Timing Mediation Initiatives

8/4/2019 Timing Mediation Initiatives

1/57

STALEMATE

AWAYOU

T

RIPE

N

FUTU

REMEDIATOR

I. William Zartman and Alvaro de Soto

Timing

mediaTionInitiatives


2/57

Step 4: Rip en the Stalemate and a Way Out

Ripen the Stalemate

Use Diplomatic Measures

Employ Economic Measures

Apply Military Measures

Ripen the Attractiveness of Negotiating

Use Diplomatic Measures to Rerame the Conict

Declare a Willingness to Engage

Determine Prenegotiation Functions

Step 5: pOSitiOn OneSe lf aS a futuRe mediatOR

note: Sps squl. thy lp shul b p

huhu h pss.

Step 1: aSSeSS the exiStence and peRcepti On Of a

Stalemate

Identify Objective Indicators

Determine I a Stalemate Exists

Assess the Extent o Hurt

Analyze Costs That Produce Pain

Recognize That Losses Are a Sign of Pain

Evaluate Changes in Leadership

Assess Changes in Allies

Identify Subjective Indicators

Evaluate the Meaning behind Ofcial Statements

Assess Unofcial Statements in Public Media

Step 2: aSSeSS the exiStence and peRcepti On Of a

Way Out

Identify Objective Indicators

Evaluate Ofcial Statements

Assess Preliminary Signs o Cooperation

Identify Subjective Indicators

Step 3: induce RecOgnitiOn Of the Stalemate and a

Way Out

Induce Recognition of Stalemate and Pain

Directly Encourage the Perception o a Stalemate

Indirectly Encourage the Perception o a Stalemate

Induce Perceptions of a Way Out

Sell Solutions

Encourage Perceptions

Display Creativity

timing me diation ini tiativeS


3/57

iming Mediation Initiatives


4/57


5/57

United States Institute o Peace

Washington, D.C.

Timing

mediaTion

Initiatives

I. William Zartman and Alvaro de Soto

Conict Management ProgramThe Paul H. Nitze School o Advanced International StudiesThe Johns Hopkins University

Washington, D.C.


6/57

Te Peacemakers oolkitSeries Editors: A. Heather Coyne and Nigel Quinney

Te views expressed in this report are those o the authors alone. Tey do not necessarilyreect views o the United States Institute o Peace.

United States Institute o Peace1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700Fax: 202-429-6063E-mail: [email protected]: www.usip.org

2010 by the Endowment o the United States Institute o Peace. All rights reserved.

First published 2010.

o request permission to photocopy or reprint materials or course use, contact CopyrightClearance Center at www.copyright.com.

Printed in the United States o America

Te paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements o American NationalStandards or Inormation SciencePermance o Paper or Printed Library Materials,ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Zartman, I. William.

iming mediation initiatives / I. William Zartman and Alvaro de Soto.

p. cm. (Conict management program)

Includes bibliographical reerences.

ISBN 978-1-60127-058-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Mediation, International. I. Soto, Alvaro de, 1943- II. itle.

JZ6045.Z39 2010

303.69dc22

2010005548


7/57

Contents

Checkpoints ...................................................................... Inside Front Cover

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 5

Step 1: Assess the Existence and Perception o a Stalemate ...................... 11

Step 2: Assess the Existence and Perception o a Way Out ....................... 23

Step 3: Induce Recognition o the Stalemate and a Way Out ................... 29

Step 4: Ripen the Stalemate and a Way Out ................................................ 35

Step 5: Position Onesel as a Future Mediator ............................................ 43

Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 45

Notes ................................................................................................................ 47

Further Reading .............................................................................................. 48

About the Authors .......................................................................................... 49

About the Conict Management Program at SAIS ................................... 50

About the United States Institute o Peace .................................................. 51


8/57


9/57

55

Introduction

I it is to succeed, a mediation initiative cannot be launched at just anytime; the conict must be ripe or the initiation o negotiation. Partiesresolve their conict only when they have to do sowhen each partyseorts to achieve a unilaterally satisactory result are blocked and theparties eel trapped in an uncomortable and costly predicament.

Te idea o a ripe moment is by no means new or otherwise unamiliarto diplomats. Ripeness o time is one o the absolute essences odiplomacy, wrote John Campbell more than thirty years ago. You have to

do the right thing at the right time.1

wo years earlier, Henry Kissingerhad recognized that stalemate is the most propitious condition orsettlement.

2Chester A. Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary o state or Arica

between 1981 and 1989, said o the Namibian dispute, Te second halo 1987 was . . . the moment when the situation ripened.

3Conversely,

practitioners oen say that mediation is not advisable because a conictis not yet ripe. In mid-1992, in the midst o ongoing conict, the Iraniandeputy oreign minister noted, Te situation in Azerbaijan is not ripe or

such moves or mediation.4

Te concept o a ripe moment centers on the conicting partiesperception o a mutually hurting stalemate thatoptimallyisassociated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe.When parties nd themselves locked in a conict that they cannot escalateto victory and this deadlock is painul to both o them (although notnecessarily in equal degree or or the same reasons), they seek analternative policy, or a way out. Te catastrophe is an indication o pain

that might increase sharply i prompt action to alter the situation is nottaken. Te stalemate can be viewed as a plateau (a at and unpromisingterrain without relie), and the catastrophe as a precipice (the point wherethings suddenly and predictably get worse). A more dynamic metaphor is


10/57

6

Peacemakers oolkit

that o the moment when the upper hand slips and the lower hand rises,

both parties moving toward equality, with both movements carrying painor each party.

Certain elements are necessary or ripeness to occur. In the rst place,all conicting parties must perceive a stalemate. Yet, while ripeness is amatter o perception, that perception is usually related to objectiveconditions. Tese can be brought to the conicting parties attention by amediator or an opposing party i they are not immediately recognized bythe party itsel, and they can be resisted so long as the conicting partyreuses or is otherwise able to block out their perception. It is theperception o the objective condition, not the condition itsel, that makesor a mutually hurting stalemate. I the parties do not recognize that theyare in an impasse, a mutually hurting stalemate has not (yet) occurred; ithe parties do perceive themselves to be at an impasse, no matter howimsy the evidence, a mutually hurting stalemate exists.

Te other element necessary or a ripe moment is also perceptional: a

sense o a way out. Parties do not have to be able to identiy a specicsolution, but they must have the sense that a negotiated solution is possibleand that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search ora solution. Without a sense o a way out, the push or resolution associatedwith a mutually hurting stalemate leaves the parties with nowhere to go.

Ripeness is not sel-implementing; it is only the necessary butinsufcient condition or the inauguration o negotiation or mediation,and so it presents an opportunity or mediators. Ripeness must be seized,

either by the parties or (i not) by a mediator. Yet, the existence o ripenessguarantees no results by itsel. Not all ripe moments are seized and turnedinto negotiations; implementation o mediation depends rst onrecognition o the ripeness and then on exploitation o the moment.

5

Ripeness is thereore not predictive in the sense that one can orecastwhen a given situation will become ripe. It is predictive in the sense oproviding a point at which to identiy the elements necessary (i notsufcient) or the productive inauguration o negotiations. As such, the

state o ripeness is o great value to policymakers seeking to know whenand how to begin a peace process.

Te absence o ripeness is not a valid reason or inaction. Prospectivemediators (and the parties themselves) can develop a policy o ripening,


11/57

7

Introduction

cultivating both objective and subjective elements o ripeness i these

elements do not appear on their own. I ripening is unproductive, theallback position or the prospective mediator is positioning, making surethe parties realize that the mediator is present and available whenever theyare ready to listen. wo challenges are posed by this notion: how torecognize ripeness and what to do about it. Finding a ripe momentrequires conducting research and intelligence studies to identiy objectiveand subjective indicators o ripeness. o establish whether ripeness exists,prospective mediators should regularly study objective acts as well as

subjective expressions o pain, impasse, and inability to bear the cost ourther escalation related to the objective evidence o stalemate, casualties,and material costs, along with expressions o a sense o a way out.

Tis toolkit lays out the steps mediators can take to recognize ripenessthemselves, to oster the parties perception o ripeness, and to ripen theconict. Step 1 describes how the mediator should assess whether amutually hurting stalemate exists and, i it does, how painul it is. Step 2ocuses on assessing the parties perception o a way out. In each o these

steps, the mediator should assess both objective conditions (such as risingcosts o conict or the parties) that testiy to the existence o stalemate,pain, and possibilities o a joint search or an outcome, and subjectiveindicators (such as ofcial statements by the parties) that show that theparties actually perceive the stalemate, the hurt associated with it, and thepossibility o negotiations. Step 3 presents measures the mediator can taketo induce the parties perception o a stalemate and a way out. Step 4explains how to enhance objective conditions or ripeness, creating a

stalemate and the pain associated with it as a basis or urther eorts toencourage the perception o the new acts. I ripening is not possible, amediator should take Step 5, which involves the mediator positioning sothat the parties recognize that they can turn to the mediator or help whenthe situation eventually becomes ripe.

