the following three areas: 1) the members’ participation in union democracy; 2) the representivity of union democracy; and 3) the legitimacy of union democracy.

‘Communitv‘

- I- - Figure 2: Conceptualising union delegation

democracy

@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. Trade union democracy in Denmark and Sweden 119

Members participation in union democracy

As outlined above, participation is a vital aspect of union delegation democracy and, with the tendencies towards a differentiation in the traditional value community, the extent and the profundity of union participation becomes decisive for the democracy’s ’internal’ strength. That is, to what extent do the interests of those at the top of the organisation accord with the values, preferences and interests which are present at the grass roots.

However one should be aware that participation, by its very nature, is an ambiguous concept. Whether the individual member participates or not, can be an expression of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Possible causes as to whether members chose to be active or passive can, among others, be: (a) That the negotiations concerning wage- and working conditions are experienced as totally detached from the individual’s union participation. Only in a situation of crisis do many members become conscious of their role as a union member. (b) That the individual is of the view that there is no point in participating. Government from the top is experienced as having become so massive that the members feel that it violates their concept of democracy. (c) That the union activity is hampered by management in the workplace by means of various inter- ferences in the individual’s ’right to organ- ise’. (d) That the union are experienced as a stiff ‘apparatus’, a relic of the industrial society with which the individual cannot identify. And finally, (e) the lack of activity can result from the individual’s satisfaction with the present function of the union and, at the same time, he or she views obligations outside the union as more important.

Participation can also be viewed as a process of learning which gives the participants an insight into matters that otherwise are reserved for the leadership of the organisation[26]. And finally, participation is a precondition for changes in attitudes, changes which can increase the sense of solidarity, community and be a starting point for the articulation of new common values.

An extensive degree of passivity is conse- quently not necessarily an indicator of the lack of internal democracy, but can mean that the leadership (not via dialogue) gets members united behind the general lines

of policy, and gets, (not from below), the necessary inputs for developing the representation of interests.

Given the tendency towards individualisation one may expect a general decline in participation over time, and that patterns of participation are dependent on the members’ collective/individual (c-i) orientations. Spe- cifically, this means the lowest rate of union participation among members with ’individualised‘ orientation, and that the ’individual’ oriented participate in a different way than the traditional ‘collective’ oriented in terms of comparatively low participation in the traditional forms of meetings such as general meetings and a relatively higher participation in activities close to the workplace, where participation is connected with a larger element of self-interest. That the tendencies towards individualisation will indicate changed patterns of participation in this direction is, among others, discussed by Hyman[27].

Trends in union meeting participation in Denmark and

Sweden Surveys indicate that participation in union meetings among all organised wage earners in Denmark in the period from 1979 to 1991 has halved[28]. Focusing only on participation within the LO there is a correspond- ing-although weaker-tendency to falling participation, as comparable surveys from respectively 1982* and 1992 (APL-study) indicate a fall in participation in union meetings of from 38% to 30%. The greatest decline is among the members who are under 50 years, skilled workers and white collar workers, while there is an unchanged participation rate among unskilled workers just as there only is a slight decline among the members who are over 50 years.

* The data referred to here has been made available by Steen Scheuer (Copenhagen Business School, Institute of Organisation and Industrial Sociology) and are described in general in Scheuer[29]. It must be noted that Scheuer originally categorised the members activity into local union level and club level, while the APL-study operates with a wider measure of participation since participation here includes meetings in the workplace in general. Excluding the members that only participate in workplace meetings, the tendency is of a falling participation rate.

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Compared with Denmark, the surveys car- ried out by the Swedish LO indicate that there is a higher level of participation in the Swedish labour movement. The overall tendency in members’ participation rate is, however, the same, eg. a 4% decline from 1978 to 1993. But in the Swedish case the decline is concentrated among the young members under 30 years of age. Among both the 3 0 4 9 year olds and the members 50 years old and above, there is in fact a small increase in participation in meetings[30].

