Tim Bayne University of Oxford & St. Catherine’s College the puzzle of cognitive phenomenology

Tim Bayne

University of Oxford &

St. Catherine’s College

the puzzle of cognitive phenomenology

Alex Byrne: “The notion of phenomenal character may be hard to explain but it is easy to understand…..

….at any rate, everyone seems to understand it.”

“Should we include any mental states that are not feelings and experiences [on the list of phenomenally conscious states]? Consider my desire to eat ice cream. Is there not something it is like for me to have this desire? If so, is this state not phenomenally conscious? And what about the belief that I am a very fine fellow? Or the memory that September 2 is the date on which I first fell in love? … It seems to me not implausible to deal with these cases by arguing that insofar as there is any phenomenal or immediately experienced felt quality to the above states, this is due to their being accompanied by sensations or images or feelings that are the real bearers of the phenomenal character.”

Tye 1995: 4

“Should we include any mental states that are not feelings and experiences [on the list of phenomenally conscious states]? Consider my desire to eat ice cream. Is there not something it is like for me to have this desire? If so, is this state not phenomenally conscious? And what about the belief that I am a very fine fellow? Or the memory that September 2 is the date on which I first fell in love? … It seems to me not implausible to deal with these cases by arguing that insofar as there is any phenomenal or immediately experienced felt quality to the above states, this is due to their being accompanied by sensations or images or feelings that are the real bearers of the phenomenal character.”

Tye 1995: 4

“There are propositional attitudes, and we are sometimes noninferentially conscious about our attitudinal states. But such consciousness does not feel like anything. A propositional attitude and consciousness about that attitude have no phenomenological properties. ...There are different sorts of states we call “conscious states,” and the most important sorts are not like having sensations.”

Nelkin 1989: 430

“…thoughts aren’t phenomenally conscious per se. Our thoughts aren’t like anything, in the relevant sense, except to the extent that they might be associated with visual or other images or emotional feelings, which will be phenomenally conscious by virtue of their quasi-sensory status.”

Carruthers 2005: 138-9

“Bodily sensations and perceptual experiences are prime examples of states for which there is something it is like to be in them. They have a phenomenal feel, a phenomenology, or, in a term sometimes used in psychology, raw feels. Cognitive states are prime examples of states for which there is not something it is like to be in them, of states that lack a phenomenology.”

Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007: 129

“[T]he experience of seeing red and the experience of now seeming to understand this very sentence, and of thinking that nobody could have had different parents … all fall into the vast category of experiential episodes that have a certain qualitative character for those who have them as they have them.”

Strawson 1994: 194

“…generally, as we think—whether we are speaking in complete sentences, or fragments, or speaking barely or not at all, silently or aloud—the phenomenal character of our noniconic thought is in continual modulation, which cannot be identified simply with changes in the phenomenal character of either vision or visualization, hearing or auralization, etc.”

Siewert 1998: 282

“In addition to arguing that there is something it is like to think a conscious thought, I shall also argue that what it is like to think a conscious thought is distinct from what it is like to be in any other kind of conscious mental state, and that what it is like to think the conscious thought that p is distinct from what it is like to think any other conscious thought…”

Pitt 2004: 2

“Quine notwithstanding, it seems plainly false—and false for phenomenological reasons—that there is indeterminacy as to whether one is having a thought that rabbits have tails or whether one is instead having a thought that (say) collections of undetached rabbit parts have tail-subsets. It is false because there is something that it is like to have the occurrent thought that rabbits have tails, and what it is like is different from what it would be like to have the occurrent thought that collections of undetached rabbit parts have tail subsets.”

Horgan & Tienson 2002: 522

conservative view: phenomenality is possessed by only a restricted range of conscious mental states; in particular, conscious thoughts possess no distinctive phenomenal character

liberal view: phenomenality is relatively unrestricted; in particular, conscious thoughts do possess distinctive phenomenal characters

Deflationary use: ‘cognitive phenomenology’ picks out whatever kind of phenomenology thoughts possess

Inflationary use: ‘cognitive phenomenology’ picks out distinctively cognitive phenomenal features.