A Word to the Mediator

Te ollowing material is written or all types o mediators, to be used and

adapted as circumstances and capabilities demand. However, mediatorscome in dierent shapes and sizes, and this aects what they can do.Great-power mediators are guided by their own interests, the mostimportant o which is the need to see an end to the conict. Conicting


12/57

8

Peacemakers oolkit

parties, in turn, are governed as much by the importance o demands o

their relationship with the mediator as by their interests directly in theconict. Tus, a more powerul state can be a mediator with muscle,playing an active role, serving as a mediator as manipulator with themeans to sweeten the outcome and restrain the conict i necessary. Tesemediators can have a useul role in ripening the conict objectively and inchanging the parties perception o it, but they should avoid imposingtheir own solutions, leaving ownership o the solution rmly in the handso the parties. States o course do not mediate; their agents do, and a

great-power mediator must be careul to ensure that the mandate underwhich he or she operates is clear and that the various agencies at home areully behind the mission.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and weaker states have theadvantage o being less suspect or their interest in mediation. Tus, theycan urge awareness o the stalemate and its associated pain and canpropose solutions in a more disinterested way. However, they have littleor no power to alter events, and relationships with the conicting parties

may be o less interest to them than to great-power mediators.

Te United Nations is located somewhere between the two, but has anadditional constraint: UN mediators are ully dependent on the mandategiven them by the UN Security Council. Te UN secretary-general mayinitiate a mediating process on his own but only at his own risk and mustnot get too ar out ahead o the Security Council. Te institution oriends o the secretary-general and his special representative (SRSG)

is a particularly helpul device to ensure that support. Te SRSG canthreaten to withdraw the mediation i the parties do not cooperate, butas with the NGOs and small states, that threat is about the only pressureavailable. Mediation is 90 percent persuasion in any case.

Whatever the mediator, i there is more than one the most importantimperative is coordination! Multiple mediators can easily becomecompeting mediators, undercutting each other and weakening theirposition (while expecting to strengthen it) with the parties, who can play

them o against each other in an outbidding process. Multiple mediatorscan reinorce each other, on the condition that they agree on a leadmediator and consult among themselves requently. NGOs and smallstates can make contacts and provide ideas that large states cannot, andthey deserve attention rom the lead mediator.


13/57

9

Introduction

The Peacemakers Toolkit

This handbook is part o the series The Peacemakers Toolkit, which is beingpublished by the United States Institute o Peace.

For twenty-ve years, the United States Institute o Peace has supportedthe work o mediators through research, training programs, workshops, andpublications designed to discover and disseminate the keys to eectivemediation. The Institutemandated by the U.S. Congress to help prevent,manage, and resolve international confict through nonviolent meanshas conceived oThe Peacemakers Toolkitas a way o combining its own

accumulated expertise with that o other organizations active in the eldo mediation. Most publications in the series are produced jointly by theInstitute and a partner organization. All publications are careully reviewedbeore publication by highly experienced mediators to ensure that the nalproduct will be a useul and reliable resource or practitioners.

The Online Version

There is an online version oThe Peacemakers Toolkitthat not only pres-

ents the text o this handbook but also connects readers to a vast web oinormation. Links in the online version give readers immediate access toa considerable variety o publications, news reports, directories, and othersources o data regarding ongoing mediation initiatives, case studies,theoretical rameworks, and education and training. These links enable theonline Toolkitto serve as a you are here map to the larger literature onmediation.


14/57


15/57

11

Step 1

Assess the Existence and

Perception o a Stalemate

Identiy Objective Indicators

Objective indicators provide evidence o the existence o a stalemate andpain associated with it. Objective indicators can include events external tothe actions o the parties, as well as the behavior o the parties themselves.

Determine I a Stalemate Exists

Stalemate means parties are caught in a conict that they cannot win at anacceptable cost: Tey cannot escalate their way to victory.

Are the conicting parties stuck in a stalemate? Is the conict activeor merely rozen in inactivity? Have there been attempts by either sideto escalate its way out o the stalemate by militaryor even political

means? Have those eorts produced no clear outcome except to showthat winning is impossible? In these cases, the message is evident andthe evidence o a mutual stalemate is direct. Te best evidence or adesire to escalate is an attempt to escalate, but the parties may alsoannounce plans, make threats, leak intentions, and so on. But that is notenough; it is the ailure o the escalation (all back) that produces thehurting stalemate.

Israel and Hamas escalated their conict in Gaza in early 2008 until they

saw that neither could prevail over the other; an inormal cease-re andsecret negotiations ensued; the cycle was repeated again at a higher levelo intensity at the beginning o 2009, with the stated purpose, on the parto Israel, o restoring the deterrent capacity it had earlier lost.


16/57

12

Peacemakers oolkit

In 1965, India and Pakistan launched a series o escalations over the

Rann o Kutch and Kashmir that demonstrated that Pakistan could not takeKashmir by orce and India could threaten but not take Lahore; exhausted,both sides ell back into a cease-re demanded by the United Nations andthen a ull truce mediated by the Soviet Union.

In Angola in 1986, both the South Arican Deense Force and theAngolan army supported by Cuban troops attempted to change the battleline around Cuito Canevale and ailed, setting the scene or negotiation.

In November 1989, a major oensive by the Frente Farabundo Martpara la Liberacin Nacional (FMLN) ailed to ignite a popular insurrectionagainst the armed orces, leading it to conclude that negotiation was theonly way out; the armed orces ailure to crush the oensive brought theEl Salvador government to the realization that, aer eight years o eort, itcould not deeat the insurgents, leaving negotiation as the only way out.

Te message o ailed escalations is particularly clear i one indicator iscombined with others; or example, i the eorts to escalate are costly andadd to an already unacceptable burden that the escalation seeks to escape,or i the stalemated eorts begin to produce increased casualtiesin otherwords, i there is clear evidence not only o a stalemate but o one thathurts (see the section Assess the Extent o Hurt, below).

In South Arica in 1990, newly elected National Party chair and primeminister F. W. de Klerk saw that the regime was no longer able to provide thewhite minority with security and prosperity, to contain and control the black

majority, or to claim international acceptance and legitimacy, and that thecost o these ailings was steadily rising.

Has one side made successul attacks in the conict but then with-drawn to its previous positions? Such escalations to call (as opposed toescalations to raise) show the opponent that one party can escalate butdoes not want to and preers to negotiate.

In the last year o the second Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Iraq repeatedly

penetrated Iran and then withdrew, calling on Iran to negotiate an endto hostilities, which it then did. In the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, theUnited States maintained its blockade but reduced the perimeter, as it leta Russian ship not carrying missile parts pass.


17/57

13

Step 1: Assess the Existence and Perception o a Stalemate

Assess the Extent o Hurt

Hurt means that the parties are suering some costs or lossesphysical,nancial, or less tangibleas a result o the stalemate. Although hurt issubjective, it is a response to objective conditions that should cause paini they would only realize it. Both parties must eel hurt and stymied or astalemate to exist, although it is rare that they eel so to the same degree.Mutual does not imply symmetry; it simply means that each party eelsdamaged by the stalemate. I one party hurts more than the other(s), it is achallenge to the mediator to bring them to ocus on their own pain and

not on the dierence in the perceived degree o pain.

Analyze Costs Tat Produce Pain. Rising absolute costs are clearindicators o a painul stalemate i they do not produce results and i theimbalance between costs and results is noted in a public outcry. Are risingnancial costs o the conict evident?

Relative costs can indicate pain when measured against some standard.Are costs rising above an acceptable level, independent o their results? Te

acceptable level may have been proclaimed ahead o time in governmentstatements or suddenly discovered as the costs rise. Are costs risingcompared with expectations in relation either to anticipated outlays or toanticipated results? Results may be achieved, but not to the extent that theparties have led themselves or their public supporters to expect.

Opportunity costs, where conict costs prevent other preerableexpenditures, can also indicate pain. Are popular or necessary alternatives

being dropped or lack o unds? Budget, construction, or programmaticdiscussions may indicate the elimination o items in times o belt-tightening.

