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Trade Competition and American Decolonization
Thomas B. Pepinsky
Department of GovernmentCornell University
November 9, 2012
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 1 / 25
Motivations
Philippine independence in comparative perspective
1. The role of sugar. Why? How?
2. The “inevitability” of decolonization
3. Decolonization in a time of empire
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 2 / 25
Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism
Early colonialism ⇒ Extraction and market capture
Late colonialism ⇒Imperial expansion + technological change + agr. development= competition between metropoles and colonies
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 3 / 25
Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism
Early colonialism ⇒ Extraction and market capture
Late colonialism ⇒Imperial expansion + technological change + agr. development= competition between metropoles and colonies
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 3 / 25
Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism
Politics ⇒ supporters versus opponents of decolonization
More support for decolonization if
1. Diverse colonial exports
2. Easy substitution for domestic products
More opposition to decolonization if
1. Colonial producers are “represented” in the metropole
2. Colonial producers overcome collective action problems
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 4 / 25
Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism
Politics ⇒ supporters versus opponents of decolonization
More support for decolonization if
1. Diverse colonial exports
2. Easy substitution for domestic products
More opposition to decolonization if
1. Colonial producers are “represented” in the metropole
2. Colonial producers overcome collective action problems
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 4 / 25
Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism
Politics ⇒ supporters versus opponents of decolonization
More support for decolonization if
1. Diverse colonial exports
2. Easy substitution for domestic products
More opposition to decolonization if
1. Colonial producers are “represented” in the metropole
2. Colonial producers overcome collective action problems
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 4 / 25
Expectations
●
●
Support for and Opposition to Decolonization
Diversity of Competitive Exports
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Low High
Low
Hig
hBroad Support
Diffuse Opposition
Decolonization Most Likely
Narrow SupportDiffuse Opposition
Narrow SupportConcentrated Opposition
Decolonization Most Unlikely
Broad SupportConcentrated Opposition
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 5 / 25
Cases
●
●
Today's Three Cases
Diversity of Competitive Exports
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Low High
Low
Hig
hPhilippines
Hawaii
Puerto Rico
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 6 / 25
Comparing the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
Philippines Hawaii Puerto Rico
Sugar Exports High High HighEthnic-Racial Core “Asiatic” “Asiatic” “Latin”Dominant Religion Catholicism “Indigenous” CatholicismTime as U.S. Terr. Since 1898 Since 1898 (...) Since 1898Strategic Importance High High HighIndependence demand High High High
U.S. Share of Sugar c. 10% 100% 68%Industrial conc. Dispersed “Big Five” Four FirmsOther exports Coconuts None None
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 7 / 25
Sugar Production
Hawaii Philippines Puerto Rico
Cane Production and Export, 1929−1933
Tho
usan
ds o
f Lon
g To
ns o
f Raw
Sug
ar
020
040
060
080
010
00
Production Export
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 8 / 25
Ownership
Filipino Spanish American
Philippines' Sugar Industry, 1930
Per
cent
020
4060
8010
0
Land OwnershipLand Ownership (Acreage)Centrals Ownership
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 9 / 25
Ownership
Local Spanish American
Puerto Rican Sugar Industry, 1930
Per
cent
020
4060
8010
0
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 10 / 25
Concentration
United Porto Rican Fajardo Aguirre South Porto Rico
Puerto Rico, 1930
010
2030
4050
Percent of U.S.−Owned LandPercent of U.S.−Leasedor −Controlled LandPercent of Total U.S. Land
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 11 / 25
Concentration
Alexanderand Baldwin
AmericanFactors
C. Brewer& Co.
Castleand Cooke
T.H. Daviesand Co.
Other
Hawaii, 1939 (Big Five)
05
1015
2025
3035
Percent of Total Sugar ProductionNumber of Plantations
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 12 / 25
Collective Action and Political Power
Puerto Rico: Access in Washington and control in San Juan
By the depression, absentee corporations controlled the bulk of sugar productionalong with the most important supportive economic activities such as banking,transportation, communications, public utilities, and most important of allgovernment.