C-I orientation and participation in meetings

When the members’ c-i orientations are included in the analysis of participation in Denmark and Sweden*, Table 1 indicates a partially expected correlation: participation in union meetings depends on c-i orientation in that the members with ‘collective’ orientation participate in union meetings far more than the members with ’neutral’ and ‘individualised’ orientation. And further that the meeting participation rate is higher among the ‘neutral’ than among the ‘individual’ oriented members.

This correlation is quite distinct in the case of Denmark but less so when it comes

to Sweden, as the participation rate here is higher among the ‘individual’ oriented than among the members with ‘neutral’ c-i orientations. A possible explanation for this could be that, in Sweden, the members who are critical of the union to a greater extent than in Denmark show up and express their dissatisfaction. This could, furthermore, be connected to the fact that the Swedish Citi- zen Survey of 1987 showed an exceptionally low level of participation compared with Swedish LO’S own member survey from 1988. The critical participants-who also are frequently respondents in surveys-are strongly represented.

Table 1 indicates further that in Denmark there is a great difference in participation rate in the different forms of meetings. The highest level of participation in 1992 was workplace meetings and general meetings and the lowest in union meetings and after work meetings. These differences become even more significant when one looks at c-i orientation since a considerably higher proportion of members with ‘collective’ orientation than the ‘individualised’ oriented participate in general meetings and union meetings: union activities which definitely often have a more ritual character. Concerning after work meetings and work-

Table 1 : Members’ participation in meetings arranged by the union within one year, distributed by c-i orientation (per cent and N )

Denmark Sweden

After Meetings Joint Joint General- Union works in the partici- partici-

assembly(s) meetings meetings workplace pation* pation

’Collective’ 32 20 17 34 52 (870) 22 (244) ‘Neutral’ 24 15 12 26 44 (956) 16 (167) ‘Individualised’ 16 8 10 24 38 (1114) 18 (162) All 23 13 12 27 44 (3298) 20 (573)

Note: Denmark: Due to several reply options the percentages do not add up to 100. Weighted data, significant at level < 0.005. Sweden: Significant at level > 0.05. *This participation measure is higher than the earlier mentioned because of involvement of meetings in the workplace.

Source: The APL-database and the Swedish Citizen Survey.

* The data from the Swedish Citizens Survey has been made available by Jens Hoff (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science) and are described in general in Hoff(311.

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place meetings, the differences are not nearly so marked.

Herein lies an affirmation of Hyman’s hypothesis regarding changes in participation patterns due to the tendencies toward increased individualisation since, among the ‘collective’ oriented there is a higher level of participation in all types of union activities both under the auspices of the union and in workplace meetings under company auspices. The ‘individual‘ oriented predomi- nantly participate in meetings in the workplace which presumably are more important to the individual‘s own working conditions. Goul Andersen points to a similar tendency among all organised Danish wage earners in 1990, and argues that the displacement in union participation from the union level to the workplace level corresponds to the tendency in political participation. Wage earners and other groups of citizens are most active in contexts where the possibility of exercising influence is highest in relation to the political outcome for the individual[32].

Representivity in union democracy

A weakness in analyses of union democracy which are exclusively based on surveys is that one is not able to examine what the different organisational levels actually do in order to incorporate the members values and preferences in the representation of interests. But decisions and influence are more than structures and channels. It is first and foremost people who think and act, and in a movement built on the principles of delegation democracy it is crucial who elects whom.

Those members who participate are also the ones who elect the representatives who will be the bearers of union policy in the workplace plus communicators of member values in the union organisation, cf. Figure 2. The principle of delegation signi- fies that the members who do not participate in the union work at the ground level of the organisation risk having their interests ignored in union policy. But it is likewise a problem for the organisation if there are large differences in values and positions between respectively the active, policy cany- ing members and the passive: as, in the long run, this might lead to a decrease in support from certain groups of members.

Given the increased individualisation and

value pluralism plus the decline in participation in union meetings in general, there is reason to focus on who participates in union work, who, currently, has chosen not to and in this way draw up a picture of which values are filtered into the union organisation. It is to be expected that there is an unequal representation of values: that the members with ’collective’ rather than with more ‘individual’ orientation to a greater extent fill elected union posts. Like- wise that they-as shown above-are more likely to participate in union meetings.

