". ~'~~ijA,:,i:;'~ ' 2D ~~~~L~~1 (~()ri~ ~(~~j{~'EThl'A,'''TRY . Ii': Alt ,SM Francisc? 96.3"3 UNCLASSIFIED

20 June H69

SV!3JfX;T : Combat· A.fter Actbn Report (;PCfW )-69 ( ... ?!,C;~ g ,Cd) (U)

Cor!'T'"nd ing Offjccl' 3d Ede, lOlst Abn !hv J.:fTh : 53 .. ~Fe 96J5j

(el 01' 2- 5C6

I, 4'

DAT;~_S ('It' OF~:~lP3ICN: ;' ~l~""'~:~J~ i , ~)n t:i ~n) .

AEOIWlED UNCLASSIFIED BY

~ DOD DIR. 5200. 1 R BY 1//9<:'$ ON II tntty 9'1

... , ~ 'O • .; 'C' : " , • . . . -. ~ . . ' ~

~ .. ' . (C) ~, ... T' ... ;.)(. · l.;.·-.' ·. ~ i " ~ r,'':' f, .• '.',.·C'F,R'. L-IC "en ..... '1" ~h:". r~(1~ ( ... l'jI,r;' ........ ?~ l , . ~ . , ~, .... _ .. ... c ... , j, •• ~ • . " ., '.; ' "

6. (C) Tl/? _ :::.''''·';;'' -,"./2 - '.~ .. 06 f _ ) . ....,..... ,, ~ . , ~

" • Ar tilJ,e ry'

(1) C/2-}19th ],rtl11ery (105). Direct Sup,J:lrt.

(2 ) 2-11th Artillery (-) (155). General SJPprt Reinforcinj1.

(3) 1-fl3rd Artillery- (-) (175/8"). ~~ncral Support ReinforCing.

(ll) 1J-·77 th Artillery (-) (,'!?,A). ~,eneral SUDpDI' t Reinfcrcioj!.

( 2 ) 1r o +, ~ r vr!. .:',.0:~ .. n.:lt. Helicopter Bn ttali.on .

til" ' ..... ·' ! tC; ~:: ! : .. ·' '- , •. , •• J \ . • " '

.

AVD.MGG SUE3JEGT: Combat Wter Action Report OFOI'UI 3-62

CL En&i.neer: 1 Plat B/32&h Enw.

e* Pathfinder: l6Oth Aviation Woup.

Ci tV jf ,. UNCLASSIFIED AVDJ-Ce-c SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report OPORD 3-69 (APACHE Sl'K:,t) (u)

d. Engineer: 1 PIa t Il/J26th En,,1'.

e. Pathi'inder: l60th Aviation Group.

8. (C) E'TELUGE~!CE : See Intelli!!encc J r.cl os ure.

9. (c ) HlSSICN: 2-5C6t h In1', combat as s ault, 21 !!:ay 1969, in t o FSB Airborne (1D3SS070), c ~nduct RI F operations t o l ocate and destroy enemy f orces, base areas and caches j.n assigned area of opera tion.

lG. ( C) CO NCE.t""T OF OPERATICN: Three (3) compan i es conduct RIF / Search ,".nd : l car O pcr~ tions on sepa Nte axes with t he EN CP, one (1) " ifle c~="p" r:y ;md t he coml::at support cOI'lpany (-) located at FSf< Airborne 1" .1' s Gc'j r:,ty" C},-,s t ru 7tion and i!!1prDvcmnt. D1' the f ae iIi ty.

L1. EXECUTIO 1\ :

a . Ec th od of Operation:

(1.) A/2 - 5C6 : Pr ovide se ctlrity, cond uct l r:s a l H F 'wi i:npr(lve de­fen s i ve p D:.~ t. ionG a t FS~~ Airborne.

(2) , ~ / 1" / 2-;.'('0: RIF/Search and Clear from F·S3 .U r-borr.e to the 9'1.

(3) C/2-506: KIF/Search and Clear from !"S8 A i.rborn!: to the S-SE,

( I) ) D/ 2-506: RIF/Search and Clear from FSB Airborne: to the ~Jftl •

( S) F/2 -506 (- ) 1 Frovide 81mm mortar support from FSB Airborne.

(a) Provice grol.lnd surveillance; t:'TCiu;,h employm'el1t ':;it' creW:" serVed' starlight soopes, radar, and anti-intrusion devices.

( b) Recon Plat provide security f ar F'3"l Airborne, improve de­fensive p:siti()ns and cond ~ ct local RIF operati ons. (See Inclosure 2, Operations 3chema tic.)

b. Opcratio!1o Narrative:

(1 ) ?l Hay 69: The 2-so6t>h Inf began participation in Operation t.PAC' ir; SN:.,.-I -"ith the move,nent,. by CH-u7, of the Bn CP, Companies B, C and E (-) ;rom Camp EVrms, Phong DieD District Headquarters and An 10 Bridge to FSB Blaze :YD5'2 9020). This move consis ted of 312 PA..'[ utili zing 10 CH-L7 sorties. Upon :omplet ion ()f the '-1ook move to FSB Bla~, the Bn CP and Company E (-) conducted 1 CA from PZ FSB Blaze t.o FST< Airborne. This move c onsisted of 107 PAX, util­Lzi11g 22 sorties. Comp:my A was released from OPCON to tlle 3-l87th Inf and con­iu cted a CA from PZ YG ] 27 982 to 1 Z l'SB Airb orne with 8.5 PAX utilizing 17 s orties . ; ompany A and Rec'ln Pl at a s sumed a defensive p~sitbn on l"SB Airb orne. Because )f dArknes s, C;:)rr;p an.ic :::> B, C and D r emaj.n cd at FSB Blaz~ and !i'SB Currahee ';)vp,rnight.

€ \I l , ( 6", K3 ( It, [

U ~,\i''' , r ':C'," c i '~ \.J L." "-\ ' .J ::

AVLC-CB SUBJECT :

18 June 1969 Combat. O;>eratlonlJ Afte,r Action Report, Oporation APACHE SNOW.

(3) Hoc ()r.l!rr~nn!! tions. That lJupply personnel utilize the 155 powder !x.1. [; cont, l.I : n(; ~'1J for !'Osupply of ;.e.ter.

2 Inclofiures:

//\ 0 ~~~~Oill1lS~ U LTC Infantry

COl11ll\3.nding

10 )/ll.y - 9 Jun 69. 3 Jun - 9 Jun 69.

AVro~cc-c \ PW :;e

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report OFORD 3~69 (APACHE SN'JW) (U) UNCLASSIFI

(2) 22 May 69: 'Phe CA of Ccrnpanies B, C and D from FSB'~ Blaze and Currahee Has completed and consi.sted of 282 PAX and 5'( sorties. Upon completion of this CA., all e l ements 01" the 2-~;(J6th InI' Were on or near .',,'B Airborne. Companies B, C aDd D began their RTF/Search and Clea r Cperations away f r om FSB Airborne on separate axes. Company A and the Heeor. ? lat conducted local RIF missions in the in:mediate vicin ity of FSB Airb::>rne . All unIts began f .i.nding eV.idence of enemy activity a~ they continued their operations, i.e., DUrr,e r o\;s items of enomy equipment, bunke rs and hooches. Some of the bunk"rs appeureu to have beell used as r ec(·w tly as three (3) "h·eeks. There wa !~ :;~ erG(~':1 contact on 22 Hay.

