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PEOPLE vs. ARAGON
FACTS:
FIRST MARRIAGE:
September 28, 1925:
The accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima,
contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the
Philippine Independent Church in Cebu.
SECOND MARRIAGE:
August 27, 1934:
While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the
accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted
a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in the Santa
Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a
traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where
he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he
maintained his first wife, Gorrea.
August 5, 1939
First wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City.
After Maria Gorrea's death, the accused brought Maria
Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not
live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in
1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes
because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the
accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria
Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing
treatment of her eyesight.
THIRD MARRIAGE:
October 3, 1953
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu.
Although the accused made an attempt to deny his
previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however,
believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said
second marriage was fully established not only by the
certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony
of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors
of the wedding, and the identification of the accused
made by Maria Faicol.
ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of bigamy with regards to his third
marriage?
RULING:
NO. Prior the Family Code, a judicial decree declaring a
marriage as void ab initio is not required.
The second marriage (Faicol and Aragon) is void ab initio
because it was celebrated during the subsistence of a
previous marriage. 3rd marriage is valid. Aragon is not
guilty of bigamy.
MERCADO v. TAN
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma
Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with
Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not
know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado, and after a
month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared
marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing
the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
RULING:
YES. Mercado is guilty of bigamy. A judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed
bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without
the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge.
TENEBRO v. CA
FACTS:
Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The
two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In
1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a
certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be
proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further
argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been
declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.
Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
RULING:
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the
first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug
Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages
(except those falling under the principle of psychological
incapacity) should be allowed to be used as a valid
defense for bigamy. Void ab initio marriages require no
judicial decree to establish their nullity. It is true that the
Revised Penal Code does not require the first or second
marriage to be declared void to avoid a criminal case of
bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable
marriages - because again, void ab initio marriages really
do not need such judicial decree.
Just in case: the OTHER ARAGON case
PEOPLE v. ARAGON
FACTS:
Aragon was charged with the crime of bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C.
Palomer on September 21, 1947, while his previous valid
marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting and
had not been dissolved. While the said case was pending
trial, Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil action in the same
court against Aragon alleging that the latter "by means
of force, threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced
plaintiff to marry him” and praying that the marriage be
annulled. Aragon filed a motion in the criminal case for
bigamy, praying that the criminal charge be provisionally
dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for
annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial
question. The court denied this motion on the ground
that the validity of the second marriage may be
determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. This
appeal has been presented to this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prejudicial question exists between the
annulment case filed by Palomer and the criminal case
for bigamy against Aragon.
RULING:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which
arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court; this is first element. Jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is
the second element.
In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused
claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right
to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the
civil action for nullity must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the
first marriage is a prejudicial question.
Should Palomer’s allegations regarding Aragon’s use of
force be true, it is no doubt illegal and void, however, this
does not bar him from prosecution against the crime of
bigamy. The pendency of the civil action for the
annulment of the marriage filed by Palomer, is absolutely
immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-
appellant. It does not determine the existence of any of
the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon
is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.