Today's Associations, Tomorrow's Unions

Today's Associations, Tomorrow's UnionsAuthor(s): Casey Ichniowski and Jeffrey S. ZaxSource: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1990), pp. 191-208Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2523699 .

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TODAY'S ASSOCIATIONS, TOMORROW'S UNIONS

CASEY ICHNIOWSKI AND JEFFREY S. ZAX*

This paper investigates the effects of association-style unionism on union membership. In a 1984 Harris poll examining workers' attitudes toward various forms of employee organization, nearly half of all nonunion workers indicated they would join an association, but most of these potential association members said they would not vote for a unison to serve as a bargaining agent. Analysis of census data on local government departments strongly suggests, however, that the substitution away from traditional bargaining representation attributable to associations would be followed by an increase in the membership of traditional unions. Specifically, the authors find that in all local government services, the presence of an association in 1977 was a strong predictor of the formation of a bargaining unit by 1982-holding constant other important determinants of public employee unionism, including the legal environment.

ALTHOUGH many studies have explored rlthe reasons for the decline of unionization in the private sector over the past three decades (see, for example, Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985), these investigations generally have not exam- ined the question of whether unions might arrest this decline with new organizing strategies.' The AFL-CIO has cautiously supported one new strategy-a limited

* Casey Ichniowski is Associate Professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business and Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research Labor Studies Program. Jeffrey Zax is Associate Professor of Economics at Queens College and the Graduate Center of C.U.N.Y. and Research Economist at the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors thank Edwin Ramos for research assistance and participants in the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute Labor Studies Conference for helpful comments.

l In one notable exception, Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986:253) conclude that the possibility of strategic changes in union organizing are "perhaps least likely, yet the most interesting, to contemplate" of four possible scenarios they consider for the future of U.S. industrial relations.

"associate membership" program (AFL- CIO 1985). This program is controversial, however. It faces "angry opposition from several unions . . . [which] fear that halfway membership would undercut chances to organize full-time members" (Arnold et al. 1985). Partly because of this objection, most members of this program are former union members who have been laid off or who have retired.

This study is the first to examine the effects of association-style unionism on membership in the contemporary U.S. labor movement. It investigates whether the growth of associations would further injure an already failing labor movement.

Our study uses a mix of methodologies. First, we analyze the results of a survey of nonunion employees in all sectors of the economy regarding their attitudes toward various forms of employee representation. Second, we present an econometric analysis of census data covering employment in local government, where nonbargaining employee associations have long coexisted with unions that bargain. Third, inter-

Industrial and Iabor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1990). (? by Cornell University. 00 19-7939/90/4302 $01.00

191



192 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

views with representatives from private and public sector unions provide additional insights on the role of association- style unionism in the labor movement.

Associations in the Union Movement

Collective bargaining is the principal activity of traditional unions. In this study we refer to such unions as bargaining agents or bargaining unions. We define "associations" as unions that do not engage in collective bargaining. Because there are many possible services that labor unions could provide other than bargaining, there is no single "association model." In general, associations place greater empha- sis on social, professional, and consumer benefits and activities than do bargaining unions.2

Existing associations demonstrate the variety of forms that this type of labor organization may take. For example, in its experimental associate membership program, the AFL-CIO provides consumer benefits such as credit cards, insurance, legal services, and travel packages at discount rates to active members of a bargaining union and to associate members through the Union Privilege Benefit Programs (UPBP) corporation.

Some private sector international unions in the AFL-CIO offer professional and work-related services in addition to consumer benefits to employees who are not members of a bargaining union. For example, the United Auto Workers (UAW), in its technical, office, and professional organizing campaigns, tries to remain in communication with and to provide services to those workers who

2 The name of the "union" does not necessarily distinguish between associations and bargaining unions. As examples, this study defines locals of the National Education Association and the Interna- tional Association of Fire Fighters as bargaining unions or agents in local governments where they bargain, despite the word "association" in their formal names. For the purpose of this paper, locals of these labor unions are associations only in local governments where they do not bargain.

supported the UAW in unsuccessful organizing campaigns (Perkins interview).

Many public sector unions have longer histories of providing services without bargaining. In this sector, the nature of association-style unionism is also varied. For example, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) sponsors a "members only benefits" program that closely parallels the AFL-CIO's UPBP. The American Federa- tion of Teachers (AFT) also has associate members. Through its program, the AFT has recruited individual teachers as members from school districts that the AFT does not represent.

International unions, state-level labor organizations, and local government unions in the public sector provide social activities, professional conferences, and politi- cal representation to members not covered by collective bargaining. Some associations in local government departments represent their members informally in discus- sions with their public employers.

Theoretical Effects of Associations on Union Membership

Associations should affect both total union membership and membership in bargaining unions. Let a labor union be represented by the bundle of services that it offers. If these services do not include collective bargaining, the union is an association; otherwise it is a conventional bargaining agent. Although the actual set of services that some associations offer may be larger than the set of services of some bargaining unions, the potential set of association services is, by definition, smaller because associations do not bargain.

Theoretically, the important distinction between the two types of unions is that bargaining unions tie nonbargaining services to the provision of collective bargaining and associations do not. A static analysis of the economics of tying arrange- ments yields unambiguous predictions about the membership effects that would occur if an international union allowed the



TODAY'S ASSOCIATIONS, TOMORROW'S UNIONS 193

formation of associations in addition to conventional bargaining representation.

The utility that a nonunion employee receives from bargaining services (UB), association services (UA), and nonunion status (UN) determines the employee's preferences for each of the three union status categories. Six preference orderings are possible: (1) UB>UA>UN; (2) UB> UN> UA; (3) UN> UB> UA; (4) UN>UA>UB; (5) UA>UN>UB; and (6) UA> UB> UN.

