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#CyberCamp19 Threat Hunting y Simulación de Ataques Lórien Doménech Ruiz y Carlos Caballero García

Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

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Page 1: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

#CyberCamp19

Threat Hunting y Simulación de

Ataques Lórien Doménech Ruiz y Carlos Caballero García

Page 2: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Índice 1.Threat Hunting Intro 2.Vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals 3. Configuring threat hunting environments 4. Attack simulation 5. Playbook and case study 6. Conclusions

Page 3: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

#CyberCamp19

Ponentes 1. Lórien Doménech Ruiz

Carlos Caballero García

Page 4: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting Intro

Page 5: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting Intro

Where is Threat Hunting in a Incident Life Cycle?

Professionals: Hackers, Sysadmins, Analysts, Incident Responders, Forensics …

Page 6: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting Intro

What is it for?

Page 7: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting Intro

What do we need?

Page 8: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting Intro

Others resources

Page 9: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals

Page 10: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals

MITRE ATT&CK™ It’s a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.

mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise

Page 11: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals

Cybercriminals : Lazarus Group

Page 12: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Vulnerabilities exploited by cybercriminals

Mitre Att&ck on sandbox: Ryuk Ransomware analysis - 09/2019

Page 13: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Setting threat hunting environments

Page 14: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

VPN

Threat Hunting environments

House Lab with ESXi

Requirements Laptops Server with ESXi VM Windows Server 2019 VM Windows 10 VM Windows 7 CentOS 7 Ubuntu S 18.04 (Caldera) Splunk Cloud (Universal Forwarder on Vm’s) Sysmon Configuration

Page 15: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

House Lab with ESXi Detail requirements

CPU: 2 CPU: 2 CPU: 4 CPU: 2 CPU: 2 RAM: 4GB RAM: 2GB RAM: 6GB RAM: 3GB RAM: 2GB DISK: 40GB DISK: 20GB DISK: 40GB DISK: 10GB DISK: 10GB

CPU: Xeon 16 RAM: 64GB DISK: 2TB

Page 16: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

Sysmon Configuration Install Sysmon with a configuration file to the environment. Installation: sysmon –accepteula –i c:\windows\config.xml

Page 17: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

Page 18: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

Page 19: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

Page 20: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

Detection Lab This lab has been designed with defenders in mind. Its primary purpose is to allow the user to quickly build a Windows domain that comes pre-loaded with security tooling and some best practices when it comes to system logging configuration

Primary Lab Features: • Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics is installed on the WEF machine, with the

lightweight ATA gateway installed on the DC • Splunk forwarders are pre-installed and all indexes are pre-created. Technology add-

ons for Windows are also preconfigured. • A custom Windows auditing configuration is set via GPO to include command line

process auditing and additional OS-level logging • Palantir's Windows Event Forwarding subscriptions and custom channels are

implemented • Powershell transcript logging is enabled. All logs are saved to \\wef\pslogs • osquery comes installed on each host and is pre-configured to connect to a Fleet

server via TLS. Fleet is preconfigured with the configuration from Palantir's osquery Configuration

• Sysmon is installed and configured using SwiftOnSecurity’s open-sourced configuration • All autostart items are logged to Windows Event Logs via AutorunsToWinEventLog • SMBv1 Auditing is enabled

Requirements • 55GB+ of free disk space • 16GB+ of RAM • Packer 1.3.2 or newer • Vagrant 2.2.2 or newer • Virtualbox or VMWare or AWS

DEMO TIME!

Page 21: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

SOF-ELK® VM Platform focused on the typical needs of computer forensic investigators/analysts and information security operations personnel. The platform is a customized build of the open source Elastic stack, consisting of the Elasticsearch storage and search engine, Logstash ingest and enrichment system, Kibana dashboard frontend, and Elastic Beats log shipper

Requirements • 40GB+ of free disk space • 8GB+ of RAM • VMWare

Page 22: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Threat Hunting environments

HELK HELK is one of the first open source hunt platforms. Components and structure:

Requirements 40GB+ of free disk space - 8GB+ of RAM - VMWare

Page 23: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Attack simulation

Page 24: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Attack simulation

Caldera CALDERA is an automated adversary emulation system, built on the MITRE ATT&CK™ framework.

Caldera 2.0 changes: the introduction of two operating modes: adversary mode (Adversary mode is the classic CALDERA capability) and chain mode (designed to allow users to orchestrate/string together atomic unit tests into larger attack sequences).

Requirements Python 3.5.3+ Google Chrome is our only supported/tested browser

Plugins

DEMO TIME!

