ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099115500

© 2

009

The

Aut

hor.

Jou

rnal

com

pila

tion

© 2

009

ippr

Government DefenceMinister Baroness Taylorhas warned that 75 per centof all threats faced byBritain emanate from the

Afghanistan/Pakistan (AFPAK) region.British forces will thus stay in the region forthe foreseeable future. Support for the mis-sion is waning in Britain with a recent pollsuggesting some 52 per cent of the Britishpeople want to bring the troops home.However, calls to exit Afghanistan, giventhe threat and the American alliance, arepremature.

Three things now matter. First, thatsomething like a credible AfghanGovernment partner emerges from the elec-toral process. Second, that a collective unityof Coalition effort, as called for by LordAshdown, is generated in support of theUnited States’s AFPAK strategy in what isgoing to be a critical 18-month period. TheBritish-led Policy Action Group (PAG)already established the precedent for suchan effort. Third, any such effort cannot besimply an extension of current thinking. Anew start is needed no later than January2010 and such a start will require a big newidea. Here, Britain’s role can be vital if it hasa) the level of ambition to play such a role;and b) openness to external ideas.

The central problem is clear: how best toengage what is increasingly the key con-

stituency – the young Afghan (andPakistani) unemployed. In effect, theAfghan Government and its coalition alliesare competing with the Taliban and AlQaeda for this critical reserve of manpower.If the Afghan Government and its partnerssucceed in ‘capturing’ this group then allother efforts could well bear fruit.

Unity of effort and purpose must beginat home and be established on two essentialfactors: a new political consensus must befashioned between Britain’s political right(the armed forces) and its political left (aidand development professionals); and theremust be a willingness to think big about thesolutions needed.

British�strategy�todayThe Government’s UK Policy in Afghanistanand Pakistan:The Way Forward (April 2009) issound because it puts aid and developmentfront and centre. The British are offering£665m of aid and development to Pakistanover the 2009–2013 period and £510m overthe same period to Afghanistan. Havingsent 700 troops to cover the August 2009Afghan elections, the British will be send-ing a further 500 to reinforce the Americantroop surge that, come 2010, will see a fur-ther 30,000 US forces in eastern and south-ern Afghanistan, pushing hard against theborder with Pakistan.

Three�big�Britishideas�forAfghanistanAfghanistan�still�poses�a�real�threat�to�the�UK�but�this�isnot�the�moment�to�cut�and�run.�New�–�big�–�thinking�isrequired�if�Britain�is�to�help�break�out�of�the�currentcycle�of�doom�and�defeatism�that�is�afflicting�too�muchof�the�Coalition�effort,�says�JJuulliiaann��LLiinnddlleeyy--FFrreenncchh

Of all the US’s allies Britain is paying byfar the biggest price for unrest in bothAfghanistan and Pakistan. Britain is themain European market for Afghan-sourcedheroin, which now accounts for some 90per cent of the UK’s supply. A large num-ber of Pakistanis, many of them from poorregions, have emigrated to Britain over therecent past and the link between radicalisa-tion of Pakistan and its diaspora is evident,as Baroness Taylor suggested. Indeed, thecurrent efforts of the British Government topretend that no links exist between its secu-rity policy and immigration policy under-mine the credibility of both governmentand policy. Like it or not, what happens inthe AFPAK region does resonate on Britishstreets.

A further problem is that the strategy isbeing undermined by the pre-general elec-tion political paralysis currently taking holdin the UK and the depressed and defeatiststate of Whitehall. Few in the political estab-lishment seem to believe there is any realchance of progress right now. Britain des-perately needs a new government (of what-ever hue) to inject some political leadershipinto the process, which is currently toobureaucratic and subject to turf battlesbetween departments.

While the armed forces are undoubtedlyat war, neither the rest of Whitehall norindeed the country seems to see it like that.A much greater effort to fashion a realWhole of Government approach backed upwith the required political and financialresources is needed – a true civil-militarycampaign plan and the will to influenceAmerican strategy with good British ideas.

