Time, Eternity and Revelation: The Incarnational Shape of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time and Eternity

8/13/2019 Time, Eternity and Revelation: The Incarnational Shape of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time and Eternity

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2. Barth and Eternity

Barth’s investi gation into the concept of eternity begins with revelation. By “revelation ” Barth does

not mean Scripture, but Jesus Christ, the “reality of God’s revelation,” to whom Scripture points. 1

Revelation is an event, not the record of an event. That event is the incarnation. The incarnation is

therefore the right starting point of any true doctrine.

For Barth, the God attested by revelation is “Wholly Other, ” a God whose freedom is unlimited. Both

these concepts – God’s otherness and freedom – can be seen at pla y in Barth’s invocation of Scripture

for articulating his doctrine of eternity: “Whenever Holy Scripture speaks of God as eternal, it stresses

His freedom. It takes him emphatically out of the realm of man and men, away from all history and all

nature. It sets Him at the beginning and end of all being and on high above it and unfathomably beneath

it.” 2 In order for God to be God, he must be completely free. A God limited by time would not be free,

and therefore would not be what Scripture means by God. In particular, he would not be free to be

constant. Eternity is therefore

the principle of the divine constancy, of the unchangeableness and therefore the reliability of thedivine being. … The reason why He is free to be constant is that time has no power over Him. …eternity is thus the principle of the divine unity, uniqueness and simplicity. When we refer backto G od’s constancy and unity, we find that when we speak of God’s eternity we have to do with afinal word concerning the divine freedom. 3

Barth notes that time was in antiquity depicted as a god , “the god of the world and time, Chronos .”4 But

seen this way it is clear that time has no power over God: “There is no time in itself, rivalling God and

1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics , vol. I.2 (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 10.2 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. , vol. II.1 (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 609.3 Ibid.4 Barth, CD, 2010, I.2:49.



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imposing conditions on Him. There is no god called Chronos. ”5 That is why for Barth, “God is the creator

of time.” 6

Barth begins his definition of eternity this way in order to draw a sharp separation between eternity

and time corresponding to the separation between God and humanity: “Time can have no thing to do

with God.” 7 Indeed, because what Scripture means by “God ” is not simply a large and powerful being

within the Universe, nor even Aristotle’s First Mover, a god still very much within an already existing

structure. No, God is Wholly Other, the self-existent creator of all, who is prior to all. Any attempt to

appeal to time as a boundary or constraint on God’s freedom and power is foreign to the Scriptural

teaching concerning God.

3. Barth s Relation to the Tradition

In affirming God’s eternity as his freedom from the constraints of time, Barth stands in continuity

with the Christian tradition. He applauds the tradition for stressing eternity’s separation from time: “It

is quite correct, as in the older theology, to understand the idea of eternity and therefore God Himself

first of all in this clear antithesis. In the sense mentioned, [eternity] is in fact non- temporality.” 8 He

endorses the famous Boethian definition of time as “ interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta

possessio” – “the complete possession all at once of illimitabl e life. ”9 This definition was the assumed

backdrop of all medieval discourse on eternity. According to Mark Edwards, “the western philosophical

and theological traditions have repeatedly gravitated towards Boethius’ construal as the favored

definition of e ternity.” 10 Stump/Kretzmann put it more strongly: Boethius’ “ definition of eternity was the

5 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics , vol. III.2 (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 456.6 Barth, CD, 2010, I.2:47.7 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:608.8 Ibid.9 Ibid., II.1:610; Tra nslation from Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of

Philosophy 78, no. 8 (August 1981): 431, doi:10.2307/2026047.10 Mark James Edwards, “The Divine Moment: Eternity, Time, and Triune Temporality in Karl Barth’s Church

Dogmatics” (Ph.D., Princeton Theological Seminary, 2013), 3.