Costsabsolute, relative, or opportunitycan be calculated usingpublic inormation augmented by other sources; the costs themselves arehard statistics. Te elements against which costs are compared, such assimilarly acceptable levels and expectations, are also statistics, althoughprobably less sharply advertised, and can be gleaned rom public media,since they are the basis or public reactions.

Recognize Tat Losses Are a Sign o Pain. Te same kind o reerencepoints used to evaluate costs can be used in regard to losses: ofcially orunofcially expressed expectations and acceptable limits. As with costs,


18/57

14

Peacemakers oolkit

both the absolute gure or losses and the gap between losses and

expectations inict pain. Are body bags and other measures o casualtiesthat indicate the costs in human lives on the rise?

Rising U.S. casualties in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s, andthe absence o decisive results, brought home to Washington and Hanoi theneed to negotiate.

Te makeup o casualties matters too: Not all body bags are equal. Is acrucial social or economic group suering disproportionately? Again,

expectations and limits come into the calculation.

When white body bags came back to South Arica rom Angola in198586, the ruling minority began to take notice and prepared to negotiate.

Rising numbers o reugees and internally displaced persons mightindicate population losses or the home state or costs or the host state.

External events may be a source o losses. Have climatic disasters

such as droughts and oods occurred and produced unexpected losses? Suchevents can make pursuit o the conict dicult and change the combatantschances or success. Such unanticipated losses (and costs) cause pain not onlyin the absolute sense but also relative to expectations, since they comeliterallyout o the blue.

Te 2005 tsunami caused heavy casualties to both sides (but particularlythe rebels) in the war over Aceh in Indonesia, leading directly to the openingo negotiations under oreign mediation. Te 1990 drought in southeast

Arica caused heavy losses or the population o Mozambique and openedthe way or the hurting, stalemated sides to begin negotiations mediated bySantEgidio and later the United Nations.

Climatic hazards do not automatically cause a mutually hurtingstalemate, but they may harden the conict. A potential mediator mustcareully watch to see which way the winds are blowing on the ground.

Te drought in the mid-1970s in the Horn o Arica brought Ogadenireugees to Mogadishu to urge the Somali government to drive Ethiopiansout o their lands.


19/57

15


Calculations o losses can be made using public inormation augmented

by other sources; the weight o losses can be discerned rom ofcialstatements and commentaries in the media. Hard data about rst-levellosses (i.e., data about the losses themselves) can generate second-levellosses such as the loss o public condence and support. Losses are morelikely to be the subject o public demonstrations than are costs; suchdemonstrations indicate the objective extent o publicly elt pain.

Evaluate Changes in Leadership. Leadership changes can be second-level indicators o a mutually hurting stalemate, but interpreting suchchanges is not always a straightorward business. Te replacement oa hard-liner with a so-liner, or a rightist with a leist, may be anunambiguous sign o recognition o the need to seek an end to theconict. However, it may take a hard-liner or a leader with strongnationalist credentials not only to recognize that his or her countryneeds an agreement with the opponent but also to carry the body politicinto a change o policy. Changes to a so-liner or an accommodationiststance that do not produce the opening o negotiations can lead to a

second policy reversal and a closing o the window o ripeness.

Te replacement o Glafos Clerides by assos Papadopoulos as GreekCypriot leader as EU accession drew near in early 2004 drastically reducedprospects or a settlement o the conict in Cyprus.

Te change need not only be at the top; the removal o hard-lineadvisors or, in harsher systems, the repression o extremists providesincumbents with greater latitude to act on their own.

Te advent to power o General Charles de Gaulle in 1958 brought Franceinto negotiations with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) to enda war that neither side could win militarily. Te advent to power o anothergeneral, Dwight Eisenhower, in 1952 opened the Korean War to a productiveturn o negotiations. Te advent o a third general, Itzak Rabin in Israel in1992, brought productive negotiations out o a double stalemate, both in theIsraeli-Palestinian war and in the Madrid-Washington peace talks.

Te arrival o military personnel to political leadership is not, ocourse, the only indicator o a painully stalemated conict and a ripenessor negotiations; the advent, by election or not, o so-liners is a second-level indicator o a mutually hurting stalemate.


20/57

16

Peacemakers oolkit

Te election o more moderate or leist civilians provided an indication

o a mutually hurting stalemate in both parts o Cyprus in 2008 (thoughit was dampened by the deeat o the urkish Cypriot leaders orces inlegislative elections); in the United States in 1974 in regard to the PanamaCanal dispute; in Argentina in 1984 in regard to the Beagle Channel dispute;and in Ecuador in 1998 in regard to the Peru-Ecuador border dispute.

Te reasons the new leadership gained power and any accompanyingmessages must be studied or signs o recognition that the conict is in astalemate and it hurts.

Assess Changes in Allies. Changes in allies can also constitute objectiveindicators o a mutually hurting stalemate and point to a change indirection toward negotiation or mediation. External allies may eel costsand losses themselves, they may change their views o the desirability ocontinuing the conict, or they may change governments to a new regimethat demotes the conicts importance. I external allies begin to suerrom the continuation o the conict, they can lessen their support or it,

undergoing a hurting stalemate themselves. I external allies begin to eelthe conict is costly or them, regardless o its eect on the partiesthemselves, this perception can be conveyed to the parties.

Te external supporters o the Patriotic Front and the independentgovernment o Rhodesia in 1979 elt the hurting stalemate beore theconicting parties themselves and leaned on the parties to accept mediation.Te conict was costing them good relations among other allies, notablyother Arican states and the United States, and their reputation was suering

or not bringing the conict to an end.

By 2009, external supporters o both sides in the Western SaharanconictSpain, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, aswell as members o the Arican Union who had been strong-armed intorecognizing the Sahrawi governmentwere beginning to tire o thelong-running (since 1974) conict, which threatened to blow up, and beganto look or a compromise even though any compromise would all short o

sel-determination.

Are external patrons seeking to rein in the conict they are notwinning because it is no longer in their interest or is actually hurtingthem, rather than using the conicting parties as their proxies merely to


21/57

17


damage the other side? Are external patrons or both sides initiating

contacts between themselves, discussing making peace regardless owhether the conicting parties want to reach a settlement?

Tis type o disengagement by the superpowers at the end o the ColdWar was typical o the period and led to the initiation o negotiations in anumber o conicts in Central America and Arica. As the Cold War beganto wind down, the external supporters o the Angolan government, theSouth-West Arican Peoples Organization (SWAPO), the South Aricanregime, and the National Union or the otal Independence o Angola(UNIA) ound the conict not worth pursuing and the stalemate toopainul to bear and so leaned on their proxies to begin serious negotiations.

Internal allies can provide indications o a mutually hurting stalemate.Have crucial elements o support or the government become disaectedby the unsuccessul pursuit o the conict, to the point o looking or away out (see Step 2, below)? Te allies need not go so ar as to actuallyseek a way out on their own; grumbling, signs o reusal to support the

parties, interviews, and statements signal a growing dissatisaction that thegovernment is well advised to heed.

With the Northern Ireland economy weakening and the Irish tigerclimbing by the early 1990s, Ulster businesspeople (most o them Protestant)began to call or a single island economy. Te Northern Ireland Coned-eration o British Industries issued a paper supporting peace initiatives.

In El Salvador, the hurting nature o the military conict was elt above

all by large landowners, who in response to the rising costs o agriculturalproduction had moved their activities to urban industry and commerce andso no longer needed the war but could buy into a limited land-or-peaceormula to end it. Contacts between business leaders and the FMLN parallelto the ocial negotiations indicated such a trend. Te shi in interests o thelanded class, the backbone o the government party, ARENA, le thegovernment with only the army as an ally or its conict policy, and thearmy was the group that was stalemated.

Tese various indications o hurt and stalemate are cumulative: Temore that are available, the more they can trigger the perception o astalemate, and the more easily the mediator can make the case that itshould be perceived. However, even single indicators can be powerul


22/57

18

Peacemakers oolkit

goads to perception: When costs or body bags or allies support are o

great importance, these objective indicators can be sufcient to attractattention. Not all indicators need be present or a stalemate to exist, andthe absence o cost, pain, and the like need not obliterate other indicatorsi they are compelling.

Identiy Subjective Indicators

Ripeness does not exist without a subjective perception o a mutuallyhurting stalemate and a way out. In most cases, subjective indicators are a

response to objective events. Sometimes, however, subjective perceptionsare not rooted in objective realitybut perception o an objective eventthat does not exist may produce the same result.

