Cerezo v. Tuazon

G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004

TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious Liability v. Subsidiary Liability

FACTS:

Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as

provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.

Cerezo vs TuazonCountry Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed acomplaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband AttorneyJuan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").His complaint that the driver of the Country Bus willfully, unlawfully, and feloniouslyoperate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without dueregard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to preventloss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damageto the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk andbecoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issuedsummons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses"). The Cerezo spousesfiled a comment with motion for bill of particulars and granted by the court. Atty. Elpidio B.Valera appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion

  praying for the resolution of Tuazon s motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of newsummons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court.The trial court issued an order resolving Tuazon s motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezospouses urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of theplaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existingrules.Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. The trial courtdenied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezospouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spousesdid not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. The trialcourt issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to presenthis evidence.After considering Tuazon s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruledin Tuazon s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda s liability because therewas no service of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for thedamages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo s employee, pursuantto Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision. She filed before the trial court a petition forrelief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifyingbefore the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearingsand of orders of the court.Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of theCerezo spouses in the case.The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trialcourt refused to grant relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. The Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a good andsubstantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because theyrelied on an expected settlement of the case.The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari.The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court of appeals a petition for review oncertiorari  the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review oncertiorari for failure toattach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition and failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, with prayer for restraining order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution records show that thepetitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of an annulment of judgment is nolonger available.Issues:(1) Whether or not the case needed to be reviewed(2) Whether or not the lower courts and the court of appeals gravely erred in renderingdecision(3) Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages

  Held:(1) The Supreme Court held that the petition has no merit. The issues are interrelated. Anexamination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that It is either by sheerignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal

technicalities that they have managedto delay the disposition of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Theissues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of thedecision of the trial court.(2) The lower courts and the court of appeals did not erred in rendering their decision, andwas infact competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezoeven in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo s contention, Foronda is not anindispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reservethe filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damagesagainst Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence. thiscourt affirms the decision thereto.(3) There is a modification that the amount due shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial court s decision

Cangco vs Manila Railroad

January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose Cangco arose from his seat in the 2nd class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support

As the train slowed down another passenger and also an employee of the railroad company Emilio Zuñiga got off the same car alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.

When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped off but 1 or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons so his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. 

o His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. 

the car moved forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full stop

He was bought to the hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated

o operation was unsatisfactory so he had second operation at another hospital was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder expending a total of P790.25 

It is customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market

CFI: favored Manila Railroad Co. (MRR)- Cangco had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering

ISSUE: W/N MRR should be held liable.

HELD: YES. lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. 

In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined

Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual

o article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract

two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee

there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence.

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.

o Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

Cangco vs Manila RailroadCangco, herein plaintiff, was an employee of the defendant in this case, Manila Railroad Company.  Upon the occasion in question, plaintiff was returning home by train from his daily labors.  As the train drew up to the station, plaintiff arose from his seat.  As the train slowed down, plaintiff stepped off, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons.  As a result, his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform.

The accident occurred between 7-8 o’clock on a dark night as the railroad station was lighted dimly, objects on the platform were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

Plaintiff sued the defendant company for damages.  The latter interposed the defense that the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.

ISSUE:

            Should Manila Railroad be held liable?RULING:

              Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court holding that it was important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant was the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That was to say, its liability was direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."

On the railroad company’s defense of contributory negligence on the part of Cangco, the Court held that the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melds piled on the platform existed.  Moreover, the place was dark or dimly lighted.  Thus, there was failure on the part of the defendant to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains.

Libi vs IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

Libi vs IACFACTS:Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. 

Libi vs IAC

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

Libi vs IAC

Torts and Damages – Vicarious Liability of Parents – Murder-Suicide of Minor Lovers

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie Ann’s house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).

Apparently, Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.

The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?

HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their son had possession of said gun. They only found out about it when the shooting happened. Further, they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause damages against other persons.

What is the nature of their liability?

In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.

Libi vs IACJulie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses, and Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, were sweethearts for more than two years before their death. Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and

irresponsible character. Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused him to threaten her. 14 January 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound of the same firearm. Private respondents claimed that it was Wendell who deliberately caused their daughter's death, and his, respectively. Spouses Libi contended that a third party, probably a person related to Wendell's work as a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent, must have caused his death and Julie's. Gotiong spouses filed a civil case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence, and denied defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient merit. On appeal to respondent court, the lower court's decision was set aside. Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of respondent court promulgated on 2 January 1985 sentencing defendants-spouses Libi to pay to plaintiff P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Issues: Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Held: The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their company. It is also proven that defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Tamargo vs CA

FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer

In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court’s decision. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review

ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his natural parents or adopting parents?

HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners’ complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings

Natural parents.

It is not disputed that Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.

The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

xxx xxx xxx

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

NOTES:

(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.

Tamargo vs CAIn October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.  

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

Tamargo vs CAIn October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents. In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982.Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

RULING:No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Castilex vs CAJose Benjamin Abad was a Production Manager of petitioner. Abad was given a car owned by petitioner since he sometimes does overtime work at the petitioner’s office. While leaving a restaurant after work, he figured in a vehicular accident which led to the death of Vasquez, a side walk vendor and respondents’ son. Thereafter respondents and Cebu Doctor’s Hospital sued Abad and petitioner for damages. HELD: The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the accident is not itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said car unless it appears that Abad was operating the vehicle within the course/ scope of his employment. The facts surrounding the case showed that

Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time the accident occurred. 2:00 am was way beyond Abad’s normal working hours as well as his overtime work. His being at a place known as a “haven for prostitutes, pimp and drug pushers and addicts”, had no connection to petitioner’s business,; neither had it any relation to his duties as petitioner’s manager. Rather, using his service car for personal purposes is a form of fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.

