TORTS Midterm Cases

7/28/2019 TORTS Midterm Cases

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TORTS AND DAMAGESMidterm 1st Batch

1. People vs. Bisda 406 SCRA 454, GR 140895, July17, 2003

Facts:Alma Bisda and Jenny Basilan (cousin of Yaya Wendy,not a stranger) were involved in kidnapping for ransomof victim Angela Michelle Soriano (6yo) in Marikina onSep 3, 1998, after her class by telling her that herparents were waiting for her in Jollibee. They broughtthe kid to Jollibee and afterwards to their residence inPaco, ManilaThey asked for 5M ransom from William and Marymaewhich they negotiated down to 50k and 25k

Alma was apprehended and her alibi was she was alsoa victim and the perpetrator was Jenny Rose.Jenny Rose voluntary arrived at the PAOCTF where sheannounced that she was one of Almas cohortsDefenses laid by accused: inconsistent testimony of

Angela, voluntariness of Angela, Angela was free toroam around the house thus no illegal detention.

Issue: WON accused guilty of kidnapping

Held:

AffirmativeAccused guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty ofdeath by lethal injection and to pay jointly and severallyto the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the amount ofP300,000 by way of moral damages and P 100,000 byway of exemplary damages. Under Article 2219,paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code, moral damagesmay be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest anddetention.The prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence toprove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, orat least one of them, demanded ransom from theSoriano spouses for the release of their daughter.To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for thecrime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention forransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable

doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprivethe victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of thevictim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused,which is ransom for the victim or other person for therelease of the victim. The purpose of the offender inextorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance whichmay be proved by his words and overt acts before,during and after the kidnapping and detention of thevictim. Neither actual demand for nor actual paymentof ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove thequalifying circumstance if (a) there is more than onecircumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferencesare proven; (c) the combination of all thecircumstances is such as to produce a convictionbeyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Magbanua vs. IAC 137 SCRA 329Facts:The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents allsurenamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenantsof the defendants, and that the latter divert the flow ofwater from their farm lots which caused the drying upof their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas

for they could not plant palay due to lack of water. Thetrial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffsand ordered the defendants to pay moral andexemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendantsappealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed theappeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplarydamages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon thereinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agreeto the appellate court in its decision because the formerbelieve that as a shared tenants, they are entitled to bemaintained as agricultural lessees in peacefulcultivation in their respective landholdings.

Issue:WON the tenants of defendants were entitled to moraland exemplary damages.

Held:The petition is granted and the decision under review ismodified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receiveaward of moral and exemplary damages by thedefendants .

Under the law, the landowners have obligation to keepthe tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation ofhis landholding. In this case, it shows that thepetitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm

lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings.The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and causedprejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under

Article 2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the award ofmoral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of thesame Code which provides, Any person who willfullycauses loss or injury to another in a manner that iscontrary to morals, good customs or public policy shallcompensate the latter for the damage. The defendantsacted in an oppressive manner which is contrary to themorals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liablefor the compensation to the latter.

3. MVRS Publications Inc. et al vs. Islamic DawahCouncil of the Phil. et al. 396 SCRA 210

FACTS:1.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THEPHILIPPINES,INC.,alocalfederation of more than seventy (70) Muslimreligiousorganizations,and someindividualMuslims field in the RTC of Manila a complaint fordamages in their own behalf and as a classsuit in behalfof the Muslim members nationwide againstMVRSPUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staffarising from an articlepublished in the 1 August 1992issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

2.Thecomplaint:a)The statement was insulting and damaging to theMuslims;b) that these words alluding to the pig as the God of

theMuslims was not only published out of sheerignorancebut with intent to hurt thefeelings, cast insult anddisparage the Muslims andIslam, as a religion in thiscountry, in violation of law,public policy, good morals andhuman relations;c)that on account of these libelouswordsBulgar insultednot only the Muslims in thePhilippines but the entireMuslim world, especially everyMuslim individual in non-Muslim countries.


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3.MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., intheir defense,contended that the article did notmention respondents as theobject of the article andtherefore were not entitled to damages; and, that thearticle was merely an expression of belief or opinionandwas published without malice nor intention to causedamage,prejudice or injury to Muslims.

4.The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that IslamicDawah et al.failed to establish their cause of actionsince the persons allegedlydefamed by the article werenot specifically identified.The alleged libelous articlerefers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for whichthereaders of the libel could not readily identify thepersonalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it isdifficult for an individual Muslimmember to prove thatthe defamatory remarks apply to him.

5.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of theRTC. It opinedthat it was "clear from the disputedarticle that the defamationwasdirected to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This libelousimputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who areMuslims sharing the same religiousbeliefs." It added that the suitfor damages was a "classsuit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAHCOUNCIL OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as aMuslim

umbrella organization gave it the requisite personalitytosue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was an existence of the elementsof libel in the Bulgar article.

HELDThe article was not libelous.

1.There was no fairly identifiable person who wasallegedlyinjured by theBulgar article. An individualMuslim has areputation that is personal, separateand distinct in thecommunity. Each has a varyinginterest and a divergentpolitical and religious view.There is no injury to thereputation

of the individual Muslims who constitute thiscommunitythat can give rise to an action for group libel.Eachreputation is personal in character to everyperson.Together, the Muslims do not have a singlecommonreputation that will give them a common orgeneral interestin the subject matter of thecontroversy.

2.Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written)andslander (in general, oral), means the offense ofinjuring aperson's character, fame or reputationthrough falseandmalicious statements. It is that which tends to injurereputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatoryfeelings or opinions about the plaintiff.

3.Defamation is an invasion of arelational interest sinceitinvolves the opinion which others in the communitymayhave, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words whicharemerely insulting are not actionable as libel orslander per se, and mere words of general abusehowever opprobrious,ill-natured, or vexatious, whetherwritten or spoken, donotconstitute a basis for an action

for defamation in theabsence of an allegation forspecial damages.

4.Declarations made about a large class of peoplecannotbeinterpreted to advert to an identified or identifiableindividual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no memberof such class has a right of action without at allimpairing theequally demanding right of free speechand expression, aswell as of the press, under theBill ofRights

5.The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC:where thedefamation is alleged to have been directedat a group or class, it is essential that thestatement must be sosweeping or all-embracing as toapply to every individual inthat groupor class, or sufficiently specific sothat eachindividual in the class or group can prove thatthedefamatory statement specifically pointed to him, sothat hecan bring the action separately.

7."Emotional distress" tort action has no application inthiscase because no particular individual was identifiedin theBulgar article.

"Emotional distress" means any highlyunpleasantmental reaction such as extreme grief,shame,humiliation, embarrassment, anger,disappointment, worry,nausea, mental suffering andanguish, shock, fright, horror,and chagrin.

This kind of tort action is personal in nature,i.e., it is acivil action filed by anindividual to assuage theinjuriesto his emotional tranquility due to personal attacksonhis character. Under theSecond Restatement of theLaw, to recover for theintentional infliction of emotionaldistress the plaintiffmust show that:

(a)The conduct of the defendant was intentionalor inreckless disregard of the plaintiff;

(b)The conduct was extreme and outrageous;(c)There was a causal connection betweenthedefendant's conduct and the plaintiff'smentaldistress;(d)The plaintiff's mental distress was extremeandsevere.

8."Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conductthat isso outrageous in character, and so extreme indegree, as togo beyond all possible bounds of decency.The actionsmust have been so terrifying as naturally tohumiliate,embarrass or frighten the plaintiff

9.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish mustprovemore than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,embarrassment,or anger. Liability does not arise from

mere insults,indignities, threats, annoyances, pettyexpressions, or other trivialities. Intentional tort causingemotional distressmustnecessarily give way to the fundamental right to freespeech.

4. Yasona vs. De Ramos 440 SCRA 154 GR 156339October 6, 2004

Facts:


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- Aurea asked Jovencio for help in paying her bankloans and in return sell to him half of her land.- Jovencio did help and Deed of Sale was executed andthe land was divided into 2 as contained in the Title.- 22 years later Aurea sued Jovencio for estafacontending that she was directed to sign blank paperwhich turned out to be documents transferringownership of her property.- The case did not prosper and Jovencio filed MaliciousProsecution against her.

