The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction · ment of the Bank’s experience with post-conflict reconstruction. The objective of the assessment is to distill

The World Bank’sExperience with

Post-ConflictReconstruction

W O R L D B A N K O P E R A T I O N S E V A L U A T I O N D E P A R T M E N T

1998

The World Bank

Washington, D.C.

Alcira KreimerJohn Eriksson

Robert MuscatMargaret Arnold

Colin Scott

Copyright © 1998

The International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development/THE WORLD BANK

1818 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

First printing June 1998

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Design: The Magazine Group/Jeff Kibler

Photo credits: Curt Carnemark: Cover, p. 3, p. 7, p. 39.

Tim Cullen: p. 15, p. 19, p. 23, p. 35, p. 42, p. 49.

ISSN 1011-6984

ISBN 0-8213-4290-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The World Bank’s experience with post-conflict reconstruction/Alcira Kreimer…[et/al.].

p. cm. — (A World Bank operations evaluation study, ISSN 1011-6984)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8213-4290-8

1. World Bank. 2. Economic assistance—Evaluation. I. Kreimer, Alcira. II. World Bank. III. Series.

HG3881.5.W57W6949 1998

332.1’532—dc21

98-36250CIP

Printed on recycled paper.

APL Adaptable Program LoanBiH Bosnia and HerzegovinaBP Bank ProcedureCAS Country Assistance StrategyCG Consultative GroupCTF Consultant Trust FundDAC Development Assistance Committee

(of the OECD)DGF Development Grant FundDRF Debt-Reduction FacilityEAP East Asia and Pacific Regional OfficeECA Europe and Central Asia Regional OfficeED Executive DirectorEDI Economic Development InstituteEDUCO Community-managed Schools

Program (Educación conParticipación de la Comunidad)

EERC Emergency Economic Recovery CreditERC Economic Rehabilitation CreditERL Emergency Recovery LoanERR Program Emergency Reconstruction and

Rehabilitation ProgramERRP Emergency Reconstruction and

Rehabilitation ProjectESW Economic and Sector WorkEU European UnionFAO UN Food and Agriculture

OrganizationFRM Resource Mobilization DepartmentGDP Gross Domestic ProductGP Good PracticeICR Implementation Completion ReportIDB Inter-American Development BankIFC International Finance CorporationILO International Labour OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundLAC Latin America and the Caribbean

Regional Office

LIL Learning and Innovation LoanLLC Learning and Leadership CenterMENA Middle East and North Africa

Regional OfficeMIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee

AgencyMOH Ministry of HealthNGO Non-governmental OrganizationNURP Northern Uganda Reconstruction

ProjectOECD Organization for Economic

Cooperation and DevelopmentOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentOD Operational DirectiveOP Operational PolicyPCP Post-Conflict Program PCR Project Completion ReportPHRD Policy and Human Resources

Development FundPIU Project Implementation UnitPMU Project Management UnitPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportPPF Project Preparation FacilityRIL Rehabilitation Import LoanSAC Structural Adjustment CreditSAL Structural Adjustment LoanSAS South Asia Regional OfficeTA Technical AssistanceUN United NationsUNDP UN Development ProgrammeUNHCR UN High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF UN Children’s FundUNOHR UN Office of the High RepresentativeUNOPS UN Operational ServicesUSAID United States Agency for International

DevelopmentWHO World Health Organization

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

iii

C o n t e n t s

v Acknowledgmentsvii Foreword, Prefacio, Préfaceix Executive Summary, Resumen, Résumé Analytique

1 1. Introduction1 Background and Study Objectives1 Conceptual Framework2 Study Scope and Methodology

5 2. Evolution of Bank Policy Markers5 Operational Policy on Lending for Emergencies6 Framework Paper for Post-Conflict Reconstruction6 Board Discussion and Decisions

9 3. Anatomy of the Bank’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio9 The Bank’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

12 The Lending Portfolio13 Non-lending Services15 The Cost of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations15 Lessons from Evaluations of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations18 Characteristics of Post-Conflict Countries

21 4. Defining the Bank’s Role21 The Bank’s Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting Sustainable Peace21 Obstacles to the Peace Objective22 Economic and Social Factors in (Levels of) Conflict22 Peace Conditionality24 Partnership Coordination24 A Place at the Table24 The Bank’s Role in Aid Coordination26 Other Aspects of Partnership

27 5. The Bank’s Comparative Advantage and Performance27 Stabilizing and Rebuilding the Economy28 Fiscal and Structural Economic Reforms28 Housing Recovery29 The Problem of Demining29 Rebuilding Human, Social, and Cultural Capital30 Social Capital30 The Role of Women30 Demobilization31 Is Land the Lever?32 Culture is Not a Luxury

33 6. The Folly of Some Conventional Wisdoms33 Too High a Price for Tax Revenue?34 Timing and Sequence Are the Keys34 Consider Political Realities34 First Things First

iv

37 7. The Bank’s Institutional Arrangements37 Country Teams38 Support and Reinforcement38 No Universal Pattern38 Give Teams the Tools38 Programming, Design, and Implementation39 Need is Only Part of the Equation40 Processes Can Become Obstacles41 Variable Results (PIUs and PMUs)41 Client and Staff Training and Development41 Implications for Monitoring and Evaluation42 Importance of Continuity42 Through a Different Lens43 Developing Consistency44 Returning to “Normal” Operations

45 8. Directions for Future Bank Policy

49 Endnotes

53 Selected Bibliography

57 Annexes57 Annex 1. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies66 Annex 2. List of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lending Operations72 Annex 3. List of People Interviewed for the Study78 Annex 4. Comparison of PCR/ICR Ratings with PPAR/EVM Ratings80 Annex 5. IBRD/IDA Lending Commitments by Region (with detail of

post-conflict countries)82 Annex 6. Partnership in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Workshop—

Directory of Participants92 Annex 7. The World Bank’s Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction/

Management Response95 Annex 8. Report from CODE/Committee on Development Effectiveness

Tables10 3.1: Summary of World Bank Group Involvement in Post-conflict

Reconstruction13 3.2: IBRD/IDA Commitments to Post-Conflict Countries as a Percentage

of the Regional and Global Portfolios (Percent)16 3.3: Staff Years Dedicated to the Nine Case Study Countries24 4.1: The Bank’s Role and Effectiveness in Coordination and Partnership28 5.1: The Bank’s Role and Effectiveness in Rebuilding the Economy29 5.2: The Bank’s Role and Effectiveness in Restoring Human, Social, and

Cultural Capital

Figures12 3.1: Post-Conflict Lending Operations Approved by Region14 3.2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lending by Sector, 1977–1997

T h e W o r l d B a n k ’ s E x p e r i e n c e w i t h P o s t - C o n f l i c t R e c o n s t r u c t i o n

v

This report synthesizes the findings of an assess-ment of the Bank’s experience with post-conflictreconstruction. The objective of the assessment

is to distill lessons for ongoing and future operationsfrom the Bank’s experience in providing assistance forpost-conflict reconstruction. In addition to this sum-mary document, outputs of the study include separatevolumes of the case studies.

The report has been prepared by a team led byAlcira Kreimer and comprising John Eriksson, RobertMuscat, Margaret Arnold, and Colin Scott. The follow-ing consultants contributed to the country case studies:Ann Elwan on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Jose Marquesand Mauricio Silva on El Salvador; and Paul Collier andZerubabel Ojoo on Uganda. Caroline Clarke prepared areview of the portfolio. Gregg Jackson provided assis-tance on methodological issues and June Taboroff pre-pared a paper on cultural heritage. William B. Hurlbutprovided editorial assistance. Helen Watkins providedadministrative assistance.

Cooperation and partial funding for the study wereprovided by the Swiss Agency for Development andCooperation (SDC) as part of the OED/SDC partnershipprogram. OED thanks SDC for its generous support.

Many World Bank staff members contributed valu-able inputs throughout the study, taking the time to beinterviewed, offering comments, and reviewing drafts.The assessment team appreciates their thoughtful contri-butions, and acknowledges the valuable comments pro-vided by the following staff members: Gordon Appleby,Ana Maria Arriagada, Mark Baird, Ian Bannon, Nat

Colletta, Laura Cooley, Guy Darlan, Gloria Davis,Patrice Dufour, Patricia Weiss Fagen, Laura Frigenti,Steve Holtzman, Laurens Hoppenbrouwer, AndrasHorvai, Paul Hubbard, Ian Johnson, Markus Kostner,Linda Lowenstein, Katherine Marshall, Mark Malloch-Brown, Peter Miovic, Chukwuma Obidegwu,Rory O’Sullivan, Christiaan J. Poortman, ChristopherRedfern, Ritva Reinikka, Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer,Geoffrey Shepherd, Nils Tcheyan, Christine Wallich, andThomas A. White. OED also thanks external reviewersMary Anderson, Kenneth Bush, and Niels Dabelstein for their time and helpful comments. OED also thanksMr. E. Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary/Trea-surer of the Ministry of Finance of Uganda for his thor-ough comments on the Uganda case study. The commentsfrom the Committee on Development Effectiveness(CODE) have been reviewed and incorporated. Remain-ing errors of commission or omission, as well as the con-clusions and recommendations, are those of the authorsand should not be attributed to any of the reviewers.

The report was produced as part of the OEDPK pub-lication series by a team under the direction of ElizabethCampbell-Pagé, consisting of Leo Demesmaker, TsigeKagombe, Roshna Kapadia, and Kathy Strauss.

Acknowledgments

Director-General, Operations Evaluation Department: Robert Picciotto

Director, Operations Evaluation Department: Elizabeth McAllister

Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluations: Roger Slade

Task Manager: Alcira Kreimer

vii

FOREWORDThe attached study is basedon a review of the Bank’sglobal portfolio; nine countrycase studies (three field studiesand six desk studies); a litera-ture review; and interviews

with Bank staff, other donors,international agencies, NGOs, and(for field studies) member govern-ments. The study identifies 18countries with 157 Bank-supportedpost-conflict operations represent-ing US$6.2 billion in lending. Itreveals that the Bank has a criticalrole to play in post-conflict recon-struction. The Bank’s use of consul-tative groups has been particularlyeffective for mobilizing aidresources, including facilitating theclearing of arrears; seeking a coor-dinated approach to macroeco-nomic issues; and providing infor-mation on recovery needs andassistance flows. Two other impor-tant contributions are to promoteaid coordination and, if invited, toadvise on the economic develop-ment dimensions of peace accordoptions.

The main recommendationemerging from the study is that theBank should develop a clear Oper-ational Policy on post-conflictreconstruction assistance using theFramework for World BankInvolvement in Post-ConflictReconstruction as a starting point.The policy should address readi-ness to provide economic develop-ment policy advice during peacenegotiations; post-conflict aid coor-dination; leadership on macroeco-nomic and external debt issues incollaboration with the IMF andkey external donors; definition ofpriorities in macroeconomic stabi-lization programs, infrastructurerebuilding, and restoration of

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PREFACIOEl estudio que se adjunta estábasado en un examen de la car-tera del Banco; nueve estudios decasos sobre países (tres estudiossobre el terreno y seis estudiosteóricos), un estudio bibliográ-

fico, y entrevistas a funcionarios delBanco, otros donantes, organismosinternacionales, organizaciones nogubernamentales y (en el caso de losestudios sobre el terreno) gobiernos depaíses miembros. En el estudio se iden-tifican 18 países y 157 operacionessobre situaciones posteriores a un con-flicto respaldadas por el Bancomediante préstamos por un total deUS$6.200 millones, lo que indica quela institución cumple una función fun-damental en la reconstrucción de pos-guerra. El recurso del Banco a gruposconsultivos ha resultado especialmenteeficaz para movilizar recursos de ayuday facilitar la liquidación de pagos atra-sados, para encontrar la forma de coor-dinar acciones sobre los asuntosmacroeconómicos y para suministrarinformación sobre las necesidades derecuperación y los flujos de asistencia.Otros dos aportes importantes son pro-mover la coordinación de la ayuda y, sise pide asistencia, dar asesoramientosobre las dimensiones de los acuerdosde paz en términos del desarrollo económico.

La principal recomendación delestudio es que el Banco debería formu-lar una política operacional claramentedefinida sobre asistencia para lareconstrucción después de los conflic-tos a partir del documento tituladoFramework for World Bank Involve-

ment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

En dicha política se deberían abordaraspectos tales como la preparaciónpara dar asesoría sobre políticas dedesarrollo económico durante las nego-ciaciones de paz; coordinación de laayuda en la etapa posterior a los con-

PRÉFACEL’étude ci-jointe se fonde sur unexamen du portefeuille mondialde la Banque, sur neuf études decas de pays (trois sur le terrain etsix sur dossier), sur une analysedes publications pertinentes, ainsi

que sur des entretiens avec des mem-bres du personnel de la Banque, avecd’autres bailleurs de fonds, organismesinternationaux, ONG, et, pour les étu-des sur le terrain, avec les gouverne-ments des pays membres concernés.L’étude recense 18 pays où la Banqueapporte son concours à 157 opérationspost-conflits, représentant un volumede prêts de 6,2 milliards de dollars. Ellemet en lumière le rôle crucial que laBanque peut jouer pour aider les pays àse relever d’un conflit. Les groupesconsultatifs organisés par la Banquesont un moyen particulièrement effi-cace de mobiliser des ressources d’aide,et aussi de faciliter le règlement desarriérés, de définir une approche coor-donnée des questions macroéconomi-ques, et de réunir des informations surles besoins de reconstruction et les fluxd’aide. La Banque peut aussi contri-buer utilement à la coordination del’aide et, si on le lui demande, au stadede la négociation des accords de paix,elle peut dispenser des conseils sur levolet développement économique desoptions envisagées.

L’étude recommande avant toutque la Banque se dote d’une politiqueopérationnelle sans ambiguïté sur l’aideà la reconstruction post-conflits, en sefondant sur le « Cadre d’action de laBanque mondiale pour la reconstruc-tion des pays sortant d’un conflit ». Cenouveau document devrait traiter lesquestions suivantes : aptitude à fournirdes conseils sur la politique de dévelop-pement économique durant les négocia-tions de paix ; coordination de l’aidepost-conflits ; pilotage du traitementdes questions relatives à la situation

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human and social capital;selectivity in macroeconomicand structural policy condi-tionality; flexibility in pro-gramming, design, and imple-mentation; the division oflabor between headquarters

and field staff; and the importanceof monitoring and evaluation.


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flictos; liderazgo en cuestionesmacroeconómicas y sobre deudaexterna, en colaboración con elFMI y donantes externos clave;determinación de prioridadespara los programas de estabiliza-ción macroeconómica, recons-

trucción de infraestructura y restitucióndel capital humano y social; selectivi-dad en la condicionalidad de políticamacroeconómica y estructural; flexibi-lidad en las etapas de programación,diseño y ejecución; división de funcio-nes entre el personal de la sede y el des-tacado fuera de la sede, y la importan-cia del seguimiento y la evaluación.

macroéconomique et à l’endette-ment extérieur, en collaborationavec le FMI et les principauxbailleurs de fonds extérieurs ; hié-rarchisation des priorités entreprogrammes de stabilisationmacroéconomique, reconstruc-

tion de l’infrastructure et rétablisse-ment du capital humain et des struc-tures sociales ; sélectivité de laconditionnalité en matière de politiquemacroéconomique et structurelle ; sou-plesse de la programmation, de laconception et de l’exécution ; divisiondu travail entre le siège et le personnelsur le terrain ; et importance du suivi etde l’évaluation.

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Robert PicciottoDirector-General, Operations Evaluation Department

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe explosion of civil con-flicts in the post-Cold Warworld has tested the WorldBank’s ability to addressunprecedented devastation ofhuman and social capital.

Since 1980, the volume of Banklending to post-conflict countrieshas increased over 800 percent, toUS$6.2 billion, and touched everyregion and economic sector. ThisOperations Evaluation Department(OED) assessment of the Bank’spost-conflict reconstruction port-folio aims to enhance the institu-tion’s ability to respond more effec-tively and efficiently to the needs ofsocieties rebuilding after conflict.The assessment examines Bankoperational policies as they relateto post-conflict reconstruction andcalls for a new policy statementthat will consolidate, clarify andrefine existing policies.

To accomplish its aim thestudy assesses recent Bank experi-ence in post-conflict reconstructionand extracts lessons for ongoingand future operations. The core ofthe assessment consists of nine casestudies: three chosen for field study(Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH], ElSalvador, and Uganda) and six cho-sen for desk reviews (Cambodia,Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda,and Sri Lanka). In all these cases,the Bank played a significant rolein attempting to assist with post-conflict reconstruction. They repre-sent diversity in the causes of statefailure or collapse as well as in thefactors that influence initiation orresumption of Bank operations.The cases also vary in region andphase of Bank assistance.

In conducting the case studies,six key issues were analyzed: (a) theBank’s main strengths or compara-

RESUMENEl estallido de conflictos civilescon posterioridad a la guerra fríaha puesto a prueba la capacidaddel Banco Mundial para hacerfrente a una devastación sin pre-cedentes en términos de capital

humano y social. Desde 1980, el volu-men del financiamiento del Banco a lospaíses que salen de un conflicto haaumentado más del 800%, hasta llegara US$6.200 millones, y ha beneficiadoa todas las regiones y sectores de laeconomía. La presente evaluación de lacartera de préstamos del Banco parafines de reconstrucción después de unconflicto preparada por el Departa-mento de Evaluación de Operaciones(DEO) tiene por objeto aumentar lacapacidad de la institución para aten-der con mayor eficiencia y eficacia a lasnecesidades de las sociedades que haniniciado el proceso de reconstruccióntras un conflicto. En la evaluación sepasa revista a las políticas operaciona-les del Banco relacionadas con lareconstrucción después de los conflic-tos y se propugna una nueva declara-ción de políticas que consolide, aclare yperfeccione las políticas vigentes.

Para lograr los objetivos señala-dos, en el estudio se evalúa la experien-cia reciente del Banco en materia dereconstrucción después de los conflic-tos y se extraen enseñanzas para lasoperaciones en marcha y futuras. Laparte fundamental de la evaluacióncomprende nueve estudios de casos:tres fueron seleccionados para estudiossobre el terreno (Bosnia y Herzegovina,El Salvador y Uganda), y seis para estu-dios teóricos (Camboya, Eritrea, Haití,Líbano, Rwanda y Sri Lanka). Entodos los casos, el Banco cumplió unaimportante función de asistencia parala reconstrucción en situaciones de esetipo. Ellos representan la diversidad decausas del fracaso o desmoronamientodel Estado, así como de los factores

RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUEL’explosion de troubles civils dansle monde de l’après- guerre froide amis à rude épreuve la capacité de laBanque à faire face à des cata-strophes humaines et sociales d’uneampleur sans précédent. Depuis

1980, le volume des prêts accordés à despays sortant de conflits a augmenté deplus de 800 % pour atteindre 6,2 -milliards de dollars, répartis entre toutesles régions du monde et tous les secteurséconomiques. Réalisée par le Départe-ment de l’évaluation des opérations(OED), la présente étude du portefeuilledes projets de reconstruction post-conflitvise à renforcer l’aptitude de l’institutionà répondre plus efficacement aux besoinsdes sociétés sortant d’un conflit. Elle exa-mine les principes qui guident les opéra-tions de la Banque dans ce domaine etrecommande l’adoption de nouvellesdirectives pour renforcer, clarifier et amé-liorer les politiques actuelles.

Dans cette perspective, l’étude éva-lue l’expérience récente de la Banque eten tire les leçons au profit des projets encours et à venir. Cette évaluation reposeessentiellement sur neuf monographies,dont trois ont fait l’objet de recherchessur le terrain (Bosnie-Herzégovine, ElSalvador et Ouganda) et six d’étudesdocumentaires (Cambodge, Érythrée,Haïti, Liban, Rwanda et Sri Lanka).Dans tous ces cas, la Banque a joué unrôle important dans l’action entreprisepour aider ces pays à se relever deconflits. Ces exemples sont représenta-tifs des diverses causes de l’échec ou del’effondrement de l’État, ainsi que desfacteurs qui amènent la Banque à inter-venir ou à reprendre ses opérations. Ilsreflètent également la diversité desrégions concernées et les différentesphases de l’aide de la Banque.

