Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy

8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.

1/17

Beyond System: The Rhetoric of ParalogyAuthor(s): Thomas KentSource: College English, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Sep., 1989), pp. 492-507Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378007.

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2/17

Thomas Kent

B e y o n d

S y s t e m

h e

R h e t o r i c

o

P a r a l o g y

Systemic

rhetoric

is the

conception

of

rhetoric that treats discourse

production

and

discourse

analysis

as

codifiable

processes,

processes

derived from

the idea

that

language possesses

a

foundational

or

conventional

center of some

sort.

This

formulation of rhetoric as system traces its genealogy to Plato's and Aristotle's

responses

to the

pragmatic

rhetorics of the

Sophists.

As

we now

know,

the

Sophists

fulfilled a

very

valuable

social function

in

Greek

society by providing

the

practical

training required

of

young

men in

order for

them to succeed

in the

democratic

city-state.

Best

represented by

Protagoras

and

Gorgias,

the

Sophists

travelled

from

city

to

city

instructing

citizens,

primarily patrician

young

men,

in

the

important

art

or techne of

rhetoric,

and

this

instruction

typically

included

practical training

in

the

routine but

important day-to-day

activities

required

in

Greek

political,

legal,

and

economic

social

life.

Steeped

in

Gorgiasian

ag-

nosticism and

Protagorean

materialism,

the

Sophistic conception

of

rhetoric

treated

discourse as a social

instrument,

and as

the

practical

treatment

of

language-in-use,

the

Sophistic

rhetorics were

thoroughly

pragmatic,

decentered,

and

anti-metaphysical.

For

Plato,

this kind of

pragmatic approach

to discourse

obviously posed

a

di-

rect

threat

to his

entire

metaphysics,

and for

Aristotle,

Sophistic

materialism

led

directly

to

an

untenable

relativism

that threatened

the

foundation

of his

catego-

ries.

Although

I

cannot

pursue

here all the reasons

that

Plato and

Aristotle

so

vi-

olently

condemned the

Sophists,

reasons

that

clearly

included

the

problem

of

economic

competition

for

students,

one

important

reason

no doubt

concerned

the Sophistic rejection of foundational epistemology based on the Protagorean

contention that

man and not

eternal forms or

categories

is

the center

of

all

things

(see Rankin;

Coby; esp.

Kerford).

For

epistemological

foundationalism

and

a

metaphysics

of

presence

to

endure,

Sophistic philosophy,

which

consisted

pri-

marily

of

rhetoric in

its

practical

uses,

had

to

be

eradicated,

and for

the most

part

it

was. The

Sophistic

conception

of rhetoric as

a

social

art

grounded

in

the

everyday

uses of

language

has

been

lost

to

us;

in our

contemporary

genealogy

of

rhetoric,

no continuous

Sophistic

rhetorical

tradition exists.

For

2500

years,

Thomas Kent

is associate

professor

of

English

at

Iowa

State

University.

He

is the

author

of

Interpreta-

tion and Genre: The Role of Generic Perception in the Study of Narrative Texts (Bucknell University

Press).

College

English,

Volume

51,

Number

5,

September

1989

492

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3/17

Beyond

System:

The Rhetoric

of

Paralogy

493

rhetoric

has been

dominated not

by

social

pragmatic

conceptions

of

language-in-

use,

but rather

by

epistemologically-centered

conceptions

of

language

as

system.

Aristotle

established the

boundaries of rhetoric

as we know it that from

antiq-

uity

to our time have remained

remarkably

stable,

especially

in the areas of

dis-

course

production

and

analysis.

In the

Rhetoric,

Aristotle

argues

that

discourse

production

may

be

described

according

to

a kind

of

organic

structuralism

where

a

text-usually

an

oral

address-transcends

the sum of its

parts.

For

Aristotle,

a

text-whatever

its

kind-cannot be reduced to discrete

parts

that,

in

turn,

may

be

abstracted

from the

process

of discourse

production

and then talked

about

without

concern

for each

part's

structural interaction

with all the other

parts.

In

the

Aristotelian

formulation,

discourse

production always

constitutes

a

systemic

process

characterized

by

what he calls the

enthymeme. According

to

Aristo-

tle,

rhetoric

stands in an

antistrophic

relation to dialectic

in

that dialectic

aims

for

scientific

reduction

characterized

by

the

syllogism

while rhetoric aims

for

rhetorical

reconstruction characterized

by

the

enthymeme

(see

Raymond).

Both

rhetoric and

dialectic,

however,

resemble one

another-they

are

not

opposi-

tions-in

that

both

are

based on

logical

constructs

(the

syllogism

and the en-

thymeme)

and

both

may

be

reduced to a

process

or

system. Employing

the

epis-

temological

foundation

provided by

the

systemic enthymeme,

Aristotle

generates

the

primary

function of rhetoric- the

faculty

of

observing

in

any

given

case

the

available

means of

persuasion

(11:1355b)-and

proceeds

to char-

acterize

the

process

of

persuasion according

to certain

proofs,

logical

categories,

and topoi (see Ryan). Beginning with the presupposition of the enthymeme-a

presupposition

derived

from

his initial

separation

of rhetoric from

dialectic-Ar-

istotle

generates

a

logico-systemic

superstructure

for

rhetoric that

stands outside

both

history

and

social

interaction,

and it

represents

a clear

reaction to

the

Sophistic

notion of

rhetoric as a

pragmatic

social

activity.

Ironically,

the

most

enduring legacy

of the

Aristotelian

systemic

rhetoric

has

been

the

non-Aristotelian

classical

reduction of

rhetoric into discrete

categories

of

inventio,

dispositio,

elocutio,

memoria,

and

pronuntiatio.

In the

Rhetoric,

Ar-

istotle

emphasizes

the

organic

and

interactive

character of

discourse

production

within

his

logical

system,

but within the

classical

Greco-Roman

paradigm,

Aris-

totle's organicism-his search for a systemic rhetorical method-was dropped in

favor

of a

formulaic linear

system

that

described the

stages

in

the

process

of dis-

course

production.

For

example,

the

primary

Aristotelian

thrust

in

Cicero's

De

oratore,

Tacitus'

Dialogus,

and

Quintilian's

Institutio

oratoria

concerns

the

proper

parts

that

come

together

to

form the

oratorial

text,

especially

the role

played

by

invention in

composing

these

parts.

The

founding

fathers of the

classical

rhetorical

tradition

studied the

categories

themselves,

and

they

paid

lit-

tle

attention

to

organicism

and

practically

no

attention

to the

possibility

of

re-

constituting

Aristotle's

formal

categories.