Issue: WON Aurea is liable for Malicious Prosecution

Held: Affirmative

"malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an actionfor damages brought by one against whom a criminalprosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding hasbeen instituted maliciously and without probable cause,after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or otherproceeding in favor of the defendant therein."

To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must beproof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinisterdesign to vex or humiliate a person, and that it wasinitiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that hischarges were false and groundless. Concededly, the

mere act of submitting a case to the authorities forprosecution does not make one liable for maliciousprosecution.

Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases,requires the elements of(1) malice and(2) absence of probable cause.

These two elements are present in the presentcontroversy. Petitioners were completely aware thatJovencio was the rightful owner of the lot covered byTCT No. 73251, clearly signifying that they wereimpelled by malice and avarice in bringing theunfounded action. That there was no probable cause at

all for the filing of the estafa.

5. Alonzo vs. CA 241 SCRA 51

Facts:From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo wasthe Field Operations Officer of the Philippine MedicalCare Commission (PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13,1985, accused was directed by Executive Officer of thePMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct inspections ofMedicare-accredited clinics and hospitals. (orderapproved by Chairman of PMCC, Dr. Pacifico Marcos)

Among the inspected by accused were the Sto. NioMedical Clinic in Astorga, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, andOur Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in Guihing,Hagonoy,

Davao del Sur, owned and managed by complainantDra. Angeles Velasco.

Inspection report noted physical plant- too small for a50 bed hospital and other violations and a threat oflibel by the couple Dra. Velasco and Judge Dan Velasco.

On the basis of said report and other documents,Executive Director Rossi Castro, on October 15, 1985,filed a complaint with the PMCC against the Sto. Nio

Medical Clinic for "Misrepresentation by ExtendingConfinement of Patients, Misrepresentation by Claimingfor Non-Existing Patients, Breach of Warranty of

Accreditation"

Finding that the last portions of the report to belibelous, Velascos filed complaint for libel.

Alonzos defense: privilege communication

RTC ruling: Alonzo guilty and found defamatory thestatement in the last paragraph which read: "thehusband is a judge and it gives them certain amount of'untouchability.' In fact, they make court suits theirpasttime." The trial court said that this statement"conveys the meaning that Judge Velasco abuses hispowers and authority as a judge thus enabling him andhis wife to violate the law with impunity and even'make court suits their pasttime [sic].'" Regarding therequirement of publication, it held that there wassufficient publication of the petitioner's subject reportwhen she sent it to Dr. Tamesis , a person other thanthe complainants, who read the report.

CA: affirmed "qualified privileged communication" waslost because of proof of actual malice obviously madeout of ill-will or revenge.

Issue: WON questioned report of the petitioner to Dr.Tamesis is libelous

Held: Negative

Malice is not presumed and must, therefore, be proved.

RPC Art. 333. Definition of libel. A libel is a publicand malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice ordefect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission,condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause thedishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridicalperson or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.For an imputation then to be libelous, the followingrequisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory;(b) it must be malicious;(c) it must be given publicity; and(d) the victim must be identifiable. 5

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 isdefamatory and, under the general rule laid down in

Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumedto be malicious, even if it be true; if no good intentionand justifiable motive for making it is shown. There ismalice when the author of the imputation is promptedby personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in responseto duty but merely to injure the reputation of theperson who claims to have been defamed. 6 Truth thenis not a defense, unless it is shown that the mattercharged as libelous was made with good motives and

for justifiable ends.

It is undisputed that Alonzo, as Field Operations Officerfor Region XI of the PMCC, is a public officer and thatshe submitted the questioned report after she hadconducted the inspection of the two clinics of Dr.

Velasco pursuant to and by virtue of the directive of theExecutive Officer, Atty. Rossi Castro, which was dulyapproved by the Chairman of the PMCC, Dr. PacificoMarcos, as Special Order No. 73 12 under which she


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was to submit a report. Her authority to conduct theinspection and to submit the corresponding report werenot questioned by the private respondents.

It is precisely because of such authority that the Courtof Appeals conceded that her questioned report was aqualified privileged communication under the firstparagraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.There can then be no doubt that the petitioner madeher report in the exercise of her official duty orfunction. She rendered it in due course to her superiorwho had a duty to perform with respect to its subjectmatter and which the latter faithfully did by filing theappropriate complaint against Dr. Velasco after anevaluation of the report.

Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice inlaw was negated by the privileged character of thereport. The privilege may only be lost by proof ofmalice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a]privileged communication should not be subjected tomicroscopic examination to discover grounds of maliceor falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat theprotection which the law throws over privilegedcommunications. The ultimate test is that ofbonafides." 15

Tested under these principle, we disagree with theconclusion of the trial court that malice in fact was dulyproved in this case since the petitioner "was moved byill-will" because Dr. Velasco did not grant her "a loan ofP1,500.00" and refused "to bear the vacation expensesof her children at the Davao Insular Hotel, the mostexpensive hostelry in Davao City." This conclusion ispurely conjectural for, as a matter of fact, Dr. Velascoherself was uncertain if these incidents indeed incitedthe petitioner.

Finally, the statement on the threat of a libel chargewas evidently based on a rumor (from the grapevine)which we, nevertheless, find to be relevant to thereport since it serves to forewarn the petitioner'ssuperiors of the risks she and they might meet as a

consequence of her report on the violations and toemphasize the need for PMCC's firmness and courageto pursue the appropriate charges as may be warrantedin the premises.

All told then, the prosecution in this case was unable toprove malice in fact.

Finally there was, in law, no publication of thequestioned report. The rule is settled that acommunication made by a public officer in thedischarge of his official duties to another or to a bodyof officers having a duty to perform with respect to thesubject matter of the communication does not amountto a publication within the meaning of the law ondefamation. 20

6. Canlas vs. CA GR 112160 February 28, 2000

Facts:Canlas and Maosca decided to venture in business. Toraise capital, Canlas executed an SPA authorizingMaosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land. Eventually,Canlas agreed to sell these to Maosca for 850k. Canlasdelivered the TCTs, and Maosca issued postdated

checks (40k, 460k), but the check for 460k was notsufficiently funded.

Maosca was able to mortgage the parcels of land toan Atty. Magno with the help of impostors whomisrepresented themselves as Sps. Canlas [fakecouple]. Maosca was granted a 500k loan by AsianSavings Bank [ASB] with the involvement of the fakecouple.[TOWARDS THE END OF THE CASE, it was saidthat Canlas was with Maosca when the lattersubmitted documents for the loan application. Maoscashowed Canlas several TCTs, which were collaterals forthe loan, and Canlas was confident that his parcels ofland were not involved. However,Maosca used Sps.Canlasparcels of land as collaterals. A 200k check wasreleased, and Canlas received it as payment of theparcels of land he sold to Maosca.]

The loan was not paid so the mortgage was foreclosed.Canlas wrote to ASB, saying that the execution of themortgage was without their authority, so steps shouldbe taken to annul the mortgage. Canlas also wrote thesheriff to cancel the auction sale; however, the salepushed through.

Sps. Canlas instituted a case for annulment of deed ofreal estate mortgage [REM], with prayer for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC issuedan order restraining the sheriff from issuing theCertificate of Sheriffs Sale, and it annulled the REM. CAreversed RTC,holding that the REM was valid, that Sps.Canlas are not entitled to relief because of theirnegligence. CA said ASB exercised due diligence ingranting loan application, and that it did not act withbad faith.

Issue: WON Canlas may recover

Held: Affirmative

1. ASB DID NOT OBSERVE REQUIRED DILIGENCE INVERIFYING COUPLES IDENTITY

2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE; ASBMUST SUFFER RESULTING LOSS

Assuming Canlas was negligent, what was his fault? Hegave Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraudby entrusting to the latter TCTs of the parcels of land(even though Maosca did not pay yet!). HOWEVER,

ASB had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, byfaithfully complying with the bank requirement ofascertaining the identity of persons transacting withthem.

