CI llLDR[\. 5 C.-";\·!R()"i~I[.~TS QUARTERLY. 8(1).... '?' r:".'l e >lQ! C-"J,C", > FJWHor.mentS Quar,erly

The Young Child's Experience of Space and Child Care CenterDesign: A Practical Meditation

David KennedyChild and Family Studies

.\rorthern Michi<zan Unit'ersit

The physlCal, perceptual, and cognitive differences between adults and young chlldn'have significant Implications fur the deSign or child care centers. This ;InK!\.' cC'n<itdL'r­fl rst how architecture intluences child ren', development, then the d ifiL'rl'm,l." b.:-: \\ L'L'rhow young children and adults experience and use space and then th.:- prol:i.:-m l):

dC~lgnlng colle....tlve <pace for young chIldren that is responsive to those dIfferences. Fill!

broad, quahtat,\,c characlen'-tlcs of optimal ,htld care centers are id\.'ntiflcd: that 1!1,'~' r\.'omehke, have an unfInished character, have an open relationship to the natural \,'\HIJ,

JnU proVIde an overall vanety and balance of kinds of spaces.

It IS one of the mysteries of human developmentthat when we get old enough to reflect on what itis like to be young chlldren, we hardly rememberbeIng young children ourselves. This amnesiaabout our childhoods is engra ....ed not only in ourFersonal \'iew of our own past, but In 0urrelationships with the very young. Although werecognize them immediately and unconditionallyas our own, \'I.'e face them across an abvss ofmemory and experience.

\ll.'rlcau-Ponty (196-+, p. 137) referred to childrenas "polymorphs." "It is," he said, "true both thatadult functions are already represented in thechild, and that they don't have the same meaningas they do in adults. [It is like) a game of chess:All ~he pieces are there from the beginning, andyet the game changes their arrangement." AndSchactel (1959, p. 285), in a classic statement,explained "childhood amnesia" as a result of adultmemory structures being "unsuitable toaccommodate early childhood experience." Theadult's mode of experiencing has changed, heclaimed, to such an extent that he or she "is noteven capable of imagining what the childex pet;ences."

YOU"lg children see the world from two to threefee~ at:.:ve the ground, instead of five to six feet.Th~lr sense of time does not seem to be the same.The differ:?nces in cognitive and perceptualmodes an~ less obvious, but their behaviors signal

Requests for reprints should be sent to David Kennedy, Childand Family Studies, Northern Michigan University,Marquette, MI 49855-5366,

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characteristics of Ii ved experlenCC-SenSM\'affective and volitional F'<1ttL'rns, ,1"polymorphous" form of se\,uahty, palterns 0i II'..'of the material en"ironment, appr0'lChes to SP,Kl'

and equipment, to range and pilthwily-th,lladults both recognize and find nliC'(1. This raper 1-;

about those differences-which, In Y011n~

children anyway, seem to be uni\'ers,ll clcr(I~'

cultural, socioeconory1ic, and far.1illill systL'ms­and about their brOad impliciltions t,lr IhL'architecture of child care cenlcr',.l II I~ neccsScHYto Identify these differences a:1d c0nsldcr thL'1design implications because cldults gL'nerallL'design and build environments in the IInJge 0t

their own experience of time, space, andrelationship. They arc egocentric in this regard,in the classic Piagetian scn~ of not being able tobe anything else. Those adults, however, wh0presume to plan envir::>nments specifically foryoung children are in a peculiar position: If theyare, as Schactel claims, "not even capable ofimagining what the child experiences:' how <Hethey to imagine architectural space-especiallythe communal space of child care centers-forsuch a creature, one both like and profoundlyunlike themselves? The importance of suchplanning should not be underestimated, for in asociety where childcare is increasinglycollectivized, the c.haracter of that communcllspace will be 0.1e major vehicle of socialreproduction, and contribute to the formillion of nmodal adult personality.

As any artifact reflects its artificer, archilectllrillspace talks back to us and tells liS how we sec Clnd

3& YOl];\;C CHILO'S SPACE A.'\JO CHILD CARE DESIG\i

think. Typical school space for chtldren, with Itsfanatical. impoverished regularities, tells us that\\'e see children as basically irregular and chaoticbeings, ra w matenal out of which the product. ddult" IS made, through an intensive pattern ofIntcrdctlons whose major characteristic is rigorousdenial ot the unique form of children's('\Fx·ricnc.:-. It tells liS that childhood, a temporaryand a lesser condition, is not \....orthy of its own,Hchllecture. School architecture seems to implythat childhood should not be "indulge"; that the\\',lY we become adults is through acting likeaJlI1t~, which in turn seems to imply that childrenmust be made into adults through behavioralraIning, as opposed to the assumption that oneypically becomes an adult in the natural course

("If evcnts.

Although school architecture is a lamentablemonument to adult egocentrism, those of us whopresume to be decentered in this regard are notnecessarily brought any closer to beIng able toImagine what the young child experiences.HO\\'ever, sensitivity to how the lived experienceof children is not being served architecturally cansharpen our interpretation of how it might be.Ve learn to become both archaeologists of our

own lived experience and interpreters of theexperience of children. We work for a "fusion ofhorizons" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273), a dialogue·....·ith children's lived experience, which results inIncreased understanding. It is on this basis thatwe can then approach with more confidence thedesign of architectural space that is responsive tovoung children'S lived exp€rience.