Castilex vs CA

Company’s car driven by its manager collided with a motorcycle resulting to death of the latter’s driver.

Held: The mere fact that an employee is driving the company’s car at the time of the accident is not itself sufficient to charge the employer liable for the negligent operation of the car unless the employee is acting within the scope or course of his employment. –vicarious liability of employer for acts of its employees.

Castilex vs CASUMMARY:  At dawn, Vasquez was driving his motorcycle at arotondawhen Abad, manager of petitioner Castilex IndustrialCorporation, with a company pickup, driving against the flow of traffic, collided with him. Vasquez eventually died. An action for damages was filed by his parents. Trial court and CA found Vasquez and his employer CASTILEX liable, the latter under Art. 2180 par.5. CASTILEX appealed to SC on the ground that Vasquez was not acting within the scope of his employment when the collisionoccurred but for personal reasons.SC:absolved the company from liability, ruling that Abad was not acting within the scope of thefunctions entrusted to him when the incident happened. As such, its burden to prove that it was diligent did not arise.DOCTRINE:Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long asthey were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on theoccasion of their functions.NOTE:Circumstances surrounding the incident were considered to determine whether Abad was acting within his assigned tasks at thetime of the incident. These include the fact that the area was a "lively place," and a woman shouting "daddy, daddy," when Abad wasonly 29. Steps: 1) Establish EE; 2) Establish negligence; 3) Establish WON employee was acting within scope (burden on plaintiff); 4)Defense of employer of due diligence in selection and supervision

Lanuzo vs ping

Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves pure legal questions.

On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00.

The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.

The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the loss of the store including the merchandise for sale therein, the residential house of mixed materials, furnitures,

clothing and households fixtures; (b) ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and severally P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which represents plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the whole amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an amount equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff, plus the costs of this suit.

Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default" was denied.

Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding them jointly and severally liable.

On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questions of law.

We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 2 that:

A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce.

Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case of his right to institute a civil action separately is quoted hereunder in full:

UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:

1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police included in the complaint the claim of the undersigned for civil liability;

2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused herein and his employer;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of record therein and that the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be not included herein.

xxx xxx xxx 3

The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the safety of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically, what should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4

As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. 5 And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, 6 except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the defendant. 7

The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the

criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.

... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary 9

But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim

Marchan vs Mendoza

Petitioners, the driver of the passenger bus responsible for the injuries sustained by respondent for which he was duly prosecuted and thereafter convicted for serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries, and the bus firm, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, seek the reversal of a Court of Appeals decision of December 14, 1964 and a resolution of March 31, 1965, holding them liable both for compensatory and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. It is the contention of petitioners that errors of law were committed when, in the aforesaid decision, it was held that there was an implied contract of carriage between the petitioner bus firm and respondents, the breach of which was the occasion for their liability for compensatory and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals follow: "In the evening of February 22, 1954, between 9:00 and 9:30 o'clock, a passenger bus No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, bearing Plate No. TPU-708 which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday, Polo, Bulacan, while travelling on its way to Manila; as a result of which plaintiffs-appellees Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child, [respondents in this proceeding], who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries. Plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities which up to the time when this case was tried he continued to suffer. The physician who attended and treated plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza opined that he may never walk again. Consequently the driver of said bus Silverio Marchan [now petitioner] was prosecuted for serious, less serious and slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before the Justice of the Peace Court of Polo Bulacan, and thereafter convicted as charged on June 29, 1956 ..., which judgment of conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Court of First Instance of same province ... In this present action before us, plaintiffs-appellees Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child sought to recover damages against defendant-appellant Arsenio Marchan, then the driver of bus No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, and from defendants-appellants Bienvenido P. Buan and Natividad Paras in their capacity as administrator and administratix, respectively of the estate of the late Florencio P. Buan, doing business under the style name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, predicated not only on a breach of contract of carriage for failure of defendants operator as well as the defendant driver to safely convey them to their destination, but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant Silverio Marchan resulting to plaintiff-appellee's multiple physical damages."1

The Court of Appeals in the decision under review found that there was a preponderance of evidence to the effect that while respondents Arsenio Mendoza, his wife, Leonarda Ilaya, and child, Zenaida Mendoza "were waiting for a passenger bus on January 22, 1954 at about 9:00 in the evening at Malanday, they boarded defendants-appellants' bus bearing No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines with Plate No. TPU-708 bound for Manila. And they were treated as passengers thereto, for they paid their

corresponding fares. As they travelled along the highway bound for Manila, said bus was traveling at a high rate of speed without due regard to the safety of the passengers. So much so that one of the passengers had to call the attention of Silverio Marchan who was then at the steering wheel of said bus to lessen the speed or to slow down, but then defendant Silverio Marchan did not heed the request of said passenger; neither did he slacken his speed. On the contrary, defendant Silverio Marchan even increased his speed while approaching a six-by-six truck which was then parked ahead, apparently for the purpose of passing the said parked truck and to avoid collision with the incoming vehicle from the opposite direction. But, when appellant Silverio Marchan veered his truck to resume position over the right lane, the rear tires of said truck skidded because of his high rate of speed, thereby causing said truck to fall into a ditch. Substantially, the happening of the accident' resulting to the multiple injuries of plaintiffs-appellees, was explained by defendant Silverio Marchan who declared that while he was driving his bus from Barrio Malanday bound towards Manila on a road test, he suddenly noticed an oncoming vehicle. He thus shifted his light from dim to bright. Just then, he noticed a six-by-six truck parked on the right lane of the road where he was driving. Confronted with such situation that if he would apply his brake he would bump his bus against the parked truck he then increased his speed with the view of passing the said parked truck, and thereafter he veered to negotiate for the proper position on the right lane, but in so doing he swerved to the right in order to avoid collision from the oncoming vehicle the rear portion of the bus skidded and fell into the ditch."2