Canlas negligence made him undeserving of an awardof attorneys fees.

PROPERTY LESSON: A CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE

MUST BE CONSTITUTED ONLY BY THE PROPERTYSABSOLUTE OWNER, SO A MORTGAGE CONSTITUTEDBY AN IMPOSTOR IS VOID

7. So Ping Bun vs. CA GR 120554 September 21, 1999

Facts:In 1963, TekHua Trading Co, through its managingpartner,SoPekGiok, entered into lease agreements with


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lessor Dee C.Chuan& Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects offour (4) leasecontracts were premises located at Nos.930, 930-Int., 924-Band 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo,Manila. TekHua used theareas to store its textiles. Thecontracts each had a one-yearterm. They provided thatshould the lessee continue tooccupy the premises afterthe term, the lease shall be on amonth-to-monthbasis.When the contracts expired, the parties didnot renew thecontracts, but TekHua continuedto occupy the premises.

In1976, TekHua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, theoriginalmembers of TekHua Trading Co. includingManuel C. Tiong,formedTekHua Enterprising Corp.,herein respondentcorporation.SoPekGiok, managingpartner of TekHua Trading, died in1986. SoPekGioks grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun,occupied thewarehouse for his own textile business, TrendsetterMarketing.

On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressedto TekHua Enterprises, informing the latter of the25% increase inrent effective September 1, 1989. Therent increase was lateron reduced to 20% effectiveJanuary 1, 1990, upon otherlessees demand. Again onDecember 1, 1990, the lessorimplemented a 30% rentincrease. Enclosed in these letterswere new lease

contracts for signing. DCCSI warned thatfailure of thelessee to accomplish the contracts shall bedeemed aslack of interest on the lessees part, andagreement tothe termination of the lease. Privaterespondents did notanswer any of these letters. Still, thelease contractswere not rescinded.On March 1, 1991, privaterespondent Tiong sent a letter topetitioner, to recoverpossession of the warehouse.

Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992,petitionerrequested formal contracts of lease withDCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bunclaimed that after thedeath of his grandfather, SoPek Giok, he had been occupyingthe premises for histextile business and religiously paid rent.DCCSI accededto petitioners request. The lease contracts infavor of

Trendsetter were executed.In the suit for injunction,private respondents pressed for thenullification of thelease contracts between DCCSI andpetitioner. Theyalso claimed damages.

Issue: WON SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUSINTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT

Held: Affirmative

There was tort interference in the case at bar aspetitioner deprived respondent corporation of thelatters property right. However, nothing on recordimputed malice on petitioner; thus, precludingdamages. But although the extent of damages was notquantifiable, it does not relieve petitioner of the legal

liability for entering into contracts and causing breachof existing ones. Hence, the Court confirmed thepermanent injunction and nullification of the leasecontracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing.

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results frominjury, and damages are the recompense orcompensation awarded for the damage suffered. Onebecomes liable in an action for damages for a non-

trespassory invasion of anothers interest in the privateuse and enjoyment of asset if

(a) the other has property rights and privileges withrespect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,(b) the invasion is substantial,(c) the defend ants conduct is a legal cause of theinvasion, and(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonableor unintentional and actionable under generalnegligence rules.

The elements of tort interference are:(1) existence of valid contract;(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of theexistence of contract; and(3)interference of the third person is without legal

justification or excuse.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So PingBun prevailed upon DCCSIto lease the warehouse to hisenterprise at the expense of respondent corporation.

Though petitioner took interest in the property ofrespondent corporation and benefitedfrom it, nothingon record imputes deliberate wrongful motives ormalice on him.

Sec 1314of the Civil Code categorically provides alsothat, Any third person who induces another to violatehis contract shall be liable for damages to the othercontracting party.

Petitioner argues that damage is an essential elementof tort interference, and since thetrial court and theappellate court ruled that private respondents were notentitled toactual, moral or exemplary damages, itfollows that he ought to be absolved of anyliability,including attorneys fees.

It is true that the lower courts did not award damages,but this was only becausethe extent of damages wasnot quantifiable. While we do not encourage tort

interferers seeking their economic interest tointrudeinto existing contracts at the expense of others,however, we find that theconduct herein complained ofdid not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatoryaward for damages in the absence of any malice. Thebusiness desire is there to makesome gain to thedetriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,however,precludes damages. But it does not relievepetitioner of the legal liability for enteringinto contractsand causing breach of existing ones. The respondentappellate courtcorrectly confirmed the permanentinjunction and nullification of the lease contractsbetween DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, withoutawarding damages. The injunctionsaved therespondents from further damage or injury caused bypetitioners interference.

8. Arafiles vs. Phil. Journalist Inc. GR 150256 March 25,2004

FACTS:This is a complaint for damages filed byCatalinoArafiles, Director of the National InstituteofAtmospheric Science (NIAS) against Peoples JournalTonight reporter, Romy Morales.


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On April 14, 1987, Morales was at the Western PoliceDistrict Headquarters when NIAS employee,EmelitaDespuig lodged a complaint for forcibleabduction with rape and forcible abduction withattempted rape against Arafiles. After interviewingEmelita and checking the police blotter, Morales wrotea story about it, which was published that same day.

Arafiles then filed a complaint against Morales, allegingthat on account of the grossly malicious and overlysensationalized reporting in the news item aspersionswere cast on his character; his reputation as a directorof theNIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became theobject of public contempt and ridicule as he wasdepicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; andthe news item deferred his promotion to the position ofDeputy Administrator of PAGASA.

For its part, Morales et al. countered that the newsitem, having been sourced from the Police Blotter,which is an official public document and bolstered by apersonal interview of the victim, falls within theprotective constitutional provision of freedom of thepress.

The RTC ruled in favor of Arafiles, stating that the

article did not use phrases like allegedly orreportedly and that it reported the allegations of thevictim as if it were fact and truth. On appeal to the CA,the RTC decision was reversed. CA found no proof thatrespondents were motivated by a sinister intent tocause harm and injury to petitioner.

ISSUE:WON publication was as malicious sensationalizationof fabricated facts?

The argument of the petitioner is that the sole basis ofthe news item is the police blotter. However, said policeblotterplainly shows that there was only one count ofabduction and rape reported by Emelita.

SC found that while the police blotter entry recordedEmelitas complaint about only a case for abductionwith rape, her sworn statement given in the presenceof Morales, who subsequently interviewed her, reportedabout the second abduction incident.

The presentation of the news item subject ofpetitioners complaint may have been in a sensationalmanner, but it is not per se illegal. The first sevenparagraphs gave the impression that a certain directorof the NIAS actually committed the crimes, but thesucceeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to thereaders that the narration of events was only Emelitasaccount to the police.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good

name and reputation, but we do not consider that therespondents, under the circumstances of this case, hadviolated said right or abused the freedom of the press.The newspapers should be given such leeway andtolerance as to enable them to courageously andeffectively perform their important role in ourdemocracy. In the preparation of stories, pressreporters and editors usually have to race with theirdeadlines; and consistently with good faith andreasonable care, they should not be held to account, to

a point of suppression, for honest mistakes orimperfection in the choice of words.

9. Manila Electric Co. vs. CA GR 132539 July 11, 2001

Facts:

1st Case

October 19, 1987, Concast(steel manufacturing) filedinjunction against Manila Electric for demandingpayment of P6,753,192.85 representing the value ofelectric current, allegedly used but not registered in themeter with a threat of disconnection if unpaid for 3days.

That the plaintiff is engaged in steel manufacturing andits plant is heavily dependent upon the electric supplyfrom the defendant for its daily operation and thethreatened disconnection of electric supply to theplaintiff which has already become very imminent willcause it great and irreparable damage and injury as notonly will its various machinery for steel making andprocessing will grind to a halt, but various ingredientsin the steel making process stand to be spoiled and thesteel making process itself will be ruined; not tomention the fact that the plaintiff will be needlessly

exposed to public ridicule on account of a contestedbilling by the defendant;

TRO granted.

