Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction Modalities Which Target Nuclear Proliferation

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Purpose

This paper relates UCIC research on systems that track nuclear WMD, existing weaknesses in such nonproliferation systems, and technologies indispensable to eliminating said weaknesses.

AntiProliferation Specifications

Organizations that track WMD include:

• Australia Group    • Missile Technology Control Regime    • Nuclear Suppliers Group   

Regulatory vehicles that codify WMD include:

• Bureau of Industry and Security    • Chemical Weapons Convention    • Commerce Control List    • Commodity Designator Codes    • International Atomic Energy Agency    • International Maritime Dangerous Goods List    • International Munitions List     • Standard Transportation Commodity Code • Strategic Materials Lists (by nation; example, Singapore)• United States Munitions List    • UN Security Council Resolutions    • US Department of Homeland Security    • US Department of Transportation Codes    • Weapons Designator Codes1

Many other lists track WMD through trade surveillance. We also discuss these. Our aim is to show that neither generalized nomenclatures nor WMDspecific systems have been nor will be sufficient to drive nonproliferation efforts.2

Indeed, absent a distributed architecture that supports all such systems (and a culture of cooperation between antiproliferation bodies), we cannot achieve global security in this area.3

1 ITAR , NHM, NST/CR, and similar vehicles also codify WMD.2 Not all methodologies are flawed; some suffer from flawed implementation. In most, however,

weaknesses are a) insufficient interoperability; and b) lack of real-time updates.3 We close with a model that will improve efficacy of existing systems without altering them.

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Generalized Nomenclatures

Before addressing specialized sets, we examine general nomenclatures, many which classify products germane to nuclear technology. Here, our immediate objective is simply to contrast nonspecific classifications against systems that exclusively track materials essential to nuclear weapons production.4

Many nomenclatures in wide use codify weapons and components that apply. Consider, for example, United Nations Standard Products and Services Code (UNSPSC). Although UNSPSC does not specifically flag components essential to production, it does classify holistic objects.5

For example:

46121501 Air To Air Missiles 6

46121511 Air To Surface Missiles 46121502 Antiaircraft Missiles 46121509 Antiballistic Missiles 46121503 Antimissile Missiles 46121504 Antiship Missiles 46121505 Antitank Missiles 46121506 Ballistic Missiles 46121507 Cruise Missiles 20121210 Fracturing Missiles 46121500 Guided Missiles 46141501 Missile Launchers 46120000 Missiles 46121600 Missile Subsystems7

46121603 Missile Warheads 46121602 Solid Missile Boosters 46121508 Surface To Air Missiles 46121510 Surface To Surface Missiles8

46121512 Training Missiles

These definitions issued from authors who lack familiarity with or knowledge of the US Nuclear Arsenal. In HTS, we meet similar results, because its authors created a tariff, not an interdiction tool:

8412.10.00.10 Missile And Rocket Engines 9306.00.00.00 Bombs, Grenades, Torpedoes, Mines, Missiles 9306.90.00.20 Guided Missiles 9306.90.00.60 Parts For Guided Missiles

4 We shortly demonstrate the nonproliferation relevance of such lists (Page 6).5 Products whose parts contain flagged items a) whole; or b) not-yet-assembled.6 Grayed items rarely but can carry nuclear payload.7 This encompasses items which, if not explicitly named, escape screens.8 This could connote Minuteman-style devices, but absent WSDC identifiers, we cannot say.

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If we seek specific components9, we encounter more concrete results. Analysis across threehundred generaluse nomenclatures reaps exclusively onpoint returns. Table 1.0 is an excerpt from that dataset.

Set Key Nation Definition

ATECO 23.30 Italy Trattamento dei    combustibili nucleari    

CNIT 284410100080 Italy Uranio naturale, greggio [Euratom] 

CPF 23.30.1 France Éléments    radioactifs    

DB3 23.30.00 Denmark Oparbejdning    af    nukleart      brændsel    

GSITC 52515 Greece περιέχουν      ουράνιο      φτωχό      σε   U235    

HTS 2844200010 America10 Uranium oxide enriched in U235 

HTS 2844200020 America Uranium fluoride enriched in U235 

KLASS 07.21 Germany Bergbau      auf      Uran    und    Thoriumerze    

KTS 2612100000 Korea 우라늄광과 그 정광

NACE1 23.30 EU Processing of nuclear fuel 

NOGA 12.00A Switzerland Bergbau auf Uran und Thoriumerze 

OKEC 12.00 Slovakia T žbaě    a úprava    uranových    

PKD 07.21.Z Poland Górnictwo      rud      uranu    i    toru    

PRODLIST 2330.0055 Brazil Uranio    empobrecido em    U235    

SCG 28441011 Canada Uranium Dioxide 

SCG 28441020 Canada Uranium Hexafluoride 

SITC3 52515 Turkey URANYUM   ,    TORYUM   

SITC3 52515 Greece περιέχουν ουράνιο φτωχό σε U235 

SPIN 23.300.01 Sweden Naturligt      uran      och      föreningar    

TSA 4225000 America Uranium Oxide 

TSA 4225220 America Uranium Fluorides 

TSA 4225240 America Uranium Compounds 

TSA 4945040 America Radioactive Isotopes 

UNCCS 336200 United Nations Uranium Enriched In U235

VTS 284430 Vietnam Uran       ãđ       cđượ      làm      nghèo      t iớ      U235    

Table 1.0, Data Excerpt From 300 Nomenclatures

9 Uranium.10 Most HTS/WCO versions bear 17 references, but listing them would over-represent HS.

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A query for isotopes produces similar results. Generalized nomenclatures also distinguish nuclear medicine materials from strategic isotopes.11 See Table 2.0.

Set Key Definition

CPA 24.13.51 Isotopes and their compounds  (See ROSATOM Manual)

CTBT 2801.20 Isotopes radioactifs, Uranium, Cobalt 60 

IMDG 1046/7440597 Helium, Isotope Of Mass 3 

IMDG 1957/7782390 Hydrogen, Isotope Of Mass 2 

IMDG 2912/7440611 Uranium, Isotope Of Mass 238 

MESH   12   D01.496 Isotopes 

NAICS1013 3254121171 AntiNeoplastic Agents, Radioactive Isotopes 

NIOSH X7258 Technetium, Radioactive Isotopes 

NIP 24.13.51.000 Deuterium Oxide, Isotopes 

NLM C1642 Technetium_99m Radioisotope 

ProdCOM 24135100 Heavy Water (Deuterium Oxide), Isotopes 

SCTG 20299 Isotopes: Uranium, Cobalt 60, or Tritium 

SITC3 52519 Radioactive Elements And Isotopes 

USGS14 00149 AlphaEmitting Isotopes Of Radium

Table 2.0. Excerpt from isotope dataset

Note: few regional and national nomenclatures classified products used exclusively in nuclear research. This condition, as we shortly 

explain, increases likelihood of undetected traffic.  Systems that do codify such strategic materials issue from permanent UN Security Council members (nations with nuclear arsenals). Save these, only nationstates that produce WMD components admit systems that codify such commodities.15

 

11 Distinction isn't always possible because many Medical isotopes issue from enriched Uranium.12 Mesh precludes ambiguity by virtue of its function.13 This ten-digit NAICS definition precludes ambiguity:it specifies a medical context.14 This US Geological Survey record is also narrow; it specifies an environmental condition.15 Nation-states that intelligence suggests possess such weapons (but which have not yet self-

declared) also codify such products. This, however, neither confirms nor disproves suspicions; it indicates only that these nations a) know that intelligence agencies class them capable; and b) openly trade such products absent embargo. (Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Chechnya, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, and Ukraine).

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Why Regional and National Nomenclatures Matter

Many readers, particularly those who work for nonproliferation agencies, will doubtless wonder why we began with generalized nomenclatures. After all, in nonproliferation, WCO/HTS/HS remains the “gold standard” and heavyweight of all nomenclatures worldwide. As such, isn't it true that merely crosswalking HS to the major nonproliferation regimes will eliminate WMD procurement? 

No, the aforesaid assertion is false, misleading, and is, in itself, a security hole. The next section (in concert with Plate One) explains why.

Why HStoNonproliferationRegime Mapping Will Not Eliminate WMD

To concretely understand why crosswalks between WCO/HS and the six major nonproliferation regimes buy us sparse security, you will ultimately need Plate One, an interactive world map of nomenclatures.

Before you load Plate One in an Acrobatcompliant program, however, we ask that you momentarily set down this document and examine your immediate surroundings.16 Locate items that you purchased in the last thirty days, closely examine them, and ask yourself this: do any of those items bear Harmonized Tariff identifiers?17

The answer (to the aforesaid question), for 98% of readers (from 170 nations) is no; no items in their home or office bear WCO/HS numbers. The reason for this condition is simple enough: nationstates, states, principalities, counties, and cities do not use Harmonized Tariff for intrastate trade or transportation. Large shipping lines and/or retailers in Paris, for example, would more likely use CPF or NAF. An even more likely contingency, however (even in Paris), is EAN/UCC.

Initially, most readers will find these facts recondite, chiefly because the facts represent subtle weaknesses in existing nonproliferation systems. However, these subtle weaknesses could invite disastrous ramifications. Plainly stated, these facts indicate that hours after a commodity secures admissions to any WCO/HScompliant nation, WMD investigators loose their ability to “see” it.18

16 Presumably, you are located inside a room, in your office or home.17 The question truly isn't rhetorical. We urge you to indulge us and execute the exercise.18 Another way to express the problem is this: using just HS, intelligence officers are armed with

little more than bifocals. If, however, intelligence officers could instead resolve WMD-sensitive regimes to any nomenclature in real-time, they could graduate from using antiquated bifocals to using an electron microscope (the analogy is not rhetorical).

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Insufficiencies in Standards That Track WMD

We next examine obstacles to nonproliferation, from whence such obstacles originate, and how data standards help and hinder nonproliferation efforts.

Most complications arise from:

• Commingling and Misclassification• Lack of material composition visualization• Insufficient InterAgency communication

Commingling and MisClassification

The chief obstacle to nonproliferation efforts is how standards classify WMD.Few codes distinguish nuclear weapons from other WMD.19 Hazard systems20 assign nuclear WMD to the same lists that enumerate other hazards (toxics and precursors, typically).21 Such commingling complicates efforts to track nuclear WMD, but policy often necessitates such coupling.

