Tillich: Nature and Method of Theology · 2019. 9. 16. · the nature of theology, we pray that we might be able to understand what they’re saying, and that we might catch a better

Contemporary Theology I:

Transcript - ST503 Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies© 2019 Our Daily Bread University. All rights reserved.

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LESSON 15 of 24ST503

Tillich: Nature and Method of Theology

Contemporary Theology I:Hegel to Death of God Theologies

This is lecture 15 for the course Contemporary Theology 1. In my last lecture, at the end, I began to discuss with you the theology of Paul Tillich. I want to continue with that in this lecture, but before we turn to that, let’s pause for a moment of prayer.

Father, we thank You again for the privilege of study. As we reflect upon these great thinkers of the not-so-distant past, and we see what they said about You and about the nature of Your Word and the nature of theology, we pray that we might be able to understand what they’re saying, and that we might catch a better glimpse of our own theology and what it should be. So bless our time together in this lecture. For it’s in Christ’s name we pray it. Amen.

As I began to discuss Tillich’s theology with you, I turned first of all to Tillich’s concept of the nature, method, and structure of systematic theology. I made some general observations about what he has to say on these topics. And then, right at the end of last lecture, I turned to what he has to say about the nature of systematic theology. At that point, we didn’t get too far, and so I want to pick things up where we left it off.

Tillich began his discussion of the nature of systematic theology by talking about the theological circle, and I mentioned what he means by that. Now I want to turn to the next aspect of what he has to say about the nature of systematic theology.

After discussing the theological circle, he then turns to what he refers to as the “two formal criteria of every theology.” The first criterion that Tillich sets forth is the following. He says that the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological, then, which deal with their object insofar as it becomes a matter of ultimate concern for us. Now, according to Tillich, though, the religious concern is ultimate; and it makes all other concerns preliminary. We might have concerns about our job, we might have concerns about our family, and we

John S. Feinberg, Ph.D.Experience: Professor of Biblical and

Systematic Theology, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.

Transcript - ST503 Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies © 2019 Our Daily Bread University. All rights reserved.


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might have concerns about what’s going on in society. But these may not necessarily be religious concerns. There are things that are of religious concern to us, and Tillich says it’s our religious concern which is our ultimate concern.

Tillich says it is called a concern to indicate the existential character of religious experience. What he means by that is to simply say that religious experience is experience that touches us right at the very core of our existence. So it’s concern, then, to indicate the existential character of religious experience. That concern speaks of our need to be related to that which is ultimate. Tillich says that we should never think of this ultimate, about which we are concerned, as a separated object that can somehow or other be handled and known without concern. In other words, whatever it is that is our ultimate concern is not something that we are disinterested or dispassionately related to. There’s something that is out there for us to be concerned about, but Tillich says that something should never be thought of apart from our concern about it and for it.

In Systematic Theology, Volume 1, on pages 11 and 12, he speaks about this first criterion. Let me just read to you what he has to say. He says “We have used the term ‘ultimate concern’ without explanation. Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the Great Commandment.” And then he quotes from Mark 12:29, that says, “The Lord our God, the Lord is one. And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength.” After quoting that verse, Tillich then said,

The religious concern is ultimate. It excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance. It makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance. The unconditional concern is total. No part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it. There is no “place” to flee from it. The total concern is infinite. No moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite. The word “concern” points to the “existential” character of religious experience. We cannot speak adequately of the “object of religion” without simultaneously removing its character as an object. That which is ultimate gives itself only to the attitude of ultimate concern. It is the correlate of an unconditional concern



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but not a “highest thing,” called “the absolute” or “the unconditioned,” about which we could argue in detached objectivity. It is the object of total surrender, demanding also the surrender of our subjectivity while we look at it. It is a matter of infinite passion and interest.

And then here in parenthesis he cites Kierkegaard and, of course, I’m sure you recognize that what Tillich is saying here sounds an awful lot like what Kierkegaard had to say about genuine faith.