2nd Case

On 22 January 1982, the Concast entered into aservice agreement with MERALCOwhereby MERALCOobligated itself for a fee to supply Metro Concast withelectric energy at the latters manufacturing plant inBgy. LawangBato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The termsand conditions of the agreement were embodied in aprepared standard form denominated AGREEMENTFOR THE SALE OF ELECTRIC ENERGY.

Series of inspection by MERALCO showed tampering byConcast, thus billed of P44,470,441.22 representing anunspecified amount of electric energy allegedlyconsumed but not registered in the electric meters for[an] unspecified period of time, upon the allegedfinding that in the inspection of its metering installationon 02 April 1987.

Metro Concast disclaimed any knowledge of thealleged tampering of MERALCOs metering installationand refused to pay the said differential billing,prompting MERALCO to give notice to Metro Concast ofeventual disconnection of its electric power supplyshould it fail to settle and pay the said billing within agiven period.

On 13 July 1987, in a tactical move to ward off thethreat of disconnection, Metro Concast filed Civil CaseNo. 54752 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166,Pasig, Metro Manila, to enjoin MERALCO fromdisconnecting the supply of electricity to MetroConcasts plant at Bgy. LawangBato, Valenzuela, MetroManila.

On 28 July 1987, MERALCO filed its answer withcounterclaim for the sum


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of P45,836,886.78representing the alleged actualelectrical consumption from June 1982 to June 1987,and for damages, attorneys fees and litigationexpenses.

RTC decision: in favor of Concast

In the First Case, the trial court[13] held that Meralcofailed to sufficiently establish by preponderance ofevidence that Metro Concast had tampered with thesecondary lead wires and forcibly pulled out the conduitpipes inside its compound. Without sufficient evidenceof electricity pilferage, Meralco had no legal ground fordisconnecting and discontinuing its supply of electricityto Metro Concast. Thus, judgment[14] in favor of thelatter was rendered by the trial court, making thepreliminary injunction permanent and ordering Meralcoto pay P50,000 as and for attorneys fees.

In the Second Case, the trial court[15] did not givecredit to the testimonies of the witnesses presented byMeralco.

Rulings of the Court of Appeals

In the First Case, the Court of Appeals accorded greatweight to the findings of the trial court that Meralco

failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish thatMetro Concast had tampered with the wirings inside itscompound. Thus, it upheld the trial court but deletedthe award of attorneys fees, since no justification forthe award had been indicated.

In the Second Case, the CA reversed the trial court. Itconcluded that Meralco had presented enough evidenceto establish sufficiently that Metro Concast hadtampered with the metering facilities installed inside itscompound.

Issue: WON there was Tampering of Metering Facilities

1st case- Negative

Meralco had failed to establish adequately that MetroConcast was guilty of tampering with the meteringequipment installed inside the corporations compoundduring the period June 4, 1987 to August 19, 1987.

did find the conduit pipe ajar with the meter cabinet,an indication of willful tampering. Yet, he did not makeany official report on the supposed meddling with thefacility. Worse, Meralco took no immediate steps toseal it so as to avoid further losses. Withoutexplanation, Talusan had to wait for a fourth occasionbefore conducting further inspections.

On the other hand, if Talusans first statement wastrue, no tampering or pilferage could have been doneprior to August 4, 1987. But why is Meralco now

charging alleged losses from June 4, 1987 to August19, 1987?

With such convoluted evidence, Meralco indeed failedto substantiate its allegations of tampering andpilferage against Metro Concast during the period June4 to August 19, 1987.

2nd case- Affirmative

Indeed, a closer examination of the testimony ofMeralcos principal witness reveals that there was actualtampering of the metering facilities inside the MetroConcast compound.

The CA further noted that in discovering the tamperingof the metering facilities, the Meralco inspection team

had to open the secondary terminal cover at thepotential transformer to be able to inspect thesecondary current leads inside the conduits x xx.[23] The bare portions found on the secondary leadsprovided the means for stealing electric current andpreventing the meter from fully registering the actualconsumption of Metro Concast. In turn, this facttranslated into losses on the part of Meralco.

The Court also finds no reversible error in the CAsruling that Metro Concast should bear the responsibilityfor the tampering of the facilities within its compound,which was totally under its supervision andcontrol.[24]Being within its control, any resultantbreach in the integrity of the equipment is indeedattributable to it. Besides, the Meralco inspection wasdone in the presence of the officers of Metro Concast,specifically Willy Salas, to whom the irregularities werepointed out upon discovery. Being in the employ ofMetro Concast, he could have been presented by the

corporation to rebut Partos testimony. The fact thathe was not presented only shows that he had reallynothing to say to controvert the evidence presented byMeralco.

10. GMA Network & Rey Vidal vs. Jesus Bustos MD GR146846 October 17, 2006

FACTS:A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INCand newscaster, Rey Vidal. The issue started from thePetition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessfulexaminees of the physicians licensure examinationsbefore the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and theboard of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate

the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting ofthe total scores and erroneous checking of answers totest questions vitiated the results of the examinations.

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network,Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among otherbeats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing ofthe mandamus petition. After securing a copy of thepetition, Vidal composed and narrated the newscoverage for the ten o'clock evening news edition ofGMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof theallegations of the unsuccessful examiners that thegross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capriciouschecking that must have been going on for yearsshould now be stopped once and for all. Simultaneouswith the news, was an old video footage showing

physicians wearing black armbands.

Along these lines, respondents claimed that the saidreport was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal andGMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth,defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneousvisual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7.They added that, the showing of the unrelated oldfootage was done purposely so as to make a forcefulimpact on their audience making it appear that other
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jul2001/108301.htm#_edn13


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HELD: Negative

Dizons, as possessors in good faith, were and areentitled by law to retain the property in question, untilthe indemnity due to them is paid. In other words, theywere never under obligation to pay damages toTolentino either jointly or solidarily, and, hence, therewas no solidary obligation on their part that could havebeen remitted.

These claims for damages cannot be upheld: the first,for P80,000, because the damages resulting from saiddeprivation of use and possession have already beenadjudicated in the decision in question; and the second,for P100,000, because the undue delay was mainly dueto the action of the lower court. Besides, an action forcertiorari and mandamus, before this Court, is not aproceeding suitable for the determination of the latterdamages.

2. Grand Union Supermarket vs. EspinoFacts:Engr. Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer fromU.P.Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor&Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager,incharge

of motoring and warehousing therein;honourablydischarged from the Philippine Army in1946; a Philippine government pensionado of theUnited Statesfor six months; member of the Philippine

VeteransLegion; author of articles published in theManilaSunday Times and Philippines Free Press;member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713;son of thelate Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister,Department of Foreign Affairs at the PhilippineEmbassy, Washington.-

One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their 2daughters went to shop at South Supermarket(ownedby Grand Union) in Makati. While his wife wasshoppingfor groceries, he went around the store andfound acylindrical rat-tail file that he had wanted to

buy forhis hobby. Because it was small, he didnt put itin thegrocery cart because it might fall and get lost.Heinstead held it in his hand. While still shopping, heandhis wife ran into his aunts maid. While theyweretalking he stuck the file in his breast pocket, withagood part of the merchandise exposed.

He paid for the items in his wifes cart; but heforgotabout the file in his pocket. On their way out, theguardstopped him and told him he hadnt paid for thefile. Heapologized and said he had forgotten. Hestartedtowards the cashier to pay; but the guardstopped himand said they were to go to the back ofthesupermarket. There, a report was made, whereEspinosaid that he just forgot that he placed it in hispocketwhile talking to the maid and his wife. He was

thenbrought to the front of the grocery, near thecashierstoa Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am and themanypeople were at the store.

Fandino read the report and remarked:Ano,nakawannamanito. Espino said he was going topay for it.Fandino replied: That is all they say, thepeople whomwecause not paying for the goods say . . .They allintended to pay for the things that are found tothem.