Pour chacune de ces monogra-phies, on a analysé six grands thèmes :a) les principaux atouts ou avantagescomparatifs de la Banque ; b) les parte-

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tive advantages; (b) its partner-ship with other donors, inter-national organizations, andNGOs; (c) its role in recon-struction strategy and damageand needs assessment; (d) itsrole in rebuilding the economy

and institutions of governance; (e) itsmanagement of resources andprocesses; and (f) its monitoring andevaluation experience. The studyfocused on lesson-learning ratherthan accountability for performance.It examined Bank policies, decision-making processes, non-lending ser-vices, and scores of operations,many of them ongoing, making anaudit nearly impossible. Althoughfactors of performance related toprocess are identified, the study isnot meant to be a process review.

Findings and RecommendationsPost-conflict reconstruction is a cen-tral issue for the Bank; it comprises asignificant portion of the portfolioand affects the institution’s coreactivities. In the past, however, theBank has addressed the special needsposed by civil conflict on an ad hocbasis. The Board took steps to rem-edy this in 1997 with its endorse-ment of a policy framework to guideits actions in post-conflict situations.The subsequent creation of the Post-Conflict Unit further advanced workin this area by creating a focal pointfor policy development, cross-coun-try learning, and the development ofexpertise. Clearly, if the Bank is toimprove the relevance, efficacy, andefficiency of its support to post-con-flict countries, it needs to continue inthis direction and adjust the way itconducts business to accommodatethe special needs of countries emerg-ing from conflict.

The findings of this study pointto five areas of focus for further

que influyen en el inicio o reanu-dación de las operaciones delBanco. Además, los casos analiza-dos corresponden a diferentesregiones y reflejan diversas etapasde la asistencia de la institución.

En los estudios de casos seanalizaron seis cuestiones fundamenta-les: a) las principales fortalezas o venta-jas comparativas del Banco; b) su aso-ciación con otros donantes, organismosinternacionales y organizaciones nogubernamentales; c) su participación enla estrategia de reconstrucción y en laevaluación de los daños y necesidades;d) su participación en la reconstrucciónde la economía y las instituciones degobierno; e) la gestión de los recursos yprocesos, y f) su experiencia en lo querespecta al seguimiento y la evaluación.El estudio se orientó más bien a extraerenseñanzas que a dar cuenta de losresultados. Se examinaron las políticasdel Banco, los procesos de adopción dedecisiones en la institución, los servi-cios no crediticios y las calificacionesde las operaciones, muchas de las cua-les están en marcha, por lo que era casiimposible efectuar una auditoría. Sibien se identifican factores de desem-peño relacionados con los procesos, lafinalidad del estudio no era evaluardichos procesos.

Hallazgos y recomendacionesLa reconstrucción después de los con-flictos es un tema de importancia cen-tral para el Banco; representa una parteimportante de su cartera y afecta lasactividades básicas de la institución. Enel pasado, sin embargo, el Banco aten-día las necesidades especiales que plan-teaban los conflictos civiles según lascircunstancias de cada caso. En 1997,el Directorio Ejecutivo decidió adoptarmedidas para remediar esta situación yaprobó un marco de políticas queorientaba sus acciones en las situacio-nes de posguerra. La creación ulterior

nariats qu’elle a établis avecd’autres bailleurs de fonds, orga-nismes internationaux et ONG ;c) son rôle dans l’élaboration desstratégies de reconstruction etdans l’évaluation des dommageset des besoins ; d) son rôle dans le

redressement de l’économie et le réta-blissement des institutions gouverne-mentales ; e) sa gestion des ressources etdes processus ; et f) son expérience enmatière de suivi et d’évaluation. On adavantage cherché à tirer les leçons del’action entreprise qu’à porter un juge-ment sur les résultats. L’examen a portésur les politiques de la Banque, les pro-cessus de décision, les services hors prêtet la notation des projets, le fait quebeaucoup sont encore inachevés ren-dant un audit presque impossible. Sil’on a identifié les facteurs de perfor-mance liés aux processus, le but de l’é-tude n’étant pas d’évaluer ces processus.

Conclusions et recommandationsLa reconstruction des pays sortant d’unconflit occupe une place centrale dansla mission de la Banque. Elle représenteune part importante de son portefeuilleet affecte ses activités essentielles.Cependant, par le passé, la Banque arépondu aux besoins issus de conflitscivils sur une base ad hoc. Le Conseil acherché à remédier à cette situation en1997 en approuvant un cadre d’actiongénéral pour guider l’aide de la Banqueà la suite de conflits. La création ulté-rieure de l’Unité post-conflits a permisde nouveaux progrès en constituant unpoint d’ancrage pour l’élaboration depolitiques, l’échange d’expérience d’unpays à l’autre et le renforcement descompétences. Il est évident que si laBanque veut améliorer la pertinence,l’efficacité et l’efficience de l’appuiapporté aux pays sortant de conflits,elle devra continuer dans cette voie etadapter ses moyens d’action auxbesoins particuliers de ces pays.


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improvement: clarifying Bankpolicy, defining the Bank’srole, sharpening the Bank’scomparative advantage andperformance, considering thefolly of some conventionalwisdoms, and making appro-

priate institutional arrangements.

Clarify Bank PolicyThe Bank currently lacks an ade-quate Operational Policy on assis-tance for post-conflict reconstruc-tion. Policy guidance is now drawnprimarily from Operational Policy(OP) 8.5, which was originallydeveloped for reconstruction fol-lowing natural disasters. Otherguidance comes from the Frame-work for World Bank Involvementin Post-Conflict Countries of April1997. The main recommendationemerging from the study is that theBank should revise the Frameworkand transform it into an Opera-tional Policy, with accompanyingBank Procedures and Good Prac-tices to guide Bank staff in provid-ing post-conflict reconstructionassistance. OP8.5 should be revisedto apply only to natural disasters(as well as unexpected man-madedisasters of limited duration thatmay require such emergency assis-tance, such as large-scale industrialaccidents). The new OP, BPs, andGPs should address the followingissues:

• readiness to provide eco-nomic development policyadvice during peacenegotiations;

• post-conflict aid coordination;• leadership on macroeco-

nomic and external debtissues in collaboration withthe IMF and external donors;

• definition of priorities amongmacroeconomic stabilization,

de la Unidad de Situaciones Pos-teriores a los Conflictos significóun avance en este ámbito, al esta-blecerse un centro de coordina-ción para formular políticas,aprender de la experiencia de losdistintos países y preparar perso-

nal especializado. Sin lugar a dudas, sisu propósito es dar mayor relevancia alapoyo que brinda a los países que salende un conflicto y mejorar la eficiencia yeficacia de dicha asistencia, el Bancodebe continuar en esa dirección y adap-tar la manera en que lleva a cabo susactividades para atender las necesida-des especiales de esos países.

Los hallazgos de este estudioapuntan a cinco áreas que puedenseguir mejorándose: aclaración de lapolítica del Banco; definición del papelque le cabe a la institución; determina-ción más precisa de su ventaja compa-rativa y mejora de su desempeño;reconsideración de ciertos criteriosgeneralmente aceptados que no resul-tan acertados, y establecimiento demecanismos institucionales apropiados.

Aclaración de la política del BancoActualmente el Banco no tiene una polí-tica operacional adecuada en materiade asistencia para la reconstrucción des-pués de los conflictos. Las orientacionesde política se basan fundamentalmenteen la política operacional OP8.5, queen un principio se formuló para lareconstrucción después de desastresnaturales. Otras orientaciones provie-nen del documento titulado Framework

for World Bank Involvement in Post-

Conflict Countries, de abril de 1997. Larecomendación más importante delestudio es que el Banco debería revisarese documento y convertirlo en políticaoperacional. A ello se acompañaríanprocedimientos del Banco (BP) y prácti-cas recomendadas (GP) que orientarana los funcionarios a la hora de prestarasistencia para la reconstrucción des-

L’étude recommande d’axerl’effort d’amélioration sur cinqdomaines : clarifier la politiquede la Banque, définir son rôle,préciser son avantage comparatifet renforcer sa performance,remettre en cause certaines prati-

ques conventionnelles, et mettre enplace le dispositif institutionnelapproprié.

Clarifier la politique de la BanqueÀ l’heure actuelle, la Banque n’a pasde politique opérationnelle appro-priée pour l’aide à la reconstruction àl’issue de conflits. Les directives exis-tantes se limitent essentiellement à laNote de politique opérationnelle 8.5(OP 8.5), initialement élaborée pourl’aide à la reconstruction à la suite decatastrophes naturelles. D’autresindications sont données dans ledocument d’avril 1997 « Cadre

d’action de la Banque mondiale dans

les situations de conflit ». La princi-pale recommandation de l’étude estde réviser ce document et d’en faireune Note de politique opérationnelle,en la complétant par d’autres Notessur les procédures de la Banque (BP)et sur les pratiques recommandées(GP) afin de guider le travail des ser-vices de la Banque. L’OP 8.5 devraitêtre révisée et ne s’appliquer qu’auxcatastrophes naturelles (ainsi qu’auxcatastrophes imprévues d’originehumaine et d’une durée limitée, cel-les-ci pouvant exiger le même type desecours d’urgence, dans le cas parexemple de graves accidents indus-triels). Les nouvelles Notes sur lapolitique opérationnelle (OP), lesprocédures (BP) et les pratiquesrecommandées (GP) devraient traiterles questions suivantes :

• aptitude à fournir des conseilssur la politique de développe-ment économique durant lesnégociations de paix ;


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infrastructure rebuilding, andrestoration of human andsocial capital;

• macroeconomic and structuralpolicy conditionality;

• flexibility in programming,design, and implementation;

• institutional arrangements;• the importance of monitoring

and evaluation; and• promoting equitable

development.The recommendations that fol-

low provide more detail on theissues outlined above, and shouldbe dealt with in the new OP, BPs,and GPs.

Define the Bank’s RoleThe Bank has a critical role to playin the early stages of post-conflictreconstruction. The Bank can bevaluable in external aid coordina-tion, which is specially important inthe transition from war to peace.The Bank’s use of consultativegroups has been particularly effec-tive for mobilizing resources, includ-ing facilitating the clearing ofarrears; seeking a coordinatedapproach to macroeconomic issues;and providing information onrecovery needs and assistance flows.

Similarly, if invited to partici-pate, the Bank has the potential tomake effective contributions topeace negotiations. Bank advice onthe economic development dimen-sions of peace accord options canhelp improve economic governancecomponents of peace accords andlay a foundation for more effectiveinterpretation and implementationin the critical first months followingagreement. The Bank’s participationin the peace negotiations in Bosniaand Herzegovina and Guatemalaare two examples of its potential tocontribute to the peace process.

pués de los conflictos. Se deberíarevisar la OP8.5, de manera quese aplique únicamente a los desas-tres naturales (así como a los des-astres imprevistos y de corta dura-ción causados por la intervenciónhumana que requieran asistencia

de emergencia, como los accidentesindustriales de gran magnitud). Lasnuevas OP, BP y GP podrían abordarlos siguientes aspectos:

• preparación para dar asesoríasobre políticas de desarrollo eco-nómico durante las negociacionesde paz;

• coordinación de la ayuda en laetapa posterior a los conflictos;

• liderazgo en cuestiones macro-económicas y sobre la deudaexterna, en colaboración con elFMI y los donantes externos;

• determinación de prioridadesentre estabilización macroeconó-mica, reconstrucción de lainfraestructura y restitución delcapital humano y social;

• condicionalidad de la políticamacroeconómica y estructural;

• flexibilidad en las etapas de pro-gramación, diseño y ejecución;

• mecanismos institucionales;• importancia del seguimiento y la

evaluación, y• promoción del desarrollo con

equidad.En las recomendaciones que se

presentan más adelante se describencon más detalle las cuestiones antesseñaladas; dichas recomendaciones sedeberían abordar en las nuevas OP, BPy GP.

Definición del papel del BancoEl Banco cumple un papel fundamentalen las primeras etapas de la reconstruc-ción de posguerra. Su participaciónpuede ser muy valiosa para la coordi-nación de la ayuda externa, que esespecialmente importante en la transi-

• coordination de l’aide post-conflit ;

• pilotage du traitement des ques-tions relatives à la situationmacroéconomique et à l’endet-tement extérieur, en collabora-tion avec le FMI et les bailleursde fonds extérieurs ;

• hiérarchisation des prioritésentre stabilisation macroécono-mique, reconstruction de l’infras-tructure, rétablissement du capi-tal humain et des structuressociales ;

• conditionnalité en matière depolitique macroéconomique etstructurelle ;

• souplesse de la programmation, dela conception et de l’exécution ;

• dispositifs institutionnels ;• importance du suivi et de l’éva-

luation ; et• promotion d’un développement

équitable.Les recommandations présentées

ci-après donnent plus de détails sur cesdivers éléments et devraient être prisesen compte dans les nouvelles Notes OP,BP et GP.

Définition du rôle de la BanqueLa Banque a un rôle critique à joueraux premiers stades de l’effort dereconstruction post-conflit. Elle peutcontribuer utilement à la coordinationde l’aide extérieure, qui revêt uneimportance particulière pour la transi-tion de la guerre à la paix. Les groupesconsultatifs organisés par la Banquesont un moyen particulièrement effi-cace de mobiliser des ressources, etaussi de faciliter le règlement des arrié-rés, de définir une approche coordon-née des questions macroéconomiques etde réunir des informations sur lesbesoins et les flux d’aide.

De même, s’il lui est demandé d’yparticiper, la Banque est en mesure decontribuer utilement à la négociation


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Although not the focus ofthe study, the case studiesrevealed several examples inwhich the Bank either did notaddress emerging distribu-tional imbalances or missed asignificant opportunity to pro-

mote equitable development. TheBank needs to recognize its poten-tial to influence the course of pre-conflict events. Although it maynot be appropriate for the Bank toadopt an OP on conflict prevention(as this may imply crossing the lineinto the realm of political issueswhich would be inappropriateunder the Bank’s mandate), GoodPractices should be developed thatencourage staff to be sensitive topredatory and exclusionary behav-ior that adversely affects projectsand shared development objectives.The Bank should raise such con-cerns in its dialogue with the gov-ernment and other donors.

Sharpen the Bank’s ComparativeAdvantage and PerformanceThe two areas of strongest Bankperformance have been support formacroeconomic stabilization andrebuilding physical infrastructure.Supporting the achievement ofmacroeconomic stabilization shouldbe one of the Bank’s highest andearliest priorities in post-conflict sit-uations. The macroeconomic issuesat stake in post-conflict reconstruc-tion may call for substantial policyconditionality. Such conditionalityrequires case-by-case analysis, how-ever. Depending on the countryimplementation capacity and thepolitical environment, it may not beappropriate to introduce wide-rang-ing conditionalities all at once.

The Bank should also be pre-pared to support the rebuilding ofphysical infrastructure, with ade-

ción de la guerra a la paz. El usopor parte del Banco de gruposconsultivos ha sido especialmenteeficaz para la movilización derecursos, que incluye facilitar laliquidación de pagos atrasados; labúsqueda de un enfoque coordi-

nado para abordar las cuestionesmacroeconómicas, y el suministro deinformación sobre las necesidades derecuperación y sobre los flujos deasistencia.

Del mismo modo, si lo invitan aparticipar, el Banco tiene la capacidadde contribuir con eficacia a las nego-ciaciones de paz. El asesoramiento delBanco sobre las dimensiones de losacuerdos de paz en términos del desa-rrollo económico puede ayudar a mejo-rar los componentes de gestión econó-mica de dichos acuerdos y a sentar lasbases que permitan que su interpreta-ción y aplicación sean más eficaces enlos primeros meses críticos después defirmado el acuerdo. La participacióndel Banco en las negociaciones de pazen Bosnia y Herzegovina y en Guate-mala son dos ejemplos de la contribu-ción que puede hacer el Banco al pro-ceso de paz.

Si bien no son el centro de aten-ción del informe, los estudios de casosmostraron varios ejemplos en los que elBanco no corrigió desequilibrios inci-pientes en materia distributiva o des-aprovechó una oportunidad impor-tante de promover el desarrollo conequidad. El Banco debe reconocer quetiene el potencial de influir en el cursode los acontecimientos que preceden aun conflicto. Aunque tal vez no seaprocedente que el Banco adopte unapolítica operacional sobre prevenciónde conflictos (puesto que ello podríaimplicar una intromisión en asuntospolíticos que, por mandato, no son desu incumbencia), se deberían formularprácticas recomendadas (GP) que alen-taran al personal del Banco a no pasar

des accords de paix. Ses conseilssur le volet développement écono-mique des options envisagéespeuvent aider à améliorer les dis-positions de ces accords relativesà l’organisation de la gestion del’économie et ouvrir la voie à une

meilleure interprétation et à une appli-cation plus efficace pendant les pre-miers mois critiques de leur mise enoeuvre. Sa participation à la négocia-tion des accords pour la Bosnie-Herzé-govine et le Guatemala témoigne de lacontribution que la Banque peutapporter au processus de paix.

Bien que l’étude n’ait pas été cen-trée sur cet aspect, les monographiesont révélé plusieurs cas où la Banquen’a pas réagi à l’apparition de déséqui-libres dans la répartition ou n’a pas suexploiter une bonne occasion de pro-mouvoir un développement équitable.La Banque doit être consciente del’influence qu’elle peut exercer sur lecours des événements avant le déclen-chement d’un conflit. Il serait peut-êtreinapproprié d’établir une Note OP(Politique opérationnelle) sur la préven-tion des conflits (cela pouvant êtreperçu comme une ingérence dans ledomaine politique contraire au mandatde la Banque), mais il conviendrait depréparer une Note GP (Pratiquesrecommandées) pour sensibiliser le per-sonnel aux comportements prédateurset aux pratiques d’exclusion qui por-tent préjudice aux projets et à la mobi-lisation de toutes les énergies au serviced’objectifs de développement com-muns. La Banque devrait inclure cetaspect du problème parmi les thèmesde son dialogue avec les gouvernementset les autres bailleurs de fonds.

Préciser l’avantage comparatif de laBanque et renforcer sa performanceC’est dans le domaine de la stabilisationmacroéconomique et dans celui de laréhabilitation des infrastructures physi-


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quate attention to necessarypolicy and institutionalreforms. Rebuilding infra-structure often requires de-mining. Although there arestrong economic and humani-tarian reasons for demining,

the main lesson learned from thisassessment is that the Bank’s com-parative advantage in stand-alonedemining projects is not apparent.Adherence to the 1997 OperationalGuidelines on Demining, is critical.Bank involvement in such activitiesshould focus primarily on indirect,non-clearance activities, such ascoordination, information andmine awareness, training, and insti-tution building. Support for mineclearance should be always inte-grated with a specific developmentactivity.

The restoration of human andsocial capital has not been a prior-ity in Bank post-conflict portfolios.The case of BiH, where the Banksupported early and balancedsocial sector work that producedsome promising reports, appears tobe an exception. Although comple-tion reports in social sector post-conflict reconstruction are still rela-tively few, it seems that mostresults of Bank efforts in these sec-tors have been modest. Ugandaoperations produced unsatisfactoryresults, and modest results are evi-dent so far in the restoration ofsocial and human capital in Eritrea,Haiti, and Rwanda. The El Sal-vador Basic Education Moderniza-tion Project has been a rare excep-tion producing encouraging resultsin the social sectors. The participa-tory nature of the program hascontributed to consensus-buildingand the sustainability of the peaceprocess. Partnerships with otherinternational and bilateral agencies

por alto los comportamientosabusivos y excluyentes, que afec-tan negativamente a los proyectosy a los objetivos comunes enmateria de desarrollo. El Bancodebería plantear estas inquietudesen su diálogo con los gobiernos y

otros donantes.

