The Zambian Election: Triumph or Tragedy?Author(s): James A. ScarrittSource: Africa Today, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb. - Mar., 1969), pp. 4-5Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184983 .

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the preservation of Nigerian unity. Many of those who feel this way are deeply patriotic. My criticism of their stand is tempered with respect for their idealism. Yet, I think it is wrong to put the value and interest of the state-Nigeria-over the clearly asserted interest of the people. It seems irrational for an African government to decimate an African people merely to maintain the unity of a recently inherited state. What price such unity? Here it is the reduction of a proud and prosperous people to the bare bones of existence.

A third argument against Biafran independence is rational in terms of the self-interest of other Nigerian groups. They fear that if one section goes, others too may go. If the Ibos can be independent, why not the Yorubas, the Kanuris, or the Kano State? Minority groups in the Middle Belt, especially, dread the breakup of the country into three or four parts, in which case they might revert to their previous con- dition of appendages to the emirate system of Nor- thern Nigeria. It is not surprising that these elements, now so prominent in the army, are among the most vehement campaigners to keep Nigeria one.

Their views are reasonable, and therein lies the tragic core of this dispute. It is not right for the Ibos to

be punished and denied their freedom; yet the Federal Government has a cogent case. The war goes on mainly because there is no logical solution to be found within the context of the existing pattern of petty statehoods. The way out is via a truly pan-African solution-one that would transcend both the parochial nationalism of Nigeria and the parochial nationalism of Biafra. We should sympathize with the values of the best of the Nigerian patriots. With them, we should say "unity." But unity need not be predicated on the preservation of states created during the colonial era. Local boundary adjustments, when they are desired by the people concerned, need not be inconsistent with the promotion of African unity and may even facilitate that purpose. Is this visionary? Perhaps; but the pan- African vision is a better guide to action than the destructive realpolitik of parochial nationalism.

From the pan-African perspective, Biafran nationalism and Nigerian nationalism are equally parochial and inadequate. Certainly the Nigerian nationalist position is not superior to the Biafran. Neither one should be maintained as a political fetish.

Richard L. Sklar

The Zambian Elecion - Triumph or Tragedy? Newsweek magazine of December 30, 1968,

reports that President Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) won a "striking triumph" in the elections of December 19 by winning 79 out of 105 seats (in fact they won 81), 30 by acclamation. Kaunda and U.N.I.P. view the results somewhat differently, principally because of eight seats they did not win. These were the only seats U.N.I.P. lost outside the Bantu Botatwe (Tongas and related tribes) area of the Southern Province and a portion of the Central Province, where the ruling party knew it was relatively weak since it had recently lost four by-elections there to the opposition African National Congress (A.N.C.). In addition most of U.N.I.P.'s victories were by substantial margins, some of them exceeding 100 to one.

Why then, was the loss of 24 seats, and especially eight of these, viewed with such dismay by President Kaunda and other U.N.I.P. leaders. To begin with, the eight seats were in Barotse Province, one of U.N.I.P.'s traditional strongholds, and constituted a substantial majority of the seats in that province. Secondly, seven of the eight U.N.I.P. defeats were by margins approaching or exceeding three to one. Thirdly, a week before the election Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika was selected by the traditional elders as Litunga (Paramount Chief) of the Lozi, the principal tribe in Barotse Province. Mbikusita Lewanika is most clearly remembered in Zambia as the chief African cooperator with the European dominated government of the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Finally, U.N.I.P. was disappointed because it wanted to win all or virtually all of the seats

and thus create a one-party system by election. In- stead there was a decline in the percentage of seats held by U.N.I.P. (The percentage of votes is made meaningless by the thirty uncontested seats.)

An appraisal of the real significance of the election must begin with a closer look at the Barotse situation. First, there is the new Litunga. President Kaunda attended the installation ceremonies, but did not make the speech he had planned, ostensibly because of the weather. According to some reports he was taken by surprise by Lewanika's election, and was deeply disappointed. Other reports indicate Kaunda knew what was going to happen, but felt obliged to attend anyway. The new Litunga made a somewhat conciliatory speech, but this did not stop rumors that he would soon be deposed. Whatever they may feel about developments within U.N.I.P., educated Lozi are generally not in favor of Lewanika.