Nonunion employees with preference orderings 1 through 4 are indifferent about the establishment of associations. Regardless of whether the association option is available, groups 1 and 2 prefer to be members of a bargaining union, and groups 3 and 4 prefer to remain nonunion. Employees with ordering 5 prefer nonunion status to bargaining union membership, but join the organized labor movement if association membership is available. Employees with ordering 6 will avoid nonunion status if possible. They prefer association membership to bargaining union membership but will accept bargaining unions if associations are not available.

If bargaining unions are the only form of employee organization, then nonunion employees with preference orderings 1, 2, and 6 represent the potential increase in union membership. If associations are also available, the potential increase in the labor movement is larger, since it includes employees with ordering 5. Once associations are available, however, the number of nonunion employees interested in bargaining unions is smaller, consisting only of employees with preference orderings 1 and 2. Potential association members include both employees with ordering 5, a potential net gain to the labor movement, and employees with ordering 6, who would join a bargaining union if associations were not available.3

3Some members of existing bargaining unions may also prefer association membership. These workers, however, would probably not substitute significantly away from bargaining unions if associations were established. In union or agency shops,

The substitution away from the conventional form of unionism among nonunion employees with preference ordering 6 is the source of concern for those union leaders opposed to the encouragement of associations. Such substitution could impair the ability of unions to negotiate benefits, despite the potential for a gain in total membership, if union negotiating power depends on the extent of contract coverage rather than the extent of membership (Freeman and Medoff 1981).

Many proponents of associations encourage this fear. Not only do they welcome the increased membership of employees with preference ordering 5, they agree with opponents that association programs will weaken conventional unionism by capturing employees with ordering 6. Heckscher, for example, argues that "industrial unionism will . . . be replaced by associational unionism" (1988:8).

The arguments for and against association programs are implicitly based on this two-period, before/after model. In this model, the theoretical prediction that associations will increase aggregate membership in all forms of unions but reduce membership in bargaining unions is unar- guable.

The evolution of unionization, however, is a multi-period, dynamic process. Over a longer period of time, associations may be stepping stones to bargaining, rather than road blocks. Nonunion workers who established associations for purposes other than bargaining should be able to adopt collective bargaining, if they later wish to, with greater ease than nonunion workers without any collective organization. Further- more, nonunion workers who desire collective bargaining may find that the best strategy for ultimately establishing a bargaining relationship is to gradually build support for collective activity through the creation of an association. Regardless of the initial motivation for forming an association, these nonbargaining unions may fa-

workers must first decertify their bargaining agent before they can replace their bargaining union with an association.




cilitate the subsequent formation of bargaining unions for at least three reasons.

First, the establishment of an association accomplishes some of the tasks necessary to organize workers for collective bargaining. The costs of obtaining recognition as a bargaining agent are therefore greater for nonunion workers than for workers with association memberships. As one obvious example, union organizers often have dif- ficulty arranging times and places to meet nonunion workers during organizing drives. If an association exists, union organizers can take advantage of its meetings.

Second, associations may be acceptable "trial runs" for workers who are uncertain about unionization. Ambivalent or anti- union workers may resist the establish. ment of a bargaining agent but not object to the formation of a voluntary association. They may then begin to look more favorably on bargaining unions as they become familiar with association activities.4 Furthermore, nonunion workers who support unionization in principle may hesitate to formally approve a bargaining agent because this choice can be reversed only through the difficult process of decertification. These workers may require a sample of the promised benefits of union representation before they will commit themselves to a bargaining agent.

Third, associations may reduce the effectiveness of employer opposition to unionization. Increased management opposition to the certification of bargaining agents under the National Labor Relations Act over the last three decades has contributed significantly to the decline in unionization (Freeman 1987). Employer opposition to bargaining agents may be less effective when it is expressed after employees have already established a collective identity through an association. Favorable experiences with an employee association may also reduce an employer's resistance to collective bargaining.

4An explicit objective of the UAW associate program for technical, office, and professional employees is to demonstrate the advantages of union membership to employees who voted against the UAW (Perkins interview).

Of course, these demonstration and learning effects may work in the opposite direction. Workers may simply accept associations as the "equilibrium" form of unionization. If the performance of associations is unsatisfactory, workers may reject all forms of unionization. Employers may also promote associations to prevent the formation of a bargaining union. Bargaining would suffer if these negative effects of associations are dominant. On the other hand, if associations ultimately encourage the establishment of bargaining relationships, labor movement objections to associations are invalid.

Attitudes of Nonunion Workers Toward Associations and Unions

The Union Image Survey (UIS), con- ducted in 1984 by Louis Harris and Associates on behalf of the AFL-CIO, polled 1,452 workers- 1,119 of whom neither belonged to unions nor were covered by union contracts-on their preferences for bargaining agents and for associations. The two principal survey questions were:

If an election were held tomorrow to decide whether your workplace would be unionized or not, do you think you would definitely vote for a union, probably vote for a union, probably vote against the union, or definitely vote against a union? If a voluntary employee organization existed in your area which could provide all of these services [listed in the two previous survey questions]5 to members for an annual fee of $50, how likely would you be to join-do you think you definitely would join, probably would join, probably would not join, or definitely would not join?

5The possible association services explored in the preceding UIS questions are those listed in Table 3, below. These questions indicate that the services of the voluntary employee organization do not include collective bargaining. Furthermore, another survey question asks: "If the employee association were affiliated with the AFL-CIO, even though you wouldn't be joining a union to represent you on the job, would you be more likely or less likely to join the employee association?" This question again demonstrates that the UIS explicitly distinguishes between associations and conventional bargaining agents.




Of the 1, 119 nonunion respondents, only 82 (7.3%) answered "not sure" to one or both of the questions.6 The remaining 1,037 had explicit positive or negative reactions to both questions.7 As shown in Table 1, whereas 29.2% of all nonunion workers (lines 1 and 2) indicated that they would vote to join a bargaining union,8 46.7% (lines 1 and 3) indicated that they would join a voluntary association.