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locus classicus for medieval discussions of the concept .”11 Alan Padgett concurs that “the consensus of

Augustine and Boethius dominated the Latin theology of the Mid dle Ages.” 12 Likewise Adrian Langdon

affirms, “Boethius provided what is considered the classical definition of eternity .”13 By approvingly

quoting Boethius, Barth establishes strong continuity with the traditional Christian teaching on eternity.

However, Barth also has a criticism of the tradition. Although traditional concepts (here represented

by Augustine and Anselm) rightly began with the “confrontation between eternity and time,” they were

“far too occupied” with this confrontation to move beyond it and see eternity as itself containing a form

of temporality. 14 This is insufficient for Barth: “it is a poor and short -sighted view to understand God’s

eternity only from the standpoint that it is the negation of time.”15

For the traditional view, “eternity is generally defined in its negative relation to time. While time is

mutable eternity is immutable, while time is flowing eternity is static.” 16 This negative relation is the

right place to start, according to Barth. Eternity must be defined negatively against the limitations of

time. But he insists that there is an important difference between defining eternity only negatively and

also defining it positively – as ‘time plus’ rather than ‘reality minus time’. In this sense Barth endorses

Boethius more strongly than the Christian tradition in general because he sees both the positive and the

negative strands in Boethius’ definition, 17 whereas theologians following Boethius understood only the

negative strand. 18 Barth’s position regarding the tradition is that “ a positive r elation to time … must be

11 Stump and Kretzmann, “Eternity,” 429. 12 Alan G., 1955- Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time , Library of Philosophy and Religion

(Basingstoke :New York: Macmillan ;St. Martin’s Press,, 1992), 46. 13 Adrian E. V. Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary: Trinity, Eternity, and Time in Karl Barth’s ‘Church

Dogmatics’” (Ph.D., McGill Univers ity (Canada), 2009), 14.14 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:610.15 Ibid.16 Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary,” 1. 17 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:610.18 Ibid., II.1:611.



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brought into greater prominence than in the older theology, without cancelling or blurring the

distinction between the two, or imposing upon eternity the limitations of time.” 19

4. Eternity Time and the Incarnation

The reason Barth insists on the importance of a dual positive and negative definition of eternity is

that only this corresponds to the incarnation: “a correct understanding of the concept of eternity is

reached only if we start … from the real fellowship between God and the creature, and therefore

between eternity and time. This means starting from the incarnation of the divine Word in Jesus

Christ.” 20 When we start with the incarnation , Barth argues, “we cannot understand God’s eternity as

pure timelessness.” 21 The incarnation not only means that God has revealed himself in time, it also

means that the eternal has itself entered time: “‘The Word became flesh’ also means ‘the Word became

time’.” 22 Indeed, “the fact that the Word became flesh undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be

eternity, in its very pow er as eternity, eternity became time. Yes, it became time. … In Jesus Christ it

comes about that God takes time to Himself, that He Himself, the eternal One, becomes temporal.” 23

Edwards calls this statement the “ starting point ,” “Barth’s basis for His cons trual of eternity .”24 It leads

Barth to link God with time inextricably, such that he can say, “the eternal God does not live without

time. He is supremely temporal.” 25

The impact of the incarnation on Barth’s conception of eternity cannot be overestimated: “since …

God Himself, without ceasing to be the eternal God, took time and made it His own, we have to confess

that He was able to do this. … If we say that God’s eternity excluded this possibility, we are not speaking

19 Ibid., II.1:613.20 Ibid., II.1:616.21 Ibid., II.1:617.22 Barth, CD, 2010, I.2:50.23 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:616.24 Edwards, “The Divine Moment,” 63. 25 Barth, CD, 2010, III.2:437.