The most significant leader of the Lozi defection is Nalumino Mundia, a former U.N.I.P. Minister and leader of the banned United Party, who was in restriction at the time of the election. He was expelled from U.N.I.P. after breaking party discipline on several important matters, and had previously been removed from his ministerial post for alleged corruption. Mundia now represents Lozi dissatisfaction with the results of the U.N.I.P. party elections of 1967, in which a coalition of Bembas (the largest tribe in Zambia) and Tongas captured vir- tually all party offices. It was said that some of the Lozi defeated in the 1968 elections such as Arthur Wina and Munu Sipalo had seriously considered joining Mundia in the United Party in 1967, and that 4

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their recent defeat is attributable to their followers' dissatisfaction that this was not done. What such in- dividuals will do in the future is an important but unanswered question. They are now tending to their personal business affairs, and it is rumored that A. Wina may be the next Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia. He reportedly refused an offer to become Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Barotse dissatisfaction continues to encompass a wide spectrum of opinion. Some of the A.N.C. victors are "conservatives" like Lewanika, and others are more "radical" like Mundia. Some middle-level U.N.I.P. leaders in Barotse Province are said to have worked covertly for the election of A.N.C. candidates, and they probably did so without regard to any policy commitments other than fostering specifically Barotse interests. This is typical of "tribalism" as it is manifested in post-independence African politics. How long such a coalition can hold together is by no means certain, however.

Turning to the broader question of the nature of political opposition in Zambia, it is clear that there are still two oppositions rather than one, in spite of the common A.N.C. label. The "real" A.N.C. increased its margin of victory among Bantu Botatwe voters, even arranging for the election of an ex-federationist European independent in one constituency, and held its own as a strong minority party in such towns as Lusaka and Mufulira. Lozi supported A.N.C. only because it remained the one available alternative after the banning of the United Party. A lasting, much less an increasing, coordination of activities between Mundia and A.N.C. President Harry Nkumbula will be very difficult to achieve. It is unlikely that either will be prepared to play second fiddle to the other.

Broadening our perspective further to examine the significance of the election- for the Zambian political system as a whole, we can say that, while U.N.I.P. received a psychological setback, it was not significantly affected in terms of the exercise of power. As was true of A.N.C., most of U.N.I.P.'s victories were by increased margins, indicating an increased polarization along tribal lines in most areas of Zambia. If reports of an attempt to create a party representing Eastern Province interests are true, polarization might have had serious consequences for U.N.I.P. Such a party did not materialize however.

In attempting to eliminate this polarization and gain a truly nation-wide majority support, U.N.I.P. should continue to employ both the carrot and the stick, in careful balance. The recalcitrant provinces cannot be favored too much for fear of alienating more faithful supporters. Yet the former cannot be ef- fectively brought into or returned to the fold through pure coercion either: development is a vital prerequisite, especially in Barotse Province. We have

argued that the opposition is likely to experience major internal conflicts, and thus the ruling party can afford to treat it as far less than a serious threat. However, post-election developments indicate that this is not U.N.J.P.'s attitude at the present time.

The broader perspective ot the race conflict that pervades all Southern Africa cannot be ignored, however. While there is no concrete evidence that powers south of the Zambesi have given financial or other support to the Zambian oppositions, these powers are certainly pleased by the election results. Nkumbula has recently come out for some form of increased ties with the south, and Lozi traditional leaders and former employees of South African mines are reportedly upset with their respective losses of per capita revenues and wages due to government's ban on South African labor recruiting in Barotse Province. Several Barotse villages have been bombed by the Portuguese in retaliation for alleged guerrilla raids from bases on Zambian soil. Should the Zambian oppositions become a fifth column seeking to un- dermine Zambia's strong stand against minority rule in Southern Africa , they would deserve to be con- sidered more dangerous. Zambia's stand on this issue is important for all Africa. But the values of opposition leaders are not against African majority rule, and any leanings they might seem to have in a southward direction would be for opportunistic reasons. For their own good, and for Zambia's and Africa's good, they should exercise a very stringent self-restraint in this regard.

James A. Scarritt

AFRICA TODAY 5

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