Tools for Conflict-Sensitive

Agriculture

Talk for AIARD Annual Meeting, June 4, 2006

Michael S. Lund, Senior Associate for Conflict and Peacebuilding,

Management Systems International, Inc.

Overview

Post 9/11 US foreign policy sees development as key part of war on terrorism

• Remote, poor countries that had no geo-strategic significance are seen as possible breeding grounds or sanctuaries for terrorists.

• US Gov’t. inter-agency efforts are focussing on failed states and post-conflict countries

• Varied programming sectors – women, police, agriculture, youth --are “discovering” conflict and fragile states and want to address them

Aims of talk:Part I. Recent conflicts and useful conceptsPart II. How agricultural issues can be part of the problemPart III. How agricultural professionals can be part of the solution

Part I: Recent Conflicts and Useful

ConceptsGlobal Picture

Since 1989, there have been about 115 major armed conflicts. The vast bulk arose over intra-state issues – control of the government or territory, or government policies -- not issues between states.

Examples

• Former Soviet Union: Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnya • Balkans: Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo• Africa: Algeria, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda,

Democratic Republic of Congo• Asia: East Timor, Nepal, Afghanistan, Philippines• Latin America: Chiapas, Mexico

Many intra-state conflicts are still active: 20 in 2005 (e.g., Colombia, Sri Lanka).

Types of post-Cold War conflicts

Global or regional transnational: Islamic jihadists (e.g., IMT in Central Asia), Al Qaeda

Intra-state, on a national scale: – humanitarian emergencies (Somalia), – civil wars secessionist struggles (Eritrea), – ethnic and religious identity-based civil wars (southern Sudan), – ethnic cleansing (Yugoslavia), – genocide (Rwanda), – insurgencies (northern Uganda), – terrorist bombings (North Caucasus in Russia)

Intra-state, pitting national vs. local interests: natural resource conflicts (Papua in Indonesia, Bougainville)

Intra-state, localized: – intercommunal resource conflicts (Indonesia, Kenya), – inter-ethnic riots (India)– local political uprisings (Uzbekistan),

THE GOOD NEWS: Violent conflicts have declined!

Global Trends in Violent Conflict: 1946-2004

Warfare Totals

(Societal +All Interstate)

Societal Warfare

All Interstate Wars

(inc. colonial wars)

Interstate Warfare

Why?

This drop in conflicts is not accidental. It results from developing country leaders’ political learning, plus:

“…persistent and coordinated efforts atpeacebuilding by civil society organizations, national leaders, non-governmental organizations, and international bodies.” (Gurr and Marshall, 2005)

THE BAD NEWS: Future trends can bring new conflicts!

• Current “post-conflict” countries can slide back to conflict (e.g., E. Timor)

• Powerful global trends can generate future conflicts and failed states:

– Environmental: degradation; global warming; scarcer water, oil, and land

– Social: rapid population growth, millions of educated but unemployed young people, gross socio-economic disparities within and between nations

– Economic: globalization, liberalization, smuggling– Political: democratization; terrorism and anti-terrorism;

erosion of international cooperation– Military: small arms proliferation

Early Warnings

31 countries are currently listed as very vulnerable to mass killings, serious violent conflict, or government collapse in the next few years, such as:

• Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Lebanon, Pakistan, Papua in Indonesia.

51 other countries are somewhat vulnerable, such as:• Armenia, Egypt, India, Russia, Serbia

Why Be Concerned about Conflict and Fragile States?

Violent intra-state conflicts destroy the environment and development and export problems

Conflicts and state failure are “development in reverse.”

• They inflict on the conflict countries: civilian deaths and injuries, ruined infrastructure, hunger, disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria), population dislocation, higher military expenditures, capital outflows, destroyed or halted development programs, policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma, landmines.

• They export to us and others: refugees, migrants, disease, increased military burdens, reduced economic growth, illicit drugs.

Part II: How Agricultural Issues can be Part of

the Problem

Four basic ways agriculture can contribute to conflicts

1. Failures in aggregate production: widespread food insecurity can generate popular unrest

2. Chronic mal-distribution of assets within or benefits from the agricultural process (e.g., land tenure, seed, water, credit, infrastructure, technical assistance, prices, income) creates inter-group competition

3. Social or other externalities: harmful crops (e.g., poppies for coca, cotton or other crops requiring exploitative labor or environmental damage)

4. Rural lands as symbols for group identity (e.g., Chiapas Indians)

Violent Conflicts Have Multiple Sources

For violent conflicts to actually erupt,

underlying, enabling and triggering factors must come together -- at the same place and time.

The “Perfect Storm”

The “dry woodpile on a hot day”

Sources and Drivers of Violent Conflicts

• Underlying (“root”) sources are slow-acting, hard-to-change conditions that increase the possibility of violence

• Enabling sources are processes -- institutions, policies, politics, resources, ideologies -- that worsen the underlying sources or fail to address them and thus mobilize collective violence

• Triggering factors are immediate acts or sudden events that directly cause violence or escalate it further

How agriculture problems can cumulate into violent conflicts: Illustrated in (A) Zimbabwe and (B) Uzbekistan

Sources Examples Agricultural Illustrations

Underlying Mountainous or forested terrain, fragile environment (e.g., drought), natural “resource curse”

A. Limits of arable land in Zimbabwe

B. Rich soil but chronic poverty, unemployed urban youth in Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan

Enabling Skewed land tenure laws, extremist political mobilization and ideologies (“creed”);