Certainly lively

debate

ensued about

the

function of

these

five

parts

of discourse

production

from

Boethius' refor-

mulation of the enthymeme-his epicheireme-forward to Ramus' further elab-

oration of

rhetoric

as

primarily

style

and

delivery

(omitting

invention and the

topics)

through

the

Port-Royal Logic

to Richard

Whately

who

considered rhet-

oric

(in

conformity

with

the

very

just

and

philosophic

view

of

Aristotle)

as an




4/17

494

College

English

offshoot

from

Logic (8).

These

debates,

however,

never

questioned

the

logical

and

formalist

foundation

of the

classical

paradigm,

nor did

they

question

the

Ar-

istotelian

conception

of

system.

In our time, this classical

paradigm

still controlsour

conception

of discourse

production,

and

it

appears

regularly

as the

constitutive

schema from

which

the

entire

field

of

rhetoric

takes its

shape.

For the

most

part,

our

contemporary

metadiscourse of

rhetoric-the

language

we

employ

to talk

about rhetoric-has

remained

the

same

for

2000

years.

We

continue to

employ

the

classical

paradig-

matic

categories

of

discourse

production,

although nowadays

we

generally

reduce the

five

categories

to

three:

invention,

arrangement,

nd

style.

Of

course,

it

is

important

to

emphasize

that

current

notions about

discourse

production

reinvent

Aristotle

in the

sense that

they

attempt

to revive the idea of

organic

n-

teraction

among

these three

paradigmaticelements within somethingthat has

come

to

be

called

the

writing

process.

Although

these

contemporaryprocess

approaches

to

writing-approaches

usually

derived

from theories of invention-

attempt

a

return

o

Aristotle

by

adding

an

interactiveand recursivedimension o

the

act of

discourse

production,

they

do

not

attempt

to

go

beyond

Aristotle's

categories

nor do

they

attempt

to

conceptualize

a

rhetorical radition

outside

the

classical

paradigm.

For

example,

current

process

theories

of

discourse

produc-

tion

generally

follow three

epistemological

approaches:

the Kantian

approach,

the

neo-positivist

approach,

and

the

social-semiotic

approach.

The Kantian

ap-

proach

understands

discourse

production

to be

generated

from

innate

mental

categories that constitute humanconsciousness; modal theories of discourse,

tagmemic

theory,

the

Prewriting

School,

and

expressive

theories

represent

ex-

amples

of

this

approach.

The

neo-positivist

approach

understandsdiscourse

pro-

duction

to be an

empiricalphenomenon

that

can be tested

and

measured;

work

by

schema

theorists,

cyberneticists

and

information

heorists,

protocol

theorists,

and

brain

hemisphere

researchers

represent

this

approach.

The social-semiotic

approach

understands

discourse

production

o be a

communal

activity

that

is so-

cially

and

historically

determined;

ethnography,

collaborative

writing heory,

so-

cial

constructionist

theory,

and the

conventionalist semiotics

of the

Halliday

school are

examples

of

this

approach.

These three divisions

obviously

do

consti-

tute the only way to characterize current approaches to discourse production

(for

other

possible

divisions

see,

e.g., Faigley;

Berlin);

nor do

these

categories

possess

firm

boundaries

in

that

some rhetoricians

see themselves

working

in

more than one

category.

For

example,

many

neo-positivist empiricists,

especial-

ly

protocol

theorists like

Linda

Flower

and

Kantians

like

Peter

Elbow,

claim

that

their work

possesses

a

strong

social

dimension.

Although

strict boundaries

are

impossible

to establish

precisely,

most

of

our

approaches

o

current

research

in

discourse

production

conform

n

general

to the

outline sketched

out

here.

Although seemingly

different,

these

approaches

actually

share

a

set

of

com-

mon

assumptions,

especially

the Kantian and the

neo-positivist approaches,

which are

philosophically

akin anyway. First, each

approach

defines itself and

finds its

identity

within

the

classical

paradigm;

all

Kantians,

neo-positivists,

or

social

constructionists see themselves

working

within invention

theory, stylis-

tics,

or

some other

subcategory

of

the classical

paradigm.

Few rhetoricians




5/17

Beyond

System:

The Rhetoric

of Paralogy

495

question

the

legitimacy

of

the

paradigm

or seek alternative

ways

of characteriz-

ing

rhetoric.

Second,

and

perhaps

more

important,

none of these three

ap-

proaches

sees

itself

reacting against

the Aristotelian

formulation

of rhetoric as

a

system.

Each

approach

may

describe

the

system

differently-as

mental

con-

structs,

phenomenalistic

data,

or social

conventions-but

all these

approaches

assume

nonetheless

that discourse

production

may

be

codified in

a

logico/sys-

temic manner. In

fact,

most

contemporary

rhetoricians

perceive

their work to

be

part

of one

long

and continuous

Aristotelian

tradition,

and,

today,

no influential

theory

of

rhetoric-except perhaps

Kenneth

Burke's

acknowledgement

of

the

unconscious

(e.g.,

Burke

167-69)-suggests

that

discourse

production

might

be

paralogic

and

unsystemic

in nature.

Much like

theories of discourse

production,

contemporary

theories

of

dis-

course analysis also conform both to the classical paradigm that defines the

boundaries of rhetoric and to

the Aristotelian

conception

of discourse

as

system.

Broadly speaking,

the

dominant

approach

to discourse

analysis

in this

century

corresponds

to the rhetorical

category

of elocutio

or

style,

which

constitutes

an

extraordinarily

wide

range

of

endeavors

(see

Bennett).

Contemporary

rhetorical

analysis,

which includes much

contemporary

literary

analysis

as

well,

has

been

dominated

by

one

aspect

of

style,

the

study

of

tropological

language--especially

metaphor

and

metonomy-and

this

preoccupation

is

the thread

that connects

rhetoric with

contemporary poetics,

linguistics,

and

philosophy

(see

Rice;

Gen-

ette;

Todorov).

In

one

sense,

the histories

of

twentieth-century poetics,

lin-

guistics, and analytic philosophy share a common horizon, the study of figura-

tion.

In

contemporary poetics,

for

example,

we

may

trace

a

genealogy

that

stretches from Russian Formalist

preoccupations

with

poetic

language,

struc-

turalist

descriptions

of

metaphor

and

metonomy,

New Critical

conceptions

of

irony

and

metaphoric complexity

to current

communitarian,

phenomenological,

and

deconstructive

conceptions

of

literary language.

