Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection · I. INTRODUCTION ... PIR Priority Information Requirements PSYOP Psychological Operations SF Special Forces ... recruitment, communication,

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

2009-12

Beyond Lawrence ethnographic intelligence for USSOCOM

Machiela, Chad T.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4376

NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

BEYOND LAWRENCE: ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE FOR USSOCOM

by

Varman S. Chhoeung Chad T. Machiela

December 2009

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons Second Reader: David Tucker

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

i

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE December 2009

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Beyond Lawrence: Ethnographic Intelligence for USSOCOM 6. AUTHOR(S) Chhoeung, Varman S. and Machiela, Chad T.

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) is “information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization” and the collection and processing of information regarding “ties built through kinship connections, tribal relationships, religious education, and other forms of normal, everyday association.” This thesis describes how the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) can employ an organization of ethnographic sensors to develop and maintain long-term, trust-based relationships among target populations throughout the world to improve sociocultural understanding in support of USSOCOM, Geographic Combatant Commander, and Country Team objectives. This thesis also demonstrates why USSOCOM has the most to gain from supporting this low-cost, sustainable solution to redressing a gap in our current collection and analysis.

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

83

14. SUBJECT TERMS Sociocultural log, Sociocultural Report, ethnographic intelligence, ethnographic sensor, sensor teams, cultural intelligence, sociocultural understanding, sociocultural conceptual framework, DoDD 3000.5 (SSTR) 16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

ii


iii

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

BEYOND LAWRENCE: ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE FOR USSOCOM

Varman S. Chhoeung

Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 1999

Chad T. Machiela

Chief Warrant Officer 3, United States Army B.A., Western Michigan University, 1993

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2009

Author: Varman S. Chhoeung Chad T. Machiela

Approved by: Anna Simons Thesis Advisor

David Tucker Second Reader

Gordon McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

iv


v

ABSTRACT

Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) is “information about indigenous forms of

association, local means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization” and the

collection and processing of information regarding “ties built through kinship

connections, tribal relationships, religious education, and other forms of normal,

everyday association.” This thesis describes how the United States Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) can employ an organization of ethnographic sensors to develop

and maintain long-term, trust-based relationships among target populations throughout

the world to improve sociocultural understanding in support of USSOCOM, Geographic

Combatant Commander, and Country Team objectives. This thesis also demonstrates

why USSOCOM has the most to gain from supporting this low-cost, sustainable solution

to redressing a gap in our current collection and analysis.

vi


vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. WHAT IS ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE?......................................1 B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, PAST LITERATURE......................................5 C. BRIDGING THE GAP—A LOW COST PROPOSAL................................7

II. A DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC SENSOR .................................9

III. CASE STUDY COMPARISON—ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE IN MALI AND THAILAND ..........................................................................................23 A. DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, DIFFERENT PROBLEMS, ONE

CAPABILITY ................................................................................................23 B. MALI...............................................................................................................24

1. Ungoverned Spaces in Mali...............................................................25 2. Military Support for SSTR in Mali..................................................30

C. THAILAND....................................................................................................31 1. Ungoverned Spaces within Thailand................................................32 2. Military Support for SSTR in Thailand ..........................................36

D. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM.................................38

IV. THE ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SENSOR..........................................41 A. KEY TASKS FOR THE ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

SENSOR..........................................................................................................42 1. Understand the Ethnographic Intelligence Cycle and Methods....42 2. Understand Effective Social Entrepreneurship ..............................43 3. Enhance the Department of State’s Mission and Efforts ...............44

B. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE USSOCOM EI SENSOR...............45 C. THE SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER ..........................................................46

1. Education............................................................................................47 2. Operational Experience.....................................................................48 3. Language Capability..........................................................................48

D. FEASIBILITY................................................................................................49 E. PROPOSED CAREER PATH......................................................................52

V. TEAM COMPOSITION ...........................................................................................55 A. THE TEAMS..................................................................................................55 B. THE HEADQUARTERS ..............................................................................56 C. DISSEMINATION OF ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE................58

1. The Sociocultural Report and Sociocultural Log ...........................59 2. Availability of Ethnographic Intelligence Products........................60

VI. CONCLUSION - THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB ........................................63

LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................65

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................69

viii


ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Mali ..................................................................................................................24 Figure 2. Mali Security Force Locations, Populated Places, and Water Sites. ...............26 Figure 3. Mali Tribal Language Regions. .......................................................................27 Figure 4. Thailand ...........................................................................................................32 Figure 5. Chin Haw Trade Routes and Mosques in Thailand .........................................34 Figure 6. Myanmar Refugees and Unregistered Mosques in Thailand...........................37 Figure 7. Ethnographic Sensor Timeline for Special Forces Officers ............................53 Figure 8. Proposed Task Organization ............................................................................57 Figure 9. Ethnographic Intelligence Office Division ......................................................57 Figure 10. Secrecy vs. Efficacy of Information (Johnson, 2005, p. 12)............................60

x


xi

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

CA Civil Affairs

CENTCOM Central Command

CNT Counter-NarcoTerrorism

COIN Counterinsurgency

CT Counterterrorism

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DoDD Department of Defense Directive

DoDI Department of Defense Instructions

DoS Department of State

EI Ethnographic Intelligence

EUCOM European Command

GCC Geographic Combatant Commander

GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, aka the Al-Qaeda

Organization in the Islamic Maghreb

HA Humanitarian Assistance

HTS Human Terrain System

HUMINT Human Intelligence

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training

JUSMAG Joint United States Military Advisory Group

MARSOC Marine Special Operations Command

MI Military Intelligence

MIST Military Information Support Team

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NIPR Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network

ODA Operational Detachment-Alpha

xii

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACOM Pacific Command

PIR Priority Information Requirements

PSYOP Psychological Operations

SF Special Forces

SFA Security Force Assistance

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOF Special Operations Forces

SR Special Reconnaissance

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

TDY Temporary Duty

TECHINT Technical Intelligence

TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USASFC United States Army Special Forces Command

USG United States Government

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW Unconventional Warfare

1

I. INTRODUCTION

Culture matters greatly. This is yet another claim that is not unique to irregular warfare, but is of greater significance in that mode of conflict. Since irregular warfare is above all else a contest for the acquiescence and allegiance of civilian locals, their beliefs, values, expectations and preferred behaviors are authoritative. If we do not know much about those beliefs and values, we are unlikely to register much progress in persuasion, except by accident. Indeed, by behaving like strangers in a strange land—true aliens—our regular soldiers and officials are as likely to do more harm than good to their mission.

Colin S. Gray, Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters

A. WHAT IS ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE?

Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) is “information about indigenous forms of

association, local means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization” and the

collection and processing of information regarding “ties built through kinship

connections, tribal relationships, religious education, and other forms of normal,

everyday association” (Simons and Tucker, 2004, p. 2). EI provides the sociocultural

framework to give decision makers, policy officials, and commanders the context

necessary to better forecast how populations will react to both enemy and U.S. actions.

With EI, military forces responding to regional emergencies or conducting security

assistance operations will have a better understanding of operational environments, along

with more detailed information about the key citizens and important non-state

relationships, which always affect mission success. Country team officials will have

greater access to communities that do not normally interact with embassy representatives,

access that will help them design policy and focus U.S. participation within the host

country. Through the products developed by an increased EI capacity, decision makers

can better develop policies and inter-state relationships that promote U.S. interests, and

that will be accepted by and in accordance with the needs of client communities and host

nations.

2

In a 2004 report for OSD/Net Assessment, NPS Professors Anna Simons and

David Tucker described the importance of EI:

No organization within the U.S. Government’s vast intelligence system currently gathers information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization. Yet, ties built through kinship connections, tribal relationships, religious education, and other forms of normal, everyday association remain available to our adversaries throughout the non-western world as ready-made means of recruitment, communication, resourcing, and support. Worse, in addition to doubling as latent networks, these indigenous institutions offer ideal cover. They comprise the social fabric of most places; they are as familiar and comfortable as the neighborhoods in which people grow up (p. 2).

Until very recently, conventional intelligence methods focused almost exclusively

on information regarding states, militaries, and target individuals. The information used

to develop intelligence on these entities is typically gleaned from relatively easily

identifiable sources such as maps, military tables of organization, bureaucratic structures,

descriptions of local political leaders, and demographic data, or more advanced products

such as the profiles compiled by the CIA’s National Clandestine Services. What no

agency collects is information that describes interactions among populations, societies,

and communities—the relationships that describe how members are likely to act and react

to one another. Additionally, without the appropriate conceptual framework for analysis

any ethnographic information collected incidental to other intelligence operations is

almost impossible to process into useful intelligence.

Arguably, recent U.S. successes in Iraq have hinged upon efforts made by tactical

unit commanders and the relationships they have developed with tribes in their areas.

This has occurred without—or even in spite of—U.S. Army intelligence doctrine. For

example, Field Manual 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer’s Handbook, recommends that

intelligence officers develop strategic level products using the following: Global security

forecasts, battlefield development plans, automated and hardcopy databases, arms

proliferation and military power studies related to the weapons acquisition strategies and

the overall military power and potential of selected foreign military forces, TECHINT

and user bulletins, the CIA World Factbook and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

3

country studies, and open source studies and articles (pp. 2–4). Only the last—open

source studies—includes information relevant to predicting the behavior of non-state

actors within the area of operation, and even professionally produced ethnographies are

not written specifically to address factors crucial to military or government forces. As we

have seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan, without knowledge of the strength of the enemy

it is difficult to determine the tactical effect of operations against non-state actors, let

alone plan an effective strategic campaign. In his report for the Center for the Study of

Intelligence, Dr. Rob Johnston (2005) found that even when correctly estimating an

enemy’s capability, analysts’ failure to determine the enemy’s intentions “may be a result

of missing hypotheses or mental models about an adversary’s behavior” (p. 8).

The goal of the EI sensor, as conceived in this thesis, is to do much more than

develop Dilthey's verstehen (Glass, 2005)1. The USSOCOM EI sensor must not only

understand the community he studies so well that he can act in a manner the society

members accept as appropriate for themselves, but he must also be able to communicate

his understanding to others. In the same way a linguist studies, records, and translates a

foreign language so that others can learn to understand and make themselves understood

in that language as well, the EI sensor must record and convey the nature of social

relationships to others so that they can begin to act appropriately within that culture

(Sanday, 1979, p. 527). Even more important, while the sociocultural products developed

by USSOCOM EI sensors will have great value for expanding the conceptual framework

commanders and policy officials use to assess situations abroad, the real value to

USSOCOM and its core missions lies in the long-term relationships developed and

maintained over the course of the EI sensors’ careers, and beyond.

This thesis proposes that through EI sensors, USSOCOM will be able to nurture

relationships and establish trust in the same way relationships and trust are generated

throughout the non-western world: "never by money, always by time" (Simons and

Tucker, 2004, p. 11). Ideally, the social capital to be developed by EI sensors will be

available to be leveraged in support of U.S. interests well into the future and can be

1 To thoroughly immerse oneself in and empathetically re-live the experiences of the studied

population so as to gain a visceral sociological and psychological understanding of them.

4

maintained on a personal level via various mechanisms, such as JCETs and other training

deployments to the target country, short SME visits, follow-on EI rotations, and extensive

personal communication. Because the objective of the EI sensor is to build relationships

throughout all segments of society, the EI sensor will interact with a great range of

communities outside the embassy’s “cocktail circuit.” More so than other DoS or DoD

elements operating in a target country, the EI sensor team will have access to and daily

contact with all strata of a population because of sensors’ willingness to go without

modern amenities and into less secure, more austere regions. To fully engage the target

populace, a researcher must be willing and empowered to travel to locations throughout

the target country, regardless of creature comforts or presence of dangerous elements—

exactly the sort of duty for which USSOCOM operators eagerly volunteer. As Tucker and

Lamb (2007) observe, “only two organizations in the U.S. Government presume that their

personnel will operate in violent and austere circumstances, have expertise in preparing

them to do so and supporting them once they are there: the Defense Department and the

CIA” (p. 211).2 As with all deployments, risk to deployed forces must be balanced

against the expected benefits of remote community engagement. In the same way the

TSOC manages the employment of JCET, CA, or MIST team deployments, the TSOC

will coordinate with EI sensors to ensure that the sensors’ time and risk are managed to

best answer the TSOC and GCC commander’s information requirements.

This thesis takes to heart Ben Connable’s (2009) admonition that an “effective

solution to the cultural intelligence gap is to retrain intelligence staffs to collect and

analyze cultural data and to include this data in all-source intelligence products” (p. 63).

In no way does what this thesis proposes satisfy the urgent requirement to increase

cultural savvy throughout the Services. Rather, the program described in this thesis

recommends selecting individuals with an affinity for empathizing and communicating

2 Tucker and Lamb (2007) explain why the CIA should not be tasked to collect Ethnographic

Intelligence. The CIA’s organizational culture is based on the development of its case officers to conduct clandestine operations in support of its primary missions. The CIA lists its primary missions as: collecting information regarding the “plans, intentions and capabilities of our adversaries,” “producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning and opportunity to the President,” and “conducting covert action at the direction of the President” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). The CIA’s organizational focus on developing strategic-level intelligence for senior government officials precludes its officers from developing low-level sociocultural information in a country not currently considered strategically crucial.

5

with people of other cultures to serve as long-term primary collectors to target countries

or communities. The argument is that the DoD needs to provide collectors with time,

resources, and access to the population in order that they may develop the relationships

that will lead to greater sociocultural understanding, and ultimately provide a venue for

sharing sociocultural products with the rest of the force. The program to be described also

supports DoDD 3000.5 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, the November 28, 2005, tasking to the Under

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. According to paragraph 5.3.4.3, the

military will “develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability

operations skills by learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term

immersion in foreign societies” (p. 6).

B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, PAST LITERATURE

This thesis builds upon a paper submitted to OSD/Net Assessment in 2004 by Dr.

Anna Simons and Dr. David Tucker entitled Improving Human Intelligence in the War on

Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability, and offers a different approach

than another thesis that also drew on Dr. Simons and Dr. Tucker’s paper by LTC Alfred

Renzi entitled The Military Cooperation Group.

Simons first defines Ethnographic Intelligence, explains why the United States

must create a capability to collect EI, and argues that U.S. intelligence agencies do not

collect sufficient EI—information regarding the social ties built through the everyday

interactions our enemies use to recruit, organize, and mobilize. Access to this information

is readily available in most countries, but requires the deployment of Ethnographic

Sensors—specially selected individuals trained and employed to collect sociocultural

information, through person-to-person interaction over time. Tucker proposes an

organization to produce EI, and then evaluates the Army, the State Department, the CIA,

and creation of a new organization as possible organizational hosts for their proposed

sensor capability. He recommends two feasible options. The first, more conventional

solution would be to create a new operational support career field within the Army, a

proposal likely to take years to implement. The second, more unconventional option

6

would be to create a new joint agency similar to USSOCOM that would recruit from

across the entire government. While we agree that a separate agency focused on

developing this information might be the most effective solution, we do not believe that

such an organization could be created expeditiously given current levels of political will,

command emphasis, and financial constraints.

LTC Renzi further expounds upon the importance of collecting Ethnographic

Intelligence, but argues for a different solution than that of Simons and Tucker. Renzi

recommends the creation of a Military Cooperation Group at U.S. embassies that would

consolidate the functions of the Defense Attaché, Security Assistance Officer, and

Ethnographic Information Officer under one command. This new structure would assist

with the collection of EI, provide limited command and control of collectors, and share

information with the embassy, other Military Cooperation Groups, and Geographic

Combatant Commanders (GCC). While we agree with Renzi on the need to develop EI,

we believe his recommended organization is bureaucratically infeasible due to the great

expense and political will required to pass legislation to implement it.

Worth mentioning, too, is the Human Terrain System (HTS). Established in

September 2007, the HTS has served as a ‘band aid’ solution applied to our lack of

cultural understanding about Afghanistan and Iraq. The HTS attempts to utilize academic

professionals and experienced military personnel to rapidly develop sociocultural

information and provide recommendations to military unit commanders. While their

academic backgrounds and experience in effective fieldwork techniques may allow some

members of Human Terrain Teams to map superficial relationships quickly, their “drive-

by” relationships with the populace do not build trust, the “essential component of all

enduring social relationships” (Seligman, 1997, p. 13). The utility of the HTS has been

hotly debated, and estimates of the classified cost range from $60 million to over $130

million dollars to work with deployed military forces in only two countries. More

important than cost, however, in order to benefit from long-term relationships in

countries throughout the world, USSOCOM needs sensors not only trained in fieldwork

7

methodology for the study of people and communities, but also well-versed in the

intelligence and operational needs of military forces and committed to USSOCOM for

the length of a career, and longer.

C. BRIDGING THE GAP—A LOW COST PROPOSAL

This thesis offers a blueprint for an organization of Ethnographic Sensors that

USSOCOM can employ in support of U.S. interests throughout the world without major

changes to current manning, budget, or force levels, and demonstrates why USSOCOM is

ideally suited to develop—and has the most to gain from supporting—this low-cost,

sustainable solution. Chapter II describes a few days in the life of a hypothetical EI

sensor. Chapter III compares case studies of Mali and Thailand to suggest how EI would

support USSOCOM core missions and DoD core competencies, and demonstrates how

this single capability would be flexible enough to be employed in disparate countries.

Chapter IV describes the essential tasks of an EI sensor, suggests how sensors might be

selected, and demonstrates that because USSOCOM already employs operators with the

requisite skills, only minor changes to current structure would be needed to manage its EI

sensors within the existing personnel system. Chapter V will outline the organization of

the EI teams and headquarters, and address how ethnographic intelligence will be

disseminated to support USSOCOM core missions and information requirements for

other organizations. Chapter VI concludes this thesis.

8


9

II. A DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC SENSOR

To better demonstrate how the EI sensor will collect and employ sociocultural

information, the following paragraphs describe a few days in the life of Major Parks, an

ethnographic sensor nearing the end of his first assignment to the U.S. Embassy in

Bamako, Mali. In this example, Parks (formerly a 10th Special Forces Group detachment

commander) has been working in Mali for almost three years. He has worked hard to

develop relationships with members of several target communities throughout the

country.

Parks begins his day with language training, as he does whenever he is in the

capital. While fluent in French (the official language of Mali), he discovered upon his

arrival that few Malians outside of the capital city of Bamako actually speak French.

After reviewing the Priority Information Requirements (PIR) provided by the Theater

Special Operations Command (TSOC) in order to develop an EI collection plan, Parks

realized that most of the people he needed to study live well outside the capital and speak

a variety of tribal languages. Northern Mali in particular is almost completely outside

government control, leaving large ungoverned spaces open as safe havens and transport

routes for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (also called the Al-

Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb) and Knights of Change. Recognizing the

importance of relationships among the Tuareg tribes living in those northern areas, Parks

asked members of the Country Team to recommend an instructor to teach him Tamasheq.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office in Bamako

recommended Abu, a Malian citizen they often employed as a guide during their

infrequent trips into the northern regions. Because positions with USAID were much

sought after by Malians, Parks knew that Abu was likely to be well connected within his

community to have been able to secure his position. Sure enough, after many language

lessons, not only had Abu proven to be a wealth of information about the Tuareg, but he

was also able to introduce Parks to several influential members in different Tuareg

communities.

10

After his language lesson, Parks tells Abu that they will no longer be studying

Tamasheq together, though he would like Abu to begin instructing his replacement and

newest team member. Major Thomas. Parks wants to focus on Hassaniya Arabic for the

remainder of his time in Mali to help him prepare for his next job working in the

operations section at the TSOC, where he will coordinate the operations of several sensor

teams. Major Parks is aware that he will not achieve fluency in Hassaniya in just a few

weeks, but he intends to learn enough to greet others respectfully in their own language

and to make light conversation. More importantly, he hopes his new language trainer will

provide the team with as much information about social capital in the areas where

Hassaniya Arabic is spoken as Abu has provided for the Tuareg. Greater understanding of

the people who speak Hassaniya Arabic will help Parks better analyze the relationships

among the different Pan-Sahel tribes.

After his last language lesson with Abu, Parks joins Thomas and another member

of the sensor team, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Mills, at the embassy’s cashier’s office where

they draw funds provided by the TSOC for travel expenses. The sensors proceed to the

defense attaché’s office to remind him of their planned departure on a week-long trip to

Araouane, a town roughly 800 km northeast of the capital, and to see if he has any

specific information requests. The defense attaché asks Parks to take photos of a school

whose construction EUCOM has funded in a village just south of Timbuktu. As the only

official assigned to the small attaché office in Bamako, the defense attaché has no time to

take the completion photos himself. While only the TSOC can officially task the sensor

team, the EI sensors have found that offering their assistance to others when this

complements what they are already doing enhances their own efforts while supporting the

embassy’s overall mission. Thus, Parks agrees to make the minor detour to photograph

the completed school.

The sensor team departs in their Toyota Land Cruiser immediately after final

coordination with the embassy regional security officer. Their vehicle is loaded with

food, drinking water, repair kit, four spare tires on the roof rack (once in the desert, they

will likely use all four during their one-week trip), extra inner tubes, cots, mosquito nets,

Thuraya satellite phone, 10 small boxes of Chinese green tea, 15 pounds of sugar in

11

Ziploc bags, and several boxes of school supplies provided by an NGO whose director

wants to help inaugurate the new school, but whose budget cannot support travel to the

remote location. The team drives east, on the only paved road that crosses Mali from west

to east, and arrives in Segou just before nightfall. The sensors have arranged to spend the

night with a family that Mills has come to know well during his three years in Mali. After

dinner, they sip tea and share gossip about events in Segou in exchange for the latest

news from Bamako. Several hours of friendly conversation later, the family and guests

climb the stairs to the roof of the house where they will sleep for the night.

The next morning the team joins their hosts for a light breakfast of jam spread

over flat loaves of bread (thankfully free of the sand ever-present in the bread of the

northern areas) and instant coffee. Thomas asks his hosts in French if they have any

peanut butter, and everyone at the table breaks into hearty laughter. Obviously straining

to keep a straight face, their host’s wife passes Thomas a jar of homemade peanut butter.

Later, while Parks and Thomas inspect the vehicle to ensure that all equipment is tied

down, Thomas asks about the unexpected reaction to his simple question. “When I asked

for peanut butter, why did everybody laugh like that? Did I say it wrong?”

Parks laughs again. “No, you said it right. You have to know the context. The

climate here is especially suitable for growing peanuts, and this community is known

throughout the country for its production of peanut butter. This tribe in particular is

associated with growing peanuts; there are even several jokes based on the stereotype.”

“Oh. I hope I didn’t offend them.”

“No, you didn’t. They know you are new here, and they really thought it was

funny. But now you see how misunderstanding your own misunderstanding can lead to

faulty conclusions. You assumed your French was wrong, when the issue actually had to

do with the social context which you couldn’t have known unless you knew a lot about

the community.”

Once back on the road, Parks drives while Mills updates the Sociocultural Log

about the community they just visited, and together they discuss new insights into tribal

relations near Segou. As the team continues northeast through heavily vegetated southern

12

Mali, Thomas thinks of a question and turns to Parks, “In the three days I have been here,

it seems like you guys know everybody. What do I tell people if they ask what it is I do

here in Mali?”

“You always tell them the truth. You are a military officer stationed in the

embassy to work in the Cultural Studies Office supporting the defense attaché. Because

of the actions of different intelligence agencies over the years there is always the

suspicion that government officials working outside the embassy are spies. Now, the

Malians cannot help but think we are up to something secret. You tell them that the

reason the U.S. military is paying us to be here is because the U.S. Government has

realized that all of its efforts throughout the world could be better planned and conducted

if we understood the population.”

Thomas looks skeptical. “Won’t they still be suspicious?”

Parks laughs, and Mills grins without looking up from his laptop. “Yes, they will.

And they will be for a while. The way you overcome that is with transparency. We don’t

just walk up to people and start interviewing them. We become friends. We build

relationships. What we do here is a mix of fieldwork and just being friendly with people

who are genuinely interesting.”

Parks continues, “When I got here this program didn’t exist, so I didn’t know

anybody. I started out by just watching people and studying the language with Abu. Abu

was a huge help, because when he introduced me to people some of the trust those people

had in him was extended to me. The more I talked to people, the more they began to trust

me. Eventually people realized that I never ask about anything they don’t want to talk

about. It occurred to them that I can’t be a spy because I never try to find out anything

that isn’t plainly obvious to all. You will have to do the same.”

“What do you mean by obvious to all?”

“Think about if from your perspective. What if somebody walked up to you and

asked you why a sergeant is required to salute a Major? What about if he asked you why

more men than women in America ride motorcycles? Or, why many Americans think it

necessary to ask a father’s permission to marry his daughter before asking her?”

13

“I wouldn’t care. None of that stuff is classified. Most of it isn’t even personal.”

“That is exactly the point, and the problem. Right now an intelligence officer

sitting in his office in Virginia can determine, without getting up from his desk, how

many people are living in this little village we are driving through. He can probably do it

in real time while you are on the phone with him. But what he can’t tell you is how these

people relate to one another. He can’t tell you who leaders of this village are or why the

other villagers accept them as leaders. If Mali suffered a natural disaster tomorrow and

became a host to multinational relief forces, who are the social entrepreneurs of this little

village we can engage to jump start reconstruction efforts? Who are the opportunists who

will use the crisis to profit from ignorant relief workers? To everybody living in this

village the answers to those questions are so obvious that they don’t even talk about them

to each other. Yet, those are the questions we are trying to get answers to.”

The team arrives in Mopti in the early afternoon and checks into a hotel. Parks

and Mills leave Thomas at the hotel to conduct vehicle maintenance while they split up to

visit friends living in different parts of the city. While the team members travel together

for convenience and added safety, whenever possible they build relationships among

communities individually. It is easier for a community to socialize an individual than to

socialize a group—however small.

Mopti is a city large enough to offer cell phone coverage, and Parks sends a text

message to Mills that he will be spending the night at his host’s house. Mills takes

advantage of the Internet connection provided by the small hotel to check his email. He

finds a request from an analyst working for one of Psychological Operations’ Strategic

Studies Detachments for additional information about a Sociocultural Report the team

has posted on the EI portal. Mills makes a note to follow up on this request during his

next visit to the area being queried about.

Thomas joins Mills for dinner at a small restaurant. “Why didn’t Parks take me

with him to meet his friends here? He is leaving pretty soon, shouldn’t I start getting to

know them?”

14

“This isn’t like Iraq where he is going to leave you a list of HUMINT contacts

and walk out. The people he became friends with here will be his friends for life. He will

probably introduce you to them later, but nobody will pressure them to associate with us.

Parks will most likely be back here for another tour, and he’ll stay in contact with them

while he is at the TSOC.”

“How does that work?”

“I’m sure you had a roommate during your freshman year in college. When was

the last time you talked to him?”

“He forwarded an article to me a few weeks ago.”

“When was the last time you saw him?”

Thomas thinks about that, “Umm . . . I guess eight or nine years ago.”

“If he called you right now and said he had a problem, would you help him?”

“Sure.”

Mills nods. “There you go. Obviously your strongest relationships are with the

people you spend time with regularly, but there is still great strength in relationships

maintained even casually over a long period of time. You shared a room with a guy for a

year or two, and now, after five times that amount of time has passed, you still talk to

him, and you still have enough warm feelings toward him to help him out. You did that

just by staying in touch with someone you shared experiences with. Build those kinds of

relationships here, and you will be successful.”

The next morning the team’s departure is delayed. Parks is introduced to several

members of his host’s extended family who arrive for a visit and are flattered by his

genuine interest in their family. Mills spends this unexpected free time updating the

team’s products from his notes. He updates the composite sociocultural map to assist his

geospatial analysis of their contacts’ areas of influence. Thomas has not had much

experience with ArcGIS, and he is surprised to see how effectively it can be used to layer

the sociocultural information detailed in the reports with geospatial data to connect

15

people with places. He also notices that is can’t be coincidence that most of the new

relationships the team has developed are located along primary smuggling routes into and

out of Mauritania.

By the time Parks rejoins them and the team gets back on the road, the sun is well

over the horizon and the day has grown warm. As they turn off the paved road and head

north, the road fades from gravel to tracks worn deep into the sand. By early afternoon,

they have to turn off the vehicle’s air conditioner, as the engine is prone to overheat while

driving through the deep sand with the compressor on. To take his mind off the pressing

heat, Thomas asks a question he has been hesitant to bring up before. “I understand that

ethnographic intelligence is about people instead of things, but what exactly is the

difference? How is it different from regular intelligence? Or even just sociology?”

“That is actually a very good question.” To explain, Parks pulls a notebook from

his bag and opens to a blank page, then draws four circles with lines connecting them in a

diamond shape.

Thomas has seen this before. “That’s a link analysis diagram.”

“That’s right. A lot of analysts use link analysis in their product development. The

difference between regular intelligence methods and ethnographic intelligence is really

which parts of this diagram we focus on.” Parks draws the circles in more heavily.

“Conventional intelligence techniques focus on the nodes, the person. The analyst tries to

learn everything about these nodes and develops detailed target packets or extensive

personality profiles. Commanders and policy officials then use those products to decide

how they should engage the actors to get the results they want. You were in Iraq—what

happens if one of these guys gets killed?” Parks crosses out one of the circles.

“Somebody else takes his spot.”

Parks draws in a new circle near the one he crossed out. “So what do you know

about this guy?”

“Nothing. You just drew him in. He could be anybody.”

16

“That’s exactly right. We have no way to predict what this guy will do because

we know nothing about him. That’s the limitation of focusing on nodes.” Parks begins

drawing in the lines between the circles more heavily. “Ethnographic intelligence

describes the relationships between the nodes—how the nodes relate to one another.

Every one of these actors forms part of this little society I’ve drawn, and this society puts

rules on each actor’s behavior and each actor must act appropriately for his role.”

“What do you mean rules?”

“If you were to walk into the Pentagon tomorrow and start giving orders to invade

Canada, would anybody listen to you? What if you told the first colonel you saw to get

you some coffee? You can’t. Your role in our military society is that of a major. There

are rules about who can send a colonel for coffee and who can order an invasion. It

doesn’t matter what your personal characteristics are. Major Thomas can’t do those

things.” Parks points to one of the circles. “Now, if this fellow is the leader of this group,

and we understand the rules that define membership in this group, we don’t need a target

packet to have a rough idea of how he will behave. If the group accepts him as a leader,

we know that his behavior and ideology must be seen as appropriate to them because

they accepted him as a leader. And that’s only on the smallest scale. Once we understand

how different communities within a society relate to one another, we can begin to

forecast what might happen if the state were to fail, or if a natural disaster occurred in one

part of the country. If the economy and state apparatus collapse, the last relationships to

fail will be trust-based relationships, like family or community ties. If we understand

those, we can guess what the target society will look like when the artificial control

imposed by security forces collapses.”

“You mean like in Iraq?”

“I mean anywhere. Remember Hurricane Katrina? In the United States, we have a

federal agency with a budget of more than a billion dollars to do nothing but stand ready

to respond to natural disasters. After the hurricane hit, whose response did you hear about

first?”

“Corporations, churches, charities, private citizens . . .”

17

“Exactly—the quickest to respond were those who already had relationships with

people and organizations in Louisiana. It was those relationships that enabled the aid to

get to where it was needed quickly. Corporations and churches maintain trust-based

relationships as part of doing business. When disaster struck, there was no need to

coordinate authorization, confirm details, or allocate supplies—they just sent everything

they could.”

Due to their late start, the team knows they are unable to get to the school they are

to photograph for the defense attaché before evening, much less reach the ferry that

travels between the banks of the Niger River southeast of Timbuktu. Rather than push on

through the evening only to wait on the banks of the river with the crowd of local

residents who will form to wait for ferry service to resume in the morning, the team opts

to drive a short distance from the trail to the top of a large hill overlooking several miles

of sandy plains. There they lay out their folding mats and light a fire in their small

charcoal stove to brew tea. As the tea heats, a nomad appears seemingly from nowhere

and joins them at their fire. Parks laughs, because he has noted that throughout northern

Mali whenever anyone stops to brew the highly sweetened green tea, passing travelers

will often join them even when there seem to be none about. Good manners dictate that

the guests be offered tea and whatever food is served. Likewise, Parks knows that he and

the team could stop and join any group of strangers preparing tea and they would be

welcomed in turn. The three sensors attempt to converse with their guest in French,

Tamasheq, and Bambara, but to no avail. Once the tea is heated, Mills makes a show of

pouring the tea from greater and greater heights into one of the three small glasses they

have set out before returning it to the pot. Malian nomads put as much emphasis into how

tea is poured as how it is prepared, and their guest smiles his approval as Mills pours the

tea a final time from a height of almost three feet, leaving a layer of sweet foam at the top

of each glass. Their guest stays with them for two small glasses of tea, and shares

dubiously in the team’s Meals Ready-to-Eat (MRE) before placing his hand held over his

heart in a small bow and departing into the darkening desert.

18

Thomas enjoys being in the field, but has something on his mind. “So, we get to

spend a lot of time travelling, and I can see why. But life back in the embassy . . . how do

I make that work?”

“That’s a good question. The answer is that you work just as hard to build

relationships there as you do out here. You study the culture of the embassy as closely as

you do the culture of the communities we are trying to connect with. Sometimes I think I

have more in common with the Tuareg than with our State Department counterparts. But

really, every person on the Country Team and at USAID does their best to accomplish the

mission, and they deal with problems we know nothing about. For a lot of different

reasons they can use a little help from us sometimes—just as we can use their help.

That’s where you can make yourself useful. The most important thing is to think of

yourself as a guest in their house, which you are. It is always good behavior for a guest to

offer help, but not to criticize or make negative comments. Always offer your work,

experience, and products to the other agencies here, in-country, as a courtesy and let them

make their own evaluation of it. Remember that we are looking for different things than

they are, so our products may not always be helpful to their efforts. Like a good guest

you offer them the report you wrote on the village they are traveling to and answer any

questions they have; but, be careful with your commentary and suggestions. Think about

how you would feel if two political officers from State showed up at your patrol base and

started commenting on the way you ran your patrols. Don’t be that guy.”

The next morning, after tea and another MRE, the team inputs the coordinates for

the new school they’re headed to into their GPS. They continue north on the road to

Timbuktu, hoping that they will find a set of tracks leading in the correct direction. As

they continue north, the terrain changes to larger and larger stretches of soft sand with

less vegetation. Before long they cross a set of tracks leading in the direction of their

destination. They follow the tracks for an hour and arrive at the small village before the

day has a chance to grow too hot. Several villagers emerge from their blocky houses,

excited to receive them. The villagers then conduct them on a grand tour of the school,

which is finished and ready for use. Parks finds the schoolmaster, and together they

unload the school supplies into the administrator’s small office. Parks is not surprised to

19

see the school finished on time. Parks recommended this contractor to the defense attaché

based on the man’s admirable performance in support of a Special Forces JCET with the

Malian military last year. Parks and Mills take several photos of the school as well as

several photos of the children holding new notebooks and pencil boxes for the NGO

director.

The team then continues on and arrives at the ferry crossing on the bank of the

Niger. Their arrival causes the waiting crowd to stir, as they know the ferry will depart

now that a paying customer has arrived. While paying their fare, Thomas watches

curiously as a small unattended herd of goats descends the dune and walks onto the ferry.

The goats work their way through the crowd to the front of the ferry and wait on the

ramps during the 20-minute crossing. Thomas looks around for their shepherd, but the

goats appear to be both unattended and unremarked upon by the other passengers on the

ferry. Upon arrival at the opposite bank, the goats leap from the ramp and move

purposefully through the cluster of mud structures that tend to mark all ferry crossing

points. Parks notes that the ferry landing has moved since his last visit, but this is normal

since the loading and unloading sites shift up or down the river as the height of the river

changes.

“What’s with those goats?” Thomas inquires.

“What do you think?”

“Well, they seem to know the way. I guess that means they have done this trip so

many times, they know how to do it themselves.”

“And what does that tell you about this area?”

“Well, whoever owns them must trust his neighbors a lot not to steal them. Aren’t

they valuable?”

“That was a couple hundred dollars worth of goats, yes. But look around. This is a

ferry crossing. Not all of these people are locals, and anybody travelling to Timbuktu

from the south has to come through here. Yet, the goats are still out here by themselves.”

20

“Oh. He probably has so much family on both sides of the river that he doesn’t

have to keep an eye on them constantly.”

“Now you know something about the people here, and you didn’t have to talk to

anybody. What you concluded is still just a hypothesis, but that’s how EI works. You

watch how people behave, make a hypothesis about why they do things the way they do,

then you test your hypothesis. The goal of the report you will write for each community

is to make it as accurate an account of the culture as you can. The report is perfect if

somebody who has never been to Mali can read it and then come here and act the way

Malians would expect another Malian to act. Of course, it will never be that good, but it

will still be very useful for forecasting how plans or policies will be received by those

described in the report.”

The team continues on and arrives in Timbuktu half an hour later. They check

into the Hendrina Khan, the better of the city’s two hotels, which offers both air-

conditioned rooms and Internet access. Outside the hotel wait several merchants hawking

various souvenirs and a group of teenage boys. Several of the boys excitedly greet Parks

by name, as he often employs them to run errands during his visits to Timbuktu. Parks

sends one boy to ensure that Colonel Ali, the local garrison commander, is still expecting

them at four o’clock. The three sensors enjoy lunch at the hotel, and hear back from their

messenger that the Colonel is prepared to receive them as scheduled. They spend the

early afternoon conversing with the hotel owner—a man well-connected, highly

educated, and always willing to share his knowledge of the area.

The team’s meeting with Colonel Ali goes well, and he agrees to provide the

sensors with the usual escort of soldiers mandated by the Country Team for U.S. officials

traveling north of the Niger River. The team and escort will depart together into the

Sahara tomorrow morning bound for Araouane, where they hope to arrive before dark.

Parks knows from experience that the soldiers will bring their own food and water but

little else. Thus, Parks sends one of the boys to purchase additional inner tubes for the

soldiers’ Toyota, as they will almost certainly have a few flat tires during the trip. He

sends another boy to ensure that the owner of the small gas station will open his shop at

dawn, because the soldiers’ truck will just as surely be out of fuel.

21

That evening the team sits on the tiled patio and drinks sweet green tea from little

glasses under a darkening sky. Thomas has the reports about the community of Araouane

spread out on the table. “We have two types of reports here. What is the difference

between a Sociocultural Log and a Sociocultural Report?”

“The Sociocultural Log is a lot like history written by a historian. The big

difference is that a historian uses multiple sources to try to determine what happened so

as to be as objective as possible. Our goal is not necessarily to develop an objective

history, but rather to record the history accurately as a community perceives it because

it’s their perception of their history that shapes how they react to future events. The more

developed the log is the more useful it will be for understanding how the community

defines who is in, and—just as important—who is outside the community. The more

developed the log is the more useful it will be for forecasting how the community will

react to phenomena similar to what it has faced before. Finally, the more accurate it is,

the more the reader can begin to understand what sort of behavior the community expects

of its members and can act accordingly. Essentially, it’s your working document: what

you observe, what you think it means, and what you predict will come of it.

“In contrast, the Sociocultural Report is essentially a summary. If the log is the

accumulated data, the report is the analysis. It outlines your analysis of the culture you

are studying without rehashing all the material from the log, so it serves as a tool that

decision makers and policy officials can use to plan operations or develop policy that will

fit the needs of the community studied without their having to study the log and make

their own analysis second-hand. Both of these are living documents, and only as current

as your last update of them. Does that clear things up?”

“I think so. I’m sure it will become clear as I read more of them.”

As the sun lightens the horizon the next morning, the sensor team greets their

escort, briefs the planned route, and provides the escort with a small handheld radio.

Together they fuel both vehicles and then drive north into the dunes. They all hope to get

as far as possible before the sun pushes the desert temperatures over 130 degrees

Fahrenheit.

22


23

III. CASE STUDY COMPARISON—ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE IN MALI AND THAILAND

A. DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, DIFFERENT PROBLEMS, ONE CAPABILITY

The following case study comparison demonstrates that even though countries

with drastically different characteristics will present different challenges to EI sensors,

the inherent flexibility of the sensor team will allow sensors to develop effective methods

specific to their host nation communities regardless of the country they are in. Mali and

Thailand were selected for this comparison because of their dissimilarity in geography,

climate, government, population size, population density, and number of religious and

ethnic communities. The countries are in different operational theaters and therefore

under different geographic combatant commanders of the Department of Defense.

Additionally, the size and composition of the Department of State presence in both

countries is drastically different.3

Located in western Africa, Mali is a country roughly twice the size of Texas with

a population of over 12 million. While the official language of the country is French,

large segments of the population speak a variety of tribal languages and have little

representation in the government. The U.S. has a small embassy and large USAID office

located in the capital city of Bamako, as well as 155 Peace Corps Volunteers spread

throughout the country. Thailand, located in Southeast Asia, is half the size of Mali, but

has more than five times the population—almost 66 million. The official language of the

country is Thai, with a literacy rate over 92 percent. The U.S. has an extremely large

embassy in Bangkok, with a Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG)

larger than the entire U.S. diplomatic mission in Mali. Also, the embassy includes

representatives from the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, Bureau of

Diplomatic Security office, Centers for Disease Control office, Drug Enforcement

3 Each of us has also spent time in these countries, and so we draw on our first-hand knowledge, as

well as secondary sources.

24

Administration office, and six other U.S. agencies, as well as a consulate in Chiang Mai

and almost 100 Peace Corps Volunteers throughout the country.

The features Mali and Thailand have in common include some of the same

characteristics common to many countries in the lower half of the Failed States Index

(2009). The Fund for Peace ranks Mali 83rd of the 177 countries it evaluates on its index,

at the low end of its “Warning” category. Thailand ranks even worse, at 79. Mali has long

sought to counter occasional low-level insurgent violence by its Tuareg population in the

northern region of the country; Thailand has struggled to contain an insurgent movement

in its southern provinces almost since the Thai Government annexed the Sultanate of

Patani in 1902. Mali’s ungoverned spaces are used extensively by insurgent groups, such

as the GSPC and Knights of Change, as a haven in which to regroup as they seek to

destabilize neighboring Algeria and Mauritania. Thailand, by comparison, is a center for

document forgery, money laundering, and serves as a relaxation and recreation site for

several transnational terrorist groups (Cheow, 2003). Residents in Mali are concerned

about the destabilizing effect of Dawa and Wahhabi mosques in Kidal, Mopti, Timbuktu,

and Sikasso; Thai citizens worry about the spread of Wahhabi mosques among the

disenfranchised hill tribes north of Chiang Mai (Lintner, 2004).

B. MALI

Figure 1. Mali

25

1. Ungoverned Spaces in Mali

Mali is a country with a broad range of geographic conditions, from the towering

dunes and rocky wastes of the Sahara Desert in the north to the heavy jungles of the

southern regions. Mali has one of the more stable governments in West Africa, with an

elected president and parliament. Mali’s Failed State Index Score is 78.7 (more than

twice the United States’ score of 32.8 but less than Somalia’s 114.2) and is ranked 83rd

out of 177 evaluated countries for instability (Failed States Index, 2009). While Mali’s

ratio of security forces to country area is not as low as that of some states with higher

Failed State Index scores, Mali has large expanses completely beyond governmental

control. As shown in Figure 2, the Malian military maintains no bases north of Timbuktu,

Kidal, or Menaka, while the forces stationed there have few trucks and little fuel, and

generally travel no farther than 20 or 30 miles from their bases—though they will patrol

farther if directed to do so. As Figure 2 indicates, there is a 100-mile buffer around each

of the major installations, representing an optimistic effective sphere of influence for

each station. Note that the entire northern portion of the country, a region as large as

Texas, is completely unpatrolled. Home to the Tuareg and several Bedouin tribes, this

area is continuously used by criminal and terrorist organizations such as the GSPC, the

Knights of Change, and smugglers of various products.

26

Figure 2. Mali Security Force Locations, Populated Places, and Water Sites.4

Compounding the difficulty in patrolling these areas given the sheer distances

involved is the complete lack of roads. All travel north of the Niger River is by four-

wheel drive vehicle, donkey, or camel—over rocks, shifting dunes, and desert. The blue

points on the map indicate named water sites, areas where traveling Tuareg, Bedouins,

and smugglers frequently stop to resupply their water or nourish their herds, and where

tribal communities establish camps for seasonal use. These camps are outside the security

sphere of influence, and as the seasons change the Bedouins move their camps and herds.

This makes it difficult for the government to find the camps and to have any influence on

the residents’ behavior.

In addition to the terrain separating government agencies from the people of

northern Mali, the number of languages spoken throughout the country creates barriers of

another type, the rough boundaries of which are depicted in Figure 3. Though the official

4 Toponymic information is based on the Geographic Names Database, containing official standard

names approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names and maintained by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. More information is available at the Products and Services link at www.nga.mil. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency name, initials, and seal are protected by 10 United States Code Section §445.

27

language of Mali is French, the largest language in use is Bambara (60 percent), the

language of the tribe in power. While Bambara is effective in numerous populated places

in the southern half of the country, it forms a barrier to interaction with the Tuareg,

Arabs, and other tribes in the north. Not only are state agencies unable to communicate

with these communities, but the lack of northerners in the military and security forces

ensures a lack of access for them as well.

Figure 3. Mali Tribal Language Regions.5

Malian citizens have expressed concern over the spread of fundamentalist Dawa

mosques in Kidal, Mopti, and Bamako that specifically draw recruits from among

unemployed youth. Of additional concern are the spread of Wahhabi mosques and

foreign religious teachers in Timbuktu and Sikasso. Because these areas are outside the

areas normally visited by embassy staff, as well as outside the areas visited by Malian

Government personnel, there is little information available to state agencies to use as a

baseline to determine the spread or decline of these fundamentalist groups. Because the

5 NGA (2009) General Navigation Chart Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED. Language location

data from Ethnologue, (2009). Retrieved March 1, 2009 from http://www.ethnologue.com/show_ country.asp?name=Mali.

28

EI sensors would have both the time to engage the population directly and to develop the

language capability to study communities throughout Mali, sensors would be able to

more accurately assess what is happening in these otherwise underrepresented

communities.

In the past, Special Reconnaissance (SR) often consisted of SF teams infiltrating

denied territory, preparing hide sites, and reporting for days or weeks at a time on the

movement and disposition of enemy forces. That mode of collection has been replaced by

more advanced TECHINT, which can provide the same information without risk to

personnel and at less risk of compromise. However, even the best forms of TECHINT

cannot gather the level of sociocultural detail described by EI. Ethnographic Intelligence

sensors would essentially conduct another type of “SR” for USSOCOM. For instance,

these sensors would be able to study and describe in granular detail the nature and

disposition of the communities surrounding mosques in Kidal and Sikasso to determine

what influence the mosques have on the community and, from that baseline, identify

changes in community relationships as they occur. Right now, though this information is

unclassified and freely available to the entire community, it cannot be observed by

satellite, signal intercept, or even regular patrols.

For EI sensors already paying attention to the contour and content of community

relationships the abnormal would be obvious. Arguably, there is decreased need for

expensive and often maligned human intelligence operations among a population more

than willing to provide information to authorities in exchange for protection from outside

actors the community views as detrimental to its own survival. Members of the GSPC

often stop traders in northern Mali and demand a tax in the form of portions of cargo.

These hapless traders do not hide their knowledge of GSPC terrorist activity out of

sympathy for the terrorists’ cause or even out of fear of reprisal, but simply because they

have nobody to report the information to. Likewise, communities do not purposely keep

visits by passing insurgents secret; their silence instead reflects a lack of attention from

Bamako.

Because the EI sensors’ objective truly will be to better understand host nation

communities so that the USG can more effectively conduct Security Force Assistance

29

(SFA), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Stability,

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, ethnographic sensors will

strive to operate with complete transparency. In order to maintain access to the

population, EI sensors must always strive to ensure that their behavior fits their role as

students of culture. “Cover” for the EI sensor will have a different focus than the cover

used for clandestine intelligence operations. EI sensors will not want to hide their

objectives. In fact, sensors will generally want to appear as open and approachable as

possible. For some situations, however, the sensors will have to tailor their appearance to

the environment. In an area of regular tourist traffic like Timbuktu or Kidal sensors will

be able to interact with friendly residents regularly and openly to develop baselines. But

to protect friends in some areas sensors may have to balance their desired transparency

against the need to protect residents from retaliation for perceived cooperation with

“spies” or security forces. Sensors may have to evaluate the situation to find ways to

soften their appearance without lying about their affiliation, something that would

confirm the worst suspicions in the minds of the community.

Because the sensor team will not engage in human source operations, EI sensors

will be able to pass information reported openly by community members to other

government agencies through intelligence spot reports. Those agencies can then use that

information to track, target, and disrupt organizations. As this information can not be tied

back to specific individuals or even small groups, terrorist organizations will be able to

retaliate only by taking action against entire communities—an undertaking that even

Malian security forces avoid during Tuareg uprisings, according to Colonel Ali,

commander of Malian forces stationed in Timbuktu (personal communication, May 13,

2005). Even if the government of Mali is unwilling or unable to prosecute terrorists in

northern Mali, target information on these groups can be shared through the TSOC and

defense attaché offices in the region. That way the country team and TSOC can begin to

devise other avenues of approach, potentially via Mauritania or Algeria.

30

2. Military Support for SSTR in Mali

In 2008, the U.S. DoD provided millions of dollars in Humanitarian Assistance

funds to the USAID mission in Mali to develop a joint counterterrorism program. As one

critic pointed out, “Skilled aid workers have the soft skills, historical and cultural

knowledge, and technical expertise needed for effective development. The U.S. military,

on the other hand, is good at fighting and building temporary infrastructure—not human

development” (Moseley, 2009). Certainly Moseley is correct in his implication: that to

conduct more effective SSTR and civil-military operations, DoD officials and

commanders must improve their historical and cultural knowledge of the communities

they strive to assist, as identified in DoDD 3000.5 Military Support for Stability, Security,

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.

Citizens in many countries have many times expressed frustration not in the

amount of HA rendered by the U.S., but how the money is spent. Often communities see

humanitarian assistance funds funneled into the hands of the wealthy and politically well

connected (Transparency International, 2006). In Mali, citizens outside the ruling faction

have long watched the benefits of international assistance dollars funneled to the elites of

the Bambara-dominated government, forcing them to look outside the government to

foreign NGOs and religious organizations for assistance (Gutelius, 2006, p. 38). That

assistance has come with a price, however, and these same citizens now watch in concern

as the Islamist teachings of Dawa and Wahhabism spread among unemployed youth.

Kaplan (2005) describes how U.S. assistance efforts have been most successful

when conducted by elements small enough to administer military and government

assistance without inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment. As he notes, smaller U.S. elements

must of necessity work with community members. Because the small U.S. elements lack

the resources and manpower to operate unilaterally, community members must be

recruited to support operations and are well positioned to closely advise how best to

improve local living conditions. Civil affairs units have proven to be a useful tool to win

access to target populations to gather operational information. However, the army's

specialists in civil-military operations are trained in general principles of community

31

development and do not have regional expertise. Nor are they trained in developing

sociocultural understanding. CA operators are specialists in select fields, not in select

communities. Unfortunately, change agents like CA operators often find that "techniques

that have worked in one community may fail when applied in another not because they

were inapplicable but because what was really involved was not understood"

(Goodenough, 1963, p.24). Additionally, because the majority of the U.S. military’s civil

affairs personnel are reservists, they do not deploy to areas long enough to develop the

necessary sociocultural expertise even if they were trained in ethnographic techniques.

Civil affairs personnel could, however, plan and conduct their efforts in Mali in

conjunction with EI sensors already stationed in-country, who, by close association, will

be familiar with the USAID contingent’s long-term plans for Mali. Perhaps engaging EI

sensors and CA personnel early, and allowing them to work in conjunction with USAID

efforts, can curtail the need for large-scale stabilization efforts by identifying and

engaging areas of tension before they spread.

C. THAILAND

Largely an agrarian country of small villages and rice paddies, it is a testament to

Thailand’s beauty and the friendliness of most Thais that Thailand has remained a

popular tourist location even while its government struggles to control both the flow of

illicit drugs by armed drug traffickers and the fighting caused by separatists determined

to create an autonomous state in southern Thailand.

32

1. Ungoverned Spaces within Thailand

Figure 4. Thailand

Former Prime Minister Thaksin’s bloody “War on Drugs,” which sanctioned

extrajudicial killing and “shoot on sight” policies for those involved in the drug trade,

was reviled by the international media as an abuse of civil rights. However, since the

recent coup, the sheer volume of illegal drugs transported through the ungoverned space

between Myanmar and Thailand has led 67 percent of Thai citizens to support a return to

extrajudicial killings. Many Thais consider the 2,000 reported killings by police as a

lesser evil compared to the thousands killed by the drug trade. Residents report that even

when they provide details regarding the identities of drug traffickers to local police,

arrests are not made (Montlake, 2008). This is not for lack of interest on the part of the

police, but because the terrain along the border between northern Thailand and Myanmar

is difficult to patrol. Steep mountains, gullies, and lack of roads prevent vehicle patrols,

while jungle foliage prevents identification or tracking of drug traffickers from the air.

There are no security forces stationed in the area to develop the “beat cop” familiarity

33

with local residents, who, in return, can identify those who don’t belong. At the same

time, without basing, the security forces cannot remain in the area long enough to act on

tips provided by residents.

In addition to the problems caused by the drugs funneled in from the ungoverned

spaces in the northwest of the country, the Kingdom of Thailand has had difficulties

assimilating the native population of its southern provinces since it annexed the Sultanate

of Patani, located between Thailand (then Siam) and Malaysia (then Malaya), in 1902.

While the international press covers the southern insurgency extensively, less is reported

on Islam in northern Thailand. Northern Thai Muslims are largely descendants of the

“Chin Haw” traders who traveled the rugged mountain region between China and

northern Thailand. The Chin Haw practice a form of Islam based on the Hanafi sect of

Sunni Islam, which in turn is heavily influenced by Chinese traditions. They established

mosques in the larger northern Thai cities along their trade routes in Chiang Mai, Chiang

Rai, and Fang. Until the 1970s, northern Muslims of Chinese and Bengali descent had

virtually no contact with Islam as practiced in the Arab Middle East.

While Thailand’s Malay Muslims’ separate ethnic identity has caused problems

with assimilation and has motivated separatist groups in the south, Thailand’s Muslims of

Chinese and Bengali descent in northern Thailand have lived in peace for over a century.

Only recently has the spread of Saudi financing of Wahhabi mosques in northern

Thailand come to the attention of the Thai Government and international press. In 1972,

the At Taqwa Mosque was built with financing from Saudi Arabia (Liulan, 2004), and

graduates from the Mosque have studied in Middle Eastern nations. Since then many

have returned to Chiang Mai to teach at the mosques there (Liulan, 2006, p. 356).

Throughout Thailand, mosques and schools are financed by Pakistan and Saudi

Arabia (Cheow, 2003). In addition to offering financial support, external actors provide a

sense of extended community for Muslims in the south and increase the sense of

disequilibrium between Malay Muslims’ values and expectations on the one hand, and

the administration’s policies on the other. "Regional Islamic terrorists are looking at the

area for a possible jihad (holy war). Disgruntled Muslim youth form a potential labor

pool” (Wiseman, 2004).

34

Large mosques and Islamic schools have been constructed in Mae Sot, Chiang

Rai, and Chiang Mai. Several smaller mosques have likewise been built for

disenfranchised hill tribes in tiny villages such as Ban Pangsa, shown in Figure 5. These

new mosques (depicted in red) are not located along the trade routes where the

descendents of the Chin Haw and Bengali Muslims settled. Instead, they are located in

the mountainous border areas outside the influence of Thai security forces. These areas

are not only used by drug traffickers, but also inhabited by the Akha, a tribal people

believed to have originated in Mongolia, as well as other “hill people” or tribal

communities without Thai citizenship. Though living in Thailand, these groups are not

afforded citizenship by the Thai Government and do not qualify for services like health

care or education. As the Thai Government mostly leaves the hill tribes alone to run their

own affairs, to date the hill tribes seem content to remain in the mountains and venture

out only to sell works of craftsmanship at tourist markets like the Chiang Mai night

bazaar.

Figure 5. Chin Haw Trade Routes and Mosques in Thailand6

6 Mosque locations from NGA Unclassified GeoNames server and MapMagic 2005, trade route data

from Liulan (2006).

35

Obviously, the mere presence of a Wahhabi mosque catering to a disenfranchised

segment of the population does not automatically mean that radical Islamic teachings are

being preached to an otherwise peaceful people. Lintner (2004) cites Islamic scholars

who estimate the number of converts in the hundreds, not thousands. But Linter also

draws attention to the Thai Government’s concern about the spread of Islamic mosques

and organizations already linked to fundamentalist Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait, as well as the recent relocation of peaceful Akha children to Ban Pangsa’s sister

madrassa in southern Thailand at a time when other schools are sending children to the

north for the children’s safety. Many suspect that the motivation for these transfers is to

expose the students to a more fundamentalist form of Islam while children are separated

from the influence of their parents.

As in COIN, the center of gravity in Counterterrorism (CT) is the population

through which terrorists and insurgents move and from (and against) that they often

strike. Factors such as low job opportunities for military age males and porous borders in

ungoverned spaces have long been identified as some of the factors that have a

destabilizing effect upon governments, yet we still lack the ability to even develop a

baseline for assessing current conditions in these areas. Without a baseline or access to

ungoverned spaces, USSOCOM cannot track the rate at which terrorist or insurgent

groups target these communities, nor can USSOCOM gauge the seriousness of

recruitment. In areas like that along the northern border between Thailand and Laos, the

mountain tribes are almost ideal target populations for recruitment due to their

disenfranchisement by the Thai Government and lack of government security force

presence or interest in the area. Just as members of the embassy staff depend upon

relationships with their Thai Government counterparts for information (who, in turn, are

primarily concerned with tracking the supporters of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin), the

United States Intelligence Community currently relies on news reporters for sociocultural

information instead of building relationships among with members of these communities

directly.

36

2. Military Support for SSTR in Thailand

The international community’s efforts to provide effective humanitarian

assistance to the areas devastated by the 2004 tsunami demonstrate the marked difference

it can make when societies are well understood by aid agencies. Decades worth of regular

Security Force Assistance (SFA) and international cooperation facilitated U.S. aid efforts

in Thailand. In contrast, administering aid in Myanmar was much more difficult and, in

some places, impossible. Even six months after the tsunami, wreckage of homes still

littered the Myanmar shoreline and children were living on UNICEF relief supplies

(Rush, 2005). The military junta’s policies form barriers not only to active foreign

assistance, but also to the development of community understanding through study of

social topography. Aid workers do not know which community members have enough

social capital to assist in reconstruction efforts, nor which entities will use relief resources

to advance their own interests instead of passing them on to the public.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has since had to scale back its

presence in Myanmar (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,

2007, p. 5), and protracted difficulties in conducting operations have caused Medicins

Sans Frontieres (MSF) France to cease operations in Myanmar altogether. As fewer

international agencies have a presence in Myanmar, it will become all the more important

for EI sensors in Thailand to engage refugees from Myanmar in order to better map the

social topography so as to prepare for future disasters and to prevent spillover

destabilizing effects in Thailand and throughout the region.

The United Nations (2009) reports that there are 111,000 registered Myanmar

refugees living in camps along the border between Thailand and Myanmar. Some

refugees have fled the fighting between government and rebel forces, other have fled

forced recruitment and forced labor by the government. The refugees are restricted to the

camps and unable to pursue work or education in Thailand. An EI sensor team in

Thailand would be well positioned to work with the Myanmar refugees to gain a better

understanding about communities in Myanmar. Just as Ruth Benedict in her renowned

ethnography, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, was able to describe Japanese society

without ever having entered Japan herself, EI sensors should be able to engage refugees

37

from Myanmar living in Thailand in order to assist U.S. policy makers better tailor U.S.

policy toward the Junta in Myanmar, identify underlying trust relationships among the

Burmese, and better plan contingency and relief operations for when and if the state

collapses. Additionally, as depicted in Figure 6, there is the location of the refugee camps

to consider; they are in the same mountainous ungoverned space used by drug traffickers.

Note also their proximity to the unregistered, Saudi-sponsored mosques described

previously. An EI sensor team’s efforts here will not only assist in developing greater

understanding of Myanmar, but also increase understanding of the communities within

this ungoverned space through which the drug traffickers smuggle drugs into Thailand

and into which the Wahabbi mosques expand their influence.

Figure 6. Myanmar Refugees and Unregistered Mosques in Thailand7

7 Refugee locations and camp size data from map by Julien Zwang, Shoklo Malaria Research Unit,

Mae Sot, Thailand. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://demoplanet.free.fr/karen_refugee_camps.htm.

38

D. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM

In Mali, the small size of the embassy virtually assures that the sensor team will

be invited to attend weekly country team meetings. These meetings will allow the EI

sensors to develop relationships within the embassy to help them become accepted as full

partners in the embassy mission. During discussions regarding EUCOM’s humanitarian

assistance planning officers operating in Mali in 2005, Ambassador McCulley stressed

the extent to which he found the sociocultural input of military officers who engaged the

population while working within the embassy to be extremely valuable, and he regularly

petitioned their input during country team meetings. He also recognized that the officers

themselves would not be fully integrated into the embassy team until they were assigned

to the embassy on permanent change of station orders (personal communication,

November 5, 2005). Sensors assigned to embassies for the same tour lengths served by

DoS officials will be able to offer their products and the benefit of their conceptual

framework, and the EI team’s transparency should help dampen the suspicion that

military officers are conducting secret operations outside the purview of the country

team.

In contrast, the massive size of the U.S. mission in Thailand will likely preclude

the sensor team from having the same access to the country team as it would in a smaller

embassy like Mali. However, the products developed by the sensor team about

communities outside the embassy’s normal sphere of influence will still serve to assist

members of the country team in Thailand. More importantly, the individual relationships,

baselines reports, and detailed logs about communities at risk in the ungoverned spaces of

Thailand that can be developed to enhance understanding about neighboring Myanmar,

would make the sensor team in Thailand an invaluable resource for the PACOM GCC.

Countries that score lowest on the Failed State Index are generally located next to each

other, and share regional problems. By posting sensor teams to Mali and Thailand, these

teams would be perfectly positioned to access precisely those communities that span

borders. The teams would thus be able to develop products about countries that are

otherwise inaccessible to the U.S. Even without an embassy in Myanmar, the sensor team

posted to Thailand can develop products to be used by the GCC and other country teams

39

throughout the region to generate a more comprehensive policy, to plan for

contingencies, and to conduct large-scale humanitarian assistance operations with greater

overall effectiveness.

There are two additional considerations in EI force deployment based on the

location of less stable countries:

1. A synergistic effect can be gained by employing teams in adjacent countries, as gains in one country can be built upon by a team in a neighboring country and regional entities can likewise be engaged.

2. When resources are limited and regional engagement is necessary, a team located in one country may have contacts through cross-border communities to potentially expand its scope through temporary duty via neighboring embassies, thereby expanding influence without the cost of an additional team deployment.

While Mali and Thailand offer drastically different operational environments, the

same EI sensor team structure of two to four trained sensors assigned to the embassy

team and supported by the TSOC should be effective in both countries. The flexibility of

the EI sensor team will allow sensors to use the sociocultural conceptual framework they

have gained through immersion and applied study of the communities of the host nation

to tailor an ethnographic intelligence cycle that supports the conventional intelligence

cycle by focusing on population-centric questions that the TSOC commander’s staff

didn’t know enough about the target country to ask when they developed the TSOC

commander’s Priority Information Requirements (PIR). The EI sensor knows which

communities to focus on to develop access and gain information to be processed into

answers for the PIR.

40


41

IV. THE ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SENSOR

The EI sensor must possess a diverse set of skills. He needs to understand the

anthropological approach to developing sociocultural products. He must be able to map

the social structure (key communities, subgroups, relational ties, and methods of

interaction [kinship, occupation, schooling, etc.]). Most significantly, he must use his

military operational experience in conjunction with the sociocultural intelligence cycle to

develop ethnographic products that answer the strategic and operational needs of the

GCC and his staff, the Country Team, and tactical commanders. The greatest advantage

to employing USSOCOM operators to collect EI in support of USSOCOM’s needs is

encapsulated in E.E Evans-Pritchard’s (1967) comment on fieldwork in general, “all I

want to emphasize is that what one brings out of a field-study largely depends on what

one brings to it” (p. 241).

Sensors deployed by USSOCOM would have a thorough understanding of the

information requirements of tactical, operational, and strategic missions because they

have performed those missions as operators for years. By carefully selecting from the

general pool of USSOCOM operators for the specific requirements listed below,

USSOCOM can ensure that it gets from its fieldwork teams what it needs—and more.

Soldiers other than Special Forces officers (CA, PSYOP, MI) or members of

AFSOC, Navy SEALS, or MARSOC could very likely also serve as effective

ethnographic sensors, and female sensors would provide access to additional segments of

the population that would add a critical dimension. However, in this thesis we focus on

the Special Forces officer for initial manning of this capability because the United States

Special Forces Command (USASFC) provides the largest pool of candidates who already

possess the desired training, maturity, and experience of having worked in small teams.

Special Forces officers have already volunteered for careers working among indigenous

populations with little support and may already have operational experience in target

42

regions. This combined skill set and career focus allows for the lowest possible initial

investment and greatest return on investment when canvassing appropriate recruiting

pools for EI.

A. KEY TASKS FOR THE ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SENSOR

1. Understand the Ethnographic Intelligence Cycle and Methods

Operators and analysts must understand the conventional intelligence cycle in

order to identify observable indicators that indicate an adversary’s intent. Likewise, the

EI sensor must understand the GCC and TSOC commander’s Priority Information

Requirements and engagement strategy in order to develop and maintain an ethnographic

intelligence cycle. This cycle drives development of sociocultural logs to record how

specific communities have responded to phenomena in the past, as well sociocultural

reports to summarize cultural aspects that may have a bearing upon proposed operations

or policy. The EI sensor must be able to develop his own EI PIR by studying the Country

Team’s mission and intent, as well as the GCC strategy in order to identify likely friction

points with U.S. policy and interests before they become problems. The EI sensor must

be able to examine and record cultural norms, standards, and artifacts subjectively (what

does the subject say is the reason for this behavior?), as well as objectively (what

behavior is observed, what reactions can be detected?). He has to be able to conduct

assessments (what are the costs of compliance and non-compliance? Does this behavior

still meet a perceived need? What is its cost?), advise, and plan (should U.S. forces

behave similarly? Should officials engage an NGO to educate the populace away from a

dysfunctional norm or behavior?). The EI sensor must understand intelligence analysis

and methodology, to include the use of social network analysis and link analysis to

identify lines of social influence and social power structures. Additionally, the EI sensor

must know how to identify fault lines and areas of potential conflict, and then be able to

graphically, textually, and geospatially depict that information in a manner that is

accessible and easily understandable to an end user with no anthropological or

intelligence expertise. The EI sensor must routinely update intelligence reports as the

society described inevitably changes. Most importantly, the EI sensor should constantly

43

use the sociocultural products to forecast behavior, test hypotheses, and then objectively

evaluate the accuracy of his forecasts to determine areas for additional study.

2. Understand Effective Social Entrepreneurship

The U.S. is well known for its robust humanitarian aid and economic

development assistance packages. Unfortunately, local populations are frequently

frustrated by their perception that those efforts are often channeled to the undeserving

through corruption or lack of awareness of where true needs exist. Generally, citizens do

not blame the U.S. mission; they blame their own government functionaries for funneling

assistance according to personal relationships, in a more personalized and nepotistic form

of American pork barrel politics. Such a perception weakens the respect for the central

government that the aid is intended to bolster. Additionally, the client community often

resists projects because the effort works against one or more of their perceived wants or

needs (Goodenough, 1963, p. 7).8 Often, in an effort to make their concerns evident,

disenfranchised critics are not only willing to talk to U.S. officials in their areas, but will

actively seek them out. With EI sensors present in the more remote regions, the

grievances of the populace can be more easily (and continuously) assessed.

As a student of social structure, working both in target nation communities and

within the embassy, the EI sensor must understand how to be an effective social

entrepreneur. As noted by Goodenough (1963), change agents such as U.S. policy-

makers, NGO volunteers, U.S. Peace Corp volunteers, have separate and distinct

customary modes of operation that they will be bureaucratically unwilling to change (p.

26). Unlike an anthropologist, who strives primarily to record information about a society

to enhance understanding and form theories about social behavior, the USSOCOM

operator first and foremost represents the leading edge of a strategic effort to support U.S.

national interests. During a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on May 12,

2009, Greg Mortenson, humanitarian and author of Three Cups of Tea, remarked on his

personal exchanges with CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and USSOCOM

8 While Goodenough’s assessment is decades old, the same observations he made in 1963 about the

need for community involvement in assistance efforts were repeated in the Inspector General’s review of operations in Iraq in Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.

44

Commander Admiral Olson, and described how military commanders stressed the need

for the U.S. military to focus on building relationships among the populations the U.S. is

attempting to assist. In the same way that Mortenson identified and leveraged contacts in

Pakistan and Afghanistan with social capital that enabled him to build more than 70

schools, the personal relationships formed as the EI sensors develop their sociocultural

products will enable them to identify those members of the community with the social

capital to assist in implementing future aid programs, as well as the community members

most likely to capitalize on disaster. In cases where SSTR operations are implemented,

the EI sensor will also be able to report the true measure of mission success by the degree

to which the population accepts the changes that the operation was intended to influence,

and not simply quantify the numbers of projects completed. “In the last analysis . . .

success is measured by the degree to which the changed conditions are exploited and by

the desirability of the direction that the exploitation takes" (Goodenough, 1963, p. 17).

Because of his career-long affiliation with host nation communities, the EI sensor will be

in a unique position to evaluate the effectiveness of aid programs or security assistance

policies well beyond budget cycles and single-tour postings.

3. Enhance the Department of State’s Mission and Efforts

Far from competing with the State Department’s efforts, USSOCOM EI sensors

will provide the Country Team with a cooperative eyes-and-ears in a package already

bundled with strong planning skills, operational experience, and a can-do attitude

centered on mission accomplishment. In return, the sensors’ support for the country team

mission will give the host nation a reason to accept EI sensors traveling throughout the

country engaging disenfranchised communities. As Gutelius (2006) reports, the

government of Mali already allows EUCOM forces to travel extensively in the northern

regions of Mali as part of their assistance efforts. The Malian Government understands

that the amount of assistance money they will receive is based on need, and that

assessment is part and parcel of SFA and HA. However, as we have seen in Mali, Iraq,

and Afghanistan, SFA and HA provide limited short-term access to communities, but

little benefit in support of building long-term relationships. It is important to realize that

45

assistance funds will provide EI sensors with access to the population—access sensors

will use to begin to build relationships over time, the way community members do. As

part of the country team, EI sensors may assist the defense attaché in administering HA

funds or helping USAID personnel to develop projects that may then be associated with

the sensors. The projects may be built and funded by DoD or USAID, but the community

will forever link the sensors to the projects because the sensors showed up first, helped in

construction, and return frequently to ensure the projects are still functioning correctly.

Additionally, ethnographic sensors will provide their sociocultural analysis to the

Country Team to supplement the embassy’s understanding of remote and lesser-known

communities. The TSOC, U.S. Embassy staff, and regional NGOs, may use the

information EI sensors provide to better plan operations, employ HA and SFA, and/or

develop policy that will address the disparity between local communities’ values and

expectations and the U.S. or host nation policies and operations early, thereby hopefully

reducing the need to conduct large-scale or kinetic operations in the future.

B. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE USSOCOM EI SENSOR

Certain individuals have an affinity for operating overseas in different languages,

cultures, and among different peoples. The EI sensor position would be unique in that it

requires the selection of motivated people with an eclectic skill set. The majority of those

in the armed services would not likely excel in this field, but USSOCOM does have a

population that can effectively collect ethnographic intelligence.

T.E. Lawrence is known throughout USSOCOM as an outstanding example of the

UW warrior, but little credit is given to the qualities and background that made Lawrence

successful. It was not Lawrence’s ability to ride a camel, wield a sword, or shoot a gun

that enabled him to connect with and lead the Arabs in operations against the enemy, but

rather his sociocultural understanding of the Arab people, gained through intense study,

investment of time, and natural affinity.

More than four decades ago, Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams (1960)

recommended a training program for Foreign Service officers that would match

46

Lawrence’s example by combining education, language, and operational orientation. The

core of their recommended training consisted of:

1. A liberal arts education program in which the dividing line between domestic and foreign affairs has been blurred, with the study of foreign cultures and languages the rule rather than the exception.

2. Professional training in a subject matter field. [The authors specifically mention military science as one type, but SOF operators also have experience in administration, training host nation personnel, and social engineering.]

3. Special linguistic skills, area knowledge, and experience relevant to overseas deployment.

4. Immediate orientation to the particular job to be done abroad.

Most officers within USASFC already meet these core requirements. In the

following paragraphs, we examine these broad categories of desired attributes: education,

experience, and language ability. With selection of the right candidates, only the fourth

element of training—orientation—would be required prior to deployment.

C. THE SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER

While this program should be open to all within USSOCOM, we believe that

Special Forces soldiers in USASFC can best support most of the initial manpower

requirements. About one fourth of USSOCOM’s 43,745 active duty members are

assigned to USASFC (Olson, 2008, p. 16). Not only does USASFC have the personnel

with the requisite skills and background needed to perform as ethnographic sensors, but

also it has the personnel strength to support the program, the operational need for greater

sociocultural data and, most importantly the most to gain from increased long-term

relationships with members of target societies. Using Soldiers from within USASFC

would take minimal additional investment in personnel while maximizing transfer of

sociocultural understanding back and forth between the EI community and operational

units to ensure that EI collection will address unit’s collection needs.

47

1. Education At a minimum, all Army officers are required to have a baccalaureate degree.

Mid-grade officers are also given an opportunity to obtain higher degrees, which would

further enhance their value to this program. Officers are provided with various options,

such as advanced civil schooling at a civilian institution of their choice, advanced

military schooling at institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School, or schooling abroad

through the Olmstead Scholarship whereby military members study at an overseas

institution. Military officers also receive specialized military education throughout their

careers.

Having attended the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), Special Forces

officers have invaluable unconventional warfare skills. During the year-long (or longer)

SFQC, Special Forces candidates must pass an Unconventional Warfare (UW) exercise

during which they must infiltrate into the fictitious country of Pineland, link up with

unorganized indigenous forces, then train, motivate, organize, and lead the guerrillas in

simulated combat missions. The SFQC culminates in language training that prepares the

Special Forces officer to work with members of other communities in their language.

Special Forces warrant officers are not required to have baccalaureate degrees,

though the Special Forces warrant officer branch manager reports that 117 of the 550

Special Forces warrant officers have a BA, a BS, or a more advanced degree (personal

communication, June 24, 2009). What warrant officers instead offer ethnographic

intelligence collection is advanced technical expertise and experience, and in particular a

thorough understanding of the intelligence community and intelligence cycle gained as a

result of training and experience as a Special Forces intelligence sergeant prior to

commissioning as a warrant officer. This training includes familiarity with ArcGIS,

FalconView, and other geospatial analysis tools; Pathfinder and other data mining tools;

ASOT Level I or Level III; and link analysis via tools such as Analyst’s Notebook and

Crimelink. For Special Forces warrant officer candidates to be considered as EI sensors,

they should have two to ten years of Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) experience

or have operated on a small self-reliant operational team, and be knowledgeable about all

of the administrative requirements and procedures to deploy and operate effectively in

host nations.

48

2. Operational Experience

The vast majority of Special Forces officers have deployed overseas. Most have

deployed to combat zones in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Moreover, many have also

deployed in support of Joint Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) or Counter Narco-

Terrorism (CNT) missions in various countries around the globe. While operating in

combat zones, officers gain experience working with conventional force commanders,

local government leaders, local tribal leaders, and members of the population—analogous

to the relationships an EI sensor would foster with members of local communities. In

these operational deployments, officers are evaluated and rated on their ability to balance

the needs of their chain of command with those of U.S. agency representatives outside

their chain of command, as well as local government and tribal leaders. Additionally,

mission operational success depends on the unit’s ability to connect with the local

military and population, collect information to support their own intelligence cycle, and

process that information into actionable intelligence to support operations. During

peacetime deployments in support of JCET or CNT missions, Special Forces detachments

deploy for one to six months to target countries. The detachments, under the command of

a Special Forces captain, coordinate the mission with the TSOC, U.S. Country Team, and

host nation forces, and coordinate with and provide training to residents around the

training area whenever possible using the local language.

3. Language Capability

As Goodenough (1964) wrote 45 years ago:

It is in the course of learning his language and how to use it that every human being acquires the bulk of his culture. An ethnographer, himself a human being, can hope to acquire another society's culture only by learning and using its language. Thus, as a set of forms, language is not only a part of a culture; as a set of easily manipulated non-iconic signs, it is a major instrument for learning it. (p. 39)

Language reflects the society that speaks it. Even with the best translator, some

meanings may not be passed from speaker to sensor. As the primary goal of the EI sensor

program is to develop and maintain long-term relationships in target countries, continued

49

efforts by ethnographic sensors to improve their language abilities are crucial to success,

and sensors’ efforts to understand the language and culture will be noticed and

appreciated by members of target communities. Given the number of languages used

within some countries, it may not be realistic to expect every ethnographic sensor to

achieve fluency in every language within a given area of operations. But even when an

ethnographic sensor requires the occasional support of an interpreter to collect data

accurately, population members he interacts with will sense his enthusiastic efforts to

engage them in their own language. In countries that have only one predominant

language, the EI sensor’s constant attention to improving his language ability will pay

huge dividends.

Special Forces relies on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) to

estimate the ability of members to learn a language and to determine candidate language

assignments. The Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) is used to measure

language proficiency. Because of the sheer number of languages used throughout the

world, the key language consideration in selecting as an EI sensor should be capability,

not necessarily current proficiency. For instance, a fluent Chinese speaker may never

deploy to China, but the fact that the operator did attain fluency in a second language in

the past demonstrates an affinity for learning a new language and the motivation to do so.

While not definitive, DLAB and DLPT scores represent significant selection criteria

because they suggest a demonstrated capacity to learn a foreign language and the

personal interest and ambition to maintain it.

D. FEASIBILITY

Special Forces Officers make up only 1,218 of the over 40,000 personnel within

USSOCOM (November 11, 2008). However, the unique education, operational

experience, and language ability of Special Forces Officers and warrant officers make

them an ideal pool from which to select candidates to serve as ethnographic sensors.

Personnel training and background requirements for this program favor Special Forces

junior majors and warrant officers who have successfully completed their service on an

Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA). Candidates must understand that the core

50

objective of the program is for officers to form and maintain long-term relationships in

target countries and regions. As such, they will likely receive continuing assignments into

the target country, broken only by rotations back to the Continental United States

(CONUS) for continued education or to work at USSOCOM or TSOC headquarters

(while still maintaining friendships and relationships in-country). Warrant officers should

expect to return regularly to the Special Forces Groups to maintain their awareness of the

tactical units’ operational needs and to share their sociocultural understanding and

country contacts with their affiliated units.

Entry into the program is a long-term commitment, and junior officers must

understand that their selection will almost certainly preclude them from command of a

tactical battalion, as once officers enter this operational field they will serve in it for the

remainder of their careers. This choice is not atypical; some SF officers already choose to

serve in one of the many functional areas such as Operations Research, Foreign Area

Officer, or Space Operations, eschewing the possibility of receiving a tactical battalion

command position. As there are only about 10 active duty SF tactical battalions available

for a population of roughly 100 officers per year group, the chance of being selected to

command an SF tactical battalion is relatively small.9 Because SF officers can choose to

remain in an operational career field and not be forced into a Functional Area, Special

Forces officers must choose to leave the regiment of their own volition. The branch

manager for Special Forces Major s reported that in 2009, nine of the 100 officers in Year

Group 2001 chose to continue their career in a Functional Area, foregoing any

opportunity to continue work within the Special Forces Regiment (personal

communication, May 11, 2009). The Ethnographic Sensor program provides an

opportunity for those Special Forces officers who have completed their ODA time to

remain part of a small operational team on the extreme edge of forward deployment. As

such, this program may allow USSOCOM to keep more of the captains and majors that it

has already invested in while also allowing these officers a path for career progression to

the rank of colonel.

9 There will be 20 active duty tactical SF battalions over the course of the next few years with the

growth of the 4th battalion in each SF group. Of those 20, only 10 are open for command to any given year group of officers.

51

For Special Forces warrant officers, career progression would be enhanced rather

than adversely affected by participation in this program and is, therefore, not detailed in

the career progression plan below. Warrant officers are already able to transition

smoothly between overseas assignments, company, battalion, group, and higher

headquarters. Regular rotations in and out of target countries would only increase the

sharing of sociocultural knowledge between the EI program and the operational groups,

and help ensure EI sensor teams are kept aware of current operational needs.

The Special Forces community is currently capable of filling ethnographic teams

in critical countries using field grade officers and warrant officers (CW3 through CW5),

all of whom have finished 2–10 years of service on an ODA. As of November 2008, the

Special Forces officer community has 125% of its assigned strength ([1,218 officers

assigned and 975 authorized], personal communication, November 18, 2008). The

Special Forces community is very top-heavy with field grade officers. Currently the

community is 220% strength for colonels, 160% strength for lieutenant colonels, and

174% strength for majors (SF Branch Brief, 2009). The growth of a fourth battalion in

each group will result in an even greater excess of field grade officers over the next few

years, as the jobs for captains and majors will not increase in the same proportions. While

warrant officers are not as over-strength as commissioned officers, at the CW3 through

CW5 ranks there are many that could work within the ethnographic sensor community.

There are currently 124 CW3s (115 are authorized) and 85 CW4s (69 authorized). Many

of those excess warrant officers are serving in other combat arms billets or in continuing

education.

While many Special Forces NCOs have the desired skills and experience to serve

as EI sensors, lack of time remaining in their service obligation after completion of

detachment time makes them less than ideal for assignment to an organization focused on

long-term program affiliation. And with the expansion of the groups with a fourth

battalion there will continue to be a shortage of Special Forces NCOs. However, this does

not mean select individuals should not be detailed for ethnographic sensor work, since

52

such service would provide NCOs with greater understanding of ethnographic

intelligence collection methodology, as well as increased familiarity with target

countries.10

E. PROPOSED CAREER PATH

To recap, establishment of an EI sensor program within USSOCOM would

require only small changes to the current career path of Special Forces officers. Ideally,

candidates for this program will be Special Forces officers with roughly 10 years in

service. This would provide a service life for an ethnographic sensor of 10 years or more,

and allow an officer to rotate two to three times into a target country to build and

maintain the long-term relationships that are at the heart of this program. Officers who

choose to stay beyond twenty years in service may continue to serve as ethnographic

sensor team leaders, TSOC desk officers, or program coordinators at USSOCOM. This

will require USSOCOM and USASOC to coordinate with Human Resources Command

to code the positions of ethnographic sensors as Key and Developmental (KD). As

officers in each grade need to serve a minimum of 12 months in a KD position in order to

advance to the next grade, ethnographic sensors would still have the opportunity to

advance in grade, compete for schools, and stay in the military. The timeline in Figure 7

highlights the standard career path of a Special Forces officer in comparison to a

proposed timeline for the ethnographic sensor.

10 NCOs could potentially be ideal for the EI Sensor program if, after 20 years, they could continue

their service as EI Sensors in the National Guard, Army Reserves, or in a Government Service position.

53

Year Standard SF Timeline Boards Ethnographic Sensor Officer

OBC

1.5 ‐ Pin 1LT

2.5 ‐ ARSOF Board3 ‐ Pin CPT / SFAS

MCCC

8.5 ‐ PZ MAJ

9.5 ‐ Pin MAJ

15.5 ‐ PZ LTC16.3 ‐ PZ LTC Command16.5 ‐ Pin LTC

5

Ethnographic Sensor Team Leader

0

1

2

3

4

17

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

19

20

LT Time

SFQC

SFG CPT Time

ILE

SF MAJ Time

Joint Assignment

BN Command

18

Same

Ethnographic Sensor Journeyman

TSOC / USASOC / SOCOM

SFG CPT Time

Language / School

Ethnographic Sensor Apprentice

TSOC / USASOC / SOCOM

Figure 7. Ethnographic Sensor Timeline for Special Forces Officers

54


55

V. TEAM COMPOSITION

The most critical component of the ethnographic sensor program is the individual

sensor. These individuals will form small teams permanently affiliated with various

countries or regions. The TSOC desk officers will determine team size and configuration

as they address the varying requirements of each location. A sensor whose personality

supports effective fieldwork in China may not be as well received in Malaysia, and the

U.S. Embassy in Mali may be more amenable to the program than the embassy in

Thailand. Therefore, team composition and size can be adjusted as necessary by the

TSOC and coordinated through the Country Team to fit its needs without major changes

to the EI sensor team basic design.

The current configuration of the TSOCs and GCCs can fulfill the requirement for

command and control of EI sensor teams. USSOCOM already employs TSOCs to

provide command and control for several worldwide programs, and the manpower

required to manage this additional program would be small, consisting more of

coordination and ensuring that products meet the TSOC’s and GCC’s needs than

requiring supervision of daily activity. USSOCOM does not need to allocate a large

number of sensors at once, but could select from the force small numbers to establish

sensor teams in priority locations, adding new locations as needed. This chapter will

demonstrate that USSOCOM’s current organizational structure can assist with

establishing the teams, and that the headquarters to fulfill command and control functions

already exist.

A. THE TEAMS

A small team provides the best balance between developing long-term

relationships among important communities in target countries and employing minimal

additional force structure in countries sensitive to an American military presence. As

noted by sociologists and anthropologists, it is far easier for a community to socialize an

individual than assimilate a group; a large team prevents the building of close inter-

personal ties required to collect EI effectively. The ideal size for most EI sensor teams

56

will be two to four sensors. Keeping the team size small has several advantages in

addition to those listed above: minimal manpower required to establish the program; no

requirement for support personnel; and minimal workspace requirements (always at a

premium in embassies). As Clausewitz’s notion of friction suggests, the larger an element

is the exponentially greater its resource requirements. The larger any military unit

becomes, the more of its time, energy, and resources are spent supporting its own

existence.

Ethnographic sensor teams can be configured by the TSOCs to meet short and

long-term requirements. Regionally oriented SOF, such as CA, PSYOP, and SF units

could benefit from sending personnel on TDY orders to support EI sensor teams. These

TDY augmentees would assist both their units and the EI sensor team in areas where

there will be upcoming unit missions by helping to prepare their detachments through

developing a thorough intelligence preparation of the environment. These augmentees

would not be expected to form the long-term relationships that this thesis asserts are

necessary to effectively collect EI. Rather, the TDY member would ensure the

ethnographic sensor team is operationally grounded in its work and sensitive to the needs

of the deploying force. Additionally, close contact between the EI sensor team and the

mission unit would ensure that the sociocultural products developed, and the

understanding gained, would be processed and made available to other U.S. Government

agencies and military units to use in the future.

B. THE HEADQUARTERS

The primary function would be to prepare new candidates (and families) for their

PCS overseas, and to provide support for program participants. The Department of

Defense maintains command and control of its forces through GCCs. Within each of the

regions a TSOC coordinates SOF elements. The TSOCs within each combatant command

would serve as the Command and Control element for the ethnographic sensor teams.

The ethnographic teams would report to and be managed by the TSOCs. The main

purposes of coordination at this level would be ensure the EI sensor teams support the

mission of the GCC and to convey information from the teams to the command.

57

Currently, the International Engagement Division of the Strategic Engagement Group of

USSOCOM is fielding three programs to expand access in other countries: Special

Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO), Senior SOF Representatives (SSR), and Force

Development Teams (FDT). Each of these elements works overseas with the U.S.

Country Team under the operational control of the TSOC. The EI sensor program could

follow the same model.

SECDEF

PACOM

SOCPAC

EI Detachment

SOUTHCOM EUCOM AFRICOM CENTCOM

US Country Team

SOCOM

Figure 8. Proposed Task Organization

At USSOCOM, an EI office could easily fall under the Strategic Engagement

Branch, already home to the three previously mentioned programs. The main function of

this bureaucracy would be to support the training of all ethnographic sensors and to

provide resources as required.

Figure 9. Ethnographic Intelligence Office Division

58

C. DISSEMINATION OF ETHNOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE The primary objective of the EI sensor is to develop and maintain long-term trust-

based relationships among target populations throughout the world to improve

sociocultural understanding in support of GCC and Country Team objectives. While

those relationships are the most valuable end product of the program, sensors will gain

access to communities and share sociocultural understanding through the development of

written products, the Sociocultural Report and Sociocultural Log. Because SFA and HA

funds will be spent more effectively with greater understanding of the communities to be

assisted, ethnographic sensors will have a purpose acceptable to the host nation

government, thus enabling them to travel throughout the country interacting with its

citizens, and population members will have a vested reason to respond to EI sensor

requests to share personal information with foreigners. These products would not merely

serve as an excuse to interact with the population; they are the vehicles that would enable

the ethnographic sensor to transfer his understanding about target communities to

commanders and policy officials who plan operations and policies for that country.

As Stanford University anthropologist Charles Frake (1964b) asserts, “the model

... is not: ‘if a person is confronted with stimulus X, he will do Y,’ but: if a person is in

situation X, performance Y will be judged appropriate by native actors” (p. 133). The

Sociocultural Report may be used by DoS and DoD officials to enhance their

understanding of the society that operations and policies will affect. The Sociocultural

Log, meanwhile, can be used to forecast how communities will react to planned policies

and operations by considering how those communities responded to similar events in the

past. Both products can be used by analysts and experts throughout the U.S. intelligence

community to further develop understanding of the target communities and provide their

recommendations and analyses back to the sensors to enhance future study in support of

peacetime operations or major theater war. Finally, relationships among target

communities and the sociocultural products developed about them can be leveraged by

the EI sensor to assist Country Team and USAID officials in tailoring humanitarian

assistance and stabilization and reconstruction funds in support of U.S. interests, and in

turn can further increase access to the population and incentivize locals to want to engage

with the EI sensors.

59

1. The Sociocultural Report and Sociocultural Log

A number of disciplines use “ethnography” and the “ethnographic method” to

describe the study of social or cultural communities, and define both terms to best fit their

particular science. This has resulted in many different uses of the term ethnography, some

almost contradictory. Because these definitions are used primarily for academic and

theoretical purposes, and to avoid misunderstanding, we have coined the terms

Sociocultural Report and Sociocultural Log to describe products that describe a culture

collected on by USSOCOM ethnographic sensors for use by SOF and other government

agencies. Frake’s (1964) description perhaps best fits what EI sensors will endeavor to

produce. Substituting in our terms—Sociocultural Report and Sociocultural Log—results

in the following definition:

[A Sociocultural Report] is produced from . . . [A Sociocultural Log] of the events of a society within a given period of time . . . To describe a culture . . . is not to recount the events of a society but to specify what one must know to make those events maximally probable. The problem is not to state what someone did but to specify the conditions under which it is culturally appropriate to anticipate that he, or persons occupying his role, will render an equivalent performance. This conception of a cultural description . . . should be a theory of cultural behavior in a particular society. (p. 111)

The base written products EI sensors will develop about significant communities

are Sociocultural Reports and Sociocultural Logs. The Sociocultural Report collates,

analyzes, summarizes, and offers a general forecast based on the accompanying

Sociocultural Log. More than offering a mere timeline or history, the Sociocultural Log

provides details of events within a community and the community’s consensus and

subjective reactions to those events, thereby permitting identification of patterns and

cultural norms, which should allow the ethnographer to forecast how the community

might react to similar events in the future. While very important in their own right, these

products are also the vehicles by which the EI sensors will both analyze target

communities and develop relationships throughout the population in an altruistic and

non-confrontational manner. In unstable and impoverished areas, it is rare for members of

60

any disenfranchised community to be entirely unwilling to discuss their needs and

grievances with those they hope might provide or secure assistance.

2. Availability of Ethnographic Intelligence Products

During his analysis of the U.S. intelligence community, Johnson (2005) found

that as the classification of information increases from Unclassified to compartmented

Top Secret, the efficacy of the information decreases in rough proportion simply because

the end users of information no longer have access to it. This relationship is shown in

Figure 10.

Figure 10. Secrecy vs. Efficacy of Information (From Johnson, 2005, p. 12)

Ideally, EI products, developed from interviews and regular social contact with

willing participants, using unclassified methods, would be posted and maintained on a

portal accessible on the NIPR net, and available to any official U.S. Government user.

Official Web sites such as OpenSource.gov provide an unclassified venue to distribute

information while ensuring that only U.S. Government officials with accounts can access

the information. Because EI data will remain unclassified and accessible to any

government agencies, analysts within the intelligence community will be able to use the

source data to conduct more advanced levels of analysis than that conducted by the

sensors themselves. Additionally, because of the embedded and long-term nature of EI

sensor engagement, analysts in agencies that conduct cultural analysis but do not deploy

61

sensors (such as the DoS Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Psychological

Operations’ strategic studies detachments) who seek to support their own cultural

analysis through regular and easy access to the products developed by EI sensor teams

may want to contact EI sensors directly with their suggestions and analysis. As the depth

and breadth of sociocultural reports increase, analysts from intelligence entities that do

not currently focus on sociocultural information may begin to see the value of

supplementing conventional intelligence products through developing their own

sociocultural conceptual framework.

The U.S. intelligence community does not lack trained analysts. Instead, it lacks

‘eyes and ears’ on the ground coupled to a sensor who possesses the right kind of

sociocultural framework through which to interpret and report data. Once posted to the

portal, ethnographies can be commented on in a thread format both by analysts and by

other government users who have knowledge of the area. Users of ethnographic

intelligence will then have access to the base product, threads of analysis, and

commentary from other users, as well as contact information on which to base their

policies or plans.

62


63

VI. CONCLUSION - THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB

With Ethnographic Intelligence decision makers, policy officials, and

commanders will have the sociocultural context necessary to better understand how

populations will react to both enemy and U.S. actions. Decision makers will have access

to detailed reports about how communities have responded to events and policies in the

past, as well as about cultural factors that may influence how planned efforts will be

received by target populations so that they may develop policies and inter-state

relationships that better promote U.S. interests. Country team officials will gain greater

knowledge a fuller range of the population so as to more appropriately design policy and

focus U.S. efforts. Military forces responding to regional emergencies or conducting

security assistance operations will be able to access more accurate information about their

operational environment and more detailed information on key citizens and the important

non-state relationships that always affect mission success. Most importantly, via EI

sensors USSOCOM will establish and grow long-term relationships that will provide

ever-increasing access to—and understanding of—communities throughout the world.

In the same way a linguist studies, records, and translates a foreign language so

that others can learn to understand and make themselves understood in that language, the

EI sensor must record and make sense of the social relationships of a community so that

others can learn to understand the actions of and act appropriately within the culture

studied. Even more important than the Sociocultural Reports and Sociocultural Logs

produced are the long-term relationships developed and maintained over the course of the

EI sensors’ careers. Through EI sensors, USSOCOM would be able to nurture

relationships and establish trust in the same way relationships and trust are generated

throughout the non-western world: "never by money, always by time.” The social capital

developed by EI sensors could then be leveraged in support of U.S. interests well into the

future, maintained on a personal level through JCETs and other training deployments,

short SME visits, follow-on EI rotations, and extensive personal communication.

64

USSOCOM is ideally suited to quickly and effectively establish an increased

capacity to develop EI in order to more effectively support U.S. interests worldwide

without this requiring major changes to current manning, budget, or force levels.

Arguably, USSOCOM also has the most to gain from managing these assets, though all

U.S. Government agencies with operations outside the U.S. will benefit from EI products.

While, as this thesis has argued, USASFC is the logical choice to provide the

forces to establish the ethnographic sensor community, as the program grows and

develops it would benefit by recruiting from across the Department of Defense. Once the

program is established with experienced operators, new candidates need not meet all of

the selection requirements of the initial manning because the existing team members

would be able to provide more EI sensor-specific training on the ground. Accepting

officers from other branches would then expand the skills resident on EI sensor teams,

and bring new research and analysis techniques into the program. Further analysis of

career paths for other possible candidates drawn from the Navy SEALS, the AFSOC, the

MARSOC, CA, PSYOPs, and MI communities could lead to further expansion of the

pool once the program is established. Simons and Tucker (2004) proposed that a new

corps of officers with its own personnel system be created to support an ethnographic

intelligence capability. As the value of sociocultural understanding becomes evident, Dr.

Simons and Dr. Tucker’s proposal may be the natural progression for this program.

65

LIST OF REFERENCES

Barton, F. and Unger, N. (2009. Civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity. (Workshop Report). Washington DC: Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Central Intelligence Agency (2009). Retrieved June 29, 2009, from Central Intelligence

Agency Web site: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values/index. html

Cleveland, H., Mangone, G. J., and Adams, J. C. (1960). The overseas Americans. New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc. Connable, B. (2009). All our eggs in a broken basket: How the Human Terrain System is

undermining sustainable military cultural competence. Military Review. April 2009. 57–64.

Department of State. (2008). International religious freedom report 2008. Washington

DC: Author. Department of State. (2009). Retrieved June 28, 2009, from Department of State Web

site: http://www.state.gov/s/inr/ Department of the Army. (1998). FM 34-8-2 Intelligence officer’s handbook.

Washington, DC: Author. Department of the Army. (2000). FM 3-05.30 Psychological operations. Washington,

DC: Author. Department of the Army. (2001). FM 3-05.20 Special Forces operations. Washington,

DC: Author. ESRI Data & Maps. (2002). Redlands, CA: Environmental Systems Research Institute. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1967). Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Oxford:

Clarendon Press. Frake, C. O. (1964a). A structural description of Subanun “religious behavior.” In W.

Goodenough (Ed.) Explorations in cultural anthropology in honor of George Peter Murdock. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Frake, C. O. (1964b). Notes on queries in ethnography. American Anthropologist, 66(3),

132–145. Retrieved May 13, 2009 from JSTOR database.

66

Failed States Index (2009). Retrieved August 1, 2009, from Fund for Peace Web site: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

Glass, J. E. (2005). Visceral verstehen. Electronic Journal of Sociology. ISSN: 1198

3655. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from http://www.sociology.org/content/2005/ tier3/__Visceral%20Verstehen.pdf

Goodenough, W. H. (1963). Cooperation in change: An anthropological approach to

community development. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Goodenough, W. H. (1964). Cultural anthropology and linguistics. In D. Hymes (Ed.)

Language in culture and society: A reader in linguistics and anthropology (pp. 36–39). New York: Harper and Row.

Gutelius, D. (2006). War on terror and social networks in Mali. ISIM Review (17).

Retrieved August 18, 2009, from http://www.isim.nl/ Holohan, A. (2005). Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan,

Iraq, and beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2007). Tsunami two-

year progress report: Myanmar. Retrieved August 16, 2009, from http:// www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/04/2804mynpr.pdf

Jackson, M. (1996). Things as they are: New directions in phenomenological

anthropology. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Jackson, M. (1998). Minima ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the anthropological

project. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Johnson, R. (2005). Analytic culture in the U.S. intelligence community an ethnographic

study. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence. Kaplan, R. (2005). Imperial grunts: The American military on the ground. New York:

Random House. Katzenbach, J. and Smith D. (1993). The wisdom of teams. Boston: Harvard Business

School Press. Kusiac, P. (2008). Sociocultural expertise and the military: Beyond the controversy.

Military Review, November–December 2008, 65–76. Lamb, D. and Lamb, C. (2007). United States Special Operations Forces. New York:

Columbia University Press.

67

Learned, J.G. (2004). The star and crescent in northern Thailand. North by Northwest Newsletter April 2004. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://www.north-by-north-east.com/articles/06_04_2.asp

Lewis, M. Paul (ed.), 2009. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Sixteenth edition. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International. Online version: http://www.ethnologue.com/ Lintner, B. (2004, November 4). Society tribal loyalties. Asia Pacific Media Services.

Retrieved August 5, 2008, from Asia Pacific Media Services Ltd.: http://www.asiapacificms.com

Liulan, W. (2006, December 3). Hui Yunnanese migratory history in relation to the Han

Yunnanese and ethnic resurgence in northern Thailand. Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, 337–358. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from Center for Southeastern Asian Studies Kyoto University: http://www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Liulan, W. (2004, March 1). Yunnanese Muslims along the northern Thai border. Kyoto

Review of Southwest Asia, 4, 356–370. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from Kyoto Review: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Montlake, S. (2008, January 8). As drug trafficking revives, Thais back another harsh

crackdown. [Electronic version] The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved August 13, 2009, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0109/p06s01-woap.html

Marine Corps Base Quantico. (2009). Retrieved June 28, 2009, from Marine Corps Base

Quantico Web page: http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA Moseley, W. G. (2009). Stop the blanket militarization of humanitarian aid. Foreign

Policy. Retrieved August 19, 2009, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2009/07/31/stop_the_blanket_militarization_of_humanitarian_aid

Murdock, G. P., Ford, C. S., Hudson ,A. E., Kennedy, R., Simmons, L. W. Whiting, J. W.

M. (1971). Outline of cultural materials. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files Inc.

Olsen, E. T. (2009). Posture of Special Operations Forces. Retrieved August 22, 2009,

from http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2008.pdf Rush, J. (2005). Myanmar: Many still rely on tsunami relief supplies from 6 months ago.

UNICEF Tsunami Disaster – Countries in Crisis. Retrieved August 13, 2009, from http://www.unicef.org/emerg/disasterinasia/index_27395.html

Sanday, P. R. (1979). The ethnographic paradigm(s). Administrative Science Quarterly,

24(4), 527–538. Retrieved November 7, 2008 from JSTOR database.

68

Seligman, A. (1997). The problem of trust. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Simons, A. and Tucker, D. (2004). Improving human intelligence in the war on

terrorism: The need for ethnographic capability, Unpublished manuscript. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Special Forces Intelligence Sergeants Course. (2003). Training schedule 18F (01-03

Change 1). Fort Bragg, NC: Author. Transparency International (2006). Corruption in humanitarian aid. (3). Berlin:

Transparency International Secretariat’s Policy and Research Department. Wolcott, H. F. (1995). The art of fieldwork. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press. Wolcott, H. F. (1999). Ethnography: A way of seeing. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

69

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, VA

2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA

3. JSOU Hurlburt Fld, FL

4. ASD/SOLIC Washington, DC

5. USSOCOM J-7 MacDill AFB, FL

6. HQ USSOCOM Library MacDill AFB, FL

7. SOCOM IATF

MacDill AFB, FL

Documents

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection · I. INTRODUCTION ... PIR Priority Information Requirements PSYOP Psychological Operations SF Special Forces ... recruitment, communication,