Moreover, government still too oftenseems more interested in spin than sub-stance. This is a shame because the eightguiding principles that the Government has

presented are all sound. These include anenhanced international effort, a regionalapproach, promotion of a joint civil-militarystructure, better coordination with theAfghan Government and betweenCoalition partners, a three-phase long-termstrategy with Afghan civil primacy as thegoal, as well as demonstrable respect forsovereignty and local values. Like the US’sMcChrystal plan, it can only work if suffi-cient resources are injected, backed up byeffective organisation and credible auditing.Given the financial and economic chal-lenges the Government and its mainlyEuropean partners currently face, how cred-ible is the UK’s planning?

Are the British prepared to invest politi-cally or financially at a higher level of effortat a crucial moment? The answer wouldappear to be dangerously close to ‘no’.There is also some evidence of the influenceminorities are now exerting on the foreignand security policy of a British Governmentseemingly fearful of sections of the immi-grant populations that have entered in suchlarge numbers over recent years. This is notthe fault of minorities because as membersof the British community they have everyright to express their opinion – it is calleddemocracy. However, it is underminingnational cohesion.

Britain’s�big�political�ideaSo what could and should Britain do to addvalue to American leadership? First, stopbeing so politically correct about Britain’spast in the region and start using it toadvantage. The UK has knowledge of theregion that no other Western society pos-sesses and it must use it better. Even as anAfghan Government of sorts is fashioned itis evident that contact must be made withsome elements around the Taliban. TheAmerican military surge should at leasthelp create a dialogue that is led from aposition of strength. Britain’s knowledge ofthe people and the region will be vital here.

Many Tier-Two and -Three Taliban arenot happy with the assorted Arabs,Uzbheks and Chechens who comprise the ©

200

9 T

he A

utho

r. J

ourn

al c

ompi

latio

n ©

200

9 ip

pr

ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099 115511

The�British�should�do�moreto�exploit�the�traditionallinks�it�has�with�thePakistani�armed�forces

so-called foreign fighters and want theirrights and property, seized by the regime,restored. And the murder of some 200 trib-al elders by the foreign fighters suggests thePashtunwali code of hospitality to fellowMuslims may be stretched. The Britishshould do more to exploit the traditionallinks it has with the Pakistani armed forces.It must also do more to support the effortsof the Pakistani Army to put pressure onthe safe havens in Northwest Pakistan, par-ticularly through training and intelligencesharing.

Of course, much will depend on the per-formance of the new Afghan Government.Britain and the US must make it clear tothose in power that support for them is con-ditional upon efforts to reduce corruptionand improve governance. There is morethan one way to deal with Al Qaeda giventhat the West knows so much more aboutthem and their methods than it did in 2001.The growing insurgency has been accom-panied by increasing corruption and anincrease in drug production and trafficking,much of it with the collusion of local (andsome not so local) warlords and officials inthe Karzai government. Afghanistan hasbecome a virtual narco-state as a result.Certainly, there has been a catastrophic fail-ure in strategy and investment by theCoalition to wean farmers in the South offthe poppy. With 85 per cent of the popula-tion of the six provinces served by ISAF(International Security Assistance Force)Regional Command South dependent onagriculture for survival, there needs to be asubstitution strategy that addresses the fun-damental issues of security and economicwell-being if it is to work over the mediumto long term. However, any such redress willtake time and British strategic patience isnoticeably lacking at present.

As General Stanley McChrystal rightlysays, the main emphasis in Afghanistanmust be on real improvements to the qualityof life of the Afghan people. That will takemoney – lots of it. However, any such effortwould be easier if Americans, Europeansand Afghans could agree on something toaim for. The political solution will look

more like Kyrgystan than Switzerland andstrategy should be shaped in pursuit of suchan end. As the elections have demonstrated,the establishment of a truly functioning,democratic state is not feasible, at least notyet. The focus now must be on creatingbasic but robust instruments of governmentthat reinforce traditional structures in pur-suit of both a reasonable level of stabilityand the prevention of terrorism.