Determinar con más precisión las ventajas comparativas del Banco ymejorar su desempeñoLas dos esferas en las que el Banco haobtenido los mejores resultados hansido el respaldo a la estabilizaciónmacroeconómica y la reconstrucciónde la infraestructura física. Una de lasprimeras y principales prioridades delBanco en las situaciones posteriores alos conflictos debería ser apoyar laestabilización macroeconómica. Losasuntos macroeconómicos que están enjuego en tales situaciones pueden hacernecesario un alto grado de condiciona-lidad, la que, no obstante, debe anali-zarse caso por caso. Dependiendo de lacapacidad de cada país de aplicar lasmedidas, y de las condiciones políticas,puede no ser recomendable introducirde una sola vez condicionalidades deamplio alcance.

El Banco también debería estar pre-parado para apoyar la reconstrucción dela infraestructura física, prestando ladebida atención a las reformas institucio-nales y de política que sean necesarias.En muchos casos, para poder reconstruirla infraestructura es necesario removerminas. Si bien existen fuertes razoneseconómicas y humanitarias para el des-minado, la principal enseñanza de estaevaluación es que no es evidente que elBanco tenga una ventaja comparativa enproyectos autónomos de remoción deminas. Es fundamental adherirse a lasdirectrices operacionales sobre remociónde minas (Operational Guidelines on

Demining), emitidas en 1997. La partici-pación del Banco en esta esfera debería

ques que l’aide de la Banque aabouti aux meilleurs résultats.Soutenir la stabilisation de lasituation macroéconomiquedevrait être l’une des premières etdes principales priorités de la Ban-que pour les pays sortant d’un

conflit. Les enjeux macroéconomiquesdes périodes post-conflit peuvent rendrenécessaire une forte conditionnalité,laquelle doit cependant faire l’objetd’une analyse particulière, cas par cas.Selon la capacité d’exécution du pays etle contexte politique, il peut ne pas êtreopportun d’imposer simultanément demultiples conditions.

La Banque devrait aussi être prêteà contribuer à la reconstruction desinfrastructures physiques, en portanttoute l’attention voulue aux indispensa-bles réformes des politiques et des insti-tutions. La reconstruction de l’infras-tructure exige souvent des opérations dedéminage. Bien que de solides raisonséconomiques et humanitaires justifientces travaux, la principale leçon de cetteévaluation est que la Banque ne paraîtpas avoir d’avantage comparatif dans cedomaine si le projet consiste uniquementen travaux de déminage. Il est d’uneimportance critique de respecter lesDirectives opérationnelles sur le démi-

nage, publiées en 1997. La participationde la Banque devrait viser essentielle-ment non pas l’enlèvement des mines,mais une aide indirecte (coordination,information et sensibilisation, formation,renforcement des institutions, etc.) L’aideapportée aux travaux de déminagedevrait toujours être intégrée à une acti-vité spécifique de développement.

La restauration du capitalhumain et du potentiel associatif n’apas été l’une des priorités des projets dela Banque dans les pays sortant d’unconflit. Le cas de la Bosnie-Herzégo-vine, pays pour lequel la Banque a trèsvite apporté son soutien à des travauxsur les secteurs sociaux qui ont abouti


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and with NGOs that have asolid record in the restorationof human and social capitalshould be promoted. In pro-viding further support fordemobilization and reintegra-tion of ex-combatants, the

Bank should strengthen the capac-ity it has acquired and incorporatethe relevant experience of otheragencies. Considering the potentialimportance of demobilization infuture Bank programs, furtherresearch on the subject iswarranted.

The Bank has done little toincorporate gender issues in itspost-conflict portfolio. Only in BiHdid the Bank make a specific opera-tional effort to address the particu-lar needs of women. Reconstructionefforts must consider the possibleeconomic difficulties faced bywomen in post-conflict situations,and should also examine the role ofwomen in rebuilding social capital.Analysis can also identify unequalpower relations underlying socialorganizations to ensure that womenare not further marginalized byreconstruction interventions.

Consider the Folly of SomeConventional WisdomsThe devastation of human, socialand physical capital often found atthe beginning of a post-conflictperiod, and the particular provi-sions of a peace agreement, mayrequire that some conventionalwisdoms of development practicebe set aside for a time. For exam-ple, the Uganda case study findsthat owing to a history of preda-tory government tax policy duringthe conflict periods, pressure by theFund and Bank on tax effort (oftenincluded in a standard stabilizationpackage) has had a chilling effect

centrarse fundamentalmente enactividades indirectas que no ten-gan que ver con el desminadomismo, como coordinación, infor-mación y sensibilización sobre eltema, capacitación y fortaleci-miento institucional. El respaldo a

las actividades de desminado deberíaestar siempre integrado a una actividadespecífica de desarrollo.

La restitución del capital humanoy social no ha sido una de las priorida-des en la cartera del Banco relacionadacon situaciones posteriores a los con-flictos. La excepción parece ser el casode Bosnia y Herzegovina, en que elBanco proporcionó financiamientopara la realización de estudios inicialesy equilibrados de los sectores socialesque dieron como resultado algunosinformes prometedores. Todavía sonrelativamente escasos los informes determinación de proyectos de recons-trucción de posguerra relacionados conlos sectores sociales, pero al parecer lamayoría de los resultados de los esfuer-zos del Banco en esos sectores han sidomoderados. Las operaciones realizadasen Uganda no fueron satisfactorias yhasta ahora se observan resultadosmoderados en la restitución del capitalsocial y humano en Eritrea, Haití yRwanda. El proyecto de modernizaciónde la educación básica de El Salvadorha sido una excepción poco común queha dado resultados alentadores en lossectores sociales. El carácter participa-tivo del programa ha contribuido a laformación de consenso y a la sostenibi-lidad de proceso de paz. Deberíanfomentarse las alianzas con otros orga-nismos internacionales y bilaterales ycon organizaciones no gubernamenta-les que gocen de un sólido historial enmateria de restitución del capitalhumano y social. Para apoyar aún másla desmovilización y la reintegración delos ex combatientes, el Banco deberíaconsolidar la capacidad ya adquirida e

à des rapports prometteurs,paraît constituer une exception.Bien que relativement peu desprojets destinés à ces secteursaient déjà donné lieu à la prépa-ration de rapports de fin d’exécu-tion, il semble que les résultats

des opérations de la Banque aient géné-ralement été limités. En Ouganda, lesrésultats n’ont pas été satisfaisants et, àce stade, on ne constate guère de pro-grès dans le rétablissement du capitalhumain et du potentiel associatif enErythrée, en Haïti et au Rwanda. Leprojet de modernisation de l’enseigne-ment de base en El Salvador est l’undes rares cas où l’on relève des résultatsencourageants dans les secteurssociaux. Le caractère participatif duprogramme a contribué à la formationd’un consensus et à la viabilité du pro-cessus de paix. Il convient d’encouragerl’établissement de partenariats avecd’autres institutions internationales etbilatérales et avec les ONG qui ont unesolide expérience de la restauration ducapital humain et associatif. Lorsqu’ellesoutiendra de nouveaux projets d’aideà la démobilisation et à la réinsertiondes anciens combattants, la Banquedevrait renforcer les moyens dont elles’est dotée et prendre en compte l’expé-rience d’autres institutions. L’impor-tance que pourraient avoir les opéra-tions de démobilisation dans lesprogrammes futurs de la Banque justi-fie de nouvelles recherches sur ce sujet.

La Banque n’a guère cherché àprendre en compte la problématique

hommes-femmes dans ses projets pourles pays sortant de conflits. Elle ne s’estexpressément attachée à répondre auxbesoins particuliers des femmes quedans le cas de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Ildoit être tenu compte dans l’effort dereconstruction des difficultés économi-ques auxquelles les femmes peuvent setrouver confrontées dans les situationspost-conflit, de même que de la contri-


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on private investment, drivingeconomic activity into subsis-tence, or along with investablefunds, abroad. The Cambodiacase study finds that the Bankhas continued to push fordownsizing the civil service

when the political coalitionarrangement under the peaceaccords was based in part on rais-ing the size of the civil service toabsorb large numbers of the incom-ing parties’ functionaries. TheBank’s position was not politicallyrealistic from the outset. Forhuman capital development, a con-ventional wisdom among donors isto focus on primary education. Butin a country where conflict haseradicated education systems, as inRwanda, a case can be made fordonor assistance (not necessarilyfrom the Bank) to the secondaryand tertiary education levels.

Make Appropriate InstitutionalArrangementsSenior management must give highpriority to staffing and structuringpost-conflict country teams. Thecountry director must have a man-date to give the country substantialif not full-time attention. Residentrepresentatives need sufficientauthority to make a wide range ofprogramming and implementationdecisions in the field. Despite thehigh up-front costs, adequately-staffed resident missions are a pre-condition for successful Bank inter-vention in post-conflict situations.The circumstances of those coun-tries, including weakened govern-ment capacity and rapidly changingconditions, require heightened sup-port from the Bank.

Flexibility and speed are para-mount in the programming, design,and implementation of Bank post-

incorporar la experiencia de otrosorganismos. Teniendo en cuentala importancia que podría tenerla desmovilización en los progra-mas del Banco en el futuro, sejustifica realizar nuevas investiga-ciones sobre este tema.

El Banco no ha desplegadomuchos esfuerzos por incorporar lascuestiones relativas al género en la car-tera de proyectos sobre situaciones pos-teriores a los conflictos. Solamente enBosnia y Herzegovina el Banco llevó acabo una operación específica paraatender las necesidades particulares delas mujeres. En los esfuerzos de recons-trucción se deben tener en cuenta lasposibles dificultades económicas de lasmujeres en ese tipo de situaciones, y sedebería examinar su papel en la recons-trucción del capital social. En los análi-sis se pueden identificar también lasdesigualdades en las relaciones depoder que existen en las organizacionessociales, a fin de garantizar que lasmujeres no queden más marginadascomo consecuencia de las intervencio-nes de reconstrucción.

Reconsideración de ciertos criteriosgeneralmente aceptados que noresultan acertadosLa devastación del capital humano,social y físico que suele encontrarse alcomienzo del período de posguerra ylas disposiciones particulares de losacuerdos de paz pueden exigir que sedejen de lado por algún tiempo ciertoscriterios generalmente aceptados sobrelas prácticas relativas al desarrollo. Porejemplo, en el estudio de Uganda seobserva que, debido a la política tribu-taria de carácter abusivo que se habíaaplicado históricamente durante losperíodos de conflicto, la presión ejer-cida por el Fondo y el Banco en estamateria (a menudo inserta en un con-junto estándar de medidas de estabili-zación) ha resultado en el congela-

bution qu’elles pourraient appor-ter à la reconstitution du poten-tiel associatif. Ce travail d’analysepermettra aussi d’identifier lesinégalités de la répartition despouvoirs inhérente aux structuressociales, de manière à éviter que

les opérations de reconstructionn’accentuent encore la marginalisationdes femmes.

Remettre en cause certaines pratiquesconventionnellesLa situation dans laquelle se trouventsouvent les pays qui viennent de sortird’un conflit — pertes humaines, dés-agrégation du tissu social et destructiondes infrastructures — et les conditionsparticulières de l’accord de paix peu-vent imposer de renoncer provisoire-ment à certaines pratiques de dévelop-pement conventionnelles. Par exemple,l’étude sur l’Ouganda montre qu’enraison du caractère abusif de la politi-que fiscale appliquée par le gouverne-ment pendant le conflit, l’effort fiscaldemandé à ce pays par le Fonds et laBanque (comme c’est souvent le casdans les programmes standard de stabi-lisation) a déprimé l’investissementprivé, poussant les agents économiquesà passer à des activités de subsistanceou à transférer leurs activités, de mêmeque leurs capitaux, à l’étranger. L’étudesur le Cambodge montre que la Banquea recommandé avec insistance uneréduction des effectifs de la fonctionpublique, alors que la coalition politi-que issue des accords de paix était fon-dée en partie sur l’élargissement de lafonction publique pour absorber ungrand nombre des fonctionnaires despartis membres de la coalition. Dès ledépart, la position de la Banque man-quait de réalisme politique. En ce quiconcerne la valorisation du capitalhumain, la pratique habituelle desbailleurs de fonds est de donner lapriorité à l’enseignement primaire.


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conflict reconstruction efforts.Standard Bank procurementand disbursement processeshave often created stumblingblocks to post-conflict recov-ery. The Bank should makegreater use of preparation and

piloting funds, mechanisms forrapid procurement and disburse-ment, and training in-country enti-ties responsible for procurement.

To implement post-conflictoperations satisfactorily, the Bankmust be prepared to allocate suffi-cient administrative budgetresources for adequate monitoring.The overall Bank portfolio in apost-conflict country should peri-odically be assessed for relevance,that is, its contribution to sustain-able peace and development. Pro-ject-by-project assessments oftendo not provide the broader picture,although multisectoral or adjust-ment operations should certainlybe assessed on their contribution tothe larger objective. The studyrevealed that delays as long as ayear or more have reduced the use-fulness of post-conflict completionreports. Post-conflict operationscompletion reports should be com-pleted in a timely manner. In viewof the need for such information inoften highly volatile post-conflictsettings, the interval between pro-ject closing and completion reportsshould be sharply reduced, withappropriate streamlining of theprocess. OED should developguidelines on how to apply evalua-tion criteria with greater sensitivityto the post-conflict political andeconomic environment when con-ducting completion reports.

ConclusionSocieties emerging from conflictface daunting reconstruction chal-

miento de la inversión privada.Ante tal situación, la actividadeconómica ha llegado a niveles desubsistencia o ha sido desplazadadel país, junto con los fondos dis-ponibles para inversión. En elestudio sobre Camboya se

observa que el Banco ha seguido insis-tiendo en que se reduzca la administra-ción pública, en circunstancia que elarreglo de coalición política en elmarco de los acuerdos de paz sebasaba, en parte, en el aumento deltamaño de la administración públicapara absorber a un gran número defuncionarios de los partidos. Desde uncomienzo la posición del Banco fuepolíticamente poco realista. En lo querespecta al desarrollo del capitalhumano, un criterio tradicional entrelos donantes es concentrarse en la edu-cación primaria. Sin embargo, en lospaíses donde los conflictos han erradi-cado los sistemas de enseñanza, comoen el caso de Rwanda, puede justifi-carse que la asistencia de los donantes(no necesariamente del Banco) se des-tine a los niveles secundario y terciariode la educación.

Establecer mecanismos institucionalesadecuadosLos directivos superiores deben asignaruna alta prioridad a la dotación de per-sonal y la estructura de los equipos quetrabajen en países que salen de un con-flicto. En el mandato del director acargo del país se debe contemplar queéste destine gran parte del tiempo, o sededique exclusivamente, a dicho país.Los representantes residentes debentener suficientes facultades para tomardiversas decisiones sobre programacióny ejecución en el terreno. A pesar delelevado nivel de los costos iniciales, esindispensable que las misiones residen-tes cuenten con el personal necesariopara asegurar que las intervencionesdel Banco en situaciones posteriores a

Mais, dans les pays dont les systè-mes éducatifs ont été complète-ment détruits par un conflit,comme au Rwanda, il peut êtrejustifié que l’aide des donateurs(pas nécessairement celle de laBanque) aille à l’enseignement

secondaire et supérieur.

Mettre en place le cadre institutionnelappropriéLa direction doit attacher une impor-tance prioritaire à la composition et à lastructure des équipes chargées des payssortant de conflits. Le chef de l’équipedoit pouvoir consacrer au pays dont ilest responsable la majorité sinon latotalité de son temps. Les représentantsrésidents doivent être dotés de pouvoirssuffisants pour pouvoir prendre sur leterrain toute une gamme de décisionsde programmation et d’exécution.Même si, au départ, cela doit entraînerde grosses dépenses, il est indispensableque les missions résidentes soient dotéesd’un personnel suffisant pour assurer lesuccès des interventions post-conflit dela Banque. L’état dans lequel se trou-vent ces pays, du fait notamment del’affaiblissement des moyens d’actiondes pouvoirs publics et de l’évolutionrapide de leur situation, justifie uneintensification de l’aide de la Banque.

Flexibilité et rapidité sont d’uneimportance capitale aux stades de laprogrammation, de la conception et del’exécution des opérations de recons-truction. Les procédures standard de laBanque en matière de passation desmarchés et de décaissement ont souventfait obstacle aux efforts de redresse-ment. La Banque devrait faire une plusgrande place à la préparation et à lamise en place de fonds pilotes, à lacréation de mécanismes propres à accé-lérer la passation des marchés et ledécaissement de son aide, et à la forma-tion des responsables nationaux de lapassation des marchés.


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lenges. The Bank is firmlycommitted to assisting thesesocieties, and has much tooffer. Its greatest strengths liein supporting macroeconomicstabilization, rebuilding physi-cal infrastructure, mobilizing

resources, and coordinating aid. Inother areas, such as rebuildinghuman and social capital, theBank’s support can be improved.New partnerships with other agen-cies should be promoted. The Bankcan more fully support the peaceprocess by advising peace negotia-tions on the economic developmentimplications of peace accordoptions and, later, by implementingpolicy conditionalities that ease theimplementation of peace accords.The post-conflict context impliesother requirements for Bank assis-tance such as the need for proactiveinvolvement of senior managementin key decisions; strong commit-ment by country directors andteams; resident missions with ade-quate staffing and decisionmakingauthority; timely evaluation andmonitoring; and analytic and eval-uation work that is sensitive to thepotential for Bank operations toincrease or decrease the tensionsthat lead to conflict. Bankprocesses should be adapted so thatthe programming, design, andimplementation of Bank recon-struction assistance remain timelyand flexible in the face of urgentneeds and volatile circumstancestypically found in post-conflict set-tings. The recent creation of thePost-Conflict Unit, the Post-Con-flict Program, and the adaptablelending instruments are significantsteps in this direction. Finally, theFramework for World BankInvolvement in Post-ConflictReconstruction should be revised

un conflicto sean exitosas. Dadaslas circunstancias de esos países,donde la capacidad del gobiernose ha visto debilitada y las condi-ciones cambian rápidamente, serequiere un mayor respaldo delBanco.

La flexibilidad y la rapidez sondos condiciones sumamente importan-tes en la programación, el diseño y laejecución de los programas del Bancosobre reconstrucción de posguerra. Losprocesos estándar de adquisiciones ydesembolsos que sigue el Banco amenudo han creado obstáculos para larecuperación en esas situaciones. ElBanco debería utilizar en mayormedida fondos para la preparación yrealización de proyectos piloto, ademásde mecanismos para desembolsos rápi-dos y adquisiciones expeditas, y darcapacitación a las entidades nacionalesresponsables de las adquisiciones.