Hence the finding of negligence in the decision under review. Thus: "From the facts as established preponderantly by the plaintiff and substantially corroborated by the defendant Silverio Marchan, it is clear that the cause of the accident was the gross negligence of the defendant Silverio Marchan who when driving his vehicle on the night in question was expected to have employed the highest degree of care; and should have been assiduously prudent in handling his vehicle to insure the safety of his passengers. There is no reason why he could not have stopped his vehicle when noticing a parked truck ahead of him if he was not driving at a high speed. His admission to the effect that if he would apply his brake he would bump or hit the parked truck ahead of him, since there was no time for him to stop the bus he was driving, is a patent indication that he was travelling at a high rate of speed without taking the necessary precaution under the circumstance, considering that it was then nighttime. It is our considered view that under the situation as pictured before us by the driver of said bus, he should not have increased his speed and by-passed the parked truck obviously with the view of preventing a collision with the incoming vehicle. Any prudent person placed under the situation of the appellant would not have assumed the risk as what appellant did. The most natural reaction that could be expected from one under the circumstance was for him to have slackened and reduced his speed. But this was not done simply because defendant-appellant could not possibly do so under the circumstance because he was then travelling at a high rate of speed. In fact, he had increased his speed in order to avoid ramming the parked truck without, however, taking the necessary precaution to insure the safety of his passengers."3

On the above facts, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of December 14, 1964, affirmed the amount of P40,000.00 awarded by the court below as compensatory damages modifying the appealed lower court decision by holding petitioners to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and sustaining the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00. Then came the resolution of March 31, 1965 by the Court of Appeals, where the motion for reconsideration of petitioners was denied for lack of merit.

In their brief as petitioners, the first error assigned is the alleged absence of an implied contract of carriage by the petitioner bus firm and respondent. On this point, it was the holding of the Court of Appeals: "Since it is undisputed by the evidence on record that appellant Silverio Marchan was then at the steering wheel of the vehicle of the defendant transportation company at that moment, the riding public is not expected to inquire from time to time before they board the passenger bus whether or not the driver who is at the steering wheel of said bus was authorized to drive said vehicle or that said driver is acting within the scope of his authority and observing the existing rules and regulations required of him by the management. To hold otherwise would in effect render the aforequoted provision of law (Article 1759) ineffective."4 It is clear from the above Civil Code provision that common carriers cannot escape liability "for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders..." 5 From Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia,6 where this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed the "direct and immediate" liability of the carrier under the above legal provision, "not merely subsidiary or secondary," to Maranan v. Perez,7 a 1967 decision, the invariable holding has been the responsibility for breach of the contract of carriage on the part of the carrier. According to the facts as above disclosed, which this Court cannot disturb, the applicability of Article 1759 is indisputable. Hence, the total absence of merit of the first assignment of error.

The next two errors assigned would dispute the holding of the Court of Appeals in imposing liability in the respective amounts of P40,000.00 for compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. Again,

such assignments of error cannot be looked upon with favor. What the Court of Appeals did deserves not reprobation but approval by this Court.

As to why the amount in compensatory damages should be fixed in the sum of P40,000.00 is explained in the appealed decision thus: "Likewise, it is our considered view that the amount of P40,000.00 awarded by the court below as compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair, considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower extremities, which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation throughout the remaining years of his life, especially so if we take into account that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza was only 26 years old when he met an accident on January 22, 1954; and taking the average span of life of a Filipino, he may be expected to live for 30 years more; and bearing in mind the earning capacity of Arsenio Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived an income of almost P100.00 a month from the business of his father-in-law as Assistant Supervisor of the small [fairs] and his income of P100.00 a month which he derived as a professional boxer."8 Considering that respondent Arsenio Mendoza was only in his middle twenties when, thru the negligence of petitioners, he lost the use of his limbs, being condemned for the remainder of his life to be a paralytic, in effect leading a maimed, well-nigh useless existence, the fixing of such liability in the amount of P40,000.00 as compensatory damages was well within the discretion of the Court of Appeals. 1äwphï1.ñët

As to the finding of liability for exemplary damages, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution of March 31, 1965, stated the following: "We now come to the imposition of exemplary damages upon defendants-appellants' carrier. It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor counterclaim of error for the same by the appellees. It is to be observed however, that in the complaint, plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable." Now, since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of said Silverio Marchan who is appellant's employee; and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages, plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises, in effect, therefore, the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint."9

In support of the above view, Singson v. Aragon was cited by the Court of Appeals. 10 As was there held by this Court: "From the above legal provisions it appears that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. It further appears that the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, because its determination depends upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, it need not also be alleged, and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. Unless and until this premise is determined and established, what may be claimed as exemplary damages would amount to a mere surmise or speculation. It follows as a necessary consequence that the amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be predetermined. One can merely ask that it be determined by the court if in the use of its discretion the same is warranted by the evidence, and this is just what appellee has done.".

Such a principle has been repeatedly upheld. 11 In Corpuz v. Cuaderno, 12 this Court, again through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, made clear that the amount "lies within the province of the court a quo, ..." It must be admitted, of course, that where it could be shown that a tribunal acted "with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest judgment," then there is room for the interposition of the corrective power of this Tribunal.

No such reproach can be hurled at the decision and resolution now under review. No such indictment would be justified. As noted earlier, both the second and the third assignments of error are devoid of merit.

Nor is there any occasion to consider further the fourth assigned error, petitioner being dissatisfied with the award of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees to respondents. On its face, such an assignment of an alleged error is conspicuously futile. 1äwphï1.ñët

The judgment, however, must be modified in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Soberano v. Manila Railroad Co. 13 Respondents are entitled to interest for the amount of compensatory damages from the date of the decision of the lower court and legal interest on the exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, as thus modified, the decision is affirmed, petitioners being liable for the sum of P40,000.00 in the concept of compensatory damages

with interest at the legal rate from and after January 26, 1960, and the sum of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest at the legal rate from and after December 14, 1964, as well as for the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, likewise earning a legal rate of interest from and after January 26, 1960. Costs against petitioners.