0) 23 Iray 69: The 2- .r;'O'S th Tnf cl)Ltit'u,·," Dperat ion s i.n ec::; i cTIed ,1.0 with t.he Bn CP, C::npar.ies !:. and E ( - ) l ~)cat (:,d ,3t fo'j3 \:l .. r'b on "";' , ·It CC: ':',' h')"r:', FSB .h iroorn e re.ce ived four (4) T'J unds of 60r:i'.:~ f'; ~rt,ar fLl'? T!: ~~:r( ·, -.,.;rt·c no '.~~';:-ul tiG:: ns a result of this action .... C')r,: r.;ani~~ E.: "!.-3 , C '-, .... 1-3 D c ~nt. :: .; .. : (~ (~ T:' :" :"r: ':; (!vid(')DC.;'J Dr (~ nemy activity j .r: the a rea " Cc ::'1 , vi.f'- :::j '~6C~O? :~ , r"': " ,;l ' r~d s :r. ,s11 arms f irE~ fr08 3D uDk:"Jown enemy forC'2 re~~ul :-_- :_ :"';!. ]. '-, 1. Us/:~~::\ H,'x i '2 :' S/,r!IA . At 1010 hOI.irs 1.lt YD36106u, Co B r:as a rrail1 in c('~:":.a ci, 1.'" :i..!:.h V~;"; e (:») (; rx~ r~y . The poi.nt m~ .:) ,,;as hi t~ but 3 S a rE~s u lt of an ari]Or che:..-t pl:}t ~ '\ ~:~;l.ch he ~J;jS wear ­

ing, he ~l1stcd_ncd sr~l'y a minor in~j u ry· .. lI t 1050 hOU '::3 , a::' t .. he s;:r;e J~C"~ tj em , Co 13 Has u(';2:in in contact for t he third time today vlii:..h the smr:e thr';. ::: (3) enemy,~ ':he llGc:)!} Pl.at. Has sBnt from FSH Airborne ~.:.() Co B's l o:a t j.on to asslfj~:· in the rcm ovnl of Co H's T(lA" andWIAs.2~506 uS0d·~lxk"ing.firc "Hh 8lm," '"0'1· tars and empl~ycd an nIl' '>trj.ke on a hillto::, neal' Co :)':; l ·e,cation. /'.t, 1213 hour:::, ~t, YI;?;.dO'?6., Co D rece ived small BotTlS 8nri .R.PC~ firn .. In ·:.::.h is (lctiOD, Co D held one (1; man l·;ounded who, at 1250 hOurs died r."s 11 result of i.njuries su~··· ta:iJlllc1. At 1705 hours, at YD.3).lhD78, CoD had one (J.) insomin:? r',)l.lnd, a sus­pected f32mm m(~rtar rotlnd. This r esult.ed in one (1) marl ·rd OIH1df~d . nut, 2t 172r~ hours, this man died as a result of his \;~tm(l,s. For the day, then, there wer.., 4 US/KIA, 5 US/;'iI]i, and 1 T)S/N'3I (Non-Batt,le-Injury).

(LI) 24 Hay 69: The 2- 506th Inf c~mtinued to conduct RIF/Search ano Clear Operati ~l1S in its assif-ned f() , with Co B moving to the ~, Go C to the S and Co D t.o t hB t,I;v .. Sif.;DS of enemy Activity weT6 st.ill b ~1 in (1 ff)und as un i ts pr ORr eGSeC: . At OShS h?urs J F5B Airborne r e ce ived an e::.:~imated Je r')unds of 6Om:l mortar fj_r ',? frofT' an unkTi :; i-l n l.,cation . There Kerr: ne r:~ ative casualties in this OC'0;.011 . CO D haa three 0) c ontacts d\, rinc; U,,, J Ryat 0920 h~ ' rs, 1210 hours Mel HIO') h:,l1rs. In the first ar;tion , at (F'20 houn" at YD342076 , Co D observed 0[18 (1) ,tvA movin !"' a'1ol;t 200 me ters frDm t.hair ]I·.Dr to the east. They engaged hi:n ".:':,;1 srcall a,-rr.s fire, bo-rever, a RIF of' tre area had ne"ative re­sults. The, n at. 1210 hours, at YD341076, Co D rece~ved t<,n (10) r:li.1t1ds of small arms sni.pe r Lire. The sn'.pe r was be l i.8ve d tD be l:cated iD a tre e . A RIF once .1r:a.i.n lee t~ ne:;Rtj.ve resL'lts. l<'inally, at 1800 hours, Co D at XD3LI07L' rec8i".!c( f ou r ( 4) T'")\.'.nds c."" sn:all arms fi r e t,l ith the su~pected 8iiem:/ l ,:" cat :i. ~n bp.i n~ IS"O mctE!c'S t? tl.18 .ir sc,t' th. They etlo-<l"" d but dId Dot receive return fire. I n all t h r p.c c:m tac t s , CD D di.d n')t have .:l ny· casu ~lties . In other actl:m todoY, CQ C at 11;:;6 h~lUrs , <It, ·iLl3!..;?OTl, discovered and d",st. r o,Ycd tw D (2) 250 pound bO!r.bs . Then a t 1803 h:;l'::.. ... s , .Jt YD3S1076, CO C r eceived t hree (3) bursts of small arms fire b\l ~·, 8usttlil;ed r;ecativc j.njuries'. They checkl~d Dut the area of the sus -p e e ten e nemy l':: c cd:,i8D but had nega t i v€: findi~r~s. An LP from Co C sp~t,ted ':me (1) NVA nrmed \\7i t!l ;"', T) ;\KL~7 ~!h:) f~Ln·:d at :,~sg A _~.rb:>rnc dl1 rin ~ t.he firinr. of 2. l1 mad mi~iUtc" 11 C T"· t.hr; cay then, theN: ·..r~r€:: 1"1::;· friendly or- cQnf i r'mf'c enemy

C:O' W~ftil!.il,l

UNCLASSIFIED If

AVDG-CC-C 5tJB,)ECT:

c ONf'v "T* Combat iLftGl:' Action F!ep~rt CPeIlD 3-69

UNCLASSIFIED ( P ~,:L"C' ,"rr',r) (1]) .'~ .... '-.' 0 ~ lAo. , \

casualties as a result of tilesc actions. There ,[('r<:: several burckers and hooches found in the flO. Add i tionally, units f cund varL.'l!s items of enemy clothing and equipment.

(5) 25 May 69: All ';nits continued to maneuver aF,ainst suspected enemy positions and caches and continued tD find bunkers, fi~hting positions ;md enemy clothing and equipment. At 0915 hours, an air strike was empJ.oY0d for L2 construst,ir:.m. The only cantact for thA d.qy t .. ras made by Co B at le,'jS hO~1rs 3.t YD36J.066, at lJh.i..c~1 time t.hey received three (3) RPG rcmnds arY~ s'~;n'; 81::011 nrms fireo They returned fire and after checking out the aree, ~),';:~{

[["mel ;) pDol of blood but nq;;at,ive further. In the action, Co P SUSGaiLeO five (5) ·vITA.