In

linguistics,

we

may

trace

out a similar

heritage

from the

Prague

School's

structuralist

analyses

of meta-

phoric

and

metonymic

axes,

anthropological

linguistic

concerns

with

figuration

and

myth,

to current

discussions of

metaphoric

language

in

speech

act

theory

and

pragmatics.

Twentieth-century

analytic

philosophy

also has

been

centrally

concerned with figuration from Gotlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the early

Wittgenstein, through

the

Vienna

Circle

and

Anglo-American

positivism,

to

the

later

Wittgenstein,

Gilbert

Ryle,

J.

L.

Austin,

and Donald Davidson

(to

cite

just

a few

of the

major figures

within

this one branch of

philosophy).

Although

contemporary

poetics, linguistics,

and

analytic philosophy

pursue

very

different

ends,

each

endeavor,

in

its own

way,

undertakes

a brand

of

rhe-

torical

analysis

that

takes

shape

only

against

the

backdrop

of

the classical

para-

digm.

Consider,

for

example,

Roman

Jakobson's

famous distinction

between

metaphoric-paradigmatic

constructions and

metonymic-syntagmatic

construc-

tions. To

comprehend

Jakobson's

distinction,

we

obviously

must

first under-

stand the

paradigm

in

which he is

working.

That

is,

we must

understand

that

Jakobson

employs

the traditional

conceptions

of

metaphor

and

metonomy

in

radically

new

ways;

we must

understand,

in

other

words,

that Jakobson

himself

accepts

the

boundaries of the

classical

paradigm

while he

simultaneously

sets




6/17

496

College

English

out

to

widen

them. We

must

also understand that

Jakobson makes no

attempt

to

destroy

the

paradigm,

for he

seeks

only

to

employ

traditional

rhetorical

concepts

in

new

ways.

Even

a

radically

subversive

analytical

strategy

like American

de-

construction theory, or at least the deconstruction

theory

practiced

by

Paul de

Man,

finds its

field

of reference

only

in

relation to its reaction

against

the

meta-

physically

centered

conceptions

of

tropes-primarily metaphor-represented

within the

classical

paradigm.

Certainly,

de Manian deconstruction seeks

to

un-

dermine

these

conceptions,

but

in

order to do

so,

it

must

accept

the classical

paradigm

as the

representation

for

rhetoric. Unlike

Derrida,

de Man does

not

seek

to

challenge

the

paradigm

itself, and,

in

fact,

he

seems

to view

his work

as

an

extension of the

classical

paradigm

(see

de

Man

6).

In

addition

to

accepting

the

representation

of rhetoric established

by

the

classical

paradigm,

most

contemporary


analysis

also

corre-

spond

to

contemporary

theories of

discourse

production

in

another

important

way.

Like

theories

of discourse

production,

most

contemporary

theories

of

dis-

course

analysis-I

would

say

all

except Jacques

Derrida's deconstruction

theory

and some

versions of American

pragmatic

theory-follow

the Aristotelian

exam-

ple by

proposing

a

logico-systemic

foundation for the

analysis

of

figuration.

In

this

century literary

theorists,

linguistic

theorists,

and

language philosophers

have

quested

for the

holy grail

of a

totalizing system,

for a

definitive

and

final

explanation

of

language's

figurative

power.

In

fact,

the

history

of

discourse

anal-

ysis

in

this

century may

be

described as the

usurpation

of one

totalizing

system

by another totalizing system. In poetics, for example, the analysis of literary dis-

course has been

dominated

by

the

preoccupation

with formal

systems-the

for-

malisms of

Russian

Formalism,

New

Criticism,

Structuralism,

and

American

versions of

Phenomenology.

For

linguistics,

a similar

story

may

be told: struc-

turalist and

anthropological

theories,

generative

theories,

and

pragmatic/speech

act theories all

attempt

to describe how discourse

operates

by employing

the

foundational

notion of

system.

Analytic

philosophy

also

has been

dominated

by

the

quest

for a

logical system

that

might explain

the

operation

of

discourse,

and,

as Richard

Rorty

points

out,

only recently

have

some

philosophers

relinquished

this task.

Existing

within the classical

paradigm

that establishes

the boundaries

of rhetoric, the dominant contemporary theories of both discourse production

and

discourse

analysis rely

on the notion

of

system,

and little attention

has

been

given

to the

possibility

that discourse

production

and

analysis

may

be

non-

systemic

and

paralogical

in nature.

Within the

classical

paradigm,

the foundational

element

that

gives

both

dis-

course

production

and

analysis

their

systemic

identities

has

changed

over

time.

For

Aristotle,

the foundational

element that identified

his

rhetorical

system

was

the

enthymeme;

for

Ramus,

it

was

dialectic;

for

Jakobson,

it was

metaphoric

and

metonymic displacement,

and so forth.

In

contemporary

rhetorical

study,

the most

powerful

foundational

element,

the element that

cuts across

all

the

many different kinds of rhetorical systems, is the notion of convention. In con-

temporary


production,

for

example,

some

conception

of

convention

provides

the foundational

element that

supports

every

rhetorical

sys-

tem.

Kantians

argue

that

the

logico-mental

categories

shared

by

language

users




7/17

Beyond System:

The Rhetoric

of

Paralogy 497

possess

a

conventional

dimension.

According

to

the

Kantians,

these

schematic

categories

do

not

constitute

things-in-themselves;

rather,

they

represent

the

con-

tingent

and

conventional mental

processes

that we

employ

to

structure

reality,

and these

processes

may

even

change

over time. Similar to the Kantian

conven-

tionalists,

the

neo-positivists

argue

that

the

things

that

they analyze-protocols,

recall,

syntactic

maturity, given-new

constructs,

and so forth-do not

constitute

things-in-themselves;

rather,

they

represent

shared conventional

processes

that

remain

static

long

enough

to reveal

themselves to us so that

we

may

measure

and

codify

them.

Unlike the

Kantians and

neo-positivists,

the

social-

semioticians

argue

that

socially

constructed conventions

constitute

all that

we

can

know

about

reality;

for

these

materialists,

conventions become

the

things-in-

themselves,

and our

ability

to

produce

discourse becomes

contingent

on

our

more

fundamental

ability

to

understand our

social

and

historical

situation.

Similar

to

these

theories

of

discourse

production,

most

contemporary

theories

of

discourse

analysis

also

include a

conception

of convention as

a

foundational

element in

their

analytical

systems.