But this docs not finish the matter. There are anynumber of ways in which architectural space canrespond to lived experience, whether a child's oran adult's-from the prison, the yurt, a Victorianhouse, to the typical classroom or adventureplayground. Authoritarian architecture respondsto its inhabitants, but its response is coercive,domineering, and totaliZing. Therefore, even if wewere, with scientific precision, capable ofknowing what the child experiences, it would notnecessarily imply a way to respond to thatexperience. Environments that cater to childhoodexperience the way certain environments cater toadult lust, for example, -"Playland," etc.-are,somehow, as far from reality as the traditionalclassroom. So we must add to this inquiry adevelopmental dimension, which obliges us to seethe child from the perspective of the whole

lifespan-that is, <l~ a tutur~ adult. Thl~ I~

necessary because "adult" ilnd (hd-i lr,'

mutually necessary; "child" can onl~' be \1L'l1n\'d 111

relation to "adult:' and \'isa versa. E\'C'I"Y child :­directed towards "growing up" \\'ith ,1 kln\i \'amor fali, and e\'erv adult carries cln·(,riCln.li, .child, lurking," as Ortcg.1 y Gel ......L·t ~.lld In Ih,d~pth of his eyes" (1Y'\~. p. 131). I hl~ '111.11111,~

our search for an optimJ.l archltectllr;~ f('f th\·young child: it must be not only rcSpcnSl\'L', 1''11

educati\'e. It must Inter.let with the child In .1 \\ ....

that both lends itsclf tn Ihc rhllJ's Ch.H.Ktl'!'I~I"·

manner of being in the world. and .11 ..... , dr.lI\'" iiichild forward, through childhood tLl\\',H,j ,11'

optimal adulthood.

But what is an optimal adulthood? That'llh"qll'nmust be asked by those designing sp,w:.' t,1r (htl,lcare centers, and will be tdken up belOh', Ft1r thL'moment, it may be defined as an adulthood Ih.lI

is in a hermeneutical relationship With Its O\\'n

childhood (Lippitz, 1986; Misgeld, 19R5), i.e., In aninterpretive relationship, characterlzcd both by Jcertain distance and a drive for mutualitv andunderstanding. But even granting this rJthl'rcircular definition, how Ciln architectural dcsicnpresu mc to influence this relationshi p? BetMl'that question can be addressed, it is nCCL'sc;,lrY toreflect on how architectural design iniluenccc;lived experience; and then on the differentl,1]relationship between the lived exp('rience oichildren and of adults.

ARCHITECTURE AND EXPERIENCE

Architecture, as Yi-Fu Tuan (1977, p. 116) hasexplained, actually defines and clarifies livedexperience. Architectural space gives "insidc" and"outside"-which are already given in the body­world matrix of perceptual awarencss-aconsummate, habitable expression, and thusbrings them to a clarity that was only inchO<ltebefore. Not only does "the body respond ... tosuch basic figures of design as enclosure andexposure, verticality and horizontality, mass,volume, interior spaciousness, and light," but aslanguage does for thought, the built environmentrefines and defines the otherwise "diffuse andfleeting" spatial world, and thereby sensibilityitself. [t defines lived sensations for us byproviding them a context through which they arclived. To build is to "establish a world in themidst of primeval disorder" (Tuan, 197i, p. 104),

YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE A:'-JD CHILD CARE DESIC;\J ~l

I: also "demarcates and intensifies the forms oi:;,.)clal life" Architectural space works either toeliy the world of social roles and relationships

'l' g., the authority figure has m()re space, andets the \'iew) or to transform them in some way.

The house functions as a "text encoding the rules(Ii beha\'lor and even a whole world view" (Tuan,1917, pp. 112, 116).

Architectural space teaches as well; to anonliterate people the house may be not only ashelter but also a ritual place and the locus ofeconomic activity_ Such a house can com­municate ideas even more effectively than canritual. [ts symbols form a system and are vividlyrcal to the iamily members as they pass throughthe dIfferent stages of life.

It is worth remembering that young children are a"nonliterate people" and carry the identifyingmarks of adult nonJiterate mental culture, Ong'sdescriptions of the noetic modes of primary oralculture are also true in some ways of the youngchild (1982).2 Although our young children areplaced in a highly literate culture and arc rapidlyinternaliZing the psychological modes of literacy,they still inhabit the organic, personalistic, oralcosmos which Ong associates both withnonliterate peoples and with the ancient andmedie\'al \vorlds.3 As in nonliterate cultures, thehouse is the young child's first definitive text,\\'hich forms and instructs lived experience.

At its best, architectural space evokes the originalhuman boundaried space of paradise. Through itsinternal richness, and the security of itsboundaries, it protects against danger, excess, andindeterminacy from both within and without, Ittransforms space into place, i.e., into a space thathas acquired "definition and meaning" (Tuan,1977, p, 136). It is "primal" space, in that it is"fused," or "joined" with the person for whom it ismeaningful; it has become incorporated into theperson's reflexivity. The house has long beenrecognized in depth psychology-in dream work,or example, and in young children's drawings, as

well as in lived experience-as an image of theself. As Marc 0977, p. 67) describes it:

Its [the house's] reality is durable andtangible: the place whence all humanactivities have emerged. It provides thenecessary base from which consciousnessis formed, consolidated and expanded,

and the self ddi ned The h,'lu:.l' I' t hl'

hearth, the (("lmm0n g,ounJ i'l 1110..'psyche's growth and transform~tlPn,

All of this is particularly significant \\'hl'n arr!l,·,jto young children. It would seem t("l tndl\.Jk th.ltarchitecture for young children carrit::i \.'\en m0r\.'iconic power than it docs for adults. As mu,-hchildhood autobiography (CC'e, 19~-I, p. 1~:-) ,lndour own personal arche010gies Sh0\\'. 'h(,ll~l' [('rthe child is cosmos in intensifIed and ~\'mb(llt(,

form, a world whose ordl.'r "t('u(he:" rL,\" ..ll" ,1thl

instructs," If architectural spuce IS m0r,'interlocutive, speaks more 10udly, In J nwrL'educational voice, to young children th,ln Ii'adults, then this underscores the imr0r1.1ncL' ClI

thinking carefully and refiectl\''''Y ,1bollt thL'spaces in which groups of children spend up totwelve hours a day. We arc ch~llenged toimagine environments that "teach, reveal. andinstruct," if only because we know Ih"t in defaultof our imagining them, they will instruct anyw<lYand contribute to the kinds of adults \\'h0, hannginternalized their characteristics and effects, orelikely to perpetuate them-whether Ih"y .Ireauthoritarian or dialogical. But if dialogIcal. Indialogue with what? This brings us to th\.'question of how young children's livl"jexperience is different from adults',

THE YOUNG CHILD'S LIVED EXPERIE:,\CEOFSPACE

It seems reasonable to assume that the cxistcnll,llspace of the young child is more like infant spacethan adult space. Infant space is probably not"space" in the sense in which we understand theterm, but a person: Space is originally given inthe person of the caregiver, and any real topos ithas is in this form. It is fundamentally personJI.interlocutive, and interactive, a multisensorialspace of action, which is as oral, tactile, andkinesthetic as it is visual. It is the space' nf anobject reached for to connect with, to introjectthrough the mouth, or explore synaesthetically,Or it is the space of an object from whosethreatening presence we shrink.