Para llevar a cabo con éxito lasoperaciones de reconstrucción en paísesque salen de un conflicto, el Bancodebe estar preparado para asignar sufi-cientes recursos del presupuesto admi-nistrativo a fin de asegurar un segui-miento adecuado. Debería evaluarseperiódicamente la totalidad de la car-tera del Banco relacionada con cadapaís en esa situación para determinar siésta es pertinente, es decir, si efectiva-mente está contribuyendo a una pazduradera y al desarrollo sostenible. Lasevaluaciones de cada proyecto porseparado a menudo no muestran elpanorama más amplio, y ciertamentedeberían evaluarse las operaciones mul-tisectoriales o de ajuste para determi-nar su aporte al objetivo de más amplioalcance. El estudio mostró que debidoa atrasos de hasta un año o dos enalgunos informes de terminación deoperaciones sobre reconstrucción deposguerra, éstos han perdido utilidad.Ese tipo de informes deberían termi-narse a tiempo. Puesto que la informa-

Pour mener à bonne fin lesopérations post-conflit, la Banquedoit être prête à porter les res-sources budgétaires allouées auxactivités de suivi à un niveau suf-fisant pour assurer une supervi-sion adéquate. Elle devrait pério-

diquement évaluer l’ensemble de sonportefeuille pour chacun des pays sor-tant de conflits pour juger de sa perti-nence, c’est-à-dire de sa contribution àune paix et à un développement dura-bles. Souvent, lorsque les projets sontconsidérés indépendamment les uns desautres, on ne peut pas se faire une idéede la situation globale, quoique ce soitnormalement indispensable dans le casdes opérations d’ajustement et des pro-jets multisectoriels. L’étude montre queles rapports de fin d’exécution préparéspour les opérations post-conflit ontperdu de leur utilité pour avoir été pré-parés avec un ou deux ans de retard.Ces rapports devraient être établis aussirapidement que possible. Étant donnél’intérêt de ces informations pour lespays sortant de conflits dont la situa-tion est souvent très instable, ilconvient de réduire fortement l’inter-valle qui s’écoule entre la clôture duprojet et la présentation du rapport defin d’exécution en apportant les modifi-cations appropriées au processus.L’ODE devrait élaborer des directivessur le mode d’utilisation des critèresd’évaluation de sorte que l’environne-ment politique et économique des payssortant de conflits soit mieux pris encompte lors de la préparation des rap-ports de fin d’exécution.


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to constitute an OperationalPolicy statement that consoli-dates, clarifies, and refinesexisting policy guidance forsupport to post-conflictreconstruction.

ción que contienen es muy nece-saria en lugares en los que lascondiciones suelen ser muy ines-tables, se debería reducir conside-rablemente el intervalo entre elcierre del proyecto y la finaliza-ción de los informes de termina-

ción, mediante la debida racionaliza-ción del proceso. El DEO deberíapreparar directrices sobre la manera deaplicar los criterios de evaluacióndurante la preparación de los informesde terminación, de manera de tenermás en cuenta las condiciones políticasy económicas en los países que salen deun conflicto.


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Introduction

11

O ne does not have to spend long in Bosnia, or Gaza or the lakes district in Africa to

know that without economic hope we will not have peace. Without equity we will not

have global stability. Without a better sense of social justice our cities will not be safe

and our societies will not be stable. Without inclusion, too many of us will be condemned to live

separate, armed and frightened lives.

James D. Wolfensohn, address to the 1997 World Bank

Annual Meetings, Hong Kong, September 23, 1997

Background and Study ObjectivesFrom Bretton Woods to the present day, the World Bankhas taken up the task of post-conflict reconstruction.Some of the first loans the Bank made helped rebuildEuropean countries leveled by World War II. That erasaw the Bank concentrating on providing physical capi-tal. Today’s challenge is quite different. The end of theCold War and burgeoning civil conflicts in the 1990shave tested the ability of the entire international commu-nity to address unprecedented devastation of human andsocial capital. In this climate, President Wolfensohn hasraised Bank assistance to countries emerging from con-flict to a high priority. He has named inclusion the keydevelopment challenge of our time.1 Civil conflict, themost violent manifestation of exclusion, is near the apexof that challenge.

In view of both the high risk and high potentialreturns entailed by an expanded role for the Bank inpost-conflict reconstruction, the Bank’s Board of Execu-tive Directors (EDs) called on OED to assess recent andongoing Bank experience. OED’s review, documented inthis report, aims to enhance the Bank’s ability torespond more effectively and efficiently to the needs ofsocieties rebuilding after conflict. The study’s mainobjective was to identify lessons from recent Bank expe-

rience relevant to ongoing and future post-conflictreconstruction operations. The study focused on lesson-learning rather than accountability for performance. Itexamined Bank decisionmaking processes, non-lendingservices, and scores of operations, many of which areongoing, making an audit nearly impossible. Althoughthe study identifies factors of performance related toprocesses, it is not a process review. A recent draft paperbeing prepared for the OECD/DAC to be issued asguidelines on evaluating humanitarian assistance pro-grams states that “Evaluations of humanitarian assis-tance programmes should be seen as a contribution to adialogue about program performance, and not as a‘judgment from above.’”2 In a similar fashion, this studyaims to contribute to the dialogue on the Bank’s abilityto respond more effectively and efficiently to the needsof societies rebuilding after conflict. It also provides rec-ommendations for clarification and refinement of Bankpolicy in this area.

Conceptual FrameworkPost-conflict reconstruction, like other development dis-ciplines, has unique concepts that require some explana-tion. The starting point for this study is a recent Bankpaper, A Framework for World Bank Involvement in

2

Post-Conflict Reconstruction (April 1997). That reportidentifies a “conflict country” as one that has recentlyexperienced widespread violence, or where a main pre-occupation of the state is armed warfare, where the statehas failed, or where a significant part of the populationis engaged in armed struggle with the state. A November1995 paper prepared for a Bank task force describes allthese as “failed states” and argues that external agenciesneed to understand the varying histories and nature of“failure” processes. Through such understanding it maybe possible to draw lessons applicable to situationswhere the pre-conditions for state failure exist, butwhere preventive policies are still possible.3 The paperidentifies five categories of socio-political emergenciesand argues that the requirements for effective post-con-flict reconstruction may vary between categories.4 Thosecategories are as follows:

a) stable states with disorderly transfers of powerbut with bureaucratic/governance continuity(Thailand 1932–1992);

b) peaceful dissolution into successor states(Malaysia/Singapore, 1964);

c) state failure due to predatory or ineffectual gov-ernance (Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,Uganda, Zaire);

d) state erosion or failure due to ethnic/regional con-flict (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burma, Congo,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Lebanon, Rwanda, SriLanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, former Yugoslavia,including Bosnia and Herzegovina); and

e) state failure due to ideological conflict (Angola,Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique).

In the early 1990s, donors and agencies often usedthe term “continuum” to describe the relationshipbetween conflict, relief, reconstruction, and develop-ment. The prevalence of discontinuities in post-conflictsituations, however, has put this label in increasing disfa-vor. More suggestive of the reality of recent conflict andpost-conflict situations is “complex emergency,” the termused by the UNDP and by the recently published multi-donor evaluation of the Rwanda emergency.5 Complexemergencies, though they have multiple causes, are essen-tially political in nature and entail violent conflict. Theytypically include a breakdown of limits, institutions, andgovernance, widespread suffering and massive popula-tion displacement, and they often require a range ofresponses from the international community. A complexemergency tends to be dynamic, characterized by rapidchanges that are difficult to predict.6

Complex emergencies present difficult issues for thetiming, nature, and scale of donor response. RecentBank-funded post-conflict reconstruction assistance hasencompassed a much wider range of activities than thatprovided in the post-Second World War years or forrecovery from natural disasters. The Bank’s assistancehas had two overall objectives: to facilitate the transitionfrom war to sustainable peace and to support theresumption of economic and social development. Thus,while post-conflict reconstruction, like post-natural dis-aster reconstruction, typically involves the repair andreconstruction of physical infrastructure, it also entails anumber of interventions aimed at rebuilding institutions.Those interventions have included jump-starting theeconomy, reconstructing the framework for governance,rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure,and planning for financial normalization. The Bank hasalso provided targeted assistance to displaced personsand vulnerable groups and addressed unique needs aris-ing from complex emergencies, including demining anddemobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Incontrast to post-disaster reconstruction, post-conflictreconstruction assistance often operates amid tensionbetween key actors within the country, which influencesrelations among involved international parties as well.

Study Scope and MethodologyCase studies of nine diverse country experiences formthe core of this assessment. After consultations with theBoard, the Regional Departments, and Bank manage-ment, three countries were selected for field study(Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Uganda) andsix were selected for desk reviews (Cambodia, Eritrea,Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka). In each coun-try the Bank significantly assisted post-conflict recon-struction. The countries are diverse in the causes of statefailure or collapse as well as in the factors that influenceinitiation or resumption of Bank operations.7

The assessment team reviewed a substantial volumeof Bank documents for each case study country and con-ducted extensive interviews with Bank staff (includinggovernment officials for the field studies). The team alsoconsulted with other donors and NGOs in Washington,New York, and Geneva (and in the field study coun-tries), reviewed Bank and non-Bank literature on post-conflict reconstruction, and reviewed the Bank’s globalportfolio. A selected list of documents reviewed and alist of persons interviewed are contained in the bibliog-raphy and Annex 3, respectively.


3

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The key issues addressed by the assessment are (a)the timing and scope of the Bank’s role, including ques-tions about its comparative advantage; (b) its partner-ship and coordination with other donors, internationalorganizations, and NGOs; (c) the Bank’s contribution todamage and needs assessments and to reconstructionstrategies; (d) its role in rebuilding institutions; (e) Bankinstruments and processes; and (f) implications for mon-itoring and evaluation. From these issues a set ofdetailed questions, included in a November 1996 DesignPaper for the assessment, were developed to guide the

interviews conducted for the case studies and for theconsultations with other donors and NGOs.

The report continues with an analysis of the Bank’spolicy markers on post-conflict reconstruction assis-tance in Chapter 2, followed by an anatomy of theBank’s post-conflict portfolio in Chapter 3. The mainfindings of the study and their implications are pre-sented in Chapters 4 through 7. Chapter 8 concludes thereport by recommending future directions for Bank pol-icy on post-conflict reconstruction.

Urban structures in Lebanon

5

Evolution of BankPolicy Markers

22

The Bank’s operational policy on lending for emergencies contains elements of recon-

struction policy. These elements focus on emergencies caused by natural disasters,

however, and are inadequate for post-conflict reconstruction operations. The Frame-

work paper and recent discussion and decisions of the Board regarding operations in post-con-

flict countries contain more appropriate markers for policy, but these do not constitute a con-

solidated policy statement.

Operational Policy on Lending for EmergenciesIncreased emergency recovery activity in the 1970s and1980s, particularly in response to natural disasters,prompted the Bank to adopt reconstruction guidelines in1984 that encouraged natural disaster prevention andmitigation in post-disaster activities (Operational Note10.07). In October 1988 the Board approved “Lendingby the Bank for Emergencies,” a policy paper based onthe 1984 guidelines. Although the paper alluded to civilwar, it did not go far in exploring the differencesbetween reconstruction after natural disasters and afterconflicts.1 The guidelines were then transformed in 1989into Operational Directive 8.50 (OD8.50), “EmergencyRecovery Assistance,” which similarly emphasizedemergency recovery after natural disasters. In August1995, without any major conceptual changes, OD8.5became Operational Policy 8.5 (OP 8.5).

Thus, the existing operational policy derives largelyfrom the need to respond to urgent financing needs forpost-natural disaster reconstruction. The basic princi-ples governing these documents are general and say thatthe Bank should finance productive activities andinvestment rather than relief and consumption. Theyfocus on emergencies that seriously dislocate a borrow-ing member’s economy and call for a quick response

from the government and the Bank. The OP defines anemergency as “an extraordinary event of limited dura-tion such as a war, civil disturbance, or natural disas-ter.” To facilitate rapid response the policy discouragesthe application of conditionality to emergency opera-tions unless “directly linked to the cause of the emer-gency.” While it indicates that “to the extent possible,normal procurement and disbursement rules shouldapply,” it also provides for “special flexibility in thecase of emergency loans.”

Recent conflicts have typically been more complexthan the OP 8.5 characterization. These conflicts haveoften been protracted rather than limited in durationand have torn the country’s social fabric anddestroyed its physical and human capital. Whileregional tensions and political ideologies with roots inthe Cold War era have figured in some conflicts, intra-border issues in which economic, political, ethnic, andreligious factors are intertwined, have been particu-larly divisive. Among the countries that have experi-enced conflicts with some or all of these characteris-tics are El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Mozambique,Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda—all recipients of Bank Emergency Recovery Loans andCredits (ERL/Cs).

6

Framework Paper for Post-conflict ReconstructionIn the post-Cold War era, much of the Bank’s post-con-flict reconstruction work has responded ad hoc to bor-rowers’ needs. As Chapter 3 documents, these needshave grown considerably in recent years, and operationsin countries emerging from conflict have increased as aproportion of the Bank’s portfolio. In response, theBank issued its Framework in April 1997 to guide itsinvolvement in post-conflict reconstruction.

The Framework, developed in consultation withBank operational staff, Executive Directors, and a broadcircle of international actors, including UN agencies,nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and represen-tatives of concerned governments, outlines a five-stageprocess for Bank involvement:

1. Preparation of a watching brief in countries inconflict where the Bank has no active portfolio.This is used to track developments and build aknowledge base to facilitate effective and timelyBank interventions once the conflict has movedtoward resolution.

2. Preparation of a transitional support strategy assoon as resolution is in sight. Bank staff wouldcollaborate with the government and other part-ners to prepare a national recovery program as aninitial step toward a more comprehensive, full-scale reconstruction program. The strategy wouldinclude a clear statement of risks, strategies forentry and exit, and details on how the overallproposal would be financed.

3. Early reconstruction activities, starting as soon asfield conditions allow. These would be small-scale operations that would not follow normalBank preparation procedures, such as urgentrepair of vital infrastructure, urgent demining, ormicrocredit activities.

4. Post-conflict reconstruction under emergencyprocedures, including larger-scale operationssuch as physical reconstruction, economic recov-ery, institution building, and social reintegration.

5. A return to normal operations.The Framework also makes several operational

recommendations:1. The Bank should establish or reinforce its field

presence in post-conflict countries to monitor,coordinate, and respond to changes inherent inpost-conflict situations.

2. The Bank needs to forge key partnerships withUN agencies, other donors, NGOs, and other

stakeholders in the reconstruction process asearly as possible.

3. The Bank should clearly understand how itsactivities will affect and take over from emer-gency operations. This will help avoid negativepatterns that could jeopardize later reconstruc-tion and development activities.

4. Aid coordination should begin with the earliestefforts at reconstruction. The Bank should bepart of a rigorous management of the interna-tional community’s role.

5. The Bank should develop new operational guide-lines that include emergency lending proceduresspecifically designed for post-conflict situations.

6. The newer areas of operation for the Bank—demobilization, reintegration, and demining—should be further supported and developed.

7. Flexible funding is necessary for early reconstruc-tion activities.

The Framework emphasizes that country teams, asthe first line in post-conflict activities, must have assuredresources for the watching brief, planning and assess-ment, and early phases of reconstruction. As recom-mended by the Framework and endorsed by the Board,a post-conflict unit has been established to consolidatethe Bank’s learning on reconstruction issues, to supportstaff in developing and implementing reconstructionstrategies, and act as a focal point for partnership withother members of the international community.

Board Discussion and DecisionsThe Framework reflects much of the current thinking ofthe Bank’s EDs and its senior management, but furtherclarification of policy is needed. To shed more light onemerging policy issues, this study reviewed transcripts ofrecent meetings of the Bank’s EDs. This review revealedsome patterns in Board decisions that have guided theBank’s actions and found an evolution of thinking onpolicy issues. While the Board’s discussions of post-con-flict reconstruction have consolidated several areas ofconsensus, they have also raised several issues on whichagreement has proved elusive.

Relief versus reconstruction. The Board is quiteclear that it is not in the Bank’s mandate to provide reliefassistance. The Articles of Agreement say that the pur-pose of the Bank is to “assist in the reconstruction anddevelopment of territories of members by facilitating theinvestment of capital for productive purposes…” (Arti-cle I.i). Other agencies have a comparative advantage in


7

providing relief, and while the Bank’s work may com-plement their efforts, it is not to overlap them. TheBoard also recognizes the difficulty of drawing the linebetween relief work and reconstruction. Documentationon the Bank’s assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina(BiH) says that it is following a two-track strategy, thefirst being support to “selected immediate assistance

programs”2 through the TrustFund established for BiH. Somecomponents of these emergencyoperations may be consideredrelief, for example, replenishingbooks and educational materialsunder the Emergency Education

Reconstruction Project. During discussions on theFramework, Board members agreed that this issue needsto be tackled. While some believed that the Frameworkjustifies relief, others suggested that such activities helpclose the gap between relief and reconstruction (by pro-viding resources to keep educational and medical sys-tems operational in order to maintain human capital).3

Aid coordination. Most Board members agree thatthe Bank can play a large role in aid coordination, per-haps not leading in every case, but at least facilitatingthe process. The Bank’s involvement should seek torelate assistance to the requirements of economicreforms. By necessity, in some countries other agenciesshould lead in aid coordination. In Angola and Cambo-dia, for example, the Bank has been absent for long peri-ods and lacks solid knowledge of the country. In suchcases the Bank should be more sensitive and learn fromthe experience of other institutions. As recommended inthe Framework, the Bank should maintain a watchingbrief in conflict countries where it is not active.

Flexibility and speed. These are essential to post-conflict reconstruction. The Bank needs to be able torespond quickly to situations that are often complex andin flux. Board discussions have pointed out that thelending program also needs to be flexible to respond tothe risks being taken. In Angola, for example, Bankstrategy in 1991 was called a “lending framework” thatwould be revised in response to the government.Rwanda has been noted by the Board as an examplewhere the Bank was not flexible.

Risk. The Framework proposes a component onrisk management that has been welcomed by the Board.The risks and rate of return in post-conflict countries arevolatile and a return of hostilities could wipe out mil-lions of dollars of Bank work overnight. While dis-

cussing the Framework,one ED noted that theBank has no exit strategy incase hostilities resume.Although the Frameworkdoes not detail what mightcomprise an exit strategy, itnotes that one must beincluded in the TransitionalSupport Strategy (para.47). During 1991 discus-sions on Bank involvementin Angola, some Boardmembers expressed deepconcern over the high riskthe Bank was taking: confi-

dence that the proposed interventions would work wasonly marginal. Noting that the Board has little to dowith a project after it is approved, one member askedwhat the Board could do about problems that arise dur-ing the implementation and supervision of projects. TheFramework says that the Board will be kept informed atintervals about the assessment of risks and the stepsbeing taken by management in this regard.

The Bank’s comparative advantage. Board mem-bers unanimously agree that the Bank should focus onactivities in which it has a comparative advantage andavoid overlapping with the activities of other agencies. Atraditional area of strength for the Bank has been therebuilding of physical infrastructure. Board membersalso agree that macroeconomic management and policyissues are comparative advantages for the Bank. Butsome hesitate to declare a comparative advantage for theBank in newer areas, such as demining, demobilizationand reintegration of ex-combatants, and dealing withdisplaced populations. The Angola peace accords, forexample, called for demobilizing 150,000 troops. In a1991 discussion of the issue, some Board members ques-tioned whether the Bank would be able to respond tothose needs. If not, they recommended that the Bankpursue the issue through aid coordination and assistother agencies with it. Since that time, the Bank’s demo-bilization activities have increased. As no other agencyhas yet systematically addressed the issue, the Bank mayhave created a comparative advantage for itself. Regard-ing reintegration of displaced populations, some Boardmembers have expressed concerns that the Bank may beoverlapping with UN agencies. One Board memberstated that job creation may deserve further elaboration

E v o l u t i o n o f B a n k P o l i c y M a r k e r s

The framework isthe basis for a

fully developedoperational policy

Man in Yemen Republic

8

in the Framework, since it is one of the most importantcontributions the Bank can make. Also mentioned inBoard discussions is demining, another area in which theBank has tried to create comparative advantage.