In

structuralist and formalist

poetics,

for

ex-

ample,

genres

like

poems

and

novels often are

distinguished

according

to

their

uses of

something

we

call

literary

conventions,

and,

in

turn,

stylistic analysis

becomes

the

description

of

these

conventions.

Contemporary

linguistics-espe-

cially

in

the

area

of

speech

act

theory-and

analytic philosophy

also

are

grounded

in

the

idea

that

language

is

conventional;

in

fact,

the one

assumption

shared

by

most

language

philosophers

in

this

century

is the

foundational

as-

sumption that language is conventional in nature. For example, David Lewis

claims

that

It

is

a

platitude-something only

a

philosopher

would dream

of

denying-that

there

are

conventions of

language

(160).

Language

philosophers,

linguistic

theorists,

and

literary

critics

only recently

have

begun

to

question

the

idea that

conventionalism forms the

foundation

for

all

of

language

study,

and

the

two

contemporary

philosophers

who have

contrib-

uted

most to

this

critique

are

Donald

Davidson and

Jacques

Derrida.

At

first

glance,

Davidson

and

Derrida

would seem

to share

little

philosophical

common

ground;

Davidson

represents

the

culmination of

analytic

philosophy

in

this cen-

tury,

and

Derrida

has

devoted

his

career

to

deconstructing

the

tradition

that

Davidson represents. On closer inspection, however, Davidson's and Derrida's

treatments of

convention

share

many

important

similarities,

and

although

they

approach

the

subject

from

very

different

angles, they

end

up

in

much the same

place

(for

a

further

discussion of

these

similarities,

see

Wheeler;

Pradhan).

Both

Davidson

and

Derrida

argue

that

language

is

not

convention-bound

and,

conse-

quently,

they

suggest

that

theories of

discourse

production

and

analysis

that

ground

themselves

in

this

assumption

require

reformulation.

By

calling

into

question

the

very

foundation

of

contemporary

rhetoric-and

of all

language

study

for

that

matter-Davidson

and

Derrida also

question

the

possibility

of a

totalizing

Aristotelian

systemic

analysis

of

discourse

as well as the

existence of

the classical

paradigm

that forces us to define rhetoric

according

to

categories

established in

antiquity

and

legitimated

by

habit

and

tradition. In

their

critiques

of

conventionalism,

Davidson

and

Derrida

require

us to reinvent

rhetoric ac-

cording

to a

different

paradigm,

a

paradigm

defined

not

by systemic

logic

but,




8/17

498

College

English

rather,

by

nonsystemic

paralogy.

Such a

reformulation

of rhetoric

offers

new

possibilities

for the

study

of both

discourse

production

and discourse

analysis

while

it

simultaneously

requires

us to

rethink

some of our foundational

assump-

tions

about

language

itself.

Donald

Davidson

formulates

his

critique

of conventionalism

in the

essay

Communication

and

Convention,

which he

concludes

by inverting

the con-

ventionalist

argument

that

language

is

convention-bound.

Davidson tells us:

if

I am

right

in

what

I

have said in

this

paper,

convention

is

not

a

condition

of

lan-

guage.

I

suggest,

then,

that

philosophers

who make

convention

a

necessary

element

in

language

have

the matter

backwards.The

truth s rather hat

language

s a

condi-

tion

for

having

conventions.

(280)

In

traditional

language

philosophy,

it is

convention that links

the

sign

we

pro-

duce to the act the sign produces in the world, and Davidson denies that any

such

link

exists that

connects what

our words mean

.

.

.

and our

purposes

in

using

them

(271).

By

denying

traditional

assumptions

about the nature

of

lan-

guage

conventions,

Davidson does not

explain meaning by reverting

to

a sim-

plistic

correspondence

theory

between

signifier

and

signified.

He does not

sug-

gest,

for

example,

that a

non-arbitrary,

one-to-one

correspondence

exists

between

signifier

and

signified.

He

admits

the arbitrariness of

signs,

but

insists

that

arbitrary

should not be

confused

with

convention,

for

clearly,

what is

arbi-

trary

is

not

necessarily

conventional

(265).

To

say

that a

particular

sound

or

a

particular

mark

arbitrarily signifies something

does not

mean that

the sound

or

the mark is conventional. Thus he departs from the tradition marked off by J. L.

Austin,

H.

P.

Grice,

John

Searle,

and Michael

Dummett,

and

many

other

lan-

guage

philosophers,

rhetoricians,

and

literary

theorists who hold

that

we

employ

language

in

order

to

bring

about certain

changes

in

the

world,

and

that because

language

possesses

illocutionary

force,

some

non-arbitrary

conventional

connec-

tion

must

exist

between the

sign

and its effect

in

the world.

If

such

a conven-

tional

connection were

non-arbitrary,

it

would

possess

regularity

or

what

Der-

rida

calls

iterability

across

language

(179).

That

is,

a

non-arbitrary

convention

of

language

that

signifies

the

illocutionary

force of a sound

or a

mark would

op-

erate

independently

of

any

particular

language

or

language

act.

Both

Davidson

and

Derrida

argue

that no such feature of

language

exists.

In

his

analysis,

Davidson isolates three

categories

of

theories that

attempt

to

describe the link

between a

sign's meaning

and its social

effect:

first,

there

are

theories

that

claim

there

is a

convention

connecting

sentences

in one

or

another

grammatical

mood

(or

containing

an

explicit performative

phrase)

with

illocutionary

ntentions,

or some

broader

purpose;

second,

there

are theories

that

look

to

a

conventional

use

for

each

sentence;

and

third,

there

are theories

to

the

ef-

fect that

there is a

convention

that ties

individualwords to

an extension or

inten-

sion. These are

not

competing

theories.

Depending

on

details,

all

combinations

of

these

theories are

possible.

(266)

The first kind of

theory

pertains

to theorists like Dummett who

suggest

that sen-

tences assert

something

and that assertions are convention-bound.

Davidson

identifies three

problems

with

such

a formulation.

First,

Davidson

points

out

the

commonsense notion that the same sentence

may

be

employed

for uses

other




9/17

Beyond

System:

The Rhetoric

of

Paralogy

499

than

assertion;

it

may

be

employed

for

telling

a

joke

or

asking

a

question

and

so

forth.

Therefore,

if there

is

a

convention

that

makes an assertion

an

assertion,

it

must reside

outside

the

sentence

itself

in

the context

where the sentence is

ut-

tered. No conventional element connected with the isolated sentence-like

mood,

for

example-can

mark the

sentence

as

an assertion or

any

other kind

of

performative,

and

when we move

our search

from the isolated

sentence

to

the

context in

which it is

uttered,

we

still

cannot

discover a codifiable

conventional

element that

gives

an

assertion its

identity.