Security and stability in Afghanistanhave historically required a balancebetween top-down efforts to create a centralgovernment, and bottom-up efforts tosecure local support. Since 2001, the US andthe international community have focusedpredominantly on top-down security efforts,including the establishment of an AfghanNational Police Service and the AfghanNational Army. But the deteriorating situa-tion and local nature of the insurgencyrequire a proper sub-national effort to workwith local tribes, sub-tribes, and clans toestablish order and governance in ruralparts of Afghanistan. That is after all thecentral plank of General McChrystal’s peo-ple-centric approach to military operations.Historically the British have always had asense for such an approach and it is at thesub-national level that the British have achance to lead.

Britain’s�big�military�ideaThe 2009 NATO Summit Declaration onAfghanistan, in which Britain played a keyrole, agreed important specifics: the NATOtraining mission, more police trainers, sup-port for Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) in the run-up to the elections,increasing the size of OperationalMentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) toexpand the Afghan National Army to134,000, growth of the role of the AfghanNational Army Trust Fund, enhanced coop-eration between Afghan and Pakistani gov-ernments, strengthening of the IntegratedApproach with the United Nations to bettersynchronise cross-country civil-militaryefforts, and support for the UN electionfund. These are all elements of what is

ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099115522

© 2

009

The

Aut

hor.

Jou

rnal

com

pila

tion

© 2

009

ippr

increasingly called ‘hybrid war’. However,something was missing from the NATODeclaration: influencing the non-NATO USmilitary.

Central to Britain’s mission inAfghanistan is shaping American strategy.The US is open to ideas and the Britishshould be using their creativity and innova-tion to make the most of limited resources,an area in which traditionally they are sostrong. Indeed, central to successful fulfil-ment of the McChrystal concept of opera-tions (CONOPS) will be a British-inspiredEuropean effort to promote creative civil-military effect, within well embedded multi-national foundations and a rigorous Britishanalysis of the challenges posed by contem-porary conflict. If there is a problem withthe military effort (and there are a few) it isthat much of the leadership comes from aUS Central Command (CENTCOM) thathas little time for Europeans and littleunderstanding of NATO. This results in atendency to use European forces in a waythat makes them appear less efficient thanthey actually are. At the heart of militaryeffect in complex contingencies is the artand science of command and control inwhich forces must adapt continually, con-ceptually and structurally, in pursuit of cam-paign authority over the whole mix of civil-ian and military effort.

Campaign planning is everything inAfghanistan and no other country in theworld possesses the experience the Britishdo. At the theatre and tactical level it meansgetting the operational design right andexecuting that design. Here the British,uniquely, have an opportunity to act as abridge between American forces with theirtendency to plan at their level of power(with little regard for the impact of theirassumptions on weaker forces) andEuropean forces which have a far lowerlevel of technical, numeric and doctrinalstrength.

For example, the Americans are effec-tively planning to create a super-headquar-ters under which all American andCoalition forces will be commanded. Thissuper-headquarters will have to look across

the entire political, military and develop-ment landscape. However, such a headquar-ters is likely to further undermine Europeanpolitical support for the campaign asEuropean forces will effectively be removedfrom NATO control by the American mili-tary (whatever the rhetoric). Moreover,CENTCOM will use European forces inef-ficiently because it does not understandthem or their method and, doubtless,American commanders with little experi-ence of working with Europeans willbecome frustrated.