Victory Liner vs MalecdanMalecdan was a 75 year-old farmer. While crossing the National Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a busof petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Joson bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing,respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a result,Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping him.•  The incident was witnessed by Malecdan's neighbor, Lorena, who was resting in anearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on hisleft shoulder, from which bone fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena andanother person to the Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival.  The carabaoalso died soon afterwards. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for recklessimprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was filed against the Victory Liner bus driver Joson.• Private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court, which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver guilty of grossnegligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of grossnegligence in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its driver were held liable for damages.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS• W/N Victory Liner as employer of the driver Joson is vicariously liable for theheirs of the victim Malecdan.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI VICTORY LINER IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OFITS EMPLOYEE DRIVER.•  Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delictcommitted by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, theinjured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.• Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employeesacting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." For thispurpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised suchdiligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of theperformance of his duties.• In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine themas to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to thesupervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures,monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breachesthereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.• In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.'s writtenexamination, actual driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological examination, NBIclearance, physical examination, hematology examination, urinalysis, student drivertraining, shop training, birth certificate, high school diploma and reports from theGeneral Maintenance Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he hadpassed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to work as a professionaldriver. However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving experience

Filamer Christian vs IACFuntecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitionerFilamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned toclean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.• Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one lateafternoon.• 

 The place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.•  Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road,negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.•  According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hitthem so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving,they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did notstop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, PotencianoKapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, andhit him.•  Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the timeof the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.• Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allanand Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetchstudents in the morning of the next school day.• In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan'shouse, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving forthe purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for theservice for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.•  Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for whichact the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was donebeyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of theirassigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of theemployer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of theinjury or damage.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS• W/N Filamer is liable as Funtecha’s employer.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, Filamer is liable•  There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractualobligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whoseacts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a positionto exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)."• Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an officialappointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be heldresponsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving atthe time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact thatFuntecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of hisjanitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting thepresumptionjuris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selectionof a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed toshow proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.•  An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary disciplinecalled for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficialto their employer. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has setforth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees fromtaking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting thedriver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drivethe school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it hadimposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by personsother than the driver.•  The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant inthe civil case for damages. As far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff PotencianoKapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle andpresumably was one authorized by the school to drive. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that theplaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and thefact that Funtecha was

engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his ownbut in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility onthe part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated

Filamer Christian vs IAC

Labor Standards – Human Resources Development – Torts – Section 14, Rule X, Book III, IRR (Labor Code)

NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990)

Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.

In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

Filamer Christian vs IACFuntecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision.

Resulting to the death of Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

ISSUE:Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be applied?

HELD:

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

Baliwag Transit vs CA

On April 10, 1985, a Complaint for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage was filed by private respondents, the Spouses Sotero Cailipan, Jr. and Zenaida Lopez, and their son George, of legal age, against Baliwag Transit. The Complaint alleged that George, who was a paying passenger on a Baliwag bus on December 17, 1984, suffered multiple serious physical injuries when he was thrown off said bus driven in a careless & negligent manner by Leonardo Cruz, the authorized bus driver. As a result, he was confined in the hospital for treatment, incurring medical expenses, which were borne by his parents in the sum of about P200,000.00 plus other incidental expenses of about P10,000.00.

On February 5, 1986, Baliwag filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer, which was granted by the RTC. The Amended Answer incorporated the affirmative defense that on May 16 1985, George bad been paid all his claims for damages arising from the incident subject matter of the complaint when he signed the following “Release of Claims”, witnessed by his brother Benjamin L. Cailipan, a licensed engineer:

For and in consideration of the payment to me/us of the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND TWENTY and 50/100 PESOS ONLY (P8,020.50), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we, being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge Fortune Insurance and/or Baliwag transit, Inc. his/her heirs, executors and assigns, from any and all liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue on account of any and all claims or causes of action which I/we now or may here after have for personal injuries, damage to property, loss of services, medical expenses, losses or damages of any and every kind or nature whatsoever, now known or what may hereafter develop by me/us sustained or received on or about 17th day of December, 1984 through Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Physical Injuries, and I/we hereby declare that I/we fully understand the terms of this settlement and voluntarily accept said sum for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of the injuries and damages, expenses and inconvenience above mentioned. (Rollo, p. 11)

Opposing to petitioner’s affirmative defense, Sotero Cailipan, Jr. testified that be is the father of George, who at the time of the incident was a student, living with his parents & totally dependent on them for their support; that they (the parents) shouldered the expenses for his hospitalization; and that they had not signed the “Release of Claims.”

In an Order dated 29 August 1986, the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 20, ruled that since the contract of carriage is between Baliwag and George L. Cailipan, the latter, who is of legal age, had the exclusive right to execute the Release of Claims despite the fact that he is still a student & dependent on his parents for support. Consequently, the execution by George of the Release of Claims discharges Baliwag and Fortune Insurance.

The Spouses appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision on October 22, 1987 setting aside the appealed Order and holding that the “Release of Claims” cannot operate as a valid ground for the dismissal of the case because it does not have the conformity of all the parties, particularly George’s parents, who have a substantial interest in the case as they stand to be prejudiced by the judgment because they spent a sizeable amount for the medical bills of their son; that the Release of Claims was secured by Fortune Insurance for the consideration of P8,020.50 as the full and final settlement of its liability under the insurance policy and not for the purpose of releasing Baliwag from its liability as a carrier in this suit for breach of contract. The Appellate Court also ordered the remand of the case to the lower Court for trial on the merits and for George to return the amount of P8,020.50 to Fortune Insurance.