Of all nonunion workers who said they would vote for conventional union representation-those in lines 1 and 2-the 71.6% in line 1 were also favorably disposed toward associations. The workers in line 1 are those with preference orderings 1 and 6, as described above. If workers with ordering 6 are numerous, the growth of collective bargaining would be considerably reduced by the availability of associations. Unfortunately, the UIS does not distinguish between orderings 1 and 6, because it did not ask workers who prefer both forms of employee representation to nonunion status to rank the two.

Regardless of the frequency of ordering 6, the group in line 1 of Table 1 is smaller than the group in line 3. These workers, who indicated that they would vote for an association but not for a bargaining agent, have preference ordering 5.9 They represent one-quarter of all nonunion workers,

6 The total sample of 1,452 respondents includes 250 union members and 83 nonunion workers who are covered by union contracts. All statistics for union and nonunion employees in this section exclude covered nonmembers. We refer to the 1,119 workers who were neither union members nor nonunion members covered by union contracts as "nonunion workers," for convenience. All statistics are virtually unchanged if covered nonmembers are included among nonunion employees.

We thank Henry Farber for providing the UIS data file and Charles McDonald of the AFL-CIO for permission to use the survey.

7 Positive responses: "definitely" or "probably" would vote for a union or join an association; negative responses: 'probably would not" and "definitely would not."

8 This percentage is similar to the corresponding percentages found in the 1977 Quality of Employ- ment Survey (30%; see Kochan 1979) and in the 1980 National Longitudinal Survey (27%; see Hills 1985).

9 Workers in line 2 have preference ordering 2. Those in line 4 have preference orderings 3 and 4.

Table 1. Attitudes of Nonunion Workers to Associations and Bargaining Unions: Responses from the Union Image

Survey, 1984. Percentage (Number

Attitude of Obs.)

1. Positive to Bargaining Unionsa and 20.9% Positive to Associations (217)

2. Positive to Bargaining Unions and 8.3% Negative to Associations (86)

3. Negative to Bargaining Unions and 25.8% Positive to Associations (268)

4. Negative to Bargaining Unions and 44.9% Negative to Associations (466)

5. TOTAL 100.0% (1,037)

a Positive responses: "definitely" or "probably" would vote for a union or join an association. Negative responses: "definitely" or "probably" would not vote for a union or join an association.

Source: Harris and Associates (1984).

a potential net increase in total union membership that approximately equals current union membership. This potential membership increase is available only through associations. Furthermore, of all workers favorably disposed toward associations (lines 1 and 3), a majority- 55.3%-indicated that they would not vote for a conventional union.

The UIS asks workers additional questions about their perceptions of specific services and effects of bargaining unions and associations. These questions help identify what differentiates workers in the four categories of Table 1. Table 2 presents average responses of nonunion workers in the four categories to questions concerning their perceptions of bargaining unions. It also reports average responses of union members for compari- son.

The first row of Table 2 demonstrates that all four nonunion groups disagree to about the same extent with the suggestion that "unions have become too weak to protect their members adequately." For all four groups, the average response is just slightly higher than the midpoint of 2.5 on the four-point scale, indicating only mild disagreement. Furthermore, the average response of union members to the same




Table 2. Workers' Average Responses, by Group, to Survey Items Concerning Union Bargaining Agents and Their Services: Union Image Survey, 1984.

Nonunion Workers

Positive Positive Negative Negative to Unions, to Unions, to Unions, to Unions,

Survey Positive to Negative to Positive to Negative to Union Item Associations Associations Associations Associations Membersa

1. Unions Have Become Too Weakb 2.65 2.68 2.81 2.78 2.45

2. Union Services Are Commensurate with Dues 2.19 2.22 2.78 2.93 2.50

3. Unions Stifle Individual Initiative 2.56 2.54 2.06 2.00 2.62

4. Unions Coerce Members 2.40 2.33 1.91 1.89 2.45

5. Unions Increase Risk of Bankruptcy 2.69 2.67 2.24 2.03 2.78

6. Employees Don't Need Unions to Ensure Fairness 2.92 2.75 2.14 1.94 3.00

7. Overall Job Satisfaction 1.96 1.85 1.55 1.42 1.72

a Covered nonmembers are excluded from these statistics. For the four groups of nonunion members, positive and negative responses are as defined in note "a" to Table 1.

b Answers to questions in lines 1-6 are: 1 = agree strongly; 2 = agree somewhat; 3 = disagree somewhat; 4 disagree strongly. c Answers on Job Satisfaction in line 7 are: 1 = very satisfied; 2 = somewhat satisfied; 3 = not too satisfied;

4 = not at all satisfied. Source: Harris and Associates (1984).

question is also very near the midpoint of 2.5, although it is in the direction of mild agreement.

Line 1 provides no evidence that nonunion workers believe unions are too weak. In fact, workers in all nonunion groups believe quite the opposite is true. For example, according to other survey questions not reported in Table 2, more than four times as many workers believe that pay would "get better" with a union as believe that it would "get worse" in three of the four groups. Even in the group that was an exception-workers who would support neither a bargaining union nor an association- 120 believe pay would improve, whereas only 65 believe it would worsen.'0 Further, in all four groups, at least twice as many workers believe unions would improve fringe benefits as believe that they would reduce fringe benefits.

10 Other possible answers were "remain about the same" and "not sure."

Lines 2-5 of Table 2 demonstrate that beliefs about union treatment of members, rather than beliefs about the strength of unions, distinguish between workers who are favorably and unfavorably disposed toward bargaining agents. Workers who would vote against representation by a bargaining union, those in columns 3 and 4, are more likely to believe that unions charge more in dues than they return in services, resist member initiative, and coerce members to support unpopular policies. They are also more likely to believe that unions increase the probability of employer bankruptcy.