The European strategic culture (such asit is) is built on a new civil-military partner-ship, and this will be as important as realfighting power. This is also the Europeanway of doing war. In other words, forEuropeans hybrid conflict demands hybridsolutions. This shows how important it is toplace influencing at the heart of operationaldesign and raises questions particularly sen-sitive for European leaders and publics.Whom do we want to influence and howdo we communicate that influence? What isthe relative influence effect of kinetic – com-bat – operations or non-kinetic operationsand how should they be synchronised andsequenced? What should be the philosophyof command and control, and, rather moreprosaically, how is it best to spendEuropean money, which is a weapon systemin its own right? Spending it wisely willdepend entirely on the true integration ofmilitary and civil planning.

Britain’s big military idea will necessar-ily concern balancing American firepowerand manoeuvre with a role for Europeansthat effectively bridges the apparent gapbetween the purely military and the pure-ly civilian and craft a campaign plan tothat effect. It is difficult to see how anygenuine campaign momentum can beginto be generated within an ISAFHeadquarters that is under ever moredirect American control, using individualcountries drawn at random from acrossNATO and the other coalition nationsand led by an impatient and over-workedAmerican super-headquarters. TheAmericans will either become preoccupied ©

200

9 T

he A

utho

r. J

ourn

al c

ompi

latio

n ©

200

9 ip

pr

ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099 115533

with the tactical battle and neglect thetheatre aspects, or focus on satisfying the-atre requirements and fail to give subordi-nate tactical commanders the support,leadership or operational design theyneed. Britain can play a vital role here ifthe Americans will let them.

However, any such role will require amove beyond the predictably rhetorical tobegin to deliver unity of purpose betweenthe military and the non-military players.That will require a military headquartersstructured, trained and with an ethos capa-ble of integrated planning and executiondesigned to ensure non-military players’buy-in to the campaign plan. Herein lies thekernel of the big British military idea.NATO’s British-led Allied Rapid ReactionCorps (ARRC) must become the centre-piece of the European effort, both as a cen-tre for civil-military innovation and a newtype of fighting headquarters whereAmerican leadership and European strate-gic culture meet.

To that end, this tactical-level land com-ponent headquarters must be adapted toprovide the support, leadership and clarityof intent to subordinate formations inorder to tee them up to achieve success.Ironically, this is exactly what wasachieved when General Sir DavidRichards was COMISAF (Commander,International Security Assistance Force)and which has now been lost. Planningmust be seen as an exercise on squeezingthe most effect out of partner and alliedforces. This will be achieved by makingthe most out of national caveats through aheadquarters that has multi-nationalitydeep in its DNA, ethos and training and

which is capable of achieving genuine buy-in from all contributing nations. TheARRC must be optimised for hybrid con-flict from the outset.

Britain’s�big�economic�ideaWhile counter-insurgency efforts are ofcourse vital, not least the strengthening ofthe competence of local security forces(and at present there is a 70 per cent short-fall in international mentors for the policeand a 50 per cent shortfall for the Army)the real progress will be measured interms of the economy. Much has rightfullybeen made of the corrosive impact of nar-cotics on both the Afghan economy andgovernance. Corruption linked to nar-cotics goes right to the heart of govern-ment and governance. However, anyprogress will take a very long time andwill not deal with the essential problemthat is stalling progress: that 90 per cent ofunder-25-year-olds are unemployed. It isthese people for which the AfghanGovernment, its Coalition partners andthe Taliban are competing.

To win this battle a big economic idea isneeded in the form of several major newinfrastructure projects that will both suckup this pool of the dangerously unem-ployed and embed the Afghan economy ina new regional economic regional groupinginvolving neighbours and Asian powerpartners. Such a ‘Central and SouthernAsian Economic Council’ would have posi-tive benefits far beyond Afghanistan itself.It would need to include regional partnerssuch as China, India, Russia and even Iran,thus re-legitimising the security effort. Itwould also need to closely involve CentralAsian partners who share an ethnic identitywith the Afghans, particularly Pashtun,Uzhbeks and Tadjiks.