This longrunning complication is well known. Commenting on the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference22,Daniel Feakes23, bluntly explains:

The main obstacle to breaking the CWC deadlock in the Middle East is  the political linkage between chemical and nuclear weapons made by Arab states. Many refused to sign the CWC in 1993...Complicating the 

19 Biologicals, toxins, etc.20 UCUC categorizes these as “HARMS-A” systems.21 HAZMAT , IATA, IMDG, IML, Nation-State Strategic Goods Lists, STCC, UNNA, etc.22 April, 2008.23 University of Sussex. Editor, Creation of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons: A Case Study in the Birth of an Intergovernmental Organization. (2007).

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situation is the fact that the linkage works both ways, with some analysts citing the chemical weapons stockpiles of neighboring countries as justification for Israel’s nuclear arsenal. As Pfirter put it, in the Middle East, chemical weapons are ‘hostage’ to nuclear weapons. States Outside the CWC; Egypt, Israel, Syria.24

This issue directly bears on classifications.25 Because classifications issue from and strictly adhere to international law, we cannot expect them to unilaterally disentangle chemical and nuclear WMD. Absent explicit changes in policy and increased international cooperation, classifications will continue to comingle nuclear and chemical WMD.IMDG26 commingles various WMD:

2968 Maneb, Stabilized 2969 Castor Beans Or Castor Meal 2977 Radioactive Material, Uranium Hexafluoride, Fissile 2978 Radioactive Material, Uranium Hexafluoride, Non Fissile27

Note: IMDGlike sets are guides only. The authors did not intend to code every hazardous substance (an impossible task; more than 32 million compounds exist). Rather, such lists provide hazard    classes   .   Researchers apply class numbers to all products that meet IMDG's criteria. Thus, even though IMDG boasts just 3,000 numbers. many databases code several hundred thousand substances to IMDG (in some cases, context is intentionally wide, e.g., “Flammable Liquid.”)

STCC28 likewise commingles:

2819711   Radioactive Materials 29

2819720   Uranium Fluorides 30

2819745   RadioActive Special Solids 2819901   Metallic Sodium 2819903   Potassium Permanganate 2819904   Calcium 4929114   Radioactive Material, Uranium Hexafluoride 4929115   Radioactive Material, Uranium Hexafluoride

Why Many Systems Commingle

The practice of fusing chemical and nuclear WMD evolved independently of 

24 March, 2008. ACT.25 Reso. 1718 compounded the confusion (“...all other existing weapons of mass destruction.”)26 International Maritime Dangerous Goods List. 27 Also see 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911, 2912, 2913, 2915, 2916, 2917, 2919. HAZMAT.28 Standard Transportation Commodity Code .29 An indiscriminate class (that entertains both chemical and nuclear materials).30 Insufficient specificity.

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CWC, however. It was a centerpiece of defense doctrine, a byproduct of Cold War policies, and a strategy whose formative years spanned Nixon to Clinton. 

DOD’s 1994 report makes clear that these were by then inextricable:

...to add emphasis and provide joint doctrine, proposed Joint Pub 311 (Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense) was approved for publication 15 April 1994. Joint Pub 311 sets forth principles and doctrine to govern the joint operations for nuclear,  biological, and chemical (NBC) defense of the Armed Forces of the United States.  DoD Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense Annual Report To Congress    June 1994   .31

American policy, furthermore, carried tremendous weight overseas. Thus, one byproduct of our position was that individual states responded in kind. Rogue states, in particular, exploited ambiguities that then existed. 

CWC dramatically altered this climate by introducing a previously unknown urgency for other states to acquire WMD capability. Many defense programs thus a) accelerated WMD development; and b) cultivated covert supply lines.

In NIE200216H,32 we learn that:

Baghdad renewed production of mustard, sarin, GX  (cyclosarin) and VX...procured covertly types and quantities of chemicals sufficient to allow limited CW production. NIE2002 6HC    (0546, CIA)   , Gershwin, Landry, Maj. Gen. (Conventional Military Issues). Strategic/Nuclear Programs, Science and Technology.33 

Intercepts34 of strategy sessions between Hussein and Kamil Hassan al Majid35 depict Iraqi response. The answer, Majid knew, lay in procurement:

Hassan:  Sir, if you’ll allow me; some chemicals are already distributed.  To keep us on the safe side, in terms of supply, we, Sir, deal   only with common materials like phosphorous, ethyl alcohol, and

         methyl [unintelligible].

Hussein: ...I need these germs [to be] fixed on the missiles.

Many analysts argue that Hussein’s removal secured a safer MidEast. This, we cannot today confirm (it may be decades before we can accurately determine 

31 “An assessment of the overall readiness of the Armed Forces to fight in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare environment.” The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law No. 103-160. [Emphasis Added].

32 Popularly known as Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD.33 P.6, Para. 6,7. Also Para.4: estimate, procurement of centrifuge tubes (25,000 projected). 34 Included in 27 September, 2004 report to DCI.35 Then-MIC Director, and Muzahim S’ab Hasan al Masiri (Iraqi Air Force).

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outcome). However, we do know this: the existing models remain inordinately weighted toward chemical WMD.

Complicating the issue further is that current conditions may preclude efforts to decouple chemical and nuclear WMD, at least in the immediate future. The reason is that some nations literally fused chemical and nuclear technologies. A 2008 CRS Report that provides updated proliferation metrics indicates that eleven nations known to possess SRBM and MRBM also have chemical WMD programs.36 Less than half possess nuclear weaponry. Analysts must therefore consider the possibility that said missiles double as chemical delivery systems. 

A Closer View: The Best Tracking Regimes

Below, we explore another interdiction obstacle: the case of regimes which,37 notwithstanding their adequacy as regulatory vehicles, remain isolated from other nonproliferation schemes.

The Commodity Designator Code System

One highquality construct is the Commodity Designator Code system (CDC). Unlike IMDG, which evolved from need for maritime security38, CDC evolved from specific security concerns shared by most members of the International Community. Specifically, CDC sought to contain WMD proliferation in rogue states,39 and formed the technical backbone of Resolution 1051.40

CDC’s component of interest is that its keys41 are unique. This feature is (as we soon explain) both CDC’s greatest asset and greatest liability. Before we delve into that issue, however, we first restate CDC structure.

Commodity Designator Code System Structure

CDC is a complex classification, because its records bear three data elements:

• Identifier• Definition

36 Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, and Viet Nam. See Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends. CRS Report to Congress. Paul K. Kerr. CRS-20, Table 1. [The State of Proliferation].

37 Even if they co-mingle chemical and nuclear WMD.38 And unlike STCC, an industry-driven construct.39 Most notably, CDC aimed at Iraq.40 Handbook for Notification of Exports to Iraq, SC Resolution (1051), Annex C. See also Goods

Review List (unofficial) accompanying Resolution 1409 (21 May 2002), a much-expanded and more detailed vehicle. Also see 1284.

41 That is, alphanumeric identifiers.

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• Reference

CDC Identifiers

CDC Identifiers (keys) bear uniform strcuture:

XYYYYYYYYZZ

Variables are:

• X – A letter (AZ)• Y – Numerals (09)• Z – Numerals (09)

An example:

B0401000036

CDC Definitions

CDC Definitions are concise strings that describe the commodity: 

Centrifugal separators (and components)

CDC References

CDC References identify documents which a) furnish a legal foundation for the instant prohibition; and b) provide additional detail:

S/1995/208 Annex III Appendix. Para 4.1

Full CDC Records

Fullyarticulated CDCs, then, bear three elements (identifier, definition, and reference). Table 3.0 below is a typical CDC record.

Identifier Definition Reference

B04010000-36 Centrifugal separators/components) S/1995/208, Annex III (Appendix) Para. 4.1

Table 3.0  Commodity Designator Code, Full Record

Our below examples include CDC Identifier and Definition only (i.e., we omit References) because CDC strengths reside in these fields.

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CDC Strength: A Strong Technical Construct

CDC is especially strong in a technical sense, because even though it couples chemical and nuclear WMD, its definitions describe commodities in sufficient specificity to mitigate difussion that typically plagues commingling.

A few records illustrate this point:

N28140F0003   Alexandrite Lasers N3002000003   Electromagnetic Isotope Separators C0126000022   Hydrogen Fluoride N2802000003   Liquid Uranium Metal Handling System N2801000003   Uranium Vaporization System

Examination of CDC keys immediately reveals inherent logic. For example, the keys above bear the N28 prefix, which corrleates to laser enrichment:

N2809000003   Fluorination Systems42

N28XXXX0003   Laser Isotopic Separation Plant N2813000003   Lasers N2810000003   Mass Spectrometers/Ion SourcesN2804000003   Separator Module Housing N2811000003   Solidification/Liquidification Stations For UF6 N2806000003   UF5 Product Collectors N2812000003   UF6/Carrier Gas Separation Systems N2803000003   Uranium Metal Product/Tail Collector Systems

The identifiers also bear the 03 suffix, which signifies the enrichment process generally (laser, plasma, etc.)

CDC Liability: Lack of Interoperability

Given the aforementioned, CDC seems superior to most tracking systems. A quick comparison reveals its strengths:

• Immutability    – whereas other systems invite customs officials to “fit” a commodity in approprote classes, CDC offers explicit definitions;

• Legal Context    – whereas other systems relegate enforcement to controls that prevail wherever a commodity resides at any given moment, CDC prescribes global penalties; and

• Granularity    – whereas other systems fail to articulate components that constitute a nuclear program, CDC codifies materials essential to each procedural production step (raw materials, processing, enrichment).

42 This is a partial list only; in the original 1051 distribution, there are 33 N28 IDs.

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Given these advantages, shouldn’t CDC emerge as the dominant (if not sole) standard? No. In fact, the same feature that renders CDC a strong contender also precludes it from being the authoritative scheme. 

As we related, CDC identifiers are unique, and we use this definition without qualification.43 CDCs are so specialized that many automated tracking systems worldwide do not recognize them.44 Save a small community of EURATOM and UN inspection teams (and the Security Council itself), CDC identifiers provide zero interoperability with other systems.