To continue with Tillich, he says, “It’s a matter of infinite passion and interest making us its object whenever we try to make it our object. For this reason, we have avoided terms like ‘the ultimate,’ ‘the unconditioned,’ ‘the universal,’ ‘the infinite,’ and have spoken of ultimate, unconditional, total, infinite concern. Of course, in every concern there is something about which one is concerned. But this something should not appear as a separate or separated object, which could be known and handled without concern. This, then, is the first formal criterion of theology.” And then he lists it again, “The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object insofar as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us.”

Tillich then turns to discuss the second formal criterion for every theology. The first criterion told us that theology has to be about our ultimate concern, and it talked a little bit about what our ultimate concern might be; but in the second criterion, Tillich turns to specify more carefully and more clearly the content of our ultimate concern. What is it that we ought to be ultimately concerned about specifically? Tillich says that our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not being. Only those statements, then, are theological, which deal with their object insofar as it becomes a matter of being or not being for us. So the second criterion, then, deals with the content of our ultimate concern; and that content, according to Tillich, has to be something which determines or deals with our being or our not being.

Tillich says that nothing can be of ultimate concern which doesn’t have the power of threatening and saving our being. And when he uses the term “being” here, he doesn’t just mean our mere existence in time and space. It means, instead, the whole



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of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence. In other words, Tillich is not just talking here about mere life and death. He’s talking about the very root and source of existence and its meaning. Of course, in this respect, you see that he’s very much following along the line of existentialism.

Since this matter of our ultimate concern, and our ultimate concern being about our being and nonbeing—since this is a formal criterion, it must remain general, according to Tillich. And that means that the ultimate concern is not to be some special object, such as God. An object which affects our ultimate concern could be a god, of course, but it could be anything else. Tillich explains what he means by saying that the object of ultimate concern must be general on pages 14-15 of Volume 1 of The Systematics. Let me, if I may, read that to you. He says,

The second formal criterion of theology does not point to any special content, symbol, or doctrine. It remains formal and, consequently, open for contents which are able to express “that which determines our being or nonbeing.” At the same time, it excludes contents which do not have this power from entering the theological realm. Whether it is a god who is a being besides others (even a highest being) or an angel who inhabits a celestial realm (called the realm of “spirits”) or a man who possesses supernatural powers (even if he’s called the God-man), none of these is an object of theology if it fails to withstand the criticism of the second formal criterion of theology; that is, if it is not a matter of being or nonbeing for us.

Having laid out these two formal criteria of theology, he then turns to one last topic that is involved in his elaboration of his understanding of the nature of systematic theology. That third item that he talks about—the first was his concept of the theological circle, the second the two formal criteria of theology—and now the third item is the relationship of theology and Christianity.

Tillich says here that every theology talks about God, regardless of whether it’s a Christian theology or some other type of theology. But Tillich says that it’s Christian theology which is the theology because of its claim that the Logos became flesh. Now if, in fact, this is true, then Tillich says Christian theology has a foundation that transcends any other theology and cannot itself be transcended.



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As you listen to this, I trust that this brings back your thoughts about what we said about Hegel and his understanding of philosophy and its relationship to religion. You remember Hegel said that the final philosophy needs to incorporate religion, but it wasn’t just any religion that would do. According to Hegel, it had to be the Christian religion, and we noted why he felt that way. What Tillich is saying here is very similar to what we saw in the thought of Hegel.

So he believes, then, that Christian theology is the theology. It is the right theology, and it cannot be transcended by any other theology whatsoever. In its emphasis on the incarnation, in particular, Tillich say, it focuses on the union of the finite and the infinite, the absolutely concrete and the absolutely abstract. In doing this, it is getting to the fundamental problem of existence, which, according to Tillich, is the problem of finite beings being estranged from infinite being. The Christian theology not only gets to this fundamental problem of existence, but it provides a solution to it through the incarnation. As doing such, Tillich says, it is, more than any other theology, a theology that focuses on matters of ultimate concern.

