Theory of Federalism

© Kamla-Raj 2003 Anthropologist, 5 (3): 169-178 (2003)

INTRODUCTION

The state as a political organism is erected onthe bedrock of efficacious structural politicalorganisation. Thus, structural political organi-sation is one of the indispensable determinantsof administrative efficiency of any given state.And, all over the world, there exists various typesof this structural political arrangement though,with varying degrees of relevance and utility.

One of such organisations which has witheredthe test of time in most democratic Polities ofthe world is federalism. It is a common thing tonow accord federalism the characteristics ofpolity building hence, Schmitt (1997:19) onceopined that “ the benefits of statehood-liberty andautonomy-are gained through... federal (political)arrangement. Thus reincarnating Laski’s (1948)position that “ liberty in a state cannot be pres-erved without a measure of federalism” embe-dded in its political process.

The political utility of federalism as a polity-building mechanism and an enhancer of people’sliberty is deep-seatedly rooted in history. Sinceits adoption as a political organisation, it has cont-inued to gain vitality by ways of practical utili-zation in different countries all over the world.This trend has been articulated by Schmit(Ibid:20) thus:

Federal political arrangement reached theirapotheosis in the form of three first modernfederations such as the United states underits 1787 constitution, Switzerland under its1848 (and then 1874) constitution andCanada under its 1867 constitution.Indeed, during the modern epoch it wasonly federation which offered a model ofstatehood able to serve as an alternative tothe reified state.On the same token, Ajayi (1997:149)

synoptically reincarnated the earlier docum-entation of this trend by Eleazar (1973). Acco-rding to this trend, federalism was practicallyoperated in seventeen countries in 1971 while

The Theory and Practice of Federalism as a StructuralMechanism of Governance: How Adequate for Gender Struggle

and Representation in Nigeria?S.T. Akindele and O. R. Olaopa

eighteen other countries adopted federal princi-ples to augment the decentralization of their sys-tem of government.

In his own appraisal and empirical documen-tation of this trend, Schmit (op.cit:24), claimedthat, “nearly 40 percent of the world’s populationcurrently lives within political systems which areformally federal”. To him, federalism is “ amongthe most widespread of the various revolutionswhich are changing the face of the globe” (ibid)

The reasons for this widespread embracementof federalism as a form of political arrangementhave been advanced with varying degrees ofspecificity. The underlying assumption of feder-alism which provide opportunity for mutualunderstanding of the terms of cohabitation by thefederating units (Wendler, 1997:iv) has beenimplicitly identified as one of the catalysingfactors of the spread of the federal idea. Thisspread has equally been tied to the fact that:

federalism has emerged as a means ofaccommodating the growing desire ofpeople to preserve or revive the intimacyof small societies, and the growing nece-ssity for larger combinations to mobilisethe utilization of common resource better(Schmitt op.cit: 24).The popular acceptance and spread of this

political arrangement in our view, innocuouslynecessitate its theoretical and practical analyses.The principal aim of this paper is to analyticallyconsider federalism in the theoretical andpractical perspectives with a view to determineits adequacy or otherwise for today’s politicalrealities, particularly in Nigeria.

In pursuing this goal, this paper is divided intofive parts. The introduction is the first, while thesecond part synoptically considers the conceptof federalism particularly in line with its defini-tional pluralism. Against this background, thethird part reviews the concept from the theoreticalperspectives of scholars who have written manytomes on the concept and, who, by doing so, and,without prejudice to the various contestations on

170 S.T. AKINDELE AND O. R. OLAOPA

the subject-matter in question, have eloquentlythrough argumentative premise provided thebasic characteristics common to all federalism.The fourth part looks at the adequacy or other-wise of the theoretical perspectives on federalismin view of the contemporary realities or comple-xities of today’s political systems across the globegiving relevance to the gender dimension of poli-tical existence of the citizens. The fifth and finalpart concludes the paper.