A space that is alive and personal is quitedifferent from the idealized, visually dominJtedspace which we find reified in adult architecture.Typical Western adult space is static, segmented,and schematized. It is a space of abstraction,

-to YOLJ!'.:G CHILD'S SPACE A..\JD CHILD CARE DESIG0J

..;cparation, removal, of an overwhelming"Qlcctl\·it:-·, \,'hich docs a\..;ay with time and the~ody. This space is reified in our public.Hchttecturc, which is so vast. regularized, and

isassociated from touch and kinesthetics that It,lssumes a sort of demonic spirituality (Sommer,

--l). But if we accept the normative psycho­Jnalytic premise that "original" is also "originary,"hen through an archeology of our own adult

perception, \\IC find the personal, interactive spaceuf mfancy underlying the genetic and culturalstrata of adulthood, and still the basis of ourmtcrlocutive reaction to anv architecture. In theoriginary condition, as Macmurray's 0961, p. 80>classic formulation puts it, "It is the whole Otherthat is personal," and it is through a process ofdepersonalization that we eventually arrive at theconcept of an inanimate object. Thus, for theInfant, and for all of us on a fundamental level,perception is a being-addressed by a living world.

Although the visual, as Erikson 0977, p. 46) haspointed out, is chief among the senses in "theestablishment of a rudimentary sense of reality inthe infant," it has a different valence within theoverall intemal balance of the infant's sensorium.Vision becomes more powerful than the othersenses; it serves to get the infant in touch with theobject, in order to encounter it with all the senses..-\s Lewin (935) has argued, the object is onepolarity of a field which includes the body. Thisbody-world field is dynamic, relational, andInterconnected. The young child's sense of thecharacter of space shrinks and expands accordingto the motivational, affective valences of the field.Space is not only alive and personal, butlibidinized: It is charged negatively or positivelywith the attractiveness or balefulness of theobject, which beckons or repels.

Even the lived space of the four, five, and six­year-old is, relative to the adult, quiteundifferentiated between body and environment.In Lewinian terms, the field is not articulated.There is still high and primitive integration. Therelationship is what Merleau-Ponty (1968, p.l38)calls "chiasmic." "Where," he asks, "are we to putthe limit between the body and the world, sincethe world is flesh?" The world which I am placedin forms a unity with me the perceiver. Since it isa part of my awareness and I am alive, there is nopart of the field of perception that I could withany final certainty call "dead," "inanimate," orreduce to some lesser level of being.

Adults also interact continuallv dnJ ,h n,lTlllt.l:i,with objects 10 space, but they h,l\'C k,lrnl'd t,) \.1..so in order to separate from thcm, tt' ~ut th·~ ~)

aside, and to transform them t(IT S(lme kind ('I lh

(Heideggcr, 1977). This IS, to be slire. a lorm "introjection. bu tit f011l1\vS much nilrr<'\\'l'r Ii nl'<;In a much more systl.'matlc w"y. 1 hroll~~h

looking, adults can get enough of an Idea ab<'lltthe properties of almost any 0bj,'ct th,1t thc;' dc,not fecI compelled to touch It eXcl'pt tor Srl."'ClilCpredetermined purposes. Things havc thl'!rplaces. For the young child, on the 0thcr h,H1,i. th\.,function of the object is largely the pk',1SllTC , t tho

interactIOn itself.

The space of the young child is mythlcdl. In thcsense des< -,bed by Merlcau-Ponty (1CJ6~, p. ::~:;)

when he speaks at "a mythical space In whIchdirections and pOSitions are determined by theresidence in it of great affective entitIes." Theseaffective entities are, as we have seen, personsfirst-the primary space of the caregiver-thenthe primal space of the home, which is affectivelydetermined by the human presences that suffuseit. Lewin 0935, p. 79) has called the youngchild's space "psychobiological," in that It I~

"quaSi-physical, quaSi-social, and quasi-mental"-­a systematic field of relationships of dynamictension in continuous transformation. Casslrer(1955, pp. 84-85), calls the originary spacemythic as well, and describes it as positional: i[has no abstractly determined constant apMt fromone's place in it. "E\'ery point, e\'cry clementpossesses ... a kind of tonality of its own ... aspecial distinguishing character which cannot bedescribed in general concepts, bu t which isimmediately experienced as such." [t is"distinguished from the abstract space of purecognition by [the] foundation of individualfeeling on which it rests and from which it seemsinseparable."

The adult develops, through typification (Hart,1979; Piaget &: Inhelder, 1967; Schutz &:Luckmann, 1973), a neu tral space, approachableby a coordination of perspectives, the "view fromabove." For the young child this kind of space isalready on the horizon of experience, part of thetelos of development. But it is still linked topersons, and to the personal aspects of theenvironment. The presence or absence ofsignificant persons changes the total structure ofthe psycho-spatial environment, especially itsfeeling of security or insecurity (Lewin, 1935).

YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE A\iD CHILD CARE DESIG:-.. 4

J p':'chologlCal environment that is affecti\'ely'll",lre', the :'oung child tends to inhabit the edges,,~ hl~ or her Itfespace, and these edges are

~tc1ntl: ('xpanding as the child responds to thebeckoning challenges of the world. The spatial1"'.'1 r(lnment Invites engagement and:r.ln~l(lrmJtl\.'C action (Suransky, 1982), It,'j-.llkngcs the young child to "excorporate" self inInteraction wIth objects, and in this interaction,th' (hilJ constructs and discovers the meaningslIt ohll'ctS (Vandenberg, 1971). Thi ngs call out,nil!, as with adults, to be overcome and put aSide,bllt to be played with-the stairs call out to climb,he ball to throw, the empty container to be filled,

the filled container to be emptied, the puddle tobe splashed in, ....·ide-open spaces to run in, etc.\loreover, it is through this interaction thatJ.Jifcrentiation of self from world comes about:TIHoul;h "open communion," or "living directlyInto the world" (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 60), thebllundaries between subject and object take

hare.

The :'oung child's project is to master the worldthrough parlicipation in its play, resulting in thatrelative independence from the world whichchtlrtcrizes adulthood. But while independencemay be the unconscious aim of the child's project,11l.·r project is distinct from that of adults. InHeldegger's (1977, p. 21) words, the adult'sprOject is to "pursue and entrap nature as acalculable coherence of forces," what he calls"enframing." This is the project of a being alreadyfully separated from nature, The young childplays in a unity with nature, and through thatplay, separation develops. The environmentprovides the aliment for this process, which,although it is characterized by "opencommu nion," is in that very communion amovement of "primal distancing" (Vandenberg,1971, p. 61), an equilibration process resulting inincreasing separation. One is increasingly able toput things aside, to use only the part that can beregulated and secured-stored, distributed,placed in reserve for future use. In adults,mastery becomes the ability to resist the call of theenvironment to play, and to shape it from adistance for what Heidegger (977) called thestanding reserve.

The project of the young child resembles that ofthe artist. The artist may be said to be the adultwho has resisted what Suransky (1982) calls the"false dichotimization" of work and play. For both

artist and (hild, somethi ng emerge,; Irrm t: 1 _

engagement \...·ith the envirc'1nment. cl !='rlldlld 111,,(is relatively unexp<'ctl'd. because It has e'm('n~l',t

through intcracti ve ria y tha t a \lows ltlr ere,) In l,'outcomcs. The artifact \\'hich ('merges frC'm the'interaction is a representation of the CIl,'t'1l1nh'r Itis not a part oi the standing reSl'T\·C'-thl· t'lIt,\'1neof strategies of domination-but d s:·ml',..I\ l'1:'transformation. It stands In a different IllC,lmn~

relationship to the en\·IT()nmt'nl. It rl'~I~t~ th~'

status of standing reseT\'e, it is ··un-cnfr,lme"lbJco.a transformation of the cnvironml'nl.

In this cond i tion of "pu re assi mila tlO n.· sraccbecomes the boundaries of the self, ior the worldof dramatic play is at the command of theimagination. Winnicott's <1971, p. 51) notion oftransitional or "potential" space expresses thisvery well:

This area of playing is not i:1Ol'r pS~'chlC

reality. It is outside the individual, but itis not the external world... Into this playarea the child gathers objects orphenomena from external re,llily anduses these in the sen'ice of ... Inner t1r

personal reality... In playing, the childmanipulates external phenomena in theservice of the dream and invests chllsenexternal phenomena with dream meaningand feeling.

The phenomenon of transitional space points to afundamental difference between adults andyoung children in the balance between inner andouter spatiality. Perhaps we could say thatwaking space and dream space are less separatedin young children than in adults. In the dream,space and time both "happen to" us and arccompletely self-produced, The dream space has amysterious, inchoate, symbolic function, full ofmeaning. The tower, the winding staircase, thebuilding with innumerable rooms through whichone wanders-all are the self as much as they arethe object.

Dramatic play could almost be described as"dream work." It requires and builds a sense oftime and space apart, a protected milieu (Kel1y­Byrne, 1989), in order for that existential locationto emerge, which Winnicott (19il, p. 50) describesas on the "line between the subjective and thatwhich is objectively perceived" ~r, as Huizinga(1955, p. 10) has described it that "temporMv

17-t_ YOLiNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIG:'-.'

I

\,'orlJ \\'1thln the ordinary world, dedicated to the!'C'rl,lrmance or an aCI apart."

DE\'ELOP\1E:'\TAL IQEALS A.,.o STYlES OF:\BSTRACTIO:"."

"l' nOI" H'turn to the question: How do \,·:ei011agJne architectural spacc--€specially collective~pace-i(lr the young child, a ~ing both like andprofoundl;, unlike us? The answer depends on(lur Ideas of chtldhood and adullhood, and thenature of the transformation lhat separates them.E"cry cducator and every designer of educational.ettings has ideas about these, implicit or(Ilherwise. Such ideas are normative, and varyilcrOSS ti me a nd space-every age and el'eryculture has its Ideal adult. Notions of the idealadult arc in the process of dramatic change in thewestern industrialized countries. ConfrontedI,'ith the growing possibility of planet death,adults who are still "in touch" with theenvironment on a fundamental level areconstructed as an ideal. It is precisely this quali ty\,'hich I have indicated is characteristic of infantsand young children. This suggests that children'senvironments and educational program beconstructed to foster the conservation rather thanthe atrophy of this quality, thus encouraging thede"elopment of responsible adults in the sense ofbeing responsive to their environments andtherefore less liable to maim or pollute it.

How then, assuming we support this ideal of anew sense of responsibility (Jonas, 1984), do webuild environments that encourage children togrow into such adults? There are two basicvariables to consider, one psychological and onecultural. Psychologically, the reality is that youngchildren are involved in a distancing process:They are replacing the immediate with themediated, with the typified "stock of knowledge"(Schutz & Luckmann, 1973); the totality ofconcrete experience with the universality of thelanguage-<:ontrolled concept; the wholeness of theperceptual image with the inclusiveness of theabstract, logical, operational structure (Piaget,1969). That is the young child's developmentaldialectic: Experience itself results in morearticulated, differentiated, and hierarchicallyorganized mediating structures.