Subjective indicators o a mutually hurting stalematethat is, statementsand comments by the parties that betray a lack o condence in securing amilitary victory and a discomort in that impasseprovide the necessaryevidence o a mutually hurting stalemate. Te perect indicator would read

something like, We ound ourselves stalemated in the conict and it hurt,so we decided to look or an alternate way o dealing with the conict.

Evaluate the Meaning behind Ofcial Statements

Ofcial statements may provide evidence that the parties recognize thatthey are indeed in a stalemate and it is painul in terms o losses or costs(or both). Are there statements o impending catastrophe, conict atigue,escalation utility, or waning public support? Are policy changes, such as

escalations to call, being discussed or introduced?

Joe Slovo, Communist Party leader in South Arica, said as negotiationstook shape in the early 1990s, Te National Party couldnt rule any longer,and we [the Arican National Congress (ANC)] couldnt seize power by orce.So that means both sides have to compromise.

6

In a dierent type o conict, a conict with nature but also with otherparties over action to take, the U.S. representative at the Ad Hoc Working

Group that would eventually prepare the Vienna Convention or theProtection o the Ozone Layer in March 1985 said in January that themargin o error between complacency [stalemate] and catastrophe [hurt] istoo small or comort.

7


23/57

19


Are there indirect indications, such as re-evaluations o interests,

readjustments o goals, or the announcement o alternative plans or thepursuit o the conict, that point to the hurting stalemate as their cause?

President Nixon indicated a policy o drawing down troops in Vietnamand relying on local eorts to ensure deense in the Asian arena beore talkson mutual troop withdrawals actually began.

Oen there is no observable expression o a mutually hurting stale-mate. Te subjective indicator is hidden in inner decision-making circles

or even in a decision makers mind, posing an exceptional challenge to themediator, who must pick up on that perception even when ofcial circlesare closed.

Te Pakistani government turned to negotiations with the hill tribes andthe aliban in 2008 and 2009 because the costs o the conict rose above thepublicly acceptable level and were producing gains only or the insurgenciesin the North. Te Aghan government sought negotiations with the alibanat the same time or the same reasons. Tese decision-making processes wereaccompanied by inormal discussions, rumors, interviews, leaks, andstatements to and by the media.

Subjective indicators can come in many orms. Te mediator should besensitive to source, tone, and wording o statements. Te smaller thesubjective indication o a mutually hurting stalemate, the more it warrantsinvestigation and encouragement. Indicators are not likely to come as broad,clear statements, at least not initially, but rather as slight changes in standard

language, leaks, back channel messages, trial balloons, and the like. Nor areinitial indicators likely to come as unambiguous messages; they may well becontradicted by ofcial statements at the same time. Indeed, such contra-dictions may be an indication o policy debates within the conict party,showing the need to encourage the perception o an opening.

Assess Unofcial Statements in Public Media

Te media may provide an indirect indication o the subjective perception

o a mutually hurting stalemate. Are there editorials and op-eds bywell-placed observers analyzing the situation, airing possibilities, andoering solutions? Are there protests against rising costs, unachievedresults, or costs above an acceptable level, rom the public or governments?


24/57

20

Peacemakers oolkit

Are there public reactions o pain, that is, indicators o the gap between

costs and expectations?

Oen the line between ofcialdom and unofcialdom is porous, withmessages going both ways. Unofcial statements can be used to test ideasbeore they are issued by ofcials. Tey can also be used to express ideas,pass them to ofcialdom, and build public support or them. In countriessusceptible to public pressure, rising public opposition to policiescontinuing the conict can lay the ground or ofcial recognition o aneed or policy change. Even (or perhaps, especially) in authoritariancountries, rising public opposition to a policy can be maniested in subtleways and is watched careully by the incumbent regime (as in the case ogovernment attention in Morocco and Algeria to public attitudes toward theSaharan conict).

Unofcial statements can be used to issue trial balloons designed toattract reactions rom the other side. Such statements can be related tospecic objective pressures, such as sanctions, conict losses, or declining

domestic ortunes, and also to soer pressures, such as public condem-nations, loss o domestic support, or assessments o vulnerability.

As de Soto noted in El Salvador, As the dust settled, the notion that theconict could not be solved by military means, and that its persistence wascausing pain that could no longer be endured, began to take shape. Teoensive codied the existence o a mutually hurting stalemate. Te conictwas ripe or a negotiated solution.

Te same procedures in regard to ofcial statements apply to unofcialsubjective indications o a mutually hurting stalemate. On the one hand,the mediator and his or her team should be well-read and alert tostatements beyond those rom ofcial leaders and spokespersons. Whetherin a society o controlled or o ree public expression, the mediating teamshould careully screen the media and opinion leaders to identiy trends inthought and inuential commentaries. On the other hand, the mediatingteam must be extremely sensitive to nuances in such statements and

should consider whether those nuances are tentative expressions oevolving thinking within ofcial circles or deliberate attempts to introducenew thinking and perceptions into those circles, that is, whether thestatements come rom or go to policymakers. Ofcial statements carry


25/57

21


more weight, but unofcial statements may be signicant in illuminating

subtle shis and initial turns in policy. Ofcial statements need not beormal announcements; they can appear in press interviews, in legislativehearings, or in the context o discussions. Tereore, the mediating teammust be alert to small indications o change. Although team membersshould be listening or any change in tone rom conict parties, anassigned number o specied channels should be established to acilitatesignal detection.


26/57


27/57

23

Step 2

Assess the Existence and

Perception o a Way OutIn assessing whether a way out o the stalemate existsas in assessing theripeness o a stalematethe mediator must look or both objective andsubjective indicators. Way out does not necessarily mean that theconicting parties have identied a mutually acceptable solution to theirconict, but it does mean that both parties have perceived that they and

the other party are willing to look or a joint solution.

Objective indicators are less distinguishable rom subjective indicatorsor the way out than or the mutually hurting stalemate because theexistence o the way out is itsel primarily subjective and depends on eachpartys perception o the other partys intentions. An objective indicator o away out may be an action or statement by one party; a subjective indicatormay be the other sides perception o that move as an encouragement to talk.

In January 2006, Hamas won a majority in Palestinian legislativeelections, earning it the right to lead a government. (Te Quartet had earliersupported Hamass participation as part o Palestinian Authority PresidentAbbass inclusive strategy aimed at bringing the most powerul resistancemovement into the mainstream.) Hamas had taken signicant steps byagreeing to and complying with a unilateral cessation o attacks against Israel.Hamas oered to include Abbass Fateh in a unity governmentanotherobjective indicator. Hamass overtures were rebued by the Quartet, which

instead set strict conditions or engagement with and cut o aid to thePalestinian Authority, under which Israel in eect blockaded the Palestinians.

In March 2009, President Obama coupled New Year greetings to Iranwith a riendly wish to engage in dialogue, an objective indicator; the


28/57

24

Peacemakers oolkit

Iranian response was to pile on additional conditions, an indicator o the

absence (at least or the moment) o a subjective perception o a way out.

Identiy Objective Indicators

Te process o assessing objective evidence o a way out begins withidentiying the willingness o each side to look or a joint solution as analternative to the pursuit o escalation and victory. Unlike mutuallyhurting stalemate indicators, way out indicators are not external to theparties actions or statements but are ound in the moves o each party.

Tere are ewer objective indicators o a way out than there are objectiveindicators o a mutually hurting stalemate because the ormer depend on asignal o some sort rom one side: In other words, they are to some extentan amalgam o objective and subjective indicators.

Evaluate Ofcial Statements

Ofcial statements may indicate greater openness to talking or awillingness to drop preconditions. Have one or both parties issuedstatements announcing a change either in substantive positions or inpolicies toward a joint search or agreement? Has one party gone so ar asto indicate its intention to seek negotiations (as occurred in NorthernIreland in 1996)?

Unilateral cease-res can be ambiguous indicators, because cease-resmay serve only as an opportunity to reprovision or rearm military orces,but they may also constitute a trial balloon leading to talks. Has one o the

parties ordered a unilateral cease-re? Such announcements should beinvestigated and pursued.

De-escalation o goals rom holistic or abstract aims to specicpurposes can lay the ground or a negotiable way out. Has one o theparties made public statements that drop a crucial element o previousconditions? In the absence o changes in positions, statements o revisedinterests can provide an indirect indication o a sense o a way out. Whatis not said can be as signicant as what is said. Statements may be made

to the media, in parliament, or via any other venue, international ordomestic, that gets the message across. Because they are tentative, suchstatements may well oat only as trial balloons, coupled with denials andcontradictions in order not to make the policy change seem too abrupt


29/57

25

Step 2: Assess the Existence and Perception o a Way Out

while awaiting response rom the other side. Te mediator and the other

side need to be alert to such subtle messages.