ISSUES:

What is the legal effect of the Release of Claims executed by George during the pendency of this case?

HELD:

Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the Release of Claims executed by him, as the injured party, discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability is valid. He was then of legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural Engineering, and had the capacity to do acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article 402, Civil Code). Thus, he could sue and be sued even without the assistance of his parents.

The contract of carriage was actually between George, as the paying passenger, and Baliwag, as the common carrier. As such carrier, Baliwag was bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, and is liable for injuries to them through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees (Articles 1755 and 1759, Civil Code). Thus, George had the right to be safely brought to his destination and Baliwag had the correlative obligation to do so. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto, as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract (Marimperio Compania Naviera, S.A. vs. CA, No. L-40234, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 368).

A real party-in-interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party-in-interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act/omission violates the legal right of the former (Lee vs. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. 60973, May 28, 1988). In the absence of any contract of carriage between Baliwag and George’s parents, the latter are not real parties-in-interest in an action for breach of that contract.

The general rule of the common law is that every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed. 15 Enc. P1. & Pr. p. 484. “For the immediate wrong and damage the person injured is the only one who can maintain the action.” Id. p. 578. The person who sustains an injury is the person to bring an action for the injury against the wrongdoer.” Dicey parties to Actions, 347. (Cited in Green v. Shoemaker, 73 A 688, 23 L.R.A., N.S. 667).

There is no question regarding the genuineness & due execution of the Release of Claims. It is a duly notarized public document. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Article 1370, Civil Code). The phraseology “any and all claims or causes of action” is broad enough to include all damages that may accrue to the injured party arising from the unfortunate accident.

The Release of Claims had the effect of a compromise agreement since it was entered into for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment & settlement of the cause of action involved. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced (Article 2028, Civil Code).

Baliwag Transit vs CA

December 17 1984: George, who was a paying passenger on a Baliwag bus (Baliwag) he was thrown off by the bus driven in a careless and negligent manner by Leonardo Cruz, authorized

bus driver, along Barangay Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan

o suffered multiple serious physical injurieso confined in the hospital for treatment,

incurring medical expenses, which were borne by his parents, Spouses Sotero Cailipan, Jr. and Zenaida Lopez, in the sum of about P200,000.00 plus other incidental expenses of about P10,000.00 

April 10 1985: o Baliwag: solely attributable to his own

voluntary act in that, without warning and provocation, he suddenly stood up from his seat and headed for the door of the bus as if in a daze, opened it and jumped off while said bus was in motion, in spite of the protestations by the driver and without the knowledge of the conductor

o Baliwag then filed a Third-Party Complaint against Fortune Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., on its third-party liability insurance in the amount of P50,000.00

Fortune Insurance claimed limited liability, the coverage being subject to a Schedule of Indemnities forming part of the insurance policy.

November 14 1985 and November 18 1985: Fortune Insurance and Baliwag each filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground that George, in consideration of the sum of P8,020.50 had executed a notarized "Release of Claims" dated 16 May 1985. - denied as they were filed beyond the time for pleading and after the Answer were already filed so Baliwag amended its answer to include such

RTC: dismissed the Complaint and Third-party Complaint, ruling that since the contract of carriage is between Baliwag and George L. Cailipan (of legal age) had the exclusive right to execute the Release of Claims despite the fact that he is still a student and dependent on his parents for support

October 22 1987: setting aside the appealed Order and holding that the "Release of Claims" cannot operate as a valid ground for the dismissal of the case because it does not have the conformity of all the parties, particularly George's parents, who have a substantial interest in the case as they stand to be prejudiced by the judgment because they spent a sizeable amount for the medical bills of their son

Baliwag filed Petition for Review on certiorari

ISSUE: W/N the contract signed by George during case pendency is valid discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability 

HELD: YES. CA SET ASIDE

George is of legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural Engineering, and had the capacity to do acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article 402, Civil Code)

o could sue and be sued even without the assistance of his parents

George had the right to be safely brought to his destination and Baliwag had the correlative obligation to do so

Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto, as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract:

o real party-in-interest -plaintiff - who has a legal right 

o real party-in-interest-defendant - who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal right of the former  

In the absence of any contract of carriage between Baliwag and George's parents, the latter are not real parties-in-interest in an action for breach of that contract

general rule of the common law is that every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed

The phraseology "any and all claims or causes of action" is broad enough to include all damages that may accrue to the injured party arising from the unfortunate accident.

o The Release of Claims had the effect of a compromise agreement since it was entered into for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of the cause of action involved.

o compromise - contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced (Article 2028, Civil Code). 

Baliwag Transit vs CAOn 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.

At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire.

Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!”. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the truck’s helper, and injury to several others among them herein respondents.

Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly and severally the Garcia spouses the following: (1) P25,000.00 hospitalization and medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in eight (8) years, (3) P2,000.00 for the hospitalization of their son Allan Garcia, (4) P50,000.00 moral damages, and (5) P30,000.00 attorney's fee.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney's fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE: Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to the Garcia spouses correct?”

HELD:

Yes.

The propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical fees. The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record. The Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits "B-1 " to "B-42" but their total amounted only to P5,017.74. To be sure, Leticia testified as to the extra amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00. To prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party must be presented. The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that damages have been actually suffered. Thus, we reduce the actual damages for medical and hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.

The award of moral damages is in accord with law. In a breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The evidence shows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith. Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the accident.