Espino objected, saying he was a regular customerof the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay fortheP3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5billand said it was a fine. Espino and wife objectedandsaid that he was not a common criminal. Fandinosaid itwas a reward for guards who apprehendpilferers.People started milling around and stared atEspino. Hewas directed to get in line at the cashier topay for thefile. All the time the people were staring athim. He wastotally embarrassed.- After paying he and his wife walked out quickly.Hethought about going back that night to throw stonesatthe supermarket; but decided to file a case. TheCFIdismissed. CA awarded him damages.

ISSUEWON Espino is entitled to damages for thehumiliationhe experienced at the supermarket

HELDYES- The false accusation charged against theprivaterespondent after detaining and interrogating himby theuniformed guards and the mode and manner inwhichhe was subjected, shouting at him, imposingupon hima fine, threatening to call the police and in thepresenceand hearing of many people at the

Supermarket whichbrought and caused him humiliationandembarrassment, sufficiently rendered thepetitionersliable for damages under Articles 19 and 21in relationto Article 2219 of the Civil Code.Petitionerswilfullycaused loss or injury to privaterespondent in a mannerthat was contrary to morals,good customs or publicpolicy. Everyone must respectthe dignity,personality, privacy and peace of mind ofhis neighboursand other persons (Article 26, CivilCode). And onemust act with justice, give everyone hisdue andobserve honesty and good faith (Article 19,Civil Code).

- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary inorderthat moral, nominal, temperate, liquidatedorexemplary damages may be adjudicated,

theassessment of such damages, except liquidatedones,is left to the discretion of the court, according tothecircumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New CivilCode). The whole incident that befell respondent hadariseninsuch a manner that was created unwittingly byhis ownact of forgetting to pay for the file. It washisforgetfulness in checking out the item and paying foritthat started the chain of events which led tohisembarrassment and humiliation, thereby causinghimmental anguish, wounded feelings and seriousanxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omissioncontributed tothe occurrence of his injury or loss andsuchcontributory negligence is a factor which mayreducethe damages that private respondent mayrecover (Art.2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, thatmany peoplewere present and they saw and heard the

ensuinginterrogation and altercation appears to besimply amatter of coincidence in a supermarket whichis apublic place and the crowd of onlookers,hearersorbystanders was not deliberately sought orcalled bymanagement to witness privaterespondent'spredicament. The Court does not believethat privaterespondent was intentionally paraded inorder tohumiliate or embarrass him becausepetitioner'sbusiness depended for its success andpatronage thegood will of the buying public which can


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only bepreserved and promoted by good publicrelations.

DispositionPetition denied. CA modified: moraldamages = P5k;attys fees = P2k. no exemplarydamages

3. Patricio vs. Hon. Oscar LivesteFacts:Patricio was an ordained Catholic priest and appointedDirector General of the 1976 Religious and MunicipalTown Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz.

On 16 May 1976, 10PM, while a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the townfiesta, Patricio together with two (2) policemen wereposted near the gate of the public auditorium to checkon the assigned watchers of the gate. Privaterespondent Bacalocos, President of the Association ofBarangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of theSangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of drunkennessand standing near the same gate together with hiscompanions, struck a bottle of beer on the tablecausing an injury on his hand which started to bleed.Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and

asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, andbefore petitioner could respond, private respondent,without provocation, hit petitioner's face with hisbloodied hand.

Criminal complaint for "Slander by Deedwas flied bypetitioner with the MTC-Pilar, Capiz, but the same wasdismissed. Subsequently, a complaint for damages wasfiled by petitioner with the court a quo which ruled inhis favourholding Bacalocosliable for moral damages asa result of the physical suffering, moral shock andsocial humiliation caused by private respondent's act ofhitting petitioner on the face in public. The Courtordered defendant to pay plaintiff the damages asfollows:a) Moral damages of P10,000.00

b) Exemplary damages, P1,000.00 andc) Attorney's fees, P2,000.00.

Respondent filed MR which the Court granted,particularly noting that there was indeed no showing ofcompensatory damages being proved. The Courtreconsidered its decision to conform that moral andexemplary damages, in order to merit, the plaintiffought to have proven actual or compensatory damages.

Issue: WON Patricio is entitled to moral and exemplarydamages.

Held: Affirmative

There is no question that moral damages may be

recovered in cases where a defendant's wrongful act oromission has caused the complainant physical suffering,mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirchedreputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, socialhumiliation and similar injury. An award of moraldamages is allowed in cases specified or analogous tothose provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in thefollowing and analogous cases(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts.(4) Adultery or concubinage;(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;(6) Illegal search;(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;(8) Malicious prosecution;(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27,28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Private respondent's contention that there was no badfaith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face andthat the incident was merely accidental is not tenable.It was established before the court a quo that therewas an existing feud between the families of bothpetitioner and private respondent and that privaterespondent slapped the petitioner without provocationin the presence of several persons.

The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner onthe face is contrary to morals and good customs andcaused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock,wounded feelings and social humiliation. Privaterespondent has to take full responsibility for his act andhis claim that he was unaware of what he had done topetitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no

excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to thelatter.

Pursuant to Art.21 of the Civil Code in relation to par.(10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person whowilfully causes loss or injury to another in a mannerthat is contrary to morals, good customs or publicpolicy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The fact that no actual or compensatory damage wasproven before the trial court, does not adversely affectpetitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moraldamages may be awarded in appropriate cases referredto in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code(Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that thewrongful act complained of had caused any physical

injury upon the complainant.

In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplaryor corrective damages may be imposed upon hereinprivate respondent by way of example or correction forthe public good. Exemplary damages are required bypublic policy to suppress the wanton acts of theoffender. They are an antidote so that the poison ofwickedness may not run through the body politic. Theamount of exemplary damages need not be provedwhere it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to eithermoral, temperate or compensatory damages, as thecase may be, although such award cannot be recoveredas a matter of right.

4. Geluz vs. CAFacts:

Nita Villanueva had abortion for 3 times with the aid ofDr. Geluz. One in 1950, before they were legallymarried with the plaintiff (who gave his consent), theother 2 abortions were after the marriage. Plaintiff fileda case for damages after the last abortion of their 2-months old fetus.


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The CA and the trial court predicated the award ofdamages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art.2206 of the NCC.

Issue: WON award for damages was proper.

Held: Negative

Fixing an award for the death of a person, does notcover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowedwith personality.

Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on itsbehalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarilyprocured her abortion could not recover damages fromthe physician who caused the same.

(1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on accountof personal injury or death pertains primarily to theinjured, no such right of action could derivativelyaccrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. Infact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf ofthe unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can takeplace from one that lacked juridical personality. It is noanswer to invoke the provisional personality of a

conceived child (conceptus pro natohabetur) underArticle 40 of the Civil Code, because that same articleexpressly limits such provisional personality byimposing the condition that the child should besubsequently born alive: "provided it be born later withthe condition specified in the following article." In thepresent case, there is no dispute that the child wasdead when separated from its mother's womb.

(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitledto collect any damages at all. But such damages mustbe those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguishedfrom the injury or violation of the rights of thedeceased, his right to life and physical integrity.Because the parents cannot expect either help, supportor services from an unborn child, they would normally

be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of thenormal development of the speshominis that was thefoetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguishattendant to its loss, and the disappointment of theirparental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as toexemplary damages, if the circumstances shouldwarrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there isno basis for an award of moral damages, evidentlybecause the husband's indifference to the previousabortions clearly indicates that he was unconcernedwith the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered bornif it is alive at the time it is completely delivered fromthe mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an

intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is notdeemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after itscomplete delivery from the maternal womb.

Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by thecutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removaltakes place naturally or by surgical operation.

"The aborted creature does not reach the category of anatural person and consequently is not born in the

contemplation of law."

5. Carandang vs. Santiago

Facts:At CFI-Batangas, Valenton was convicted of the crimeof frustrated homicide committed against Carandang.