Cognitive Phenomenology Thesis (CPT):

There are non-sensory phenomenal properties —cognitive phenomenological (CP) properties—associated with normal conscious (occurrent) thought

Scope: CPT is neutral on the grain of CP properties

Thought as such

Thought attitudes

Thought contents

Modality: CPT does not imply any particular account of the relationship between thoughts and CP properties

CPT allows that thoughts can occur in the absence of cognitive phenomenology, and that cognitive phenomenology can occur in the absence of thought

So we need to distinguish CPT from the phenomenal intentionality program

Q: Does CPT entail that thoughts can be individuated in phenomenological terms?

No – the liberal could hold that thought in the absence of cognitive phenomenology is possible

Nor does the claim that thoughts can be individuated in phenomenological terms entails liberalism

An inconsistent triad

Phenomenal Uniformity: The participants in the CP debate are broadly similar in the phenomenal properties that they instantiate

Introspective Accuracy: The participants in this debate are not making any gross errors concerning the range of phenomenal properties that they do, or do not, instantiate

Terminological Agreement: The participants in this debate operate with a shared conception of what cognitive phenomenology would be



Introspective Accuracy: The participants in the CP debate are not making any gross errors concerning the range of phenomenal properties that they do, or do not, instantiate

Terminological Agreement: The participants in this debate operate with a shared conception of what cognitive phenomenology would be




Terminological Agreement: The participants in the CP debate have a shared conception of what cognitive phenomenology would be





rejecting phenomenal uniformity?

(i) The proposal requires differences in the normal population

(ii) Many (most?) individuals differences concern phenomenal state tokens not phenomenal state types

(iii) There is no behavioural/functional evidence for differences of the kind that might account for the CP debate

rejecting phenomenal uniformity?

In sum, individual differences in phenomenal profile might be significantly deeper than we tend to assume, but it’s hard to believe that they run deep enough to account for the cognitive phenomenology debate

Q: Might the debate be the result of introspective error?

“We are prone to gross error, even in favourable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology….we are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept.”

Schwitzgebel 2008; see also Spener 2011

“Schwitzgebel (2008) uses the apparent irresolvability of the question of cognitive phenomenology to argue for the unreliability of introspection itself. ... however, he oversteps the mark. For the main point at issue, we will suggest, is whether cognition is implicated in phenomenal consciousness constitutively or just causally. And this isn’t a difference that should always be accessible to introspection, on anyone’s view of the latter.”

Carruthers & Veillet 2011: 35

Phenomenal blindspots: If liberals are right, then conservatives are failing to introspect phenomenal properties that they do have

Phenomenal confabulation: If conservatives are right, then liberals are ‘introspecting’ phenomenal properties that they don’t have

Phenomenal blindspots: If liberals are right, then conservatives are failing to introspect phenomenal properties that they do have

Phenomenal confabulation: If conservatives are right, then liberals are ‘introspecting’ phenomenal properties that they don’t have

an introspective blindspot?

Conservatives attempt to introspect cognitive phenomenology under conditions that would appear to be introspectively optimal

Thus, the debate cannot be explained by appeal to (say) working memory problems (cf. Sperling experiments)


Might cognitive phenomenology be particularly elusive?

“sensory phenomenology is more strikingly vivid than cognitive phenomenology” (Horgan 2011: 77)


Thoughts themselves are not typically elusive, so why should their phenomenology be elusive?


“Attentive introspection reveals that both the phenomenology of intentional content and the phenomenology of attitude type are phenomenal aspects of experience, aspects that you cannot miss if you simply pay attention.”

Horgan & Tienson 2002


“In the spirit of Horgan and Tienson’s appeal for a reader to “pay attention to your own experience”, I have just done the decisive experiment: I thought first that George Bush is President of the United States, and had CNN-mediated auditory and visual phenomenology that focused on one of his speeches. I then took a short break, doodled a little, wandered around the room, and then had a thought with that very same content and…nothing.”

Wilson 2003: 417

Q: How might conservatives account for the statements that liberals make?

A: Liberals confuse the phenomenality of the sensory accompaniments of thoughts with the (non-existent) phenomenality of thought itself

introspective confabulation?

An analogy: what it’s like to live in Des Moines

introspective confabulation?