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM

Federalism as a concept of governance con-notes a political system or arrangement erectedon two ( or more) levels of government. And,these levels deal with common and territoriallydiverse issues and policies (Aklindele et al.,1998; Akindele, 1987; Nwabuzor and Muller,1985; Awa, 1973; Akindele and Olaopa, 1997,1998). However, the pattern of relationshipamong these levels of government as does theiractions or inactions are rarely stable over a periodof time. In other words, federalism is “highlydynamic and the equilibrium of its power is conti-nuously changing” (Encyclopedia Britannica,1969: 136) in ways conducive to mutually bene-ficial reinvention for both the “governors” andthe “governed” whenever the need arises. Thishas been so within all federating polities and,should be so in those that are claiming or want toclaim to be federating. Thus, it has been arguedthat “federalism is a process rather than a staticdesign” (Ibid). And, that it is a spectrum(Livingstone:1971:25) because it is not:

absolute but a relative term, there is nospecific point at which society ceases tobe unified and becomes diversified. Allcountries fall somewhere in the spectrumwhich spring from a theoretically whollyintegrated society at one extreme to theore-tically wholly diversified at the other (ibid)There is no doubt that a federal political arran-

gement is complex and demanding, looking atits various components which Schmitt (1997:op.cit.:150) likened to “a car model” with severaldifferent bodies, engines and several types ofoptions.

This explains why Smiley (1977) once arguedthat:

a federal system must attempt to deal with

diversities which are territorially basedeither by conferring the power over someof these pervasive diversities on the stateor by giving the constituent (local govern-ment) units a permanent voice - (or func-tion through decentralisation or devo-lution) - in the central government (to makethe citizens feel the impact or presence ofthe government).It equally explains the varying degrees of

definitional elucidations given to the concept offederalism by most scholars. While Rodee, Chri-stol, Anderson and Greene (1983:52) definedfederalism as “a constitutional division of govern-mental power between the national and the cons-tituent units,” to Friedrich (1963:585) federalismis

a union of group united by one or morecommon objectives but retaining theirdistinctive group being for other pur-poses... it unites without destroying them-selves that are uniting and it is meant tostrengthen them in their group relations.Along this same analytical plane Akindele

(1995a:138) once defined a federal state:as a political entity or country wherepowers and indispensable decisions areexercised and made at two or multilaterallevels of government in accordance withthe strict mutually agreed constitutionalprovisions of the country concerned.It could be reasonably argued that these posi-

tions formed the basis of Kolawole’s (1986:1)claim that “federalism is anchored on consentientrelationship” and, that of Eleazar (1968:360) that:

federalism can exist only where there isconsiderable tolerance of diversity andwillingness to take political action throughconciliation even when the power to actunilaterally is availableThese complexities have affected the thinking

of various scholars on the concept vis-à-vis theirtheoretical constructs on it and its applicativesubject matter. This explains why Akindele(1995A: 92) once opined that:

The concept of federalism, because ofmany tomes already written on it has notbeen free from the problem of definitionalpluralism... In other words... it is not anexception as far as the problems of defini-

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 171

tion are concerned.It equally explains Idahosa and Aghahowa’s

(1997:151) claim that, there is no agreementamong writers on a single definition of the term“federalism”.

These contestations notwithstanding, the basiccharacteristics peculiar to all federal politicalarrangements have been theoretically packagedby scholars of repute within the scholarship ofpolitical science and related disciplines. Thesetheoretical exploits are analytically perused inthe section that now follows.

The Theory of FederalismThere is no gainsaying the fact that, various

contending theories have been propounded byscholars in their attempt to analytically bring intoclearer perspectives the nitty-gritty of federalismas a structural mechanism for the governance ofmen within various polities that form part of thephysiology of global political community. Thesetheories have variously highlighted the compo-nents inherent in federalism (already referred toabove) as does the attention they deserve in that:

the actual sorting out of functional tasksamong different levels of government is aperennial source of tension and uncertaintyin most federalism (ACIR, 1980:301).It should be stated at this point, that, our consi-

deration of federalism in theoretical and practicalperspectives would be more of a contemporaryreview of the works of Wheare (1964), Riker(1964), Livingstone (1971). Eleazar (1966,1973), Friedrich (1963) and other scholars of thecontemporary period in line with the complexdemands on today’s federation. But then, wewould argue that there can hardly be any appro-priate point of departure than the contributionsof K.C Wheare (1964).