Carandangfiled a civil case in CFI-Manila to recoveractual and moral damages for the injuries sustained.

After the defendants submitted their answer, theypresented a motion to suspend the trial of the civilcase, pending the termination of the criminal case inCA. The Judge Santiago ruled that the trial of the civilaction must await the result of the criminal case onappeal.

Issue: WON the term "physical injuries" used in Article33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Codeonly, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whetherinflicted with intent to kill or not.

Held:

Article 33 of the new Civil Code:In cases of defamation,

fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,may be brought by the injured party. Such civil actionshall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The Article in question uses the words "defamation","fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraudare used in their ordinary generic sense because thereare no specific provisions in the RPC.

With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evidentthat the term "physical injuries" could not have beenused in its specific sense as a crime defined in theRevised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the

Code Commission would have used terms in the samearticle some in their general and another in itstechnical sense.

"Physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodilyinjury, not the crime of physical injuries, because theterms used with the latter are general terms.

If the intent has been to establish a civil action for thebodily harm received by the complainant similar to thecivil action for assault and battery, as the CodeCommission states, the civil action should lie whetherthe offense committed is that of physical injuries, orfrustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or evendeath.The respondent judge committed an error in

suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order tothat affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby orderedto proceed with the trial of said civil case withoutawaiting the result of the pending criminal case.


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TORTS AND DAMAGESMidterm 3rd Batch

1. AC Enterprise vs. Fabrelle Properties CorpFacts:

Petitioner ownsthe Feliza Building which issituated atthe rear of the Frabelle Condominium Iwhich is ownedby respondent. Feliza has 36 exhaustof blowers fromair-conditioning units on its buildingwhich produce acontinuous, intense and unbearablenoise and hot airblasts directed towards the rear of FrabelleCondominium. Respondent wrote requests topetitionerto abate the nuisance but which wasignored by thelatter. Frabelle went filed a complaintbefore thePollution Adjudication Board. Pending thedecision onthe complaint, respondent requestedoffice of theMakati Mayor to cancel petitionersbusiness permit. Thecomplaint was directed to theNCR Environmentalmanagement Bureau and it ruledthat there the exhauston the blowers were not thesole factor in the noisepollution. Unsatisfied with theresolution, respondentfiled a complaint for theabatement of nuisance with aprayer for the issuanceof preliminary and permanentinjunction before thetrial court of Malabon City. It ruledthat there is asufficient cause of action for respondent

to file acomplaint and it ruled in the latters favor. Courtof Appeals ruled that respondent has the right toabatethe nuisance to protect his property andproprietaryrights against business losses.

Issue:Whether or not respondent has a cause of action andRTC has the jurisdiction over the case.

Held:The Court held that a simple suit for abatementofnuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of theRTCwhere it is the one which has the right todeclarewhether a thing is a nuisance as under Article694 of the Civil Code. More so, having suffered fromthenuisance, respondent has a cause of action where

itmay institute an action to abate it as under Article705and 706. There is cause of action if there is a rightinfavor one party and an obligation not to violatethatright for the other and there is a breach ofthatobligation. LGUs are not vested with the powertodeclare a thing a nuisance.

PETITION DENIED

2. Limanch-O Hotel and Leasing Corp vs. City ofOlongapo

Facts:Sometime in 1993, after obtaining a search warrant,the City of Olongapo assessed Dado and LHLunregistered electricity consumption from November

1988 to February 1993 in the amount of P9,364,276.50with a threat to cut off the electric supply if he did notsettle the amount. The City mayor then also called forthe boycott of Dados business after he was branded anelectricity thief.

The Regional Trial Court however upon petition of Dadorendered a decision in the latters favor enjoining theCity from collecting the deficiency amount and fromcutting off the power supply.

The City then filed a motion for reconsideration butpending resolution of said motion it also filed criminalcomplaint against Dado for theft of electric currentpunished under PD 410 and for disengaging andtampering with his electric meters potential linkthereby resulting in zero-zero power consumption inviolation of City Ordinance 23, Series of 1989 and PD401.

After preliminary investigation however, the CityProsecutor dismissed the charges. Eventually theSecretary of Justice sustained this finding and alsodismissed the charges although it initially directed thefiling of an Information for theft of electricity. Thisruling of the DOJ dismissing the charges was affirmedby the Court of Appeals (CA) and ultimately by theSupreme Court (SC).

Then it was Dado and LHL who now sued the City forhaving filed malicious and unfounded charges of theftof electricity against them. Dado claimed that hesuffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirchedreputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and socialhumiliation while LHL suffered loss of businessgoodwill, financial reverses and injured reputation.The said complaint of Dado and LHL was howeverdismissed by the RTC upon demurrer to the evidence

filed by the City. This was affirmed by the CA. Bothcourts found that Dado and LHL failed to prove that theCity instituted the criminal complaint for theft ofelectricity against them maliciously and withoutprobable cause.

Issues:Were the RTC and the CA correct?

Yes. The burden in suits for malicious prosecution isbeing able to prove the complainants deliberateinitiation of a criminal action knowing the charge to befalse and groundless. Here the City did not concoct outof thin air the criminal charge of theft of electricity. Itfiled the case based on the results of an investigationcarried out at Dados premises which indicated a

tampering of the electric meter. The City did notconjure the charge with the intention of vexing Dadoand LHL. It acted within its right to bring up the resultof its investigation to the authorities for evaluation andresolution.The fact that the DOJ found no probable cause andthat such finding was sustained by the SC does notmean that a case of malicious prosecution alreadyexists against the City. The SC merely determined thatthe DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion.Such finding does not amount to a judicialdetermination of lack of probable cause.The test should be whether sufficient facts exist whichshow that, in bringing the criminal action, complainantacted without probable cause which is defined as theexistence of such facts and circumstances as would

excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the personcharged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probablyguilty of the crime or wrongdoing. Here the fact thatthe filing of the complaint was prompted by the resultof an investigation shows that the City had reasonableground to believe that a crime had probably beencommitted.Finally no evidence was shown that there was badblood between the City and Dado and LHL prior to thefiling of the case which circumstance if present could


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justify a malicious motive in filing the charge. Resort tojudicial process, by itself, is not an evidence of ill willwhich would automatically make complainant liable formalicious prosecution. Otherwise peaceful recourse tothe courts will be greatly discouraged and the exerciseof ones right to litigate would become meaningless andempty.

The fact that the City branded Dado and LHL asthieves, asked the people not to patronize theirbusiness and had been overly zealous in pursuing thecriminal complaint, are not the legal malicecontemplated in suits for malicious prosecution. Thedetermining factor is evil motive in bringing the action,not the acts exhibited by complainant after the casehas been filed

3. Lazatin vs. TwanoFACTS:

Angel C. Twao and Gregorio T. Castro filed a case forthe recovery of P35,000 plus interest against F. L.Lazatin, et al. for their purchase from the U.S.government of 225 auto-trucks.

CFI: dismissed the complaint as well as intervention

CA: reversed - Twao and Castro are co-owners in thebusiness of buying and selling surplus auto-trucks, andordered the Lazatin to pay P10K so it was levied on hisproperties and was subsequently sold at the publicauction where Twao and Castro were the purchasersBefore the expiration of the redemption period, Lazatindeposited the redemption priceLazatin filed to recover from Twao and Castrothe balance of P19,676.09 representing the proceeds ofauto-trucks sold directly to the purchasers by Twaoand Castro and secured a writ of attachment allegingthat no security whatsoever for the payment claimed inthe complaint and that they are removing or are aboutto remove or dispose of their property with intent todefraud their creditors and that the sheriff refused todeliver the amount deposited

Lower court granted the Urgent Motion to Dissolve theWrit of Preliminary Attachment and dissolved the writMay 9, 1953: Lazatin diedMarch 10, 1954: Gil Gotiangco was appointed andqualified as administrator of plaintiff's estate

RTC: Lazatin and Central Surety and Insurance Co.solidarily liable to pay P3,000 for attorney'sfees, P500 for moral damages, 6% interest and costs.CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Lazatin is liable for the damages

HELD: YES. Affirmed with modification: elimination ofmoral damages

Article 2197 mentions the kind of damages recoverable,among which are (1) actual or compensatory and(2) moral Article 2219 provides that moral damagesmay be recovered in the following and analogous casesmalice is an essential ingredient(3) malicious prosecutionThere is an abundance of case holding that the actionto recover damages from the attachment plaintiff, forthe wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment

(malicious attachment) is identical or is analogous tothe ordinary action for malicious prosecutioncourt did not make any finding that the said petitionwas maliciously sued out therefore not entitled to moraldamagesIn the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees andexpenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannotbe covered, except: . . .