You can see, again, that this emphasis on Christianity, because of the incarnation, is very similar to what Hegel had said, the blending of the finite and the infinite; but, of course, Tillich is now giving it more of an existentialist tone to it, because he’s saying not only is this an important element—the union of the finite and the infinite—but it’s important because it gets to the very root of the problem of existence. And in doing that it raises for us the matter of ultimate concern.

Having said these things about the nature of systematic theology, Tillich then turns to discuss the method and the structure of systematic theology. He says that if the task of systematic theology is to explain the contents of the Christian faith, then there are three questions which immediately arise. And these questions have to be raised and dealt with prior to speaking about the method and the structure of theology itself. Now what are those three questions that are preliminary to dealing with the method and structure of systematic?

The first one, Tillich says, is the question of what are the sources of systematic theology. The second question is: what is the medium of their reception, or how do you go about receiving the various sources of systematic? And then the third preliminary question



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is: What is the norm determining the use of the sources? What I want to do for the next few moments is take a look with you at what Tillich says about each one of these three questions.

What about, then, the sources of systematic theology? Tillich lists several of them, and we want to see what he says about each one of them. First of all, he says, the Bible is one source of systematic theology; and it is the basic source of systematic, because it is the original document about the events on which the Christian church is founded. Now, lest you think that this means that Tillich has a really high view of Scripture, like an orthodox view, we shouldn’t get overly enthusiastic here. Tillich thinks that Scripture is very important, but he is not going to have an orthodox perspective on Scripture. Let me read to you what he says about the Bible.

This comes from Volume 1 of The Systematics, and it’s on page 35. Tillich says: “The Bible, however, is the basic source of systematic theology because it is the original document about the events on which the Christian church is founded. If we use the word ‘document’ for the Bible, we must exclude legal connotation. The Bible is not a legally conceived, formulated, and sealed record about a divine deed on the basis of which claims can be decided. The documentary character of the Bible is identical with the fact that it contains the original witness of those who participated in the revealing events.” That surely sounds an awful lot like what Karl Barth says. Tillich then says, “Their participation”—that is, those who were the original witnesses and those who received the revealing events—“Their participation was their response to the happenings, which became revealing events through this response. The inspiration of the biblical writers is their receptive and creative response to potentially revelatory facts.” That surely is far from an orthodox notion of inspiration.

He says, “The inspiration of the writers of the New Testament is their acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, and with Him, of the New Being, of which they became witnesses. Since there is no revelation unless there is someone who receives it as revelation, the act of reception is a part of the event itself. The Bible is both original event and original document. It witnesses to that of which it is a part.” I’m sure you recognize there, at the end, the comment about there being no revelation without someone to receive it and how closely that fits with what Karl Barth has to say, as well as other Neo-orthodox thinkers. So, clearly, this is not an orthodox perspective on Scripture; but, nonetheless, Tillich says the Bible is definitely one of the sources of systematic theology.



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In addition to the Bible as a source of systematic theology, Tillich says there’s also church history. Tillich says we have to remember that the Genesis of the Bible is an event in church history. The systematic theologian, therefore, in using the Bible as a source implicitly uses church history as a source as well. He must not only do this implicitly, but he also needs to do it explicitly, make a specific point to use the events of church history in doing his systematic.

A third source of systematic theology, according to Tillich, is material that is presented by the history of religion and culture. Let me read to you what Tillich has to say about that. This, again, comes from Volume 1 of The Systematics, and we find it on page 38. Tillich explains this idea as follows. He says:

A broader source of systematic theology than all those mentioned so far is the material presented by the history of religion and culture. Its impact on the systematic theologian begins with the language he uses and the cultural education he has received. His spiritual life is shaped by his social and individual encounter with reality. That is expressed in the language, poetry, philosophy, religion, etcetera, of the cultural tradition in which he has grown up and from which he takes some content in every moment of his life, in his theological work and also outside it. Beyond this immediate and unavoidable contact with culture and religion, the systematic theologian deals with them directly in many ways. He uses culture and religion intentionally as his means of expression. He points to them for confirmation of his statements. He fights against them as contradictions of the Christian message. And, above all, he formulates the existential questions implied in them, to which his theology intends to be the answer.