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of the eternity which He has revealed to us.” 26 To define time only negatively is to deny the incarnation:

“if we try to cling to the idea of a divine eternity that is purely timeless, we must be careful that we are

not compelled to deny both God’s revelation and reconciliation in Jesus Christ , and also the triune being

of God revealed and active in them .”27 The temporality of God is a necessary consequence of revelation:

“Without God’s complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.” 28

The incarnation not only shapes Bart h’s concept of eternity, it also underpins his concept of time

itself. While theologies prior to Barth projected a metaphysic of eternity based on a human

understanding of time, Barth does not see this approach as sufficient: “We must let ourselves be told

what time is by revelation itself, and only then, and with that reference, form our idea of the time of

revelation.” 29 It is a signature move for Barth, and it is crucial as a precondition for everything that

follows. Not only is it impossible for human beings to understand God apart from revelation, it is equally

impossible for human beings apart from revelation even to understand themselves. In the same way,

time itself cannot be understood independently of the incarnation any more than can eternity.

The reality of revelation as itself taking place within time has an impact on how we conceive time,

not only epistemologically but also ontologically. The incarnation is an event. 30 An event takes place

within time, thereby validating the objective reality of time. This is why Barth rejects the subjective

definition of time he finds in Augustine. 31 The incarnation means God has invested time with more than

subjective significance: time “must be regarded as a proper reality.” 32

26 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:617.27 Ibid., II.1:618.28 Ibid., II.1:621.29 Barth, CD, 2010, I.2:45.30 Ibid.31 Ibid., I.2:46.32 Ibid.



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In summary, Barth argues that God is both eternal and temporal. He is eternal because time has no

power over him. He is temporal because eternity itself is temporal and not to be understood in a static

way as the mere negation of time. We know eternity has temporal shape because of what the

incarnation reveals about the nature of eternity: that it was able to take time into itself. Eternity

includes rather than excludes time. But we can also only know what time is by means of the incarnation.

The incarnation shows that time has objective reality and cannot be dismissed as purely subjective

experience.

5. Barth s Relation to the Revisionist Perspective

Barth’s insistence on God’s temporality and on the objective reality of time accords with a school of

thought strongly opposed to the traditional view of God’s eternity . The origins of this view can be traced

back to G.W.F. Hegel, who, according to Alan Padgett, “more than anyone else set the stage for the

modern discussion.” 33 Hegel “radically called into question the traditional doctrine of divine eternity.” 34

Afterwards, “no one could take [Hegel’s] thought seriously and still hold to the traditional view of a

changeless, absolutely timeless God.” 35

We shall examine this rejection of divine timelessness as represented by a number of modern

philosophers of religion. 36 They level two charges against the notion of a timeless God. The first of these

is that such a notion is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of the incarnation – or indeed with any

involvement of God in time. Stephen Davies makes the argument that although in theory one could

argue for a timeless God, the Ch ristian God cannot be timeless because he created: “If God creates a

33 Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time , 53.34 Ibid., 54.35 Ibid.; See also George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids,

Mich. ;Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans,, 2000), 188, “[the modern view of eternity] has its philosophical forebears inWhitehead and Hegel.”

36 Although they do not consciously trace their lineage directly to Hegel, their rejection of divine timelessnessis rooted in a common conceptual framework that adopts a revisionist approach to traditional metaphysics ingeneral.



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given temporal thing, then God’s act of creation is itself temporal (though it may be temporally eternal).

If God is timelessly eternal in the sense defined earlier, he cannot create temp oral things.” 37 Another

form of the objection derives from God’s activity in the world. A God who acts must be a God who

changes, and a God who changes cannot be timeless. So Nicholas Wolterstorff writes, “God the

Redeemer cannot be a God eternal. This is so because God the Redeemer is a God who changes. And

any being which changes is a being among whose states there is temporal succession.” 38 Ryan Mullins

argues that the incarnation specifically renders divine timelessness impossible, because in it God took

on temporality and therefore became subject to change. He summarises, “divine timelessness is not

compatible with the incarnation. One must pick either divine timelessness or the incarnation. Christians

cannot give up the incarnation .”39

The second reason given by those who reject divine timelessness is that the concept itself is

incoherent. So Richard Swinburne writes:

