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Towards a separate IPMI Domain Stefan Lüders CERN Computer Security Officer AI 2014/1/23

Towards a separate IPMI Domain

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Towards a separate IPMI Domain. Stefan L üders CERN Computer Security Officer AI 2014/1/23. About IPMI No-Security. IPMI/BMC is the most direct way to access physical hosts BMCs are full fledged computers themselves today IPMI/BMC interfaces insufficiently protected: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Towards a separate IPMI Domain

Towards a separate IPMI Domain

Stefan Lüders CERN Computer Security Officer

AI 2014/1/23

Page 2: Towards a separate IPMI Domain

About IPMI No-Security• IPMI/BMC is the most direct way to access physical hosts

• BMCs are full fledged computers themselves today

• IPMI/BMC interfaces insufficiently protected:

• New firmware only irregularly provided

• Old BMC are difficult to upgrade

• Prompt patching, in any case, difficult

• 2013: Fixing severe IPMI/BMC vulnerabilities took 5 months

Page 3: Towards a separate IPMI Domain

A CC MGMT Domain

Firewall /Gateway

General Purpose Network(GPN)

Experiment Network

GPN

IPMI

We have already a dedicated network domain for IPMI,PDUS, KVM connections, …• …in the barn and at Wigner• …to come to CC machine room• …transparent to GPN/LCG

Proposal:• Restrict access on Feb 5th

• Any objections?• What misses to be “trusted”?

(e.g. IPMI no_contact)

“Trusted” Bypass List:IT CC AGILE IPMIIT CC CONSOLE SERVICEIT CC LXADM WITH SSHIT DRUPAL IPMIIT LINUXSOFT IPMIHTTPS