Adequate Classification, Inadequate Application

This section addresses sets that target solely those transfers of embargoed or prohibited nuclear components. Our example is the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Commerce Control List.

Bureau of Industry and Security

The Bureau of Industry and Security45 maintains the Commerce Control List46, an Export Administration Regulation47 that flags prohibited products.

The US Commerce Control List

CCL Category 0 (Zero), Nuclear Materials, Facilities, and Equipment48 is chief; it enumerates each commodity, its specifications, and restrictions thereon. In many ways, CCL0 constitutes the finest regulatory tool of its kind, due in large part to its authorship. CCL0 provides technical and scientific information with degrees of exactitude that many codes lack:

Centrifuge housing/recipients to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge, consisting of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm with precisionmachined ends made or protected by UFresistant materials. Nuclear Materials, Facilities, and Equipment; B. Test, Inspection, and Production Equipment, List of Items Controlled. Supp. 1, Part 774. P.10. C12.

Categories 0 through 1 enumerate chemicals, machinery, and metals essential to WMD production, including nuclear weapons. But as we soon explain, even 

43 In computing (classification, cryptography, ontology, etc.), there are“degrees” of uniqueness. Variables that influence uniqueness include time, bit size, strength, seed source, etc.

44 Not one point-of-entry system flags CDC identifiers (CDC notification mandated paper forms). Contrast this to DOT, EAR, HAZMAT, IATA, IMDG, ITAR, STCC, UNNA, USML, and WDC.

45 Hereafter, “BIS,” a Department of Commerce (DOC) division.46 Hereafter, “CCL.”47 Hereafter, “EAR.”48 “...and Miscellaneous Items.” See Supplement Number One to Part 774 CCL.

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CCL’s exactitude, absent material composition visualization, falls short. 

CCL Construction

CCL’s construction (unlike most sets that flag hazardous materials) unfolds in a format that conforms to US legislative records.49 The publiclyaccessible CCL comes in plain text and Portable Document Format. Structurally, CCL unfolds in doublecolumn, longform paragraphs.

Shaded areas highlight recurrent headings.50 CCL’s chief fault is immediately apparent: its structure renders it unfriendly to data processing. That is to say, CCL demands considerable effort to reorganize it so that automated systems can manipulate it.51

Note: this is common to many regulatory vehicles, including USML, ITAR, and BATF’s explosives schedule. Even CWC poses this problem (though to a lesser degree; CWC, at least, assigns each record a CAS, meaning that it appends at least one external identifier).

49 It is similar in many respects to CFR format.50 Item description, License Requirements, License Exceptions, List of Items Controlled.51 The UCIC project has undertaken this task. We expect to integrate CCL into UCIC by Q4 2008.

However, given its complexity (especially regarding many shifting conditions re licensing exceptions, specified concentrations, and other attributes), we prefer to secure validation from Commerce prior to granting any agency access.

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Commerce Control List Weaknesses

CCL is, as noted, an excellent construct. Unfortunately, it harbors several key weaknesses. Here, we identify just one: inconsistent ordinal control. 

CCL and Inconsistent Ordinal Control

CCL, like many lists, exceeds simple onetoone cardinalities and even onetomany correlations. Rather, CCL (by design or not) occasionally imposes manytomany relations. In information systems, this is permissible, providing that a multifaceted relational model preserves at least two “fixed points” per layer.52

ECCN/CCL 1C980 handily demonstrates the problem. Please see Table 4.0.

ECCN/CCL Definition

1C980 Ammonia, Aqueous 

1C980 Asphalt Paving Mixtures 

1C980 Automotive, Diesel, Marine Engine Lubricating Oil 

1C980 Aviation Engine Lubricating Oil 

1C980 Carbon Dioxide And Monoxide 

1C980 Fuel Oils 

1C980 Greases 

1C980 Helium 

1C980 Hydraulic Fluids 

1C980 Hydrogen 

1C980 Inorganic Chemicals, Supp. 1, Pt. 754 (Naval) 

1C980 Jet Engine Lubricating Oil 

52 As in Newtonian physics (or optics), one must posses two points (minimum) to fix a third.

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1C980 Lubricating Oil 

1C980 Oil, Lubricating, Cutting, Or Quenching 

1C980 Oils, Distillate Fuel 

1C980 Paraffin Wax 

1C980 Transmission Fluids, Automatic

          Table 4.0, ECCN/CCL 1C980, Ordinal Control Absent

This condition, which in CS notation, is (Helium == Hydrogen), is untenable. Moreover, unlike countless other CCL designations, 1C980 has no child node. To understand why 1C980's lack of progeny matters, consider 0A001's lineage. Its ECCN identity announces a class or set. Please see Table 5.0 below.

ECCN/CCL Definition

0A001 Nuclear Reactors, Civil 

0A001 Nuclear Reactors & Reactor Components 

 This class or set signals that 0A001 is the cardinal node (or root) of a tree. We therefore know (or expect) that its children will selfselect their identities in a sufficiently specific manner to distinguish themselves from one another. And, just as one would expect, they do. Please see the below tree.

0A001 Nuclear Reactors and Components | +-- 0A001.A Pressure Vessels | +-- 0A001.B Fuel Element Handling Equipment | +-- 0A001.C Control Rods | +-- 0A001.D Electronic Controls | +-- 0A001.E Pressure Tubes, For Fuel Elements, Primary Coolant |-- 0A001.E Tubes, Pressure | +-- 0A001.F Tubes, Zirconium |-- 0A001.F Zirconium Metal and Alloy Tubes, Assemblies | +-- 0A001.G Pumps, Coolant | +-- 0A001.H Baffles |-- 0A001.H Core Grid Plates |-- 0A001.H Core Support Structures |-- 0A001.H Diffuser Plates

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|-- 0A001.H Thermal Shields | +-- 0A001.I Heat Exchangers

As the tree demonstrates, 0A001.C (Control Rods) are distinct from 0A001.G(Coolant Pumps). Here, the distinction is clear. 1C980, however, never breaks into child nodes. Hence, 1C980 represents all aforementioned 1C980 items in toto, inclusive. 

The problem (a recondite problem, perhaps, but a crippling one nonetheless) is merely this: Irrespective of BIS rationale for 1C980's designations, 1C980 's disposition invites diffusion. That is, 1C980 presents a serious obstacle to any crosscorrelation with other codes (such as HTS).To understand why, consider Table 6.0's correlations below.

# AES/HTS ECCN DEFINITION

1 2814200000 1C980 Ammonia, Aqueous 

2 2715000000 1C980 Bituminous Asphalt 

3 2811210000 1C980 Carbon Dioxide 

4 2804290010 1C980 Helium 

5 2804100000 1C980 Hydrogen 

The correlations in Table x.x above are unidirectional. That is, they serve only one purpose: triggers that use them can notify BIS of transfers that entail the specified HTS numbers. Analysis in the opposite direction, however, are not possible. For example, absent additional ordinal control, how would a party performing traffic analysis determine which HTS an 1C980 transfer entails? Perhaps more pointedly, 1C980 ascribes the listed commodities no context, even though the commodities [obviously] represent varying risks.53

Additional Classification Obstacles to Interdiction

We next discuss issues that complicate or even preclude effective interdiction, including:

• Misconceptions about identifiers• Reporting gaps in existing inventory lists• Lack of interoperability between tracking systems

53 Ammonia, Helium, and Hydrogen can all pose life-threatening risks under certain conditions. Asphalt is not Immediately Dangerous To Life And Health (a CDC designation that Ammonia does bear). In short, 1C980 applies substandard practice.

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Misconceptions About CommonlyUsed Identifiers

Even technical personnel sometimes develop misconceptions about triggerlist identifiers. One alarming misconception concerns the imagined surety of cheminformatic identifiers. 

The Chemical Abstract Services Number

The most widelyknown chemical identifier is the Chemical Abstracts Service number or CAS, a proprietary, dashdelimited number.54 Alternatives in recent years have emerged, but CAS retains its dominance.55

Even many chemistry students believe that a CAS number uniquely identifies the substance to which it correlates. This is false.56

Consider this record:

10049146   Uranium Fluoride

Per popular notions, 10049146 uniquely identifies Uranium Fluoride. This is untrue. Rather, 10049146 is a unique value that identifies Uranium Fluoride. The distinction between these statements is not semantic; they signal entirely different outcomes.

Uranium Fluoride boasts several hundred identifiers, in fact, but this example begins with CAS. Please examine the below records:

7783815 Uranium Fluoride 7783815 Uranium Fluoride (Uf6) 10049146 Uranium Fluoride 10049146 Uranium Fluoride (U2F8) 10049146 Uranium Fluoride (Uf4), (T4) 13536840 Uranium Fluoride Oxide 13536840 Uranium Fluoride Oxide 13536840 Uranium Fluoride (Uo2F2) 13775069 Uranium Fluoride (Uf3) 13775070 Uranium Fluoride

54 Which also contains a check-digit.55 The European Chemical Bureau (as it was until recently known, now the Consumer Products

Safety and Quality Unit) created several alternatives, including ECC/EINCES and IPSC, presumably to enjoy freedom from CAS intellectual property restrictions. Even more recent examples (which now include identifiers that depict molecules in graphic format) are InChi and SMILES. Absent easing of its intellectual property controls, CAS faces certain extinction [it cannot compete with “free” or “open source” systems].

56 The UK Delegation to CWC took up this issue, noting that in future Convention specifications, CWC should seek alternate means. See below.