Tree days into the Cuban stalemate, on October 25, 1962, John Scali,an ABC correspondent, received an urgent invitation to lunch rom a Sovietembassy ocial, who presented what would become the ultimate ormulaor agreement to resolve the Missile Crisis but to which he added conditionslater that evening; the dmarche, rather than its wobbly substance, was clearindication o a way out.

Assess Preliminary Signs o Cooperation

Are there new joint actions, cooperation in nonconict programs, cease-re actions, exchanges o prisoners or wounded, assurances o troopmovements, declarations o non-hostile intentions, or exchanges ogreetings and memorial messages?

Te amous Ping-Pong diplomacy between the United States and Chinaindicated a soening o relations that opened the way to talks over the

renewal o diplomatic contacts between the two countries.

Objective indicators o the possibility o a way out may be ound ininormal statements, op-eds, media and conerence discussions, and evenactions indicating that the government should give some indication o awillingness to explore discussions with the adversary. Parts o society thatnormally support the government, such as business groups, can give suchindications even i the government does not. Such statements, it should benoted, are merely pressure; it takes a similar statement rom the govern-ment to constitute solid evidence o a willingness to seek a way out. Leaksregarding splits within rebel leadership can turn into objective evidence osuch willingness, creating an opening that the government might seize.

Beginning in 1986, South Arican businesspeople traveled to Zimbabweto meet ANC leaders to investigate the possibility o resolving the conictbetween the two parts o society and their political representatives. Fouryears later, talks began.

Identiy Subjective Indicators

For the mediator, recognizing a way out involves nding signs o thesubjective perception o the possibility o a way out by both parties. Te


30/57

26

Peacemakers oolkit

perect indicator would read something like, We think our opponent is

willing to join us in looking or a solution, or more broadly, Te way to anegotiated solution is less encumbered than might have appeared.

When looking or subjective indicators o a way out, mediators shouldask themselves the ollowing kinds o questions: Has one side recentlyreerred to past moments o cohabitation or cooperation with the otherside, made positive comments about the other side, issued statements thatseek to de-demonize the other side, or recognized the other sides needs

and aims? Has there been a decrease in negative statements about theother party, in insistence on the need to win at any cost or the certainty odoing so, or in the valor o holding out at all costs or the patriotic cause?

Have previously insurmountable obstacles to negotiations orunacceptable conditions to an agreement been removed? Have previousmaximum goals, humbling preconditions, or preliminary capitulationsbeen reduced?

A journalist covering the Aceh conict noted, the scale o the tsunamidisaster was so huge . . . that hearts and minds there seem to have changed.Te [Aceh separatist movement] decided to suspend at least its ambition toachieve independence because . . . rebuildingnot ghtingwas thepriority.

8

Catching subjective indicators requires a tuned ear and a sharp eye,because the parties will usually avoid overt statements lest they sound likea capitulation instead o an invitation. Mediators should be attentive or

any signs that the door to negotiation is opening.

In February 2009, the Algerian prime minister gave a number oulllable conditions to Morocco or the opening o their common borderwithout, or the rst time, mentioning the Western Saharan conict, anindication o a possible path to a way out in the relations between the twoparties to the conict.

Mediators may be able to perceive subjective indicators o a way out

directly via general contacts with the conicting parties. Discussions withthe parties may yield no explicit admission that they are tired enough oattempts to break the stalemate to be open to considering negotiations,but the mediator may sense such a change o heart.


31/57

27

Step 2: Assess the Existence and Perception o a Way Out

A U.S. State Department ocial working on Bosnia stated in August

1995, Events on the ground have made it propitious to try again to get thenegotiations started. Te Serbs are on the run a bit. Tat wont last orever.So we are taking the obvious major step.

9

Right aer the 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador that heightened thesense o the mutually hurting stalemate, President Alberto Fujimori o Perudeclared that the existing boundaries will remain demarcated, a little morein a curved line, but the demarcation will be completed and the problemwill be nished, a declaration that drew much public criticism because itsuggested that a negotiated settlement o the remaining problem was beingconsidered, as indeed it was.

10


32/57


33/57

29

Step 3

Induce Recognition o the

Stalemate and a Way OutWhen conicting parties cannot see the mess they are in and are notreceptive to the possibility o mediated negotiations, the mediator needs tohelp them perceive their stalemate and the pain associated with it and thepossibility o negotiating a way out. Tese acts o ripening assume that,objectively, a hurting stalemate and the possibility o negotiating a

compromise exist and that the subjective appreciation o these acts isabsent. Te parties will resist, consciously or subconsciously, because theywant to win and because they do not want to recognize the situation oentrapment that they have created or themselvesor simply because theydo not agree with the mediators assessment, possibly because they are inpossession o inormation that contradicts it.

Induce Recognition o Stalemate and Pain

All the mediators skills o persuasion are called on when the mediatormust induce the parties to the conict to recognize that a hurtingstalemate exists. Conversations beginning with Dont you think that?Dont you see that? How long can you? What do you thinko? are good openers. Diplomacy involves eorts to help the parties seethe importance o ending the conict early rather than prolonging it in thehopes o better ortunes in the uture. Because continued conict meanscontinued costs, and probably rising costs as well, the mediator should

strive to persuade the parties to calculate and compare the price they willpay or holding out or an uncertain victory with the benets they willaccrue rom negotiating sooner rather than later.


34/57

30

Peacemakers oolkit

Directly Encourage the Perception o a Stalemate

Te mediator should begin by empathizing with and expressing under-standing o the position o the party being addressed, and then drawattention to the acts and press or signs o recognition. One tactic is tostart either with the hurt or the stalemate, and then relate it to the otherelement. Mediators should work to ree the parties rom thinking in termso the conict and their goals in it and instead look to uture opportunitiesand alternatives and creative ways out o it, moving rom mutually hurtingstalemate to a way out.

Secretary o State Henry Kissinger, meeting with the Israeli cabinet oGolda Meir, explained that he understood the position o Israel in reusing tonegotiate with Egypt but then, with a historians eloquence, lamented howthe lost opportunity would look some years hence, when the costs o ailing tonegotiate would have become apparent.

11

Te mediator might draw parallels with other situations where theparties ound themselves in a hurting stalemate and suggest similarities tothe current situation.

When Robert Doussou was persuading Beninois dictator MatthieuKerekou to reach an agreement with the NGOs pressing or a newconstitution, Kerekou was said to be deeply impressed by CNN reporting onthe situation o Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu as he aced (but didnot give in to) the same sort o popular pressure.

Te mediator should encourage the parties to think about thesustainability o the present course and to evaluate its costs and losses,to consider the strength o the opponent and evaluate the chances oovercoming the other side, and to reect on the chances o winning andits costs and the chances and costs o the opponents attempt to win. Temediator should encourage the parties to evaluate the possibilities oescalation and to undertake a cost-benet analysis o their own escalationsand their eorts to counter the opponents escalation.

Indirectly Encourage the Perception o a Stalemate

Te mediator can encourage other parties to work as riends o themediator and impress upon the conicting parties the painul impasse inwhich they are caught. Te mediator may be able to plant, discreetly, an


35/57

31

Step 3: Induce Recognition o the Stalemate and a Way Out

awareness o the stalemate and its hurt in op-eds and other articles in the

media, as well as among opinion leaders, riends o decision makers, andother mutual contacts. Te parties allies may also be helpul in spurring aperception o the stalemate and its hurt. Can the parties allies be inducedto reduce or terminate their support or continuing eorts to bear orbreak out o the stalemate, and to indicate that they will no longer pourresources into eorts to do so? Can alternative goals be encouraged thatwould draw resources and attention away rom the conict situation andbring out the stalemate that characterizes it? Can other parties in similar

situations be brought in to testiy?

rack-II eorts can also be used, directly or indirectly, to encourage theparties perception o a stalemate. For instance, the mediator may oersupport to NGOs that host sessions at which supporters o one or bothparties are asked to analyze the current conict situation and to try tounderstand the other sides perspective on the conict.

Induce Perceptions o a Way Out

Te mediator can induce recognition o a way out by identiying possibleand acceptable outcomes and persuading each party that the other seesthat possibility as well. Te mediator should test salient solutions oracceptability, air alternative solutions i a single salient solution does notexist, develop ideas about possible solutions i no salient solution exists,and bring up components o a solution i compensation or construction isrequired. In this step, the mediators riend is the phrase, What would youdo i?