With a view to the empirical analysis, the members are categorised into three groups on the basis of their current union activity: ’elected’ (members who hold elected posts), ’participants’ (members who participate in union activities), and ‘passive’ (members who at present have chosen not to be active), see Figure 3.

The categorisation indicates that the proportion of ‘elected’ is the same-lOo/O-in the Danish and the Swedish labour movement, while there are relatively big differences in the proportions of ’participants’ and ‘passive’ members. As earlier commented, the Swedish Citizens Survey from 1987 shows a considerably lower level of participation than Swedish LO’S own member surveys where the proportion of ‘participants‘ and ’passive’ however still is lower than in Denmark. Despite the possible unreliabilit- ies involved in comparing the Danish and Swedish data one can well illuminate the question of representation within each coun- try and undertake relative comparisons between the two countries.

One can speak of identical tendencies in the following areas: (a) The age variable has a great effect on the level of union activity. The younger members-less than 30 years old-are to a significantly greater extent ‘passive’ than the 30-50 year olds, and especially members who are more than 50 years old. The members who are over 50 years old have, on the contrary, an over- representation of ’elected’. The tendency is especially noticeable in Denmark where there is a difference of no less than 10% in the proportions of ‘elected’ between the youngest (4%) and oldest age category (14%). (b) Presumably correlated to the above, there are likewise similar tendencies in relation to the members’ educational back- ground: the less schooling, the higher the level of union activity. Again, the tendency

122 Industrial Relations Journal @ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996.

Yes ’Elected’ Denmark: 10

Elective union post? Sweden: 10 no ’Participant’

Denmark: 36 Sweden: 10

Figure 3: Classification of the members by their level of union activity, Denmark (1992) and Sweden (1987) (per cent). Note: Denmark: Weighted data, N = 3301. Note that meetings in the workplace is included. Sweden: N = 593. Source: The APL-database and the Swedish Citizen Survey.

’Passive’ Denmark: 54 Sweden: 80

is more significant in Denmark. (c) The variable of labour market status shows that among the full-time employed there is a significantly higher proportion of ’elected’ than among both the part-time employed and the currently unemployed members, who naturally do not have the same possibilities for participating in union democracy eg. as shop stewards or by participation in workplace meetings. (d) Finally there is a tendency for the ‘collective’ oriented members to a greater extent than the ‘individual’ oriented to hold elected posts, while the latter to a greater extent are ’passive’. In Denmark this tendency is more significant than in Sweden, see Table 2.

The following differences are conspicuous: (e) Where in Denmark there is no appreciable difference between men and women’s participation in union democracy these differences are significant in the case of Sweden.

In Sweden there is a significantly higher proportion of ’elected’ among men than among women, who, on the other hand, have a higher proportion of ‘passive’. ( f ) Concerning the members’ employment by sector-public or private employment-in Denmark there is a considerably higher com- mitment to union democracy among public employees than among private employees, while the opposite is the case in Sweden. (g) Finally there are considerable differences when one examines the members’ occu- pations. In Sweden, it is generally the white collar workers who are the most active in union democracy while the unskilled workers are the least active; both in relation to the proportion of ’elected’ and ’participants’. In Denmark, on the other hand, it is the white collar workers who are characterised by the lowest degree of union activity while, among the unskilled workers, they have the

Table 2 : Level of union activity in Denmark (1992) and Sweden (1987), distributed by c-i orientation (per cent and N)

~

‘Elected’

’Collective’ 12 ‘Neutral’ 9 ’Individualised’ 8

’Collective’ 12 ’Neutral’ 12 ’Individualised’ 6

’Participant’ ’Passive’ Sum (per cent/N) Denmark

41 46 99/ 871 36 54 991 956 33 60 101/1116

S v e r i g e 11 77 100/ 244 6 83 101/ 165

12 82 100/ 162

Note: Denmark: Significant at level < 0.005. Sweden: Significant at level > 0.05. Source: The APL-database and The Swedish Citizen Survey.

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highest proportion of ’elected’, and among the skilled workers the highest proportion of ’participants’.