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Each bold entry is unique. You may not initially accept this statement as true, but test it. Arrange the list onevalueperline:

10049146 10049146 10049146 13536840 13536840 13536840 13775069 13775070 7783815 7783815 Uranium Fluoride Uranium Fluoride Uranium Fluoride Uranium Fluoride Oxide Uranium Fluoride Oxide Uranium Fluoride (U2F8) Uranium Fluoride (Uf3) Uranium Fluoride (Uf4), (T4) Uranium Fluoride (Uf6) Uranium Fluoride (Uo2F2)

Next, use lexical or cryptographic tools to remove duplicates. Lexical tools sort text alphabetically so you can identify duplicates on sight. Cryptographic tools apply algorithms to derive each record's digital fingerprint.57 Either method is sufficient to produce this result:

10049146 13536840 13775069 13775070 7783815 Uranium Fluoride Uranium Fluoride Oxide Uranium Fluoride (U2F8) Uranium Fluoride (Uf3) Uranium Fluoride (Uf4), (T4) Uranium Fluoride (Uf6)

Each item matches other identifiers. Pubchem yields the following record:

    List 1++++| 00144749 | 167075  | uranium fluoride | < unique| 00293196 | 167075  | uranium fluoride |

57 Digest Algorithms include DSS, EVP, MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA, and SHA1.

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| 01152265 | 660632  | Uranium fluoride | < unique++++

Of Pubchem's two identifiers,58 one yields the following record:

    List 2++++| 00063922 | 167075  | einecs 2320286       || 00144457 | 167075  | un2977                 || 00144458 | 167075  | un2978                 || 00144749 | 167075  | uranium fluoride       |  foothold from←| 00144752 | 167075  | uranium fluoride (uf6) |    previous record| 00144754 | 167075  | uranium hexafluoride   || 00144772 | 167075  | uranyl fluoride        || 00212369 | 167075  | einecs 2320286       || 00292904 | 167075  | un2977                 || 00292905 | 167075  | un2978                 || 00293196 | 167075  | uranium fluoride       || 00293199 | 167075  | uranium fluoride (uf6) || 00293201 | 167075  | uranium hexafluoride   || 00293219 | 167075  | uranyl fluoride        |++++

The other yields another record:

    List 3++++ | 00763515 | 660632  | EINECS 2374059       | | 01152265 | 660632  | Uranium fluoride       | | 01152267 | 660632  | Uranium fluoride (UF5) || 01152281 | 660632  | Uranium pentafluoride  | < new member++++

 PubChem asserts that 167075 and 660632 are equivalent (see List 1). If this is true, why are so many List 2 values absent from List 3? List 3 carries Uranium Pentafluoride and two EINECS identifiers absent from List 2. Finally, in List 2, we see UF6 notation; List 3 applies UF5 (for an identical lineitem). From this, you can deduce that PubChem never intended to uniquely identify chemical compounds. Despite this, students and researchers often mistakenly assume otherwise.

Why CWC and MTCR Only Marginally Support CAS

Most organizations do not understand this issue and thus remain ignorant as to how it bears on surveillance. One organization that understands this issue well is Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).59 Its guidelines explain:

58 These (bold) are unique only in PubChem's universe.59 We soon highlight MTCR.

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“In some instances chemicals are listed by name and CAS number. Chemicals of the same structural formula (including hydrates) are controlled regardless of name or CAS number. CAS numbers are shown to assist in identifying whether a particular chemical or mixture is controlled, irrespective of nomenclature. CAS numbers cannot be used as unique identifiers because some forms of the listed chemical have different CAS numbers, and mixtures containing a listed chemical may also have different CAS numbers.” Equipment, Software, Technology Annex. Terminology.

MTCR is not alone. An emphatic critique of CAS comes from British Delegates to CWC. In The Role of CAS Numbers in Context of CWC60, they explain:

CAS numbers are not appropriate for use in determining whether a particular chemical falls within the schedules, as they cannot be relied upon to uniquely identify a chemical...we recommend...removing all CAS numbers. The CAS number bears no relationship to the composition or the molecular structure of the chemical itself...a CAS number does not always refer to a unique or unambiguously identified substance. 

The Delegates then enumerate various CAS shortcomings. In many cases, for example, chemicals sharing identical molecular structure bear different CAS numbers.61  In other cases, polymers and mixes bear statespecific conditions that warrant differentiation but nonetheless bear identical CAS numbers. The Delegation’s most persuasive point, however, lay buried in summation:

The Chemical Abstracts Service will assign a number to a compound and enter its details within their registry only following a request to do so and payment of a fee.. Shortcomings, Paragraph 10. [Emphasis Added].

The underlying assertion is difficult to miss: given CWC’s gravity (all nations share a desire to eliminate WMD), the practice of relying on proprietary and commercial interests is untenable. UCIC shares this view.

In sum, such identifiers do not uniquely identify chemicals; therefore, systems that use them [to power automated detection mechanisms] harbor a flaw that any competent programmer can exploit.

Reporting Gaps in Existing Inventory Lists

Next, we examine an administrative issue: discrepancies in existing tracking tools and methodologies. For this purpose, we need only one example: DHS 

60 V6.31/103 . Executive Summary, Preface, and especially Shortcomings of CAS Numbers of Identification Purposes (P2.7).

61 Mixed and stereoisomers, salts, other stabilized forms, etc.

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Chemicals of Interest List (hereafter COI), one component of the Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standard.

DHS COI/CFATS: Wasted Effort

In November, 2007, DHS published its COI List.62 COI names 300+ chemicals and synonyms thereof. To these, DHS applied triggers  and traps that, if met, necessitate reporting.63 The scheme and modality behind it issued from and applied RiskBased Performance Standards that DHS established.

Our study focused on COI’s efficacy. Our objective was to assay a) conformity in labs from statetostate; and b) COI’s contextual depth.64 Our results show that COI failed to achieve its aim. COI’s deficiencies, taken individually, might seem manageable. Together, however, they render COI meaningless.

Some perspective:

• Many labs failed to retain the full COI list. True, common logic suggests that a lab should record only those chemicals it actually stocks, but COI sought a standard. From a standards viewpoint, all labs must retain the full list.  The raison d'être of any informatic standard is to establish uniformity. Unless all participants record every field (even fields that remain unpopulated), the standard achieves nothing. COI fostered false notions of security. Because its implementations differed from laboratory to laboratory, they were incompatible from inception;

• Just 6% of labs applied synonyms at ratios of greater than onetoone. To grasp the gravity of this fact, consider that Potassium Nitrate has 627 synonyms;

• Only 60% of labs applied registration numbers and most used Chemical Abstract Service identifiers. Again using Potassium Nitrate, most labs (inside that 60%) applied just one CAS number. Potassium Nitrate bears more than fifty;65 and

• Just 42% of labs included66 COI/CFATS’ most important features: triggers and thresholds. An even smaller percentage included CFATS fields that mandate notification after sabotage, theft, or other events that DHS explicitly defined.

62 COI’s official designation is Appendix A of CFATS. DOCID:FR09AP07-17; 6 CFR Part 27. RIN 1601-AA41, Federal Register Volume 72, Number 67. April 9, 2007.

63 In many cases, triggers activated on concentration levels, quantity, and so forth.64 By conceptual depth, we mean this: did COI sufficiently cover every possible permutation of

chemical classes or individual chemicals that constitute agents and/or precursors?65 Its most-commonly-used CAS numbers are 7631-99-4, 7761-88-8, 7789-18-6, 10043-27-3,

10045-95-1, 10099-59-9, 10099-67-9, 10102-45-1, 10108-73-3, 10138-01-9, 10139-58-9, 10143-38-1, 10168-80-6, 10168-81-7, 10168-82-8, 10361-80-5, 10361-83-8, 10361-93-0, 13465-60-6, 13473-90-0, 13494-90-1, 13597-99-4, 13768-67-7, 13770-61-1, 14985-19-4, and 16774-21-3.

66 In forms, spreadsheets, or word processing templates.

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COI implementations varied too widely to offer DHS reliable reporting.67 Even if a lab did report, the intelligence would lack indispensable artifacts.

More disturbing is that COI was incapable of evolving. COI should have been the first phase of a program wider in scope. If DHS had achieved a standard, it could then have moved to the next logical step: a system to monitor chemical inventories in realtime. DHS failed to achieved the indispensable ingredient of such a system: uniformity.

We deem COI a static, worthless program which, had DHS handled differently, could have strengthened national security.

Note: Many labs, especially at universities, may have deliberately omitted key values. University chemistry programs have a long history of healthy American radicalism. Key players may have seen COI/CFATS as intrusive and unnecessary.68 DHS could have achieved a different outcome had it unveiled future plans for a tracking system like we describe.

Many COI shortcomings reflect another obstacle to nonproliferation, one we discuss below: incompatibility of existing tracking systems.

Lack of Tracking System Compatibility and Interoperability

Next, we address how inconsistencies in tracking systems affect our ability to track WMD. 

67 Labs that failed to include triggers will never report (per COI/CFATS provisions) because functionally, they cannot report (reporting hinges on traps and triggers that remain absent from their implementations).

68 Truthfully, as DHS implemented it, it was. DHS argued that theft or sabotage might occur at these facilities. But few labs stock toxics or precursors in sufficient quantity to manufacture WMD. More likely scenarios entail thefts at manufacturing plants.

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Interoperability, Tariff Systems

Another interoperability issue concerns tariff systems. Below, we analyze how growing divergence between tariffs continues to reduce efficacy of the nuclear controls.

Since Harmonized Tariff System's introduction, most nations have used HTS, and with relatively few variations.69 Also since HTS's inception, convergence of tariffs have facilitated closer cooperation between nationstates on CWC toxics and precursors.70 And, until recently, despite the intersection of trade combines both multilateral and regional, this correlation remained inviolate.

In 2008, however, more pressing security concerns (particularly in America), introduced conditions that will soon weaken that relationship. 

69 This may be globalization's most overt artifact, a regulatory manifestation that continues to affect (and in some cases, articulate) trade offers and agreements between members of various trade combines.

70 Indeed, most nations “park” CWC-relevant substances inside subsections of Chapters 28 and 29 (the few exceptions run to toxins and biological weapons, many of which inhabit the 3000 series). This condition, furthermore, arose during the tariff's formative stages.

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Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime is the most welldeveloped construct, particularly given its exclusive focus on weapons technology transfer. That is, MTCR does not observe linkage between chemical and nuclear WMD (unlike many organizations whose trajectories run parallel to existing diplomatic and political negotiations). Instead, it focuses on nuclear proliferation only.MTCR targets fifteen essential areas of production:

• Complete Delivery Systems • Complete Subsystems Usable For Complete Delivery Systems • Propulsion Components And Equipment • Propellants, Chemicals And Propellant Production • Structural Composites and Materials • Instrumentation, Navigation, Direction Finding • Flight Control • Avionics • Launch Support • Computers • Analogue To Digital Converters • Test Facilities And Equipment • ModelingSimulation And Design Integration • Stealth Technology • Nuclear Effects Protection

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MTCR’s most recent Equipment, Software and Technology Annex71 consists of a 72page enumeration of materials essential to each production stage. MTCR definitions, in many cases, attain degrees of granularity comparable to those we encounter in BIS.