God’s timelessness is said to consist in his existing at all moments of human time – simultaneously. … But if t1 is s imultaneous with t2 and t2 with t3, then t1 is simultaneous witht3. So if the instant at which God knows these things were simultaneous with both yesterday,today and tomorrow, then these days would be simultaneous with each other. So yesterdaywould be the same day as today and as tomorrow – which is clearly nonsense. 40

Similarly, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that, “ God exists now . That is to say: God exists at this present

time. And if something exists at a time, that is sufficient for it to be in time. ”41 This amounts to the

position that the existence of time itself negates the possibility of timelessness.

37 Stephen T. Davis, Logic and the Nature of God , Library of Philosophy and Religion (London: Macmillan,,1983), 13.

38 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Is Everlasting,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996), 125 –126.

39 Ryan Mullins, “In Search of a Timeless God” (Ph.D., University of St. Andrews, 2013), 198. 40 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism , Rev., Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford:

Clarendon Press,, 1993), 228.41 Cited in Mullins, “In Search of a Timeless God,” 90. Italics original.



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The use of the incarnation by these thinkers has interesting correspondences to Barth. Both he and

they feel the importance of the incarnation for a Christian doctrine of eternity. Both argue for the

necessity of affirming divine temporality as a result. But for the revisionists, to affirm divine temporality

means to deny divine timelessness, because both cannot possibly be true. For example, Mullins writes,

“When it comes to whether God is temporal or atemporal, there simply is no third way. The two

positions are logically contradictory. If they were logically contrary —like your pet is either a dog or a

cat —we could find another option. With logically contradictory properties —such as either God exists or

does not exist —there are no other options. ”42 For Mullins, the incarnation proves the temporality of

God, so divine atemporality must be abandoned as incompatible with an incarnationally rooted

Christian faith.

Barth, however, while affirming divine temporality in equally strong terms, does not see it as

incompatible with divine atemporality. He affirms both with equal strength. It is this feature of Barth’s

work that makes him at times hard to understand. Daniel Griswold verbs dryly that “Barth’s statements

about God, time, and eternity are sometimes difficult to follow. Indeed, to some they often seem

contradictory. ”43 The seemingly irreconcilable contradictions have led many to abandon Barth’s entire

corpus of work on time and eternity as “edifying nonsense.” 44 Gunton, after puzzling over Barth’s

assertions for a few paragraphs, concludes that “Barth’s statement as a whole is unclear, if not patently

ambiguous. … The truth appears to be that at times Barth defines eternity in th e light of (temporal)

revelation, while at others he opposes it to time.” 45 Others have interpreted Barth as falling into one of

the two opposing camps. Mullins dismisses Barth’s view (represented by two of Barth’s expositors,

42 Ibid., 20.43 Daniel Griswold, “Perichoretic Eternality: God’s Relationship to Time in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics”

(Ph.D., Southern Methodist University, 2010), 6.44 William Lane Craig, approvingly citing Grace Jantzen. Found in Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary,” 68

n.122.45 Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth , Oxford

Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press,, 1978), 180.



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Langdon and Kevin Vanhoozer) a s a “confusion” which “break[s] down into contradiction.” 46 For Mullins,

Barth is essentially an exponent of divine timelessness and to be rejected as such. 47 On the other hand,