Lending instruments/financing post-conflict recon-struction. Although Board members concede that speedand flexibility are crucial for post-conflict operations,they disagree on how financing can best allow for speedand flexibility. Financing was by far the most contentiousissue during meetings on the Framework paper, and sev-eral times it was left to be decided later. Some supportedthe establishment of a post-conflict trust fund or Devel-opment Grant Facility for use by countries where tradi-tional lending was not immediately available. This wouldavoid the time loss incurred by doing it case-by-case andcould attract additional resources. Others opposed thetrust fund idea and raised concerns that supply wouldcreate demand and raise expectations that the Bankcould not meet. Some argued that the Bank’s strength liesin the rigor of its approach, based on ensuring that fundsare used to the best advantage; if it was decided thatgrants were more appropriate than loans or credits, thenthe Bank may not be the right institution for the activi-ties. In support of this view, it was suggested that if exist-ing lending vehicles were not adequate, then new instru-ments could be created case-by-case. Some wereconcerned that going beyond IDA could create equityproblems and mainstream what should be extraordinaryassistance for post-conflict activities. BiH and the WestBank and Gaza may have set precedents for the estab-lishment of trust funds for post-conflict reconstructionactivities. The final report of the Framework does notprovide much detail on budgetary arrangements andfinancing instruments for post-conflict reconstruction,indicating that this issue warrants further discussion.

Arrears. Related to the issue of financing, Boardmembers have also expressed differing views on how todeal with the arrears of countries emerging from con-flict. The majority of countries in arrears to the Bank arecountries in conflict.4 Some EDs consider it necessary tohave a flexible attitude toward helping countries dealwith arrears to the Bank and that arrears should not bean impediment to post-conflict reconstruction lending.Others hold that it should be an extraordinary decisionto provide resources to member countries in arrears, andurge a more cautious attitude. The Framework tries toaccommodate both views, while not making any specificproposals. As arrears are a common and significantproblem of countries emerging from conflict, the Frame-

work says that planning the countries’ financial normal-ization is crucial. It says that while solutions will dependon a variety of factors, including the size of the arrearsand the amount of support from the international donorcommunity to assist with financing, normalization maytake a long time. At the same time, it notes that the pres-ence of arrears does not preclude other post-conflictreconstruction assistance from the Bank, such as themobilization of assistance from donor countries or othernon-lending activities (para. 33).

Preventing conflict. The Framework reflects theview of many EDs that the Bank can help prevent con-flict by supporting activities that are intended to miti-gate tensions in at-risk countries. Other EDs have urgedcaution in this area, saying that the Bank must not straybeyond its mandate into political matters. The Frame-work takes these views into account and says that, firstand foremost, Bank activities should “do no harm” and,further, “when requested to do so by a member, theBank should consider supporting government attemptsto promote activities which ameliorate conditions whichmay lead to conflict.…”

Timing of Bank re-entry. Views vary regarding themost appropriate timing for the Bank to start operationsin post-conflict countries. EDs noted that the generalpresumption had been that the Bank should not startoperations until hostilities and related political tensions(such as border closures) had completely ceased or beenresolved. Recent decisions suggest a tendency towardearlier involvement, however. Angola, El Salvador, andSri Lanka are examples where the Bank became involvedbefore the hostilities completely ceased.5 The first Struc-tural Adjustment Loan (SAL) for El Salvador wasapproved about a year before the peace accords weresigned, but the Board and staff considered that the peacenegotiations were going well. In Sri Lanka and Angola,peace accords had recently been signed, and Boardmembers requested assurance that the hostilities hadindeed virtually ended. It was agreed that the Bankwould be taking a calculated risk in these countries, butthat it was one that outweighed the risk of waiting untilthe strife had completely ended. Another example is theWest Bank and Gaza, where border closures with Israelhave devastated the Palestinian economy because of lostjobs and restricted flows of materials. While an end tothe closures required a political solution, the Bankdecided that it was too dangerous to wait when imme-diate steps could restore confidence, create employment,and regenerate demand.


9

Anatomy of the Bank’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio

33

Every post-conflict country is unique and no one formula can respond to all reconstruc-

tion needs. The World Bank uses a broad array of mechanisms to support the transition

to peace and the resumption of economic and social development. Its lending operations

comprise macroeconomic and sectoral adjustment reforms, direct investment, and technical assis-

tance in support of reconstruction. Non-lending services include damage and needs assessment,

economic and sector work, country assistance strategies, and aid coordination. A review of the

portfolio reveals that the Bank uses conventional lendinginstruments more often than quick-disbursing onesdesigned for emergencies to support reconstruction, andthat reconstruction efforts are often framed as traditionalBank work. There is not a well established pattern show-ing whether post-conflict reconstruction activities comeat a higher cost than “normal” operations, as indicatedby the amount of staff time required to support them.

The Bank’s Approach to Post-Conflict ReconstructionThe Bank’s support of post-conflict reconstruction hastaken a variety of forms ranging from comprehensivepackages of lending and non-lending services, throughmore modest but strategic support, to a focus on specificaspects of recovery such as economic stabilization ortransition to a market economy. Lending operationsaddress a range of needs common to post-conflict situa-tions such as jump-starting the economy, resettlementand investment in war-affected regions, repair of war-damaged infrastructure, reform of a nonfunctioning orcorrupt civil service and public administration, and tar-geted programs for veterans and vulnerable groups suchas widows and children. Non-lending services helpdefine broad recovery and reconstruction strategies andassist in mobilizing and coordinating international

resources. This chapter describes these differentapproaches and the Bank’s global post-conflict recon-struction portfolio.

The assessment team identified 34 countries as post-conflict. Table 3.1 summarizes Bank Group support tothese countries. Before analyzing the support strategies,it is worth noting that compiling a list of Bank opera-tions and other activities that support post-conflictreconstruction was an arduous task, because of the dif-ficulty of defining “post-conflict,” as well as the classifi-cation of Bank programs. Drawing a line between con-flict and post-conflict is not easy. The apparent closurepoints to conflict, such as peace agreements or elections,rarely signal the clear beginning of a definable post-con-flict reconstruction period. Rather, there is a period oftransition where peace must still be consolidated andground laid before sustainable recovery can begin. Evenamong the countries with identified Bank-financed“post-conflict reconstruction” operations, about halfare experiencing ongoing conflict.

Distinguishing post-conflict reconstruction opera-tions from “normal” operations can also be a compli-cated matter. To identify such operations, the assessmentteam looked for an explicit objective like “supportingthe transition to peace and the resumption of economic

10

and social development.” However, some documents foroperations dealing with potentially conflict-relevantissues (such as poverty alleviation and decentralization)completely avoided referring to conflict, or if they did,did so in a way that obscured rather than elucidated a

linkage to conflict. Their post-conflict reconstructionobjectives may be overlooked, downplayed, or simplynot made explicit in the project documentation. Projectsmay be framed as poverty alleviation programs, publicsector management, or decentralization projects, yet


TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF WORLD BANK GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

LOAN/CREDITVOLUME TRUST IFC TRUST

COUNTRY (US$Millions) FUNDS FUNDS DRF EDI IFC MIGA

AFRAngola 228.8 • •Burundi 14.6 •Eritrea 42.5 • •Ethiopia 391.3 • • • •Liberia •Mozambique 220 • • • • •Namibia •Rwanda 228 • •Sierra Leone • • •Somalia • •South Africa • • • •Sudan •Uganda 2304.4 • • • • • •

EAPCambodia 237.1 •Lao PDR 53.2 •Myanmar

SASAfghanistan •Sri Lanka 78 • • • •

ECAAzerbaijan • •Bosnia and

Herzegovina 357.6 • • • •Croatia 248 • • •Cyprus •Georgia •Russian Federation • • •Tajikistan 69.7 • • •

MENAAlgeria • •IraqLebanon 538.9 • • • •West Bank and Gaza 135 •Yemen • • •

LACEl Salvador 451.5 • • • • •Guatemala • • •Haiti 276.4 • •Nicaragua 277 • • • •

Note: The dollar amounts are based on approved post-conflict reconstruction related projects, as of December 15, 1997.“DRF” is Debt Reduction Facility.

11

they benefit war-affected areas and groups, reform cor-rupt and partisan public sector agencies, and build thefoundations for civil participation—all of which can beimportant reconstruction priorities.

Moreover, the Bank’s reconstruction projects are noteasily identified by lending instrument. Most post-con-flict reconstruction operations might readily be expected

to be Emergency Recovery Loans(ERLs) as they are designed “torestore assets and productivityimmediately after a major emer-gency (war, civil disturbance, or

natural disaster) that seriously disrupts the country’seconomy.”1 However, little more than a handful of thepost-conflict operations identified for the study usedERLs or other quick-disbursing instruments such asRehabilitation Import Loans (RILs). With these con-cepts explained, we can turn to a discussion of patternsof Bank support for post-conflict reconstruction.

Two states—Bosnia and Herzegovina and Uganda—received comprehensive reconstruction support from theBank. In BiH, the Bank helped start the reconstructioneffort in 1996 without waiting for financial normaliza-tion and membership in the Bank. Sixteen emergencyprojects for the country have addressed all major infra-structure and social sectors. They also incorporate afocus on employment-generation and support institu-tional development. In addition, the Bank has providedassistance for normalization of the country’s financialrelationship with the international community, includingclearing of arrears and Bank membership; developmentand implementation of a medium-term assistance strat-egy to support the government’s systemic reform pro-gram; and continuation of support to the country’s over-all reconstruction program.

The Bank’s involvement in Uganda’s reconstructionwas particularly comprehensive. Since the NationalResistance Movement Government took power in Janu-ary 1986, the Bank has coordinated closely with inter-national donors to support the country’s reconstructioneffort. In the first five years after the conflict(1987–1992), the Bank supported approximately 25lending operations amounting to more than US$1 bil-lion. It has provided financing for an economic recoverycredit and a series of sectoral investment and reformprograms (agriculture, education, health, railways,telecommunication) aimed at rehabilitating key eco-nomic and social infrastructure affected by the war.

In other countries, Bank lending was explicitly

geared to meet post-conflict reconstruction objectives,but the level of engagement was neither as comprehen-sive nor as significant as in BiH and Uganda. In manycases, modifying the existing portfolio was an importantelement of the Bank’s strategy. In Mozambique, chang-ing the Bank-supported health, education, and humanresources projects contributed to the reconstructioneffort. In Rwanda, more than US$100 million of undis-bursed funds from nine existing projects were reallo-cated to finance activities under the government’s Emer-gency Recovery Program.

The Bank has treated some post-conflict countriesas countries in transition to market economies—Algeria,Azerbaijan, Georgia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Tajikistanare some obvious examples. Political instability, socialunrest, and violent conflict may be understood as inher-ent difficulties of an economic transition, or as largelyexogenous results of historical conditions of poverty,inequity, and other social disparities.2 Nicaragua is illus-trative: After the 1990 elections, the new governmentimmediately embarked on a stabilization and adjust-ment effort to reverse the effects of a decade of centralplanning. The Bank supported the move to a marketeconomy with a $110 million economic recovery creditin 1991. Less than a year later, the Bank supported asocial investment fund “to maintain social cohesion dur-ing the period of economic adjustment,”3 and a secondeconomic recovery credit and social investment fundloan followed in 1994.

In countries where internal conflict is drawing neara close, or where tensions have abated enough to gener-ate optimism and encourage action, the Bank has beenengaged in planning next steps with the government. InAzerbaijan, for example, as a permanent peace settle-ment is expected soon, the Bank is visibly gearing-up. Aresident mission was established in Baku in September1995, and Bank support has concentrated on economicstabilization and structural reform—clearly with theobjective of supporting the country’s move to a marketeconomy, but also with an eye to post-conflict recon-struction. Both the government and the Bank plan toassess the war damage and reconstruction needs onlyafter the peace settlement can ensure safe access to theaffected areas of the country. In the meantime, Bank eco-nomic and social sector work has begun some analysisto inform the reconstruction.

In Sri Lanka, the Bank has indicated readiness to sup-port a comprehensive reconstruction effort in the north-east, following peace accords and with the expectation

A n a t o m y o f t h e B a n k ’ s P o s t - C o n f l i c t R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P o r t f o l i o

Post-Conflictor in transition?

12


that it will be a major player in assessing reconstructionneeds, providing policy advice, and coordinating donorassistance.4 In Somalia, where fighting has continueddespite a cease-fire and international presence, the Bankhas taken a similar stance, indicating its interest in sup-porting reconstruction once political stability is restored.

The Lending PortfolioThe Bank has undertaken a variety of lending operationsin countries emerging from conflict. Of the 34 countriesidentified by the study as post-conflict, 18 had lendingoperations supporting recovery. In these countries, theBank undertook 157 reconstruction projects amounting tomore than US$6.2 billion (see complete list in Annex 2).

Lending by RegionSince 1980 the volume of Bank lending to post-conflictcountries has increased over 800 percent.5 As shown inFigure 3.1, the most significant increase came in the firsthalf of the 1990s, when the majority of funds went toAfrican countries (mainly Uganda). Of the US$6.2 billion

the Bank has lent to post-conflict countries since 1980, 56percent, or US$3.5 billion, has gone to the Africa (AFR)region. The next largest share has gone to the Latin Amer-ica and Caribbean (LAC) region, which received just over16 percent. The Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and Mid-dle East and North Africa (MENA) regions have receivednearly equal shares, about 11 percent each, and the EastAsia and Pacific (EAP) region received 4.5 percent. TheSouth Asia (SAS) region received the smallest portion, justover 1 percent, consisting entirely of the EmergencyReconstruction loan to Sri Lanka in 1988 following themid-1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accords.

Over the years, lending commitments to post-con-flict countries have grown as a percentage of the Bank’soverall portfolio. As Table 3.2 indicates, overall lendingto post-conflict countries comprises over 16 percent ofIBRD’s and IDA’s lending commitments for fiscal year1998. In several regions, such as ECA and MENA, lend-ing to post-conflict countries makes up nearly half theregional portfolio. In AFR, post-conflict lending makesup close to a third of commitments.

FIGURE 3.1: POST-CONFLICT LENDING OPERATIONS APPROVED BY REGION

1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 970

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

US$

mill

ions

AFR

EAPSAS

ECA

MENA

LAC

Fiscal Year

13


Lending by SectorOver the past 20 years, the Bank’s post-conflict recon-struction lending projects have covered every sector. Ofthe US$6.2 billion in lending volume, the largest por-tion, 32.68 percent, supported “multisector” projects.These include central balance transfers to stabilize themacroeconomic situation, technical assistance loans,and general emergency reconstruction or recovery proj-ects (usually ERLs) that have several economic andsocial components and are designed to provide rapidassistance for the most pressing needs. Of the nearlyUS$2 billion in multisector lending, more than half wasin structural adjustment loans or credits for budget sup-port. The “multisector” sector also includes the de-mining project implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Nearly 10 percent of the US$6.2 billion financed agri-culture projects, and 9 percent supported transportationprojects (mainly highway reconstruction). The urbandevelopment sector received 8.5 percent of post-conflictreconstruction assistance, the largest of these loansbeing US$175 million for the reconstruction of Beirut.Population, health, and nutrition received 7.4 percent ofthe lending amount, and electric power and other energyreceived 6.6 percent. Other sectors received smalleramounts of support, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Non-lending ServicesThe Bank’s non-lending services—including economicand sector work (ESW), aid mobilization and coordina-tion, technical assistance (often Trust Fund-supported),training, research, and evaluation—are an importantpart of the post-conflict reconstruction effort. They helpaddress the special challenges faced by countries embark-ing on post-conflict reconstruction, providing support togovernments in important policy areas, as well as to theBank in its specific post-conflict lending activities.

ESW includes analyses of country macroeconomicframeworks, economic sectors, and specific issues suchas poverty, private sector investment, and public expen-ditures. In post-conflict countries, ESW has been used toidentify reconstruction priorities, assess poverty and vul-nerability for targeting program benefits, support proj-ect preparation, and understand macroeconomic issues.ESW has also supported the aid coordination process byinforming international donors of needs, mobilizingtheir support for reconstruction efforts, and keepingthem abreast of progress.

Smooth aid coordination is particularly importantin post-conflict situations, because of the massive,urgent needs and the presence of many donors eager toprovide support, each with its own agenda. In many

TABLE 3.2: IBRD/IDA COMMITMENTS TO POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE REGIONALAND GLOBAL PORTFOLIOS (PERCENT)FISCAL GLOBALYEAR AFR EAP SAS ECA MENA LAC PORTFOLIO

1980 21.08 6.86 6.65 1.13 17.26 2.57 7.951981 16.18 2.28 6.74 0.91 19.47 1.90 6.221982 17.91 4.07 4.26 0.92 5.80 1.14 5.181983 21.82 2.58 1.11 1.62 7.78 2.15 4.791984 17.08 1.63 1.84 2.74 32.22 2.28 7.281985 24.75 1.03 3.80 0.50 29.23 2.07 6.601986 13.00 0.94 2.36 1.42 5.20 1.70 3.261987 13.66 1.18 1.78 0.00 33.15 1.67 5.671988 21.94 1.83 4.58 3.76 36.69 1.79 7.721989 20.05 1.30 1.36 0.00 26.79 1.81 6.581990 17.42 1.20 4.09 1.14 37.74 0.66 7.071991 15.83 0.99 9.95 0.78 26.07 2.39 7.151992 25.82 0.73 2.32 1.49 17.69 2.78 7.311993 32.67 0.99 3.22 35.64 24.53 3.46 13.211994 29.97 1.84 0.00 44.22 21.74 3.77 14.541995 15.16 0.99 1.30 45.48 43.09 2.68 13.641996 14.35 2.60 5.32 48.18 41.64 6.22 17.171997 19.55 2.17 2.87 45.85 38.29 2.93 17.261998 30.60 0.62 2.04 43.93 45.73 6.87 16.03

Note: Percentages are based on IBRD/IDA Lending Commitments provided by the Planning and Budget Department. Completetables with lending amounts are in Annex 5.

14


post-conflict countries, the government lacks the capac-ity to coordinate donor assistance. The Bank can assistby providing a framework for mobilizing donorresources, ensuring realistic and common expectationsregarding aid on the part of stakeholders, and strength-ening the government’s aid coordination capacity. TheBank led or assisted in aid coordination in nearly all thecase study countries. Chapter 4 explores the range anddepth of that experience.

Trust Funds are also important to supporting recon-struction efforts. For many of the countries reviewed,reconstruction-related support is a sizable portion of thecountry’s total Trust Fund activity. About 20 countriesreceived post-conflict reconstruction support from TrustFunds: 14 devoted more than a third of their Trust Fundresources to post-conflict reconstruction (eight devotedmore than 80 percent). All nine case study countriesreceived Trust Fund support for operations related topost-conflict lending and non-lending services. Whilecofinancing accounts for the largest use of post-conflictTrust Fund support in most of the nine countries(including BiH and Uganda), other uses, such as techni-cal assistance and pre-investment support, have beensignificant in BiH, Cambodia, El Salvador, Lebanon,and Uganda. The use of Trust Funds for arrears clear-

ance has been critical to the resumption of Bank opera-tions in BiH, Cambodia, Haiti, and Rwanda. In BiH, aspecial Trust Fund in the amount of US$150 million andanother one set up by the Netherlands were key to fund-ing the first few reconstruction projects.

The Development Grant Facility (DGF) has recentlyapproved US$8 million for fiscal year 1998 for a Post-conflict Program (PCP). The Program will finance earlyreconstruction activities more rapidly than typical Bankoperations, making the Bank more flexible in respondingto urgent reconstruction needs. The PCP has establisheda Program Committee, which includes Bank staff as wellas external experts from UN agencies, NGOs, and othertechnical experts who periodically meet to consider pro-posals for post-conflict development efforts. The com-mittee will contribute to the selection of implementingagencies or researchers to enhance knowledge and carryout such activities as watching briefs, transitional sup-port strategies, and early reconstruction activities.