Our adoption of Wheare’s work as the pointof our analytical take-off is anchored on thisscholar’s universal acclamation as the reputedfather of (modern) federalism (Akindele, 1995b:op.cit:92). Infact, Wheare’s contribution to feder-alism which, as recently noted by Ajayi (1997:op.cit: 151) was based “in its entirety on the Ame-rican 1887 federal model” now forms the bedrockof all federal polities (Akindele 1995b:op.cit:92).His doctrine of federalism, which, while recog-nising the inevitability of conflicts among the

components of the federation or any federation,prescriptively advocates mechanism for consti-tutionally dealing with such conflicts include thefollowing:- The division of governmental responsibilities

between levels of government.- A written constitution spelling out this divi-

sion and from which federal and state authorities derive their powers.- A judiciary independent of both levels of

government that acts as an arbiter in caseswhere there are conflicts over the jurisdictionsenumerated in (1) above.

- The federal arrangement emphasizing coequal supremacy of the various blevels eachin its respective field of operation.. the citizensof the federation being concurrently undertwo authorities and owing loyalties to them(Wheare, 1964).Put together, Wheare views federalism as a

form of government which embodies “the federalprinciples”-(VanLoon & Whittington op.cit:143). However, the workability of these princi-ples is contingent on the recognition of the dualprerequisites of federalism which according toWheare (op.cit.:35-36) stated that:

... firstly, the communities of states concer-ned (i.e., federating) must desire to beunder a single independent government forsome purposes...secondly, they must desireat the same time to retain or establish inde-pendent regional government in some matt-ers at least.This, among others, explains Smiley’s

(1976:2) argument that “the most characteristicaspect of a federal constitution (i.e. federalism)is its division of law-making powers between thecentral and regional governments”. It equallyexplains the catalysing factors for federating inmost polities which Awa (1973, op cit) calledthe “determinants of federalism” and, which (Ola,1992:71) identifies as:(a) A sense of insecurity and an acknowle-

dgement of a need for common defence(b) A hope for economic advantage(c) Some profitable historical association, which

is simply continued in this form.(d) Some feelings of mutual compatibility of the

component parts(e) A history of peaceful co-existence and


settlement of disagreement through a processof give and take.

Viewed against the foregoing, Elaigwu’s(1994) argument or position on what federalismis becomes more understandable. According toElaigwu (1994:148):

A federal system of government oftenarises from the desire of a people to forma union without losing their identity.... Itis a compromise in a multinational statebetween two types of self-determination -the determination to maintain a supra-national framework of government whichguarantees security for all in the state,nation or the nation-state on the one handand the self-determination of componentgroups to retain their individual identitieson the other hand.Thus, expatiating further on the concept of

federalism, VanLoon and Whittington (op. cit.143) eloquently argued, that, “a federal systemreconciles a desire for over-all unity with a desirefor local or regional autonomy.” And, this argu-ment, has since been reinforced by Ramphal(1979) when he claimed that federalism basicallyor fundamentally

satisfies the need for co-operation andfulfils the desire for unity without beingparasitic to local identity and power(emphasis mine)Even though, these positions sound confir-

matory vis-à-vis one of the core arguments ofWheare, the latter’s position, apart from its beingunrealistic in terms of contemporary federalism,has been variously criticized.

These criticisms have further enlivened ourunderstanding of the concept of federalism parti-cularly in theoretical perspectives and their impli-cations for practical politicking and political acti-ons or inactions of government in today’s poli-tical systems. The most prominent of these incl-ude those of Livingstone (1971) and Friedrich(1964) which are respectively examined at thispoint of our analysis.