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action orproceeding against the plaintiff.

(11) In any other case where the court deems it justand equitable that attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation should be recovered." (Art. 2208, Civil Code).without cause, the good and honest motive, whichshould be presumed, when a litigant goes to court forthe determination of his alleged rightconsidering the fact that defendants-appellant leeswere drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant andwere compelled to hire an attorney to protect anddefend them, and taking into account the work done bysaid attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout theproceedings, we deem it just and equitable to award atattorney's fees for defendants-appellees

4. Santos vs. PizarroDionisio M. Sibayan was charged with recklessimprudence resulting to multiplehomicide and multiplephysical injuries due to the vehicle collision between

Viron Transit busdriven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace.However the municipal circuit trial court wasnopronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners fileda complaint for damages to therespondents pursuant totheir reservation to file a separate civil action citing

judgment conviction. And it was movedto dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitionersopposedand contends that the motion to dismiss thatbe ten (10) years from the judgment of criminalactionis the prescription and therefore it is within the periodsince it was just barely two (2)years had elapse.Thecomplaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the

ground that the cause of action had prescribed; basedon quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from theaccrual of the cause of action. Again the petitionersfiled a reconsideration that the complaint is notbasedon quasi- delict but on the final judgment ofconviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten(10)years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion forreconsideration of the petitionerswas denied by the trialcourt based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the CivilCode that thecomplaint was filed more than four (4)years after the vehicular activities therefore itprescribesalready.On the petition for certiorari thepetitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it wasdismissedthe same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It also

failed to allege that the petition was brought within the

recognizedexceptions for the allowance of certiorari inlieu of appeal. Petitioners insist that it shouldbeenforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto andnot based on quasi-delict. Since theaction is based onthe criminal liability of private respondents, the causeof action accrued fromthe finality of the judgment ofconviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing outtheaverments in the complaint make out a cause ofaction for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180of theCivil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years


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should be reckoned from the time theaccident tookplace. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiaryliability cannot be enforcedsinceSibayan was notordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting

Art. 103 of RevisedPenal Code the civil aspect of thecase were instituted in the criminal case and noreservation tofile a separate civil case was made.Respondents likewise allege that thepetitionersshouldhave appealed the adverse order ofthe trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and theprivaterespondents also filled a rejoinder both inreiteration of their arguments. Hence thispetition.Issues:Whether or not the dismissal of theaction was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar totheenforcement of the subsidiary liability of theemployer?Held:The dismissal of the action based onculpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liabilityof theemployer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C.operates with controlling force to obviate thepossibilityof the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnityeven after the rendition of a final judgment convictingthe employee. The trial court should not havedismissed the complaint onthe ground of prescription,but instead allowed the complaint for damages exdelicto to beprosecuted on the merits, this does notoffend the policy that the reservation or institution ofaseparate civil waives the other civil actions but this is

merely an avoidance of multiple suits. Theaction fordamages based on quasi- delict should be consideredwaived no occasion forpetitioners to file multiple suitsagainst private respondets as available to them is topursuedamages ex delicto.

5. Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. BustosBustos was convicted of homicide for killing Castro, 2mitigating circumstance passion or obfuscation &voluntary surrender.

The law regarding the items of damages thatare recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime,whether the claim therefor is made in the criminalproceedings itself or in a separate civil actionitemsare identical in both procedures except with attorneys

fees and expenses of litigation which can be awardedonly when a separate civil action is instituted.Art 2204 does not warrant a complete

deletion of said item of damages.Heirs are entitled to the following when death

occurs as a result of a crime:indemnity for the death of the victim of the evidence12k without need of evidence and even if mitigatingcircumstance is presentloss of earning capacity item may be consideredincluded in the prayer for actual damages and forother just and equitable reliefs art 2206 & 1764moral damages mental anguish amount fixed bycourt. Can be recovered even by illegitimatedescendants and ascendants of deceased in case ofdeath, once heirs claim such and are able to prove they

are entitled thereto, it becomes the duty of the court tomake the award.exemplary damages attended by one or moreaggravating circumstances. Fixed by courtseparatefrom finesattorneys fees and expenses of litigation actualamount (only when separate civil action has been filedor exemplary damages are awarded)interests in proper cases

emphasized that indemnity for loss of earning capacityand moral damages are recoverable separately fromand in addition to fixed sum in no. 1. Theses damagesmay be subject to Art 2204.

Art 2206 also apply to death of a passenger caused bybreach of contract of common carrier. Same rules ondamages are generally to be observed, whether deathresults from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach ofcontract of carriage.

6. Sanchez vs. Far East Bankard Trust Co.The Facts

It is undisputed that Kai J. Chin was the director andrepresentative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, theChemical International Finance Limited (CIFL), was aninvestor in [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust[C]ompany (FEBTC), x xx. In representing theinterest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a directorand sr. vice president of FEBTC. [Petitioner] JosephineSanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary ofChin. CIFL also maintained a checking account (CA#0009-04212-1) in FEBTCs investment arm, the Far EastBank Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin was one of theauthorized signatories in the said current and money

market accounts.

According to [respondent], [petitioner] madeunauthorized withdrawals from the account of CIFL inFEBTC through the use of forged or falsifiedapplications for cashiers checks which were depositedto her personal accounts. Once credited to heraccount, she withdrew the amounts andmisappropriated, misapplied and converted them to herpersonal benefit and advantage, to the damage ofFEBTC.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin tobe a credible witness.

The RTC added that the allegedly fraudulent

transactions had occurred from September 1992 toJune 1993, with the use of documents bearing thesignatures of other officials and employees ofrespondent. In other words, all the questionedtransactions had been approved and allowed by thebank officials concerned, despite apparent proceduralinfirmities.[10] Yet, only petitioner was indicted.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Granting respondents appeal, the appellatecourt ruled that the trial courts judgment of acquittaldid not preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on aquasi delict.[13] The CA held that the outcome of thecriminal case, whether conviction or acquittal, wasinconsequential in adjudging civil liability arising from

the same act that could also be considered a quasidelict. Moreover, FEBTC did not have to reserve itsright to file a separate civil action for damages, becausethe law had already made that reservation onrespondents behalf.[14]

ISSUE: was the civil liability of petitioner dulyestablished by the evidence?
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Answering in the affirmative, the CA explained that asingle act or omission may produce two forms of civilliability: one is for ex delicto or that which arises froma crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for aquasi delict or culpa extra-contractual. In the presentcase, civil liability ex delicto was foreclosed by theacquittal. Nonetheless, [a]lthough the act from whichthe civil liability might arise did not exist due to[petitioners] acquittal, [respondents] cause of actionmakes out a case of quasi delict.[50]

Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelievedpetitioners assertions that she had turned over theproceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting that shewas authorized to encash the checks, she supposedlyhad no like authority to deposit the proceeds to herpersonal bank account. The appellate court concludedthat, in breach of Article 33[51] of the Civil Code, sheabused the confidence reposed in her by [respondent]in the performance of her duty.[52] Thus, the CAordered her to pay respondent the amountof P1,187,530.86 as actual damages, representing thetotal value of five checks paid in her name and to heraccount.[53]

In view of the conflicting findings of the lower courts asregards the credibility of the witnesses, we invoke the

time-honored rule that the assessment of thecredibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matterbest undertaken by the trial court because of its uniqueopportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and notetheir demeanor, conduct and attitude under grillingexamination. These are the most significant factors inevaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthingthe truth, especially in the face of conflictingtestimonies. Through its observations during the entireproceedings, the trial court can be expected todetermine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimonyto accept and which witness to disbelieve.[54]

Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts that mightaffect the result of the case otherwise, the RTCsassessment of the witnesses and their testimonies in

this case binds even this Court.[55] In any event, wescoured the records and, unlike the CA, we found nosufficient reason to reject the trial courtsassessment. There was no arbitrariness or oversight ofany fact or circumstance of weight and influence to

justify a different conclusion.