(6) 26 }Joy 69: At 1205 hours, three 0) Rc'r c;trj.',eS We,!? "p',tcbyec for 1,2 Ca!Jstr!.../Ction. TbpI'c hrerc t,;.,~::, (2) c'ncm,r c-:;n.l.-,':1c.L..:::J durir;f] t·> .. c -hY'J l,,:'::e (-: ~ 3 t lOLO b:)urs :·:r;cn c:: D rcco~.ved <.~ppro):~_.:T:::te ·!,=/ t(:r: (:t;") rs'c:;.nds of ~:"L':jJ .. 2rm::: fire (In:j th(~ ot.her i,,"-n.S 2t 13)0 hours Hhen 3 !fst.1:/"~·hC- :-~Jldn fi~l7:~:-·!fr[,-" CD B f5.reo on one (1) enemy entering their f'orr:,t.:r I'D? ;;t ~;J)3(]'~:;S. r-'"Cf)i1J'~'s of trc:s~~ acti:.tr;~ Here one (1) NVi0{IA ano one (1) US/,IIA. In dlH;I' aetchn tc<)"y, Co C aDd the· Recon Plat E':8ch f'~l1nd a bunker c')mplex and C~ C also f'Jund fiv0 (S) f?T3VeS c')nt::': ... inp, dOCC)TI~.t)osC:d bQdlcs o

(7) n Hay (,9, The 2-506th Inf c~ntir,ucd Us .RIF/Se8rch ,1nd Clear Orcrations ir: V,e "0T~,bclTI il Shan ValJ.ey. At 0425 kllrs, there was an 82m", mortar ~tt2ck 0:1 4'sr.l ;~irboTne, Seven (7) or eight (8) r8l.:~rds 18nded inside the perimeter ',liti) cl:i.rcct hite; on tMO (2) bunkers and tTl LP be0ted 2r: rn8t(?T'S out­side the pGl'imeter" Tl:erc Here f~~_lr (4) [IS/VIA and six (6) TJS/','ITA as a result of the attack. SimultaneoQsIy, wi th the mortar attaclr on FSB A:rbome, C'l B Cflme under ~ p:rena(le attack but s:.'stained no casuaJ.·;~.ies. I)1,~ring the dav', units csnt.j.rJucd to fir;d c~Jcmy bl) rJkers:) ho Jches) equipmert. and Mu.ni ti ODS 'tlhich was hiqh­l~.ghted by three (3) separate caches, f0und' in vicinity Y[;Jli8063. anC1 dis~Dye:j~"'(?d b,Y Co C lIilich c':'l!s:i.,stco of a total of 8eO rounds of 82mm m'Jytar , 600 rC'unds of 60mm mort3r, 100 I-~?G-9 and 100 RPG-7 rcunds. HI of the ammunition in these caches was in f,000. c'Jrx3itj.C)n and was evacuate-::'l.

(8) 25 i'cay 69: The 2-506th Inf continued onerations in the northern :\ Shau Vnllcy "Uh the '31' CP, Companies A and E (-) located at FSB AirbDrne and CDmp3lJic,s 13, C and D rna:.;8uVDring 3gainst suspected enemy 1:;cati0ns and cAches. Co B at YD3560S6 cllX' C8 ,!] P.t YIJ.329075, f)und sD12111nr:kecc ane' hODch complexes and a srl{:ll ~'L'!F',~nt 'Jf c:.:-t.hing and nnd miscellaneori.;) equipment. Co C, at YD35105o, fDjt1cJ U',rroe (Jj r:ew AKu7 Rifles Hrappeo iL p18stic and se"]8 j,Ki.)7 mag­azines, At 1748 J-:~ur3, Co D, \-Thile moving into its ND'" bcatecJ at at YDJ30075, tripped 8 b:;oby trap (>CI;"!3J.Sti...'1P: of tw,:) e>r three claytTIDr:::s. This resulted il) f::'urte~~n (lLt) ~T S/i,{:j,.

( 9) The 2 ~506th lnf conti.riUed to operote in its Pl:"si.tC"ned AO. There ' . .:c:r':,' r: o cnc~;r ... / '"}:)ntClcts dl.1ri!;f the C2Y, h':Hev-?-r, Co D, t .. thile in it.s 'l'"n 'I " 'Y-'''''"'C''fl"I 'd (}', '," '~.)' h d b l',:i~ ~c.:C~1t,CCi :;"t .. J i )'~( I ,»~, rCCelve one,.J J.nCOlnlJJ'-: '·ill."lt..>E' YnOflp_.l.orSlus rrU!1 i..8-

Ij.f;v«! t') be :{ 105nm1 frv~ C/2-319th i\rt~~.11ctJ:- locn:.<,d, at FE:T3 !\irhorne~ I~S R

i;:'~::::"J.lt sf.' t.Lis, C,] r 31ls~:?':r~ed five: (S) US,!"iI'i \",t"i.l:' h.?!c! tv ~JC' ~~cd.ivaced.

u ~ . :.;' .

AV JXi--C C-C SUBJECT: Combat

( 7 iii! to.

Aft.er Action Report C PORD 3-69 UNCLASSIFIEC

(10) 30 May 69: The 2-506th Inf c')ntinued to operate in the northern A Shau Valley. At 1500 hours, vic YD327068, Co D found an anti-aircraft posi­tion with 12. 7l11ll ammunition in it and five (5) bUlikers ano four (4) hDoches. Co C found an assortment of olel and rusty ammunitbn and Recon Plat, 'Ihile on a lo­cal RIF of FSB Airborne, found three (3) sets of ;'WA fatigues anc miscellaneous medical supplies anc documents ilJ a cave.

(ll) 31 Hay 69: The 2-S06th Inf continued RTF/Search and Clear Oper­ations in its assigned fJI:: in the northern A Shau Valley. C~pan.i.es B, G and D, While operating on separate axes, all fJund evidence of enemy activi ty in their r'2spe ctive areas. At YD328066, Co D f~und a bunkerlhooch c'C1plex wi. t;, a latrine, a shOWer point and an observaUon platform. At YD3u9063, Co C located an ammuni­tion cache consistin[,; of 215-82mm mortal' rounds, 100-6Omm m~rtar rounds, 31 RPG-7 <\m 12 RPG-9 routlds and lu BuO Rockets. Also at YD3r,0067 , CQ C found another cOiche of small arms and mortar ammunition. -~n thi.s cache, there wero AK47, 9lT!1l, 1.2.7mm, li.l.Smm and RPG-7 rc·unds, as well? s 82mm and 6 Omr,1 mortar I' o llll'.'.S • CoB at YD351047, found BBO rounds of 12. 7mm ammunition. /..11 thIS above c,"ches were evacuated.

(12) I ,June 69: Companies B, C and D cOLtinued their RIF/Search and Clear Operations l"ithi.n the Bn NJ. Highlighti.'1g the dayl s activities, was a 5,5CO pound, booby trapped, rice C'lChe found by Co C at YD348C61. The riCe was polished, in 100 pound bags and in excellent condition. [,lso, at YTi349061, CD : found the \-lreck,,!!e of a UH-lD Hellcopter. At the crash site was the partial remains of a body, a flight helmet with the name "CPT Begley" on it, 2 M60 Mach­ineguns, serial numbers 6477 and 7005, 1 CAR·.1S, 1 H79 Grenade Launcher, 2 1116 ~ifles and a Jungle Pcnetrator. Other activities of the day included a cache Jf fishing equ).pment f')und by Co C at YD3L9051, which c!:JDsisted of six (6) 100 :Jound bllDdles of transparent fishing line, 400 fishing poles and 1000 snap links -lith SWl vels.