Metro Manila Transit vs CAAt about 6am of August 28, 1979, Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger apublic utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, boundfor her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While thepassenger jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig,Metro Manila another fast

moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC,for short) bus bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) "79 driven by defendantGodofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, MetroManila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached theintersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down andslacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact causedplaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passengerjeepney and (he was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital whereshe regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined fortwenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three andone half months (31/2).•  Assisted by her parents (for she was then a minor), Custodio filed a complaint fordamages against the drivers and owners of the two vehicles. The said defendants were passing the blame to one another. MMTC established its defense of having exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees through thetestimonies of its training officer, Milagros Garbo, and transport supervisor,Christian Baustista.•  The lower court ruled in favor of Custodio and held all of the defendants solidarily liable (with Calebag being declared in default) with the exception of MMTC on theground that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicantsfor job openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees. WithCustodio’s MR denied, they appealed to the CA, which modified the decision andheld MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants. MR denied.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS• Was MMTC able to establish its due diligence in the selection andsupervision of its employees?HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO. Respondent court was definitely correct in ruling that ". . . due diligence inthe selection and supervision of employee (is) not proved by mere testimonies tothe effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirementsbefore one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof."•  A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that theconclusion of respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly grounded onjurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than that of the courtbelow. It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his ownaffirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, thedegree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim ispreponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is moreconclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent onthe plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant mustlikewise prove own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable.• Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonialevidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or evensubject evidence for that matter,inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelton mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection andsupervision of employees. Petitioner's attempt to prove itsdiligentissimi patris  familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must failas it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object ordocumentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.• Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observedby petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the caseat bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there isenough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence,and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putativeexistence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its owninaction and indifference.• Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening jobapplicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transportsupervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. It thenconcluded with its sweeping pontifications that "thus, there is no doubt thatconsidering the nature of the business of petitioner, it would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection and training process with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general and its passengersin particular; . . . thus, there is no doubt that applicant had fully complied with thesaid requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake thenext set of requirements . . . and the training conducted consisting of

seminars andactual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should have not been allowed todrive the subject vehicle.” These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in

  3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS – TORTS & DAMAGESPage 204 of 528the nature of  petitio principii , couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not butexpress surprise, and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo neither testified norpresented any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergoneall the clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. Thesupposed clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner.Discussion on the vicarious liability of employer•  The basis of the employer's vicarious liability has been explained under thisratiocination: The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under thearticle, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the actsof subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is imputedto them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of thearticle says that such responsibility ceases if is proved that the persons whomight be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of a good father of afamily ( diligentissimi patris familias  ) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that itis not representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of having somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons devoid of personalit  y, but itis the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposedupon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor tothem, which forms the foundation of such responsibility.• The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engagedin business or industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, theemployer under Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by his employees withinthe scope of their assigned tasks. But,it is necessary first to establish theemployment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to holdthe employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of hisassigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only thenthat the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose thedefense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thed i l i g e n c e o f a g o o d f a t h e r o f a f a m i l y r e q u i r e d t o b e o b s e r v e d b y e m p l o y e r s t o p r e v e n t d a m a g e s u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 1 8 0 r e f e r s t o d u e d i l i g e n c e i n t h e s e l e c t i o n a n d s u p e r v i s i o n o f e m p l o y e e s i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c .•  With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driverand of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC inthis instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing hisown duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection andsupervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, thebasis of the liability being the relationship of  pater familias or on the employer's ownnegligence.• It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe duediligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not to be considered as anempty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to be the fashion of the times,since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of their vicariousliability under Article 2180.• On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs. Camarote, supra, laysdown this admonition:. . . . In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as havingexercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not havebeen satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license;he should have carefully examined the applicant for

employment as tohis qualifications, his experience and record of service. These stepsappellant failed to observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise all duediligence required of a good father of a family in the choice or selectionof driver.• Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand, includesthe formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protectionof the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through hisor its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures uponemployees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to theiremployer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of theemployer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularlyreport on their supervisory functions.• In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring andsupervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that ithas been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actualsupervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring proceduresand supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient toovercome presumption

Metro Manila Transit vs CAFACTS: Liza Rosalie Rosales died due to a vehicular accident involving petitioner MMTC’s vehicle driven by Pedro Musa. Her parents sued MMTC and Musa for damages. According to MMTC, it has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. Thus, it should not be liable for damages. HELD: The evidence presented by MMTC to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees and thus avoid the vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it. MMTC is thus primarily liable for damages arising from the negligence of its employee in view of A.2180, NCC. It can recover from its employee but does not make the latter’s liability subsidiary. They are solidarily liable. The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle for damages arising from the tortious acts of its driver is primary, joint and direct with the driver.

City of Manila vs TeoticoFacts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

City of Manila vs Teotico

orts and Damages – Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases

In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.”

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included.

City of Manila vs TeoticoIssue and Ruling: Teotico a manager, sustained a laceration on his left eyelid and contusions on his left thigh, sued Manila city for negligence citing Art. 2189 of the Civil Code. In defense, Manila City cited RA 409, its Charter. Which provision of law should prevail? In terms of territorial RA 409 applies but with regards to subject matter for negligence in general, Art. 2189 prevails making cities liable for injuries sustained due to “defective streets” in particular.

Amadora vs CAAlfredo Amadora is a student of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos. While he was in theschool’s auditorium he was shot to death by a classmate in the name of PablitoDaffon. The latter was then convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.•  The victim’s parents sued for damages under Art. 2180 against the school, theprincipal, dean for boys, the Physics teacher, the accused, his parents and someother students along with their parents.• Later, the complaint against the other students and their parents were dropped. The Amadoras contend that the presence of Alfredo was by reason of a Physicsexperiment, hence the student is still under custody of the school at the time of theincident.•  The school, however, denies liability since his presence was merely to submit thePhysics project and that the semester had already ended.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS• W/N private respondents are liableHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo.•  Article 2180 applies to schools whether academic or non-academic. The student isdeemed in the custody of the school as long as he is under the control and influenceof the school and is within its premises, whether the school semester has just begunor has ended.•  The liability of the article is by the head superior in-charge to the student and not by the school who could be liable under respondeat superior. Both have the defense of bonus pater familias. In this case the evidence did not support who the in-chargeteacher was other than the fact he submitted his Physics report.•  And even if the Physics teacher was in fact in charge there is no showing that he wasnegligent in the supervision and discipline of the accused. The private respondentsproperly adduced evidence to prove they exercised bonus pater familias

Amadora vs CAAlfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death.  Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.  The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.  Complaints against the students were dropped.  Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1.

Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.  Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.  On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision.  Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. 

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.  Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.  Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

Amadora vs CA

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while in the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester ended. He was there to submit a graduation requirement in Physics.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.

The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD, ED and AF.

On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended.

ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case

HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

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Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.

As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”

But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s age

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?

This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

NOTES:

The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

Amadora vs CAFacts: A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed when his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun in the auditorium of their school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, petitioners, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.

Issue: Whether or not the school may be held liable for the acts of its students.

Held: As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student constitutes.

Teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury, he can exonerate himself from liability.

Amadora vs CAApril 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-R e c o l e t o s w e n t t o s c h o o l t o f i n i s h a P h y s i c s e x p e r i m e n t . H o w e v e r , w h i l e h e w a s i n t h e auditorium, his classmate Pabli to Daffon fired a gun that hi t him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.•Amadora’s parents f i led a civi l act ion for damages under CC Art . 2180 against the school, i ts rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher, plus Daffon & 2 other students thru theirparents. Complaint against students was later dropped.•CFI Cebu: defendants were l iable in the sum of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss of  earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorney’s fees)•CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely.1.As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art . 2180 is not applicable since the school was anacademic institution of learning & not a school of arts & trades.2.Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester hadalready ended.3 . N o c l e a r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f a t a l g u n . 4.Defendants exercised necessary di l igence in preventing injury.•Petitioners claim their son was still under school’s custody because he went to school to

  comply w/a requirement for graduation.•Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer intheir custody since the semester was over.•A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on April 7,1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban w/o reportingsuch to the principal or taking further act ion. Gumban was one Daffon’s companions when the incident happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/crespondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same.ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. – NO.•Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School & a boy scoutattended a Rizal Day parade on city school supervisor’s instructions. Afterwards, Capunoboarded a jeep & drove i t recklessly that i t turned turt le ki l l ing 2 passengers. SCexculpated school in obiter dictum (i t was not party to the case) since i t was not aschool of arts & trades. Some just ices dissented claiming that l iabil i ty under CC Art . 2180 applied to teachers in general & heads of schools of arts & trades in particular.•Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate w/a razor blade at the Lourdes CatholicSchool, QC. Exconde ruling reiterated. Custody requirement was defined as a situationwhere student lives & boards w/teacher such that control, direction & influences on pupilsupersede those of parents.

•Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate w/fist blows in the labof Manila Technical Institute. Court ruled that even if offender was already of age & notboarding in the school, the head & teacher-in-charge were solidari ly l iable w/him. Custody was defined as the protective & supervisory custody that school, its heads & teachers exercise over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the schoolincluding recess t ime. No such requirement as actual l iving & boarding in the schoolbefore such liability is attached. It set aside Mercado ruling. Even students of age weres t i l l c o v e r e d b y p r o v i s i o n s i n c e t h e y ’ r e e q u a l l y i n c u s t o d y o f s c h o o l & s u b j t o i t s discipline.•CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether academic or non-academic. In the former,teacher-in-charge of student is the person responsible (general rule). Whereas in thelatter (arts & trades), it is the head (exception). SC agrees w/dissent in Exconde, sayingthat while the child is in school, parent is not supposed to interfere w/discipline of schoolnor w/authority & supervision of teacher. W/o authority, there can be no responsibility.N o r e a s o n t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e v i g i l a n c e e x p e c t e d f r o m t e a c h e r s f r o m a c a d e m i c institutions and non-academic ones. History of disparity:a . h e a d o f s c h o o l o f a r t s & t r a d e s e x e r c i s e d c l o s e r t u t e l a g e o v e r h i s students who apprenticed to their master , the school head. He was personally involved in teaching his students who usually boarded w/him& thus he exercised constant control, supervision & influence.b . H e a d o f a c a d e m i c s c h o o l : e x e r c i s e d o n l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s o v e r teachers who were directly dealing w/students. Thus, teacher is liable.•CC Art. 2180’s custody requirement is not limited to boarding w/schoola u t h o r i t i e s . I t ’ s n o t c o - t e r m i n o u s w / s e m . I t i n c l u d e s p e r i o d s o f   registration or before graduation during w/c, student is still subj to thedisciplinary authority of the school. There is custody for as long as he’sunder control & influence of school & w/in its premises regardless of t i m e a n d f o r a s l o n g a s s t u d e n t c a n s h o w t h a t h e i s i n s c h o o l i n pursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise & enjoyment of alegitimate student rt/privilege. It includes relaxing in the campus.•Under similar circumstances, teacher-in-charge should be liable for hisstudents’ torts. He need not be physically present or in a position toprevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child & the discipl ine inst i l led. Applicable as well to head of school of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of student’s age. Teacher should beliable & not school i tself unless he can prove that he exercised thed i l i g e n c e o f a g o o d f a t h e r s u c h a s b y e m p l o y i n g s u f f i c i e n t n o . o f   securi ty guards, etc. This defense is made available to the teacherconsidering that his responsibility/influence over the child cannot beequated to that of the parents. Parents can expect more obediencefrom the child since kid depends more on parents. Parent can inst i l l more lasting discipline on child than teacher & thus, should be held toa greater accountability for tort committed by kid. WRT liability for kidso f t h e a g e o f m a j o r i t y , l e n i e n c y s h o u l d b e o b s e r v e d i n a s s e s s i n g teacher’s responsibility considering that parents are no longer liable forthe acts of their emancipated children.HOLDING: Petition denied.  1. Rector, principal & dean – not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge. They only had generalauthority over students.2 . T e a c h e r - i n -c h a r g e : n o t d i s c l o s e d b y e v i d e n c e . J u s t b e c a u s e A m a d o r a w e n t t o s c h o o l i n connection w/a physics report doesn’t necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-in-charge.Besides, there’s no showing that the teacher was negligent in any manner. He was not even required to report to school on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence.On the contrary, they have proven that they exercised due diligence.3.Dean of boys – no proof that the gun he released was the same gun that ki l led Amadora.4 . S c h o o l – o n l y t e a c h e r o r h e a d i s r e s p o n s i b l e

Amadora vs CA

Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic Schools – Liability of Teachers and Heads of School

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in

favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.