In sum, these similarities and differences indicate that, in the Danish LO the discrep- ancies between ’elected’, ’participants’ and ’passive’ members distributed by back- ground variables are greater. Apart from the differences as to gender, the tendencies are more accentuated in Denmark. This can be interpreted as better representivity in the Swedish LO than in the Danish. This difference in representivity is further confinned by the trends in c-i orientations where, in the case of Sweden, there is only a very weak correlation - practically none - between ‘individual’ orientation and ’passivity’, while there is a stronger correlation in Denmark. One therefore must expect that the ’individual’ oriented possibly can have difficulties in getting their preferences con- sidered in the representation of interests.

Further analysis of the priority given to different objectives in interest representation indicates that the ’collective’ oriented, to a greater extent than the ’individual’ oriented, give greater priority to traditional tasks such as securing high wages, shorter working days etc. while the ’individual’ oriented members characteristically give relatively higher priority to ‘new‘ tasks; ones which give the individual a better chance for personal development in the workplace such as ‘work for a more interesting and personally rewarding job’, improved possibilities for training etc.

The legitimacy of union democracy

With the differentiation in the members’ interests, the objectives of the interest representation are no longer unambiguous. The highest possible wages and as short a working week as possible are no longer demands that can unite all members. Hence legitimacy is no longer exclusively linked to the ’external’ representation of interest-the results, but is just as much linked to ’internal‘ conditions-the individuals’ chance of getting their opinions across to their union. In the light of this, plus the decline in participation in union meetings and the imbalance in representation, one must generally expect problems of legitimacy. In addition, it is to be expected that legitimacy is lowest among the members who, in terms

of c-i orientation, are furthest from the classic ‘collective’ union member.

The APL-study has shown that, in the Danish case, there is a general dissatisfaction with the way union democracy functions today. The members express such widespread dissatisfaction that the unambiguous coherence between members’ interests and the union leadership’s interest representation no longer exists. Sixty-five per cent are of the view that there is too great a distance between what happens in the workplace and the decisions taken by the union. Only 32% are positive in their evaluation of whether the labour movements’ leaders act totally in accordance with the members interests. The experience of the members is that they cannot get across their opinions to their union despite the fact that they do make their opinions known to their union. Likewise the majority agree that the union must work towards increasing the degree of participation among members, see Table 3.

In sum, one must, therefore, conclude that the degree of legitimacy of union democracy seems very limited. For the future, the members’ statements can be interpreted as want- ing a more member-active democracy, one which includes a high level of participation, in which everybody has the chance of getting their views across. A member-active democracy which is founded on dialogue rather than one-way communication and unifi- cation, and where the elected leadership is closer to their everyday working life.

Table 4 indicates that, in Sweden too, union democratic legitimacy is not in a good state. Forty-five per cent and 22% of the members respectively signify that only to a lesser extent or not at all do they have any chance of influence.

Including c-i orientations both expected and surprising correlations appear. As expected, it is the ‘collective’ oriented that to a greater extent than the ’neutral’ and ‘individual‘ oriented express their opinions; just as they to a greater extent experience having influence on their union. Likewise the ‘collective’ oriented consider, as expected, to a greater extent than especially the ’individual’ that the labour movements’ leaders act totally in accordance with the members interests.

However, it is surprising that it is also the ’collective’ oriented that to the greatest extent consider that there is too great a distance between what happens in the work-

124 lndustrial Relations Journal 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996.

Table 3: Members’ evaluation of the union, distributed b y c-i orientation, Denmark (1992) (percentage of ‘total/partiaZ agree’ and N)

Make opinion known

(a) ’Collective’ 52 (835) ’Neutral’ 44 (923) ’Individualised‘ 39 (1075) All 40 (3060)

Get

(b) (4

opinion Leaders in across accordance

19 (824) 37 (864) 15 (902) 36 (943) 11 (1047) 21 (1085) 15 (2973) 32 (3163)

Distance workplace Increase and union activity

68 (867) 68 (850) 62 (942) 56 (930) 56 (1097) 37 (1077)

61 (3160) 53 (3075)

(4 (4

Note: Statements: (a) I always make my opinion known to my union in specific cases, (b) As a rule I get my opinions across to my union, (c) The labour movements’ leaders act totally in accordance with the members interests, (d) There is too great a distance between what happens in the workplace and the decisions taken by the union, and (e) The union must work towards increasing the activity of its members. Weighted data, significant at level < 0.005.

