TOAT - Section IX, Rhetoric v Poetic - Clark, 1969

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1/21

Swift's Knaves and Fools in the Tradition: Rhetoric versus Poetic in "A Tale of a Tub," SectionIXAuthor(s): John R. ClarkReviewed work(s):Source: Studies in Philology, Vol. 66, No. 5 (Oct., 1969), pp. 777-796Published by: University of North Carolina PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4173655.

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2/21

Swift's

Knaves and Fools in the

Tradition:

RhetoricVersus Poetic

in A Tale

of

a Tub,

Section

IX

By

JoHN

R. CLARR

N essence,

recent

criticism

of Swift's

Tale of

a

Tub, promising

and

eventful

as it

has been, has

too much

emphasized ts author's

1" tactics

"

and his

"

rhetoric."

One would

hardly wish to deny

the presence

of

rhetoric

n

the workof

art;

for all men-artists among

them-employ

rhetoric

upon

every

occasion:

"all

men make use,

more or less, of [rhetoricand dialectic]; for to a certain extent all

men

attempt

to discuss

statements and to maintain

them,

to defend

themselves

and

to

attack others."

Nonetheless,

the

work

of

art

and

the

rhetorical

tract differ

considerably;

where

the

rhetorician

seeks

to

persuade

an

audience, concerning

what it

should

think

or how

it

should

act,

the

artist "

nothing

affirmeth

";

he is

concemed with

imitation, with

the

creation of

a

complete poetic whole,

"

a

perfect

pattern."

This

means,

in

effect,

that rhetoric is

a

"useful,"

while

poetics

is a "

fine,"

art.

1

See esp. John

M.

Bullitt, Jonathan

Swift

and

the

Anatomy of Satire (Cain

bridge, Mass., 1953);

Martin

Price,

Swift's

Rhetorical

Art

(New Haven, 1953);

William

B.

Ewald,

Jr.,

The

Masks

of

Jonathan Swift (Oxford, 1954); Harold

D.

Kelling,

"Reason

in

Madness:

A Tale

of

a

Tub," PMLA,

LXIX

(1954),

I98-222;

Ronald Paulson,

Theme

and Structure

in

Swift's

Tale

of

a

Tub

(New Haven,

I960);

Charles

Allen

Beaumont, Swift's

Classical

Rhetoric

(Athens, Ga.,

I96I);

Edward

W.

Rosenheim,

Jr., Swift

and the Satirist'sArt

(Chicago,

I963); and Jack

G.

Gilbert, Jonathan

Swift:

Romantic

and

Cynic

Moralist

(Austin,

Texas, I966).

'Aristotle,

Rhetoric

I.

i.

i,

in

Rhetoric.

Poetics,

trans. W.

Rhys Roberts (New

York, 1954),

p. 19.

'Sir Philip Sidney,

The

Defense of

Poesy,

ed. Albert

S. Cook

(New York,

1890),

pP- 35,

19.

777


3/21

778 Swift'sKnavesand Fools in the Tradition

Useful art,

employing

nature's own machinery,

aids her in her effort to

realize the

ideal

in the

world

aroundus, so far as

man's

practicalneeds are served

by furthering

this

purpose. Fine art sets

practical

needs aside; it does

not seek to affect

the

real

world,

to

modify

the

actual. By

mere imageryit reveals

the

ideal

form

at

which

nature

aims

in

the highest sphere

of organic existence,-in the

region, namely,

of

human life.4

Rhetoric is

discursive;

poetry,

presentational.5For rhetoric s a

means

to creating

"

action

"

in the

real world;

whereas poetry is an

end

in

itself, the creation of a complete and imitative "action"-not in the

real

world,

but in the world of

art.

Thus,

"rhetorical

"

explorations

of

the Tale of

a

Tub

leave

some-

thing to be

desired;

and perhaps there

is no better

exemplar

of the

rhetorical

critic'spractice than

studies of that

most rich

and climactic

portion of the Tale

of

a

Tub,

Section

IX, the

"

Digression

on Mad-

ness."

Since

the critic

of rhetoric

believes that

the satirist's

primary

concern

is the

persuasion,reassurance,or

sustenance of his

audience,

he

is

too apt

to

conceive of the

satirist'sbusiness

as

the

manufacture

and distributionof virtuous doctrine. Numbers of rhetoricalcritics

have

come

to

expect

the

satirist

not

only

to

censure

folly and

vice,

but

positively

to inculcate virtue as

well.

With

Middleton

Murrv,

they

hold that

"

True satire

implies

the

condemnaton

of a

society

by

reference to an ideal,"

such

an ideal

normallyassumingthe

form of

social

aspirations

and codes-most

often termed

"reasonable stand-

ards

"

or satiric "norms."

Apparently

such

critics

expect the refer-

ence

to such

standards o

be

open, direct,

intoned

rhetorically n

the

identifiablefirst-person

oice of

the

satirist

himself; they assume

that

the "norms" or "positive standards" shall at the least stick out

4 S.

H.

Butcher, Aristotle's

Theory

of

Poetry

and

Fine

Art, intro.

John

Gassner,

4th ed.

(New York,

195

),

p.

I57.

'These terms and a valuable discussion of

them

may

be

found in

Susanne

Langer,

Philosophy

n

a

New

Key (New

York, 1948),

Chap.

IV.

6

J.

Middleton

Murry,

The

Problem

of

Style

(London, I960),

p.

59.

'That satire

appeals

to some

affirmative

"norm"

is an

idea

generally

accepted.

See, for

instance, "A Discourse

conceming the

Original and

Progress

of

Satire,"

Essays

of John

Dryden,

ed.

W.

P.

Ker,

2

Vols.

(New

York,

I96I),

II, 104;

Louis I.

Bredvold,

"A

Note

in

Defence of

Satire,"

ELH,

VII

(1940),

253-64;

Leland

Douglas

Peterson,

"The

Satiric

Norm

of

Jonathan Swift"

(unpublished

Ph. D. Diss., University of Minnesota,

I962).

Only most recently have critics

begun

to

question the

concept of satiric

norms; see A.

M.

Tibbetts et

al.,

"Norms,

Moral or

Other,

in

Satire: A

Symposium,"

Satire

Newsletter,

II

(Fall I964),

2-25.


4/21

John R. Clark 779

'round

the edges

of the

satire, shall

be something

hard,

chunky,

and

obvious,

like a turkey-bone

n the throat.

Searching

the

Tale of a

Tub

for such standards

has

proved to

be,

for

many a critic,

a traumatic

experience,

for such

standards

are

intransigently

absent.

It is just

this

elusiveness

of standards

n

the

Tale

that has led

critics frequently

of late to

accuse Swift

of

"

betray-

ing" or "trapping" his

audience.8

These claim

that, rhetorically,

Swift

leads his audience to

accept

some clearcut

prose statement

of

affirmatives,only

to

disappoint

and shock

his audience

by shifting

ground,

and

attacking

even those

positives

he had

appeared

o sustain.

As

an

instance

of such critical findings,

we might

consider

F. R.

Leavis, who

in his

essay,

"

The

Irony

of Swift,"

engages

to compre-

hend two

lengthy

and crucial paragraphs

rom the

Tale's Section

IX.

Leavis

concludes

that

Swift

in

this

passage

deliberately

betrays

his

readers,

first

coercing

them to

choose

sides between Surface

(Cre-

dulity,

delusion, happiness)

and

Depth (Curiosity,

reason,

virtuoso

experimentation);

for

the most

part

leading

readers

to

deplore

Deptlh

or

Curiosity

and to favor Surface

or

Credulity.