But liberals grant that thoughts are often (perhaps always) are accompanied by sensory phenomenology – they merely insist that they have a purely cognitive phenomenology over and above whatever sensory phenomenology they enjoy

Talk of ‘misidentification’ seems inappropriate here

Perhaps conservatives overlook CP because they have been corrupted by bad theoryPerhaps liberals confabulate CP because they have been corrupted by bad theory

theoretical corruption?

“I now believe that the theoretical attractiveness of functional orthodoxy ... was perverting my introspective judgments, an error that was aided by the fact that sensory phenomenology is more strikingly vivid than cognitive phenomenology.” Horgan 2011: 77

theoretical corruption?

If beliefs about CP were that fragile, then they would be radically unlike beliefs about sensory phenomenology

And if theorists really held this view, then wouldn’t that undermine their own ability to appeal to introspection?





rejecting terminological agreement?

‘phenomenal/phenomenality’‘experiential’‘what-it’s-likeness’ ‘qualitative’

“[T]he experience of seeing red and the experience of now seeming to understand this very sentence, and of thinking that nobody could have had different parents … all fall into the vast category of experiential episodes that have a certain qualitative character for those who have them as they have them.”

Strawson 1994: 194


“The paradigm P-conscious states are sensations, whereas the paradigm A-conscious states are ‘propositional attitude’ states like thoughts, beliefs, and desires, states with representational content expressed by ‘that’ clauses. .... One possibility is that it is just a series of mental images or subvocalizations that make thoughts P-conscious. Another possibility is that the contents themselves have a P-conscious aspect independent of their vehicles.” (Block 1995: n. 3)


“Perhaps there is a very broad use of the locution ‘what it’s like’ in ordinary life which concedes a difference in what it is like whenever there is any conscious difference of any sort whatsoever. This is not the usage I intend, however.” (Tye 1996: 302)

Georgalis (2006: 69) also recognizes two senses of ‘what it’s likeness’: a restricted sense that involves only the stimulation of sense organs and an unrestricted sense that includes propositional attitudes and contents.

My proposal is that there are two notions of phenomenal consciousness: a broad notion (employed by liberals)

a narrow notion (employed by conservatives)

Which of these notions picks out the notion of phenomenal consciousness that is of central interest to the philosophy of mind?

Not implausible to suppose that the core notion of phenomenal consciousness is conceptually hinged to explanatory gap intuitions

Generic explanatory gap: why is the neurofunctional state that is associated with a phenomenal state associated with any kind of phenomenal state (rather than with no phenomenal state at all)?

Specific explanatory gap: why is this neurofunctional state associated with this particular kind of phenomenal state (rather than with a phenomenal state of some other kind)?

Inverted spectra intuitions (Locke, Block)

These intuitions are much harder to generate for thoughts than they are for (say) experiences of colour or flavour – does this perhaps show that it is the narrow notion of phenomenal consciousness that is the core notion?

Perhaps not...

1.Inverted spectra intuitions are much harder to generate for experiences of primary qualities (spatial and temporal properties, for example) than they are for experiences of colour or flavour

2.Zombie intuitions can be generated for thought

What about knowledge argument intuitions?

“I am what is sometimes known as a "qualia freak." …. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.”

Jackson 1982

“I am what is sometimes known as a "qualia freak." …. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.”

Jackson 1982

The knowledge argument

“Cognitive Mary is the world’s expert in the cognitive neuroscience of thought. She knows what state of affairs the thought <Tokyo is a wonderful city> picks out, and she knows this thought’s cognitive role and function. However, she has never actually tokened this thought. Does she learn something when she first tokens the thought? Arguably not.”

The knowledge argument

“Motion Mary is the world’s expert in the cognitive neuroscience of representations of motion. She knows what perceptions of motion represent, and she has a complete grasp of their cognitive role and function. However, she has never actually perceived motion. Does she learn something new when she first perceives motion? Arguably not.”

The explanatory gap

In other words,

(1)It is very difficult to generate a specific explanatory gap with respect to thought (and, also, perceptions of primary qualities),

(2)But it is relatively easy to generate a generic explanatory gap with respect to thought.