According

to

Davidson,

we can

only

establish

some

very vague

criteria to

explain

why

a

sentence

may

be read

as

an

assertion in

one

context

and a

joke

in

another,

and

even

if we

could

establish

firm

criteria

to

explain why

we

agree

to

call

an

assertion

an assertion

in

every

context,

this

agreement

would not

necessarily

establish a

convention.

As

David-

son

reminds

us,

We

all

agree

that

a

horse

must

have

four

legs,

but it

is

not

a

convention

that

horses

have four

legs

(269).

Davidson's second

refutation

of the idea that

modalities

are convention-

bound

treats the

claim that a

conventional

element exists

that marks

an

as-

serter's

intention to

assert

something.

Since an

assertion

must be

recognized

as

an

assertion

by

an

audience and

is, therefore,

a

public

act,

it would

be nice

to

think

that

some

sort of

conventional

element

exists that announces

to the

world

our

intention to

assert

something.

Since no such convention

can

be isolated

in

ordinary

language

use,

Gottlob

Frege

tried,

unsuccessfully,

to

invent a

symbol

that

would

mark

an

assertion as

an

assertion.

But

such a

symbol,

as Davidson

indicates, cannot work. Clearly, if such a convention existed in ordinary lan-

guage, every

liar

or

actor would

employ

it to

convince

us of her or his

sincerity.

No

such

public,

identifiable,

consensual

convention exists nor could

exist

that

marks

a

sentence

as an

assertion

or as

any

other

kind of

performative.

Davidson's

third

refutation denies the claim

that

convention

marks the

speak-

er's

intention

to

utter a

true

sentence. Davidson shows that

this claim forms

part

of

an

analysis

of

what

assertion

means:

in

order

to

assert

something,

we must

by

definition

believe

what we

assert or we

would

not be

asserting.

No

conven-

tional

sign

could

exist that

announces

that

we

are

sincere about our

assertions,

for,

as

we

noted,

such a

sign

would

be

available to the liar as

well

as to

the

sincere. With these three arguments, Davidson demonstrates, I believe, that

whatever

it

is

that

links a

sentence

with a

performative

act in the

world

(e.g.,

whatever it

is that

enables

us to order a

hot

dog

and

get

one),

it

is

not a conven-

tion

of

language.

The

second

class

of

theories

addressed

by

Davidson

concerns

attempts

to

find

the

meaning

of a

sentence in

its

uses and not in some

attribute

(like mood)

of

the

sentence

itself.

Addressing

the first

class

of

theories,

Davidson

demonstrated

that

no

convention

can be

isolated that marks

a

particular

sentence

for a

particu-

lar

use.

He

now

addresses the

related claim

that a

sentence is linked to its

mean-

ing by

a

conventional

element

residing

outside the

sentence

in

something

fre-

quently called its conventional use. Davidson explains that Stated crudely,

such

theories

maintain

that there

is

a

single

use

(or

some finite number of

uses)

to

which a

given

sentence is

tied,

and

this

use

gives

the

meaning

of the sen-

tence

(271).

The

argument

employed

in

this kind of

theory

goes

something

like




10/17

500

College English

this: Because

any

sentence

may

be

put

to

myriad

uses,

any

one

use

(or

any

finite

number

of

uses)

of a

particular

sentence is

conventional.

Therefore,

when

we

produce

discourse,

we

always

seek,

according

to

this

argument,

the

conven-

tional element that will enable us to make our intentionsclear or, in Davidson's

terminology,

we

always

seek

to

express

an

ulterior

purpose,

an

effect

that

exists outside the

sentence itself.

Clearly,

in

speaking

or

writing,

an

intended

ef-

fect

always

exists,

but this

intended effect

cannot

be realized

only

through

the

writer's

or

speaker's

intention.

As

Davidson

says,

if I

intend to

get

my

audi-

ence

to

do or believe

something,

it

must

be

through

their

correct

interpretation

of the literal

meaning

of

my

words

(273).

(By

literal

meaning,

Davidson

means

something

along

the

lines of a

Tarski-style

theory

of truth

as

well as

the

semantic

properties

of

words

[271].)

In this

line

of

thinking,

a convention

would

be

required

to

link

up

the

literal

meaning

of a

sentence

with its ulterior

purpose,

and,

Davidson

argues,

no

such

convention

exists nor

could

there

be

one.

Davidson

cites

the

example

of

the

sen-

tence

Eat

your

eggplant,

where

a conventional

connection

supposedly

exists

between

the

ulterior

purpose

of the

sentence-getting

someone

to eat

her or

his

eggplant-and

the literal

meaning

of the

sentence.

Davidson

argues

that

if such

a

convention

did

exist,

it would

require

a

marker

that

indicates

the

speaker's

or

writer's

sincerity,

that what

he

represents

himself

as

wanting

or

trying

to

do

he

in fact

wants or

is

trying

to

do

(274).

In

this

example,

for

instance,

a conven-

tional marker

would be

required

o

tell

the listener

that

the

speaker

was

sincere

about her desire to get someone to eat eggplant.However, as we have seen, no

such marker

can exist.

According

to

Davidson,

an

unbridgeable

plit

exists

be-

tween

the

sign

and its effect

in the

world,

a

split

that

he

views

as

the

very

es-

sence

of

language:

I

conclude

that

it is not

an

accidental

feature of

language

hat

the ulterior

purpose

of an utterance

and

its

literal

meaning

are

independent,

n the sense

that the

latter

cannot be derived

from

the former:

t

is

of

the

essence

of

language.

I call this

fea-

ture of

language

the

principle

of

the

autonomy of

meaning.

(274)

Meaning

is

autonomous

because

any

sentence-no

matter

what

its

intended

literal

meaning-may

be

employed

for

any

number

of ulterior

purposes

or

per-

formative

acts.

Therefore,

no convention

exists

that

(1)

marksa sentence for a

particular

use or

(2)

marks

a

particular

use

(or

a

finite

number

of

uses)

for

a

par-

ticular

sentence.

The third class

of

theories

claims

that

meaning

s

conventional, or,

more

pre-

cisely,

that

it is

a convention

that

we

assign

the

meaning

we do to

individual

words

and sentences

when

they

are uttered

or

written

(276).

Davidson

begins

his

analysis

of

this claim

by employing

David

Lewis'

description

of

convention

as a

regularity

R):

(1)

Everyone

involved conforms

to

R

and

(2)

believes

that

others also conform.