Then,

in

a

startling

climax,

Swift

suddenly

and

willfully

reverseshimself,

admitting

that

those seeking

after

Depth

are "knaves,"

but now

equally

subverting

admirers

of

Surface,resigning

them

to the

category

of " fools."

Fools

or

Knaves:

these

are the choices.

Which

one is

right?

Leavis

in-

quires;

and

concludes

that,

for

Swift,

neither

position

is,

and that

therefore

Swift's attitude

is

wholly

"

negative."

9

A considerable

num-

ber

of critics

have

agreed

with

this

reasoning,

some

of them

going

so

far as

to

urge

that Swift

is actually

the helpless

neurotic, attracted

by

Credulity

as well

as

by

Curiosity,

and evisceratedupon

the horns

of

his dilemma.-l

'Consult

Milton

Voigt,

Swift

and the

Twentieth

Century (Detroit,

I964),

p.

150;

the

idea

is developed

at

length

by

Henry

W.

Sams,

" Swift's

Satire

of the Second

Person,"

ELH,

XXVI

(1959),

36-44.

9 F.

R. Leavis,

"The Irony

of

Swift,"

Scrutiny,

II

(March

I934), 374, 375.

"

Basil

Wiley,

The

Eighteenth

Century

Background

(Boston,

I96I),

p.

Io6;

M.

C. Bradbrook

nd

M. G. Lloyd

Thomas,

Andrew

Marvell (Cambridge,

I940),

pp. 114-7;

J.

C.

Maxwell,

"Demigods

and

Pickpockets:

The Augustan

Myth

in

Swift and Rousseau,"Scrutiny,XI

(I942),

34-9;

D. S. Savage, "Swift," Western

Review,

XV

(Autumn

1950),

25-36;

John

Lawlor,

"Radical

Satire

and

the Real-

istic

Novel,"

Essays

and

Studies 1955,

ed.

D.

M. Low (London,

1955),

pp. 58-


5/21

780 Swift'sKnavesand Fools in the Tradition

Yet there

is no invincible

necessity

hat

requiresus

to discern

n

Section

IX

the

thought-tormented

oice of Swift,

or the

spectacle

of the

greatest

satirist

of the

eighteenth

century

striving

to instill

doctrine

but

producing,

nstead,

a prostrate

nd melancholy

egativ-

ism.

The purpose

of the

present

tudy

is to examine

he Tale of

a

Tub'sSection

X

aesthetically,

reating

he

Tale

centripetally

s

single

and

complete

work

of mimetic

art.

With

Aristotle,

we shall

assume

that the artist tandsapart romhis creation,hat the shapingof his

fictional

lotsubordinates

o

itselfthe

operations

f

character,

hought,

diction,

and the other

elements

of literary

creation. And

like

Aristotle,

we

shall

expect

in fact

that

thought,

diction, personae

can only

be

comprehended

n

context,

anonly be

comprehended

n terms

of that

plot

or action

which

they serve

to frame.

In

Section

VIII,

we will

recall,

he

ostensible

Modem

persona

ad

deduced

"

system

" of the

sect of

Modern

Aeolists,

ndhe

concluded

by assertinghat he had alwayscherished or this sect "a peculiar

Honour."

1 Section

IX

smoothly

continues in this

vein: the

Modern

urges

hat

such

"

honour

"

should

not

be

palliated

imply

because

he

sect's

ounder, ack,

happened

o be

insane.

Thus

it

is

that Section

IX

proceeds

quite

simply

as a

defense of,

a

praiseof,

Madness:

delivered

n the manner f the

epideictic

peech-

that

"

ceremonial

ratory

f

display,"

s

Aristotleerms it."2For,

al-

75;

A.

E.

Dyson,

" Swift:

The

Metamorphosis

f

Irony,"

Essays

and

Studies

z958,

ed.

Basil

Willey

(London,

I959),

pp. 53-67;

David

P.

French,

"Swift, Temple,

and

'A Digressionon Madness,'"TSLL, V (Spring

I963),

esp.

49-5I;

CurtisC. Smith,

"Metaphor

Structure

n

Swift's

Tale

of

a

Tub,"

Thoth,

V

(Winter

1964),

esp.

26.

Oswald

Johnson,

"

Swift

and

the

Common

Reader,"

In

Defense

of Reading,

ed.

Reuben

A.

Brower

and Richard

Poirier

(New

York,

I962),

pp. 174-9I,

extends

the

argument

conceming

Swift's

"negativism

"

to nearly everything

Swift

wrote.

Even

the late

Herbert

Davis acknowledged

Swift

to

be

"

a

person

of

a

hard-mouthed

imagination,

easily

disposed

to run

away

with him

" in

his satires

(Stella,

A

Gentle-

woman

of the

Eighteenth

Century [New

York,

I942],

p. 27;

cf. p.

38).

11

Jonathan

Swift,

A

Tale

of

a

Tub To

which is

added The Battle

of

the Books

and

the

Mechanical

Operation

of

the Spirit,

edd.

A. C.

Guthkelch

and

D.

Nichol

Smith,

znd

ed. (Oxford,

1958),

p.

I6i.

Hereafter,

all

quotations

from

and

refer-

ences

to

specific

passages

in the

Tale

shall

refer

to

this

edition,

page

numbers

being,

included within parentheses, in the body of this paper.

la Rhetoric

I.

3.

I3

58b.

I2. That

Swift

was

thoroughly

familiar

with

traditional

oratory

s patently

obvious;

every

schoolboy

endured long years

of

such

training

(see


6/21

John R. Clark

78I

though Swift may not be the overtrhetorician iven to oration,his

Modem

persona ertainly s: in SectionIX he simplycommences n

encomium n praiseof Madness,particularlyiming o show, as such

encomiasticoratorydoes, that Madness is "worthy of praise," s

"noble s

18

and, in order o render uch honor, he Modem proceeds

through he appropriatend traditionalratorical ivisions-exordium,

narratio,

partitio, argumentatio,peroratio.1'

Here the Modern, ike Cicero's deal orator,"besideavoidingany

suspicion

f a

displayof talent,"

hoosesnot

to be

"

the

champion f

[mere] expediency,"

but rather the

championof "integrity ; he

"urges

us

on the

path

of moralworth

. .

[by collecting] xamples f

our

ancestors'

chievementshat

were

glorious

ven

though nvolving

danger,

and

. .

.

magnif[ies]

he

value of an

undyingmemory

widt

posterity."

15 His

narratio r

postulate implyurges

hat

"

the

greatest

Actions

hat have

been

performed

n the World" are

directlyowing

to Madness

I62).

In

his brief

partitio,

he announces hat his

argu-

mentatiowill producegreatexamples

where Madness s

responsible

for

(a)

"The

Establishment

f

New

Empiresby Conquest," b)

"

The

Advance

and

Progress f

New Schemes n

Philosophy,"

nd

(c)

"

the

contriving,

s

well as the

propagating f

New

Religions

(I62).

All of

these

"

proofs

" or

"

confirmationsmake he traditional

appeals

o the

noble

Ancestry

f

Madness

and

present

a

respectable

Donald

Leman

Clark, John

Milton at

St. Paul's

School:

A

Study of

Ancient

Rhetoric in

English

Renaissance

Education [New

York,

1948],

and

Alice Stayert

Brandenburg,

"English

Education and

Neo-Classical

Taste

in the

Eighteenth

Cen-

tury,"

MLQ,VIII

[I947],

'74-93).