– Bergad 1978: 81
Not only were the various U.S. appointed governors concerned with protectingU.S. interests, which meant sugar, but sugar permeated the islands political life.The political parties which received financial donations from sugar and itsassociated interests could survive; the rest could not.The insular legislature came tobe composed quite largely of Puerto Rican sugar lawyers who were understandablyloath to disturb the islands principal industry and their own sources of income
–Hanson 1955: 31
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 13 / 25
Collective Action and Political Power
Hawaii: the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association
The Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association provides a convenient medium forunifying and implementing the policies of the factors. It is governed by five trustees,each representing one of the five factorsthey also appoint the other administrativeofficers. The Association is financed by the planation members on the basis of thesugar tonnage each produces.All [sugar] is marketed under an agreement wherebyall sugar producers in the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association use the samemarketing organization and receive the same price per ton. Thus the integration ofthe Hawaiian sugar industry has been carried to its ultimate step in the refining andmarketing of the product to the mainland
– Shoemaker 1940: 29, 31
Control over the basic economic institutions of Hawaiian society reaffirmed theelite’s political position. Political and economic hegemony within Hawaii providedthe Island oligarchy with a base from which to deal with elites in Washington, NewYork, and San Francisco
– Kent 1993: 78
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 14 / 25
Exports
Sugar CoconutProducts
FiberProducts
TobaccoProducts
Gold ore,bullion, coin
Other
Philippines' Exports to the United States, 1929
Valu
e (T
hous
ands
of D
olla
rs)
010
000
2000
030
000
4000
050
000
6000
0
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 15 / 25
Voting for Philippine Independence
Narrative evidence of support for Philippine independence from
1. Sugar beets
2. Other U.S. sugar cane
3. Cotton
4. Dairy
5. Agriculture in general
NB: of course, also unions, racists, progressives too
Further empirics: mixed-effect probit regression of Senate votes forHare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933 as function of partisanship, agriculturalprofiles, Filipino population, state-level effects
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 16 / 25
Agriculture by State
Sugar Beets (10,000s of acres harvested)
00−22−44−6>6
Sugar Cane (1,000s of acres harvested)
00−11−22−4>4
Cottonseed (100,000s of tons produced)
00−11−55−10>10
Milk (100,000,000s of pounds produced)
1−55−1010−2020−50>50
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 17 / 25
Main Results
No
Yes
CottonPredicted Values
Percentage of Simulations
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
CottonFirst Differences
Change in Probability
Den
sity
No
Yes
Sugar BeetsPredicted Values
Percentage of Simulations
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Sugar BeetsFirst Differences
Change in Probability
Den
sity
No
Yes
PartisanshipPredicted Values
Percentage of Simulations
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
PartisanshipFirst Differences
Change in Probability
Den
sity
Models and simulations via Zelig (Imai, King, Lau)
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 18 / 25
Conclusions and Implications
1. Not trade itself, but organization and structure
2. Variation across colonial powers?I Corn Laws and grain exports from the Little Europes?I What did Belgium and Portugal make?
3. Disciplinary and subdisciplinary dividesI Milner 1998I area studies vs. ethnic studies vs. polisci
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 19 / 25
Conclusions and Implications
1. Not trade itself, but organization and structure
2. Variation across colonial powers?I Corn Laws and grain exports from the Little Europes?I What did Belgium and Portugal make?
3. Disciplinary and subdisciplinary dividesI Milner 1998I area studies vs. ethnic studies vs. polisci
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 19 / 25
Conclusions and Implications
1. Not trade itself, but organization and structure
2. Variation across colonial powers?I Corn Laws and grain exports from the Little Europes?I What did Belgium and Portugal make?
3. Disciplinary and subdisciplinary dividesI Milner 1998I area studies vs. ethnic studies vs. polisci
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 19 / 25
Trade Competition and American Decolonization
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 20 / 25
Extras: Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2Coef S.E. Z Coef S.E. Z
Fixed Effects(Intercept) 0.65 1.27 0.51 0.46 1.04 0.44Democrat 2.29 0.66 3.49Cotton 0.21 0.14 1.49 0.33 0.09 3.52Sugarbeets 0.34 0.14 2.36 0.22 0.11 1.94Milk -0.19 0.18 -1.06 -0.09 0.15 -0.64Pct. Filipino -0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.10 0.31Random EffectsState 0.16 0.40 0.03 0.18
Observations 94 94Groups 48 48
Each model is estimated via mixed effects probit regression (Bailey and Alimadhi
2007). Cotton, Sugarbeets, Milk, and Pct. Filipino are expressed in logs.
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 21 / 25
Extras: The E Word
Pepinsky:
Ownership → lobbying → independence
Joint Determination:
Likelihood of independence → lobbying → independence↘ ↗
ownership
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 22 / 25
Extras: Origins of U.S. Sugar (1)
●●
●●
●
●●
● ● ●
●●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●●
Sugar Production, 1921−1940
Tho
usan
ds o
f Sho
rt T
ons
of R
aw S
ugar
1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939
010
0020
0030
0040
00
Continental USA
Hawaii, Philippines,and Puerto Rico
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 23 / 25
Extras: Origins of U.S. Sugar (2)
U.S. (Beet) U.S. (Cane) Philippines Hawaii Puerto Rico Cuba Other
Origins of U.S. Sugar Supply, 1931−33 Average
Per
cent
of T
otal
U.S
. Sug
ar S
uppl
y
05
1015
2025
3035
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 24 / 25
Extras: Concentration Illustrated
Pepinsky (Cornell) Trade and Decolonization November 9, 2012 25 / 25