Source: The APL-database.

Table 4: Members’ evaluation of their possibilities for influencing the union, distributed b y c-i orientation, Sweden (1987) (per cent and N)

Very much Some Little None Sum (per cent/N) ’Collective’ 10 24 41 24 991220 ’Neutral’ 7 26 49 18 100047 ‘Individualised’ 4 27 49 21 1011141 All 4 29 45 22 1001514

Note: Question: Which possibilities do you consider yourself having for influencing the local union in specific cases? The scale has been ’translated’ as follows: 0 = None, 1-4 = Little, 5-88 = Some, 9-10 = Very much. Significant at level > 0.05.

Source: The Swedish Citizens Survey.

place and the decisions taken by the union, plus that the union must work toward increasing the level of involvement of its members.

There are presumably two possible interpretations of this. Firstly, considering all the facts-the trends as to participation, representivity and legitimacy-a possible interpretation is that the members with ’individual’ orientations are about to be delinked from the labour movement. They are powerless against the ’apparatus‘ and do not think that eg. increasing activity - including own activity - will improve this situation, cf. the considerations as to lack of participation.

Another obvious possible interpretation is that the ’individual’ members are more discontent with the unions’ actual current way of operating than the ’collective’-but

not sufficiently discontent to themselves take responsibility for ensuring that the union in the future develops in such a way as to represent their specific interests. They are satisfied with what membership rewards them in the form of secure frameworks around their job situation and the possibilities for individual support and backing if something should ‘go wrong’. In effect, they see their union as an insurance policy.

In Sweden too, there is a difference between the ‘collective’ and ’individual‘ oriented members’ experience of their own possibilities for influence but here the distribution in Table 4 indicates that, among the ‘collective’ oriented, there is a fairly large group dissatisfied with their union’s current way of functioning. Twenty-four per cent experience that they do not have any possibilities for influence on their union. This

@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 19%. Trade union democracy in Denmark and Sweden 125

could very well be a relic of the traditional left-wing union opposition, that in Denmark in recent years-especially after the fall of the Berlin wall-on the whole has been non- existent, which presumably also is the case in Sweden today.

These differences can, however, be due to the fact that the Swedish data is from 1987, when the trend presumably was less strong. Likewise, it can very well be a conse- quence of the limited possibilities for operationalisation.

As mentioned in the discussion of individualisation as an abstract concept, individualisation must be understood as a relative concept. In some contexts the individual acts on the basis of self-interest but can in others show solidarity and support common values. That this also is the case when it comes to the members own conception of praxis is illustrated in Table 5.

The members strongly support the union as an institution. Of all the members of the Danish LO, 65% totally agree, and 22% partially agree that unions are necessary for representing the interests of wage earners. And despite that, less than half participate in union meetings once a year; in term of values, there is a clear selectivity of ’elected’ up through the union system, plus the members in general are strongly dissatisfied with the way unions actually work. It appears that there is a value-based difference in this institutional support-but 79% of the ’individual’ oriented members proclaim that they totally or partially agree.

The challenge of individualisation to union

democracy The purpose of this article has been to discuss and illuminate how the tendencies

toward disaggregation of traditional common values among the members of the LO labour movement-individualisation- affect union democracy, here conceived as delegation democracy.