Culturally, the reality seems to be that Westernersin the late 20th century are confronting the effects

of the growing schism bctwern r-cnplL' ,tnd thllobjects, and by extenSIon bellq:en p\.0riL' ,1nlthl'ir eO\';rcmmcnts (Arl'ndt. Iq:;t». Thl.' In\\lkrnexperience is one of a cumulatIve Ie.ss (If a ~n:-..:

of place In our buill en\'lronments whIch (l(IS

recursively to further reinforc\? 01lr sllbic(t-()I.~jC(

alienatIOn. This alienal10n can be ,1tmbllteJ ttl .1

number of ontological, histortcal, JnJ 5"(1.11causes: The separation necessary III (pntlucr .J

nature perceived as threatening, \\'hdhcr theblack plague or the AmNtcdn wIIJ('rlll.'SS; th"legacy of Platonic and Aristotelian (mtnlngll.''':; tn\.'spirit/body split in the Christian trcldlllOn; I hI.'reflexive influence of technolngy ,Illconsciousness; the reproduction of SOCi,ll

hierarchy and domination in an i1~e oi hIghtechnology, etc. As Western Ii terJture ,It kaslsince the early 19th century demonstrates, th\.'subject-world separation of modern Westernconsciousness is haunted by a sense of a lostunity, which for the overdeveloped 0r SCparJlcdego, manifests demonically as a "hl'art otdarkness," as well as a nostalgia for childhood.

Given this separation, how do we designcommunities for young children which encouragethem to grow into adults whose style nfabstraction is not cut off from the subject-objectunity of the early years, and the creative. pla;,t'ul.zone of the transitional space?

That goal was actually posited for modernityalmost two hundred years ago. For theRomantics, in revolt against Enlightenmentepistemology, the task of education was to makeit possible for the human race to, as Coleridge putit, "carryon the feelings of childhood into thepowers of manhood" (Plotz, 1979, p. 69). ForEmerson, the child was the "perpetual Messiah,"for Wordsworth a "Mighty Prophet" (p. 68) of aform of consciousness that is not in dangerousseparation from its object. As Plotz (p. 68)summarizes it:

The romantics hold human perfection toabide in that adult who remains most intouch with his childhood life, who enters,in DeQuincey's fine phrase, "upon thewhole of his natural inheritance." Suchcontinuity of consciousness and capacityis crucial to adult fullness of being. To beable to grow up without destroying ormaiming the child in oneself is to becomethe best sort of adult.

YOUNG CH1LO'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIGN -tl

Ii the child IS in a continual state oftransformation toward abstraction and subject­world separation, the Romantic ideal aims for alund of education-and therefore a kind ofen\'ironment-that gl;lides this series of trans­formatIOns toward a more optimal separation, or.,,;hat Kegan (1982) has referred to as "subject­object truce." Assuming that the modem subject­object truce is not an end-state. but a cultural­hIstorical product, an adaptation to a certainsenes of circumstances, we must dare to assumefurther that different circumstances will forceurther adaptations. The current circumstance of

an increasing threat of planet death, then, calls forfurther adaptation, in the form of a style ofconsciousness which lives more f~lly "in" to itsenvironment, rather than setting itself against it.Such a style represents a recovery-in the sense of4gehaben. or sublatIOn-not only of childhood,

but of certain aspects of "primitive" mentality.And it involves a reformulation of the pairadult/child in the West, where historically theyhave been set in separation and contradiction.4

At this point it would be well to remember Yi-FuTuan's observation about the function of thehouse for nonliterate people-a "ritual place," a"locus of economic activity," a "system ofsymbols," a communicator of ideas. Environ­ments for young children, whether familial orcollective, are all of these things as well. Theyfunction as a field or display of messages abouttht'ir uses. Their configurations call for certain"stclOding behaviors" (Barker & Wright, 1955), thatcarry through into adulthood. Given theRomantic formulation, the best sort of environ­ment would provide behavior settings thatencourage a kind of adult intentionality whichdoes not sacrifice the child to the adult.Environments would both adapt to the youngchild's intentional modes and foster the continuityof those modes through transformations intoadulthood. The broad indications of the charac­teristics of such environments that follow are notan attempt to review or extend the definitivework that has already been done towardspecifying these characteristics-in particular thework of Prescott (984); Osmon (1971); Moore,Lane, Hill, Cohen, and McGinty (979); andGreenman (1988)S-but to ground that work inthe phenomenology of the child's livedexperience, the phenomenology of architecturalspace, and the historical moment of thechild/adult pair in the West.

HOME, I~STITUTIO~,A~D HABITABLESPACE

Such an environment would, fIrst. rrcscnt ,1nexistential space that is habitable. The best modl'lfor habitable space is the home. lang (1983. p.202) descnbes inha~ltlOb as "the eS5Cnlial teatureof subjective life ... an act of tran:,f0Trn,ltI0nwhere space becomes place." He refers to thehome as "our second body." In the h0rn\.',"everything ... has been tr,lnsmlllL'd thine'"have truly become annexed to Ollr bmi\', an,jincorporated." The child is typlc,l11y ,1SS(ICI.lkdwith the home because the h(1me i~ ..1 place III

subject~bject fusion. of the animated sp,Ke ~\'hidl

is the hallmark of childhood. 11 is a space 0/

privacy, intimacy, and empowerment. ,1ndbecomes almost sacred for its inhabitants.