Moreover, the CA based its imposition of civil liabilityupon petitioner on her supposed abuse of heremployers confidence. Granting for the sake ofargument that she indeed forged the checks andmisappropriated the proceeds to her personal benefit, itmust be recalled that it was Kai Chins signatures thatshe purportedly forged; and CIFLs account that she, ineffect, misappropriated. Be it remembered thatrespondents own documentary evidence unequivocally

concurred in the assertion of petitioner that Kai Chinhad given her express authority to transact CIFLsaccount on his behalf. Consequently, it was his, notrespondents, confidence that she had exploited. Inother words, the factual premises of the CA did notsupport its conclusion.

In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was

based on the fact that she had not committedthe offense imputed to her. Consequently, she

cannot be held civilly liable. In concluding that she,as well as her testimony, was credible, the trial courtcannot be faulted with arbitrariness ornegligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turnedover the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chinstands unrebutted.

Petition is hereby GRANTED

7. Escueta vs. FandialanFacts:OnJuly 5, 1968Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court ofFirst Instance of Laguna againstdefendant for damages.The complaint alleged that onJuly 2, 1952, defendantinflictedseveral physical injuries on the person ofplaintiff for which he was charged with thecrime offrustrated homicide but was convicted ofslight physical injuriesby the CFI of Laguna, which

judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; thaton June 20, 1956,plaintiff, having reserved his right toinstitute a separate civil action, filed with the CFIacomplaint to enforce defendant's civil liability under

Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode but the same wasdismissed , forlack of interest ; and that despite thelapseof several years and the attempt on plaintiff's partto enforce the said civil liability,defendant failed to

settle the same, thus compelling plaintiff to re-file thecase on July 5,1968.Defendant filed a motion to dismisson the ground of prescription. Which the courtgrantedbecause the action has been barred by the Statute ofLimitations since the casewas filed after the lapse of 16years, that the period of prescription applicable being4years according to Art. 1146(1) of the Civil Code.

Issue:WON the Lower Court is correct in dismissing thecomplaint filed after 16 years on theground thatthe action is barred by prescription

Ruling: Yes. The lower court correctly dismissed theplaintiff-appellant's civil action for damagesarising fromphysical injuries filed after the lapse of 16 years on theground that theaction was already barred by the four-

year statutory limitation under Article 1146 (1) of theCivil Code which provides that actions "upon an injuryto the rights of plaintiff"mustbe instituted within four years. Thepoints of question refer to thedate of accrual of plaintiff's cause of action fordamages and to the applicable period ofprescription.On the date of accrual of cause of action,the SC finds that the LC correctly sustaineddefendant'scontention that plaintiff's cause of action for damagesaccrued on July 2,1952when the physical injuries wereinflicted as against plaintiff's contention that hiscause ofaction accrued three years later on August 31, 1955when the

judgmentof conviction for physical injuries against defendant as accused in the criminal casebecame

final.Under Article 33 of the Civil Code,even withoutsuch reservation, he could prosecute hiscivil action fordamages from thephysical injuries separately andindependently ofthecriminal action and would require only a preponderance of evidence to support hisaction.Plaintiff's civilaction for damages does not fall under that category ofcivil actions basedupon a criminal offense which aresuspended to await the outcome of the criminalcaseunder Rule 111, section 3 of the Rules of Court.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/155309.htm#_ftn51


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Being a case of physical injuries underArticle 33 of theCivil Code, plaintiffs civil action for damages did notarise from nordepend upon the result of the criminalaction but from defendant's act of infliction of physicalinjuries. Hence, plaintiff's cause of action clearlyaccrued from July 2, 1952 thedate that the physicalinjuries were inflicted on him. As of that date, he hadthe right tofile and maintain his civil action for damagesand the period of prescription started torun.On theapplicable period of prescription, the SC held that theLC correctly ruled that theapplicable prescriptive periodis four years under Article 1146 (1) of the Civil Codeasagainst plaintiff's contention that it should be tenyears under Article 1144 (3) whichprovides for suchten-year prescriptive for actions based "upon a

judgment."Plaintiffs civil suit for damages arising from physicalinjuries is clearly one based upon aninjury to his rights,for which Article 1146 (1) provides a prescriptive periodof four years.Plaintiff's contention that his prescriptiveperiod should be ten years based uponthe judgment of defendant's conviction for physical injuries in the criminal case isuntenable.Nocivil liability was adjudged in the criminal case sinceplaintiff expresslyreserved the right of filing a separatecivil action. Hence, he had no standing in thecriminal

action as an offended party and the verdict ofconvictionexcludedanycivilliability.

8. Dulay vs. CAFacts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation betweenBenignoTorzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred atthe Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupaas a result of which BenignoTorzuela, the securityguard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay,widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her ownbehalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed anaction for damages against BenignoTorzuela and

private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard,alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. RespondentSuperguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the groundthat the complaint does not state a valid cause ofaction. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act ofshooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, andthat since the alleged act of shooting was committedwith deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor isgoverned by Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode. Superguard further alleged that a complaint fordamages based on negligence under Article 2176 of theNew Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of theRevised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent arguedthat petitioners filing of the complaint is premature

considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminalcase is a condition sine qua non for the employerssubsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed amotion praying that it be excluded as defendant on theground that defendant Torzuela is not one of itsemployees. Petitioners opposed both motions, statingthat their cause of action against the privaterespondents is based on their liability under Article2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declaredthat the complaint was one for damages founded on

crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of theRevised Penal Code as distinguished from those arisingfrom, quasi-delict.Issues:(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shootingNapoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionableunder Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Codeapplies only to injuries intentionally committed; and(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents issubsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.Held:(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code providesthat whoever by act or omission causes damage toanother, there being fault or negligence, is obliged topay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, ifthere is no pre-existing contractual relation betweenthe parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed bythe provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theoryof private respondents, there is no justification forlimiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code toacts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers notonly acts committed with negligence, but also actswhich are voluntary and intentional.(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 hasalready been construed to include bodily injuries

causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuriesdefined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not onlyphysical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, andattempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, itwas held that no independent civil action may be filedunder Article 33 where the crime is the result ofcriminal negligence, it must be noted, however, thatTorzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is chargedwith homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereasthe defendant in Marcia was charged with recklessimprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action basedon Article 33 lies.(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, whenan injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,there instantly arises a presumption of law that therewas negligence on the part of the master or employer

either in the selection of the servant or employee, or insupervision over him after selection or both. Theliability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct andimmediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourseagainst the negligent employee and a prior showing ofthe insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it isincumbent upon the private respondents to prove thatthey exercised the diligence of a good father of a familyin the selection and supervision of their employee.

9. Castillo vs. Castilloa). The private properties of Ysidro Castillo consisting ill38 parcels described in the project of partition shall bepartitioned in the proportion of 1/9 to each of thechildren, i.e., 1/9 to plaintiff;

b). The four (4) parcel of land share of the children inthe conjugal properties as set forth in the project ofpartition shall be also partitioned in the sameproportion;c). The seven (7) parcels of land under usufruct ofEnriqueta shall also be partitioned in the sameproportion but subject to said usufruct.d). The share in the property described in Exh.Plaintiff 2 shall be partitioned in the proportion of 1/36to each of the children and 1/4 unto Enriqueta Castillo


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the Court grants the partition as to the ot

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