That Swift

also

employed uch

oratory

to

his

own ends) in his satires s likewise apparent(see, for instance, CharlesAllen Beau-

mont, "Swift's

Classical

Rhetoric in

'A Modest Proposal,"'

Georgia

Review, XIV

[Fall

I960], 307-I7,

and Lamarr

Stephens,

"'A

Digression

n Praise

of Digressions'

as a Classical

Oration:

Rhetorical

Satire

in Section

VII of Swift's

A Tale

of

a Tub,"

Tulane

Studies

in English,

XIII [I963],

41-49).

I owe

a

considerabledebt,

in

these pages

treating

of the Modem's

oration,

to the thorough

study

by

Henry

Knight

Miller,

"The Paradoxical

Encomium

with

Special

Reference

to its Vogue

in

England,

I6oo-I8oo,"

MP,

LIII (I956),

145-78.

8Aristotle, Rhetoric,

pp.

33,

56-7.

14

Raymond

L.

Irwin,

"

The

Classical

Speech

Divisions," QJS,

XXV

(April

I939),

2i2-3;

these

terms

differ among

various

authors;

I have

largely

relied upon

Cicero's

De oratoreII. lxxviii.

3

I

5-lxxxi. 333.

lS

De oratoreII. lxxxii.

334-5,

in De Oratore,

edd.,

trans.

E. W. Sutton

and

H.

Rackham

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1948),

I,

451-2.


7/21

782 Swift's Knaves and Fools in the Tradition

analysis

of the

Company Madness

keeps: proofs, that is, which make

the

usual appeals to

Genesis,

Tradition, and Association.'6 The ora-

tion advances

regularly

enough,

the orator

citing two examples under

each of

the three

announced heads: Henry IV and

Louis XIV; Epi-

curus and

Descartes;

Jack

of

Leyden and (presumably)

brother Jack,

the

founder

of Aeolism. Thus

far,

the

Modern persona is

fulfilling

those

parts

of his oration'stitle

which

promise

to

demonstrate

"

the

Original" (Vapors) and "the

Use'"

(in Politics, Philosophy, Re-

ligion)

of Madness.

In

the crucial

eighth and

ninth

paragraphs, he Modem proceeds

further

to demonstrate

"

the Use

"

of Madness:

madness or

delusion

is

in

fact

the

only

source

of

happiness;

all

mankind must make

a

choice between

madness and a sort

of

cavilling

curiosity; and even

those who

elect the latter come

to

discover their

error

(I73). He

concludes

this

portion

of his oration

resoundingly,

asserting that

Madness

is

entirely superior

to

sanity,

to

reason,

or

to

science.

This

is thatsuperiority f being a

"

fool "among"knaves."

The

"

knave

"

in

the case is a

tricky

and deceitful

fellow simply

because

he is not "

tranquil,"

" serene,"

and

"peaceful

";

his "curi-

osity"

leads

him to uncover the

ugly

and

the

unpleasant,

to

the

en-

dorsement

of

"

the

Art

of

exposing

weak

Sides,

and

publishing

In-

firmities"

(172),

as

well

as

"

unmasking

"

(a practice

never

accepted

as "fair

usage"

in

art or in

life

[I731).

From the

perfectly regular

viewpoint

of the

Modem,

who

is,

after

all, praising

insanity,

the

"knave's"

deceit

consists

wholly

in

his

favoring

unnatural

explora-

tion, in preferringexperiments

and

anatomies,

n

discoveringa world

of flaws

and

imperfections.

The

"

fool,"

on the other

hand

(French,

fou

or

fol)

is

the

madman,

or

"natural

";

he

is,

naturally enough,

favored

n an orationwhich

is, quite devotedly,

a

praise

and a

defense

of

himself.

The

Modem

persona, then, having logically

demonstrated

the

1"

Theodore

Burgess,Epideictic

Literature

(Chicago,

I902), esp. pp. 157-66, treats

of the typical

" Universal

Lines

of

Argument

"

or

"

commonplaces

an

orator

employs

in

praising

a

person; among

them the

general

reference to

genos,

sub-

divisions

of

which

praise

the

subject'sprogonoi (ancestors), pateres (parents), his

ethos

(race), and

anatrophe,

the subject's Youth and Upbringing; in this last

"

place

"

are

introduced

the

"

companions

"

and " associates"

of

the

subject's child-

hood and youth.


8/21

John

R. Clark

783

"Original

and the

"

Use

"

of Madness,

n

the remainder

f his ora-

tion (and

sounding

ncreasingly

ike the

modem "projector")

ub-

sequently

proposes

he refinement

f

madness-its

"Improvement

n

a Commonwealth."

he

national

madare

to be

tumed

loose

from

Bedlam,

are to occupy

he choice

seats n society

and

secure

hereins

of government.

In the contextof a

verydeliberate

raise

of

folly, which,

in the

course

of its argument,

andidly

presents confirmation

f foolishness

and the consequent efutation f its oppositemember,knavery,t is

difficult

o understand

ow

the

rhetorical

riticcould

havewondered

which

"

side

"-that of

foolsor of knaves-couldpossibly

be

"

correct."

Nevertheless,

t

might

still

be

objected

hat one is wrong

to isolate

both

"

credulity

and

"

curiosity

from the life

that

adheres o

the

common orms."

A reader,

n

other

words,might insist

that

Swift

sanctions

"

credulity

which

is

synonymous

ith

shallow

adherence

to

the "common

orms

"

of

the

Anglican

Church

and

of a genteel

and questionablynlightened pperclass.Such a readerwouldargue

that Swift

in

the

Tale

of

a Tub

exposes-often

helplessly-this

very

credulous

hallowness

hat

he would

endorse;

he

reader

mightfeel

that

this

is

so

because

Swift,

no

verybright

thinker,

had

nothing

better

than

"

surfaces

and "forms"

to offer

in the

place

of fanatic

curiosity

nd

an

indifferent

cientific

determinism.

Our reply

must

be

that Swift

is not at

all

equivalent

o

his com-

mitted

persona;

we

shall

discover

hat

Swift,

unlike the

Modern

n

Section

IX

who

is

devoted

o

credulity,

tands

broadly

loof

fromthe

positions f eitherthe curiousor the credulousman.

In Section

IX,

we

will

remember,

he sane

mind is

distinctly

separate

rom

credulity

and

curiosity.

For the sane

mind,

"in

its

natural

Position

and

State of

Serenity"

I71),

chooses,

elects to

pass

its

life

in

adherence

to the " common

forms,"

which

are

"

the

pattern

of human

leaming

"-that

is,

the massive accumulation

of

value

and

experience

that

distinguishes

the historical

sense,

and,

indeed,

that renders any

sort

of

civilization

possible.

We

cannot

enough

emphasize

the idea of the mind's

" natural"

position,

and

the

concept that such a mind "elects" or " chooses" such a pattern,per-

mitting

itself to

be "instructed"

by

it.

Such

a mind

is

marked

by

decision

and

self-possession.


9/21

784 Swift's Knaves and Fools in the Traditiot

In

sharp contrast,

credulous

man and curious are equally

emble-

matic

of an "unnatural"

state; in both, the

mind is overcome

(this

is its hamartia)

by an ide'e

fixe;

in

both "a Man's Fancy gets

astride

on

his

Reason"

(17I), and such

minds cease to retain self-possession,

becoming,

instead,

themselves

possessed.