Livingstone (1971: 2) condemned Wheare’slegalistic definition of federalism on the basis ofthe fact that, it was too narrow and unso-ciolo-gical. On the basis of this analytical plane, hesociologically depicted the nature of federalismthus:

The essential nature of federalism is to besought for not in the shading of legal andconstitutional terminology but in the forcesof economic, social, political and cultural(systems) that have made the outwardforms of federalism necessary... the essenceof federalism lies not in the institutionalor constitutional structure, but in thesociety itself... A federal government ismerely a device by which the federal quali-ties of society are articulated and protected(Ibid: 22).Livingstone went further in his condemnation

of this legalistic undercurrent of Wheare’scharacterisation of federalism by using territorialdemarcation of diversities as a premise fordistinguishing the characteristics of federalpolities. In the process he claimed that:

The diversities may be distributed amongthe members of a society in such a fashionthat certain attitudes are found in particularterritorial areas, or they may be scatteredwidely throughout the whole of the society.If they are not grouped territorially thenthe society cannot be said to be federal.But, it is in the former case only this cantake the form of federalism or federalgovernment (while) in the latter case itbecomes functionalism, pluralism or someform of corporatism (Ibid: 23)As for Friedrich (1964), federalism is dynamic

rather than rigid as postulated by Wheare. Whileattacking the “federalising process” advanced byLivingstone (1971:op.cit) which, if acceptedwould make all polities federal or capable ofbeing federal, Friedrich theoretically espousedthat:

Federalism is a process rather than adesign... Any particular design or patternof competencies or jurisdictions is merelya phase, a short-run view of a continuallyevolving political reality. If understood asa process... it will become apparent thatfederalism may be operating in both thedirection of integration and differentiation(ibid: 2-3)In addition to these criticisms, are those

synoptically packaged by Ajayi (1997:op.cit)who claimed that “Wheare’s reliance on jurispru-


dence for the operation of the (federal system...makes his theory (to be) too legalistic, rigid andnot to be true all the time for all, or most politiessince his “equal and co-ordinate” thesis does nothold in real practice.” In the same vein, though,not with equal potency of condemnation, Riker(1964: 5), improved on Wheare’s classicalposition on federalism by functionally describingthe concept of federalism as a technique of gover-nance. In the process, he identified federalismas the main alternative to empire. And, struct-urally, he identified federalism as having threecharacteristics viz:1. two levels of government rule the same land2. each level has at least one area of action in

which it is autonomous and,3. there is some guarantee of autonomy of each

government in its own sphere (even though amere statement in the constitution) (ibid: 11)This position tallies with that of Sawyer

(1976) who likened federalism to a situation:Where geographical distribution of powerto govern is desired or has been achievedin a way giving several government unitsof the system some degree of security,some guarantee of continued existence asorganisations and as holders of power.In his own contribution to the explanatory

efforts on this concept, Mossman (1993: 103)has argued that internally, federalism offers anelementary flexibility within a fixed structure inwhich conflicts can be mediated”. In the samevein, Atkey (1970: 154) claimed that:

Federalism is a political method of distri-buting governmental functions between acentral government and governments of thecomponent units of the federation generallyon the basis of a “national” or “local”characterization... It is a positive politicalvalue (which needs) to be perfected by theapplication of sound and imaginativetechniques by both or all levels of govern-ment.Put together, argued Logams (1994:168), the

theory of federalism and the contestations it hasprogenized are founded upon the idea that, theexisting structure of societal conflicts, consensusand resources can be organised into at least twocommunities to which citizens belong. It isequally predicated on the idea that federalism is

a device for the coexistence of unity and diversity(Lar, 1994: 39).

Up to this point, the concept of federalism andthe excitements it has generated have beenexamined to a significant extent. But then, therealities or complexities of our federal politicalsystems call for practical solutions or actions inways amenable to the sustenance of their delic-acies. In other words, the discussion in this paperup to this point has shown that federalismas aconcept of governance- needs to be perfectedthrough the appropriate institutional mechanismsthat recognise the delicacies of its network ofrelationships which, among others, currentlyinclude the struggle for gender equality.

This being the case, the next section of thispaper briefly considers the adequacy or otherwiseof the theoretical perspectives as herein articu-lated and what should be done (if need be) fortoday’s complexities of our federal political sys-tems particularly that of Nigeria.

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES:HOW ADEQUATE FOR TODAY’SFEDERAL COMPLEXITIES ANDGENDER (EQUITY) STRUGGLE?