(13) 2 June 69: As the companies continued to maneuver within t,he ,0, they continually fOlme si1!lJS of enemy activity. The 12 element of Co C wall lir lifted to FSB Airborne to provide security and conduct boal day time RIF Jperations While the Eecon Plat was extracted from FSB f,irborne to Camp Evans GO attend Rapp811inG School. Wh:i.le conductin,! a platDon-size RIF to the SE of CSB Airbol'ne, Co A, 3t 0915 hDl1rs and at YD36i065, spotted approximately ten (10) "'-fA settir!!' up US·'type claymores. There ,/as an immAd5.ate exchanf!e of fire be­;ween the }N/\ aDel Co feo The }'VA detonated their clay-mJTe6 durin" the exchan~ )f fire. The r"sl;lts of thi.s cDntact were two (2) l:'TAt~IA, one (1) U"NIA arrl ~our (1;) US/dI!,. Thrs':ghClut the day, Companies B, C and Ie c~r.tir'Jed to find )unkers J h ')'.)ches, caves 8JJd small amounts of misceJ.lanf) JUS clothing) eC'u ipment lnd aromunitbn. Jet. 13LO hours, in vic YD3::'3064 and YD351;065,Co C f- nel hlo 2) sepa ra te rice canc85 wU.ch totaled 12,900 PDlll10S of polished rice ir. 150

)Dund b,,,?s and staCked on an 65 oef!ree slope agaicst logs and Covered with plas­iic. The rice t,ias in excellent cDnditiDn and appeE1!"'Cd t8 have been in this 10-;c.tion for approximately two v:et:ks 4

(l1.) 3 June 69: The 2-S06th Inf sttll participatinr' "'l Op2r1ltion 0?:~C~E SLC'd, cCJ1~,tinucd to fi.nd sip:ns of enemy activity dLlr.irg.'its FuF ·operat.i'.)Ds ~h:rouShout the En J.D. Units c::;ntinued to Cc:r.dlict individu;;il opE?x8tioDS and '~und srr:all bunl{or and hooch complexes nnd sn;[.!.ll quantities of enemy clot~,ing

81 Qt. CRL UNCLA"S' ~,,- ,' . ... ). 11'\;·· ... ' .:.

J.2 -~

~~.~~~~!j!!l!!)~"'I1.~ ..• !!I'Il! i

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report OPORD 3-69 C',PiiClm ,);'p~n (T1) UNCLAS$IFIE

ond equipment . At 1330 h ours, th e 11 cle'r.(, nt of ;,/2-',06, whIle Dr; 11 1 : C81 ::.17'" from FSB Airb orne, at YD362064 , f ~und two (2) ? raves c~ntaining two (2) NVA bodie s ki lled less than 24- h0urs . They were killed b.1' small arms fire p oss ib1y as a re s ult of conta ct made by another Co it RIF on 2 June 69.. At YD3uJ OS'6, Co C found t l;O (2) S:~S Rifles "rapped in plastic and buried under k;Jves. The rifl e wer e in PODr conditi on but ~Tou ld fire . They were evacuated . Ther e \,"OlS n o ene my contac t during the day.

( 15) 4 June 69 : Companies B, C and D c:Jntinued to c ::m(J,.: ~t c:I:'/Sulrch and CJ.e"r Op erations jJ1 the En if) . The only contact occurred at l OCYJ :l '::l,rs "h'of! Co D r;~:c ()ived a)prClximately t e n (10 ) r ounds of small nr!nS fire .. Th~rc~ Hc:rc no C03U ~·1J. t i0 S as a result of this actton . At YD3400S3~ CO C f:Jund 22 r C 'J.TQS of p)?r:~ TIlo rLar iUTI rm.wition. And at Y!l35506l.!, whj.le on a loc"l fl.If, Co /; I:;'w d i"c','F; (5) r OUll t1S of 82rnm mortar 3;i:TilUnition . ;J.l CD!T1 p [!!~ ies co nt_~mJe cJ t o f.l n(j bu ~; l-:: c r5, nClocn e:.:~ and rni ~;c ellan8ons i t ('ms of cl :rt."1 inr; and cqu:i.~'~17 ,_:n t .

(16) ~ .June 69: The 2- 5c6th Tn t' c:,n t :il,ued part l cip;;t, j uJ"J in the Bde ope r ;:l t.iol1 .i r, :.nc A Shau Va l 12Y by condt1 ctin~ n I F /S~2rch 2r.d C).c::.n' Gpe r .1 t. i ')p[) in it s a!:is i :J)ec j {) ~..rj . t.h the En CP l oca t G'c; c t FSi3 rirbcrnf-~ . C;)mF.1 !!i.cs 13 , C 21-Jd D c ~ntir;ll cd to m.:tneu",re r or. St~para te axes with Co B oric ~ Jted t:l the 'll(;s t , Co C to th s:J1Jth and Go D t :> the n "r t.hHes t . Co Ii r emai.necJ HS sEocurity :r (' l'ce f ~r j;'~ ;,i:::"­b orne and conduc t.ed l ocal RTF operations durin ~ the cJayl " '~l t h :·u r s . At 0735 hours, at YD314l05, C:J D made c :mt act with I1D eotim8ted "\;,,,0 (2) };" A. Ths acti on l'osultec1 in Dne (1) WJA/'rIA and one US/i.-1L, . The ;·:"i'/:Uk. had i n hi s p ,",sE' ssi(JD an R?G Launcher wl::j_ch was evacua t ed to this locati:;n ll /~ddit i ~n811Y', ro D fr..)urri at YD31h09fl , three (3) "raves f; ~'timat.ed tD be one (n year old o.nd f c ur (4) bun­ke rs with over'h'~ ad CDver. ,It 1518 h curs, at YD,31hlOLI, "GllC 13 r;l f- ment 0" Co D again mad e cont.ac t wj,th all esLi:r.2.t ed 1'''.:Jc squad . Co D sustaine d three 0) US/IlIA in thi.s a ction all of which Here medivacod shortly after the end of the c()r,tact. At 1815 h c·\l rs, CC C rECe ived one (1) RPG r Dund whi.ch expJ. 'Jded in the trees and the r e by C<lusi.nr: t h l.'ee (3) usj;-rlJl.

0.7) 6 J\!!1e 69 : All el ements of the 2-506t~: I nf c ontinued to' operate in t.;·~ G ~ssj ' 0r:ed La . ;,t 06] 0 hours, at YD3150:16, CD B h2.d incomi ng RPf} and 60mm mOr~f.ll· rounds . C') B (3L' sta ined one (1 ) US/lU ll a nd 12 U:::/,VIA from this attack . At 1500 hou rs, CD B maoe contact <lU h 2 -3 IJVA equipped wi t h s mall arms at YDJOS O!;3 . :::n t hi s action, th e r e waG one (1) US/vlI,4, .

(1 8 ) 7 .hne 6?: Tod"y Has the last d8y for t,h8 2- 506 t h Inf partici­pati on ::,n C'i p e rat:i_c,n A?::,C::E Sl,!('vlo At 1210 hours, a LeE on a VR miss ion fo r this \)ett.e].i.:m Y'c; c,,5.vc,cl rr!:lunc firo from vic l'D337 077 • Th" Bn S3 r eceived 8 :ninor 1.-;:: £; H ~'~lr:d .:is ;J res tj_t of t his a(:t i~)n. l1. t YD35S06S, CD C f ound five (5) bun-;< crs .?one .:.:m~ u ni t:l ')!1 .. The ordnance c:.nsist r:;:d of 40 Rifle (Tenade s, 3 RFf: - 9 r Dund::::.: and 2 - 6C~iml r~ :; rt, 2 r rounds . Als o Co C, at YD3S5\"'l62 m~l, d e c:mt.8ct with th r ee (3) N'!.". . In tl": i.s act:i. Jn t here were n o US casualties but ther e was one (1) HVA/ KIA ., J\' f t o. I' this ac t i 'Jr. , t hey l at.e r f ound f O:J r (h) h :)Qches i n the area . !\no upon sE: ;.:: .. rching, i'::;t~nd t~!C (2) S:{S E:.fles , 1 snipe r r ifle , S ~~ocJ el I iI.! Carbines , 2 VAS }-~3 6 r if l es ) 1 l'PsL:3 sub-i:1a chine~Jn , 8 c aS8S of Bl~O R~ck(~ ts , 1 ca s e of nrc r ou;"!ds, iJ '; ases Df ;..Kil1 al'nno, 50- 50 pound b aqs of salt a nd 20 packs of p owc ered s p.l:r.on .