Throughout

the Restora-

tion

and Age

of Reason,

Englishmen,

mindful

of

the enthusiastic

excesses

of

the Puritan Civil Wars,

feared

every

expressionof

"

fancy

"

and

"

spirit

"-feared

any

mind

overthrown, nhabited

by

spirits

and

devils.

It

was commonplace

n the

period

to

wam

against

inspiration:

"

Beware

what

Spirit rages

in

your

breast;/For

ten

inspir'd

ten thou-

sand

are

Possest."

7

Swift's

credulous

and curious

men

are

so

possessed.

In the context

of Section IX's wit, both the credulous

man and the curious

"

conceive

it in [their] Power, to

reduce the Notions of all

Mankind,

exactlyto the same

Length, and Breadth,and

Height of [their]

own

"

(i66). This conception

is

clearly

not

Swift's own;

but

it

is the en-

deavor of the

credulous

and the curious.

They would

both

attempt

to measure

the world

by

themselves,

"qui

ratione

sua

disturbant

moenia mundi

";

8

in

this crazed

undertaking they

both

appear to

"choose

"

either tranquil Epicurean

delusion

or an

ultimately un-

satisfactory

materialistic

or virtuoso

experimentalism.

Yet in

reality

they are

minds violently possessed-by

vapors

from

we

know

not

where,

if

you

will-but

possessed

all the

same, by

the

determination

to

measure

the

world

by themselves;

to

abandon,

that

is, any

aware-

ness of

"common

forms" or

of existence

itself

outside their

own

minds-forsaking

God, religion, politics,

tradition,

and

learning-,

sub-

stituting

in their

stead

a monolithic reliance either

upon

their

own

Senses

or

upon

their

immediate

privateImaginings.

Such

an

ambition

explains why,

in Section

IX,

Swift's

Modern

persona,

himself

a

veritable

archetype

of "

Sufficiency,"

9

intends to

"7Wentworth

Dillon,

Earl of

Roscommon,

"An

Essay

on

Translated Verse"

(i684), in Critical

Essays

of

the

Seventeenth

Century,

ed.

J.

E.

Spingam (Bloom-

ington, Ind.,

1957),

II,

306.

18

Jonathan Swift, "Thoughts

on

Religion,"

The

Prose Works

of Jonathan

Swift,

ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford,

1939-68),

IX,

261.

19 "

Sufficiency,the worst compositionout of the pride and ignorance of man-

kind,"

was

a favorite

term

of Sir William

Temple's;

see Sir

William

Temple's

Essays

on Ancient

&

Modern

Learning

and

On

Poetry,

ed.

J.

E.

Spingarn (Oxford,


10/21

John R. Clark 785

deducea

System

hat can so easilycontradict

veryopinionsave his

own; and why his System

emphasizes t bottoma local and

private

"something

ndividual n human Minds"

(I62). It explainswhy

"greatactions

"

(upon whichthe Modemexpends

o muchtime) are

repeatedly ttributed

o the isolatedndividual-Henry

V, LouisXIV,

Epicurus,Cartesius,

Wotton, Jack, and,

to be sure, the Modern

personahimself.

For the Modem persona,

mad and solitary

n his

garret,

s concerned nly with

the actionsand the ideas of

"

Single

Men"

(I62),

single men concernedwith themselvesalone. Both

credulousand curiousmen

are

withdrawn

nto

singularity-where

they sleep, and dream,

or

engage

n

private

occult

study,poring

over

data

amassed rom

brief

forays

nto

the

external

world,

where

they

have obtained

nformationsromvisions

and

anatomies.

As

Ian

Watt

has

observed,

".

.

.

from

the

Renaissance

nwards,

there was

a

growing

tendency

or individual

experience

o

replace

collectivetradition,"

0

culminating,

as

we

know, in the victoryof

romantic ingularity

nd economic

ndividualismn

the

nineteenth

century. Nevertheless,Restorationand eighteenth-centurymen

fought

the

good

fight against

his

encroaching

freedom

;

and

poets

and practical

men

alike

were

repeatedly

eminded hat

they

should

"hate

minuteness,

and

[be]

afraid

of

singularity."'21

Traditional

Restoration

riticism

epeatedly

arns

against

he

private,

he

singular;

these

are

equated

with

the

perverse.

In framing

a

Character

for

Tragedy,

a Poet is not to leave

his

reason, and

blindly

abandon

himself

to follow

fancy,

for then his

fancy might

be

monstrous,

might

be

singular,

and

please

no

body'smaggot

but

his

own;

but

reason is

to be

his

guide, reason is common to all people, and can never carry him from what is

Natural.22

igog),

esp.

p. 3. Consult

the discussion

of sufficiency

in Ronald

Paulson,

Theme

and Structure

n Swift's

Tale of

a

Tub, esp. pp.

92-3. Professor

Paulson conceives

of the dichotomy

between credulity

and

curiosity

exemplified

n

the

conflict between

the

"

Hack's

"

Gnostic

Idealism and

Swift's

own Lockean Realism

(p.

I37).

20The

Rise

of

the

Novel

(Berkeley

and

Los

Angeles,

1957),

p.

6o.

21

Anthony Ashley Cooper,

Third

Earl

of

Shaftesbury,

Characteristics

of

Men,

Manners,

Opinions, Times,

Treatise

II,

" Sensus Communis:

An

Essay on the

Freedom

of Wit and Humour,"

Pt.

IV,

sec.

iii, quoted

in

Watt,

Rise

of the Novel,

p. I6. Concerning

the distrustof

singularity

in the

Enlightenment,

consult

Scoat

Elledge, "The Backgroundand Development in English Criticismof the Theories

of Generality

and

Particularity,"

PMLA,

LXII

(I947),

147-82.

8S

Thomas Rymer,

"The

tragedies

of the

Last

Age

Consider'd

and

Examin'd

by


11/21

786 Swift's Knacves nd Fools in the Tradition

Swift,

unlike

his modem credulous and curious men,

participates n

this tradition opposing

entlhusiastic

ancy and the private maggot.

Moreover, there is decisive

evidence that the

"credulous" and

curious

"

men are distinctly

separate rom any view of Swift's own.

This

becomes clear when we examine the tradition of

the seven-

teenth-century

Character. The "humour character,"

with his singu-

lar and

pronouncedfoible, had been popular in English

drama since

the time

of Jonson.2; He is descended from

Menandrian comedy's

highly

conventionalizedcharacterizations, uch as those

of the cun-

ning slave, the

kindly

matron,

the

fawning parasite,the mniser

mor,

the

miles

gloriosus.24

The humour characterhas

of

course,

a still older life in

tradition;

in the

Nicomnachean

thics Aristotle

explored at length a

number of

"settled

dispositions"

of mind that

produced

in men

an

excess

or

defect

from some

moral virtue. In

treating

of

such

error-ridden

x-

tremes,

Aristotle

rendered

llustrative

"

characters such

as the

buffoon,

the vain

man,

the

profligate,

the

paltry man,

the

niggard.25

In the

work of

Aristotle's

disciple, Theophrastus,

examples

of

excesses and

defects

of virtue

are

presented

more

"

humourously,"

more

at

length,

in bolder

colors.

His

portrayals

of

exemplary

excesses and

defects

include

such

pairs

of charactersas the

Complaisant

Man

and the

Surly,

the Buffoon

and

the

Boor,

the aiazon

and

eiron,

the

coward

and

the

bully.26

the Practice

of the

Ancients

and

by

the Common Sense of

All

Ages"

(i678),

Critical Essays of

the Seventeenth

Century, II,

192.