There is no gainsaying the fact that as couldbe deciphered from the arguments in this paperso far, and, other sources which exist everywherewithin the academia, that, a lot has been writtenand said about the complexities of federalism.This notwithstanding, however, there are reasonsand need to further perfect this system of govern-ment looking at its obvious complexities. Thefueling capacity of these complexities for furthercomplexities, imperatively necessitated thesourcing of appropriate mechanisms that couldcontemporaneously enhance the adequacy andrelevance of these theoretical constructs onfederalism for the federal polities of today.Akindele (1995b: 96) identifies “a healthy systemof intergovernmental relations (IGR) as a perfe-cting mechanism in a federal political arran-gement like Nigeria. This is because, “it treatsall levels of government in a federalism asequals” And, as articulated by the ontario econo-mic council (in 1977: 3), this mechanism “allowsthe greatest freedom of choice particularly at thelocal level ( of federal political arrangement)while avoiding “beggar-my neighbour deci-


sions”. In fact, according to Akindele (1995b:op.cit), IGR is an appropriate antidote to the non-realistic nature of Wheare’s classical theory offederalism vis-a-vis the realities of today’s multi-plicities of asymmetrical goals, demands andinterests within federating political systems.

The indispensability of a proper intergovern-mental relations to the practical augumentationaladequacy of the various theoretical constructs onfederalism in today’s federal polities are identi-fiable within the chronology of the reasons onceadvanced by Dare (1980: 53). These reasonswhich call for an effective intergovernmentalrelations in today’s federal polities among othersinclude:1. The imperfections of the distribution of

functions. The very distribution of functionsbetween federal and state governments createloose threads where the powers of one govern-ment end those of the others begin. In otherwords it is virtually impossible to distributepowers without some overlap.

2. Concurrent jurisdiction: Even the federalconstitution allocates the same functions tothe two or three levels of government. Forexample housing. When both federal and stategovernments exercise concurrent powers overthe same matter or territory, cooperation is theonly alternative to overlapping and uselessduplication of efforts and the only way toavoid interference by one government withthe activities of the other.

3. National Economic Integration- In mostfederations despite the lip service paid to theautonomy and financial independence of thecomponent units, the requirements of moderneconomies call for joint planning. To do this,consultation and cooperation have becomemandatory. For this reason almost allfederations have set up joint planning age-ncies.

4. Floods, droughts and large-scale nationaldisasters which affect any part of thefederation force concerted emergency actions.

5. Consultation and cooperation help to reducethe adverse effects which actions or inactionsof certain states may have on citizens of otherstates. Example includes the attempt by certainstates to raise revenue through special levieson citizens from other states- discriminatory

school fees or tax on transients.6. Most federation today attempt to maintain the

same standards in their services. Many federalprojects are handled for the centre by the stateauthorities. These automatically call for fed-eral grants, which are made subject to meetingstated standards-roads, come readily to mind.

7. Professionalism in administration has led towhat Deil Wright terms “Picket Fence Fede-ralism”, according to which each functionalarea of government activity such as mentalhealth, housing and agriculture, like-mindedprogrammes specialists or professionals worktogether on the basis of shared values, conc-erns and interests. These officers rise abovepolitics.Not only this, due to the myopic interpretation

of most, if not all, provisions of federal politicalarrangements within most polities of the world,it has been rightly observed that, federalism astheoretically espoused and practically adoptedin a country like Nigeria needs to be reinventedbecause of its structural defects and pathologies(Asobie, 1997). Infact, without plastering thenation’s wounds, Asobie(ibid) boldly, and,maturely too, using historical approach, identifiedthe real genesis of the “ anti-federalism orien-tation” in Nigeria. This, he called the centralizingtrends which, according to him, started since1954 and continues to encourage the unilateralalteration of the existing distribution of powersamong the levels and components of Nigerianfederation.

Specifically focusing on Nigeria, it is our viewthat the myopic philosophy of “water-tight”classical federalism (Akindele, 1995b. op.cit: 99,Akindele and Olaopa, 1998) must be discon-tinued. Instead, authority of the constituent units,using appropriate and mutually acceptableintergovern-mental relations institutions, must berespected. Such authority must not be withdrawnwithout mutual willingness. For example, the nowcommon unilateral alteration and distortion ofthe nation’s military command needs re-orien-tation, restructuring and reorganisation in linewith the characteristics of a truly federal systemof government. The military must be made toperform its constitutional functions of defendingthe nation against external and internal aggressionwhen called to do so, instead of its present usur-


pation of the governance of the nation and cons-cription of the Nigerian masses into the oppressedclass part of the fallouts of which include the nowobvious femocracy rather than the needed femini-sation of women in politics.