(3)

The belief thatothers conformto R gives all involveda good reason to conformto

R.

(4)

All

concerned

prefer

that

there should

be

conformity

o R.

(5)

R is not

the

only

possible

regularity

meeting

the

last two conditions.

(6) Finally,

everyone

in-

volved

knows

(1)-(5)

and

knows

that

everyone

else

knows

(1)-(5),

etc.

(Lewis

164-65)




11/17

Beyond

System:

The Rhetoric

of

Paralogy

501

At the

center

of

Lewis'

analysis

resides the

idea that the conventional

element

in

communication

consists of

a

systemic

hermeneutic method or

a

shared

inter-

pretive technique. According

to

Lewis, speaker

and

hearer

(or

reader and

writ-

er)

must

assign

the

same

meaning

to

the

speaker's

words

in

order for

successful

communication to

occur-although

clearly

the

speaker

and hearer

(or

writer

and

reader)

are not

required

to

employ

the

same

language.

In our

ordinary

day-to-

day

communication,

most of the conditions

set

out

by

Lewis

indeed

are

met:

communication

requires

that

speakers

intend their

listeners

to

interpret

their

words

in a

certain

way;

speakers

must

know that

hearers

have

the

ability

to

in-

terpret

what

they

intend;

speakers

and

hearers

must

share the

understanding

that

speakers

intend their words to

be

interpreted,

and

so

forth.

As Davidson

in-

sists, however,

the most

important

element

of

Lewis'

analysis-the

condition

of

regularity-cannot be met.

When we

communicate,

we

certainly

share some

conditions

of a common

in-

terpretive

method

or at

least

those

minimal

conditions

set out

above,

but

reg-

ularity

can

only

mean

recurrence

over time

(what

Derrida

calls

iteration),

not

simply

agreement

at

a

specific

moment.

According

to

Davidson,

the

only

candi-

date for

this kind of

recurrence

is sound

pattern:

speaker

and

hearer

must

re-

peatedly

. . .

interpret relevantly

similar

sound

patterns

of

the

speaker

in

the

same

way

(277). (As

we will

see,

Derrida

expands

the idea

of

recurrence

in

lan-

guage

to

include the mark

as well as sound

pattern.)

The

important

word here

is

interpret,

and

although

certain sound

patterns

may

recur,

it is

difficult,

if not

impossible, to say exactly how speaker's and hearer's theories for interpreting

the

speaker's

words must coincide

(278).

These

hermeneutic

strategies

must

coincide

after we utter a

word,

or

communication

cannot

occur;

but

in order for

a

convention to

be

established

that

represents

the

coincidence

of hermeneutic

theories,

regularity

dictates that

these theories coincide

before

an utterance.

However,

as

Davidson

indicates,

communication

can occur

even

if

speaker

and

hearer

possess

different advance hermeneutic

strategies

because

a

speaker

ob-

viously

can

provide

enough

clues

to enable a hearer to

interpret

what

the

speak-

er

intends

to

communicate.

Of

course,

a

speaker

must also

possess

some notion

about how

these

clues

coincide

with

the

hearer's

ability

to

interpret

them,

but,

again,

this coincidence cannot be

predicted

or

conventionalized;

it can

only

be

guessed

at.

Davidson's

point

(and

Derrida's, too)

is that we cannot

describe this

coincidence

in

any

formal

manner. That

is,

we

cannot

conventionalize

the

pro-

cess

by

which we

make our

theory

of

interpretation

coincide

with

other

theories.

In his

analysis

of

convention,

Davidson seeks to

displace

the idea that

lan-

guage

is

convention-bound

and

foundational.

In

place

of

a

hermeneutics founded

on

the

idea of

conventionality,

Davidson

suggests

something

that he calls

radi-

cal

interpretation

that

is similar in some

ways

to

Derridean

deconstruction.

Davidson

argues

that

It is easy to misconceive the role of society in language.Language s, to be sure, a

social art.

But it is an error

to

suppose

we have seen

deeply

into

the

heart of lin-

guistic

communicationwhen

we have noticed how

society

bends

linguistic

habits

to

a

public

norm.

What is conventional about

language,

if

anything

s,

is that

people

tend to

speak

much

as their

neighbors

do.

(278)




12/17

502

College English

This

convergence

of

linguistic

practice,

the

fact that we tend to

speak

much

as

our

neighbors

do,

tells us

nothing,

however,

about the

interpretive

skills

re-

quired

to

bring

about the

convergence. According

to

Davidson,

our social

condi-

tioning

does not

provide

us

with

a

store of

language

conventions from

which we

draw when

we

wish

to

communicate

something;

social

conditioning simply

en-

sures us that

we

may,

up

to a

point,

assume

that the same method of

inter-

pretation

that we

use

for

others,

or

that we

assume others

use for

us,

will

work

for a new

speaker

(278).

In a

Gadamerian

sense,

social

conditioning provides

us with a

horizon

within which we

test out

interpretive possibilities

when

we en-

counter a

speaker

or

a

text,

and

the fit of one hermeneutic

strategy

with

another

can

never

be

prescribed

in

advance.

At

best, then,

social

conventions

represent

only

one kind of

hermeneutic

element that

helps

us

communicate.

Davidson ex-

plains that

Knowledge

of

the conventions of

language

s thus a

practical

crutch to

interpreta-

tion,

a

crutch

we cannot in

practice

afford to do

without-but

a

crutch

which,

under

optimum

conditions for

communication,

we can

in the

end

throw

away,

and

could in

theory

have

done

without

from

the

start.

(279)

Radical

interpretation

means

that

we

employ

our

knowledge

of

a

language

to

make

guesses

about what

speakers

and writers desire to

communicate,

and

no

formal

method

may

be established

to

ensure that our

guesses

will be correct.

A

knowledge

of

conventions-linguistic

or

otherwise-only

helps

make

us better

guessers. To return to the beginning of this discussion, then, convention does

not

provide

a

necessary

foundation for

language;

rather,

language provides

a

home

for convention.

In

Signature

Event

Context,

a

critique

of convention

that echoes

many

of

Davidson's

concerns,

Derrida traces

out

some

of the

implications

of

a

de-

conventionalized

language

theory,

and

by

arguing

that no

conventional link

exists

between

the

sign

and

the

sign's

effect

in the

world,

he,

in

a

sense,

cor-

roborates

Davidson's

critique

while

simultaneously

going

beyond

it.

Although

Derrida

concentrates on

the written

sign

where Davidson

treats

the

spoken

word, Derrida,

like

Davidson,

argues

that no identifiable

conventional

element

exists linking a written sign to its context because a context can never be abso-

lutely

determinable.