G ' 9 ." u- · , I " L

UNCLASSI FI ED J;Z - r

At YD337074, Co D found one (I) *UC&? rifle, one (1) SK? rule, 1 Model & rifle with grenade tiuncher, ten (l.C) arM-tank grenades ad some miscellaneous small arms ammuniti.on, CZothtig and equipment. During the hours of darkness, radar and crew served starlight scopes located at ES3 Airborne, discovered movement of small groups of indlividuals and various lights, A33 sighttip were engazed by 81mm mortars after which the movement ceased. At 1616 hours, Co B was air moved from their field location at yD309039 to FSB Airborne ts take over the secux*ity of the fire base, The CA was complete at 1640 hoErsa

a, The mission was successtilly accomplished and vast quantities of enemy supplies ati materials Were capture&

(2) KBAA: n'one

(3) KBA: Xcme

(r~) Captured: None

(C) Small arms ammo: 84,227 rds

(d) 6Onn-n mortar ammo: 712 rds

(t-3) hCinm mortar Base Plate: 1

(f) 82mm mortar arnno: IL,361 rds

(y) &mm mortar fuses: 100

A Vlll-(;IJ-IJ SUBJECT: Combat After Acti?n Report CPORD 3-69 (APACHE S~OW) (u) UNCLASStI=JE()

AtYD337074, Co D found one (1) AK47 rifle, one (1) SKS rifle, 1 Hodel h4 rifle with grenade launcherj ten (10) aniii-tank grenades and some miscellane?U5 small ams ammunition, clDthing and equipment. During the hours of darkness, radar aIld crew served starlight sCDpes located at .!i'SB AirbDrne, discovered movement of smHll groups of individuals and various lights. All sightings were engar,ed by B1mrn mDrtars after which the movement ceased. At 1616 hours, Co B ,las air moved from their field location at YD309039 to FSB Airborne to take over the seclU'ity of the fire base . The CA was complete at 1640 hours.

12. (G) RESULTS:

a. The mission 11as successfully accomplished and vast quantities of enemy suppl i es an:! materials Her e captured .

b, Enemy losses:

( 1 ) KIA : 30 (includes 21 KJA by fI/2··5C6 " h11" epCOti to 3-1137til Id)

(2) KBAA: NOlle

(.3) KBA: None

(h) Captured: None

(5) En(:);lY equipr en t captured or destZ'Jyed :

(a) Food sllpplies: 2,600 Ibs

(b) Small arms HeapDns : 27

( c) S~all arms ammo: iJh,227 res

(d) 60nnn mortar ammo: 712 rds

( 8) 60mm mortar Base Plate: 1

(f) 82mm mortar ammo: 1,361 rds

(~) 82mm mortar fuse:'): 100

(h) BilO Rkts : 38

( i) R?G 7 and 9: 200

(j) 12 .? tnm and 14.5mm Amno : 13, 708 rds

(k) V j.sc e l12~J8 DUS ammo : 129 res

TNT : 9 Ibs

(m) Cros sbcMS: 2 ,- (;' is (a MiST !;jO'. !-

UNCLAS8!F:L'l J .2 -- 7

(q) strut tares : Xl.9

(s) Bunkers: 302

UNCLASSIFIED 9 /FESI AVIG-CC-C

SUBJECT: Comba t After Actim Report orCim 3- 69 (AP ~"CHE S!!cl-i) (u)

(n) NVA r1achetes: 2

( 0) Hi nes and !1BT : 7

(p) Fuel ~ 2 0 ?al

(q) Struc tu res : 119

(r) Tunnel s: 2

(s) Bunkers : 302

( t) D"","",,,,,tS: 3',s Ibs

(u ) Her'ic:>.l su!'plies : J.ll" 1:.15

(v) SCG ;-; ndnry ~xplosion ~~ : 2

(w) RiCe : 21,360 Ibs

(x ) Un:ifor:ns: 12

(y) j,;V A canteer:s : 2

(z) Nitt8:1S : ,0 Pl' ::-;

(aG) Fjshj.n ~ line. : 600 Ib"

(bb) Fishin.'! po l es : 400 cn

( cc) Cor.:mo In :'e : 5 000 metc I'S

13 . (C) Al1·m~IST'RATION:

[to PersDnne l st rcn ::r th:

E G

D E

A.SSIGPEJ.> ?DY. ---191 172 ll9 l OS 13 1 112 1 :'1 ... ~ 120 129 113 as 89

'ffib 711

- kG - . Q ... 110": is

98 106

95 79

sed

Al1DJ-CC-C C"I'S l6W<.-S UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: Combat After ,'ccti~n 'leport OFe rm 3-69 (APAC')';S!'>;":!) (if)

UNIT l~BSIGi:ED I'DY :.'IELD

!-rEC 205 189 hG ) 112 101 79 " B J09 94 75 c 12/i 112 95 D ~L:l.3 104 87 E 91 lCO 72

7sL 600 1JSh

ULTT A.SS:U}Nl"J) PDY ----;-i'lC 1 ('(~

/l' 1[\0 j',. JJ~) lUI i·',

112 KO " 1;2 r; 116 " D 116 103 e.c I'. i~'? 9f: 'll.~

:--~7-

('0') 01/6 "~lIT-':

( ,)

C' ) T..O'~]I::;'l'JCS :

3. Concept of l~Y:'istical Gupp')rt: Lo"isticnl supp')rt vl~)S pr~.r:ic1ed thro"-'Vh normal supply clvH:r101so iwj.&'tion suppDrt fer sl,;.pply ltTaS ~)r(wtded by lJ15Rth Aviation Gnd Dthc'I' 81c~,8nts of the 160th Avi3iti,)l! r:rOI)p. r(c~scpply tJ mrmelJver 81E?)~;c~:jts \"7t<~ ;)I'~::sra~nmcd at three day intervals ~ ;JDt chC"l! 'h'2S intct=:'rateo with each l'C::,t:P;<:.Y·, ~~:-IL7 s')rties arrived i'r!)rTl Chc::ycnne nne] '\·iY'.~!T;ing ?2ds lecated .s.t Ca:np EWv'(H)S a;Jd fro;,;] fori'iard supply a:r\JCJ;.\ r:.t ":':-;:)13 1 .s 1.~lazc ,'.u·x1 Birmi:;'gham.

(1) UH-l Sorties - 170.

C':I .. h7 Sorties - 49.

1\ 3 'J' ,- '1 .!"!:Jr~n:lgc Dy cess of suppl:r to C3Cr. firebns(; ,:md unit.

(a) Fire Dace Airborne

1. Class I 30,975 lbs

2 Class II 3,000 Its

.3 :.:: lass :c I 10, oon 11),,]

f.: C12ss IV S6,000 lbs

2 ClaSt; V 80, UCX) Ibs

1 Class I 14,000 lbs

2 Class II 300 lbs - / Clnss 2 ITI 20 -&s 0

t. Class V 800 lbs

( c) Ccn:psny c

1 Class I 16~000 lbs

2 Class II 300 lbs

3 Class III 20 lhs

4 :1nss v 1,000 lbs

(d) Co~pmy 0

1 Class I 12,cr30 m-3 w.4

2 Class II 29 lbs

2 CLass III 20 lbs

4 Class v 700 lhs

c. Trcblm Areas - Lessons Learned:

(1) InitialXy, FSB A.irborne had insufficient helicopter landing area for the czount of air tmffic which some days exceed& 9 swticse To d.hv~~te this problem, the CI447 Pad, in the Artillery axa, ~2s ~31lar~f3j as well as im- proved. The existing W-1 Pati was also enlarged to accomodate t;ur, (2) helicop- ters and a new W47 I&d was constructed on the southern edge of the perimeter.