Line 6 demonstrates that these workers are more likely to feel unions are not necessary to ensure fairness. Further- more, responses not reported in Table 2 show that of 410 choices from a list of 18 reasons for opposing unions made by workers who are negative toward bargaining unions and positive toward associa-




tions (column 3), 107 assert "no need for a union," 65 assert "unions don't make sense" for the respondent's job, and 34 assert the respondent prefers to be "independent."" Similarly, line 7 indicates that the nonunion workers who oppose bargaining unions have higher levels of job satisfaction than workers who favor such unions. 12

Of all nonunion workers who oppose bargaining unions, 36.5%-those in column 3-favor associations. Table 3 demonstrates that workers in this group, despite their relatively high levels of job satisfaction, are as interested in the broad range of possible association benefits as are those workers who support both associations and unions. Workers who oppose associations, those in columns 2 and 4, have lower levels of interest in association services regardless of whether they would or would not vote for a bargaining union.

The group of nonunion workers in column 3 represents a large potential increase in total union membership if associations become available. According to Table 3, this group exhibits high levels of interest in nonbargaining services. According to results in Table 2, however, these workers are skeptical about the need for a bargaining agent.

11 The UIS allows respondents to choose more than one reason in this question. Responses by these workers to additional UIS questions demonstrate similar concerns. Twice as many workers in this group believe that they will receive less recognition for their work under bargaining unions as believe that they will receive more. Nearly twice as many believe that treatment by supervisors will get worse as believe it will improve. Fifty percent more of these respondents believe that opportunities for advancement will deteriorate as believe that they will improve. Nearly as many believe that unions will reduce job security as believe they will increase it. In contrast, among nonunion workers who favor bargaining unions, at least six times as many believe that unions will improve each of these conditions as believe they will worsen them.

12 In their average responses to each of the questions regarding satisfaction with individual job characteristics-pay, job security, recognition, fringe benefits, advancement, and participation-the four groups of respondents rank the same as in their responses to the question concerning "overall job satisfaction."

Associations Among Local Government Employees

The UIS demonstrates that a large "market" exists for association services among nonunion employees. It also suggests that the availability of associations would initially slow the growth of collective bargaining because some nonunion workers who would vote for a bargaining agent also support the association form of organization. Unfortunately, the UIS data cannot address the possibility that, over time, associations might promote collective bargaining.

The local public sector, however, provides a unique opportunity to investigate the dynamic effects of associations. Non- bargaining unions have long been a common form of employee organization in this sector. Although local public sector institutions obviously differ from those of the private sector,'3 an investigation of local public sector unionization can provide insights into the nature of the dynamic effects of associations.

Data

The Census of Governments for 1977 and that for 1982 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1979, 1984) provide longitudinal information on public employee bargaining and

13 Interestingly, however, the attitudes of workers in the private sector and local government sector toward associations and bargaining unions are remarkably similar in many respects. The UIS includes 182 respondents who are employees of local governments. Of these, 47 (25.8%) are union members and 17 (9.4%) are nonunion but covered by union contracts. Of the 118 nonunion workers, 108 have definite preferences for or against unions and associations. Compared to the nonunion workers in the UIS, slightly higher proportions of these nonunion local government workers are positive toward unions or toward associations. As a group, all categories of local government employees overwhelm- ingly believe that unions are effective in increasing compensation. The higher the job satisfaction, the stronger the belief that unions are unnecessary. Nonunion local government workers who oppose bargaining unions believe that union services are not commensurate with dues and that unions may impair job security, prevent recognition, and limit advancement. Nonunion local government workers who oppose bargaining unions but favor associations again believe that unions are unnecessary.




Table 3. Average Responses, by Group, to Survey Items Concerning Association Services: Union Image Survey, 1984.

Nonunion Workers

Positive Positive Negative Negative to Unions, to Unions, to Unions, to Unions,

Survey Positive to Negative to Positive to Negative to Union Item Associations Associations Associations Associations Membersa

1. Counseling on Workplace Problemsb 2.01 2.80 2.31 3.27

2. Job Training and Referral 1.64 2.44 1.91 2.88 3. Lobbying for Employee 2.00 2.75 2.45 3.21 -

Interests 4. Assistance in Finding Day

Care While at Workc 1.32 1.72 1.47 1.83 1.51 5. Buyer Services 1.15 1.49 1.21 1.68 1.32 6. Legal Services 1.15 1.49 1.17 1.68 1.32 7. Medical Insurance 1.03 1.33 1.13 1.53 1.20

a Covered nonmembers are excluded from these statistics. For the four groups of nonunion members, positive and negative responses are as defined in note "a" to Table 1.

b Answers to questions in lines 1-3 are: 1 = very interested; 2 = fairly interested; 3 = not too interested; 4 = not at all interested.

c Answers to questions in lines 4-7 are: 1 = interested; 2 = not interested. Answers for these questions from union members in the last column are from separate questions assessing attitudes of union members to the possible provision of the service by their own union.

Source: Harris and Associates (1984).

other public employee organizations. In both years, the Census asks for "the number of employees represented by a bargaining unit" in different departments of local government. A separate question asks for the "number of employees who are members of an employee organization."

For the analysis in this section, a dummy variable (BU) indicates the presence of a bargaining union in any government department in which a bargaining union represents any employees. Consistent with this study's definition of association, a dummy variable (AS) equals one in government departments in which some or all employees are members of an employee organization but no employees are represented by a bargaining union. BU and AS measure the two types of unionized departments in five different services- streets and highways, public welfare, police, fire, and sanitation-for all county and city governments.

The sample for the analysis includes 12,777 departments in these five services that either had no union of any kind or

had an association in 1977 in all 5,811 cities and counties covered by the Census of Governments, 1977 and 1982, and the Summary Tape Files IC and 3C of the Census of Population and Housing, 1980. Among the 2,469 departments with associations in 1977, 23.5% formed bargaining unions by 1982. Among the 10,308 nonunion departments, the rate of bargaining union formation was much lower- 6.1 1%S.14

These descriptive statistics suggest that, far from replacing bargaining, associations may be precursors to it. Of course, the probability that workers in a department will be covered by a bargaining

14 This sample omits approximately one-quarter of all departments in these five services because they already had bargaining unions in 1977. Since workers in the departments remaining in the sample probably are less favorably disposed toward bargaining unions than workers in excluded departments, this selection rule yields a sample in which the formation of bargaining unions is less likely than in the population. Estimated effects of explanatory variables on the probability of forming bargaining unions in this sample probably understate the effects in the population.




union depends on additional characteristics of the state and the locality, as well as the presence of associations. The analysis below contains extensive controls for state and local characteristics.