Eventhough, as we would like to innocuouslyemphasise here, the link between feminism andfederalism is still being forged, as an ongoingthinking, this reorganisation is particularly nece-ssary in that, femocracy which, mama (1995: 41)conceptualized as “ an antidemocratic femalepower structure” has been militarily made partof Nigeria’s political life. It was as a result ofthis we once had in Nigeria institutions for: BetterLife for Rural Women Programme, Family Supp-ort Programme, Family Economic AdvancementProgramme and so on. It is innocuous to arguethat these femocratic structures have been prac-tically unable to advance the cause of theNigerian Women despite being meant for sameby their designers. These failures are traceableto no other thing than the fact that the femocraticstructures are mere “political handouts” to thewives of the members of the military oligarchywho have no ideas of their own about how toadvance the cause of the ordinary women throughcommitted struggle. This is clearly and factually,put into perspective or corroborated by thetreatment of the office of the First Lady by thePresidency in the Fourth Republic. Eventhough,the excuse for such treatment has been largelyanchored on the lack of constitutional backingor provision for such an office, we would contendthat, if the hitherto creation and existence of theoffice has been through feminized politicalstruggle rather than through femocracy, it wouldhave been difficult if not totally impossible forthe Presidency to act the way it did on the office.Infact, as it existed and still exists in some politiesin Africa, the office of the First-Ladies, accordingto Okeke (1999:38):

gives a group of women, whose credentialsfor the job rest on their position as wivesto men in authority, the responsibility ofmobilizing of women, planning and imple-menting public programmes for them withlittle or no accountability.... The office ofthe First Lady is well integrated into thegovernment machinery and thereforecannot bite the finger that feeds it. To the

extent that first ladies’ claim to power istied to their relationship with men in power,their actions can only reinforce the verybasis of Nigerian women’s subordinatestatus.... women in such prominent rolesonly reinforce rather than confront theexisting relations of gender. Their publicpresence do not significantly change theprospect of either the larger female maj-ority who bear most of the burden of socialtransformation on the continent, or the fewat the fore front of the struggle whose exp-ertise and courage would have made adifference.This being the case, the military in Nigeria,

as it is done in most polities of the world, parti-cularly India, “where its primary focus is tosafeguard the nation’s economic interests”(Onuorah, 1999: 19), must be made as it should,to truly exist as the servant of the masses inNigeria as opposed to its present centralisedrulership over the masses. This is particularlygermane at this point of democratic governanceand continuous struggle for same in Nigeria, inview of the fact that:

The dawn of democracy on May 29, (1999)effectively marked the imperative of themilitary’s transition into a truly profe-ssional and dutiful force..... rather than aforce that has operated a libertarian systemfor decades lording it(self) over (on) therest of society (Onuorah, 1999: 19).This is particularly necessary among other

things, if federalism in Nigeria is to be truly takenas a structural device for the co-existence of unityand diversity which cannot but include the issueof women and the need for their political emanci-pation among other critical societal interests

In addition to the foregoing, the nation’s inter-governmental fiscal relationship needs reva-mping in such a way that the states would not beconstantly deprived at will, of their control overtheir material and economic resources, (Akin-dele, 1995a, 1956b; Akindele et al., 1997). Inother words, the fiscal arrangement must be suchthat allows or confers on the state the power ofself-financial determination that would rescuethem from the current situation in which theirdevelopmental aspirations or powers of indepen-dent financial thinking and existence are tied to


the apron-strings of the federal govern-ment’swillingness.

With these done, Nigerians, without genderdiscrimination regardless of the system of gove-rnance, would have unfettered rights to democr-atically or freely participate in the identificationand determination of their political preferencesin ways conducive to the attainment of the non-parasitic hope and goals which anteceded theirdesire for federating. It would equally encouragetheir continuous willingness to remain federated.