Swinburne, although with Mullins rejecting divine timelessness, understands Barth as an ally in the

cause . He writes, “the Incarnation means, according to Barth, that God acts at a particular temporal

moment. Only a temporal being can do this. ”48 He then quotes Barth’s statement that “’without God’s

complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape’.” 49

It is my opinion that the paradox in Barth’s view of eternity arises due to his prior understanding of

the paradox of the incarnation. Barth does not see the incarnation as conceptually resolvable. Earlier in

the Church Dogmatics he makes this clear: “that God’s Son or Word is the man Jesus of Nazareth is the

one Christological thesis of the New Testament; that the man Jesus of Nazareth is God’s Son or Word is

the other. Is there a synthesis of the two? To thi s question we must roundly answer, No.” 50 Any attempt

at a synthesis would fall into one of the two equal and opposite heresies, Docetism and Ebionitism, with

which Barth deals at length in the same section. 51 Docetism fails to take seriously the humanity of Christ,

and Ebionitism fails to take seriously his divinity. If the incarnation is truly the epistemological starting

point for Barth’s doctrine of eternity, we can expect to find the same paradox at its heart. This, I argue,

is precisely what we do find.

The centrality of the incarnation for correctly understanding eternity turns out, from a Barthian

perspective, to be what was lacking in both traditional and revisionist conceptions of eternity. Seen this

way, the traditional view leans in a Docetic direction, and the revisionist view leans in an Ebionite

direction. Barth’s theology affirms what both these views affirm without denying what they deny about

46 Mullins, “In Search of a Timeless God,” 19. 47 Ibid.48 Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism , 225.49 Ibid.50 Barth, CD, 2010, I.2:23.51 Ibid., I.2:15 –25.



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each other. He is able to do this because he uses the incarnation as epistemological ground from which

to conceptualise both time and eternity, which neither the tradition nor the revisionists do. In order to

demonstrate this, we shall examine the epistemological underpinnings of these views.

6. Comparing Epistemologies

As we have seen, the Christian tradition overwhelmingly based its d octrine of eternity on Boethius’

definition. But a look at Boethius’ epistemolog ical methodology reveals that he takes natural human

knowledge as his starting point . Edwards writes that Boethius’ methodology “begins with what we know

of time and temporalit y and, in the words of Plotinus, ‘proceeds upwards’ to apprehend the concept of

eternity.” 52 This is consistent with his “epistemological rule, that ‘everything which is known is known

not according to its own nature but according to the nature of those com prehending it.’” 53 It is therefore

not surprising, given his methodology along with his historical location, that Boethius’ concept of

eternity displays strong influence from pagan Greek thought. Henry Chadwick connects it to that found

in Plato’s Timaeus .54 Brian Leftow goes so far as to say that Boethius “ simply took this definition over

from pagan Neoplatonist philosophers. He did nothing to integrate it with his Christian theology. ”55

Padgett concurs, saying that “the wording is quite similar to the defini tion of eternity given by

Plotinus.” 56

Langdon offers a synopsis of the Barthian critique of the tradition. Its proponents, he says,

did not allow the biblical view of the living God or the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation toinform their definitions of eternity, since these imply the activity and movement of God in timeand history. This is not to say Christian theologians viewed God as absent from time and space,

52 Edwards, “The Divine Moment,” 10. 53 Ibid.54 Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon

Press,, 1981), 246.55 Cited in Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary,” 16. 56 Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time , 45.



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or that they denied the reality of the Trinity and incarnation, but that these positive doctrines didnot supersede the negative relation found in the Greek tradition. 57

He adds, “a ny acquaintance with Augustine or Aquinas, for example, will reveal their faithfulness to the

doctrines of the Trinity and incar nation and God‘s activity in time. But they do not redefine eternity with

the use of these beliefs .”58

However, in rejecting divine timelessness revisionists see themselves as recovering from this pagan

influence and returning to revelation as the sole source of Christian doctrine. Part of the concern for

many of these writers is that the doctrine of divine timelessness has its origins in pagan philosophy, and

would never have been developed if theologians had stayed faithful to the teaching of Scripture alone.