The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.

For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.

The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

Amadora vs CAThe setting is the Colegio-de San Jose Recoletos, which was NOT a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. A few days before the commencement exercises, student Alfredo Amadora went to school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite for graduation. When he was in the auditorium, he was shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.

Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Alfredo’s parents filed a civil action for damages under NCC 2180 against the school, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics teacher, together with Pablito and two other students, through their parents. The complaint against the students was dropped. CONTENTIONS ON CUSTODY

PETITIONERS: AMADORA UNDER SCHOOL’S CUSTODY. He was in school to show his physics experiment as a graduation prerequisite.

RESPONDENTS: AMADORA NOT UNDER SCHOOL’S CUSTODY. Semester already ended.

THE GUN ISSUE

Days before the incident, the dean of the boys confiscated from Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action. PETITIONERS contend that this was the same pistol, as Gumban was one of Daffon’s companions when the latter fired the gun that killed Amadora, and that Amadora would not have been killed if the gun was not returned by the dean of the boys.RULING OF COURTSCFIheld the remaining defendants liable. CA, however, reversed CFI and all defendants were absolved. CA found that NCC 2180 was not applicable since the school was not a school of arts and trades. It also held that the students were not in the school’s custody at the time of the incident since the semester already ended. In addition, there was no clear identification of the gun, and that the defendant exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury.ISSUES & HELD (aka QUICK SUMMARY OF FINDINGS)

1. Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools of arts and trades? – YES

2. When is the offending student supposed to be in the school’s custody? – As long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. Alfredo still under custody

3. Who is liable for the injury? – None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito on Alfredo

RULING1.     The school CANNOT be held directly liable under NCC

2180.Three cases were cited: Exconde, Mercado, and Palisoc.What you need to know in Exconde

Student boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting to the death of two of its passengers.

This decision, penned by Justice Angelo exculpated the school on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.

Justice Reyes said that the school authorities should be held liable.

o Liability was imposed on teachers in general, and heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The clause “of establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to heads.

What you need to know in Mercado

A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time in school.

Exconde was reiterated in this case (the school was exculpated on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades).

The custody requirement was not proved as it “contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parent.”

What you need to know in Palisoc

A student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the school.

The head of the school and the teacher-in-charge were held liable together with the wrongdoer, even though the latter was not boarding in the school.

The ponencia, Justice Teehankee, said, “There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live an board in the school,” as erroneously held in Exconde and Mercado.

 The case at hand – Amadora

The school has been directly impleaded unlike in Exconde and Mercado.

The school is an academic institution of learning, unlike in Palisoc wherein the school was an arts and trade school.

 Q: Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools of arts and trades? – YESGENERAL RULE. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of the student, following the first part of NCC 2180. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head that should be answerable as an exception to the general rule.                Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”On the differences between academic and non-academic schoolsThere is no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The teacher should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.                HOWEVER, why is it that for academic schools, the teacher is the one held liable, while for non-academic / arts and trade schools, the head is the one held liable? The answer can be traced to the fact that historically, the head exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an academic school because of the apprenticeship system they employed. This distinction no longer holds at present but until NCC 2180 is changed, it should be interpreted according to its clear and original mandate.

2.     At the time the incident occurred, Alfredo was still in the custody of the school authorities.Q: When is the offending student supposed to be in the school’s custody? – As long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already endedOn the teacher-in-charge and custodyThe teacher-in-charge, who is the one designated by a superior to exercise supervision over pupils for a particular subject or section, is the one who must be held liable, in the same way that parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present to be in a position to prevent it. Custody refers to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him because of such influence. For the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.                The rector, high school principal and the dean of boys CANNOT be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined, and they were only exercising general authority over the student body. Evidence did not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of Pablito was. The mere fact that Alfredo went to school to finish / submit his physics project DID NOT necessarily make the physics teacher the teacher-in-charge.                 In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable, since there was evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and returned it to the latter without reporting to authorities. HOWEVER, it has not been showed that said gun was the same that Pablito used to shoot Alfredo; hence, said fact does not necessarily link the dean to the shooting.On the defense of exercising due diligence of a good father of a familyThe school, teacher-in-charge, or the head may exculpate themselves by proving that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or bonus paterfamilias. The school can show this in selecting the head or its teachersand the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to the rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.

Such defense is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. The teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent,

who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s age. The Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. The parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter’s dependence on him is greater than on the teacher.                 However, assuming that the physics teacher was the teacher-in-charge, there is NO SHOWING that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Pablito or that he waived observance or condoned the non-observance of school rules and regulations. Respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.OPINIONSConcurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Melencio-Herrera

Disagrees with the restricted meaning given to the term teacher as “teacher-in-charge”

o The philosophy of law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in such a standing. As long as pupils and students remain in their custody, they shall be held liable for the former’s tortious acts.

 Concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez

There is a need for a major amendment, if not a complete scrapping, of the paragraph in NCC 2180 that refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices

o No more masters, apprentices in schools of arts and trades

o Teachers are often no longer objects of veneration who are given due to substitute parents