23

The concept

of

the

humours originates

with Heraclitean

metaphysics

and

Hippocratic medicine; by the principle of concordia discors, the world, like the

individual, is

bound

in a

delicate

harmony

that

can

be

unbalanced

when

malaise

leads to

the

predominance

of some

single

humour.

Jonson's

more

renowned eluci-

dations

of his

conception

of the humour character

appear

in

Asper's eighth speech

in the Prologue

to

Every

Man

Outt

of

His

Humour

(1598)

and

in Cash's definition,

III.

ii,

in the

revised

Every

Man

In His Humour

(16I2?).

24

In

the Prologue

to his

Menandrian

Heauton

Timorumenon

(lines 37-9),

Terence

lists

a

number

of the

prominent

character-types:

the

"

servus

currens,

iratus senex,

edax

parasitus, sycophanta

autem

inpudens,

avarus leno." For a

delineation

of sixteen

such

character-types,

consult Marvin

T.

Herrick, "Comic

Theory

in

the Sixteenth

Century,"

Illinois

Studies in

Language

and

Literature,

XXXIV

(Urbana,

1950),

I47-73.

25 The Nicomachean

Ethics, ed.,

trans.

H.

Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1947),

pp.

249; 227;

I8I; 213; 20I-3.

'2

" The

Characters

of

Theophrastus,"

d.,

trans.

J.

M.

Edmonds,

in

The

Char-


12/21

John R. Clark 787

As is well-known,

Hall,

Cornwallis,

Earle,

and Overbury

recom-

menced

the

tradition

of such

satiric

character-writing,

which

con-

tinues

popular

throughout

the

seventeenth

century.27

We soon

discoverthat

during

this

period no

humourous

affectation

or excess

was more

popularly

characterized

han

that

"curiosity"

in

pedants,

antiquaries,

and

similar

Baconian

collectors

of a

type

ridiculed

as

long ago

as in

Lucian's

"Ignorant

Book-Collector"

(Adversus

In-

doctum).

Later in the

seventeenth

century,

with the

growth

of the

Royal Society and inductive science, this collectoris more specifically

embodiedas

a Sir

Nicholas

Gimcrack

of Shadwell's

play, as

the

"

vir-

tuoso,"

who in

his Will

leaves

to his associate

his "rat's

testicles,

and

Whale's pizzle,"

and

to his

son his

"monsters,

both

wet

and

dry.)

28

Caught

in

this

rising

tide,

the curious

virtuoso

is

laughed

at

for

fully

a

century.

Marston deals

with several

characters named

"

Curio

";

Pope

utilizes a

"

Curio

";

and

he

is, properly,

as

Thomas

Adams

in his

Character

calls

him,

"The Curious Man":

"If

this

Itching curiositie take him in the Cephalicaveine, and possesse the

understandingpart,

he

mootes

more

questions

in an houre then

the

seven

Wise men

could resolve

in seven yeeres."

His

curiosity

regu-

larly

exceeds

any prudence

or

self-restraint:

He

hath

a

greater

desire

to

know where

Hell

is,

then

to

scape

it.... For

want

of

correcting

the

garden

of his inventions,

the weedes choke

the herbes; and

he

suffers

the skimme

of his braine to boile into

the broth.

He is a

dangerous

Prog-

nosticator,

and

propounds

desperate

riddles.

Such

a

meddler,

Adams

adds,

is

driven

to

study

mystical

emblems,

adores astrology,engages

in

Popish

plots;

for he

is

overpowered

by

acters

of

Theophrastus;

Herodes,

Cercidas,

and

the Greek

Choliambic

Poets

(Cam-

bridge,

Mass.,

1946),

pp. 50-3,

76-9; 68-71,

48-51;

98-103,

40-3;

104-9,

52-7.

27

Consult

Gwendolen

Murphy,

A

Bibliography

of

English

Character-Books,

I6o8-1700

(Oxford,

1925).

Excellent

surveys

of

the

growth

of

character-writings

may

be

found

in

Anna Janney

De

Armond,

"Some

Aspects

of

Character-Writing

in

the

Period

of

the

Restoration,"

Delaware Notes,

XVI

(I943),

55-89,

and

m

Edward

Niles

Hooker,

"Humour

in

the Age

of

Pope,"

HLQ,

XI

(1948),

36I-85.

28Joseph

Addison,

Tatler

No.

2I6,

The

Tatler,

The

Guardian

(London,

I852),

I, 394.

Consult

Walter

E.

Houghton,

Jr.,

"The

English

Virtuoso

in

the

Seven-

teenth Century,"

JHI,

III

(1942),

51-73,

I90-2.I9,

and

C. S.

Duncan,

"The

Scientist

as

a Comic

Type,"

MP,

XIV (I9I6),

28I-I.


13/21


vapors, overcome

by "humorem

in

cerebro,

in corde tumorem,

ru-

morem

n lingua."

9

On the

other

hand, the

"

credulous

7

man is equally

popular n the

"characters

"

of the tradition.

He is the

ironic

ingenu or witless naif

treated

in Wireker's

Speculum

Stultorumn,

Dedekind's

Grobianus,

Dekker's

Guls Hornbook,

Voltaire's

Candide,

and is

represented

by

all

those silly praisersof

folly that can

be traced back

in one

strand

to the Middle

Ages.30Alexander

Barclay s

severe with such

"

Foles

of lyght

credence";such

a gull

is

lyght myndyd, and

voyde

of

all prudence

Whiche alway

is wont,

without aduysement

To all

vayne

talys sone

to

gyue

credence

Aplyenge

his

ervs

thereto.

Barclay

holds the

credulous man precisely

as guilty

as the

"talc

berers

":

"They

ar as lewde

that wyll

the same byleue."

31

Furthermore,

he Old

Testament had made

little or no

distinction

between

the

"

fool

"

and the

"

knave,"both alike being sinners;

2

nor

was

such a

distinction

always

mnaintained

n the late Middle

Ages

and

early

Renaissance.3;

Samuel

Butler

certainly

transfixes

ool

and knave together

in

Hudibras:

29

Thomas

Adams,

"

The

Curious

Man,"

in A

Cabinet of

Characters,

ed.

Gwendolen

Murphy

(London, I925),

pp.

54-6.

The

"curious

"

man

is a traditional

character;

Alexander

Barclay

treats,

not only of

the

collecting

"bok-fole,"

and

the

fool addicted

to

Astronomy,

but

"

Of

ouer

great

and chargeable

curyosyte

of

men

"

in general,

who attempt

"

the hole worlde [to]

take

on

theyr

backe

";

"

Many

of this

sort wander

and compass

All

studies,

the wondrs of the worlde

to se/

With

un-

stabyll wynges fleynge from place to place" (Sebastian Brant, The Ship of Fools,

trans.

Alexander

Barclay

[1509],

ed. J.

H. Jamieson

[London,

1874],

1,

19-23;

II,

i8-22;

I,

129-32,

176).

In

fact,

'"curiosity"

was considered

in the Renaissance

one

of the gravest

sins,

and the cause

of

Adam's

Fall

(see

Howard

Schultz,

Milton

and

Forbidden

Knowledge

[New

York,

I955],

esp.

pp. I-74).

0

Consult

Barbara

Swain,

Fools

and

Folly

During

c

lliddle

Ages

and

the

Renaissance

(New

York, 1932),

esp.

Ch.

II, pp.

10-26.