The explanatory gap

So it appears as though there may be two conceptual hinges here, one of which attaches to the specific explanatory gap and one of which attaches to the generic explanatory gap

Whether or not I am right in thinking that there are two notions of phenomenal consciousness, each of which is hinged to a component of the problem of consciousness, it is clear that the cognitive phenomenology debate undermines the thought that we have a secure grip on the notion of phenomenal consciousness

Whether or not I am right in thinking that there are two notions of phenomenal consciousness, each of which is hinged to a component of the problem of consciousness, it is clear that the cognitive phenomenology debate undermines the thought that we have a secure grip on the notion of phenomenal consciousness

Thanks!

terminological worries

“…I do not wish to deny that concepts can enter into some experiential episodes, broadly construed. One cannot see something as a rabbit, for example, unless one has the concept rabbit… What happens in cases like these is that one has a sensory representation whose phenomenal content is then brought under the given concepts. Still, the concepts do not enter into the content of the sensory representation, and they are not themselves phenomenally relevant.” Tye 1995: 140

terminological worries

“…it is evident that there are conscious mental states with no special phenomenal character. In general, mental occurrences that we call ‘experiences’ appear to be those that possess phenomenal properties. If this is so, the idea of phenomenal character and the idea of there being something that it is like come apart. For it certainly seems that there is something that it is like to believe something, to suspend judgment about something, to want something, and so on. But as we saw, at least many instances of these states don’t have any phenomenal, sensory quality.”

Kim 1996: 159

Carruthers (2000): It is possible to draw a distinction between what the world (or the state of the organism’s own body) is like for an organism, and what the organism’s experience of the world (or of its own body) is like for the organism.

Lycan (2009): WILness can mean an apparently monadic property inhering in a mental state (the colour of roses; the taste of coffee), or a higher-order property of the colour or the taste: what the experience of such properties is like.

Q: Might this distinction map on to the distinction between B-WILness and N-WILness?

If ‘experiential WILness’ means the WILness of perceptual experience, then this proposal won’t account for the extensional data.So the proposal will need to be unpacked in terms of a contrast between worldly WILness and mental WILness.

“Of course the world is like something to any perceiver and to any thinker, whether their states are phenomenally conscious or not. For any experience, and any thought, will involve a partial and partially subjective ‘take’ on the elements of perception/thought. What is crucial for phenomenal consciousness, however, is that there should be something that the subject’s own mental states are like, for them….With this distinction in place, there is no reason to believe that non-imagistic thoughts will be like anything.”

Carruthers 2005: 139

“By common consent .. the kind of WILness that proponents of cognitive phenomenology have in mind is higher-order (mental-state) rather than first-order (worldy) WILness”

“Sensory states present Q-properties [first-order WILness]. Nonsensory mental states do not. But, I am persuaded, conscious nonsensory states have phenomenal character in the higher-order sense.”

Lycan, in press: 12 & 18

Lycan:

worldly WILness: conservative

mental state WILness: liberal

Carruthers:

worldly WILness: liberal

mental state WILness: conservative

…thoughts are not all content and no feel. There is something it is like to think a thought, although we don’t think of this feel as definitive of the thought. Thoughts involve words, often unspoken, images, anticipations of other kinds of experiences, and inclinations to act in various ways, and are often intimately associated with emotions. (Perry 2009: 224-25)

One possibility is that phenomenality is a cluster notion with vague and somewhat indeterminate borders.

why the debate matters

accounts of the functional role of phenomenal consciousness

accounts of the relationship between phenomenal character and intentional content

accounts of the nature of phenomenal consciousness









introspection: the liberal diagnosis

1. It’s not clear to me that one could be aware of one’s phenomenal states in a first-person manner without being aware of them as phenomenal states.

introspection: the liberal diagnosis

1. It’s not clear to me that one could be aware of one’s phenomenal states in a first-person manner without being aware of them as phenomenal states. 2. Even if it is possible to be aware of one’s phenomenal states without being aware of them as phenomenal states, surely this proposal introduces introspective puzzles of its own.

What about qualia eliminativists (Dennett): how are we to account for the existence of the debate about the very existence of qualia?

But those who deny that qualia exist are typically operating with a very loaded notion of ‘qualia’: a notion that goes beyond what is introspectively accessible.

The moral: the use of KA intuitions as a criterion of phenomenality is in danger of committing us to a highly implausible form of uber-conservativism according to which phenomenal consciousness is restricted to secondary qualities.

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Tim Bayne University of Oxford & St. Catherine’s College the puzzle of cognitive phenomenology