(2) d large resupply of demclitions was rz;iuircd tr, be on hand at all times to 3115% fcs bunker destmction, clearinc 'ields o? fire 3n the perirneer aF:ld cor;structi.on of la.ndj.gg zones. &I initial stocka- of 5000 1% is recornmer?dc

(3) ?Wh of t:w Fire ,%pport Base was alreac'y constructed when the Z-506 Inf initially moved jn. Ctherwise a greater arnol;nt of C~S-S IV material

resupply and maintain airnobility, landing zone requirement. Time bein? d factor, it was SOOn followin? items, ma;!euver elements could rapidly

•

AVDG-CC-C '. a 'I'" U/\lIJL.ADDlrlt:U

SUBJECT: Canoat After Ac tion Report OPORD 3-69 UJ':,cm~ SN::ln · (U)

(b) Company B

1 Class I lu,OOO lbs

2 Cl ass II 300 lbs

1 C'ln .. r. ;::.. ....... v v ITI 20 lbs

h Cl ass V 800 lbs

(e) Coo:pany C

I Class I 16,000 l bs

2 Class II 300 Ib s

3 Class III 20 lbs

It C l.:1SS IJ 1:000 lbs

( d) COirlpnl1Y D

1 Cl ass I 12,000 lbs

2 Cl ass II 250 lbs

1. Class III 20 lbs

h Class V 700 l bs

c . l'roblem Areas - Lessons Learned:

(1) Initially, FSB Airb orne had insuffici.ent helicopter landing area for t he a":1ount of air t.raffic wh ich some days exceedec' 90 s')rtics. To alleviate t his pr obleM, tl'e CHhi Pad , in t he Artillery area, was enlarqed as well as im­proved . The existing UH-l Pac1 wa s also enlarged to acc omodate two (2) helicop­ters and a net .. CHu7 Pad was constructed on the southe rn edge of the perimeter.

(2) A larp,e resupply of demolitions was I'"~.:;uired to be on h~nd at all t ilr.es tD allew for bunker destruction, clearinv field~ of f5.re on the perimeter and cor;struct.i.Ol1 of l Gndb" zon es . An initia l stocka a,e of 5000 1;:'8 .is recommendE

(3) ~·:uch of t:,e Fire Support Base was alre ac·y cons tru:: ted when the 2 - 506 lnf initi211y moved in . Cther>lise a grea t er amOiOnt of Class IV material would have been requi~d.

(lJ) Tn facilitate r esupply and main tain a irmobi.1i ty, landin g zone construction \;as a continu·al r equirement . Time bein" 0 fac tor, it was soon learned that, by 10Hc l'in::; the follo"in~ itenls , maneuve r e l emEnt.s could r apidly

'iil."" (~4""" C£I''''iliSS. F ~

I:;!. - /O

. __ . . _-------

AVro-CC-c Cae'r , M!;O , ) i; C

UNCLASSIFIED SUBJi;:CT: Combat After Action 1~5port NeED 3-69 (:"p/,Cll;;; SH)I'Y') (u)

es tablish landin g zones.

(a) Two (2) lonR handled axes.

(b) Two (2) chain saws.

(c) Premi xec) fuel.

(d) Oil.

(e) 30-50 e l ec tric and non-electric blastinq caps .

(f) 100-700 Ibs of C4 demolition.

(5 ) Chain saws were consolidated at FSB (':-:-borne for ir'!:"ediate ci,.­patch to companies and maintenance to i ncIt!d e sharp;< ,;. n~, a:ljus::'me r,t ~f chai ~.

tensj.on ar,d cleanin", . The quantity of oCctnol j tion re·1:.:ired for anyone Ia!",d i r,­zone va ried and depended UpClll the conditi:)n of the "-anding Z2r.e site. Daisy Cutters and Artillery preparation reduced the amo','nt of oe7:1ol.1 t .i. )f !"'eouired. Dt:e t::> t he Hi!ld turbulence in this area, landin p' zones hac tD be lar-e eno~~ to all D;] an aoditional eight (8) fee t beyond the normal area all~t ted a l1H-l aircraf t . Thr.ough its maneuver-ability and small size, the LCH was :lften used to deliver nece ssary equipment to finish partially cC'!1lp1eted Ia:lding zones.

15. (u ) CHEMICAL: N/A

L6. Cu) CIVIL PJ'1~~G~RS : N/il

17. (U) P SYD FS : N/A

L8 . (C) Q'l1i'lUNI C ,I,.TIO NS :

Cl.. Communications with mane\lVer companies and the Battalion rear was ;')nr.ist,.,ntly good throu£'hout the operation. Due tc sp~radic failure :If vital ,adio r('lays and automatic retranr:;miss ion s tatbns at ;?"' t~ l"s i"est, vic YDL07035, :c>rrmunications :-las at times diJficult.

b . f1 fon, a rd rad i.o maintenance shop was established at "',')B Airborne ~o fac ilitate rapid repair and provide back-up radios durin~ the iPU?rim repair )e rioc1 s .

C o Transmi.ssior; se curity Has above avera..-e duri.!,r the operation. One :o:npletu 9:: 1 ohaD1(o Has cxperi €lJced a nd the trans i ti t'D I'as made smoothlv.

L9. (e) EFGINFER : Upon ir,iti.al occupation of ::SB ;,irborne, ,)l1e (1) er.~inE'er )latoon was utilized to i:~prove f i.f'.htiIlR h'.Inkers, clear fields :-:' fire, en-at(' l e',i heli. copter pads and .:'enera lly expand the fi.re base .

' r \ \, -. ' I

c* Execu ti.m :

( i) T1-x infantry mission required a careful and thorough search of the imediate tcmain sumoundjng j?S?j hirb orne; cmequently, C/2-319th was wxy limited in jrOVidii>? fix+ suppart due to the proximity of the maneuver clcmen-i;~ to FL33 Airborne,

Avrn-cc-c ( _w'iil ... _ .. e!!l'~c~. '''' • .."nl ~-t...

SUBJECT: Combat Mter Action Rep~rt OFDRD 3-69 (.',PflCFE Sn014) (U)

a. Mission: Provide 2-506th Inf artillery .<iupDort fDr Operation AP!tCl1F,

b. 2-501th provide

Concept: The Inf in plac2. r'irect Support

2-506th Inf ,ras i.rserted or. F'~.'3 ;,irbornc re.HevirlP' the C/2-J19th and C/2-11th (-) remained ~n F'SB Hrborne to and General Support Rcinforcin" fires for the 2-506th Inf

(1) The infantry miGsion required a careful and thorough search of tJ12 im'ledj.ate tcrTain surrounding FSB Airborne; c:msequently, C/2-3l9th was very Limi ted in providir,'? fin') support due to the proximity of: the maneuver clements ~o F SB Airb:Jrne.