The empirical analysis has indicated that the tendencies of increasing individualisation in general affect delegation democracy negatively: there is a reverse tendency towards an ideal type ’degenerated polyarchy’ in which there is no accord between the elected union leadership, delegates etc., and the large group of passive members. The future prospects indicated by this analysis are: (a) Given that in recent decades participation has declined significantly and, viewed in the light of trends in members’ c-i orientations, plus the significant decline in the participation of the youngest members, the decline in participation must be expected to continue. (b) That the pattern of participation probably develops in the direction of less and less participation in traditional union activity such as general meetings and union meetings, while members with ’new’ patterns of orientation participate relatively more in workplace-close union activity, which to a greater extent is closely connected to their self-interest. (c) That the pattern of representation is unequal in that the members with ‘collective’ orientations to a greater extent than the ’individualised’ are active and have elected union posts. This can entail that the unions do not get the necessary input to renew themselves and represent their members’ interests. And (d) that today’s unions have a considerable lack of legitimacy; the members are greatly dissatisfied with their unions mode of operation-especially the ’individual’ oriented. However it must be emphasised that the tendencies are stronger, better substantiated

Table 5: Members’ attitude toward the necessity of unions for attending the interests of wage earners, distributed by c-i orientation, Denmark (1992) (per cent and N )

Total Partial Partial Total Sum agree agree Neutral disagree disagree (per cent1N)

’Collective’ 80 14 5 0 1 1001 886 ’Neutral’ 70 20 9 1 0 1001 964 ‘Individualised‘ 47 32 13 5 3 100/1119

22 9 2 2 10013251 All 65

Note: Statement: Unions are necessary for attending to the interests of wage earners.

Source: The APL-database. Weighted data, significant at level < 0.005.

126 Industrial Relations Iournal 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 19%.

and differentiated in the case of Denmark. The disaggregation of the traditional value

community has for these reasons drastic consequences and, on the basis of van de Valls conception of union democracy, the tendencies indicate that democracy is sliding towards Michels’ oligarchy. This is probably a premature conclusion, but it is evident that union democracy is in crisis. The lack of participation plus the widespread dissatisfaction with the unions’ actual way of functioning indicates a crisis, and the problem is intensified by the fact that representation, especially in the Danish case, is unequal. Yet one must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that the present signs of crisis means the approaching ‘death’ of the labour movement and the local unions. As has often been said, individualisation is a relative concept, and the majority of the ’individual’ oriented members actually consider the unions necessary for representing their interests. On the other hand, it is far from certain that the institutional support of this group of members is particularly stable-probably some are completely delinked from the labour movement, while others only regard the union as an insurance policy.

Hence now and in the future it will be necessary to improve union organisation and representation of interest. The challenge which seems to confront them consists in incorporating and advancing the new values of members in actual union policy eg. improved individual possibilities for personal careers in the workplace, though still on the basis of collective agreements. The path towards a future in which these new values are admitted to the union policy, are discussed and get concrete form, goes through an upgrading of union democracy.

The results presented here have shown that a large proportion of not least active members in Denmark today are aware of the need for such changes, but actual organisational initiatives seem to limp behind.

The changed patterns of participation in the direction of increased participation in activities near to and at the workplace and the overall tendency toward decentralisation in the labour market in Scandinavia-and in the Western countries in general can give a needed push in the right direction[33]. The tendencies toward decentralisation entail that traditional issues concerning wages and working conditions, plus issues

of training, participation in decision-making etc., to a greater extent will be dealt with in the individual workplace in bargaining between management and employees. In this process, the unions as a whole can become more alive for the individual member, compared to previously when negotiations on wages and working conditions exclusively took place in the central units of the organisation. And, furthermore, for union democracy, this trend may bring about better conditions in the form of an increased motivation for participation and an expansion of democracy to more policy fields etc. - even for those groups of members for whom the calculation of self-interest is the strongest motive for participation.

But it will not happen unless the labour movement itself sets about improving its own internal democracy. Democracy is a precondition for the renewal of the sense of community-for the insistence on solidarity, and not least for the solidarity which is connected to the relativity of individualisation!

References 1. Eg Baglioni, G . and C. Crouch (eds), European

Industrial Relations. The Challenge of Flexibility, Sage Publications, 1990; Regini, M. (ed), The Future of Labour Movements, Sage Publi- cations, 1992.

2. Hyman, R., ’Trade Unions and the Disaggre- gation of the Working Class’. In Regini, op.cit., p. 152.

3. Visser, J., ’The Strength of Union Movements in Advanced Capitalist Democracies: Social and Organisational Variations’. In Regini, op.cit., pp. 18-9.