Sell Solutions

Perception o a way out does not require agreement on a particularsolution but on the perception that, objectively, a solution is possible;consideration o the possible types o solution can help convince partiesthat there is an attainable goal toward which to work.

Te mediator should help identiy a salient solution on which the

parties might agree. Salient solutions are those that stand out as prominentand discussed terms o agreement to end the conict. I there are two (ormore) salient solutions, the mediator should ocus either on compromises,in which each party gives in a little in exchange or the others concessions


36/57

32

Peacemakers oolkit

until they reach a rough midpoint between their initial positions, or on a

set ocompensations, in which each party buys the achievement o anapproximation o its goals with the payment o an agreement to theothers achievement o its goals. In the case o compensation, can otherissues be brought in to balance one partys achievement o some or all oits goals? I no salient solutions exist, the construction o a new denitiono the conict and a new set o terms as the basis o a joint agreement isthe next aim. Can such solutions, or component elements that can capturethe parties attention and creativity, be identied as objectively possible?

Encourage Perceptions

Mediators should determine i outside parties can be enlisted toencourage the perception o negotiability and reciprocity. Perhapsriends o the mediator can be engaged to carry the same message.Diplomatic gatherings, consultation sessions, and articles in the press mayoer opportunities to bring out positive attitudes o the other side andelaborate means o testing them. Can discussions and conerences be

organized to bring out the negative value o demonizing, critically evaluatethe useulness o maximum preconditions, or examine the topic What isthis conict like, and what precedents exist or solutions? Can rack-IIeorts be employed to bring unofcial representatives o the partiestogether to test possibilities? Can joint meetings be scheduled to see i theusual conrontation can be turned into some potential openings ordialogue sessions to compare uture hopes?

During the civil war in Guatemala, Lutheran and Catholic churches

began contacts with both sides, ending in a meeting in Norway whererepresentatives concluded a meal by assuming blame or the current conict,a rst step in engaging in a conversation on uture aspirations.

In Liberia in 1993 and Ivory Coast in 2003, dialogue sessions were heldamong leaders o all conicting parties, programmed on our questions:Where is our country now? Where do we want it to be ve or ten years romnow? What prevents us rom attaining these goals? How can we overcome

these obstacles? Te dialogue opened possibilities o ruitul urtherdiscussions.


37/57

33

Step 3: Induce Recognition o the Stalemate and a Way Out

Display Creativity

Te mediator may need to creatively recast the situation. Can aspects opast attempts at resolution be retained? Is there something to be learnedrom examining the reasons or ailure as a guide to overcoming obstacles?What is this conict like? How were others resolved? Do similar conictssuggest similar solutions? Alternatively, do dierences rom similarconicts suggest new angles? What are the real reasons behind the otherpartys positions, and how might they be addressed?

Because timing mediation initiatives depends so heavily on theperception o the parties, not just on the realities on the ground, theeectiveness o a mediator depends in large part on his or her skill inshaping and inuencing those perceptions and in introducing innovativeways o looking at the conict that capture the attention o the parties.


38/57


39/57

35

Step 4

Ripen the Stalemate and a

Way OutI the parties do not perceive a hurting stalemate and a way out thatconstitutes a ripe moment, the mediator may have to take a more activerole in ripening the situation. I inducing recognition (the subject oStep 3) means working on the subjective appreciation o the situation,ripening (the subject o this step) may mean changing the objective

conditions. In so doing, the mediator moves rom a role as a communi-cator (carrying messages) and a ormulator (bringing ideas) to that o amanipulator (changing conditions), a more intrusive role that is suitableor more powerul mediators, not or smaller states and NGOs.

Te purpose o ripening is to bring the parties to the objective conditiono a mutually hurting stalemate and, more specically, to equalize the sidesso that neither party eels beaten in the conict or too weak to ace theopponent in negotiation. Parties eeling too weak or unequal are reluctant

to meet their opponent in negotiation and may well be unable to hold totheir agreement i one is reached. Te process o ripening also involvesgoing beyond inducing the perception o a way out to creating attractivesolutions and encouraging the parties to consider them.

Ripen the Stalemate

Ripening reers to measures taken to bring the conict to a stalemate.

Use Diplomatic Measures

Negative measures in the orm othreats and warnings may be required.Promises and positive predictions do not stand out clearly unless they are


40/57

36

Peacemakers oolkit

contrasted with worse alternatives, which may be presented in the orm

o applied threats or oreseen warnings. Te mediator should indicatepotential negative measures the mediating country would be prepared totake i the conicting party or parties reuse to acknowledge the impasseinto which they are escalating. Mediators oen make the mistake o seeingtheir role as only oering positive prospects, when in act they need alsoto indicateand sometimes ensurethe likelihood o worse prospects imediation is not accepted.

Mediators should point out the two-handed policy on which mediationis based: better prospects i mediation is accepted and pursued, worseconsequences i it is reused. Such threats and warnings should be statedevenhandedly, but i one o the parties is recalcitrant, it may need to besubjected to criticism or blocking the process. Mediators should rewardpositive responses to pressures with praise.

Conicts are ripened when the cost o third-party relations outweighs thepotential benets o the conict. A third-party mediator can help bring about

a stalemate by indicating that its own relations with the conicting partiescan be aected by their response to its eorts to end the conict; mediatorsserve as crutches or surrogates or trust between the parties, and oen theirrelations with the parties are more important than the cost o the conict.

France summoned the warring Ivorian parties to Marcoussis in 2003 tomake peaceand they came because o their concern or relations withParis. Te United States played the same role in the Sudan conict leadingup to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. A similar approach was

taken by the UN secretary-general in inviting Cypriot leaders rst to NewYork and then to Switzerland in a last-ditch attempt to nalize a settlementbeore EU accession in the rst trimester o 2004.

Te most specic diplomatic threat and evocation o relations is thethreat to leave the process. Te mediator should make it clear thatmediation will continue as long as there is sincere participation in theprocess, but that bad aith will be identied and can cause the mediation

to end. Te mediator should remember, however, that ending mediationand attaching blame means ending mediation or a long while; withdrawalwith blame is not conducive to taking up the process again soon.


41/57

37

Step 4: Ripen the Stalemate and a Way Out

President Carter always announces that his mediation implies an honest

eort and that i one o the parties does not play sincerely, he will terminatehis engagement and indicate the uncooperative party, as he did in 1988 inthe Ethiopian civil war over Eritrea. In contrast, President Clinton promisedthat he would not ascribe blame i the Camp David II mediation ailed, butthen castigated Palestinian chairman Yasir Araat or being uncooperative.

Another ocus o diplomatic ripening measures involves closing outalternative mediation and support channels and ocusing parties attentionon the stalemate and a sole mediator. Mediators should show would-bemediators that competing eorts will only encourage outbidding anddiminish the chances o success. Tey should indicate privately whyalternative channels are less likely to produce results, and invite alternativemediators to support a single mediators eorts. However, i othermediators have a better position or other advantages vis--vis the parties,all should join orces to provide a coherent, combined eort. Te mediatormay oer to orm a contact group or encourage others to constitute ariends o the mediator group.

Te Carter team mediating the Congo (Brazzaville) conict in 1999arranged the withdrawal o competing mediators, including the Francophoneand Arican heads o state, in order to avoid outbidding among mediators;it would have been helpul to get Angola to withhold its support or thegovernment in order to acilitate an even playing eld among the threepresidents.

In southwest Arica, Chester Crocker continually repeated that U.S.

mediation was the only game in town, and South Arica realized thatwhen it tried an end run with an alternative mediation using Zambia.

Even a riends o the mediator arrangement is no guarantee that endruns will not be attempted, as evidenced by the Venezuelan presidentsill-advised oray behind the UN secretary-generals back at a dicultmoment in the El Salvador negotiations in 1991.

Public positions in regard to the conict and the parties conictbehavior may serve to demarcate what the mediator regards as permissibleactions, reinorce a stalemate, and indicate limits to the conict.Condemnations o parties actions, either as public statements or as UN


42/57

38

Peacemakers oolkit

resolutions, send powerul messages. Such condemnations are oen

avoided, however, because they may imply a biased stance toward theparties, or are issued only when they can be applied to both sides. Temediator must weigh the risk that a public reprimand could entail to hisor her extremely special, even intimate relationship with parties to aconict, not unlike that between analyst and analysand. Are limitsindicated by public disapproval o specic tactics employed by one side?Do limits apply to both sides that can be used to enorce the stalemate byconstraining impressible escalations?