“conflict diamonds” (“greed”);

chronic marginalization of certain groups (“need”); corrupt, unresponsive governments;

arms flows; weak security forces

A. Disproportionate land for white farmers; Mugabe politicization of the issue using anti-colonial imagery.

B. Immiseration of peasants by

Uzbekistan gov’t. cotton harvesting policies in Ferghana Valley

Triggering Natural disasters (e.g. famine), assassination, hate rhetoric, massacres

A. Elections in Zimbabwe elicit intimidation of Mugabe’s opponents

B. Jail protests in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 2005 vent general frustrations

Existing Capacities for Peace

Almost always, some built-in local capacities also exist forthat can “brake” escalation into violence conflicts:

• Mitigating conditions (legal or illegal) often offset root causes – e.g., patronage networks, remittances, smuggling

• Transforming social and political mechanisms and policies channel grievances, contain tensions – e.g., traditional dispute resolution,

• Conciliating acts discourage violent acts and elicit cooperation -- e.g., compensatory rituals, key leaders bargaining

Capacities for Peace in Agriculture

Sources General Examples Agricultural examples

Mitigators (offset root causes)

resource interdependency Household livelihood coping practices in drought

Transformers (channel enabling causes)

Effective, legitimate law enforcement; elections, social safety nets

River basin commissions,

Gal Oya inter-ethnic irrigation project (Sri Lanka)

Conciliators (discourage triggers)

Non-violent boycotts, leaders’ good will gestures

Kyrgyz/Uzbek/Tajik water negotiations, non-violent opposition to Mugabe in Zimbabwe

To address conflict and state fragility effectively, do conflict-sensitive agriculture programming

At least, “Do No Harm”:

• Don’t worsen sources of violent conflict!

• Don’t weaken existing capacities for peace!

Even better, “Do Some Good”:

• Reduce (offset, channel, discourage) sources of violence

• Build up or add capacities for peaceful progress

Part III.:How Agricultural Professionals

can be Part of the Solution

How? Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture Programming: Steps

1. Identify sources of possible violence and state fragility (in conjunction with an agricultural sector assessment)

2. Identify existing capacities for peace 

3. Assess whether existing ag. programs are helping or hurting – how do they affect conflict sources and peace capacities? 

4. Design and implement programs that reduce the sources and strengthen the capacities.

Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture Programming

1. Identify Sources of Possible Violence

and Fragility

2. Identify Existing

Capacities for Peace 

3. Assess Whether

Existing Ag. Programs are

Hurting or Helping

4. Design and Implement Programs that are Conflict-

sensitive

What are Underlying?

Alleviating? How to Alleviate?

Conflict-sensitive technological innovations

What are Enabling?

Transforming?

How to Transform?

Conflict-sensitive land reform,

hire youth, inter-ethnic vertical production and distribution chains, inter-group business associations

What are Triggering?

Conciliating? How to Conciliate?

Local early warning and dispute resolution procedures

A Key Lesson:Act Early to Prevent Violence from Erupting

• Violent conflicts do not suddenly explode; they are preceded by increasing tensions and disputes.

• This offers time and opportunities to act -- before it is much harder to contain violence.

• It is much more humane and cheaper to act early to keep peaceful disputes from erupting into violent conflicts, through pro-active preventive actions, than to deal with wars and their aftermath. Prevention Success stories: Baltic states, Macedonia, Ukraine-

Crimea, So. China Sea Islands dispute Failures or Missed Opportunities: Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur

• Differing stages in the life cycle of conflicts often require different policies.

or Conflict

PEACE

PEACE

PEACE

Stages of Peace

WAR

CRISIS

UNSTABLE

STABLE

(Basic order)

DURABLE

(Just order)

Chechnya,early 1995

cease-fire

Bosnia, early 1996

outbreak of violence

settlement

North Korea, 1994

Kosovo, 1993

confrontation

rapprochement

Cambodia, 1995

Russia, 1993

rising tension

reconciliationU.S.-China, 1995

U.S.-Britain, 20th Century

El Salvador, 1995

South Africa, 1995

DIPLOMACY

PEACE BUILDING

PEACEMAKING(Conflict management)

PEACE ENFORCEMENT(Conflict mitigation)

CRISIS DIPLOMACY(Crisis management)

PEACEKEEPING(Conflict termination)

PREVENTIVE

(Conflict prevention)POSTCONFLICT

(Conflict resolution)PEACETIME DIPLOMACY

OR POLITICS

Duration of Conflict

Mid-conflictEarly Stage Late Stage

Life Cycle of Conflicts

Prevention is cheaper than war and post-conflict reconstruction

Violent

Conflict cases

Cost of conflict to outside powers

Cost of prevention

Savings from prevention

Bosnia (actual)

Actual: $53.7 billion

Est.: $33.3

billion

$20.4

billion

Macedonia

(possible)

Est.:$143.9

billion

Actual:$.3

billion

$143.6

billion

Conclusion

1. Conflict and failed states have many destructive impacts.

2. But violent conflicts and state breakdowns are NOT inevitable. They can beprevented, contained and terminated, and they often are.

3. The sources and dynamics of conflict and state failure are multi-faceted andcomplex, but not mysterious or inevitable.

4. Agriculture and agriculture policies/programs can affect conflict and fragility,positively or negatively -- depending how they affect conflict sourcesand peace capacities.

5. If agricultural professionals seek to understand conflict sources and peacecapacities where they work, they can design “conflict sensitive” programs thatmake a discernible difference.