For example:

“...’interior lining’ suited for the bond interface between the solid propellant and the case or insulating liner is usually a liquid polymerbased dispersion of refractory or insulating materials, e.g., carbonfilled HTPB or  other polymer with added curing agents to be sprayed or screed over a case interior.” 3.C. Materials; 3.C.1, Interior Lining Usable for Rocket Motor Cases in Systems Specified in 19.A.1/A.2.72

MTCR’s Annex structure is slightly more amenable to automated processing than is BIS. It splits production stagerelevant materials into two categories, and within these, subsections. For example, in Category II, Item 4, we find the section on Propellants. By virtue of the document’s structure (that drills down to even subsection parts), it lends itself to synchronization of resolution.

For example:

4.C.4. Oxidiser substances as follows: 

a.  Oxidiser substances usable in liquid propellant rocket    engines as follows: 

1. Dinitrogen trioxide (CAS 10544737); 2. Nitrogen dioxide/dinitrogen tetroxide; 3. Dinitrogen pentoxide; 4. Mixed Oxides of Nitrogen (MON); 5. Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA); 6. Compounds of fluorine and halogens, oxygen, nitrogen;

Given this structure, one could express Dinitrogen Pentoxide73 in two ways:

4.C.4.A.3

or

4.C.4.3

71 January, 2008.72 MTCR/TEM/2007/Annex/003. January 8, 2008.73 CAS 10102-03-1/ECC 233-264-2.

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Note: in practice, integerbased identifiers are less errorprone and easier to validate. On that account, in resolution or synchronization scenarios, it would be more beneficial for MTCR to develop a pivot table that swings these to fixedlength integers. Many systems world wide do not support the Latin character set, but all systems support and can easily process integers). Such identifiers would then expand to MTCRspecific Category/Section/Subsection headers whenever humans viewed the traffic. To attain this is trivial, programmatically and in resourceutilization terms. Surveillance gateways would flag specific integers (rather than text strings), and as such, they would demand meager processor power and network resources. Even if they detected a flagged item and transmitted warn notifications, the process would consume less than 10 milliseconds and less than 64 kilobytes (or, roughly, what fits into a single IP packet).

Technical Notes Regarding Use of MTCRLike Systems

In this section, we [briefly] observe some realities that MTCRlike system use entails [relative to electronic surveillance]. That is to say, even were detection systems to incorporate MTCR, whilst such an addition would clearly improve overall efficacy, it would still prove insufficient. This section explains why

Rogue States No Longer Overtly Procure WMD

First, rogue states74 are unlikely to purchase fullyfunctional components via legitimate channels (channels whose artifacts leave trails perceptible to trade surveillance systems). More likely scenarios entail purchases which “partout” watchlist commodities.

Note: despite assertions by recent Administrations (the outgoing Bush Administration in particular), it has been years since rogue states have undertaken overt procurement of nuclear materials. Transparent negotiation and execution of such contracts began fading away 25 years ago. (National Intelligence Daily, Havana meeting, Hussein and Kountche; and France’s price reduction lobbying re Uranium concentrate. EO12958,    April 2007, DCI. P.8.    

74 A curious term. Pragmatically, proliferation is for some states an unfortunate necessity. Given that India, Israel, and Pakistan possess such weapons, states in proximity would naturally seek similar arms. China perceives India as a threat because Indian missiles can reach 1,200 miles inside Chinese territory. Do these realities render India, from a Chinese perspective, a rogue? If not, this is only because diplomatic channels exist. Treaties are merely contracts, however, and nations often quit them. Versailles was such an instrument.

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Para. 1,3,4.75

Snce 1980 (with special emphasis after 1994), increased cooperation between permanent UNSC Members and NGOs, dramatically altered the procurement landscape. This trend ultimately spawned private or NGOsponsored regimes.

One is Nuclear Supplier’s Group.76 Created in 1974 after India self declared77, NSG established guidelines for nuclearrelated exports. Today, NSG boasts more than 40 nationstate members78 who together architected an export inventory just as refined (for its purposes and given its ends) as MTCR or BIS. NSG’s 1992 updated guidelines control nuclearrelated dualuse items. (See Proliferation Digest, DIPD96011CX. 1996).From then on, international cooperation continued to improve, and although its affects were gradual, it eventually closed the door on overt procurement. In many ways, China’s experience is especially instructive. In 1996, China began to alter its policies, and thereafter made tremendous strides to synchronize its nonproliferation efforts with her Western counterparts:

“Chinese Government authorities are taking steps to more closely monitor all types of nuclearrelated transfers and assistance...the steps may signal a new determination to address the significant administrative shortcomings in China’s exportcontrol system.” Proliferation Digest, DIPD96011CX. Intelligence Directorate.

We do not, however, contend that China’s experience went smoothly. Organic political conditions and China’s reticence to embrace transparency protracted the process. China’s drift toward an open market model likewise influenced its ability to track transfers:

“In April 1996, CAEA ViceChairman Chen Zhaobo told a defense attache that China had very strict rules on sale of prohibited nuclear material and that, as ViceChairman, he must clear any sale of ‘sensitive materials.’ However, as the industry shifted toward production for civilian applications and the marketing of dualuse technologies, lines of subordination between civilian and military nuclear sectors...have not been clearly delineated. Inadequate outreach to exporters could allow lowerprofile transfers to proceed without the knowledge of Beijing senior leadership.” Proliferation 

75 Kountche campaigned Arab nations to expand Uranium sales; France renegotiated agrrements snd price (neither contracts nor traffic were covert).

76 Hereafter, “NSG.”77 Smiling Buddha, 12 kilotons , May 18, 1974, Authorized by Gandhi, September, 1972. 78 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia,

Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea (Republic), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, and the United States.

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Digest, DIPD96011CX. [Emphasis Added].

Nonetheless, for the aforementioned reasons, the window of opportunity for rogue states to overtly procure WMD is now closed. One unintended result is that rogue states must resort to other means. Worse, however, contemporary WMD trafficking is no longer limited to statesponsored activity, a fact which analysts seldom address (much less elucidate the condition's etiology).

Most recent intelligence remains 911centric and ascribes increasing risks of proliferation to American MidEast presence. There is certainly some truth to these assertions, but a review of actual incidents reveals a more influential factor: expiration of the Cold War. Here, some background is helpful.

Nuclear Incidents in Recent Years

The Nuclear Trafficking Database logged 189 serious cases of theft, seizure, or disappearance of nuclear components from 1997 to 2008.79 Seized materials included:

• Cesium    • Cobalt    • Europium    • Hafnium    • HEU    • Iridium   • Osmium Tetroxide    • Plutonium    • Polonium    • Radium    • Strontium    • Tantalum    • Thorium    • Uranium   , Uranium Dioxide, and Uranium Oxide • Ytterbium Oxide    80

Most cases arose not in the MidEast but in Central Asia and Eastern Europe:

79 This represents only those cases where authorities intercepted actual materials.80 Other controlled items included Beryllium, Bismuth, Cadmium, Californium, and Zirconium.

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• Armenia • Azerbaijan • Belarus  • Bulgaria  • Georgia • Kazakhstan • Kyrgyzstan • Latvia • Lithuania • Moldova • Poland  • Romania • Russia • Slovakia  • Ukraine • Uzbekistan 

Serious Nuclear Theft or Illicit Traffic: Specific Cases

Table 7.0 below (clickable) summarizes serious incidents. Shaded cells signify theft or seizure of Plutonium, Thorium, and Uranium. Click on periodic table symbols to access each case.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Armenia U U CS

Azerbaijan PU/SR PU

Belarus CSSR/LEU

CSCS

Belgium U

Bulgaria AMPU

HEUHEU

CSPU

Czech Rep U

France HEU/   U   HEU

Georgia CSLEU

PU/U CS/ULEU

CS/USR/CS

U/  CS   UNK HEU HEU LR

Greece PU

Kazakhstan BE/HEU LEULEU

TH U/TH PU/U PU/U CS

Kyrgyzstan PU EU/YB PU

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Latvia PU SR

Lithuania BE/U

Moldova CS

Poland CS HEU

Portugal HEU

Romania U HEU

Russia CS/SRU

ZR/CSU/RAPU/SR

CS/THCO/PUY/SR

CS/PUOS/CDLEU/TH

CS/PUSR/OS

PU/UIR/CS

U CS/PU RA/PU TA

Ukraine RI/ CS SR/U UNK/AMNS/

AM/CSCS

CS/ U/SRY/

MED

Table: Theft, Disappearance, Illegal Traffic of Nuclear Materials. Isotopes by symbol.

Table x.x offers only limited intelligence on illicit traffic. Yet, even this trickle raises intriguing questions. For example, save the Russian Federation, those nations where incidents entail Plutonium strike us as unlikely candidates:

• Azerbaijan • Bulgaria • Georgia • Kazakhstan • Kyrgyzstan 

For example, whilst Azerbaijan has conducted nuclear research with Western Powers, she only recently commenced plans on her first reactor. In contrast, Bulgaria's reactor program is well known.81 Bulgaria's cooperation with Russia (Ozersk82), her emergence as an energy exporter, and her adherence to best practices, make Bulgaria a poor breeding ground for illicit traffic.

To delineate Table x.x's significance, we must quit political analysis for a more practical issue: geography. In a geographical light, Table x.x takes on a different character, and its seemingly inexplicable metrics suddenly obtain clarity. Four of the five above nations (divided by the Caspian) provide passage to Pakistan, 

81 Bulgaria retained two VVER-1000 (Kozloduy) and closed four others (VVER-440) to clear EU accession. Belene-1 ( - Водо водяной энергетический реактор PWR/VVER-Class ) will debut in Q1 2011 (Bulgaria shelved 2, 3, and 4).

82 Chelyabinsk-40, Chelyabinsk-65, Ozyorsk, a Ural outpost, houses Mayak, a Soviet Plutonium plant. Analysts class its Kystym Disaster far worse than Chernobyl. Russia today processes nuclear fuel at Mayak. USSR: Problems with Radioactive Waste, Defense Sites, Intelligence Directorate. Also:Kruglov's History of the Soviet Atomic Industry. Kruglov's 40-year service in USSR's nuclear program spanned a sixteen-year stint at Chelyabinsk-40.