The Bank’s training facility, the Economic Develop-ment Institute (EDI), has recently begun to address post-conflict reconstruction priorities. An examination ofEDI’s work programs for fiscal years 1991–1995 foundno obvious post-conflict reconstruction activities. In1996 and 1997, however, learning activities on such top-

FIGURE 3.2: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION LENDING BY SECTOR, 1977–1997

4.26%Education

6.57%Electric power and other energy

2.07%Environment

5.03%Finance

1.03%Industry

0.06%Mining

31.68%Multisector

0.07%Oil and gas

7.41%Population, health and nutrition

4.51%Public sector management

4.47%Social sector

1.33%Telecommunications

9.09%Transportation

8.46%Urban development

4.20%Water supply and sanitation

9.75%Agriculture

(Total lending volume: US$6.2 billion)

15

ics as civil service reform, integrity, accountability andtransparency, the role of NGOs, and social fundsemerged for post-conflict countries. In 1996 EDI articu-lated a Social Dislocation program that addresses thespecial challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. At anOctober 1996 Social Dislocation Seminar in Washington,D.C., country representatives from Angola, Cambodia,Guatemala, Mozambique, and Uganda met NGOs, theUN, and the Bank to discuss approaches to rebuildingafter conflict. Ongoing activities for fiscal year 1998include workshops addressing such issues as conflict res-olution (to take place in BiH), municipal capacity build-ing (in Guatemala and Rwanda), and reintegration (inAngola). Plans are also under way to prepare trainingmaterials on lessons learned in post-conflict Mozam-bique, as well as a training program for Bank staff onpost-conflict issues to be conducted jointly with the Post-conflict Unit and the Learning and Leadership Center.

The Cost of Post-Conflict Reconstruction OperationsIt is tempting to assume that post-conflict reconstructionoperations cost more in staff time than “normal opera-tions,” as they may need more support for complicatedaid coordination or demanding project supervision in afragile context. However, it is difficult to assert thisassumption with any certainty. A review of aggregatestaff years dedicated to support Bank activities (includinglending, supervision, ESW, country program support,technical assistance, aid coordination, and network andother country support), certainly shows a noticeablejump in staff time during the immediate post-conflictyears for the nine case study countries (see Table 3.3).This is particularly evident for BiH, Cambodia, El Sal-vador, Eritrea, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. InHaiti, ESW spiked in 1991 with President Aristide’s elec-tion then dropped-off after he was ousted. In many cases,the number of staff years is significantly higher than theaverage for the region. However, the difficulty inattributing this to the post-conflict context is indicatedby the large number of staff years in such places asEthiopia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and formerYugoslavia, where the Bank was working before the out-break of conflict and before arrival at a peace settlement.

Lessons from Evaluations of Post-Conflict ReconstructionOperationsOf 65 completed post-conflict reconstruction operationsin 15 countries, 52 had Project Completion Reports(PCRs) or Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs).

Ten had been audited by OED. Most of the Bank’s expe-rience in evaluating post-conflict reconstruction opera-tions comes from Uganda (35 out of 65 projects).

The completion reports rated performance of theevaluated operations as follows: 66 percent had “satis-factory” or better outcomes; 43 percent were consideredto be “sustainable”; and 23 percent had “substantial”institutional development impact. This is a slightlypoorer performance record than for the overall Bankportfolio, according to the Annual Review of EvaluationResults 1995. For the 1995 Review cohort of 264 oper-ations, 68 percent had “satisfactory” or better out-comes; 46 percent were considered likely to be “sustain-able;” and 27 percent had a “substantial” institutionaldevelopment impact. The 1995 Review also notes that“War and civil strife are significant factors in the out-comes of the 1995 cohort. If the analysis excludes all


Muslim woman in Sarejevo suburb, Bosnia

16


TABL

E 3.

3:ST

AFF

YEAR

S D

EDIC

ATED

TO

TH

E N

INE

CASE

STU

DY

COU

NTR

IES

FIS

CA

L1

99

8

YE

AR

:1

98

61

98

71

98

81

98

91

99

01

99

11

99

21

99

31

99

41

99

51

99

61

99

7R

EV

ISE

D

AFR

Tot

al60

5.6

611.

558

0.9

583.

865

9.2

559.

861

1.0

620.

765

4.4

607.

961

5.1

553.

659

8.1

Reg

ion

Ave

rage

11.2

11.3

10.8

10.8

12.2

10.4

11.3

11.5

12.1

11.3

11.4

10.3

11.1

Eri

trea

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.0

6.0

8.7

6.3

7.1

(Eth

iopi

a)21

.320

.412

.919

.218

.617

.916

.923

.825

.219

.719

.723

.727

.7R

wan

da16

.410

.513

.116

.016

.813

.816

.312

.713

.38.

98.

510

.512

.3U

gand

a11

.716

.918

.618

.027

.526

.528

.026

.528

.430

.930

.927

.230

.4

EA

P To

tal

277.

026

8.2

285.

428

6.3

304.

229

1.1

321.

034

0.9

342.

433

9.7

339.

032

7.4

332.

3R

egio

n A

vera

ge9.

69.

29.

89.

910

.510

.011

.111

.811

.811

.711

.711

.311

.5C

ambo

dia

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.1

2.5

2.5

5.2

9.7

12.0

10.3

8.8

LA

C T

otal

301.

931

9.1

332.

535

4.8

369.

236

7.0

390.

942

4.9

430.

940

3.0

377.

532

9.5

313.

7R

egio

n A

vera

ge7.

58.

08.

38.

99.

29.

29.

810

.610

.810

.19.

48.

27.

8E

l Sal

vado

r3.

03.

71.

92.

83.

65.

97.

310

.49.

810

.19.

410

.06.

5H

aiti

9.1

7.3

5.8

7.7

9.8

9.8

3.1

1.2

1.6

5.2

9.2

7.8

8.9

SAS

Tota

l26

4.5

269.

835

1.4

400.

950

1.4

430.

247

0.6

473.

847

3.0

386.

437

7.1

381.

340

3.5

Reg

ion

Ave

rage

24.0

24.5

31.9

36.4

45.6

39.1

42.8

43.1

43.0

35.1

34.3

34.7

36.7

Sri L

anka

18.0

17.7

20.3

16.5

19.3

23.8

21.9

27.9

25.5

22.1

24.9

24.5

25.8

EC

A T

otal

113.

010

5.0

107.

695

.911

9.5

170.

020

7.6

407.

748

2.2

468.

646

7.8

464.

450

4.9

Reg

ion

Ave

rage

2.5

2.3

2.3

2.1

2.6

3.7

4.5

8.9

10.5

10.2

10.2

10.1

11.0

BiH

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

26.7

32.1

25.2

(for

mer

Yug

osla

via)

25.7

19.5

23.2

20.7

22.2

23.9

7.8

4.2

0.6

0.7

0.1

0.2

0.0

Tota

l for

ME

NA

171.

118

1.9

186.

619

6.3

205.

618

9.1

215.

122

1.5

215.

820

8.8

199.

618

7.8

196.

9R

egio

n A

vera

ge5.

55.

96.

06.

36.

66.

16.

97.

17.

06.

76.

46.

16.

4L

eban

on0.

30.

00.

10.

00.

00.

43.

88.

113

.715

.411

.59.

612

.3

BiH

: 199

5 ce

ase-

fire

and

Day

ton/

Pari

s A

ccor

ds; C

ambo

dia:

199

3 U

N-s

pons

ored

ele

ctio

ns e

ndin

g tw

o de

cade

s of

war

; El

Salv

ador

: 199

2 Pe

ace

Tre

aty

and

1994

elec

tion

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ea: 1

992

post

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1993

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199

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; Rw

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: 199

3 pe

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1994

mas

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: 198

7 In

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198

8 E

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198

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199

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17

projects with substantial negative effects resulting fromwar and civil strife, the outcome rating for the cohortwould climb to 73% satisfactory from 68%” (pp. 8–9).

The ratings of the 21 operations completed before thefirst phase of intensive conflict in Rwanda, October 1990,stand in marked contrast to the ratings of the 12 opera-tions completed during and after the conflict. Over 60percent of outcome ratings in the former group were “sat-isfactory,” however, over 80 percent in the latter groupwere “unsatisfactory.” While it was impossible to predictfrom these results that genocide was about to occur in thesecond quarter of 1994,6 the results do reflect the acceler-ated deterioration in the socioeconomic environment andin governance occurring in Rwanda in the early 1990s.

The project evaluation documents identify severalimportant lessons for consideration in the design andimplementation of post-conflict reconstruction opera-tions. They include the importance of (i) establishing adialogue; (ii) preserving flexibility; (iii) avoiding unreal-istic expectations; (iv) maintaining simplicity; (v) keep-ing procurement and disbursement procedures consis-tent with the post-conflict context; (vi) ensuringconsistency in Bank programs; (vii) supporting priorityareas; and (viii) promoting government ownership.

Establishing a dialogue. Uganda’s First Reconstruc-tion Credit (C0983) sheds light on the importance ofopening an avenue for discussion of recovery policy.Although the direct impact of the credit was limited, itprovided a valuable opportunity to initiate a dialogue ona wide range of economic policies and management deci-sions that has been carried forward into subsequent oper-ations and economic and sector work (PPAR, para. 54).

Preserving flexibility. The more unsettled a coun-try’s institutional environment and the more uncertainthe prospects that project benefits will be sustainable,the more flexibility needs to be built into the projectdesign, that is, the more the project needs to have a“process” rather than a “blueprint” design. In Uganda’sTA III, project designers realized that they could not pre-dict the form and timing of every contingency that mightarise. They thus adopted a flexible project design thatincorporated both “blueprint” and “process” elementswith emphasis on the latter. Several components weredeliberately left underdesigned at appraisal. This con-cern was echoed by the PCR for the Sri Lanka Emer-gency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project (ERRP,C1883). A PCR lesson learned was to keep initial designsimple and build in flexibility to make midcourse cor-rections as circumstances warrant (para. 16).

Avoiding unrealistic expectations. The realizationthat the process of rehabilitation is complex and lengthyoften comes too late in the project process. Thus, expec-tations are unrealistic, and good intentions cluster toomany components under one umbrella. Although timelyand relevant, the project objectives in Uganda’s Programfor the Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs ofAdjustment (PAPSCA), were numerous and unpriori-tized. So many components covering such a wide spec-trum of subjects under the same program created exces-sive complexity.

Simplicity. Although their performance was rated“satisfactory” overall, the completion reports for two ElSalvador operations contain some lessons indicating aneed for relatively uncomplicated approaches in imme-diate post-conflict projects. The first Structural Adjust-ment Loan (SAL I, L3293) contained three pilot nutri-tion efforts that required management-intensivesupervision to address implementation problems. Whiletwo of the three pilots ended in success, the ICR sur-mised that a separate investment project might havebeen a more appropriate vehicle for implementing anutrition program. This opinion was echoed by a staffmember overseeing the SAL at the time. In fact, consid-eration had been given to including the nutrition pilotsin the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (SSRP,L3348), but they were included in the SAL to give theloan an explicit social component. One element of sec-ond-tranche conditionality for SAL I called for thedivestiture of agricultural marketing entities. Implemen-tation of this measure was delayed by stiff politicalopposition and resistance from employee groups. OneBank staff member involved at the time questioned thewisdom of including these privatization efforts in thefirst SAL. A lesson drawn by the draft ICR for the SSRPis that even where there is a high level of commitment tothe project, when institutional capacity is low, projectsneed to be relatively uncomplicated, and additionalcapacity should be ensured through pre-project and con-tinuing technical assistance and training of project staff.

Keeping procurement and disbursement proceduresconsistent with the post-conflict context. Disbursementsfor Uganda’s First Economic Recovery Credit were muchslower than had been hoped. Despite the urgent need toobtain foreign exchange, the Bank emphasized the needto restore discipline to the foreign exchange allocationand procurement procedures that had been destroyedduring the previous regime. This decision made it veryunlikely that the goal of rapid disbursement could be


18

achieved (PPAR, p. 15, para. 43). In PAPSCA, cumber-some procurement and disbursement procedures led tountimely delivery of goods and replenishment of funds.Project management and disbursement were highly cen-tralized, and construction materials were packaged intolarger contracts and procured through internationalcompetitive bidding (ICB). In some cases, it took 18months after credit effectiveness for communities toreceive materials. In the Sri Lanka ERRP, a significantimpediment to implementation was the weak mandate ofthe National Reconstruction Steering Committee toadopt streamlined and expeditious procurement proce-dures. The PCR presents as a key lesson learned the needto establish more effective institutional arrangements forproject implementation and monitoring in future emer-gency assistance operations. The PCR points to the moresuccessful experience of the IDA-supported EmergencyRecovery Project in Jordan, where a high-level govern-ment task force had a mandate to make quick procure-ment decisions and issue directions to implementationunits (PCR, paras. 14–15). Chapter 7 discusses the issueof procurement and disbursement in more detail.

Ensuring consistency in Bank programs. Projectexperience in Uganda’s Public Enterprises Project (PEP)and the Enterprise Development Project (EDP) under-lines the need for better coordination of the Bank’scountry assistance strategy. The PEP was approved in1988 and closed in 1995. Its objective was to strengthenthe government’s capacity to sustain economic recoveryby increasing productivity and output in public enter-prises. The EDP, approved three years before PEPclosed, emphasized support for a parastatal reform anddivestiture program with a goal of divesting 85 percentof all parastatals by the end of 1997. PEP’s emphasis onrestructuring parastatals was at odds with the objectiveof parallel adjustment programs, which aimed to imposehard budget constraints on the operations of parastatalsand to divest most of them. The approval of EDP threeyears before the planned closing of PEP created substan-tial confusion (PPAR, para. 10).

Supporting priority areas. Power is a priority areain post-conflict recovery. The Second Power Project,approved in 1985, was the Bank’s first operation inUganda’s energy sector in more than 20 years. It tookeight years from project signing to credit closure, com-pared with an original estimate of five years. The proj-ect’s design underestimated the impact of the unstablesituation and the needs faced by the implementing agen-cies in ensuring day-to-day operation of the power

system, competing with the requirements of projectimplementation. Also underestimated were the very sig-nificant scope of the rehabilitation works and therequirements of the transmission and distribution net-works in Kampala. Efforts to strengthen the capacity ofthe Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) lagged behindefforts to support the Ministry of Economy and Plan-ning. The project did not achieve its objective (toimprove the board’s financial performance and opera-tional efficiency) and the UEB continues to face severefinancial difficulties.

Government ownership. A Special Emergency Assis-tance Grant of US$20 million was provided for emer-gency rehabilitation in Rwanda shortly after the newgovernment assumed power in the summer of 1994. A1996 ICR has assessed the performance of this grant ingenerally positive terms, largely because implementationwas carried out expeditiously and effectively by four UNspecialized agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, andWHO). However, the ICR extracts a lesson that theBank should keep the government involved in andinformed about grants. This, according to the ICR,“avoids possible unhappiness by the government atbeing ‘bypassed’ by a grant, and sets a more securefoundation on which to build future collaborationbetween the government and the Bank” (ICR, para. 41;June 18, 1996). The issue of government ownership ispotentially of particular concern in the case of grants, asthe government may have no financial stake in the out-come of a grant-funded activity (unless it has made itsown budgetary contribution).

Characteristics of Post-Conflict CountriesFinally, project documentation shows that conflicts aredifferent everywhere and require tailor-made ap-proaches. They differ among other things in duration,intensity and scope of destruction, the relative militaryand political strength of the opponents, and the degreeto which the middle and upper classes are affected bythe hostilities.

The nine cases in this study confirmed the diversityof conflict countries. Ethnic or regional tensions wereproximate causes in BiH, Eritrea, Lebanon, Rwanda,and Sri Lanka. These divisions have typically beenaggravated for political ends by exclusionary govern-ment policies. Ideological extremism played a role inCambodia and El Salvador, with a long legacy ofinequality and exclusion also contributing to the El Sal-vador conflict. Governance that was predatory in


19

extracting resources and ineffectual in providing basicservices contributed significantly to the Haiti andUganda crises.

The extent of destruction also varied among the casestudy countries. Statistics cannot begin to capture thehuman suffering, the destruction, and the setback toeconomic and social progress wrought by civil conflict.Available information on population displaced andkilled by conflict conveys the extent of suffering alongtwo dimensions. Among the nine case study countries,the range is from 6 percent displaced in Haiti to close to60 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from about2 percent killed in El Salvador to 24 percent in Cambo-dia.7 No country, however, comes close to Rwanda inintensity: during three months in 1994, the monthly dis-placement rate was 11 percent, and monthly fatalitieswere over 4 percent.

The economies of conflict countries can plummet toless than half their pre-conflict peaks. GDP in Rwandain 1994, for example, was 46 percent of its pre-conflict

peak; BiH and Lebanon plunged even more, to 27 per-cent and 24 percent, respectively.8 And it has taken timefor these economies to get back to where they were: themost recent data for Rwanda (1996) and Lebanon(1995) put them at only about 65 percent of their pre-conflict peaks. Moreover, it is one thing to recover lostground: it is another to recover growth forgone. Conflicthas exacted a major opportunity cost even in countrieswhere post-conflict growth has brought the economy toa level above that achieved before conflict, as in El Sal-vador. The same is true for Sri Lanka, a country stillafflicted by regional conflict and where growth has beensustained, but at a slower rate than might have beenexpected in the absence of conflict.9

With this information on the recipients of post-con-flict reconstruction aid, and some general backgroundon the Bank’s global portfolio to assist the reconstruc-tion process, the following chapters now turn to a moredetailed discussion of the Bank’s role and performancein this area.


Trucks between Tuzla and Sarejevo, Bosnia

21

Defining the Bank’s Role

44

While the Bank may be unable to prevent conflict, it has the potential to influence

the course of pre-conflict events. The Bank should study the relationships

between sociopolitical and economic circumstances in situations of potential con-

flict. The Bank’s analytic work and monitoring should be sensitive to predatory and exclusion-

ary behavior that adversely affects projects and shared development objectives. It should raise

such concerns in its dialogue with the government and other donors.

A central objective of Bank programs is to fostersustained development. In post-conflict countries, sus-tained peace is essential to this goal. If invited, the Bankshould be an active adviser to peace negotiations toinform the parties of the economic development impli-cations of alternative peace agreement provisions.

The weakened capacity of government often foundin post-conflict settings magnifies the need for an effec-tive external aid coordination role. The Bank shouldparticipate in post-conflict aid coordination at an earlystage. Effective coordination arrangements requireactive internal and external involvement by Bank seniormanagement. A resident mission is particularly impor-tant for effective coordination at the sectoral and imple-mentation levels.

The Bank’s Role in Preventing Conflict and PromotingSustainable PeaceA central objective of the Bank’s programs is to fostersustained development. In post-conflict countries, sus-tained peace is essential to sustained development.Broad-based development, important in its own right,also contributes to sustainable peace. The Bank’s anti-poverty focus implies a concern with income disparitiesand exclusion of population groups—two conditions

often at the root of civil conflict. But without peace,development is impossible.

The centrality of the peace objective implies animportant corollary: the Bank must thoroughly graspthe political framework. To be relevant and effective, theBank must understand that framework, since it is amajor determinant of the prospects for sustained peace.The political framework has two related but distin-guishable components: the domestic politics of the post-conflict country and the explicit or tacit framework setby the international community.

Obstacles to the Peace ObjectiveWhile the Bank is acutely aware of the internationalpolitical framework within which it operates, its graspof the domestic political frameworks in the post-conflictcountries where it works has been uneven. One obstaclehas been the Bank’s absence from several countries dur-ing the period leading up to conflict. For example, Banklending to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)was suspended as SFRY began to break-up in mid-1991and it remained suspended during the conflict. In El Sal-vador, because of the conflict and political instability, nonew Bank-financed operation was approved betweenJune 1979 and October 1987. Because conflict broke

22

out soon after Cambodia joined the Bank in 1968, therewere no Bank credits or other activities until after thepeace settlement.

Another obstacle was that, until recent years, theBank’s analytical work in some cases gave limited atten-tion to distributional and regional imbalances, ethnictensions, policies of exclusion and predation, and otherissues that feed the political events leading to a crisis.This may have resulted in missed opportunities to pro-mote equitable and inclusive development. One positiveexample of Bank flexibility and understanding early inthe post-conflict situation was Eritrea after its war ofsecession from Ethiopia. Since Eritrea was part ofEthiopia, the Bank had no feasible role before 1991. TheBank’s response appears to have been timely and innov-ative, mainly because of the determination of an enlight-ened vice-president prepared to take risks.