Tillich also says about these sources of systematic theology that the degrees of importance in this immense amount of material that you find in Scripture, in church history, and the materials presented by the history of religion and culture. The degrees of importance of one piece of that material or another correspond to the way in which this information either more directly or indirectly relates to the central event in which the Christian faith is based, namely the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. What Tillich is saying here, then, is that you have all this



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material from which you can do systematic theology, but you can’t incorporate everything. Or, at least, if you incorporate a number of different things, you have to make some judgments as to how much emphasis to place on any one of them.

Well, how do you know which items should get more emphasis? Those items which more directly relate to the whole issue of the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ should get the greatest emphasis. Those items which have less of a direct, more of an indirect, relationship to that key item of the Christian faith, those are the items that should get less emphasis and be treated as less important.

The first preliminary question, then, was: What are the sources of systematic theology? And we’ve seen Tillich’s answer to that. Let me turn now to his answer to the second preliminary question. You remember that question was: What is the medium of the reception of the materials of systematic theology? Now Tillich is very specific about this as well. Tillich says that the sources of systematic theology can be sources only for individuals who participate in them; that is, they participate in these sources through experience. So his answer to what is the medium of reception of these sources? is that experience is the medium of reception.

Tillich says that the event on which Christianity is based, namely the New Being in Jesus the Christ, is not itself derived from experience. It is given in history. Experience is not the source from which the contents of systematic theology are taken, but it is, instead, the medium through which they are existentially received. So he makes a very clear distinction here between the medium of reception, as opposed to the source of the data or systematic theology, and also the event itself on which Christianity is based. These things are different than the way we experience all of this.

You’ve been hearing me use that phrase “New Being in Jesus the Christ or Jesus as the Christ.” I’m going to explain more fully what that means as we move on a little bit later to look at Tillich’s concept of God and then, specifically, his Christology. For right now, I’m going to just leave that terminology as Tillich states it and not explain it until we really need to see exactly what he means by it.



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Now let me move on with what he has to say about experience and experience as the medium of reception of systematic. He says that in relation to this experience there are at least three senses in which we might think of experience. And Tillich talks about each of those and explains how they relate to systematic theology. There is, on the first hand, an ontological sense of the term experience. Tillich, by this, means something very specific. He says that this ontological sense of experience is a consequence or a result of philosophical positivism. The particular movement in philosophy known as logical positivism is that to which he refers. What he says here is that the positively given is, according to this particular theory, the only reality of which we can meaningfully speak; and the positively given means that it is given in experience. You simply look out at the world; you interact with it through your various senses; and you see, hear, smell, and taste various things; and that, for you, constitutes what is reality. And positivism believed that you could directly get in touch with reality that way.

So then reality is identical with our experience, what we experience is true to the reality that’s really out there, outside of our mind and outside of our being. What about this kind of experience, experience in this ontological sense? Tillich says that if experience in this sense is supposedly used as a source of theology—if that’s the way we go—then, as a matter of fact, nothing can appear in a theological system that transcends the whole of experience. In other words, you couldn’t include in your theology anything that goes beyond what you can see or hear or taste or smell or any of those other senses that we have.

As you think about this for just a moment, you realize that a divine being, then, in the traditional sense—that is, the biblical sense—of a God who transcends sensory experience is excluded. So if we’re going to talk about the ontological sense of experience, and we’re going to use that as the basis for handling the sources of theology, our theology is only going to be about things that we can experience through our various senses.