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Afghanistan, and Iran.

The Current Model Guarantees Inevitabiliy

Second, it makes little sense to continue with antiproliferation programs that wait for intelligence to reveal that prohibited transfers are underway. Rather, as we soon discuss, the better model is to track flagged commodities at their inception and origin.83

Note: USA and Russia have deployed instanceofviolation security measures, including several that continue to enjoy success. The most promising  measure  concerns  NNSA  MegaPorts  detection     systems   . These detect radiation levels in railway shipments. Nineteen nations participate, and more will follow.

The DualUse Issue

There also remains the difficult and sensitive problem of dualuse products.84 

83 That is, use supply-chain visualization to link newly-manufactured items to tracking apparatus.84 We soon demonstrate that dual-use is also a hotly contested issue.

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Such products have legitimate functions.85 USA’s current interdiction models preclude prohibition of purchase and use of such products. Thus, detection systems that use MTCRlike constructs are suited to longterm surveillance [rather than instancerelevant alerts]. Intelligence analysts might audit years of traffic to draw composite models that reveal transfers of a) holistic dualuse products; or b) modest purchases that seek only pieces of commodities under ban. These might indicate a series of isolated purchases which by line item do not violate prohibitions but that in concert circumvent restrictions.86

Again, nonproliferation controls force changes in policies of states which seek WMD. In most cases, the reflex is immediate:

Iran   actively   sought...weapons   systems   and   spare   parts   from   the former Soviet Union, China, and Europe...Sudan obtained help from other   countries   (North   Korea,   Eastern   Europe,   FSU).   Syria   remains dependent on foreign sources for  key elements of  its CW program, including   precursors...Foreign   WMD   procurement   managers   have responded to Western export controls by seeking dualuse goods largely from Russia and China.  Acquisition of Technology Related to WMD and Advanced Convention Munitions. Intelligence Authorization Act.87 

The DualUse issue is also is complicated and contentious. Recent European releases of DualUse correlations contain astonishingly candid statements on difficulties of crosswalking dualuse systems:

This new document aims at providing a correlation between Annex I of Regulation 1504/2004 and TARIC codes. Commission is well aware of the limits of the correlation table given that TARIC and Annex I to Regulation no. 1504/2004 follow a different logic because the legal acts which they are based on aim at different purposes...From DG TAXUD's point of view it does not seem to be possible to adapt the TARIC in a way   that   it   corresponds   perfectly   with   Annex   I   to   Regulation   no. 1334/2000. Working Party on Dual Use Goods. DS 54/1/2004 REV.1.

 Ed: this paragraph's assertions (bold) are incorrect. In our study, we achieved just that. We crosswalked all control lists worldwide (and by so doing, identified critical errors. Some, we demonstrate below). 

In The European Union Dualuse Export Control Regime, Quentin Michel88 writes that since 

The   export   control   of   dualuse   items   in   the   European   Union   has always been a controversial issue. Whilst the necessity to control the 

85 Aluminum , beryllium, bismuth, lithium, titanium, tungsten, zirconium.86 Reconsider now the intercept between Hussein and his advisors (Page Nine). NIE, 2002.87 Also see India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities. Sharon Squassoni,88 Professor, European Studies Unit , Faculty of Law, Liège University.

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export and, sometimes, the external transit of such items has never been questioned, the competence of the Union and, in particular, of the   European   Commission   in   its   regu   latory   function,   has   been challenged   by   the   Member   States.  This   attitude   can   be   explained: firstly,   by   the   particular   nature   of   the   dualuse   items   which   could neither   be   assimilated   to   standard   goods   and   serv   ices   nor   to weapons;   and,   secondly,   by   the   fact   that   dualuse   items   trade   is immediately subject to specific foreign policy concerns, such as nonprolifera tion and terrorism. For these reasons, Member States have always considered that the control of dualuse items should remain politically and, if pos sible, legally within their exclusive competence. Nevertheless,   even   if   Member   States   have   been   re   luctant   to   be controlled by an EC Regulation, the im plementation of the common market induced Mem ber States to accept some EC coordination in order to maintain the efficiency of national  export control  systems. Such an ambiguous situation has guided the EU policy since the first Regulation in 1994 and explains the complexity of the present system. P.45, ESCADA Bulletin. December, 2008.

The dualuse issue is central to international security. In Illicit Trade in DualUse Commodities: Establishing Effective Trade Controls, Todd Perry89 writes: 

Interdicting strategic procurement is key to nonproliferation; Traditional models allow for....multiple layers of deception, from false statements of end use, involving claims of ‘peaceful purposes’,) to front companies, import/export companies, distributors, and other intermediaries. 90

Perry identifies Strategic Goods, Control Lists that codify them, and how many are DualUse. He then demonstrates that existing dualuse models have many deficiencies and pitfalls, including:

• DualUse manufacturers rarely realize how their products contribute to WMD, or how procurement agents might seek to exploit them; 

• Customs personnel91 are unfamiliar with dualuse commodities; 

• Dualuse shipments seem ordinary (especially to untrained eyes); and 

• Multilateral export control arrangements overlap and can even conflict.92

89 Director, Department of Energy, International Nonproliferation Export Control Program.90 International Transshipment Conference ; Tangiers, Morocco. May 20-22, 2008.91 Such as Customs Agents that man border crossings.92 Perry definitively demonstrates not merely that overt procurement is ancient history, but also

that covert procurement schemes, in recent years, have evolved into sophisticated exploitation

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                       Perry cites wellknown lists, including:

• BIS (Commerce) • Chemical Weapons Convention    • Commodity Designator Codes    • Export Control Lists • International Atomic Energy Agency    • International Munitions List    • International Traffic in Arms Regulations    • Strategic Materials Lists93 • UN Security Council Resolutions • United States Munitions List    • Weapons System Designator Codes94

Such lists frequently house commodity descriptions like these:

• Centrifugal isotope separation equipment95

• Centrifuges with acceleration > 100g96

• Beryllium, Boron, Magnesium, or Zirconium alloys97

• Nickel powder (at specific micron threshold)98

Such commodities are also interrelated. In other words, the combination of fine nickel and beryllium with centrifuges that generate such speeds (which therefore yield specific G values) are weapons program components. These centrifuges, therefore, are rare and specialized. 

Note: during our study, we joined product tables with tables that prescribed material composition. That is, datasets returning UF6processing machinery also appended critical material composition data (maraging steel, nickel and nickel alloys +17/+67%, zirconium, etc). Many smaller nations derive control lists from wellknown regimes but omit materal composition and other vital specifications. Such documents, on their faces, give one the impression that any centrifuge is suspect (e.g., the type hematology labs use). 

As Perry demonstrates, absent more granular surveillance metrics, we cannot mount effective nonproliferation efforts. 

of deficiencies in supply-chain visualization. Traditional Illicit Procurement Scheme (Suppliers, Intermediate Consignees, Front Company, End User).

93 Prominent, publicly-accessible examples include Singapore and New Zealand.94 WSDC, used in requisition systems, such as MILSTRIP. Example: Cruise Missile      =     36F   .95 CCL, 0B002.96 CCL, 2B122 .97 CCL, 1C111.a.2.e. 98 CCL, 1C240.

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Note: Perry is unique in that he understands procedural and technical procurement intelligence facets.99 For example, he explains that shipment surveillance demands automated systems that do more than merely warn on known or flagged items. He cites, for example, the need for systems that detect anomalies, including “...Vague or inconsistent commodity descriptions; inconsistent or unusual value, quantity, or weight; and spelling errors on declarations.” What Perry likely does not know is that even if shipments bear proper spelling, detection can be difficult. In our study, we found that Thiosulfurous Dichloride (10025679) as a string fails to yield 氯化硫 unless detection systems store appropriate character sets. This is equally true of    ,высокообогащенный уран   우라늄 235    를 열화 시킨, यरेूिियम, خامات يورانيوم ومركز, and אורניום הקסאפלואוריד. Plainly stated, any nation whose set is extraLatin can deploy special typefaces to evade trigger systems (in other words, intentionally misspelling line item descriptions is unnecessary).100 

Technical Note on Character Sets and Transfer Records

Regarding character sets, few computer scientists have experience in this area. Survey ten such scientists and you will probably receive the same answer ten times out of ten: Unicode. Unfortunately, Unicode addresses just one problem and then only when engineers appropriately apply it. 

For example, systems that enforce ordinary Unicode catch a mere portion of flagged transmissions that travel in extraLatin sets. Because this is not wellknown, many DBAs build tables that incorporate standard Unicode support. This is convenient, but fails to account for more specialized character sets.101

Note: consider MySQL,an RDBMS especially popular in research labs. MySQL’s initial popularity hinged on it being GPL (i.e., it was inexpensive). Recently, however, MySQL surpassed commercial systems in speed and flexibility.102 MySQL offers varied implementations, but its standard release supports collation on a fieldbyfield basis. A DBA can a) elect for general 

99 These characteristics together are rare for government officials, especially at executive levels.100For this reason, UCIC maintains a database of numbers and strings expressed in all existing

character sets and permutations of misspellings of controlled commodities therein. UCIC further hashes these values into digital fingerprints.

101“Contrary to popular belief, an individual Big5 code does not always represent a complete semantic unit. The Big5 codes of logograms are always logograms, but codes in the ‘graphical characters’ section are not always complete ‘graphical characters’. What Big5 encodes are particular graphical representations of characters or part of characters that happen to fit in the space taken by two monospaced ASCII characters. This is a property of double-byte character sets as normally used in CJK (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) computing, and is not a unique problem of Big5.” Big5 Chinese Coding.

102Tests in typical research environments (which do not account for highly specialized scientific application) show MySQL comparable or superior to DB2, Informix, Ingres, MSQL, Oracle, PostGRES, SQL Server, and Sybase.

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Unicode support in all fields; or b) apply specific character support fieldbyfield. The basic distribution supports three Chinese sets: big5, gb2312, and gbk.103 However, even if a DBA enforces all three (duplicate fields, each using different collation), the system will still fail to comprehend a dozen other Chinese sets. Further, RDBMS is only one component. The system still relies on an appropriatelyconfigured web server. And, transactions that tracking systems seek seldom unfold in HTTP. EDI is more likely, a scenario for which web services are inequipped. For these reasons, any undertaking to build an effective trigger system must include exhaustive support for character sets.