Employ Economic Measures

Measures such as economic aid, trade agreements, and debt orgivenessmay be used to strengthen one o the parties capabilities and bring about astalemate. Are there economic measures that can help the weaker party stayin the contest and achieve a more equal position in upcoming negotiations?Can economic measures be used as an incentive or greater exibility? Canthey be used to reduce the risk o engagement in talks, to cushion losses in

actual conditions, or to acilitate a shi rom conict to accommodation inthe eyes o the public? Can economic measures be used to assure a party ocontinued relations as it is pressed to make concessions?

Economic measures can also be employed to increase the attractivenesso a solution to both sides. Sometimes the prospect o ending a conict issimply not attractive enough to bring the parties to an agreement. Canadditional benets be oered to the parties as they reocus their attentionon a reramed solution? Can the parties be redirected rom conict to

development and thereby opened to the potential o donor pledges andinternational assistance? Can economic assistance be tied to a plan ordisarmament and demobilization, repatriation, rehabilitation, andreintegration (DDRRR) that would remove the danger otherwise posedby ormer combatants on the loose? Can assistance or reconstruction beoered by the international community as part o the agreement package?

Aer accomplishing two disengagements in the Middle East, on the Sinai

and the Golan Heights in 1974, U.S. mediation eorts ran up against Israelsreusal to proceed with a second Sinai withdrawal. Treat o a sweepingrevaluation o Mideast policythat is, a reconsideration o U.S.-Israelirelationsollowed, as did a massive aid commitment that remains to thisday and that had to be matched or Egypt to break the deadlock.


43/57

39


Negative economic measures can also help to equalize the sides and

bring the parties to a negotiating venue. Withholding a carrot constitutes astick, and removal o a stick constitutes a carrot. Can carrots and sticks beused to nudge the parties into a negotiation mood? Can these be presentedpositively, as adjuncts to a policy aim o resolving conict and introducingpeaceul relations in the interest o both parties?

Te United States promised loan guarantees to Israel to bring it to theMadrid Mediation Forum with the Palestinians and Arab states in 1991.

General sanctions can be used or the same purpose. Sanctions weremajor motivators gaining Slobodan Milosevics participation and agreementin the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia in 1995. General sanctions are ablunt instrument that mostly aect people who are in no position toinuence the behavior o the obdurate leaderas in the case o SaddamHusseinand the risks are such that most mediators should not beassociated with them.

Apply Military Measures

Military measures generally do not involve direct engagement, whichwould compromise the mediator, but rather the extension or withholdingo military support. Te purpose is the same as with economic measures,to keep the parties locked in a stalemated conict that they cannot winand to preserve an equality among them that allows ruitul negotiations.

France established a military interposition orce between the warring

actions in the Ivory Coast in 2005 in hopes o creating an impasse andbringing the actions to negotiations. Te United States provided arms to abeleaguered Morocco in its war or the Western Sahara in 1976 aer havingpreviously reused in order to create a military stalemate and a negotiatingsituation that the Organization o Arican Unity was advocating. Te UnitedStates also supplied arms to Israel aer it was driven rom the Sinai in 1973so that it could return to a battleeld stalemate, producing the mutuallyhurting stalemate that led in turn to the Sinai withdrawals under Kissinger

and the Washington reaty under Carter.

Measures that create a stalemate that ultimately blocks parties rompursuing a strategy aimed at winning are not merely diplomatic tactics butrequire serious commitments rom the mediators home governmenti


44/57

40

Peacemakers oolkit

that government is in a position to go that ar. Te mediator cannot

provide aid, threaten sanctions, threaten withdrawal, or oer sweetenersas a personal initiative or a tactical ploy. Such measures come rom thehome ofce and are part o the ongoing relations between the mediatorscountry and the conicting parties. Tey may well be in the legal domaino the UN Security Council under the UN Charter, but they are not likelyto be within the capability o any but major and interested parties.

Ripen the Attractiveness o Negotiating

Creating the perception o a way out involves oating ideas about possibleormulas or conict management and resolution. Te idea is not to provideterms o agreement but to help the parties think about the possibility onding solutions and attracting the agreement o the other side.

Use Diplomatic Measures to Rerame the Conict

Are there new ideas about enlarging the eld o discussion to providecompensation or compromise or new exchanges and the prospect obuying agreement? When concessions and compensations are notavailable, are there new and dierent ways o thinking about the conict?Oen this thinking involves not just new ways out o the conict but newways o raming the conict itsel. Could the parties articulate basicprinciples that constitute building blocks toward more specic thinkingabout a settlement? Putting aside the substance o an agreement, could theparties be brought to establish a procedure i ever they were to starttalking about an agreement, or at least to handle uture, conceivable

issues that could arise in the conduct o the conict?

When Lord Caradon came up with the ormula territory or securityin UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 as the key alternative tozero-sum denitions o the Arab-Israeli conict, he opened a new denitiono solutions that helped ripen thought and prepare or later negotiations(even though the Arab states rejected all negotiation at the time in the TreeNos o Khartoum).

Te phrase what i comes in again as a useul device: What i welooked at the conict in these terms; would that make a dierence? Canthinking be prompted about small steps to begin the process, includingtruces and cease-res, separation o the parties, a proposed statement o


45/57

41


principles, and a procedural roadmap? Can such measures be proposed to

the parties or issued by the mediator and its riends?

UN Security Council Resolution 435 was a roadmap or the independenceo Namibia that, together with the innumerable suggestions by the team oAssistant Secretary Crocker over a six-year period (198186), prepared theparties or a rapid grasp o the stalemate at the end o the period andsuccessul negotiations in 1987.

UN Security Council Resolution 687 laid down the principles on which

the parties relied to end the Iran-Iraq war.

Te eectiveness o the Quartets roadmap or a two-state solution to theIsraeli-Palestinian conict is marred, however, by the many reservationsattached to it by Israel that nulliy it as an agreed-upon basis or negotiation.

Declare a Willingness to Engage

Te most basic diplomatic indicator o ripening is a signal that a state

(or, occasionally, another party) is ready and willing to mediate. Teavailability o a party that will take on the costs o mediation is anindication o its estimate o the possibility o ripening the situation. Temediator should communicate to the conicting parties a willingness tohelp them end the conict and avoid being deeated. All parties shouldunderstand that the mediators relations with them are important and thattheir interests and point o view are understood. Te mediator shoulddeclare a willingness to engage, using the occasion to lay out parametersthat should guide the eort to a ruitul end, and appeal to the parties toreorient time and resources rom zero-sum conict to positive-sumprograms o joint development.

Determine Prenegotiation Functions

Prenegotiation unctions are items that must be established or decidedupon beore actual negotiations can be initiated; by resolving these issues,the mediator can clear the way or more positive consideration o a way

out. Tese unctions includeidentication o the parties necessary to a settlement as well asidentication o spoilers to be isolated;


46/57

42

Peacemakers oolkit

identication o the issues to be resolved and separation o issues not

resolvable in the conict;

identication o alternatives to the current conict course and to anegotiated agreement;

establishment o contacts and bridges between the parties;

clarication o costs and risks involved in seeking settlement;

establishment o requitement (assurance o reciprocity) between the

parties; andassurance o support or a settlement policy within each partysdomestic constituency.

In many cases, the mediator cannot decide these matters but can helpthe parties ocus on them and, by oating ideas and making suggestions,help the parties move toward preliminary decisions. Oenas in thecases o issues, parties, costs, and riskspreliminary unctions involve

the exchange o assurances between the parties that the prospectivenegotiations will remain within manageable bounds. Te mediator canbring the parties together to build bridges, i only or the process ode-demonization, not or actual negotiation.


47/57

43

Step 5

Position Onesel as a Future

MediatorI active ripening policies ail to attract the parties attention and producemovement toward negotiation, the would-be mediator can always all backon a policy o positioning. Te mediator should constantly remind theparties that he or she is available to help them out o their conict and thattheir path can end only in a stalemate that they cannot win, i they are not

there already. Are there occasions in normal diplomatic contacts when theparties can be reminded o the mediators willingness to mediate? Arethere occasions or public declarations and or private assurances that thepath to accommodation is ready to be opened? Can the mediator throw innew ideas, new ways o thinking, to keep the parties rom remaining stuckin their positions? Can the mediator repeatedly show the parties wheretheir xed positions are leading them, until they ask what the alternativesmight be? Can the mediator get authorization, rom the home ofce or

rom the UN Security Council, to just explore a bit to see what theparties are thinking in inormal moments? Are there occasions to indicateto other potential mediators whether their possible entry would beconsidered an acceptable alternative or whether the positioning partyintends to remain the only game in town?