Page 25: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Attack simulation

Cymulate Cymulate tests the strength of the security of the companies by simulating real cyber attacks across all attack vectors based on MITRE ATT&CK™.

Requirements Agent in the host Whitelist IP

Page 26: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Playbook and case study

Page 27: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Playbook and case study

PowerShell Hunting General Information Date 29/08/2019 Created by Lórien Doménech Ruiz Last execution date 09/09/2019 Estimated Resources About 24 hours Priority High

PowerShell Execution Tactic: Execution Technique: PowerShell (T1086)

Hypothesis & Trigger

Hypothesis Adversaries are using PowerShell commands to attack our infrastructure to gain access to resources inside the organization.

Hypothesis Status Initial Trigger Too many events related to suspicious PowerShell commands have been found on Siem or/and corporate Anti-Virus. MITRE Reference PowerShell (T1086) Classification Execution

PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command

Technique Description locally or on a remote computer. PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk. Administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.

Techniques Detection Detection of PowerShell execution locally or remotely. This only focus on execution of PowerShell and not on what happens after the execution or the specific goal. This can be linked to several PowerShell execution variants - Basic PowerShell Execution

Techniques Detection Detection of the abuse of signed PowerShell Hosts bypassing application whitelisting and potentially constrained language mode. This focuses on PowerShell hosts beyond powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe or wsmprovhost.exe - Alternate Signed PowerShell Hosts

Page 28: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Playbook and case study Threat Intelligence TH focus on the sector Energy Possible actors APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group-3390

APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to bePossible motivations Vietnam-based.

….

Software APT32: Cobalt Strike - commercial penetration testing tool

Actives campaign? APT32 (Last attack: February 2018, Area: East-Asian countries, References: link link2)

Actor capability APT32 (Initial access: spear-phishing emails, capability: High)

… Recommended Data Sources

ATT&CK Data Source Event Log PowerShell logs Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Turn on PowerShell Transcription

WinEvent Loaded DLLs DLL monitoring Windows Registry File monitoring Process monitoring powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe, Rundll32.exe

Process command-line parameters

Page 29: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Playbook and case study

Hunt Actions Date Action

30/08/2019 Research, get information from IT client and set the Lab environment

02/09/2019 Set the Lab environment and research 03/09/2019 Looking for Event ID: 4100, 4103 and 4104 04/09/2019 Looking for Event ID: 200, 400, 500, 501 and 800 05/09/2019 Try new configuration with Sysmon to log more event

Hunt Findings Date Detail

03/09/2019 *********************** 04/09/2019 *********************** 05/09/2019 **********************

Mitigations It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.

Code Signing Set PowerShell execution policy to execute only signed scripts. Disable or Remove It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since Feature or Program it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for

remote execution.

Privileged Account When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell Management execution policy, depending on environment configuration.

Page 30: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Playbook and case study

Final Conclusions Date: 10/09/2019 Time spent: 30 hours Has the hypothesis been confirmed? No.

X Partially. Yes.

Triggers another hunt? No. X Yes.

Constraints or difficulties while executing? The systems doesn’t collet all PowerShell information on the logs.

Hunter Notes 1. Explore the data produced in the lab environment with the analytics above and document what normal looks like from a PowerShell perspective. Then, take the findings and explore in the production environment. Lab environment 2. If execution of PowerShell happens all the time in your environment, then categorize the data collected by business unit or department to document profiles more efficiently.

Activity Logs? Partial Client Info ***** Suggested Use Case *****

Page 31: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Conclusions

Page 32: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

Resources

Threat Hunting

https://github.com/0x4D31/awesome-threat-detection

https://posts.specterops.io/threat-hunting-with-jupyter-notebooks-part-1-your-first-notebook-9a99a781fde7

https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/ThreatHunter-Playbook/tree/master/playbooks/windows

Sysmon

https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config

https://github.com/marcosd4h/sysmonx

PowerShell

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086/

https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit

https://github.com/samratashok/nishang

TaHiTI y MaGMa:

https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/wp-content/uploads/FI-ISAC-Use-Case-Framework-Full-Documentation.pdf

Sigma:

https://www.owasp.org/images/a/a8/GOD17-Sigma.pdf

Detection Lab:

https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab

SOF-ELK:

https://github.com/philhagen/sof-elk

HELK:

https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK

Caldera:

https://github.com/mitre/caldera

Page 33: Threat Hunting y simulación de ataques · 2020. 4. 21. · Energy . Possible actors . APT32, APT33, APT34, Dragonfly, Magic Hound, Threat Group- 3390 APT32 is a threat group that

GRACIAS

@loriendr @_CarlosCabal @CybercampES #CyberCamp19