Economic and Social Factors in (Levels of) ConflictThe Board has clearly stated that peacemaking andpeacekeeping fall under the mandate of the UN and arenot responsibilities of the Bank. Nevertheless, the eco-nomic and social problems normally within the Bank’smandate may be among the factors leading up to con-flict or the resumption of conflict. In such circumstancesthe Bank may be able to help reduce tensions, therebyenhancing prospects for conflict avoidance. Deliberateattention should be paid to ensuring that internationaldevelopment efforts do not exacerbate such tensions incountries at risk.

Of the nine case study countries, six were experi-encing economic stagnation or severe economic stress inthe years leading up to conflict (BiH, Cambodia, El Sal-vador, Eritrea, Haiti, and Uganda). In only three casesdo economic tensions between conflicting groups appearto have contributed only marginally (or not at all) tointernal conflict compared with the effects of political(or regional) circumstances (Cambodia, Eritrea, andLebanon). In five cases (BiH, El Salvador, Haiti,Rwanda, and Sri Lanka), economic and distributionalissues were important factors leading up to conflict.While the Bank was not playing a significant pre-conflictrole in all the cases, it was active in several.

Drawing a line in these conflicts between the realmof (economic) issues appropriate for Bank attention andthose (political) inappropriate under the Bank’s mandateis difficult. The parties to these conflicts typically havejustified resorting to violence by claiming a threat totheir fundamental interests. Such threats have been seen

as arising from the capture and inimical use of the stateso that governance is no longer exercised with equalresponsibility toward and participation of the aggrievedparties. In Sri Lanka, for example, donors may havemissed a significant opportunity to promote equitableparticipation through the huge Mahaweli power, irriga-tion, and resettlement scheme. In Rwanda, considered tobe a relatively successful development case in the 1980s,donors neither assessed nor addressed the distributionalimbalances that were emerging and that fed the politicalevents leading up to the ethnic crisis. In Haiti in 1986,international assistance failed to make the most of awindow of opportunity following the end of the Duva-lier era to promote equitable economic growth anddemocratic change.

It cannot be known if more active efforts to shapeeconomic policies and programs, or more politically-aware advice or requirements, would have reduced thesedestructive intergroup tensions and succeeded in the faceof other conflict factors. Nevertheless, opportunities tomake such efforts in areas of normal Bank involvementshould not be missed. The Bank has recognized that cor-ruption can negate its contributions, providing groundsfor reconsideration of the Bank’s program.1 The effectsof the conflicts studied—including vast population dis-location and suffering, economic disruption, anddestruction of infrastructure—greatly exceed the nega-tive effects on the economic environment commonlyobserved from corruption. The implication is clear thateconomic and distributional policies and programs thatcan avoid a slide into conflict within deeply divided soci-eties should be pursued.

Peace ConditionalityA number of external observers and critics of the Bank,including some sources and persons consulted for thisstudy, have urged the Bank to condition disbursementson compliance with peace agreements and governancecriteria. One country where critics have argued for con-ditionality deriving from peace agreements is El Sal-vador. The Bretton Woods institutions, they argue,should have insisted on “peace conditionality” in sup-port of specific programs mandated by the peaceaccords. While Bank and Fund resources and their con-ditioned assistance on tax reform at least indirectly sup-ported the accords, some argue that (i) domesticresource mobilization and expenditure reallocation fromthe military in favor of the social sectors could have beenpursued through conditionality more aggressively than it


23

was; and that (ii) the Bank could have conditioned itsassistance on specified progress in implementing suchkey accords-mandated programs as land acquisition forex-combatants and reform of the justice and lawenforcement system (even if it did not provide directfinancial support for these programs).2

In view of the fragility of immediate post-conflictsettings, the Bank’s initial response has typically been toprovide one or more emergency credits or loans to suchcountries. These instruments fall under OperationalDirective 8.50, “Lending by the Bank for Emergencies,”which discourages the application of conditionality toemergency operations unless “directly linked to thecause of the emergency” (para. 39). Considering theexperience in BiH and Cambodia, however, a case canbe made for attaching what might be called “policy andeconomic conditionality” to emergency operations. Inthe words of the former director for BiH, policy condi-tionality is essential because “conflict destroys institu-tions and policies, as well as bricks and mortar. The easy

part of any Bank operation is reconstructing the bricksand mortar; the hard—but more essential—part isrestoring the institutional base, human capital, and soci-etal bases of a post-conflict society.”

Policy conditionality requires case-by-case analysis.Depending on social and physical conditions, it may notbe appropriate to introduce wide-ranging conditionali-ties all at once. While the immediate post-conflict periodcan be a window of opportunity to pursue some policyreforms, especially those essential to macroeconomicstability, the Rwanda case exemplifies the need to exer-cise caution in pursuing an ambitious policy reformagenda soon after a major social collapse. Thus, loanand grant agreements in post-conflict countries, as inother countries, should contain provisions essential toaccomplishing the development objectives of recoveryoperations. However, in Uganda, the Fund and the Bankemphasized increased tax effort that, considering thecountry’s history of predatory tax policy, may well havedepressed private investment.

D e f i n i n g t h e B a n k ’ s R o l e

Remains of old bridge in Mostar, Bosnia

24


Partnership CoordinationIt is also important that the Bank work with otherdonors and partners in the reconstruction process tobring about agreement on the need for policy changeand the means to implement change. This could besomething as simple as getting partners to agree onallowing monetization of food aid or aid-in-kind to sup-plement devastated budgets, reintroducing partial cost-recovery for war-damaged public services, and similarmeasures.

The Bank has extremely valuable contributions tomake to peace negotiations and international consultativegroups. One contribution is to advise on the economicdevelopment dimensions of peace accord options. Becausepeace accords lay down an economic scenario, the Bank,if invited to participate, should have a seat at the table.3

During the UN’s 18-month governance mandate follow-ing the Cambodian settlement, international (and Bank)staff were hamstrung in their economic rehabilitationefforts by an overriding interpretation of the settlement’slanguage that narrowly restricted reconstruction untilelections had produced a new government. In BiH, theaccords called for a complex and fragile fiscal structurehighly dependent for its viability on willing cooperationamong parties just emerging from warfare. In such cases,the provisions for economic reconstruction might bedesigned to enhance the recovery if the parties have fullbenefit of the Bank’s advice and experience on the possi-ble economic development consequences of alternativeapproaches to implementing peace agreement provisions.

A Place at the TableWhile the Bank is not a party to peace negotiations, itcould provide such advice if it had more than observer

status. The former Bank director for BiH notes that thewillingness of diplomatic partners to have the Bank atthe table should not be taken for granted, and that theBank must and should work hard to earn its seat. Hadthe Bank played a more formal role in the negotiationsleading up to the El Salvador Peace Accords of January1992, a clearer, more realistic picture of the costs of thevarious provisions might have emerged earlier. However,some observers argue that injection of such considera-tions would have inhibited reaching an agreement. TheBiH negotiations illustrate how political considerationscan override economic ones. In that case the Bank wasinvited and participated in negotiations on technicalissues at Dayton but found that technical considerationsof efficiency in economic governance could not prevailover strictly political negotiability. As the former direc-tor for BiH notes, however, “The economic aspects ofthe settlement were the best that could be agreed to atthat time, if they were to be politically acceptable to theparties.” Yet, a frank, experience-based examination ofoptions and possible consequences may improve eco-nomic governance components of peace accords and laya foundation for more effective or cooperative interpre-tation and implementation in the critical first months ofcarrying out the agreements. Bank participation in peacenegotiations in Guatemala provides another example ofits potential contribution to the peace process.

The Bank’s Role in Aid CoordinationThere are typically many donors present in a post-con-flict situation, each with its own agenda. To respondeffectively to the massive and urgent needs, they mustwork in partnership. The weakened capacity of govern-ment often found in post-conflict settings magnifies the

TABLE 4.1: THE BANK’S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP

CAM- EL ERI- SRIBIH BODIA SALVADOR TREA HAITI LEBANON RWANDA LANKA UGANDA

Peace negotiations ↑ — — — — — n/a — —Mobilize resources ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ — — — ↑ ↑Jointly prepare

assessments and strategies ↑ ↑ ↑ — — ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑

Sectoral and in-countrycoordination ↑ — ↑ ↑ — — — ↑ ↑

Note: ↑ means the Bank played a role and was generally effective; ↓ means the Bank played a role and was not effective; —means the Bank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank’s involvement in the activities listed,and cannot reflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank’s role or its performance. See Annex 1 for sum-maries of the case studies.

25

need for an external aid coordination role. Assumingthis task does not necessarily imply leadership of theprocess, but it will probably call for leadership onmacroeconomic and external debt issues, strengtheningpolicy dialogue and policy reform, and mobilizingresources. Most of the key actors in the nine case studycountries have expressed (in one way or another) a pref-erence for Bank assistance in aid coordination, particu-larly for a Bank-convened consultative group. Some ofthe benefits they perceive from an active Bank roleinclude the quality of its analytical and advisory ser-vices, its unique relationship and access to the IMF, itscredibility in the eyes of the donor community, andrelated to the last two benefits, its potential to mobilizefunds from other sources. Table 4.1 summarizes theBank’s role in coordination and partnership efforts forthe nine case study countries.

The Bank’s use of consultative groups (CGs) hasbeen particularly effective for mobilizing aid resources,including facilitating the clearing of arrears, seeking acoordinated approach to macroeconomic issues, andproviding information on needs and assistance flows. Ithelped enormously to have the Bank’s leadership roleclearly defined and mandated by key members of theinternational community, as well as being stronglybacked by top Bank management, as in BiH after theDayton Accords. Even in the absence of such a designa-tion, it is important to have a clear request from the gov-ernment early, as in El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, and SriLanka. Also valuable, as was the case for BiH, Cambo-dia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, is a consensus among gov-ernment and main donors about the policy frameworkthat must be put in place for a sustainable recovery andreconstruction effort. In El Salvador, holding a CG meet-ing before the peace accords were signed contributed tothe effectiveness of coordination. It was also importantthat the government gave priority to donor coordinationand endorsed the Bank’s role.

One area where a coordinated, joint approachamong donors is particularly desirable is in the under-taking of damage and needs assessments, as illustratedby the experiences of BiH, Haiti, and Sri Lanka. A jointeffort in this area is more efficient and can help set thestage for effective coordination and cooperationbetween donors and government when implementingpost-conflict reconstruction efforts. Assistance forpreparing a national reconstruction plan should also becoordinated to avoid the imposition of unnecessary bur-dens on the government. Early leadership or participa-

tion in damage and needs assessments in post-conflictcountries has facilitated the Bank’s subsequent involve-ment in developing reconstructionstrategies and in aid coordination.This has required an assessment ofsocioeconomic needs and the socio-political context as well as of physi-cal damage. Scholarly expertise andparticipatory poverty assessmentswere not employed to the extent that would have beendesirable, however.

The resource mobilization function of aid coordina-tion may lead to cofinancing of operations. This is par-ticularly desirable for general program assistance forbalance of payments and budget support, for which con-ditions and tranches must be synchronized. Budget sup-port counterpart generation is often urgent for pressingpost-conflict local currency needs, that is, non-tradablegoods and services the government can only obtain fromthe local market (such as salaries of teachers and med-ical personnel). The Bank had difficulty mobilizing ade-quate cofinancing for budget support in BiH, Cambo-dia, El Salvador, and Rwanda. Although the specificcircumstances in each case were different, a commonfactor was continuing ambivalence on the part of somedonors toward the government, either about its commit-ment to peace accords or about its accountability andlegitimacy. Cofinancing of program assistance for post-conflict countries thus presents a special challenge forthe Bank. Partnerships are key to effective aid coordina-tion. It is critical to establish at the outset of the recov-ery process not only what each partner will do but alsothe areas in which the Bank cannot intervene or where itdoes not have a comparative advantage.

Another challenging aspect of coordination for theBank has been at the in-country and sectoral levels. Mis-understandings and differences can arise with otherdonors with substantial resources (such as the EU inBiH), those who have had a long-standing coordinationrole (such as the UNDP in Rwanda), or those with both(such as the EU, IDB, and UNDP in Haiti). The case ofBiH demonstrates the importance of partnerships to thereconstruction process. The Bank, along with the othermain donors in BiH, participates in a sector task forcefor each sector, and co-chairs one task force on eco-nomic policy with the IMF. All the task forces are underthe guidance of the Economic Task Force, chaired by theOffice of the High Representative. The sector task forcesare credited with success in information-sharing within

D e f i n i n g t h e B a n k ’ s R o l e

Factors forsuccessfulcoordination

26

sectors, and with some success in avoiding discord andoverlap among donors. However, success in carrying outfully coordinated programs on the ground has been lim-ited, and experience has varied by sector.

The absence of a resident mission, or a delay inestablishing a mission with the continuous engagementof a resident representative, has hindered the Bank’s abil-ity to coordinate effectively in Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti,Lebanon, and Rwanda. Lack of clear agreement at theoutset on division of labor, particularly with the UNDP,both at headquarters and in the field, can hamper effec-tive coordination, as it did in post-conflict Rwanda.

Finally, an important element is the quality of theindividuals who are expected to take the lead in aidcoordination for the Bank. At the apex, senior staff,such as the country department director, are crucial inrecruiting other donors and mobilizing their support.This was unquestionably the case for the series of post-conflict CG meetings for BiH and El Salvador. The qual-ity and leadership style of the resident representative isalso critical to the effectiveness of the Bank’s role in aidcoordination at the country level.

Other Aspects of PartnershipRelated to the presence of a resident mission is the qual-ity of the Bank’s coordination with NGOs, both inter-

national and local, and its relationships with civil soci-ety in general.4 A strong resident mission has facilitatedthese relationships, with the BiH mission and its NGOliaison officer providing the best example. The Bank isseen as an effective bridge between the government andNGOs in BiH. The Bank’s rather rough, but improvingrelationship with Salvadoran NGOs could arguablyhave been more harmonious sooner had there been aresident mission.

Despite the presence of a resident mission, the Bankhas been criticized by NGOs and some UN sources forits coordination and partnership role in Uganda. Someheld that the Bank’s leadership had focused the develop-ment community on macroeconomic reforms at theexpense of poverty alleviation programs. In addition,the Bank was criticized for employing a “standard eco-nomic model approach” to coordination rather thanadopting a specialized post-conflict approach. NGOsalso said that the rhetoric of partnership and participa-tion “was moving faster than the reality,” and indicatedthe need for greater dissemination of information onBank activities. The Bank improved this shortcomingthrough its well-used public information center in theBank resident mission. But this passive resource was notmatched by any parallel information strategy addressingthe Ugandan public.


27

The Bank’s ComparativeAdvantage and Performance

55

Supporting the achievement of macroeconomic stabilization is an area of comparative advan-

tage for the Bank and should be one of its highest priorities in post-conflict situations. The

pursuit of other economic reforms should continue incrementally, taking into account the

country’s historical and current policy and institutional enabling environment. Rebuilding physical

infrastructure is another area of strength, and the Bank should support such activities with atten-

tion to necessary policy and institutional reforms. Bank support for demining should remain

consistent with the Operational Guidelines and focus onawareness and training activities. Support for mineclearance should be integrated with a specific develop-ment activity.

The Bank’s performance in restoring human andsocial capital has been uneven. The Bank should helppost-conflict countries develop cost-effective strategies torestore human and social capital, using demand- andcommunity-driven approaches. In providing further sup-port for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combat-ants, the Bank should strengthen the capacity it hasacquired and incorporate the relevant experience of otheragencies. The Bank should give gender issues a higherpriority in post-conflict countries and support gender-specific interventions in the economic and social sectors.

Stabilizing and Rebuilding the EconomyMoving to macroeconomic stability as soon as possiblein a post-conflict setting is crucial to economic recovery.The Bank is widely perceived to have a comparativeadvantage in this area. The case studies confirmed thaton the grounds of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, sta-bilizing the economy is the area of strongest Bank per-formance in post-conflict reconstruction. Typically, theBank has been the only significant source of program

funds to cover general import needs. Together with theFund, the Bank has supported policy reforms aimed atbringing greater macroeconomic stability in each of thecase study countries. An important indicator of macro-economic stability is the current rate of inflation. In amajority of the nine cases, the monetary and fiscal sta-bilization packages the Bretton Woods institutions nego-tiated with the governments of the countries have beenessential to reducing the rate of inflation in the post-con-flict period.

While a substantial reduction in the rate of inflationis an important indication of macroeconomic stability itis unfortunately not a guarantee of stability. The case ofLebanon is instructive. The inflation of consumer priceshas come down from an annual average of 164 percentduring the 1986–1990 conflict period to 6.8 percent in1994. As a recent analysis points out, however, Lebanonhas been incurring very large fiscal deficits, with a nega-tive balance between current revenues and expendituresrunning between 9 and 11 percent of GDP between1994 and 1996, and a negative balance between overallrevenues and expenditures running between 18 and 20percent of GDP for the same period. The analysis arguesthat the large inflows of external private and publicresources that have permitted these deficits cannot be

28


sustained. Therefore, future macroeconomic stability isin jeopardy unless public saving can be increased(through a combination of increasing revenues andreducing expenditures).1

Of course, the best plans to achieve macroeconomicstability will not produce the intended results if theagreed policy measures are not implemented. Sri Lankais an example. Persistent high defense expendituresrequired in the face of continued conflict and poor per-formance on other policy reform fronts combined tomake price stability an elusive goal.

Fiscal and Structural Economic ReformsThe Bank’s performance in supporting fiscal and otherstructural economic reforms, such as privatization andtax policy, has been mixed. As discussed in the nextchapter, the Bank’s pursuit of such reforms in post-con-flict settings has not always been appropriate or timely.

The Bank’s assistance for rebuilding physical infra-structure, including the policy and institutional aspects,has been another strong area of performance. But theBank has not pursued it consistently. The Bank’sapproach to assisting basic production sectors, such asagriculture and industry, has been for the most part indi-rect, concentrating on policy and institutional enablingenvironments and on infrastructure.2 Operationsintended to strengthen public sector entities in agricul-ture in El Salvador and Rwanda encountered protractedproblems in attempting to work with weak, inefficient,

or rigid bureaucracies. This has led to the canceling orrestructuring of operations, and to a search for alterna-tive approaches to such functions as research, extension,and service and input delivery, relying more on the pri-vate sector and NGOs. The performance of operationsthat have assisted intermediary organizations in supportof microenterprise and other participatory local devel-opment efforts has been mixed. The record has been rel-atively satisfactory in BiH and Rwanda and less satis-factory in Uganda.

Housing RecoveryHousing recovery is an important component of rebuild-ing physical infrastructure because it helps with the rapidrestoration of social and economic life. Rebuilding hous-ing raises issues of land acquisition and tenure, construc-tion materials, and technological choices for reconstruc-tion. Cost recovery is another issue, as project designersmust decide whether to provide subsidies and whether todirect them to lower-income families or to those who sus-tained the most damage. In some cases the situation isfurther complicated by dramatic changes in the demo-graphic distribution of the population. In BiH, the warresulted in an exodus of refugees to other countries andmassive internal population shifts. The Bank-financedEmergency Housing Repair project (with a total projectcost of US$50 million) aims at assisting the restoration ofcommon areas and weatherproofing the fabric of publicsector housing to avoid further deterioration. Given the

TABLE 5.1: THE BANK’S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN REBUILDING THE ECONOMY


Stabilizing and rebuilding the economy ↑ ↑ ↑ — ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑

Other reforms ↑ ↑ ,↓a ↑ — ↓ — ↓ n/a ↑Physical infrastructure ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ — ↑ — ↓ ↑Productive sectors ↑ ↑ ↑,↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑,↓ ↑ ↑ ,↓b

Demining ↓ — — — — — — — —

Note: ↑ means the Bank played a role and was effective; ↓ means the Bank played a role and was not effective; — means theBank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank’s involvement in the activities listed, and cannotreflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank’s role or its performance. See Annex 1 for summaries of thecase studies.a. The Bank has made substantial efforts to improve forestry management in Cambodia, although up to now these have beenunsuccessful. In promoting the rule of law, Bank efforts have been insufficient and defective. See the Cambodia case study forgreater detail.b. In Uganda, the Bank’s TA and sugar projects had significant impact, and the agricultural project was a crucial reform,enabling the dismantling of the monopoly of the Coffee Marketing Board. The Bank project in the power sector, however, cametoo late and was insufficiently focused on institutional reform. See the Uganda case study for details.