Well, there’ a second sense that Tillich refers to in terms of experience. There was, first of all, an ontological sense of experience. In the second place, he talks about a scientific sense of experience. And here he is talking about what we derive from the experimentally tested experience of science. Now experience in this sense is more than just a bare given. It’s more than just opening your eyes and your ears and being aware of what’s going on around you. There’s more to it than that. This kind of experience



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combines rational and perceptual elements, and it is the result of a never-finished process of experimenting and testing. This method of scientific experience cannot be successfully applied to theology, according to Tillich, for two specific reasons. Here I trust you understand what he means about scientific experience. There’s more that the scientist does than simply observes reality. The scientist, then, makes some judgments about how reality fits together. He then makes various tests to confirm or to reject the judgments and the hypotheses that he’s made about reality. And once those tests are over and done with, then he makes a judgment as to the nature of reality.

Now, Tillich says that systematic theology can’t really be done by using this scientific approach to experience, and there are two reasons that it can’t be done in this way. The first one is that the object of theology, which for Tillich is our ultimate concern and its concrete expressions, is not an object within the whole of scientific experience. It can’t be discovered by detached observation. As a matter of fact, it can be found only in the acts of surrender and participation, according to Tillich.

The second reason that the process of experimenting and testing and the method of scientific experience cannot be successfully applied to theology is that the object of theology can’t be tested by scientific methods of verification. And, of course, that is surely true in regard to the object of orthodox theology. God is an immaterial being, and you’re not going to be able to test to see if He is there or if He’s done a particular activity by using the methods of scientific verification and falsification. But even for Tillich’s theology—his concept of God as our ultimate concern—is also not something which is open and available to scientific methods of verification.

Tillich talks about experience in a third sense. We’ve seen that there’s an ontological sense and there’s a scientific sense. Now Tillich turns, in the third place, to talk about mystical experience or experience by participation. He says this is the real problem of experiential theology. Let me read to you what he has to say about this from The Systematic Theology Volume 1. On pages 44 and 45, we see his explanation. Tillich says: “Mystical experience, or experience by participation, is the real problem of experiential theology.” And, remember, he said that his theology is an experiential one: that you have the sources, but your medium of reception of those sources must be through experience. So this is very definitely an experiential theology. Tillich says:



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It is secretly presupposed by the ontological, as well as by the scientific concept of experience. Without an experience of participation, neither the whole of experience nor articulated experience would reveal anything about our ultimate concern. But the question is: What does experience by participation reveal? For the Reformers, the experience was not a source of revelation. The divine Spirit testifies in us to the biblical message. No new revelations are given by the Spirit. Nothing new is mediated by the experience of the spiritual power in us. Evangelical enthusiasm, on the other hand, derives new revelations from the presence of the Spirit. The experience of the man who has the Spirit is the source of religious truth and, therefore, of systematic theology. The letter of the Bible and the doctrines of the church remain letter and law if the Spirit does not interpret them in the individual Christian. Experience as the inspiring presence of the Spirit is the ultimate source of the theology.

That concludes what Tillich has to say about this second preliminary question: What is the medium of reception of the sources? Now let me turn to what he lists as the third preliminary question that must be answered, namely: What is the norm determining the use of the sources?

Tillich says, in talking about the norm of systematics, that we need a criterion or a norm—some sort of rule, if you will, to which all the sources, as well as the mediating experience must be subjected. The sources and the medium can produce a theological system only if their use is guided by a norm. One has to know, for example, what the deciding principle will be, in terms of which materials from the sources and from our experience we’re going to incorporate into systematics and which materials we’re going to leave out. You can’t just use everything. So Tillich says we need a norm or a criterion to guide us in making our decisions about what we should include. Tillich says that the norm grows out of man’s present situation, which is filled with disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life. As a result, the question arising out of this experience is a question about a reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome; a reality of reconciliation and reunion; a reality of creativity, of meaning, and of hope. Now what kind of reality would that be? Tillich calls this reality the New Being.