(2) B/2-3l9th Artv, located on 1<'58 Berchestc-;orocn, DrTridc,d fire 811;:0-

lort for the majority of the'missions fj.red for the ~·-SC6th In1',

(3) L,-Tfth Lrty em;') (-) provided ",:cnCr2c. suppDrt ncinforcirw fires Dr the 2-506th Inf. Tho highly moblie and resp=,nsive ARI\ s(,cticns are a def­

cnite asset to the ;:;round corrrnander.

d, Ana:l.ysis; Tli8 key to successful indirect fiTe support is rapj.d respons )f the Direct :3upport Artillery Battery. flirPlDbile ooncepts dve the PTcund ~orr.mander various means Df suoportin" fires. AIM 18 l1sually alerted at the time \cntaet is initiated, on ';;03tion time varied betHeen 10 and 15 minutes; thus tub .rtHlery must have been employed and adjusted prior to the arrival of the ARA ;ection. If this has b,wn accomplishcd, the £;C'ound commander or observer can ldjust tube artillery and AI1A simultaneously. However, if the artillery unit Irovidinr, direct support cannot react prior to the arrival of the JlJtA section, oordir;ation cannot be made between the tube artillery and the Aerial Rocket rtillery, therefore, it is imperative that the reactbll time of t.he tube artil­ery from the time the missi em is reCe ived t,o the time 'Ghe rDund is fired be ess than;; minutes. It is a must that an air obser'""r be on stati.~Jn to provide ssistancc tD f:.bo ground observer-that is in contact. :'~ountain0US terrain is ery deceiving to the ground observer; visual contact to the impact is impossi­Ie, thus a round :l;r!pacting 200 meters on the opposite slope of the ground ob­crver's posHi?n moy s?und as th:lUgh it is at a far "reater distance. High ngle fire Has pr:~)narily utilized resulting in an adc',;LtioIl31 hazard~ In order CIT t.hef.~L~Ound Dl:<39Y",'f:)r to pr8vide himself with c1ose-in !:;upporting fires, he ust hav(: an ,~(c~ditil)nel set of ey-r:.:s in the sky.

1. (E)

a . Reconnaissance by fire.

(1) Itern! ·:pJ..oyin[~~ deJ.,;)y:ing: ano

<ancuver elements eDC0untcr-ad s:'Ja11 1, \l;\ tea::1S usually· harassin~ t3c t-,ics creating c~.s'~21tics an(~ tirnc 1 ":!s t .

. ·"c, II" I" .•.. , Ul\l .... r,0::::II'\C.;_-' db ?? ! G; ," ~: .. ~)T I H!

(2) solution: Extensive use of ~~3cl;n by indirect fire on planned outes of advance and the use of Pik7k Teams to screen areas to the immediate rant of maneuver elements reduces the possibility of this type of encounter nd causes the enemy to dove, thereby exposing him and keeping him off balance. requent reconnaissance by fire, additionally, benefits the ground commander 17 that he is able to encage the enemy with tildirect fire quickly by shiftirjg ram fired in targets.

b. Stay behind forw,

(2) 2; ulu i;;i 92 : Normal dip$ng and preparation of 8'DPs causes noise and !veals friendly Zocations, To avoid indirect fire attack, the maneuver element !nds a SiWI.1 reconcaissan~c force to secure the proposed 8DP. After the hours ' darkness, tk;E: co?xpany m.oves slowly and quj_etly TV the location and further Ito a perimter without digtig firhtjng positions, The arca for the PDP should rntain epough brus'il and undergrowth to hide the eXe%ent from visual detection+ me key to successful execution i s holdin(r movement t;lo a minimum.

d. ;3,dcWxkmal prstection for the poix?t man.

:UBJECT: Combat :.itel" Action Report CPCH.D 3-69 (;J'r}r!E'"".9N''W'fl/(fJ-;l''')

(2) Solution: Extensive use of recon by indirect fire on planned ou tes of advance and the use of Pink Teams to screen areas to the immedia te ront of maneuver elements reduces the possibility of this type of enco~nter nd causes the enemy to move, thereby exposinl!, him and keeping him off balance. requent n)connaissance by fire, additicnally, benefits the ground commander n that he is able to enl!age the enemy with llJdirect fire quickly by shifting rom fired in targets .

b. Stay behind forC e .

(1) Item : In efforts t o maintain c~ntinua1 surveillance of fri.endly le:nents, small r VA units, usua lly 2 to 3 indivi dua' .. =:. attempt to foU,,;{ man­lver c'Jmpanies .

(~) SOl~1 t.i0n: 1~~l1 e n€VBr possible, a s!N3l1 f:;ree ShCl·.'J.d re ~TJai r: i.n t.L~:;. ('CViOL' S night ci ef.\~nsive position in an ambush p ')stG l~ as thj.G ).;) Qf:C in~ tance

~e re friendly forces ap2 able to choose the 1 :>c8ti::m of CC):-;t2 Ct . Th;s t actic 13 effectively em!)1oyecl yie1dino; one (1) enemy} KIA during (perati'Jn ;\P) CEE ':OI;J.

c . Use of ste alt}: [.;hile entering night defensive positions.

(1 ) I t ern : Avoidin 2: enemy indirect Lire att.ack "hile i.n 1m::>.

(2) SolutiGn: Normal digg ing and preparatbn of NDPs causes noise and ,veals friendl y locations. To avoid indirect fire attack, the maneuver e lement ,nds a small rec onr;aissanc c force to secure the proposed NDP . After the hours ~ darkn ess , thE; company moves slowly and quietly to the location and further ito a perimeter Hithout digqing fighting positions . The area for the NDP should mtain enough brush and und.}rgrowth to hide the dement f r om visual detection. Ie key to successi\;l execution is holdin9' movement to a minimum.

d. Additi':lnal prstection for the point man.

{I) Ikm : The point clement is J:lo r e susceptible to booby trap.s and .ectinR U, :"D:;;oIF;nts, therC:\!Jre, all p !Jssible inE)asuT'CS sh:)uld be employed to xthsr protect these personnel.

( 2) S",l'ut ; on ' "hortl-y a.&''''' ,·· -- .:--,----.j...: .... - ........ CroD .. ~\.. .................... 1' T"I ..... { .... ~ on~ ;.,... - .... • ...... _ J . uC .1. ....L 1 1J,tJ..L.o;;;U«:;;;lIU~ ~J .--:. ........ , ........ ~ fi .l. J C ....................... t"oi ......... .:.. __ _

.ack men ,'ill \>1 ,,;11' brcas t protec tors (of the sam€ va riet.y· worn by rotary win,,; , 'iators anci do')r 7unnors). One il) p!Jssibly tw o (2) sol(He r's lives were saved i !'\ contact dur i.n:., t\~.!." oper2ti2IJ. :\lhile the loleirrht mu st be cons i dered a dis­Ivant.%:e to weerin:! the c'1est protector, this can be !J'IB','come by rotC'tin>; the. lint and s13c:< 1r.en ilt frequent jnt.a r v<lJ.s ;J nd also by a recistribption of trei.r .'Jipment 3D 2.$ to make the additis-nal WGir:ht as l:)earatle as possible .

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AVrG-CC-C SlffiJf.CT: Combat iU'ter Acti:Jl1 Re!.'SII"t CPC'?JJ ) -69 (t.PAC;'E src!i) (r;)

(1) Item: To av:;d aircraft b:>:Jby tra :)s. f:jrcraft bO,)0Y trape en; located in all pDssible lamin(; zones thro u'!h~l1 t the .',C ,

(2) .soluti on: Th:lUgh t.his bettalion d!_d n'Jt ICypcriencc any aircraf~ destruction due to booby traps, it is fECIt that the possibility Has red uced by the use of artillery and ARA on all possible landin ~ z~nes prior to a ircraft entry, Booby traps '!,encrally consist of C!lICCY'. claymore mines facine the sky .. lith pull-type firing meChanisms act i vated by the rDtor wash. Pr eparat i on b/ Artillery and f:1U" directly on the landing zone effe:::tively detonc:tes or se '/ers the lin8s connected to the firing device. Increased usa of Dais y Cutter bomb3 to estoblish future l2ndin": z::Jnes and grea wr airmobile flexibility re::1uce the likslihood of aircraft damage throu r;h epemy mining · n.:: tiyitY-1'1cl"121y h:V ':, :1[; l:;~i c

tical problem encountered ,'hen mining a la r v.e numb er oi' l ane':h'1 "; :':0008 .