Mullins argues that divine timelessness is intrinsically related to divine immutability in medieval

thought, and “ there are two pre-Christian assumptions at play in the development of this Christian

doctrine: a Platonic and an Aristotelian assumption .”59 Swinburne “suspects” that the doctrine of divine

immutability came “from neo -Platonism.” 60 Wolterstorff sees his refutation of divine timelessness as a

contribution to the modern effort to expunge the Hellenization from Christian theology. 61 Their rejection

of divine timelessness is partly an appeal to their understanding of true Christian epistemology. Boethius

began not from revelation but from human reason, which in his time was best represented by Neo-

Platonism. To expunge Platonic influence from Christian theology means to abandon beliefs like divine

timelessness which betray this foreign influence and do not derive from revelation.

It is noteworthy, however, that modern refutations of divine timelessness almost invariably make

use of the tools of analytic philosophy in order to establish either the incoherence of divine timelessness

or its incompatibility with the Incarnation. One of the high demands of analytic philosophy is rational

57 Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary,” 1. 58 Ibid.. Emphasis mine.59 Mullins, “In Search of a Timeless God,” 59. 60 Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism , 222.61 See Wolterstorff, “God Is Everlasting,” 126– 127.



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coherence and conceptual closure. Thus, although this presupposition is rarely made explicit in its

writings, this school of thought is heavily reliant on modern philosophical methods in a manner

comparable to the historic Christian reliance on Greek philosophical methods. For example, Mullins

begins his investigation by stating that one must define time before one can ask whether God is

timeless. 62 So far so good. But where Barth defines time in light of revelation (as we saw earlier), Mullins

settles on a definition of time as change (the “relational view”), not because he himself thinks that, but

because the purpose of his thesis is to refute divine timelessness, whose adherents “ overwhelmingly

hold to a relational view of time. ”63 Mullins’ project is therefore more deconstructive than constructive,

intended to demonstrate contradictions in traditional doctrine. What would his own view of time be,

and what would be its epistemological basis?

William Hasker, another analytic philosopher who refutes divine timelessness, is more self-aware

concerning his influences. He writes, “it is simply a fact that the habits of thought engender ed by [the

analytic] tradition are not particularly congenial to the theory of divine timelessness.” 64 He then delivers

an honest and revealing conclusion about the results of this influence:

A possible comment on this is that the current preference for analytical modes of thought ismerely a contingent fact about a segment of our philosophical community, and is no more to begiven unthinking allegiance than were the Platonic-mystical inclinations of some earliergenerations of philosophers. The comment is just, but the problem is inescapable. One can onlyview the world, and God, from the place where one does in fact stand. 65

The influence of analytic philosophy on revisionist perspectives can be seen in their refusal to allow

anything “logically contradictory” (in Mullins’ terms) of God, a refusal which would have baffled the

62 “it is intellectually irresponsible— if not outright impossible —to say that God is timeless without first havingsome idea of what time is.” - Mullins, “In Search of a Timeless God,” 17.

63 Ibid., 25.64 William Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge , Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press,, 1989), 181.65 Ibid.





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basis of human reasoning alone. 70 There is only one point at which he comes close to noticing the

correspondence between the incarnational paradox and divine eternality/temporality. He writes:

The claim that a God who is necessarily timeless became a temporal man is neither harder nor

easier to understand than the claim that a God who is necessarily omniscient became a fallible,humanly ignorant man or the claim that a God who is necessarily omnipotent and everlastingbecame a man of limited power who died. If so, the Incarnation is no more and no less anobjection to the doctrine of divine timelessness than it is to the doctrines of divine omnipotenceand omniscience. … [A] doctrine of divine timelessness…does not add to the burden a defenderof the Incarnation must bear. 71

The only shortfall to this insight is that it compounds the mysteries rather than sourcing them in the

same place. Edwards has noticed the strange relationship of Leftow’s doctrine of time with the

incarnation, as well as its contrast to Barth’s approach. He writes

Given that T&E [Time & Eternity ] actually does not mention, include, or explicitly operate under aconfession of God’s incarnation as Jesus Christ, more than one reader may well wonder if the“biblical picture” in T&E is all that complete. Curiously, … it demonstrates an understanding ofthis very point, though the choice is not to pursue it. In what appears to be an offhand admission,we find in T&E the following: “Clearly, a concept of eternity that allows an eternal being to belocated in time would be useful to a Christian theologian concerned to maintain both that God iseternal and that God was incarnate in Christ.” One wonders, why has not T&E pursued thiscourse instead? 72