"'Brant, Ship

of Fools,

II,

2I4,

215,

lines

1-4,

21.

82In Proverbs

he

Fool is

a

blabbererand lazy

(9:13,

I0:5,

10:14,

13:I6, 14:I5,

I7:24, 19:

1

5

),

but he

is akin

to

the

" talebearer "

of

I I: I

3.

Fools and knaves

merge

in

I2:

I5:

"The way

of a

fool

is

right

in his

own

eyes."

Traditionally,

fools

and

knaves

are

equally

sinners,

for ignorance

is

understood

as criminal

negligence.

ss

"

The

first

thing

to be remembered

is that the words

' fool ' and '

knave

'

were

constantly coupled

together,

but not always

in

quite

the same

way;

for

sometimes


14/21

John R. Clark 789

Doubtless the pleasure is as great

Of being

cheated, as to cheat;

As lookers-on eel most delight,

That least perceive a juggler'sslight,

And still

the less they understand,

The

more th'

admire his slight

of hand."

Bacon

urgesprecisely his point:

fool and knavealike are dangerous.

The

"

foulest

"

"

vice or diseaseof leaning," Bacon

asserts,

s

that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge, which is nothing

but

a

representationof truth. . . .

This vice therefore brancheth itself into

two

sorts; delight

in

deceiving, and aptness to

be

deceived; imposture and

credulity;

which, although they appear

to

be of

a

diversenature, the one seeming to

proceed

of

cunning,

and

the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most

part

concur: for

as the verse noteth,

Percontatorem

ugito, nam garrulus dem est,

an

inquisitive

man is

a

prattler, so

upon

the like reason a credulous

man is a

deceiver.8"

Although

he twin vices

of

curiosity nd credulitymight be

akin,

theyare nonethelesshe twinpoles,respectively, f excessanddefect

borne to

us

from Aristotle's thical

analysis.

Unlike

fool

or

knave,

the

wise,

the

prudent

man

sustainsa

balance,a mean, that these

others

lack: "Un homme

sage

ni

ne se

laisse

gouverner,

ni

ne

cherche

a gouvernor

es

autres: l

veut

que

la

raison

gouverne

eule,

et

toujours."

6

Thomas

Hobbes,

working

with

these

commonplace deas,

dis-

tinguishes

wo

extremestates of

mind, sensuality

and

fancifulness.

On

the one

hand,

he

analyzes

the

extremity

of

"sensual

man."

"The appetiteof sensualor bodily delight"in such a man causes

him

to seek

"

pleasures

f

sense,

which

only please

for the

present,"

leading

him

to

ignore

honor or future events and

goals,

until

he

they

were

treated

as

synonyms,

sometimes

emphasis

was

laid on

the

distinction

between

them"

(Enid

Welsford,

The Fool:

His

Social and

Literary

History [New

York, 1936], pp. 236-7).

s4

Hudibras

II. iii.I-5.

8B

"The Advancement

of

Learning,"

The Works

of

Francis

Bacon, edd. James

Spedding,

Robert

Leslie

Ellis,

and

Douglas

Denon Heath

(Boston, I86I-4),

VI,

sz2.

The

Latin

verse

is from Horace

(Ep.

I. xviii.

69).

88

[Jean de] La Bruy6re,Les Caracteresou Les Moeurs de ce Siecle suivis du

discours

a

l'Academie

et

precedes

de

la

Traduction

de

Theophraste,

ed.

G.

Mon-

gr6dien (Paris, ['9541),

p.

I32.


15/21

790

Suift's Knavesand Foolsin the Tradition

becomes

ncreasinglyess

diligent, ess curious, ess

extensive,

with

drawing into himself with a

totally inert lassitude common

to

many

a

psychotic.Such a state

of withdrawal

Hobbes calls "dulness."

The

contrary tate,

Hobbesexplains, s revealedby the man wlho

tums utterly

outward n his

interests,

who literallyappears

o

take

a

flight away

from

himself.

He reveals

the

quick ranging of mind . . .

, which is joined with curiosity of

comparing

the things that come into the mind, one with another: in which comparison, a

man delighteth himself either with

finding

unexpected similitude of things, other-

wise much

unlike, in which men place the

excellency of fancy.

In excess, such

a mind

betrays

"

mobility

in the spirits

"

still

further,

that Hobbes

designates

levity."

An

example

hereof

is

in them

that

in

the midst of

any

serious

discourse, havse

their

minds

diverted

to every little jest or witty

observation;

which maketh them

depart

from

their discourseby a

parenthesis,and

from

that parenthesis

by

another

till at

length

they

either

lose themselves, or make

their narration ike a dream,

or

some

studied

nonsense. The passions from whence

this proceedeth, s curiosity,but

with too much equality and indifference: for when all things make equal impres-

sion and

delight,

they equally throngto

be

expressed.

The final

triumph f any humour haracter'sdee

fixe,

Hobbes

under-

standsas the

mind's

"principaldefect"-either a soaring

light

out-

side

the

self

or a dejectedsubmersion

7ithin:

"

that

wvhich

men

call

mad.ness,

which appearethto be

nothing else but some imagina-

tionz of some suchi

predominlancy bove the rest, that we

have no

passionz

but from

it; and this conception is

nothing else but

excessive

vain

glory,

or vain

dejection."

7

For our purposes, he mostrevealingpresentationof the twin faults

of

"

cuLriosity

and

"

credulity"occurs n Samuel

Butler's

Characters

of

"

The Credulous

Man"

and

"

The

Curious

Man."

Butler's

"

curi-

ous

"

man is

unconcemedwith

the

utility

of

any

goal,

but rather

seeks

rarity,

and

"

stores

up

Trifles."

He

admires subtleties

above

all

Things,

because

the more subtle

they are, the

nearer

they

are

to

nothing;

and values no Art

but

that which

is

spun

so

thin,

that

it is of no

Use

at all. He

had

ratherhave an iron Chain

hung

about the

Neck of

a

s. Thomas Hobbes, "Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Pol-icy

(i 640), The

English

Works

of Thomas Hobbes

of Malmesbury,

ed.

Sir

William

Molesworth London,

I

839-45),

IV,

55-7. See also

Leviathan

I.

xi.


16/21

John R. Clark

791

Flea, than

an Alderman's

of

Gold,

and Homer's

fiads

in

a Nutshel

than

Alexander's

Cabinet.

. .

. he so

much

affects Singularity,

that

rather

than follow

the Fashion, that

is

used by the

rest of the

World,

he will

wear dissenting

Cloaths

with odd fantastic

Devices to

distinguish himself

from others,

like Marks

set upon

Cattle.

Such a curious

man

"

is

wonderfully

taken with

abstruse

Knowledge,

and had

rather

hand to

Truth with

a Pair

of

Tongs wrapt

up in

Mysteries

and Flieroglyphics,

han

touch it

with his hands,

or see

it

plainly demonstrated o his Senses." He is dedicatedto "Study upon

Things

that

are never

to be known

";

and his

studies

ultimately lead

him

to visionary

pursuit

of the

"

Philosopher's

Stone

and universal

Medicine."

8

At the opposite

extreme

is

Butler's

"

Credulous Man,"

the super-

gull

who actually

tempts

others

to

deceive

him.

"

He is

the same

thing

to a

lyar,

as

a thief

is

to a

receiver,"

and

is,

in

fact,

more

blame-

worthy

than

the

liar,

"for if

it were not for

easy

believers,

liars

would be at

a loss."