(Derrida

also

makes the same claim

for

the

spoken

word

al-

though

here I will

concentrate

only

on

his

analysis

of

the

written

sign.)

Accord-

ing

to

Derrida,

the written

sign

derives its

authority

from

absence,

for

One

writes in

order

to

communicate

something

to those

who

are absent

(177).

Writ-

ten

discourse

must, then,

remain

readable

despite

the absolute

disappearance

of

any

receiver,

determined

in

general

(179).

In

other

words,

any

written

sign

must be

repeatable

or

iterable,

and

this

iterability

gives

writing

its

identity

be-

cause A

writing

that is not

structurally

readable-iterable-beyond

the

death

of

the addressee would not be

writing

(180).

Derrida's

conception

of

iterability

and Davidson's and Lewis' analysis of convention as a regularity share an

important

common feature:

both

suggest

that the

sign

must

be

repeatable

in

order to communicate

anything

at all.

However,

where

Davidson

looks for

(and

fails to

find)

repeatability

in

convention,

Derrida looks

for it in

language

itself.




13/17

Beyond System:

The Rhetoric

of Paralogy

503

By claiming

that

no convention

may

be isolated that links

a

sign

with an effect

in

the

world,

Davidson hints

at the

possibility

that

language possesses

no

center,

no

anchor,

no

foundation

that attaches

a

sign

to a determinate

meaning.

Derrida,

however,

does not hint

at this

possibility;

he insists on

it.

Going

beyond

Davidson,

Derrida

argues

that

iterability implies

that there

is

no such

thing

as

a

code-organon

of

iterability-which

could

be

structurally

se-

cret

(180),

for the

very

feature of

iterability gives

every

language

code its

iden-

tity.

Because

every

organon

of

iterability,

by

definition,

must be

iterable,

no

code is

context

specific.

Derrida

explains

that

The

possibility

of

repeating

and thus of

identifying

the

marks

is

implicit

in

every

code,

making

t into

a

network that

is

communicable,

ransmittable,

decipherable,

iterable for a

third,

and

hence for

every

possible

user

in

general.

To be what it

is,

all

writing

must,

therefore,

be

capable

of

functioning

n the

radical

absence

of

every

empirically

determined eceiverin

general.

(180)

Rephrased,

Derrida's

formulation

argues

that

a

split

exists between

the

written

sign

and its

effect in

the

world,

a

formulation

that

supports,

it seems to

me,

Davidson's

claim for the

autonomy

of

meaning.

If

meaning

cannot be

isolated

in

the

sentence

itself

or in

its

context,

as Davidson

argues,

and

if the

meaning

of

a

word-either

spoken

or

written-is not

conventionally

or

contextually

bound,

as

both

Davidson and

Derrida

claim,

then

language

loses its

anchor

and resists

sys-

temic

formulation

altogether.

Although

Davidson

hesitates

to make

this conclu-

sion,

Derrida

does

not,

and he sees

clearly

the ramifications

of

such a de-

conventionalized language theory:

Every

sign,

linguistic

or

non-linguistic, spoken

or written

. . . in

a small

or

large

unit,

can

be

cited,

put

between

quotation

marks;

n

so

doing

t can break

with

every

given

context,

engendering

an

infinity

of new contexts

in

a mannerwhich is abso-

lutely

illimitable.

This

does not

imply

that the

mark is valid outside of

a

context,

but

on the

contrary

hat

there are

only

contexts

without

any

center or

absolute an-

choring.

This

citationality,

his

duplication

or

duplicity,

this

iterability

of the

mark

is

neither an

accident

nor an

anomaly,

it is that

(normal/abnormal)

ithoutwhich

a

mark

could

not even

have a

functioncalled

normal.

(185-86)

Derrida

argues

and

Davidson

suggests

that

language

possesses

a

paralogical

di-

mension, a dimension that, in any conventional sense, refutes formalization,

codification,

and

systemization.

Earlier in

this

discussion,

I

indicated

my

belief that

Davidson and Derrida

started

from

different

philosophical

directions

but ended in the same

place.

Working

within

the

analytic

tradition,

Davidson desires to

refute the

specific

claim that

language

is

convention-bound,

and

unlike

Derrida,

he

does not

view

his

project

as

the

decentering

of the entire

philosophical

tradition.

Derrida,

on

the

other

hand,

understands his

analysis

of both convention and context

to be

only

one

part,

although

certainly

an

extremely

important part,

of his

larger proj-

ect:

the

critique

of

a

metaphysics

of

presence.

Although

both Davidson

and

Der-

rida

approach

the

problem

of convention from

very

different

points

of view and

with

very

different aims

and

intentions,

both

agree

that

language

seems to

pos-

sess

no

conventional

anchor or at least

no anchor that we can

identify,

codify,

and

then

talk

about.

The

ramifications of such a conclusion for the

discipline

of




14/17

504

College

English

rhetoric

are

profound,

and here I

would like to

mention what

I

perceive

to

be

three

of

these

ramifications or

rhetoric in

general

and

for studies in discourse

production

and

discourse

analysis

in

particular.

(1)

If

no

codifiable

conventional link exists between a

sign

(or

a

sentence)

and

its

effect

in the

world,

then

no

systemic

rhetoric in

the Aristotelian

tradition

can

account

for

the

effects

produced

by

language.

This assertion calls into

question

the

foundational

presupposition

hat

supports

what I have

called

previously

the

classical

paradigm.

From

Aristotle

forward,

rhetoricians

have

presupposed

that

(a)

something

links

discourse

to the

world

and

(b)

this

something

could be

classified

in a

logico-systemic

way.

The

classical

paradigm

rests

on the founda-

tional

assumption

that the

correspondence

between the

sign

and

its effect in the

world

can be

represented

by

a

metalanguage

grounded

in a

conception

of

sys-

tem, process,

and

logic.

If

such

a

correspondence

between

the

sign

and its effect

in

the

world

cannot

be

represented

by

such

a

metalanguage

r,

even more to

the

point,

if

it

cannot

be

represented

at all in

any

sort of

logical

(enthymemic)

way,

we

are

forced,

then,

to reinvent

rhetoric;

we are

forced to

move

away

from

a

conception

of

rhetoric

grounded

n

ideas of

system,

process,

and formal

logic,

and

move

toward a

conception

of rhetoric

grounded

n

paralogy,

difference,

and

indeterminancy.