First, employees are more likely to form bargaining unions in states with laws that establish public employee bargaining rights (Saltzman 1985, 1988; Ichniowski 1988; Zax and Ichniowski, forthcoming). This study measures the bargaining law for each local government service in each state with six mutually exclusive dummy variables: duty-to-bargain with strikes permitted; duty-to-bargain with compulsory interest arbitration; duty-to-bargain with neither arbitration nor strikes; bargaining permitted; no law; and bargaining prohibited (Valletta and Freeman 1988). Law variables are function-specific for police and fire departments. Law variables for streets and highways, public welfare, and sanitation departments represent state laws for all local employees not in police or fire departments.

These variables are particularly important controls in this study. First, they adjust for differences in propensities to form bargaining unions across different legal environments. Second, they control for the possibility that associations may evolve into bargaining unions only in states with favorable bargaining laws. If favorable laws are essential, then association effects would be overestimated in the absence of law variables.

In the analysis below, we take special care to separate the association effects from bargaining law effects. Analyses that pool all departments in a function control for independent effects of bargaining laws with the complete set of durmmy variables. In addition, analyses within function, stratified further by three major law categories-duty-to-bargain, bargaining permitted, and no law or bargaining prohibited-control for interactions between bargaining law and all other independent variables, including the association variable.'5

15 Bargaining laws were exceptionally stable during the period 1977 to 1982. For example, laws for

State laws also determine the ability of public sector uiiions to negotiate union security provisions. A single dummy variable identifies states with public sector right-to-work laws (Valletta arid Freeman 1988). These laws prohibit union shops that require employees to become members after a short probationary period. They also usually prohibit "agency shops" that require employees represented by a bargaining union to pay dues. These laws reduce all forms of unionism in the local public sector (Ichniowski and Zax 1988).

The extent of private sector unionism in each state is an additional indicator of statewide attitudes toward unionization. Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) reported the percentage of private sector workers in each state who were union members in 1981.

Summary Tape Files IC and 3C of the Census of Population and Housing; 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982) report characteristics specific to the local government that may determine the extent of bargaining. Measures of the local labor market that should affect unionization are the unemployment rate and the distribution of private sector employment across 15 industry classifications. For example, if private sector employment is concentrated in more heavily unionized industries, local government employees' attitudes toward unionization may be more favorable.

Characteristics of the population in the local government may also be associated with differences in attitudes toward union activity. The analysis includes controls for population, the median and interquartile range of family income, percent black and

all three categories of local government employees - police, fire, and all others-changed between major law categories in only two states during that time: from no law to bargaining permitted in South Carolina and from bargaining permitted to bargaining prohibited in Virginia. Furthermore, of 27, 29, and 24 states with duty-to-bargain laws in 1977 for police, fire, and other government employees, respectively, 19, 21, and 18 already had such laws in 1972. The stability of these laws indicates that virtually no transitions from associations to bargaining unions in the sample studied here are simply attributable to transitions from laws prohibiting to laws requiring bargaining.




hispanic in the population, median age, percent of the adult population that are college graduates, and percent of the population living in the same residence in 1975 and 1980.

These characteristics of the population may be proxies for characteristics of the employees of the local government that are not available by jurisdiction. For example, more populous cities will tend to have larger departments. If unionization in the public sector varies with the size of the potential bargaining union, as it does in the private sector (see, for example, Cooke 1983), rates of bargaining union formation will vary with city size.

Finally, the rates of unionization of governments in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and county governments may differ from those in non- metropolitan or municipal governments. Dummy variables for these characteristics control for any differences in unionization by level of government and metropolitan status.

Empirical Models and Results

The probability that a department without a bargaining union in 1977 will form one by 1982 is a function of the explanatory variables described above and the presence of an association in 1977. Let BU82 represent the dummy variable for bargaining union status in 1982, AS77 the dummy variable for association status in 1977 with coefficient PAS, X the vector of other explanatory variables with coefficients A, and E the random component of the propensities to form bargaining unions with cumulative distribution (D. Then the probability of a bargaining union is:

(1) Pr(BU82 = 1 BU77=0) - 1 - (D[-Xp - AS77PAS]

Probit models yield maximum likelihood estimates of PAS and all other parameters under the assumption that + is the cumulative standard normal distribution. This section presents estimates of PAS from separate probit equations for each of the five local public functions.

Many control variables have significant effects in the expected directions. Gener- ally, duty-to-bargain laws promote the formation of bargaining unions. Depart- ments are also more likely to form bargaining unions in states where private sector unionism is more extensive. Right- to-work laws have a significant negative effect on the probability that departments will form bargaining units in three of the five functions. As an example, the appendix contains the complete probit estimates for police.'6

Table 4 presents coefficient estimates for the effect of an association in 1977 on the probability that a department formed a bargaining union by 1982 from separate probits for each of the five functions. In all five, the presence of an association in 1977 increases the probability of a bargaining union in 1982 with greater than 1% significance.

These effects are substantial. In each function, the rate of bargaining union formation among nonunion departments- those without associations in 1977-was less than half of what it would have been if associations had been present. For example, only 5.9% of the streets and highways departments that were nonunion in 1977 formed bargaining unions by 1982. The coefficient in Table 4 from the column 1 model for streets and highways implies that 12.1% of these departments would have formed bargaining unions if an association had been present in 1977.17

This coefficient also implies that the rate of bargaining union formation among departments with associations in 1977 would have been substantially lower if those associations had not been present.

16 The authors can provide complete results for all equations. Programs used to analyze these publicly available data sets are also available upon request.