Above

all,

he is

tranquil

in his

ignorance:

His

faith is of

a

very strong

constitution,

that

will swallow

and

digest

anything,

how

crude, raw,

and

unwholesome

so ever it be.

. . . He finds most

delight

in

believing

strange

things,

and the

stranger

they are,

the easier

they pass

with

him;

but

never

regards

hose

that are

plain

and

feasible,

for

every

man

can believe

such."'

During

the seventeenth century, jests

and characters of

such

"credulous"

and

"

curious"

men

were

quite

common;

"

and

Swift

knew

well

enough

the traditionof humours

and characters

we

have

been

exploring.4"

Swift

naturally

understood

the excess

of

curiosity

38

Samuel

Butler,

"

A

Curious

Man,"

Characters

and

Passages

from

Note-books,

ed.

A.

R. Waller (Cambridge,

I908), pp.

66-7.

39Butler,

"A Credulous

Man,"

ibid.,

pp.

212-3.

40

Chester

Noyes

Greenough,

A Bibliography

of

the

Theophrastan

Character

with

several

Portrait

Characters,

ed.

J.

Milton

French (Cambridge,

Mass.,

I947),

lists

characters

of

Curio

and

curiosity

(pp. II,

2I,

26, 2I0,

2I6, 227),

and

of

Credulo

and credulity

(pp.

95, 190,

272).

4' Swift

himself

records

that

he

had

read

Theophrastus

in

I697 (Tale,

pp.

lvi-lvii).

"

The

tradition

of the Theophrastan

character

had

for

Swift's

age

defined

moral

types;

the

drama

had

created

its

humor

characters

and

given

them

the

further

trappings

of

a social

position

" (Martin

Price,

Swift's

Rhetorical

Art,

p.

63).

For Swift's own repeateduse of the satiric,ad hominem character,

1710-1714,

see

Richard

I. Cook,

"

Swift's

Polemical

Characters,"

Discourse,

VI

(Winter

I962-3),

30-48.


17/21

792

Swift'sKnavesand Foolsin the Tradition

and

the defect

of credulity

xactly

as

Aristotle

ad understoodlhem-

as defections

rom

Temperance

ndintellectual

Prudence.

Surely,

oo,

the reader

amiliar

with

the Tale

of

a

Tub

will

have

observed

the

similarity

between

Swift's digressive

narrator

and

Hobbes'

wondering,

urious

wit

who

loses

himself

within

a series

of

parentheses.42

he

readerwill

also

have noted

the similarity

n

sub-

ject

matter

and language

between

Swift's

Modern

speaker

and

the

curiousand credulous haractersf the tradition:he discussion f

"the

skime

"

of the

curious

man'sbrain,

which tends

to

"

boile

into

the

broth";

43

their

joint

interest

in

"Homer's

Iliads

in a Nutshel

";

44

their

proud

penchant

or asking

"morequestions

n

an houre

han

the

seven

Wise

men could

resolve

n

sevenyeeres

;

45

their

devotion

o

"

Studyupon

Things

that are

never

to be

known

",

6

their

fondness

for propagating

iddles,

their addiction

o astrology,

heir

suscepti-

bility

to vapors.

Like these seventeenth-century

haracters,

wift's

ModernsoveMysteries, ashions,

nd

dissenting

Cloaths

;

delight

in " Hieroglyphics,"

n

Alchemy

and

the

"

Philosopher's

tone."

Swift

knew

well these

traditions

mocking redulity

ndcuriosity.

2

Just

as

Hobbes'

digressive

man departs

from his

discourse

into a parenthesis,

and from

that

into

another,

until

he lose himself,

so

the Tale's

Modem-no

mean

digressor

by

any standard-claims

that

" I

have

known

some

Authors

inclose

Digres-

sions

in

one

another,

like

a Nest

of

Boxes." (Tale,

p.

I24).

43

"

There

is a

Brain

that

will

endure

but one

Scumming:

Let

the Owner

gather

it with

Discretion,

and

manage

his little

Stock

with

Husbandry;

but

of

all

things,

let

him

beware

of

bringing

it under

the Lash of

his

Betters; because,

That

will

make it all bubble up into Impertinence,and he will find no new Supply: Wit,

without

knowledge,

being

a

Sort of

Cream,

which

gathers

in

a

Night

to

the

Top,

and by

a

skilful

Hand,

may

be soon whipt

into Froth;

but once

scumm'd

away,

what

appears

underneath

will

be

fit

for

nothing,

but to

be

thrown

to

the

Hogs"

("

The

Battel

of the

Books,"

Tale, pp.

215-6).

44

"I HAVE

sometimes

heard

of

an

Iliad

in

a

Nut-shell;

but it bath

been

mv

Fortune

to

have

much

oftener

seen a

Nut-shell

in

an

Iliad"

(Tale,

p.

I43).

45

"

It were

much

to

be

wisht,

and

I do

here humbly propose

for an

Experiment,

that

every

Prince

in Christendomt

will

take

seven

of

the

deepest

Scholars

in his

Dominions,

and

shut

them up

close for

seven Years,

in

seven

Chambers,

with

a

Command

to

write

seven ample

Commentaries

on this comprehensive

Discourse3

(Tale,

p.

I

85).

4"

The typical "curious" schemer in Philosophy, according to the Modern

persona,

takes

it into

his

Head

"

to

advance

new

Systems

with

such

an

eager

Zeal, in

things

agreed

on all

hands

impossible

o

be

known." (Tale,

p.

I66).


18/21

John R. Clark 793

Swift knew

these traditionswell. But Swift's

Modem teller of

the

Tale

understands

no such thing: all finely

unaware, the

persona

argues that a mere "mobility of

spirits" causes madness in

both

curious and

credulous men. In a handsome

anti-climax that enjoys

developing the images of ghosts

haunting an empty manse, Swift's

Modern, full of

singularity,contradicts he age-old

classical

tradition

of

excess and

defect, arguing that the two

deviations from prudence

are

the same. In

his own private System, he

deduces that

every Species

[of

Madness] proceeds from a Redundancy

of Vapour.... Now,

it

usually happens, that these active

Spirits, getting Possession of the Brain,

re-

semble those that

haunt waste and

empty Dwellings, which for want of

Business,

either

vanish, and

carry away a Piece of the House, or else

stay at home and

fling

it all

out of the

Windows. By which are mystically

display'd the two

principal

Branches of Madness,

and which some Philosophers not

considering so well as

I,

have

mistook

to be different in their

Causes, overhastily assigning

the first

to

Deficiency, and the other to Redundance.

(174)

In

this passage, although the

Modem persona

himself is unable to

recognize

it,

we encounter precise examples of excess and of defect

from

that virtue which would

adhere to the "common forms."

In

the

modem

world, credulous and curious men

alike deviate

from

nature,

from

normalcy.

On

the one hand, in religion,

politics, and deductive

philosophy,

those

men adhering to "credulity"

are governed

by private

visions

of the

moment: their projectsand

dreams are, for

them, Reality;

and

they ultimately recommend

actions and attempt to win proselytes

only to prove themselves. They

have no sense whatever of

a

larger

responsibility o the State, to Ethics, to God or to Man. They simply

begin and end their

motions in themselves. The

project

to

free mad-

men

from Bedlam

n the Tale'sSectionIX (I

74-9)

is

but a

bright

central

signal of the

irresponsibilityof the credulous man's personal

notions,

a

sign of the threat

such men constitute

to

organized

society,

religion, and

learning. Like Anne

Hutchinson and the

Antinomians

of

America, they

are solipsists,

relying for candlepowerupon

a

single,

private

"

inner light."