The space of the institution. on the other hand. 1$

the space of the ethical and the transcendent,where privacy, intimacy, and ch0icl.' ,He iorg(lnein the interests of cooperation, competit\0n.disciplined work, and festival. In the institution,one shares space with the stranger, who is one'sbrother or sister in the human lomlly. Felrchildren it is a place of transformation thT(lll~h

meeting with non-kin. including teachers ,lndpeers. Historically, it is a setting charactenz\.\.i bya high degree of external control dndorganization, routinization. and limitaticms (Inpersonal choice (Proshansky & Fabian, 1987;Rivlin, Bogert, & Cirillo, 1981; Wolfe & Ridin,1987) where autonomy, individualization,privacy, and adaptability arc at risk. In deSigningchild care centers, we are faced with tht'extraordinary problem of producing a communalspace that combines in some new way these twokinds of loci: Tempering the clannishness of thehome with the ethical clarity of the institution,and the alienation of the institution with th\.'intimacy of the home. What design clementswould lead to the transformation of col!ccti\'cspace such that the primary psychological andbehavioral ingredients of good home space werepresent? [s it a question of a logical contradiction,to wit, can home space and institutional spaceever be made one?-or of a social anc historicalcontradiction which can be changed? Given theincreasingly numerous hours that young childrenspend in institutional settings, the question is onlonger merely academic. For the young child inchild care, the home and the institution arc bothplaces of the most radical personal formation. In

4-i YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIGN

and through these spaces, the cohort's subject­(1bjl'ct style IS constructed. The I is distinguishedfrom the non-I. the animate from the non­anImate, "mine" from "yours," the masterable':-om the unmasterable, the controllable from theu nC0ntrollable, the what-I-am-responsible-forfrClm the what-r-am-not-responsible-for(rroshansky & Fabian, 1987). Settings that do notprovide for what Spivak (1984) refers to as',lrchetypal places··-i.e., spaces that meet therundamental needs of emotional shelter,freedomof mO\'emen t, terri toria lity, rea IIy sufficientstorage, places for feeding, sleeping, grooming,and excreting which are not affronts to taste andprivacy, etc.-lead to forms of deprivation thatcould have effects on the future social fabric(Wolfe, 1978). Most importantly, the lack ofawareness about the crucial human need forpersonal space (Hall, 1966) and an optimalmeasure of freedom and control in the builtenvironment threatens us culturally with the

ossibility of a "modal" personality that isassive, helpless, and stimulus-ridden (Barnes,

198]).

This design problem of reconciling home andinstitution has implications for the style ofsubject-object relations demanded by thehistorical moment. The personality best adapted(pr planet survival would appear to be the one in\\ hlch strong indh.idualism is tempered by strongcare for others. The balance between the homeand the institution is at least analogous to thebalance between the personal and the collective.The individual who takes responsibility for theother will emerge from a collective that takesresponsibility for-i.e., allows-the individual.Analogously, the redefined "home" will nurturethe powers of childhood-relative subject-objectfusion, the conservation of "transitional" space, anunderstanding of the liVing, interdependentquality of the environment~venin the face ofthe demands of work and discipline.

NFINISHED ENVIRONMENTS,EMPOWERMENT, AND HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT

A second broad characteristic of the optimalcollective environment for young children is itsunfinished character. The fundamentalIngredient of good home space, that which allowsit to become an "intimate hollow carved out of the

anonymous" (Lang, 1985. p. 202), IS the .1Qilll~ 1,1

act transformatively wlthm it. [nhabltln~ In\·\'h·\· ...incorporation, acquIsitIOn, lmtiatl\'e, l'mbrdLL'.assimilation, transmutation, annexation (Ldng.1985). The ability to do all these things requires ,1

measure of autonomy Within a spatl.11environment, a threshold ('f l'mpo\\,erment QL'h'wwhich they arc no longer posstbk Thus,architectural space must not only be ,l(cessibkbut negotiable, and encouragc cholcc.transformation through personal InltldtIVl'. an,ithe possibility of leaving one's mark on thL' l\'prlll

As we have seen, the chIld's project is wantlng'II)­be-independently. In the Western devl'll'pmenl.llformulation, this project in\'olves it processwhereby temporary separation leads tointegration at a higher level. Functions separ,lk'off and are regrouped in new hierarchicalrelationships, making for increased tlexibJlity andcontrol. This process is an outcome of engagingand interacting with the world. Throughclimbing around in the world, leapIng in It,swinging, sliding, running, crawling, h(1ppln~,

cutting, painting, and combining and 5eparatmgall its various material manifestations, anindividual body image and sense of self del·elops.Children come to i\ pla((' of lnuC'dSl'ddifferentiation from the world through acti\'c!Yexploring the limits of thci r fusmn WI th it.

This project of wanting-to-be-independentlythrough transformative action on the world leadsnot just to internal diJferentiation of structures o(consciousness; what also emerges from the child'sengagement with the world is a trace of his or herinteraction-a product. This product-unlike theadult's, which is an organization according to apredetermined taxonomy of use-is bestunderstood in the same way a work of art isunderstood: as a symbol or an artifact of theexperience of transitional space, representingboth the inner and the outer. The blockconstruction, the painting, the piece of woodbristling with nails, the costumed body, thepattern of chips, the rapt exploration of water, thepart of the father, mother, or hero all are forms ofrepresentation of the world which have emergedthrough the child's transformative action.

Thus environments that allow engagement andinteraction lead to new outcomes both internallyand externally. Through these transformations,the child is advancing developmentally; is

YOUNC CHll.D'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIC:\ .+5

. coming to himself," i.e., he or she is becoming anaJ1I11. Em'lronments that CONce us, that "do It allt~r" us, d('ny the developing adult-the child-in,~Il (If us. They are "adult" em'ironments in the~cn5e In which "adult" is exclusi\'e from "child."-l~el/ are "finished." Environments that allow fortransformation through representing the world(ilnnot be completely fInished, because aromplctely finished thing will resisttran::.iormation through action (:\Jicholson, 197·H.TranSllional srace welcomes the shape given tn it['ya transformative act. So the bare platform inthe clearing (Cohen, Hill, Lane, McGinty, &:-'100re, 1979) invites my act of dramatictransformation, waits to become, as Huizinga0955, p. 10) cal1ed it, a "consecrated spot."Confronted with a chalkboard just at her height,the young child will fill it with runic signs whichF,leam with inchoate, archetypal meaning.Equipped with the right watering can, the three: car old will dance industriously through everysunlit nook and cranny where potted plants awaithis ministrations.