Further down Edwards compares this to Barth:

On the other hand, without wanting to rationalize or diminish our wonderment at theincarnation (indeed he intends to increase it), Barth articulates a view that presupposes itsactuality. In what presents itself as really the opposite of T&E ’s methodology, Barth worksoutward from the lived existence of the Son of God as Jesus Christ to explain the conditions ofpossibility that allow for an eternal God to be incarnate in time. 73

70 Edwards writes that “Within T&E ... a metaphysical methodology operates largely independently of theincarnation, considering it as something that might be reconciled with an understanding of divine timelessness at alater point.” See Edwards, “The Divine Moment,” 125.

71 Leftow, Time and Eternity , 19.72 Edwards, “The Divine Moment,” 142. 73 Ibid., 194.



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7. Conclusion

Traditional doctrines of eternity upheld the freedom of God from the limits of time. But Barth

critiques them for their failure to follow through the implications of Christ ’s humanity for their

doctrines. For him, the incarnation gives new shape to our understanding of both time eternity. Eternity

became time and is itself “supremely temporal.” 74 The docetic element of the doctrine of eternity must

be corrected . But Barth’s view has much greater correspondence with the tradition than divergence

from it. As Langdon says, “it is not as if Barth merely dismisses the tradition, constructing his view in

opposition to others. Rather … he is being a faithful student of the history of Christian theology. It could

be argued, that he is faithful to its most important insights and critical of its wrong turns.” 75 Hunsinger

concurs: “although Barth stands mainly in the tradition of Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm, he modifies

this tradition in order to appropriate what is valid in Hegel.” 76

Revisionist denials of divine timelessness likewise accuse the tradition of failing to realise the

implications of the incarnation. But due to the need for logical coherence, they make the opposite

mistake. They d omesticate the incarnation, making the “God” in the statement “God became man” a

God who is not truly free, eternal or constant. This is to misunderstand the nature of the incarnation,

which is the mystery of the collision of the infinite with the finite, the eternal with the temporal. To take

too seriously the humanity of Christ at the cost of reducing his divinity, is Ebionitism. In this case it takes

the form of affirming God’s temporality at the cost of his eternity. As we have seen, for Barth this is to

take a wrong turn at the very start.

In contrast to both of these, Barth centralises the incarnation and maintains its full import in

explicating his doctrine of time and eternity. The divinity of Christ is upheld in the assertion of divine

74 Barth, CD, 2010, III.2:437.75 Langdon, “God the Eternal Contemporary,” 47. 76 Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace , 188.



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timelessness, in the sense that God is free from the limits of time. The humanity of Christ is upheld in

the assertion of divine temporality. Because God became man, this means that he was able to do so,

which means that eternity itself is temporal. Finally, just as the paradox of the incarnation can never be

fully resolved, neither can the paradox of atemporal temporality reach conceptual closure. Barth has

been able to hold together divine atemporality/temporality without compromising either for the sake of

the other. The freedom and constancy of God are uncompromised by incarnation, but time itself is

taken up into eternity. Eternity’s ability to enter time affirms both the objective reality of time and the

temporality of eternity, just as the Son is both fully God and fully man. In the person of Jesus Christ, the

eternal enters time without ceasing to be eternal, raising us temporal beings through Christ to

participation in God’s eternity. 77

77 Barth, CD, 2010, II.1:609.



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Bibliography

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Barnabas Aspray

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Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “God Is Everlasting.” In Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings , 125 –133. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Documents

Time, Eternity and Revelation: The Incarnational Shape of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Time and Eternity