On

the

other hand, the curious man, the

antomist or

virtuoso

who

plumbs the depths of all things, likewise seeks a personal pleasure:

he is

the

Cartesian

observer,who

satisfies

himself

about the world

by

measuring

it

from

his own single

point

of

view,

from within

the


19/21


confines of a

crampedcranium. That

he is

ultimately

depressedand

deluded

by his practice is because a

thoroughgoingmaterialismwill

ultimately exclude

the observer

himself: there will be

remaining

only atoms and

void-and nothing, quite, can ever be

induced from

these.47

Both groups-credulous and

curious-if they did

not function

privately,individually, and in

isolation,

would experience in a more

unified society "a mighty Level in the Felicity and Enjoyments of

Mortal

Men"

(172).

But Renaissance ndividualismat its

extremity

leads to a terrible

and isolating

Subjectivism,

whether

it be tlle

"

credulity" of Cartesian egoism, the

naivete

of fanatic

enthusiasm's

mysterious

beliefs,

the gullible idealismof Hobbesian

absolute mon-

archy,

the

utopianismof the

Roundhead Commonwealth;

or whether

it be

the

"curiosity"

of Epicurean

atomism and effete pleasure-seek-

ing,

the

investigatingitch of alclhemists

and Royal Society scientists,

the

historicaland

rational

investigationsof deistic theologians.

However, it is not simply, as Kathleen Williams urges, that Swift

would exhort

us to

steer

betwveen redulity and curiosity,

as

between

some

Scylla and

Charybdisof the mind, to a utopian-or an

Anglican

-compromise.48 For, in an amusing

way, the Modern

persona is

this

once

quite

correct

in

his postulates: he is certainly right that

bothl

types hiave t

in common that they are

abnormal-deviationsfrom

the

norm of moral

virtue. At their

very heart,

both the

credulous

and

the

curious man function

alike-dependent upon

a basic

subjectivism

and

selfishness that

spreads

both

in the

mind

and

in the state

like a

stain.

This is why the phrases, "for the Universal Improvementof Man-

kind" (i) and

for "the

good

of my

Country" (96),

both

of tllem

frequently repeated throughout the

Tale

of

a

Tub,

are

so

patently

ridiculous.

Credulous and curious

mcn alike are

ignorant,

and

what

tlheyT

gnore

is

precisely that social and moral sense of

responsibility

o

4"This point is

made by

Alfred

North

Whitehead,

Science and

the

Modern

World

(New York,

I948), pp. 44-5:

acceptance of Cartesiandualism

of Mind and

Matter even

eliminates

the

possibility

of induction.

48

Kathleen

Williams, Jonathaan Swift and

the Age of

Compromise

(Lawrence,

Kansas,

I958),

p.

I34.

Miss XVilliamspostulates that Swift endorsesa "mean"'

everywhere n his writing and

thinking; in

Section

IX

the mean is

between Reason

and Passion.


20/21

John R. Clark 795

something

outside

themselves

embodied

n

the more

classic

view

of man.

What weight of

ancient

witness

can prevail,

If

private

reason

hold

the

public

scale?

"

What, indeed?

The modem

eccentrics

are

utterly

devoid

of

virtue,

of

thought,

of

action,

of patriotism,

and of

a

sense of

civic duty;

not

for

them the

ancient

maxim,

"

Salus

populi suprema

est

lex

";50

neither do they heed traditionalconcepts of sophrosyne,of balance,

of

ideal

harmony.

Nor are

they

controlled

by

the most

elementary

Prudence, a

prudence

that, Aristotle

believed,

"calculate[s]

well

with

a view

to

attaining

some particular

end

of value."

1

Instead,

both credulous

and

curious

men

live for

the

present

moment,

concerned

with yesterday's

dissection

or

with this

morning's

trope or

the midday

vision;

for both,

immediate

and

unweighed

ex-

perience

takes

precedence

over

all

the traditions

of

the

past-of

history,

of custom,

of Scripture.

Nevertheless, despite the brotherhoodof credulityand curiosityin

so many

ways,

these two

still

remain

isolated,

the poles

of Cartesian

dualism:

mind and

matter.

Descartes' famous

"

Cogito,

ergo

sumn"

in

the seventeenth

century

had isolated

at a stroke

the

observer

from

the

observation,

res

cogitans

from

res extensa,

the

perceiving

subject

from

the external

object.

The

result

in

philosophy

was

to

allow,

and

eventually

to

insist

upon,

man's inability

accurately

to observe

an

"outside" world

(if

there be

one)-ultimately

isolating

one

from

another

the Cartesian

Egoist

and the Mechanical

World,

just

as

Swift's credulous egoist is divorcedfrom curiousscientist.

The

mind

kicked

out-of-doors

nto the enormous

bin of

quanta,

of

mass,

and of

motion;

the mind

turned

inward

upon

itself and

left

alone,

allowed,

like the

cannibal,

to

feed-these

directions

are

truly

what

have

given

the brain,

in the latter

end of

the

seventeenth

"9

Dryden,

"The

Hind

and

the Panther,"

Pt.

I,

lines

62-3.

5'

Cicero,

Le

Legibus

III. iii.

8.

Man's

duties

should

direct

him outside

himself,

away

from solipsism,

and

toward

that

humanistic goal

of

becoming

that

"civem

totius

mundi quasi

unius

urbis" (De

Legibus

I. xxiii).

Following

Aristotelian

deals,

Cicero

argues

that

virtue

must

be

actively

exercised,

its

noblest

employment

being

the

government

of

the

state (De

Re

Publica

I.

ii.

2).

"

Nicomachean

Ethics,

VI. v. 2, P.

337.


21/21

796 Swift's Knavesand Fools in the Tradition

century, ts "unlucky

shake."Like so many

ghosts,the humors

of

the

"

curious

man utterlyvanish,

uming

him outwardn his atten-

tion, andkickinghis

mind, as it were, out-of-doors;

hile the spirits

of the

"

credulous

man causehim, like the

Dead in

Bryant's oem,

to

be

vacantly oothed y an unfaltering

rust,

andto wrap he drapery

of his couch about

him, and lie

down to pleasantdreams.

These, finally,

are the tacit andsuggestivemeanings

f the credu-

lous and the curiousman n theTaleof a Tub'sSection X-tacit and

suggestive

ecause

Swift himselfmakesno

statement.Rather,Swift

is artistic,

dramatic;e has

createdand shaped he Modern

persona

as well

as the contestbetweencredulity

nd

curiosity,

ike

little tubs,

and

has embarked

hem

upon

their

own sea of

dramaticaction.

Swift

himselfsustains

an artisticaloofness, onsistently

etains

"aes-

thetic distance."

That is the

important oint

which

must

again

be

emphasized:

n Section

X

of

the

Tale

of

a

Tub the

Modern

persona

is certainly

ommitted

o the defenceof

credulity

and

to the tactiCs

of rhetoric; utSwiftis not. Swift is notat all the rhetoricaldvocate

eitherof

curiosity

r of

credulity,

s a numberof critics eem

to be-

lieve. Nor

is Swift

the

idle

or the confused

orator,

easing

his

audience

when

he shouldhavebeen

delivering

irtuousdoctrine.

As

artist,rather,

Swift stands

well alooffrom the actions

of the

drama

taking place

upon

his

stage.

New

York

University.

Documents

TOAT - Section IX, Rhetoric v Poetic - Clark, 1969