Th0 en\ irnnment with its quota of transitionalsf.'acc IS a \'I.·orking environment. Like the artist'sstudio, its unfinished character chal1('nges andempowers. calling us to transformative action. Itt0aches ownership and participation-which arenecessary for a sense of responsibility-throughconvincing us that the world is not a finishedrroduct into which we are placed passively,either as victims or as "lucky." In fact, as Stokols'and Shumaker's (1981) work suggests, therhysical environment, the social world, theintrapersonal, and the interpersonal worlds are allinteractive and mutually entraining. All of thesecomponents of the world are transformedthrough critical and imaginative transactions withv,'hat is unfinished into some new configurationwhich is never final. As Bognar (1985, p. 190)points out, "Real places have a continualpossibility for revision, reinterpretation,reenactment and recreation. The 'spirit of place'as a sense of totality and wholeness, therefore,can be only imprecisely precise."

THE NATURAL AND THE BUILTENVIRONMENT

A third broad characteristic of the optimalphysical collective environment for youngchildren is the extent to which it is embedded inthe natural world in a way in which the elements

of nature are rec0gnlzL'J and livcJ \\'llh, r.llhl'rthan suppressed. The separation bel\\'C'I..'n pnsl'nand nature which is the hallmark of the m01.krWest is reified architecturally in Institutlon,1lbuildings whIch arc blind tn theIr n.\turalsurroundings. Such i1rchitecture then rl',Kts uponconsciousness, in thJt it trains hum.1n pen:cptlOnto ignore nature and supports inlL'rpretrltlnns (If

nature as either a threat or a potcnticll nhlCct fl.,r"the standing rescrve." But the r(,sp0nsin' ,1JUI..like the child, remaln:::i "in touch" With n.lturl..·. Iprhim or her, nature rL't,lins a lIVIng facl..',

[n its idealized form, the h0lI')L' IS .\

transformation of nature, made from n,llurL' ,1ndbased on nature's originary forms. A::. h'C'

approach the Zulu kraal lDuly. 1979), WI.' MI..' nptsure for a moment if it is n,ltural 0r humanlvconstructed. so cunningly does it lISC the fl.'rmsand the materials of the landscape in \\ hich it ::'placed. Yet the house goes \::>cyond natUrL', Itgathers nature-the forms, the patterns. thetextures, the kinds of light, the colors, thedomains and pathways-and reconfigures it in anew interpretive focus. The house both opcns u~

to nature and protects us from it. [t IS dn 0lg,ln

through which we know nature clgaln. AsLcvinas (1969, p. 156) c'<presscs it, "The d\\'('lli:l~

remains in its own way open upon the dementfrom which it separates." The moderninstitutional building. on the other hanJ,generally turns stubbornly inward, away iromnature, providing its O\\ln alternative "nclturc" 01

plastics, fluoresc~ts, and air conditioningsystems. It does voluntarily what a bUIlding onthe moon \vould be required to do.

A building that taught young children theinterconnectedness of the natural and the humanworlds would design the interfaccs betweenindoor and outdoor to allow for optimalcontinuity and the most-open possible interactionbetween the two. The outdoors should enter thebuilding through windows, courtyards, andintermediate spaces-covered terraces andporches, etc.-and the outside made accessible inall weathers through shelters-gazebos,overhangs, protective trees and rocks, andmicroclimates of all sorts (Moore et aI., 1979).Further, collective space for young childrenshould lay bare the economics of the world bymaking the kitchen, the garden, the workbench,the solar panel, or the boiler room fully integratedaspects of the environment.

..+6 YOUNG CHILD'S SPACE :\.':0 CHILD CARE OESte:\

VARlET)' :\:'\0 RICH~-ESSOF PLACE

F;nall:-·. a buliJmg lhat pro\'iJes for h.lbitatiC'n,ransivrmatl\'e action, and hClghtened awarenes:,

,'" the naturJI ,,'orld must pro\"ide ior an o\'crall\".Hld;: and bJlance among spaces; not only iMthe iunct10nal sp.1Cc-the classroom, the stage,tl'e \,"orksh0p, \'r the as~mbly hall-but also for\, hat Hart (1979, pp. 170, 204) calls "places of:l'tJchmcnl, sec! usion. and quiel." L: nkss places,'r \\llrk an\.! (Clcbr,lllon arc bJlanccd by pl'K\'s!N 're~tlng, watching, dabbling introspecli\'ely"chtldren do not experience the "Iivingncss" of:;;~'atiality Itself. but only the people who inhabitIt. \,'ho may involuntarily drown out the still,small \'OICe of place, Life then becomes associated\, Ilh people only, and not only visual space, buto,her organisms become deanimated, Thus theprejudice is perpetuated that humans are theonly true living beings in the universe. and the\'Ision of childhood-the interlocutive subject­object relation whICh can lead to an adult sense ofrelatedness and care-is suppressed. We needplaces where we are no longer driven to act onthe world only to change it or produce somethingfrom it. Rather. through special places-the\\'indo\" nook. a textured wall, a small interiorcourtyard-the world takes us to its heart, andevery object and configuration becomes a sign ofthe unutterable truth of being itself. Such settingscan preserve and create a sense of meaning in the\-,'orld.