While any new major infrastructureprojects would not be completed in thenear future their very existence wouldhelp to reinforce stability and add signifi-cantly to economic confidence. Two proj-ects come to mind. South of KabulAfghanistan possesses what are probably

ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099115544

© 2

009

The

Aut

hor.

Jou

rnal

com

pila

tion

© 2

009

ippr

90�per�cent�of�under-25-year-olds�are�unemployed.�It�isthese�people�for�which�theAfghan�Government,�itsCoalition�partners�and�theTaliban�are�competing

the world’s second largest reserves of cop-per. The construction of a rail link from,say, Kabul to Islamabad and onto India (aswell as perhaps one to China) would notonly offer long-term economic benefits, itwould plug Afghanistan into the vibrantAsian economic region and provide massemployment for Afghans and Pakistanisalike. Of course, it would be difficult forsuch a railway to be built and it wouldneed to be protected. However, the regionis not unused to such ambition or indeedsuch pragmatism. The British built theIndian railway network during the Raj forexactly the same reasons – economicexploitation and political stability.

Additionally, more roads are needed toserve the emerging food zones whichwould not only reinforce Afghanistan’sburgeoning non-poppy agricultural sector,but also help to control exports. Thiswould certainly be the case if such a net-work reinforced rail links by plugging theAfghan economy into the wider region byimproving its road connections. China andIndia would be obvious beneficiaries butall Asian partners would likely gain. Initialnegotiations and preparatory work wouldneed to start in 2010 with constructionbeginning in 2012. Critically, such a planwould also act as a natural focus for effortsby the UN, the World Bank and other keynon-governmental and commercial organi-sations to move the narrative forward inboth Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such aproject is a very big idea indeed but that iswhat AFPAK needs. Are the British up toit?

A�big�British�idea�forAfghanistanSo, new and big thinking is required on thepart of Britain. The US AFPAK Strategy issound but is still reliant on partners willingto share the burden. Responses have notbeen encouraging; Europeans can be heardshuffling their feet and making their elo-quent and refined excuses all too audible.They too need a big idea they can believein.

Therefore, while the three strategicphase approach (security, governance andrule of law capacity building, and Afghancivil primacy) is sound it will take a hugeleap of strategic imagination to realise it.That will require a new political commit-ment, especially from the UK government,for whom too often masking the truth fromthe British people still seems more impor-tant than properly supporting the armedforces. We require an inspirational ideathat offers real hope for the future,matched by a strategic communicationscampaign.

Early civilian ownership of the AFPAKstrategy will thus be vital, but civilian inter-national organisations such as the UN andEU still remain dangerously resistant to theneed for more intense cooperation withouta new galvanising idea. Thus the politicalmoment is ripe for a big British idea. Thenext 18 months will likely see much closersynergy between the counter-terror, count-er-insurgency and counter-narcotics efforts,with Afghan civil primacy beyond 2015 therightful objective. However, only if progressis seen to be made over the next 18 monthsare European publics, including the British,likely to permit the continued loss of life(over 220 British dead since 2001) and thespending on aid and development that willbe needed to achieve such an objective.That in turn will require a UK Governmentwilling to lead and take the political heatneeded to get Afghanistan and Pakistan ontracks that ensure they are no longer threatsto themselves or others.

Ironically, Afghanistan is reasonablywell-placed. It has significant natural capitalthat needs to be exploited, financial capitalheld outside the country and emerginginstitutions of state, and it is ready for a newfuture. It is in Britain’s interest to make thathappen.

Julian Lindley-French is Eisenhower Professor ofDefence Strategy at the Netherlands DefenceAcademy and Special Professor of Strategy of theUniversity of Leiden. He is also a member of theStrategic Advisors Group of the Atlantic Council ofthe United States. ©

200

9 T

he A

utho

r. J

ourn

al c

ompi

latio

n ©

200

9 ip

pr

ppuubblliicc��ppoolliiccyy��rreesseeaarrcchh��––��SSeepptteemmbbeerr--NNoovveemmbbeerr��22000099 115555