(2)

If

no

codifiable

link exists

that connects the

sign

to its

effect

in the

world,

then no

logico-systemic

account

of

discourse

production

is

possible.

I have

ar-

gued

here

that,

in

general,

three

broad theoretical

approaches

now dominate

the

study of discourse production: the Kantian, the neo-positivist, and the social

semiotic. The

Kantian

approach

assumes that

discourse

production

may

be

de-

scribed

as

a

formal

system

of

logically

coherent

categories

or modes-classifica-

tion,

description,

narration,

and

so

forth-that,

in some sort of

conventional

way,

link

the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

with

its effect

in the

world.

The neo-

positivist

approach

assumes

that an

empirical

system-a system

built on

a

scien-

tific

model that

measures

recall,

tests short-

and

long-term

memory, investigates

brain

hemisphere

function,

analyzes

protocols,

describes

writers

at

work,

and

kindred

activities-may

be

employed

to discover

the

link between the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

and

its

effect in the

world. The social semiotic

approach

assumes

that a conventional link exists amongthe membersof different discourse com-

munities,

and

meaning

as well

as

knowledge

are

grounded

in

socially

con-

structed

conventions;

therefore,

the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

may

be

interpreted

only through

the

sign's

conventional effect in these differentdiscourse

commu-

nities.

If

no

convention

can be

found to

link

the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

to

its

ef-

fect

in

the

world,

then the

presuppositional

oundation

hat

supports

all

three

of

these

theoretical

approaches

to

discourse

production

s

seriously

undermined

f

not

destroyed entirely.

(3)

If

no

codifiable

link exists that connects the

sign

to its

effect

in the

world,

then no

formal

system of

rhetorical

analysis-no

metalanguage-can

be

formu-

lated that will account for the tropological use of language. Any rhetorical theo-

ry, linguistic

theory,

or

literary theory

that

attempts

to

explain

the relation

be-

tween

metaphor

and

metonomy

or

attempts

to describe

the

uses of

language

(for

example

the

uses of

literary/non-literary language)

must

posit

or,

at

least,

must




15/17

Beyond System:

The Rhetoric

of

Paralogy 505

presuppose

a

conventional ink

between

the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

and its

effect

in

the

world.

This

connection

may

reside either

(a)

in the

sign

(or

the

sentence)

itself

represented

by systemic

(usually synchronic)

formulations like

paradig-

matic/syntagmatic

inks,

generative

grammars,

marked

binary

oppositions,

mood

indicators,

and

so

forth-or

(b)

in the context

represented

by systemic

(usually

dialectical)

formulations ike

performatives,

discourse

communities,

horizons

of

expectation,

base/superstructure

elations,

and other diachronic

representations.

All of

these

formulationsshare

the

presupposition

hat

meaning

s

conventional.

Clearly,

if

no

conventional

ink between the

sign

and its effect can

be detected

in

either

the

sign

itself

or in

its

context,

many

of our

most

influential

heories

of

discourse

analysis

can

explain satisfactorily

neither the nature

of

language

nor

how

the

effects of

language

are

produced.

I

do

not mean

to

suggest, however,

that

languageconventions

are

nonexist-

ent,

nor do

I

mean

to

suggest

that

they

are

unimportant

or communication

or

that

they

are

not

useful

crutches in

everyday

social discourse.

Along

the lines

of

Davidson's

and

Derrida's

critiques,

I

mean to

suggest

only

that

language

makes

convention

possible,

and

not the other

way

around. No one

questions

the

claim

that

convention aids

communication,

but as

Davidson

points

out,

after

we

make

this

claim

and after

we

demonstratethat the claim

possesses

validity,

we

have

said

nothing

about the

nature of

language.

We have commented

only

about

one

feature of

language:

ts

sufficient

ability

to

generate

social conventions.

As Marx

righted

Hegelian

theory

and

set

it

on its

feet,

Davidson and

Derrida,

I

believe,

right contemporarylanguagetheory by reversing its base/superstructurerela-

tion.

Language

does

not

represent

a

superstructure

built

on

convention;

lan-

guage

provides

the

base

on which a

superstructure

f conventions resides.

When

we

analyze

or

describe

this

conventional

superstructure,

we

say very

little about

the

nature

of

the

language

base that

makes the

superstructure ossible,

and

with-

in

the

boundaries

of

the

discussion

here,

we,

in

addition,

say very

little about

the

connection

between

rhetoric

and

language, especially

the

two

endeavors of

dis-

course

production

and

analysis.

By

rethinking

our

most

fundamental

assumptions

about the

production

and

the

analysis

of

discourse-assumptions

about the

convention-boundnature of

discourse and assumptionsabout the systemic natureof discourse production

and

discourse

analysis-we

may begin

to

move

beyond

a rhetorical

radition

hat

has

reached,

I

believe,

a

dead end.

Our current

conceptions

of

rhetoric,

drenched

as

they

are

in

the

Platonic/Aristotelian

ormulationsof

logic,

process,

and

system,

cannot

account

for

the

hermeneuticdimension ntrinsic

to

both dis-

course

production

and

discourse

analysis.

I

believe

that

we

can

begin

to account

for

these

living

social

acts

only by

reinventing

rhetoric and

thereby

accounting

for

the

paralogic

nature

of

language.

Works

Cited

Aristotle.

Rhetorica.

Oxford:

Clarendon,

1924.

Vol.

11

of The

Works

of

Aristo-

tle.

Ed.

W.

D.

Ross.

Trans. W.

Rhys

Roberts.

12

vols. 1924-52.

Austin,

J. L.

How

To

Do

Things

With

Words.

Cambridge:

Harvard

UP,

1967.




16/17

506

College

English

Bennett,

James R.

A

Bibliography

of

Stylistics

and Related

Criticism. New

York:

MLA,

1986.

Berlin,James. Rhetoricand Ideologyin the WritingClass. College English50

(1988):

477-94.

Boethius. De

Topicis Differentiis.

Trans.

Eleonore

Stump.

Ithaca:

Cornell

UP,

1978.

215-36.

Burke,

Kenneth.

A

Rhetoric

of

Motives.

Berkeley:

U of California

P,

1969.

Coby,

Patrick.

Socrates

and the

Sophistic

Enlightenment. Lewisburg:

Bucknell

UP,

1987.

Davidson,

Donald.

Inquiries

into Truth

and

Interpretation.

Oxford:

Clarendon,

1984.

de

Man,

Paul.

Allegories of

Reading:

Figural

Language

in

Rousseau,

Nietzsche,

Rilke, and Proust.

New

Haven:

Documents

Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy