Theory of value and theory of ethics

208

THEORY OF VALUE AND THEORY OF ETHICS

DOROTHY WALSH

Is there such a topic as general theory of value? If there is, what is its re- lation to theory of ethics? It is difficult to debate these questions, chiefly for the reason that we are bedeviled by linguistic ambiguity - particularly in the use of the word "value" and the expression "value judgment."

To initial inspection it would seem that, if there is such a topic as general theory of value, this must deal with value in some generic sense, and, there- fore, yield suggestion about value in some specific sense, such as moral value or aesthetic value. However, it can be shown that the general theories of value with which we are familiar provide no suggestion whatever of this sort. These theories do, indeed, provide for what may be called "classification of value," but this classification is not about "kinds of value" in the sense in which it would be appropriate to speak of moral value as a kind of value.

But if this can be shown, what conclusion follows? Should we give up the notion that it makes intelligible sense to talk about "kinds of value," and settle instead for talking about "kinds of things that are valuable?" Or, to the contrary, should we give up the entire enterprise of general theory of value and concentrate our attention on inquiry in particular value disciplines such as ethics, aesthetics, logic, methodology, and so on? The answer is not easy.

It seems entirely natural to most people to speak of a moral judgment as a value judgment. They usually mean by this that a moral judgment is a kind of value judgment, and this way of talking clearly suggests that there are kinds of value judgment concerned with kinds of value. A linguistic recommendation of the form, "Please give up the habit of speaking of a moral judgment as a value judgment" may meet with the question: "Well, if a moral judgment isn't a value judgment, what is it?" Supposing we reply to this: "A moral judgment is a normative judgment of appraisal about moral rightness, or moral goodness, or moral virtue." This may be met by the puzzled query: "But doesn't 'to appraise' mean 'to evaluate,' and, if so, isn't a judgment of appraisal a judgment of evaluation and thus a value judgment?"

We could, indeed, avoid the need to question the notion of "kinds of value" and "kinds of value judgment" if we simply abandoned the whole enterprise of general theory of value. But I think it would be a mistake to do this. The fact that, in recent years, we have not encountered much debate on general theory of value may suggest that philosophers have, in fact, abandoned this inquiry. But though debate may have been abandoned, assumption has not been abandoned. It would be injudicious to overlook the fact that there is a certain general theory of value that is widely enter-

Discussion 209

tained. This is the interest theory of value, the view that value is enstated by interest, that is, by pro and con attitude. This theory has much to recommend it, the trouble is that those who accept it seem to be intent on trying to extract from it what is not there to be extracted. I think it is of some importance to see why this is so.

In the course of this paper I shall undertake to argue in support of the following claims.

1. Neither the interest theory of value nor its rival, the theory of intrinsic value, can provide for the notion of "kinds of value" in the sense in which we may wish to speak of moral value as "a kind of value." This being so, it is not appropriate to expect that either theory can serve as prolegomena to ethics.

2. Abandoning this expectation, we can still consider the respective merits of these theories, and we can find good reasons for preferring the interest theory of value.

3. I f we carefully sort out the meanings of "good" ("bad," "better," "worse") that can be provided for by the interest theory of value, we shall see that there is an important meaning of "good" ("bad," "better," "worse") that this theory does not, cannot, and should not attempt to deal with.

4. If the meaning of "good" that the interest theory cannot deal with, could be marked out in some way, possibly by means of some explicit linguistic recommendation, we could accept the interest theory of value without allowing it to distract us from inquiry into the kind of goodness and badness with which this theory has, quite simply, nothing to do.

If someone suggests that there really is no such topic as general theory of value we might reply: "But of course there is such a topic as general theory of value. We are familiar with the two competing theories in this field, namely, the theory of intrinsic value, on the one hand, and the interest theory of value, on the other. According to the first, certain things can be intrinsically valuable regardless of what anyone thinks or feels on the matter; according to the second, value is a relational characteristic, and value is enstated by interest, by pro and con attitude. Surely these views are different and it makes a difference which view you hold." Well, they are and it does. To be sure, neither theory undertakes to tell us what things are valuable, but it would not be sensible to complain of this. The intent of the theories is to explain what it means to say that something is valuable. However, if we ask: Does either theory tell us what it means to ascribe a certain kind of value to something, what it means to say that something has moral or aesthetic value? the answer must be no. Neither theory provides for "kinds of value" in that sense. It is of some importance to see why this is so.

Both theories admit of what may be called classification of value. Let us consider what this amounts to. According to the theory of intrinsic value, we have first of all the distinction between value and disvalue or, if you prefer, good and bad. Under each of these we have instrumental value and disvalue (good and bad) and intrinsic value and disvalue (intrinsic goodness

210 The Journal of Value Inquiry

and intrinsic badness). According to the interest theory of value, we have again the distinction between value and disvalue, or good and bad, and again under each of these the provision for instrumental value and disvalue, but we replace intrinsic value with what has been called terminal value. This difference between intrinsic value and terminal value might be expressed in more ordinary and familiar language by saying that "intrinsically valuable' means good in itself regardless of any reference to any valuer, and "terminally valuable" means good for itself to some valuer.

What is important to notice is that neither of these general theories of value allows for the recognition of "kinds of value" in the sense of species of value. There cannot be kinds of value, there can only be kinds of things that are valuable instrumentally and intrinsically or terminally. Since neither theory, just as such, lays down any specification as to what is valuable, any statement to the effect that a thing is of a certain sort leaves open the question of whether it is valuable. For example, x is a case of pleasure, or happiness, or justice, leaves open the question: Is pleasure or happiness or justice valuable? So far this seems quite tolerable. However, we have to go further. x is a case of moral rightness, moral virtue, moral goodness, still leaves open the question of whether x is valuable. Now since the expression "x is valuable" can be translated into "x is good," we may begin to feel uneasy about the open question. Is moral rightness, moral virtue, moral goodness good? We may be tempted to reply: "But of course. The assertion that something is morally right or morally good is a judgment of appraisal and surely a judgment of appraisal is a value judgment. How could it be otherwise?" This is what I mean about linguistic difficulty.

Now, as we know, many modern philosophers regard symptoms of linguistic difficulty as the sure sign of some sort of conceptual confusion. Any assumption that leads one into queer ways of talking must be wrong. If, then, the assumption that there is such a topic as general theory of value requires one to say that a moral judgment is not a value judgment or a judgment about value, this is all the evidence we need to inform us that the enterprise of general theory of value was a mistake and should be abandoned. Let us turn to the cultivation of our particular gardens such as ethics, aesthetics, logic, jurisprudence.

Well, this is certainly one line to take, and it rather looks as if many philosophers have taken it, since, though the preoccupation with ethics is as keen as ever, we don't now hear much debate on the topic of general theory of value. It is probably the case that the interest in general theory of value was animated by the expectation that it would yield some important consequences for ethical theory. For example, the interest theory of value offered the promise of empirical verification for value judgments and, on the basis of the assumption not recognized as unwarranted that a moral judgment was a species of value judgment, there seemed to be the promise of empirical verification for moral judgments. However, C. I. Lewis's An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation ended with the remark: "Valuation is always a matter of empirical knowledge. But what is right and what is just,

Discussion 211

can never be determined by empirical facts alone." Lewis is, indeed, quite correct. From the interest theory of value there is no direct logical passage to any moral or ethical conclusion.

The situation is the same with regard to the theory of intrinsic value considered as a general theory of value, but the fact that this is so has not been as clearly recognized and needs to be brought out. Perhaps the best known advocate of the theory of intrinsic value (intrinsic goodness) is G. E. Moore. Initially it will seem odd indeed to say that from Moore's theory of intrinsic value there is no direct logical passage to any moral or ethical view. This will seem odd for the reason that Moore called his theory of intrinsic goodness ethics. But let us not be too influenced by this act of christening, let us ask: What is it that Moore is assuming? Moore is assuming that there is one and only one field of value inquiry and this is ethics. Aesthetics, for example, is included in ethics. Indeed any question about goodness or badness is, finally, a moral question. Now perhaps it is the case that the word "moral" is not so precise in meaning that this assumption can be ruled out at once as absurd. Still, there is something rather queer about it.

Anyone inclined to hold the view that ethics is concerned with what might be called "the uniquely and distinctively moral" will not recognize "good," "right," "ought" as moral terms or moral predicates unless qualified as "morally good," "morally right," "moral obligation." The view that ethics is, in some sense, an autonomous inquiry is the view that unique and distinctive moral predicates are not capable of being completely analyzed or defined in terms of non-moral predicates. This is the view that the moral is sui generis; it must be understood as such, and cannot be explained by reference to anything not itself. There is here also the assumption that man is a moral being, in the sense in which "moral" can be contrasted with "amoral" or "non-moral." Moral disagreement is intelligible only on the basis of the assumption of a common understanding of "the kind of thing involved." We are familiar with similar claims concerning the aesthetic and the logical.

Now from this point of view, Moore's ethical theory must be regarded as a case of reductionism, since every term that might be considered a unique and distinctive moral predicate is definable by reference to intrinsic goodness and there is no reason to suppose that intrinsic goodness, if there be such a thing, is in any way distinctively moral. It is interesting, in this connection, to consider what Moore has to say on the matter of duty. It is your moral duty to choose that act, of the acts available to you, which will produce the greatest amount of intrinsic goodness, but since it is altogether unlikely that you have any chance of knowing what your duty is, there is very little point in bothering about it. Yet this absence of what one might think of as a distinctively moral concern, is after all understandable if Moore is intent on advocating a general theory of value to which he inappropriately gives the name of ethics. In short, to paraphrase the remark of C. I. Lewis, "Valuation is always a matter of intuitive insight. But what is right and what is just, can never be determined by this intuitive insight alone."


Let us now take stock of where we are. If I am correct in my argument that from general theory of value, either the theory of intrinsic value or the interest theory of value, there is no logical passage to any ethical doctrine, is this a sufficient reason for abandoning the inquiry? Well, certainly, this would be a sufficient reason if the whole point of the inquiry was to serve as prolegomena to ethics. However, there is another possibility. Supposing we say: "Well, all right, it was a mistake to suppose that general theory of value could be identical with ethics, or that from either of these theories of value some ethical theory could be inferred, yet, after all, putting aside these mistaken assumptions, we can still consider the competing claims of these theories of value." It seems to me that we can so consider them, and that it might be worth while to do so. However, in attempting this, we must give careful consideration to linguistic meaning.

A theory of value is about value and disvalue, and this must be interpreted to mean that it is about good and bad. Our first question must be: Exactly what meanings of "good" and "bad" are provided by these theories? Let us begin with the interest theory of value. This theory provides, in the first place, a meaning of "good" and "bad" in the familiar sense of good for and bad for, otherwise expressed, good as a means and bad as a means. Though the essential claim here is a claim about causal efficacy, it must be acknow- ledged that the use of "good for" rather than the more neutral "productive of" presupposes some sort of endorsement concerning the end in view. If such a statement as "Rain will be good for the crops" passes without comment, this is not simply because we are agreed about the utility of rain for the growth of vegetation, but also because we take it for granted that the growth of crops is a good thing or desirable. Such a statement as "Arsenic will be good for the poisoning of babies" will not be likely to pass without comment, or at least raised eyebrows, even though we are not in any doubt that arsenic in sufficient quantities will produce the specified effect.

Does the interest theory of value provide additional meanings of "good" and "bad"? Yes, it does. This is "good" and "bad" in the familiar sense of good to and bad to (some person), that is, good and bad for itself to some person. These meanings of "good" and "bad" are in common use. No one is at a loss to understand such a remark as: "It 's good to him, that's how he feels about it."

Summing up, we can say that although the interest theory of value does not provide for a// meanings o f "good" and "bad," the meanings it provides for are perfectly intelligible. We can go further. When a sociologist or cultural historian refers to the values of a class or group, or the dominant values of a culture or an historical period, we take him to be referring to "the things valued." For example, among the elite group of the feudal aristocracy military prowess and noble blood were matters of high value. Social change in the form of change of values (change with respect to things valued) can be traced out, and inquiry into these matters is likely to be of interest to all of us. However, this is the point at which we are likely to hear the remark: "That 's all very well, there is no doubt a meaning of 'good" in the sense of

Discussion 213

good to some person or persons, and a meaning of 'value' in the sense of something valued, but no amount of empirical information, no matter how well attested, will tell us whether what is good, in the sense of good to some person or persons, is really good." In some sense this is so, but we shall need to consider carefully what meaning we can ascribe to the expression "really good."

In addition to good in the sense of good for and in the sense of good to, there is good in the sense of good as (some particular sort of thing). For example, good as a logical argument, good as a work of art, good as a moral trait of character or as a moral act. Judgments concerning such matters are often called normative judgments of appraisal. It is characteristic of such judgments that they are made from "a point of view," for example, a logical point of view, a moral point of view. This is understandable if we recognize that normative judgments of appraisal are concerned with good and bad, better or worse, in the sense of good as, bad as, better or worse as some particular sort of thing.

Now, as we have seen, the interest theory of value does not provide for good in the sense of good as. The only meanings of "good" that are dealt with in this theory are good for some end, and good to some person. (The theory does, of course, accommodate the exclamatory "good!" when used to evince the good to state of affairs.) But to say that the interest theory of value does not provide for good in the sense of good as is not to say that it denies it, but merely that it omits it. Accordingly, the acceptance of the interest theory of value in no way debars us from pursuit of inquiry into matters relating to normative judgments concerned with good in the sense of good as. Indeed it might be said that the interest theory of value associates very well with such inquiry. Normative judgments of appraisal are not always easily arrived at. They may require funded knowledge or experience of the kind of thing involved, careful reflection, consideration of supporting reasons, and so on. It is thus natural to suppose that no one will be willing to undertake the effort involved unless this effort is sustained by interest. Otherwise expressed, it will be natural to assume the presence of a pro attitude towards the state-of-affairs of X being good as a case of some particular sort of thing. In short, we can appeal to the interest theory of value to explain motivation for normative inquiry without supposing, for one moment, that it will tell us anything at all on the issue of correctness in such inquiry.

However, the interest theory of value has its rival in the theory of intrinsic value, and we must now consider what can be said about this. According to the theory of intrinsic value certain things, organic wholes or states-of-affairs can be discerned to be intrinsically good or bad or better or worse. The discernment is said to be a matter of intuitive insight. Now to entertain sceptical doubts about this, it is by no means necessary to deny the possibility of any form of intuition. Since we recognize logical or rational intuition, we may find no insurmountable difficulty in the further recognition of moral or aesthetic intuition. In all such cases we understand the kind of thing involved


and we appraise what is suitable or fitting from some particular point of view. The difficulty, or so it seems to me, of the doctrine of intrinsic goodness is that it calls for an intuition of goodness that is not any kind of goodness. If we consider the assertion, "x is good," surely it is sensible to ask: "Good in what way? Is it good for some end or purpose? Is it good to some person or persons? Is it good as some distinctive kind of thing?" Good for, good to, and good as, we can understand, but what about goodness that is not any of these but just simply and solely goodness? Moore's celebrated open- question argument is supposed to convince us of the necessity of recognizing intrinsic goodness as the only means of closing the question, but I find my- self unconvinced by this argument. Supposing we say that x is good as a case of moral rightness or moral goodness. The open question then is: Is moral rightness or moral goodness good? The only answer to this, I believe, is that it is good to those who take an interest in morality, those who have a moral concern. To be sure, one can keep on asking: But is the taking of such an interest or the having of such a concern good? But the mere fact that one can keep on asking a question does not mean that it is sensible to do so.

Moreover, the notion of good, in the sense of good as some particular sort of thing, is manageable in a way that intrinsic goodness is not. Though normative judgments of appraisal are never so beyond controversy as to be immune to the request for reconsideration, such reconsideration can involve a reexamination of the grounds for the appraisal. Even though it be the case that the appraisal is a venture beyond the grounds, yet there are grounds and we can consider them. Then too we can intelligibly debate the issue of whether something that might be a relevant ground for one kind of appraisal is or is not relevant to the particular appraisal in hand. But in the case of intrinsic goodness, which is not any particular kind of goodness (not a case of good as) we cannot speak of grounds or reasons. All we can do is renew our inspection in the hope of discerning again this indwelling quality or characteristic. In the light of these considerations, it seems to me that the interest theory of value is to be preferred to the theory of intrinsic value.

However, it cannot be too much emphasized that, in accepting the interest theory of value, we must carefully refrain from trying to extract from this theory what is not there to be extracted, namely, any suggestion about good in the sense of good as. This theory provides only for good in the sense of good for and good to. Now questions about what is good for some end, and about what is good to some person or persons, are empirical questions. But questions about what is good as some particular sort of thing, though as- sociated with empirical considerations, are not straightforward empirical questions. We need to distinguish these questions and we shall not do this so long as we call them both "judgments of value." There is a need for some linguistic recommendation to mark the distinction.

It would be correct, but also awkward and inelegant, to make the needed linguistic distinction by talking about "judgments concerning good for and good to" in contrast to "judgments concerning good as." Perhaps we could make the distinction as "judgments about value" in contrast to "normative

Discussion 215

judgments of appraisal," or "non-normative judgments of value" contrasted with "normative judgments of value." However we phrase the linguistic recommendation that would make the distinction, let us make the distinction. This is what is important.

For some time now we have been distracted from pursuing inquiry concerning judgments of moral appraisal by the clamor of "non-cognitivists" who wish to insist on the occurrence of pro and con attitudes, and on the desire of those who have them to evince them and to evoke them in others. The advantage of a decisive recognition of the cogency and soundness of the interest theory of value is that we thus provide for all of this. Having so provided, we will be free to turn our attention to the consideration of the kind of goodness and badness that the interest theory of value does not, cannot, and also need not, deal with.

Smith College

Documents

Theory of value and theory of ethics