Technical Note on Trigger Systems and Tariff Codes

Another contingency for which few trigger systems prepare is the wide variety of ways nations express tariff keys. 

Bifurcation

Many control lists bifurcate their keys by assigning them two or more objects. We have found bifurcation to substantially hinder traffic analysis and distort enduse intelligence. To understand why, consider 26120000080 (CN), which couples Uranium and Thorium:

284430910080  Of Thorium or Uranium...

Many classifications and nomenclatures still in use (and whose authors never thoroughly calculated outcome) do not bifurcate. TSAUSA, still prominent in many maritime shipments, is one example. A screen of TSA for Thorium yields the following dataset:

4221000  Thorium nitrate 4221200  Thorium oxide 4271400  Organic thorium salts 6014500  Thorium ore including monazite 6325200  Thorium unwrought, except alloys, waste scrap104

103These correspond to Big5 Traditional, GBK Simplified, and GB2312 Simplified Chinese.104 Depending on the trigger-system modality, the system will either miss this object (for seeking

Uranium) or miss Uranium (for seeking this object). Or worse, systems that cannot differentiate bifurcated objects at all might fail to trap either.

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Character Sets

Character sets present two issues. The first complicates interoperability, whilst the second distorts or misses critical intelligence.

The first case refers to control list identifiers. These should be integers (that is, they should contain numerals only). Not all systems worldwide support Latin character set releases. Thus, systems in Asia and the MidEast may not always correctly process identifiers that harbor letters.105

The second case refers to automated intelligence gathering. Unless automated surveillance systems support all conceivable characters sets [that target traffic assumes or deploys], they will misinterpret or mangle vital data elements.

Descriptions and Definitions

Descriptions and definitions are strings. Strings present processing difficulties for several reasons. First, developers cannot know [before runtime] a string's length. Second, strings are difficult to validate, they often harbor errors, and often suffer malformation in transit. Developers can impose fixedlength and validation on definitions by hashing them (MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, etc.)

105 This often extends to punctuation also, even if transmissions unfold in UTF-8 or UTF-16.

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Material Composition Visualization: What Is It?

The term Material Composition Visualization seems daunting, but its concept is surprisingly simple. This section defines the term and demonstrates how it relates to antiproliferation efforts.

In plain English, Material Composition Visualization106 connotes the process of recognizing a holistic object from its component parts. For example, consider a Martini. As a holistic object, a Martini is an alcoholic beverage.

In Material Composition, however, a Martini consists of:

• One glass • One olive • Gin• Vermouth

106Hereafter, “MCV.”

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Why UCIC Undertook UCIC/OSS

All aforesaid issues, to nonproliferation bodies and our State Department, are wellknown. In October, 2002, GAO delivered Nonproliferation: The Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes.107 That document exhaustively described weaknesses of and inconsistencies between existing regimes.

Specifically, GAO wrote:

We identified several significant weaknesses in the activities of the regimes that could affect their ability to curb proliferation. Specifically, we found that regime members do not (1) share complete and timely export license information or (2) harmonize their their export controls promptly.

107GAO-03-43, Report to Congressional Committees; Helms (Committee on Foreign Relations) and Thompson (Comm. On Government Affairs), with Statement of Concurrence, Commerce and State. October 25, 2002.

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This new Commission document aims at providing a correlation between Annex I of Regulation 1504/2004 and TARIC codes. Commission is well aware of the limits of the correlation table given that TARIC and Annex I to Regulation no. 1504/2004 follow a different logic because the legal acts which they are based on aim at different purposes.

However, despite these above mentioned limites, the correlation table has been established as a working tool for frontline customs officers to enable them to see quickly whether a certain product could be covered by Annex I to Regulation 1504/2004. A given TARIC code under normal circumstances covers a wider range of products than those which are included in Annex I to Regulation no. 1504/2004. Therefore the fact that the TARIC code of a certain product appears in the correlation table does not necessarily mean that this product is included in Annex I to Regulation no. 1504/2004. On the other hand a product which is included in Annex I to Regulation no. 1504/2004 can be covered by more than one TARIC code or even not all covered by TARIC (example "software" can be exported on a portable computer, TARIC code 8471 3000 00, on a CD-ROM, TARIC code 8471 7051 00 or not all if it is transmitted via the internet).

From DG TAXUD's point of view it does not seem to be possible to adapt the TARIC in a way that it corresponds perfectly with Annex I to Regulation no. 1334/2000. In the first place, as it can already be seen from the correlation table, such exercise would require to create several thousands of new TARIC-codes. There are neither technical nor human ressources to handle the workload involved. Secondly

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the application of those TARIC-codes would require a technical knowledge which goes far beyond what can be done within the normal customs procedures.

Inconsistencies Across DualUse Systems

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A DualUse Inconsistency Demonstration

This demonstration limits analysis to comparison of a single ECCN against EU dualuse system keys.108 This implicitly imposes rules without which science could never correlate such lists. These rules concern: 

• Structural Characteristics• Linguistic Characteristics

Structural Characteristics, Harmonized Tariff

WCOcompatible classifications share important structural artifacts. Every HS strain, for example, unfolds by Chapter, Heading, SubHeading, and Suffix. US International Trade Commission HTS, for example, unfolds thus:

26  Chapter2612  Heading2612.10  SubHeading2612.10.00  SubHeading2612.10.00.00  Suffix

Fullyarticulated, 2612.10.00.00 (Uranium Ores), unfolds as follows:

26  Ores, Slag, and Ash2612  Uranium/Thorium Ores/Concentrates2612.10  Uranium Ores and Concentrates2612.10.00  Not further defined2612.10.00.00  N/A

USITC/HTS is a formal distribution, or a legal restatement of USHTS. Officials can safely reference it as authoritative, complete, and polished. US Automated Export System's HTS is 98% compatible with USITC/HTS, but is a less formal release, more suitable for EDI/EC.109

The AES key/value pair for Uranium Ore is:

2612100000 Uranium Ores And Concentrates

Researchers must accept that HS strains often vary in structure, even strains of common geographic or political origin. Any scientific analysis of tariff systems must therefore incorporate this condition as a fundamental proposition.

108We limit demonstration to ECCN because ECCN is CCL's smallest holistic unit. ECCN is thus a rudimentary object that reduces potential confusion. Because our pending point is critical, it is vital that readers understand it. CCL introduces additional variables that cloud the issue.

109 AES/HTS, for example, shuns delimitation.

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Structural Characteristics, Combined Nomenclature

Combined Nomenclature (INTRASTAT) closely follows USHTS structure, but it retains EUcentric artifacts via parallel columns. Column One stores a 12 digit, unbroken integer which contains USHTS keys. The CN2008 key/value pair for Uranium Ores is:

261210000080 Uranium ores and concentrates

CN2008's pair thus contains the AES pair:

261210000080   Uranium Ores and Concentrates2612100000     Uranium Ores And Concentrates

CN2008's parallel column, meanwhile, preserves EU formatting:

2612 10 1 Uranium Ores and Concentrates

Linguistic Characteristics, Combined Nomenclature

USA and EU share political and social aims, but experienced different cultural and linguistic histories. Their classifications and laws reflect this. CN's English distributions therefore retain definitions which are absent in US distributions, even when those definitions share identical aims. 

Thus, when researchers shear tariff numbers to the minimum length that still preserves reciprocity, they encounter classic differences:

2612 10     Uranium ores and concentrates 2612 10 10  Uranium ores and pitchblende, concentrates

Nuclear history conjures few more indelible images than early photographs of Madame Curie. In one, she displays a beaker that contains an oddly luminous material. This was a mixture of Barium and Radium. The Curies later isolated metal Radium from pitchblende, which we now call Uraninite. CN explicitly codifies pitchblende; AES does not.

CN and HTS also bear slight spelling variations:

2813902000     Phosphorus Sulfides281390100080   Phosphorus Sulphides

Researchers must accept that subtle differences exist between USHTS and CN. Some differences are structural; others are linguistic.

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DualUse Inconsistency Demonstration Parameters

Next, we define our demonstration's parameters. As we earlier explained, this demonstration compares (and ultimately, crosscorrelates) a single US ECCN against its EU counterparts and both CN and AES.

Our parameters, therefore, are:

• One US Export Control Number (or ECCN);• USAES keys that correspond to that ECCN;• EUCN keys that correspond to that ECCN; and• Comparison of said USAES keys against said EUCN keys

DualUse Inconsistency Parameters: US ECCN

US Bureau of Industry and Security explains that ECCN is...

...an alpha-numeric classification used in Commerce Control List to identify items for export control purposes. ECCN is different from a Schedule B number, which is used by Bureau of Census to collect trade statistics. It is also different from Harmonized Tariff System, which is used to determine import duties.

ECCNs number more than 500 and span from ECCN 0A001 (Nuclear Reactors) to ECCN 9C110 (Resinimpregnated fibers).110

Our ECCN is 0C001:

0C001   Natural uranium or depleted uranium or        thorium in the form of metal, alloy,        chemical compound or concentrate and        any other material containing one or        more of the foregoing

110 The last 20 ECCNs (9D001, 9D002, 9D003, 9D004, 9D018, 9D101, 9D103, 9D104, 9D105, 9D990, 9D991, 9E001, 9E002, 9E003, 9E018, 9E101, 9E102, 9E990, 9E991, and 9E993) codify technology germane to earlier ECCNs. That is, they do not explicitly name specific products.

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DualUse Inconsistency Parameters: USAES

Regarding USAES (our second parameter), we here use USAES keys that UCIC resolves to 0C001. Note that many of these keys exceed 0C001's scope. This is because 1A290 and 1C004 specify conditions too remote to trap many USAES. See Table 8.0 below.

ECCN Definition

1A290 Depleted uranium (any uranium containing less than 0.711% of the isotope U235) in shipments of more than 1,000 kilograms in the form of shielding contained in Xray units, radiographic exposure or teletherapy devices, radioactive thermoelectric generators, or packaging for the transportation of radioactive materials.