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Tillich then says that this New Being is manifest specifically in Jesus the Christ. And this is going to turn out to be—in fact, it is—what Tillich says we must use as the norm of systematic theology. The norm of systematic theology, when you put together this norm with the critical principles of all theology, then the norm of systematic theology for today is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern. What this means, then, is that when you decide which materials from the sources and from our experience to include in theology, it must be governed by this one concept: the concept of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern. What that means, then, is that the norm for theology is not the Bible. Instead, the norm of systematic theology is a principle that is derived from the Bible; namely, the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern. Of course, this is the norm that you get from the Bible in an encounter between the Bible and the church. You see, what Tillich is suggesting here, then, is that if you use this as your norm for systematic theology, then you are going to incorporate in your systematic theology, items which really do address the fundamental existential question: the question of our being or our nonbeing. If we use some other kind of norm, we might incorporate all sorts of items that have very little, if anything, to do with the question of our being or our nonbeing.

Let me move to another aspect of Tillich’s reflections on the nature and structure and method of systematic theology; namely, I want to look at what he refers to as the method of correlation. This, specifically, is what Tillich understands to be the right method for systematic theology. Tillich says this is the method of systematic theology which has always been used, to some degree or another, by theologians. He says we have to understand that the term correlation can be used in one of three different ways, all of which are, as a matter of fact, important for theology. In the first place, correlation can designate the correspondence of different series of data as they would, say, in a statistical set of charts. For theology, this idea of correlation involves correspondence between religious symbols, on the one hand, and that which is symbolized by them. This first meaning of correlation, then, refers to the central problem of religious knowledge; namely, religious epistemology. How then do the words and the terms that we use relate to the objects that they symbolize?

There’s a second sense in which we might think of correlation, and it too is important for theology. Tillich says that correlation can designate the logical interdependence of concepts as, for example,



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in polar relationships. In theology, this involves correlation in the logical sense between concepts that denote the human and those that denote the divine. This meaning of correlation, then, determines statements about God and the world. An example of what Tillich has in mind of a polar relationship would be the relationship of the finite with the infinite.

There’s a third sense in which correlation can be thought of, and it too is important for this method of correlation. Correlation, in the third place, can designate the real interdependence of things or events in structured whole. In theology, Tillich says, this involves correlation in the factual sense between man’s ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned. This third meaning of correlation, he says, qualifies the divine/human relationship within religious experience. I think it might be helpful for us, at this point, if I read from Tillich to see what he says more specifically about this third kind of correlation. I’m reading here, then, from page 61 in Volume 1 of the Systematics. Tillich says:

The third use of correlative thinking in theology has evoked the protest of theologians such as Karl Barth, who are afraid that any kind of divine/human correlation makes God partly dependent on man. But, although God in His abysmal nature is in no way dependent on man, God in His self-manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives His manifestation. This is true even if the doctrine of predestination—namely, that this way is foreordained by God and entirely independent of human freedom—is maintained. The divine/human relation—and therefore God as well as man within this relation—changes with the stages of history of revelation and with the stages of every personal development. There is a mutual interdependence between God for us and we for God. God’s wrath and God’s grace are not contrasts in the heart of God, in the depth of His being, but they are contrasts in the divine/human relationship. The divine/human relation is a correlation. The divine/human encounter means something real for both sides. It is an actual correlation in the third sense of the term. The divine/human relationship is a correlation also in its cognitive side. Symbolically speaking, God answers man’s question; and under the impact of God’s answers, man asks them. Theology formulates the questions implied in human existence, and theology formulates the answers implied in divine self-manifestation under the guidance of the questions implied in human existence. This is a circle

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which drives man to appoint where question and answer are not separated.

Those are the three senses in which correlation is important for theology and, of course, in which it becomes important for Tillich’s method of correlation. I want to turn and look with you next at the way Tillich’s method of correlation actually works, but we are going to do that first thing in our next lecture. For now, just reflect upon the fact that his is a method in doing theology that definitely is going to focus in on this idea of correlation. Next lecture, we’ll see exactly how that works.

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Tillich: Nature and Method of Theology · 2019. 9. 16. · the nature of theology, we pray that we might be able to understand what they’re saying, and that we might catch a better