4. See eg. Bild, T. et al., The Employee Perspective on Working Life and Politics, University of Aalborg, Department of Economics, Politics and Administration, 1995.

5. Svensk, LO, Vem ur aktiv i facket?, LO, 1981; Svensk LO, Roster om jacket och jobbet, bd. 1-5, LO, 1989; Svensk LO, Roster om facket och jobbet, bd. 1-5, LO, 1994; Hoff, J., ’Demo- krati pP arbejdspladsen: Interessevaretagelse eller skole i demokrati’. In Madsen, M. et al. (eds), Demokratiets mangfoldighed: Tendenser i dansk politik, Forlaget Politiske Studier, 1995.

6 . Valkenburg, B., ‘Individualization, Partici- pation and Solidarity‘, European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995.

7. Nielsen, H. J., ‘The End of Socialdemocratic Scandinavia‘. In Bryder, T. (ed), Party Systems, Party Behaviour and Democracy, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1993.

8. Valkenburg, opsit.

0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. Trade union democracy in D e n m a r k and S w e d e n 127

9. See eg. Inglehart, R., Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 162ff.

10. Valkenburg, op.cit. 11. Helfert, M., Sozialer Fortschritt und der

Fortschritt der lndividualiserung, Bund-Verlag, 1991.

12. Madsen, M., Trade Union Democracy and the Challenge of Individualization-a Danish and Swedish Perspective, Institute of Political Sci- ence, University of Copenhagen, Working Paper No. 8, 1995.

13. Bild, T. et al, Foellesskab og forskelle, LO og Carma, 1993, pp. 157-160.

14. Eg. Lipset, S. M. et al. Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the lnternntional Typografic Union, Free Press, 1956.

15. Michels, R., Zur Soziologie des Parteiwess in der Modernen Demokratie, Werner Klinkhardt, 1970 [1911].

16. Lipset et al. op.cit. 17. Eg, Martin, R., ‘Union Democracy: An

Explanatory Framework’, Sociology, Vol. 2, 1968, p. 207.

18. van de Vall, M., Labor Organizations, Univer- sity Press, 1970, p. 153.

19. Bild, T. et al., ’Voksende demokratiproblemer i LO’, Samfundsekonomen, No. 2, 1995.

20. Karlsen, J. E., Hva sker i fagbevegelsen? Tiden

128 lndustrial Relations Journal

Norsk Forlag, 1977, p. 142. 21. van de Vall, op.cit. 22. Allan, V. L., Power in Trade Unions: A Study of

their Organization in Great Britain, Longmans, 1954.

23. Bild, T. and M. Madsen, ‘Demokratiet i Fag- bevaegelsen’, in Madsen et al. (eds.) op. cit.

24. Tetzschner, H., ‘Organisationsinternt demokrati-et forserg pB begrebsafilaring’. In Agersnap, T. and E. Fivelsdal (eds): Demokrati i organisationer, Arnold Busck, 1978, p. 241.

25. Lewin, L., Governing Trade Unions in Sweden, Harvard University Press, 1980.

26. Dahl, E., ’Medbestemmelse og samfundsmod- el’. In Bregn, K. and H. Hvid (eds), Arbejdsliv i Skandinavien, Forlaget Sociologi, 1993.

27. Hyman, op.cit. 28. Goul Andersen, J., ’Politisk deltagelse i 1990

sammenlignet med 1979’. In Andersen, J. et al, Medborgerskab. Demokrati og politisk deltagelse, Systime, 1993, p. 62.

29. Scheuer, S., Fagforeningerne mellem kollektiv og profession, Nyt fra samfundsvidenskabeme, 1985, pp. 113-21.

30. Swedish LO (1989), opxit.; Swedish LO (1994), op.cit.

31. Hoff, op.cit., pp. 157-8. 32. Goul Andersen, op.cit., p. 65. 33. Eg. Ferner, A. and R. Hyman (eds), Industrial

Relations in the New Europe, Blackwell, 1992.

@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996.

Documents

Trade union democracy and individualisation: the cases of Denmark and Sweden