17 This calculation is performed as follows. The probability of forming a bargaining union in a department without an association is 1 - 4[ -Xf3*]. Choose - X,8* such that - X,8* =,(I- I (1 -f), where f is the sample frequency of bargaining union formation among departments without associations. Then 1 - 4[ - XP* - HAS] estimates the frequency of bargaining union formations with associations, f*. The predicted change in frequencies of bargaining unit formation is J -f




Table 4. The Effects of Associations in 1977 on the Formation of Bargaining Unions by 1982 in Local Government, by Type of Service.

Probit Coefficients on Association Variable

(1) (2) Number of No Controls Controls for

Number of Depts. with for Unions in Unions in Service Depts. Barg. Unions Other Depts. Other Depts.

Streets and Highways 4,234 432 .393*** .331*** (5.46) (3.67)

Public Welfare 1,505 77 .683*** .560*** (4.19) (3.14)

Police 3,770 395 .655*** .358*** (7.03) (3.19)

Fire 1,173 166 .684*** .647*** (5.91) (4.46)

Sanitation 2,095 140 .583*** .498*** (5.08) (3.71)

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are from function-specific probits. *** Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed t-test). Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1979, 1984).

Of the streets and highways departments with associations in 1977, 24.1% formed bargaining unions. In the absence of these associations, only 13.8% of these departments would have done so.

Furthermore, effects in streets and highways departments are modest compared to those in the other four functions. Among nonunion public welfare departments, 1977 associations would have increased the rate of bargaining union formation from 2.2% to 9.2%. For police the increase would have been from 8.2% to 23.0%; for fire, from 9.8% to 27.1%; and for sanitation, from 2.6% to 8.7%.

Similarly, the rate of bargaining union formation for public welfare departments with associations in 1977 would have been only 6.2%, rather than 24.1%, if associations had not been present. The rate for police departments would have been only 14.7%, rather than 34.8%; for fire, 11.9% rather than 30.9%; and for sanitation, 5.7% rather than 15.8%.

These results demonstrate that associations have an effect on subsequent formation of bargaining unions that is independent of the effects of many control variables, such as bargaining laws. The estimates from the Table 4, column 1 probits will be biased upward, however, if

there is some other factor omitted from the equations that was responsible for both the initial establishment of an association and the subsequent formation of a bargaining union. Additional analysis provides further evidence that the Table 4, column 1 probit estimates measure actual effects of associations on bargaining union formation and not the effects of some omitted variable that measures union support and is correlated with association status.

In particular, this study can include two direct measures of attitudes toward collective action that are specific to the local government employer because it examines up to five services in each local government. It is possible to construct a dummy variable for the presence of an association in any of the other four departments of the government in 1977, and a dummy variable for the presence of a bargaining union in any of the other four departments in 1977. If the employer-specific "climate" for unionization is responsible for the apparent effects of associations on bargaining union formation, coefficients on the 1977 association variable should be small and insignificant in the probit models of Table 4, column 1, augmented with these two additional controls.




At the same time, association coefficients from the augmented equations should be especially conservative estimates of the true effects of associations on bargaining unions. The cross-department union "spillover" variables may overcon- trol for government-specific attitudes because own-department associations themselves contribute to favorable climates for bargaining union formation. If so, the spillover variables to some extent will be capturing the same underlying mechanism as the own-department association variable.

Column 2 of Table 4 presents the coefficients on the association variable from these augmented probit equations.

These coefficients are somewhat smaller and less significant than those in column 1. All coefficients, however, remain large, positive, and significant at better than the 1 % level. These results demonstrate that associations independently encourage the eventual formation of bargaining unions, holding constant the employer-specific climate for unionization.

The estimates in Table 5 provide additional evidence of the independent effects of associations. This table presents probit coefficients on the 1977 association variable in three bargaining law subsamples for each of the five government services. The first column presents results from probits for all departments in "strong-law

Table 5. The Effects of Associations in 1977 on the Formation of Bargaining Unions by 1982 in Local Government, by Category of State Bargaining Law.

No Law and Strong Weak Bargaining

Bargaining Bargaining Prohibited Service Law States Lau) States States

Streets and Highways: Effect of Associations .229*** 1.21*** .336

(2.72) (6.14) (1.23) Number of Departments 1,578 1,039 1,617 Number of Bargaining Unions 356 47 29

Public Welfare: Effect of Associations .756*** - 2.60**

(4.20) _ (2.00) Number of Departments 712 326 467 Number of Bargaining Unions 71 0 6

Police: Effect of Associations .557*** 1.19*** .550'*

(4.51) (4.96) (2.17) Number of Departments 1,519 1,007 1,244 Number of Bargaining Unions 314 39 42

Fire: Effect of Associations .951*** 302 1.26**

(5.77) (1.22) (2.22) Number of Departments 533 405 235 Number of Bargaining Unions 108 39 19

Sanitation: Effect of Associations .402*** 3.8 1*** 1.04***

(3.01) (2.94) (2.79) Number of Departments 891 440 764 Number of Bargaining Unions 116 10 14

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Probits for public welfare and fire bargaining unions in "no-law and bargaining prohibited states" exclude independent variables for right-to-work laws, no bargaining laws, counties, and the percent of state private sector workers unionized in order to avoid singularities. The probit for public welfare in these states does not converge smoothly.

** Significant at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).




states"-states with laws requiring public sector employers to negotiate with recognized bargaining agents. The second column presents results for departments in "weak-law states," where statutes permit bargaining in the public sector. The third column presents results for states where statutes are silent with regard to public sector bargaining, or forbid it.

The coefficients in Table 5 demonstrate that associations promote the formation of bargaining unions in all bargaining environments. First, associations are important precursors of bargaining unions in states with strong bargaining laws; the coefficients of associations in the strong-law sample are positive and significant at better than the 1 % level for all five functions. Furthermore, all coefficients on the association variable in the weak-law and no-law samples are also positive. Three of the four coefficients in the weak-law sample are significant at the 1 % level.'8 Four of the five coefficients in the no-law sample are significant at better than the 5% level.