Te much-touted success o Assistant Secretary o State Crocker inpulling the rabbit out o the hat in the Namibian conict was testimony torecognizing and seizing ripeness, but the less-noticed aspect o his success was

his patient tenacity in positioning or six years until the ripe moment arrived.

In the El Salvador case, UN secretary-general Xavier Prez de Cullarbegan positioning himsel to be useul as early as November 1986, when he


48/57

44

Peacemakers oolkit

met with the secretary-general o the Organization o American States, two

and a hal years beore his role, limited to good oces, was authorized bythe UN Security Council and three years beore the turning point o ripenessallowed a direct role.

As U.S. secretary o state Alexander Haigs eort to deuse the loomingconict in the South Atlantic between the United States allies Argentinaand the United Kingdom waned in 1982, Secretary-General de Cullar putto the parties his willingness to mediate. Tey both accepted his oer, but theconict was not averted. De Cullars eort was handicapped by the ailureo the United States, which had thrown its lot behind the United Kingdom,to apprise him o the state o play at the time o handover.

Conicting parties can be expected to try and try again to prevailin their conict. Reinorcement is the normal response to opposition:Dont give up without a ght, No gain without pain, Hold the course,whatever the cost, When the going gets tough, the tough get going, andI at rst you dont succeed, try, try again are common sayings in any

culture. Tey also represent costly but useul eorts to become urtherlocked into a stalemate and to a realization that the way to victory isblocked. As long as this realization has not yet hit the parties, themediators message is best limited to Here I am i [when] you need me.

U.S. secretary o state James Baker remarked to Congress in 1990 thatwhen the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conict were serious aboutmaking peace, they should call the White House. Te telephone number,he said, is 1-202-456-1414.

Can the danger o entrapment be conveyed to the parties, along withthe willingness o a third party to help them avoid it?


49/57

45

ConclusionParties to a conict need help to extricate themselves. Winning may beunlikely, but the parties may be too embroiled in the conict to perceivethe stalemate or think o a way out. Tey needeven i they do notwelcomethe help o a mediator.

Ripeness is a characteristic o conict, and heightened conict and

attempts at escalation may be necessary to set up the conditions orripeness. I a mediator can help the parties see that danger beore theyprove it to themselves by escalation, the mediator will be perorming agreat service to the parties and to the world.

Te tactics o ripeness involve helping the conicting parties see andemerge rom a mutually hurting stalemate. Te mediator must emphasizethat there are no winners and no losers in ending the conict. Te pathrom a stalemate to an acceptable outcome begins with the conveyedwillingness to seek a way out and a perception by each party that the otherhas that willingness.

Tird parties who see involvement in a conict as mediators intheir interest must begin with their own assessment o ripeness; i theassessment is positive, mediators must convey that act to the conictingparties and help them perceive it. In this process, mediators look orindicators o the objective acts and o the parties perception o them. Te

biggest job o mediators is to enhance that perception; aer that, guidingthe parties toward the discovery o their own solutions ollows naturally(even i not easily).

Once the process o discovery and invention has begun, it is importantto keep the notions o a mutually hurting stalemate and a way out alive.Te perception o a way out turns gradually into a solution, but theperception o a painul stalemate must remain present to keep the partieson track. I they orget it, they may be tempted to drop out o negotiationsand lunge or a one-sided victory.

I such a perception is not orthcoming, the mediator is pulled into themore demanding role o helping to create the stalemate and its associated


50/57

46

Peacemakers oolkit

pain. Acting as a manipulative mediator takes commitment and runs risks,

but it may be the only way to bring the mediation to a successulconclusion.

I all eorts all short but the mediator remains interested in obtaininga positive conclusion, i or no other reason than that the pain o theunresolved conict alls on the mediator as well, the mediator can positionhimsel or hersel or a later useul role. In any case, the mediator must noteel a greater pain than the parties and thereore want a conclusion morethan they do. In that case, the parties have control over the mediatorrather than vice versa, and mediation becomes weak and vulnerable.


51/57

47

Notes1. John Campbell, Successul Negotiation: rieste (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 1976), 73.

2. Henry Kissinger, New York imes, October 12, 1974.

3. Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Arica (New York: Norton, 1992), 363.

4. Agence France Presse, May 17, 1992.

5. At the outset, conusion may arise rom the act that not all negotiations appear to bethe result o a ripe moment. Negotiation may be a tactical interlude, a breather or rest

and rearmament, a sop to external pressure, without any intent o opening a sincere

search or a joint outcome (F. C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate [New York: Harper & Row,

1964]). Tus the need or quotation marks, or or some elusive modier such as

serious or sincere, when describing negotiations. It is difcult at the outset to

determine whether negotiations are serious or sincere, and true and alse motives

may be indistinguishably mixed in the minds o the actors themselves. Many theories

contain a reerence to a alse event or an event in appearance only, as dierentiated

rom an event that has a dened purpose. Indeed, a sense o ripeness may be required to

turn negotiations or side eects into negotiations to resolve conict.6. Quoted in Paul aylor, South Arican Communist Sparks an Explosive Debate,

Washington Post, November 22, 1992, A32.

7. R. E. Benedict, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Saeguarding the Planet, rev. ed.

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 43.

8. Paul Reynolds, Analysis: Politics and the sunami, BBC, December 21, 2005,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacic/4548832.stm.

9. New York imes, August 9, 1995, A7.

10. Eduardo oche, Walter Ledesma, and Pierre Foy, Peru-Eucador: Entre la guerra y la paz(Lima: DESCO, 1998), 63.

11. Matti Golan, Te Secret Conversations o Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the

Middle East(New York: Quadrangle, 1976).


52/57

48

Further ReadingMooradian, Moorad, and Daniel Druckman. Hurting Stalemate orMediation? Te Conict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 19901995.Journal oPeace Research 36, no. 6 (1999): 70927.

ouval, Saadia. Te Peace Brokers: Mediation in the Arab-Israeli Conict,19481979. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982.

ouval, Saadia, and I. W. Zartman, eds. International Mediation in Teoryand Reality. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985.

I. W. Zartman. Ripe or Resolution. New York: Oxord University Press,1989.

. Ripeness: Te Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In Paul Stern andDaniel Druckman, eds., International Conict Resolution aer the Cold

War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000.

. Te Strategy o Preventive Diplomacy in Tird World Conicts.In Alexander George, ed.,Managing US-Soviet Rivalry. Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 1983.

I. W. Zartman and Maureen Berman. Te Practical Negotiator. NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1982.


53/57

49

About the AuthorsI. William Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Distinguished ProessorEmeritus o International Organization and Conict Resolution at theNitze School o Advanced International Studies (SAIS) o the JohnsHopkins University in Washington, D.C., and a member o the SteeringCommittee o the Processes o International Negotiation Program (PIN).

Alvaro de Soto is a senior ellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute orInternational Studies at the City University o New York Graduate Center,an associate ellow o the Geneva Centre or Security Policy, and amember o the Global Leadership Foundation in London. An ambassadorin the Peruvian diplomatic service, he has held senior positions underthree secretaries-general at United Nations headquarters in New York andin the eld.


54/57

50

About the Confict ManagementProgram at SAIS

Te Conict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins UniversitySchool o Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., is a uniqueprogram o graduate studies that teaches and conducts research into theeld o conict management within the context o international relations.

It maintains a oolkit o conict management concepts and issues anannual report based on an onsite inspection on sources o endemicconict and recommendations or its management in a specic conictarea (2006 & 2007 Haiti, 2008 Northern Ireland, 2009 Cyprus, 2010Kosovo). It also conducts PeaceKidZ, a teaching program in selectedWashington D.C. middle schools, also available as a manual. Its programsand publications are available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/unctional-studies/conict-management/index.htm and http://www.

sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/index.htm. Program director is Dr. P. errenceHopmann.


55/57

51

About the United States Instituteo PeaceTe United States Institute o Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institutionestablished and unded by Congress. Te Institute provides analysis, training,and tools to help prevent, manage, and end violent international conicts,promote stability, and proessionalize the eld o peacebuilding.

Chairman o the Board: J. Robinson WestVice Chairman: George E. MoosePresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: ara SonenshineChie Financial Ocer: Michael Graham

Board o DirectorsJ. Robinson West (Chairman), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C.George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Proessor o Practice, Te

George Washington University, Washington, D.C.Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American University,Washington, D.C.Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Proessor o Strategic Studies,School o Fo

Documents

Timing Mediation Initiatives