An overall pattern of spaces-spaces that hide;enclose; open onto larger vistas; inhabit differentlevels; connect intricately with other spaces; allowdifferent numbers of occupants; wandercoherently; afford different entryways; frame sky,..,'ater, and trees with windows; etc.-builds theanimate, interlocutive quality which is theoriginary vision, not just of childhood, but of thedeeper levels of human perception. Bognar 0985,p, 90) speaks of a designed space which providesa "richness of place," He describes it as:

. . .the concerted ability of the constituentsto induce a feeling of totality or to signifyeternity in the elusive phenomena of exis­tence, regardless of how few the elementsand how "simple" the place may be. Suchan environment invokes what Aldo vanEyck calls a "Iabyrinthian clarity," withalways another layer of "hidden"meaning or "infinite" depth to discover,

Such rLKes teach the :>llrt ('If sul'l ...,,,,-!-,'l",.',relation thaI was Idl..'ntliicd by Cl'I,'rld~..., '"'lnllllll\'e reason," HI: ddmcd It ,lS llut lr.lllltll'l1of thi nbs which arises \,'hen \,'l' ~'\':>::""':O:' .'11 rs\..'l\ ,"<IS one I,'ith thl' wh0lc.' In «'ntra,t t" I!-,.lt \\'hh'~'

presents it~lf \,'hcn , . " Wl' th!n\.. l,i \"ur~\'I\'l'~ ,1'

scrara ted belO~s. ..lnJ pi".-\..' nJ lu rc III .1n lllh ...'sis !I'the nlll1d, as object tl' :>1:bjl'Lt. Illlnl: hI llh'll~ilt

death to life" (Coven,lV, Hbl, p, ":'1 Intultt',\..,reason IS the vcry form p( i lte or' ch d,ilw. ,...1

CHILDRE~ A'O RE-HL'\1A:'\IZ.\TIO'

This essay represents on Iy a vcry ru,~ Imen tor::beginning of a much larhC'r rdlc...-tlon. Anindeterminate number of other, lr:1portant

uestions remain to be taken up, FM l"'<ampk,..... hat provisions for adults arc nccessar: In d Inll~

habitable child care center, which is. after all. n01just a child- but an adult-child ((IIk-ctlve?Further. is a truly habitable aJult-chdJcollective-whatevcr the glory of its architecturalspace-even pOSSible Without certain basicrequirements which han.' nothing to do \"itharchi tectural space? It is, for exa mple, a rguabJcthat no adult-child collective is truly habitablewithout an appropriate, ratio of adulls to children,That question leads even further, to the questionthat grounds it: Is it callow idl..'alism even tohope that we will ever attain to a cultural andsocial situation in which we give full attention toour children-the attention that they crave andthat we know results in more intelligent, moreproductive, more cooperative, happier adults?

ft could be that our goal as designers andadvocates for children should be thetransformation of all institutional and publicdomains into adult-child collectives. Rather thanfeeling guilty about forcing children out of thehome, we could use the opportunity to force thehome back into public space, and reintegrate thespheres of childrearing and productive work, in anew and dialectically transformed configuration .Returning children to the workplace after theirlong banishment by the Industrial Revolutionmay be a key element in the humanization ofwork just as returning the streets to childrenthrough limiting traffic and other hazards, and re­cognizing the total urban area as a potentialplay/learning environment for children may bethe key to re-humanizing our cities, While thismay seem a far-fetched ideal, the alternative

YOLNG CHILD'S SPACE AND CHILD CARE DESIG:'\ -1;-

-eems to be the Increasing marginalization of-:hI1JhC'oJ-at the same time that weapons~:stems proliferate, environmental pollution""'L'Cl'meS gl0bal, and dehumanized architecturehJt hous~s,adultoperall\'es of,a global system of

I:xploitation from which all traces of childhoodhave been expunged expands. That might seem0qually far-fetched, were it not actuallyhilppening.

FOOT~OTES

. I recognize that children's experience of theenvironment may differ according to their

ender, class, national, ethnic or racial pOSitionand is influenced by their health and physicalabilities. The focus of this paper, however, is onchildren in general and how their environmentalexperience is distinct from that of adults.

~ Ong identifies the psychodynamics of orality asIncorporating the following cognitive, affective,

erceptuai, and social emphases: the magical,illocutionary aspects of language; commu­nication; formulaic expression; thc tendency to"totalize"; the closeness to the "human lifeworld";he "cmpathetic and participatory" mode of

apprehending the world; the prevalence ofconcrete, contextual, and complexive forms ofcategorization; the mythic and agonistic narrativequalities; the "conservative holism" towardspersons and situations; the different forms oftemporalization 0982, Chapter 3).

3 This, indeed, offers an explanation for what hasbeen' called the "invention of childhood," in thatbefore the modern cosmos-rationalized by anew sense of space, time, and causality; andconcerned with a new sort of objectivity whichissued from a changed subject-worldrelationship-children and adults were notconstructed as different from one another as theyare now.

4 Ashis Nandy (987) has suggested that Westernadulthood, in its repudiation of childhood, is keyto understanding the Western ideology ofprogress: 'To the extent adulthood itself is valuedas a symbol of completeness and as an end­product of growth or development, childhood isseen as an imperfect transitional state on the wayto adulthood, normality, full socialization andhumanness. This is the theory of progress asapplied to the individual life cycle. The result is

the frequent use ()f childhood as .1 I.le<;l~n I'

cultural and pOlItlc,ll immatUrity M, It C0me.,; tll

the same thing, IOferiorit:-. Much of the pull ()t

the ideology of c011'nlalism and much ()f thL'power of the idea of modernity can be traced ttlthe cvolutionary implications of the c0ncC'pt OJ

the child in the Western ''\'orld,-iew'' I r. 5:-).

; Prescott, \10ore, and their collcJ£urs, am(ln~

others, have addressed the d(,sl~n ()f space III

young children. Other wNk not Spl.'CIIIC,lIl\about designing ennT0nments iM y(Hlnt;children, but preparatory research iN tho~\'

doing so includes: (1) work at the interidce l'l

social psychology and em'ironmental deSIgn, eon crowding, personal space, and intimacyregulation ( Aiello, Th0mpson, & Baum, 1951;Saegert, 1980; on perceived frecdom Clnd contr()l(Barnes, 1981); and on transactions betweenpeople and places (Spivak, 198-t; Stokols &Shumaker, 1981); and (2) work at the interface ofsocial/environmental psychology andarchitectural programming (Alexander et <11.,1978; Altman, 1975; Bechtel, 1977; Chermaydf &:Alexander, 1963; Moore, 1970; Proshil nsk~.. ,lttelson, & Ri vlin, 1970).

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