CONCLUSION

We have examined the concept of federalismin its theoretical and practical perspectives in thispaper. In the process, we identified the state as apolitical organism which exists for the bettermentof mankind and which needs to be availed in apractical sense, the necessary wherewithal ofefficacious existence if the raison- d’etre (better-ment of mankind) of its existence is to be achi-eved. And, we equally argued and identified afederal structure of political arrangement as oneof the prerequisites for achieving this.

We provided various conceptual elucidationsof federalism by different scholars of repute as aprelude to our identification of the theoreticalexploits on the concept perse by these scholars.As a follow up to these, we examined the ade-quacy or otherwise of the classical theories offederalism vis-a-vis the complexities and realitiesof today’s political systems which among othersinclude the struggle for gender equity in theauthoritative allocation of the scarce and criticalsocietal resources and, the ordered determinationof the beneficiaries.

In doing so, it was identified that, for most oftoday’s polities (Nigeria in particular), to be trulyfederal, as they claim to be, certain changes areneeded. For example, in Nigeria, such changesare required in the areas of power sharing,military structure, intergovernmental-fiscal rela-tions, revenue allocations, economic resourcesto mention a few. These changes in our viewshould equally include a constitutional femini-zation of some aspects of the political process toengender the necessary gender balance. This isparticularly necessary in view of the fact that:

an essential ingredient of democracy isthat, it is based on the quality of all the

people (without gender or any discri-mination), within a nation’s boundary, andthat all the laws of the land apply to alladults without exception. The nation’sconstitution must provide methods bywhich the people can, without recourse toviolence, control the government whichemerges in accordance with it and, evenspecify the means for its own amendment.In shorthand, the constitution itself, mustbe based on the principles of Rule of Law(and under these principles, there shouldbe no gender discrimination towards thewomen as we have in Nigeria: (Theseemphases are mine) (Nyerere, 1999:2)With these in mind, we argued for a real and

committed re-invention and refocussing-irrespective of the enormousity of the accom-panying challenges, - of the present Nigerianfederalism as the only mechanism for resusci-tating it from its present and most obviousstructural decadence and defects.

KEY WORDS Federalism. Femocracy. Feminisation.First-Lady Syndrome. Global PoliticalCommunity. Intergovernmental FiscalRelationship.

ABSTRACT In this paper we examined the concept offederalism as a political arrangment that has been adoptedfor the practical realisation of the principles of democracyin Nigeria and other similar polities within the world. Moreimportantly, following a thorough theoretical considerationof the subject-matter of federalism as one of the structuralparaphernalia of true democratic practice, we zeroed-in onthe inadequacies of the Nigerian federalism as it affects mostaspects of the existence of the citizenry today. Apart fromsuggesting the reversal of its present centralizing tendencies,we identified its lack of recognition of gender equity amongits other defects. Consequent upo n this, we called for a realrestructing of the Nigerian federalism. In other words, wecalled for a federal structure that has constitutional provisionsfor gender balance in ways conducive for a properfeminisation of some aspects of the political process in linewith the principles of rule of law which would go a longway to better the lots of the female citizens. This, in ouropinion, would put a desired stop to the constant femocracywhich, apart from its being an anti-democratic female powerstructure, has now taken on a near-epileptic nature in Nigeria,looking at the way its now acclaimed instituitions orattributable benefits, (e.g the Better Life for Rural WomenPragramme, Family Support programme, Family EconomicAdvancement Programme etc.) have been intentionally,though, appropriately, terminated in Nigeria with constancyeach time the military tranfers power to itself or change itself


through a palace or whatever type of coup d?etat. Infact, thenon-real recongnition by the Democratic Government of theFourth Republic, of these femocratic structures, particularlythe Office of the First Lady, due among other reasons, tolack of constitutional backing for them, and , their beingmere relics of femocracy, practically shows the emptinessof femocracy to women?s political emancipation. It equallyshows it, as a mere plastering of the wounds vis-à-viswomen?s political relevance in Nigeria.

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SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS

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Authors' Address: S.T. Akindele and O.R. Opaopa, Department of Political Science, ObafemiAwolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

Documents

Theory of Federalism