1C004 Uranium titanium alloys or tungsten alloys with a matrix based on iron, nickel or copper

Table 9.0 below enumerates all USAES that UCIC resolves to 0C001.

# AESHTS ECCN AESHTS DEFINITION

1 2612100000 0C001 Uranium Ores And Concentrates 

2 2612200000 0C001 Thorium Ores And Concentrates 

3 2844101000 0C001 Uranium Metal 

4 2844102010 0C001 Natural Uranium Oxide 

5 2844102025 0C001 Natural Uranium Hexafluoride 

6 2844102055 0C001 Natural Uranium Compounds, Nesoi 

7 2844105000 0C001 Alloys, Ceramic w/Natural Uranium 

8 2844200010 0C001 Uranium Oxide Enriched In U235 

9 2844200020 0C001 Uranium Fluoride Enriched In U235 

10 2844200030 0C001 Uranium Compounds Enriched In U235 

11 2844200050 0C001 Plutonium, Compounds, U235 

12 2844301000 0C001 Thorium Compounds 

13 2844302010 0C001 Uranium Oxide Depleted In U235 

14 2844302020 0C001 Uranium Fluorides Depleted In U235 

15 2844302050 0C001 Uranium Compounds Depleted In U235 

16 2844305010 0C001 Uranium Metal Depleted In U235 

17 2844305050 0C001 Alloys, Ceramic, Depleted U235

As Table 9.0 indicates, we identified 17 (seventeen) USAES for 0C001.

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DualUse Inconsistency Parameters: EUCN/TARIC

Our third parameter is the dataset of EUCN keys that correspond to US ECCN 0C001. Table 10.0 below arranges set members EUCN, EU DualUse Code, and ECCN 0C001 in sequence.

# EU CN/TARIC EUDU ECCN

1 2612101000 D017 0C001

2 2612109000 D017 0C001

3 2612201000 D017 0C001

4 2612209000 D017 0C001

5 2620999500 D017 0C001

6 2844101000 D017 0C001

7 2844103000 D017 0C001

8 2844105000 D017 0C001

9 2844109000 D017 0C001

10 2844301100 D017 0C001

11 2844301900 D017 0C001

12 2844305100 D017 0C001

13 2844305500 D017 0C001

14 2844306100 D017 0C001

15 2844306900 D017 0C001

16 2844309100 D017 0C001

17 2844309900 D017 0C001

18 2844401000 D017 0C001

EU records eighteen TARIC to0C001 correlations. 

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Notes on EU DualUse Codes

EU DualUse Code releases come in various forms. One is an annual XLS file that bears a structure identical to Table x.x. That XLS filecorrelates ECCN keys to TARIC, an EUwide system.  Member  nationstate Control  Lists or ECcertified releases  are likewise reliable sources.

DualUse  Lists  from  individual  European states serve as superb secondary validation sources. Yugoslavia and the Czech Republicprovide exceptionally accurate, wellcrafted concordances.

CN/TARIC  codes  in such  lists are  identical to codes from nonTARIC releases. Table x.x originated from a 2008 EU/TARIC update.

DualUse Inconsistency Parameters: EUCN Versus USAES Keys

Table 11.0 below is a legend for Table 12.0. Table 12.0 has eight headings.

Col Heading Significance

1 # A sequential numeric to identify each row

2 CN/TARIC The Combined Nomenclature key for 0C001

3 EUDU European DualUse Code

4 ECCN US Export Control Number

5 S Indicates success in matching AES (Y/N)

6 CN/AES KEY The CN or any portion thereof that matches AES

7 L Length needed to secure AES matches

8 Y Number of AES keys the CN/AES key matches (Yield)

# CN/TARIC EUDU ECCN S CN/AES L Y

1 2612101000 D017 0C001 N  261210 6 1

2 2612109000 D017 0C001 N  261210 6 1

3 2612201000 D017 0C001 N  261220 6 1

4 2612209000 D017 0C001 N  261220 6 1

5 2620999500 D017 0C001 N  262099 6 9

6 2844101000 D017 0C001 Y  2844101000 10 1

7 2844103000 D017 0C001 N  284410 6 5

8 2844105000 D017 0C001 Y  2844105000 10 1

9 2844109000 D017 0C001 N  284410 6 5

10 2844301100 D017 0C001 N  2844301 7 1

11 2844301900 D017 0C001 N  2844301 7 1

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12 2844305100 D017 0C001 N  2844305 7 2

13 2844305500 D017 0C001 N  2844305 7 2

14 2844306100 D017 0C001 N  284430 6 6

15 2844306900 D017 0C001 N  284430 6 6

16 2844309100 D017 0C001 N  284430 6 6

17 2844309900 D017 0C001 N  284430 6 6

18 2844401000 D017 0C001 N 284440 6 3

Only two Table 12.0 TARIC keys (2844101000 and 2844105000) offer us exact matches to AES by key. From a UCIC viewpoint, however, those matches differ in reliability and relative strength. In classification, keys that structurally differ often demonstrate stronger correlations to one another than identical keys do.

To understand this concept, consider  2844101000 and 2844105000 from their values (rather than keys). 2844101000's AES and CN definitions illustrate this problem. Please see Table 13.0 below.

# System Key Value/Definition

1 AES 2844101000 Uranium Metal 

2 CN 284410100010 Natural uranium 

3 CN 284410100080 Crude; waste and scrap (Euratom)

Strictly, the classification “Natural Uranium” (Row 2) does not constitute what we deem an exact match. Uranium is a metallic element, but in  natural form (or unrefined state), it cannot qualify as metal proper. Row 3, in contrast, does meet AES constraints, even it fails to reach “Uranium Metal” in bars, buttons, ingots, pellets, plates, rods, slugs, or other finished forms.111

In contrast, 2844105000 provides a stronger correlation. Please see Table 14.0.

# System Key Value/Definition

111 Nor need it, so long as the subcategory legitmately falls beneath its parent tree. By analogy, the classification Uranium Ores and Concentrates is sufficient to encompass Abernathyite, Andersonite, Autunite, Betafite, Carnotite, Clarkeite, Coffinite, Davidite, Margaritasite, Masuyite, Mckelveyite, Metatorbernite, Polycrase, Rutherfordine, Saleeite, Samarskite, Schoepite, Schröckingerite, Steacyite, Studtite, Thorianite, Thorite, Torbernite, Uraninite, Uranophane, Uranopilite, Wyartite, Yttrocolumbite, and Zippeite. Some of these minerals contain more than 80% Uranium and are economically recoverable. They thus qualify as Uranium analogs. Absent an explicit codification of these minerals, however, detection systems must rely on honesty of importers, exporters, and freight carriers.

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1 AES 2844105000 Alloys, Dispersions (Including Cermets), Ceramic Products And Mixtures Containing Natural Uranium Compounds

2 CN 284410500080 FerroUranium

Because Ferrouranium is an alloy,  284410500080 presents no conflict. Alloys of Uranium (whatever their composition) fall beneath 2844105000.112

However, 2844101000 is not our focus. The inconsistency arises  from the CN identifier 262099950080 and its various components. Those components are 

• 2620 91 00 • 2620 99 00 • 2620 99 10 • 2620 99 20 • 2620 99 40 • 2620 99 60 • 2620 99 95113

Table 15.0 below provides each key's description.

# Key Definition

1 2620 91 00 Containing antimony, beryllium, cadmium, etc. 

2 2620 99 00 Other 

3 2620 99 10 Containing mainly nickel 

4 2620 99 20 Containing mainly niobium and tantalum 

5 2620 99 40 Containing mainly tin 

6 2620 99 60 Containing mainly titanium 

7 2620 99 95 Other

 As many tariffs often do, CN2008's electronic distribution omits key data that humans need to clearly grasp a description. In CN (just as in AES), the 262091 series codifies Ash and Residues (except from steel production) that contains Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, or mixtures thereof.

112 Not every HS implementation applies this rule. Japan excepts Ferrouranium in three cases: 284410, 284420, and 284430. CN, in contrast, codifies Ferrouranium with both 284410 and 284420, but not 284430. America never explicitly codifies Ferrouranium in AES or HTS (for this reason, an argument exists to assign 7202998040 to control lists, but such inordinately wide classifications achieve only confusion).

113 It would be error to further break 262099950080 because, by so doing, we would exceed the Commission intended scope.

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For example, in AES:

2620910000      Ash & Residues (Other Than From The Manufacture                 Of Iron Or Steel) Containing Antimony, Beryllium,                 Cadmium, Chromium Or Their Mixtures 

2620910000's description comprehends several materials that do inhabit the Commerce Control List and thus bear ECCNs: Antimony (3C004), Beryllium (1C111.A.2.B, 1C111.A.2.E, 1C230, and 6C004.D), and Cadmium (6C002.B). However, of the three, only Beryllium in unaltered form earns a listing.114

Although the correlation (0C001) is unique to the EC, 26209* inhabits various control lists, in an environmental context. New Zealand, for example, asssigns ash/residue codes to its trigger list as hazardous waste. See Table 16.0 below.

Key/Identifier Value/Definition Authority

2620.29.00.00C Ash and residues, lead HAW 

2620.30.00.00F Ash and residues, copper HAW 

2620.60.00.00G Ash and residues, thallium HAW 

2620.60.00.00G Ash and residues, mercury HAW 

2620.60.00.00G Ash and residues, arsenic HAW 

2620.91.00.00B Ash and residues, beryllium HAW 

2620.91.00.00B Ash and residues, antimony HAW 

2620.99.00.11D Ash and residues, vanadium HAW 

2620.99.00.19K Ash and residues, other HAW 

2621.90.00.19G Other slag and ash HAW

UCIC Methodologies

This section briefly describes elements of methodologies UCIC used to assay 

114 Antimony appears in hydride form and Cadmium in various telluride configurations.

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control lists. It is our hope that this information will assist national security and nonproliferation specialists. We do not, however, recommend unlimited distribution of these materials. 

Reduction of Bifurcated Objects

Many control lists and other “warn” classifications bifurcate two objects into the same key. This substantially hinders traffic analysis and distorts enduse intelligence. To understand why, consider 26120000080 (CN), which couples Uranium and Thorium. 

LDC List or Regime Legend Codes

MCTL Military Critical Technologies List US,MIL,10,B,N,C,

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