The results in Table 4 confirm that associations encourage the formation of bargaining unions, holding constant the independent effects of bargaining laws. Those of Table 5 confirm that associations have these effects, even holding constant the independent effects of bargaining laws and the interactions of bargaining laws with all other explanatory variables. Even within the sample of states where the legal environment is overtly hostile toward bargaining, associations promote the subsequent formation of bargaining unions.

As in Table 4, the association effects in Table 5 remain significant in probits that include the additional dummy variables for the presence of associations or bargaining unions in other departments of the same local government in 1977. All significant probit coefficients in Table 5 remain significant in the augmented probits, with the exception of the probit for sanitation

18 Effects of associations for public welfare departments in states with weak laws cannot be estimated because no department in this sample formed a bargaining union between 1977 and 1982.

departments in weak-law states. In that case, the positive point estimate of 3.81 in the Table 5 model increases to 11.39 after the additional control variables are included, but the t-statistic declines from 2.94 to 1.39.

The Evolution of Associations into Bargaining Unions

Tables 4 and 5 thus provide strong statistical evidence that public sector associations promoted the formation of bargaining unions between 1977 and 1982. The relevance of this evidence to union organizing policies today might still be questioned if it were found to be an historical artifact-that is, if the transfor- mations of associations into bargaining unions between 1977 and 1982 represented a transition between an earlier period in which the association form was viable and a more recent period in which collective bargaining supersedes the association form. On the contrary, however, the persistence of old associations and continued formation of new associations suggest that the association form is far from obsolete. Associations are often long-lived, and are currently an important option for public employees.

First, associations frequently persist for long periods without becoming bargaining unions. Workers in more than three- quarters of all departments with associations in 1977 did not form bargaining unions by 1982. Even in states with duty-to-bargain laws, workers in 73.1% of all departments with associations in 1977 did not form bargaining unions. The longevity of associations in strong-law states, where both forms of employee organization are clearly available, suggests that workers in many departments continue to prefer the association form.

Furthermore, nonunion departments frequently form associations, even in states where laws favor collective bargaining. Among all nonunion departments in 1977, more formed associations by 1982 (6.8%) than formed bargaining unions (6.1 %). Even among nonunion departments in duty-to-bargain states, an association is




frequently the preferred form of employee organization. In these states, 11.9% of all nonunion departments in 1977 formed associations by 1982. The rate of bargaining union formation among these nonunion departments, 14.4%, was only slightly higher. The continued formation of new associations in all legal environments, including those that encourage bargaining, demonstrates that the association form remains viable.

These patterns suggest two possible roles of associations in the formation of bargaining unions. First, workers may form associations with the intention of maintaining that form of collective activity. If at some later date circumstances change, workers with associations will be in a better position than nonunion workers to adopt collective bargaining. Second, even if workers would initially like to establish a bargaining relationship, they may decide that they will have more success if they begin as an association, slowly build employee support, and avoid premature confrontations with a management opposed to collective bargaining. In either case, the association form is an essential precursor to, rather than a surrogate for, bargaining unions.

Interviews with international representatives of prominent public sector unions and representatives from local government departments in "no-law states" where associations eventually became bargaining unions further confirm that the association form itself, rather than some unobservable factor, encourages the subsequent development of bargaining relationships.'9 These interviews reveal that many of the theoretical mechanisms described above are at work in the transformation of associations into bargaining unions.

The lower cost of organizing bargaining unions in workplaces with existing associations than in those without associations is important. The establishment of bargain-

19 The evolution of bargaining unions from associations in no-law states is particularly interesting because the statutory environment in these states is hostile to bargaining.

ing among unaffiliated associations may require organizing efforts and resources, but fewer than those required to establish bargaining among nonunion workers. In- ternational public sector unions recognize this advantage. Most, as a matter of policy, target unaffiliated associations for affiliation efforts. These efforts have been relatively successful in recent years.

For example, in Michigan the Michigan State Employees Association (MSEA) was chartered in 1950. In 1982 and again in 1985-several years after civil service employees in that state were granted certain bargaining rights-leaders of the MSEA approached the UAW because it had an established reputation for collective bargaining in the state. In September 1985, the UAW won elections for the two largest departments of the MSEA. Simi- larly, AFSCME now represents other departments formerly affiliated with MSEA. These erstwhile associations now bargain (Perkins interview).

AFSCME apparently was the first union to adopt this strategy, but others have since followed suit. For example, the AFT now represents employees who formerly were members of independent state associations in Kentucky and Indiana. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has successfully employed this strategy in many county governments. Following affiliation with an international union, these associations often bargain contracts (Kugler interview).

The opportunity to acquaint workers with the benefits of unionization, free of the pressure of an organizing drive, is also valuable. Associate membership programs in the public sector have allowed nonunion workers to gradually develop more favorable attitudes toward union representation. For example, the AFT has solicited all nonunion teachers in Louisiana and Texas for its associate membership program. Associate membership benefits include legal defense services, teacher liabil- ity insurance, and consumer discounts. The AFT sends organizers to districts with significant numbers of associate members. Initially, the organizers attempt only to inform associate members about the possi-




ble benefits of unionization. In many cases, employee interest has increased to the point of adopting collective bargaining (Kugler interview).

Finally, experience with associations can encourage employers to accept bargaining. In 1980, the Fraternal Order of Police association in the police department of Cambridge, Ohio, organized an attack of "blue flu." The organization of employees facilitated this interruption of work. It convinced the mayor that relations with police employees would improve if he recognized the association as a bargaining agent (Hill interview).

These examples suggest that associations encourage the formation of bargaining unions in several ways. They reduce the costs of organizing; they offer an opportunity to introduce ideas of collective action without conforming to the legal regulations of recognition drives; and they offer an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of collective action to employers.

Lessons from the Public Sector Experience for the Private Sector

Conditions in the labor markets of local government and of the private sector differ. These differences will obviously limit the direct applicability of the results concerning local government associations to the private sector. The entire set of results, however, constitutes convincing evidence of a pervasive effect of associations on bargaining union formation. The pervasiveness and strength of the effect suggest that it is not narrowly confined to public sector markets.

For example, police and fire employees have unique traditions of fraternal activity. It might therefore be argued that the results found for these two services in Tables 4 and 5 indicate only that the fraternal traditions of these employees gave rise both to the initial formation of associations among them and to the subsequent formation of bargaining unions. The results, however, demonstrate that associations promote collective bargaining among local public sector em-

ployees in all services, not only fire and police. Associations encourage the formation of bargaining relationships even among workers in sanitation and streets and highways, who do not ordinarily work at a common job site. The fraternal traditions in some public functions may encourage higher levels of overall unionization, but associations promote bargaining whether or not such traditions exist.

Furthermore, the theoretical mechanisms through which associations can promote collective bargaining should ap- ply to private sector markets as well. The benefits of a trial period with voluntary collective action and the ability to introduce collective worker activity without the adversarial postures of collective bargaining should hold for both the local public sector and the private sector.

The experience of the local government sector may also be particularly relevant to the private service sector, which has many similar characteristics. For example, public welfare occupations are frequently white- collar, requiring college degrees, as are a large and increasing number of private sector occupations. Workers in sanitation and streets and highways services are in many areas themselves private sector employees. This study demonstrates that associations have helped local government unions organize workers in these services. In contrast, private sector unions have been particularly ineffective in penetrat- ing the service sector with traditional organizing strategies. This inability is increasingly damaging because the service sector represents an increasing share of employment. Associate membership programs may allow private sector unions to emulate some of the success of public sector unions.

The ability of associations to promote collective bargaining in the private sector, however, could be limited because private sector associate membership programs, such as the AFL-CIO's program, currently lack certain characteristics of public sector associations. Perhaps most important, associations in the local public sector are workplace-specific with current employees as members. In contrast, most private




sector associations are not workplace- specific, and many members of private sector associations are retirees and workers on layoff. Associations that have no workplace-specific identity, and that may not even include working members, are unlikely to be called upon to be bargaining agents.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that a large potential market exists for association services. Furthermore, associations promote the development of collective bargaining in the local public sector. Independent of the effects of other important determinants of public employee unionism, such as the legal environment, associations are precursors to bargaining unions in all services of local government. The presence of associations is a strong predictor of subsequent bargaining union formation even in states where unions have no bargaining rights and collective bargaining is rare.

Unions recognized as bargaining agents have been the sole form of unionization in the private sector of the United States. Although federal statutes do not restrict the ability of private sector workers to form nonbargaining associations, private sector unions have heretofore ignored this alternative in their pursuit of bargaining rights. Many in the union movement continue to advocate traditional organizing exclusively. Traditional organizing has, however, become increasingly ineffective.

The evidence of the Union Image Survey suggests that the formation of new associate membership programs would quickly expand the number of workers in the labor movement, that is, the combined membership of associations and traditional unions. Furthermore, evidence from departments of local governments indicates that an initial increase in associate membership could eventually contribute to an increase in membership of traditional unions. The mechanism by which private sector unions try to establish bargaining rights-adversarial organizing drives under NLRA regulations and sched- ules-may be particularly unattractive to many segments of the contemporary labor force. Associate membership programs based on voluntary participation in collective activities may succeed in spurring workers' interest in traditional bargaining representation where adversarial organizing drives fail.

Private sector unions hesitate to offer associate membership programs to currently employed workers for fear that these programs will compete with organization for collective bargaining. The results in this paper suggest, on the contrary, that the active promotion of such associations would ultimately benefit the traditional labor movement, not harm it. Private sector unions must welcome this "competition" from associations, for the moment, before associations can promote bargaining as they have in the local public sector.




Appendix Determinants of Forming a Police Bargaining Union Between 1977 and 1982 in Local Government:

Probit Estimates

Independent Variable Estimate Independent Variable Estimate

Constant -4.54*** % Local Population in Same .0914 (3.66) House as 1975 (.183)

Association, 1977 .655*** % Local Workforce in - 1.05 (7.03) Agriculture, etc. (.789)

Right-to-Work Law -.328*** % Local Workforce in --4.02* (3.05) Construction (1.72)

Duty to Bargain Law with Strikes 1.23*** % Local Workforce in -.459 Permitted (2.90) Nondurable Manufacturing (.344)

Duty to Bargain Law with 1.63*** % Local Workforce in .945 Arbitration (5.03) Durable Manufacturing (.793)

Duty to Bargain Law 1.16*** % Local Workforce in 1.01 (3.70) Transportation (.461)

Bargaining Permitted Law .162 % Local Workforce in - 1.42 (.500) Communications, etc. (.411)

No Bargaining Law .268 % Local Workforce in .230 (.842) Wholesale Trade (.0833)

% Private Sector Workers 2.70*** % Local Workforce in 2.42 Unionized Statewide (3.58) Retail Trade (1.35)

Population (100,000's) .037** % Local Workforce in 4.69 (2.08) Finance, etc. (1.59)

Family Iiicome ($1.000's) .0275 % Local Workforce in 3.36 (1.56) Business Services, etc. (1.19)

Interquartile Range, --.00897 % Local Workforce in 5.22** Family Income ($1,000's) (.810) Personal Service, etc. (2.20)

Local Unemployment Rate 3.88** % Local Workforce in 2.34 (2.50) Health Services (1.32)

% Blacks in Local -.306 % Local Workforce in 3.20* Population (.686) Educational Services (1.88)

% Hispanics in Local Population -.00230 % Local Workforce in 3.10 (.0056) Other Services (.813)

Median Age .0140 SMSA .198** (1.24) (1.97)

% College Graduates in - 1.91 County - .458*** Local Population (1.64) (4.31)

Observations: 3,770. T-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the .10 level; ** The .05 level; *** The .01 level (2-tailed tests).

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