(f) Destructbn of captured enemy equi.pment ~nd mater ial.

(1) Item : Evacuaticn of enem.'t (:!. q1.1j.pme ~:t ,':3nd ~a·i~0rl.aj_ rr'Jvcd a til!i ':; ­con2~mipr, taSK in t HO instan ces du ):in~; t he opc rat .l":,,!,, (; 1"18 :'"1c,;l '.' l':. v el' c-.:-:npany required J days to tJove 2000 rounds of :rnor t~u" 3:-10 lLCf,. 2ni1iunition to a. suj.t8c::e lanci inc: ZDne . I n ,moUlGr instance, one day Has requ i n":- te) rr,JVC LLvs tons of rice to an adequ ate bcation for extraci;io!i ,

(2) Soluti:cn! In certain situations, destruction of enemy caches lG tho only l'i' iJ$Dmlble solution. It is llnd'31~stanc13blo that capture.:' enemy r;Doc have an ~_nteJ.:U_"encE; anc tra :'ninp: value, heMc,vc r, cS:1sido r8t.bn must be civr<D to t.he 1 ?cation , ease of extrac tion, and time requ i.r6d Df a mao euve r e l ement in relatiDn- to tbeir mission.

2 Incl 1 - In t clligen Ce I r. clo811 re 2 - Opcr:: t.i:;rlS Overlay

DI STRIBU TIC 1-; : 30 - l Olst Abn Div 32 - 3d .3 do S3

!: - 2-506 File

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GEORGE:' OKr"J,Cro CFT, ra'a!ltry Adjutant

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?. (C) Tl!RIWN: Operatzion I'iPACHE STQld WELT conducted ti the A Shau-k LUO~ GI..JAz~~, a traditianal NW/XT established base ama and infiltration mute. The ?-@6th lnf area af operation was located northeast 19 the A Luoi Palley bounded qr <grids YD3Ox2, E&Ulg, m26O3 and YD30c)1e The valley varies in width from 150 xAers to two (2) kilometers. Average e~evat5.t~~ is from 575 meters in the valh: Flanks to 17&O meters k, the northeast. Slopes on the roPlkq terrain vary frw Z-l5 per cent and as s-lxep as 80 per cent CXI higher elevations.

1 (C) VBETATICi$: Multi-canopied iid muuntaixls throughout the area,

dense underzround forest dcsminate the C-1~s The lower slopes are c~verzd with bn-shwxA

ind elephant grass.

b. Durinp the 9peratj.on: The EXI~Y moved the 800th and 802nd Battalions If the 6th KVA.%@nent into the area of operatiorls. HOWeVer, in the latter lart of May, both battalkxx FJere withdrawn frapl $he &II* Contact with enemy 'orces during the operatiola consjsted of engagements with trail wakhers and

iquad-size elements. Contact was broken by the enemy on each occasir>n.

c, Results and effects of the o,peration: Cc3Oued pnz~ure by US ,F'orces II the AC forced the enemy to abandon his cache sifxs and coztinuauy relxate is forces. This action resulted ti cache sites lxi~~g abandxed, which were 'ound and destroyed or evacuated by IJs %cjrces, During the operation, the enemy 'as required to curta II his res~~pply operatf;in$ to elements in t;he mountains, lo thF: northeast, He was compd..led t;&wiQ~Iraw main fcrce tInits back across t&e ,autian border and resort to a role of observation and harassment of Allied pzrations,

Inclosure 1 (INTELLIGENCE INCWSURE) to After Action Report APA0HE ~/cw (U)

L. (C) TERRAIN: Operation APACHE Si()\'I' was conducted in the Ii Shall-/; Luoi valley, il traditional NVA/VC established base area and infiltration route. The ~-506th Inf area of' operation was located llortheast of the A Luoi Valley bounded )y grids YD3012, YD4109, YD2603 and YD3001. The valley varies in width from 150 neters to two (2) kilometers. Averarr8 elevation is from 575 meters in the valle: ['lanks to 1740 meters ill the northeast. Slopes on the rolling terrain vary f::'Dr' ?-l5 per cent and as steep as 80 per cent on higher elevations.

~. (C ) VIDETATIC: ll : !"lulti-canopied dense under"round fores t dominate the hUb md mountains throughout the area. The lower slopes are covered with bI'l ' shw:lCxi md elephant grass.

l. (C) WE,',THER: Heather is the major factor which has ahlays l imited milit.ary lperati':ms in t he it Shau-.~ Luoi Valley area. Du::,i~; .. : the ;:'eporti<i, pe: i ~;d , leather <::onditi~ns were exceptionally ~oxl, Id .~.'" te': ·,~ .: ratur'1s b,. :.·"" con::; istentl~' cn t he 80-90 degree range . Farly morlling and ·.late c: .~·;~2I'n0 0!1 10K ':e i.linrr cl id nut lrlterfere .rith combat ope rations or r e sui)ply.

~. (C) E1'"EMY ACTIVITIES:

a. Prior to operation: Prior to the operation, the enemy had free use ~f 'outes, wa rehouses and base areas • . Enemy forceD in t.he area of operat5.0ns con­listed of transportation type units. CDmbat units could be massed and had the :apabHity of conducting. offensivE) operations.

b. During the operation: The enemy moved the BOOth and 802nd Ea ttalions If the 6th NVA Hegiment into the area of operations. However, in the latter ,art, of May, both battalions ,Iere withdrawn from the AO. Contact with enemy 'orees du ring the operation consisted of em;ilgements 1-lith trail watchers and :quad-size elem(,nts. Contact was .broke.n by the enemy on each occasion.

c. Results and effects of the ope ration: CC:jtinued pressure by US Forces .n the AO forced the enemy to ab<lndon his cache sites and cor. tinually rel :>cate is forces. This action resulted in cache sites being ahand:::ned, .. hich were 'ound and des troyed or evacuated by US Forces. Durin -::- the operation, the enemy 'as required to curtail his resupply operati0ns to elements in the mountains, ,0 the northeast. He was compelled to-.. ithdraw main f('rce units back across the .aotian borde r and resort to a role of observation and harl:i3sment of Allied >perations .

, . a . Thirty-three (33) contac t s "rere made with the er:emy d:'1rin '7 the rep0rtin<:

)criod . The follo'o/iw,: empbyment ap-ainst US Forces was enCChJDterer..

(l) RPG Fin : : Extcns lye L1Se of t.be H'-',} 2 and 7 were uSf!d durin!! 8;,.,h t 8) cor:t~ct.s , :!'esdting in i'Clur (4) TTS/KIA and Spventeen (I?) US/ltlH. This wea­

·Dn i o; som "times employed wi th mortar fire t.o confuse U.s Forces as to the direct-On an~ typ·o f ; 1" 8_ \,;.-·,e." 0 r L' re '8 ' VI' n ., c· ~ -- _ 'u .". ._ c .,. f. UNCU,v~

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G . :a I' DU Q i ii' L. UI~vLJ-\;:''''t-IL:U Tab A (Trails Overlay.) to Inclosure 1 (INTELLIGENCE IkCLOSURE) to Operation APACHE SN:)W (U)

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~Dsu re 2 (OPERATIONS OVERLilY) to After Acti on Report [,PACHE SNOW' (U)

Hap , 1:50,000, RVN, sheet 6441 IV

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22 May-7 June 69

APACHE SNOW Overlay Summary

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