29

T h e B a n k ’ s C o m p a r a t i v e A d v a n t a g e a n d P e r f o r m a n c e

emergency nature of the project and the limited financialcircumstances of both households and local institutions,concessionary financing was deemed justifiable. Thecosts of repairing the common parts of buildings will berecovered over a long period reflected in gradually risingrents.

In Sri Lanka, housing has been extensively damagedby explosions (aerial bombs, mortars, and ground deto-nations), fire, and mechanical razing by bulldozers. Theshelter component of the ERR Project financed by theBank (US$29 million) complemented a shelter programimplemented by the government and assisted by bilat-eral agencies, NGOs, and UNHCR. The Bank-financedcomponent included loans for up to 20 years, with inter-est rates of 6, 4, and 2 percent, according to householdincome. The funds were on-lent through three financialintermediaries using their standard loan-processing pro-cedures. The ICR for the project found that the sheltercomponent was among the more successful, in contrastto the public infrastructure components of the project,which were delayed, destroyed, or hard to monitorbecause of continuing violence and insecurity.

The Problem of DeminingDemining is unique to post-conflict situations andessential for rehabilitation and recovery. To restart eco-nomic life, land must be made available for humanactivity through the removal of mines and the suspicionof mines. Identifying and removing landmines requiresconsiderable resources and can take decades.2 The Bankhas supported self-standing demining operations in BiHand Croatia. This experience has raised concerns regard-ing the danger, expense, and quality of landmine clear-ance. Although there are strong economic and humani-tarian reasons for demining, the main lesson learned

from this assessment is that Bank involvement shouldfocus primarily on indirect, non-clearance activities,such as coordination, information and mine awareness,training, and institution build-ing. Consistent with the Febru-ary 1997 Bank OperationalGuidelines on Demining, sup-port for landmine clearanceshould be provided always as anintegral part of a specific devel-opment activity (e.g., road con-struction). The BiH and Croatia projects should beaudited upon completion to confirm these preliminaryfindings.

Rebuilding Human, Social, and Cultural CapitalInvestment in human capital, including education andhealth spending, is an important component of post-conflict work. Violent conflict can extinguish the humanresources of a country as people are killed, maimed, ordisplaced in large numbers. Human capital services aretypically the first to be disrupted by conflict. Education,health, and community services stop, bringing the real-ization of human potential to a halt. Schools, hospitals,clinics, and community centers are destroyed, as is thegovernment’s capacity to administer services. Conflictalso creates new vulnerable groups, such as the unem-ployed, ex-combatants, women-headed households,children, and the disabled, who are legitimate beneficia-ries of reconstruction aid for socioeconomic as much ashumanitarian reasons. The restoration and developmentof human capital in the post-conflict phase is essential toestablishing a base for rebuilding the economy. Table 5.2summarizes the Bank’s role in restoring human, social,and cultural capital in the nine case study countries.

TABLE 5.2: THE BANK’S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN RESTORING HUMAN, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CAPITAL


Health ↑ ↑ ↓ — ↑ ↑ ↑ — ↓Education ↑ — ↑ — — — ↑ — ↓Role of women ↑ — — — — — — — —Demobilization ↑ — — — — — ↑ — ↑Governance ↑ ↓ ↑ — — — — ↑ ↑Cultural capital — — — — — ↑ — — —

Notes: ↑ means the Bank played a role and was effective; ↓ means the Bank played a role and was not effective; — means theBank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank’s involvement in the activities listed, and cannotreflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank’s role or its performance. See Annex 6 for summaries of thecase studies.

Putting a valueon human capitalis a recentdevelopment

30


Human capital or social sector work was not gener-ally a priority in Bank post-conflict projects or in its eco-nomic and sector work, both of which concentrated ini-tially on macroeconomic, sector, and infrastructurework. BiH appears to be an exception, with an early andbalanced inclusion of social sector work (4 of 16 proj-ects, including a specific war victims rehabilitation proj-ect) producing some promising reports. Although com-pletion reports and audits in social sector post-conflictreconstruction are still relatively few, it seems thatresults of Bank efforts in these sectors have been modest,with a few exceptions. Uganda operations producedunsatisfactory results, notwithstanding some effort toprioritize health, education, and economic support tothe rural poor and vulnerable groups. Poor social indi-cators persist in other post-conflict countries such asEritrea, Haiti, and Rwanda, despite recognition that theworkforce was potentially a major asset.

The El Salvador Basic Education ModernizationProject has been a rare exception to modest or poor per-formance in the social sectors. The project builds on aBank-supported EDUCO pilot project and employs acommunity-managed approach initiated during the con-flict by communities themselves. The participatorynature of the El Salvador program has contributed toconsensus-building and the sustainability of the peaceprocess. Strong government and Bank commitment havealso been important for performance and the achieve-ment of objectives. The Eritrean Community Develop-ment Fund, although small-scale, is another good exam-ple of a participatory approach to post-conflict recovery.

Social CapitalInherent in violent civil conflict is the destruction ofsocial capital, particularly institutions of governance andcivil society and such basic attitudes and behaviors astrust and participation. While the severity of this prob-lem in post-conflict countries is increasingly recognized,neither the Bank nor any other international donor hasan obvious comparative advantage in this area. Analysesundertaken in the Bank and elsewhere have identifiedsome key components of good governance and vigorouscivil society. These components include transparency,accountability, the rule of law, and the professions. Sev-eral recent Bank-supported pilots (as in BiH) and EDIefforts (as in Uganda) show promise in these areas.

The Role of WomenThe role of women in rebuilding social capital shouldalso be examined and capitalized on. Often considered a

“vulnerable group” in post-conflict settings, the potentialof women as strong community leaders who can facili-tate the rebuilding of social capital may be overlooked.4

Reconstruction efforts must consider the possible pro-ductive difficulties faced by women in post-conflict situ-ations (e.g., lack of labor at critical times in the agricul-tural season), since in some post-conflict countries a thirdor more of the working-age men have been killed andwomen are the productive base for restarting the econ-omy. Only in BiH has the Bank made a specific opera-tional effort to address the particular needs of women.

Although for the most part Bank projects in BiHhave not separately targeted women, project designtakes into account the particular needs of women andthe existing programs to help address those needs.Women are among the beneficiaries of the EmergencyDemobilization and Reintegration Project, the Emer-gency Recovery Project, and the War Victims Rehabili-tation Project. Displaced women were one of three tar-get groups for the pilot phase of the Local InitiativesProject, which supports microcredit programs. An eval-uation of the pilot project reveals that the average loansize for this group was 700 DM; 228 loans had been dis-bursed; 185 jobs had been created; and repayment rateswere 100 percent for the groups (and 88 percent on anindividual basis).5 The project appears to have workedremarkably well and is perceived to be successful bybeneficiaries, NGOs, other donors, and governmentofficials because of its reliance on local organizationsand its success in reaching beneficiaries.

Finally, in planning post-conflict reconstructionefforts, analysis should be used to identify unequalpower relations underlying social organizations toensure that women are not further marginalized by reliefand reconstruction interventions.6 The Bank has raisedthe issue of limited women’s property rights in its dia-logue with the government in Rwanda and it plans gen-der-specific interventions as part of its 1998–2000(CAS) program strategy.7

DemobilizationThe related activities of demobilization, reinsertion, andreintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian economyand society can be important to economic recovery andsustained peace. Bank-supported efforts in this area haveexpanded in the 1990s and the Bank has played a leader-ship role through the analysis of its experience in Africa.8

The experience of the Bank and other donors has gener-ated several lessons and produced some unresolved issues.For example, when the parties to peace accords are not

31

fully committed, one side or the other can manipulate theprocess. An approach narrowly targeted on ex-combat-ants, as opposed to an area or countrywide approach, cancreate resentment among local populations.

Demobilization can also sometimes be premature,particularly where a continuing threat to national secu-rity exists, as may have been the case in Uganda. How-ever, as Colletta notes, “if the alternative to demobiliza-tion is a militarized state, an army of underpaid andmarauding soldiers, and a government budget dedicatedto ‘defense,’ the risk of DRP (demobilization and reinte-gration program) failure due to rapidly changing cir-cumstances is well worth taking, even if information onmacrosecurity is limited, or if this information is not themost encouraging. Many governments and donorsagree. Hence, further research on security, demobiliza-tion, and reintegration issues seems warranted.”9

Is Land the Lever?The Uganda experience also demonstrates that the avail-ability of land is an important determinant of successfulreinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants. Land isnot a guarantee of success, however, as illustrated by ElSalvador, where a substantial number of ex-combatantsprovided land under the accord-mandated Land Trans-fer Program abandoned their land for a variety of rea-sons, including poor land quality, lack of supporting ser-vices and credit, and lack of aptitude and interest. TheBank has acquired some expertise in public sector down-sizing programs that can be applied to demobilizationefforts. Training schemes have had a mixed record inboth areas. Care must be taken to consider the specialneeds of the soldiers to be demobilized—they may comefrom rural areas, have little or no education, andincreasingly they are mere children.10

T h e B a n k ’ s C o m p a r a t i v e A d v a n t a g e a n d P e r f o r m a n c e

Repairing buildings in Sarejevo, Bosnia

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Culture is Not a LuxuryWhat is the justification for assisting in the protectionand conservation of cultural heritage in situations ofcomplex emergencies? Applying scarce resources to con-serving cultural heritage in a post-conflict situation mayseem frivolous at first glance. However, cultural heritagehas the power to inspire hope and remind people of theircreativity. Its destruction is a decisive way to assert pri-macy and control and can become a symbol of the bru-tality and insanity of war. So sensitive are cultural her-itage sites that they can become flashpoints in ethnic andcivil conflicts. The bombing of Bosnia’s Mostar bridgeand the 1992 attack on the mosque in Ayodha, India,demonstrate the potential of acts aimed at cultural her-itage to ignite tense situations. In attempting to re-estab-lish civil society in the face of ethnic rivalries, protectingcultural heritage is one of the tasks requiring attentionin any assistance strategy.

Although the Bank has carried out a number of proj-ects with cultural heritage conservation components, ithas little experience doing so in post-conflict situations.One recent effort is a component of the assistance strat-

egy for the West Bank and Gaza, where the Bank is sup-porting the establishment of a cultural resource manage-ment program. This includes the preparation of policies,legislation, and guidelines; development of a culturalresources review and approval system for developmentplans linked to land use planning and the environmentalassessment process; design of a budget and accountingsystem; preparation of an inventory of cultural sites;coordination mechanisms with planning authorities,municipal governments, and other agencies; and prepa-ration of a work plan. Also included is training in cul-tural heritage management, which will allow the Pales-tinians to make informed decisions on the protection andmanagement of their resources. This is viewed as integralto the transition from war to sustainable peace and as aprerequisite for economic and social development. Byforce of example, the Bank can exert considerable influ-ence in defining programs for post-conflict rebuildingthat ensure the retention of cultural heritage and canallocate sufficient resources to do so. The Bank needs toconsider also the need to build the human resources nec-essary to carry out needed conservation works.


33

The Folly of SomeConventional Wisdoms

66

The devastation of human, social, and physical capital often found at the beginning

of a post-conflict period, and the particular provisions of a peace agreement, may

require that some “conventional wisdoms” of development experience and practice

be set aside for a time.

Many “conventional wisdoms” of developmentlearned over the past several decades also apply in post-conflict settings. Among these are the importance of rel-evance, client ownership, beneficiary participation, thepolicy and institutional environments, including a posi-tive enabling environment for the private sector, andcost-effectiveness. But some characteristics of post-con-flict settings—fragility of the political environment,skittishness of private investment, concentration ofwealth and access to resources, thinness of financialsector markets, and severely reduced governance capac-ity—make some “conventional wisdoms” not applica-ble, at least not in the short run. These characteristics,of course, also exist to varying degrees in non-conflictcountries. However, they seem to have been particularlyprevalent and severe in the majority of the nine casestudy countries.

The 1997 World Development Report recognizesthe special circumstances of post-conflict countries in itsobservation that:

Although the elements of a post-conflict stabi-lization and recovery program may differ littlefrom programs applied elsewhere, there aregrounds for caution and for examining the com-ponents of the standard policy package in light

of the conditions and distortions peculiar to thepost-conflict environment.… Policies to spur theprivate sector’s recovery should therefore avoidoverly aggressive increases in taxation andshould stress the early sequencing of investment-sensitive reforms, including the preservation oflow inflation, the sale or restitution of expropri-ated housing stock, and restraint in revenue col-lection....The sequencing of standard economicpolicy reform and of governance measures alsoneeds to be tailored to avoid threatening the sus-tainability of peace agreements and to takeaccount of the typically severe distortions ineconomic conditions. (World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report 1997 :161)

Too High a Price for Tax Revenue?For example, tax policy, important for stabilization andpublic finance, has been considerably more controversialthan stabilization measures employing the instrumentsof monetary policy. In some of the nine countries, Bankand Fund insistence on rapid increase in tax effort (ratioof tax revenues to GDP) may well have been counter-productive, constraining growth of the economy and thesize of the tax base. In others, the Bank may not have

34

pursued increased tax effort vigorously enough. In theformer category, the Uganda case study finds that owingto a history of predatory government tax policy duringthe conflict periods, pressure by the Fund and Bank ontax effort has had a chilling effect on private investment,driving economic activity into subsistence, or, alongwith investable funds, abroad.1 To make matters worse,the marginal benefit of tax effort in Uganda has beenminimal, given the low capacity to expand cost-effectivepublic sector programs. The reverse case, where pressureon tax effort may not have been enough, is illustrated byEl Salvador.

Timing and Sequence Are the KeysThe impact of early measures to liberalize and restruc-ture post-conflict economies has also been mixed. Inmost cases, liberalization of the exchange rate has beenan early and successful reform. However, other mea-sures, such as sharp reductions in tariffs, liberalizationof interest rates, elimination of subsidies, civil servicereform, and sweeping privatization have been more con-troversial in post-conflict countries, including thoseexamined in this assessment. The issue has not been oneof unalterable opposition, but of timing and sequence.Because vested interest groups that would normally raisestiff opposition are in a weakened condition in post-con-flict settings, it can be argued that early reform action ismore feasible. However, the political environment inwhich a new post-conflict government finds itself maystill be very fragile and unstable, limiting its ability towin acceptance of a reform program that goes beyondstabilization. This has been the case in most of the casestudy countries.

The typically weak implementation capacity of thenew government is another reason for approaching suchreforms slowly and incrementally. Private investmentmay be very sensitive to attempts to offset declines intariff revenues by aggressive efforts to expand sharplydirect taxes on investment and business income andassets. For all these reasons, criticisms arose from insideand outside the Bank that too much emphasis was puton a rapid pace of reforms in Haiti, Rwanda, andUganda, as opposed to concentrating on maintaininglow inflation and a convertible currency, and approach-ing other reforms more incrementally.

Consider Political RealitiesThe environments for other specific reforms, often partof adjustment programs, such as civil service reform and

privatization, need to be conducive to success. The Cam-bodia study finds that the Bank continued to push fordownsizing the civil service when the political coalitionarrangement under the peace accords was based in parton raising the size of the civil service to absorb largenumbers of the incoming parties’ functionaries. TheBank’s position, in the view of some observers, was notpolitically realistic from the outset.

There was a tendency in some post-conflict situa-tions to give high priority to immediate and widespreadprivatization. While there is much in the histories of thecountries studied to support the priority given to priva-tization of state enterprises, this does not necessarilyimply that sweeping and total privatization should beamong the first reforms undertaken. As the Cambodiaand Haiti case studies show, the norms of behavior ofthe private sector and the degree of corruption andcronyism within or between the private and public sec-tors may be such that privatization may well notenhance the prospects for sustained, equitable develop-ment, and may even make them worse.

First Things FirstThe first priority in post-conflict situations should be toexamine the overall enabling environments that governthe behavior of broad sectors in the political economy.In doing so, the counterfactual must also be considered.In BiH, the former director notes that the Bank did goahead with implementing privatization efforts since thealternatives—an unjust and illegal spontaneous privati-zation undertaken by the winning economic groups andwar profiteers, or the immobilization of assets thatcould be used to generate activity—were even worse.

The Bank’s experience suggests an additional cau-tion concerning privatization in post-conflict situations.The government must have adequate capacity to plan,implement, and oversee the process. In addition, thestate enterprise(s) to be privatized must be soundenough to attract private investors or managers. Theexperience of Rwanda suggests that the Bank pushedprivatization of the major utility before the governmenthad the requisite knowledge and capability to proceed,and before the management and operation of the utilityitself were sufficiently strengthened to attract a privatesector management contract, let alone investors. TheBank has recently modified its approach and is provid-ing technical assistance to strengthen the managementstructure and systems of the utility before attemptingagain to attract private management.


35

T h e F o l l y o f S o m e C o n v e n t i o n a l W i s d o m s

Privatization of agricultural marketing entities wasa second tranche condition, one of a wide range of con-ditionalities for the first structural adjustment operation(SAL I) in El Salvador. The Implementation CompletionReport (ICR) for the project points out that implemen-tation of this measure, while ultimately carried out, wasdelayed by stiff political and labor opposition. Whetherthis condition should have been part of this first SAL,approved in 1991 during a critical period while peaceaccords were still being negotiated, is questionable.2

For human capital development, conventionalwisdom among donors, including the Bank, advocates

focus on primary education and health care. But in acountry where conflict has eradicated education andhealth systems, as in Rwanda, a case can be made fordonor assistance (not necessarily from the Bank) tothe secondary and tertiary education levels and forhospitals. Another rationale for attention to sec-ondary education is to enhance employment opportu-nities for young ex-combatants who left primaryschool to take up arms. These considerations haveinfluenced government and Bank thinking and opera-tions in education in El Salvador and Rwanda and inhealth in BiH.

Remnants of war, Bosnia

37

The Bank’s InstitutionalArrangements

77

The case studies reveal the great importance of management decisions regarding the

staffing and structuring of post-conflict country teams and the programming, design,

and implementation of operations. The country director must have a mandate to give

the country substantial if not full-time attention and resident representatives need sufficient

authority to make a wide range of programming and implementation decisions in the field.

Despite the high up-front costs, well-staffed resident missions are a pre-condition for successful

Bank intervention in post-conflict situations.

Early post-conflict situations require timely andflexible programming, design, and implementation.From the initial base of a well-prepared damage andneeds assessment, the Bank should refine its strategyover the few years that follow through a series of work-shops and policy notes. A full CAS can be preparedwhen time and resources permit. Expeditious prepara-tion, piloting and bridging funds, and loan instrumentsshould be resourced at sufficient levels to enable theBank to be effective earlier in post-conflict situations.Mechanisms for rapid procurement and disbursementshould be devised for post-conflict situations, consistentwith sound practice. The recently established Post-con-flict Unit requires the capacity to analyze a wide rangeof issues, as well as the continuing attention and occa-sional active involvement of senior Bank management.

Effective implementation of post-conflict operationsrequires intensive monitoring, and the Bank must beprepared to allocate sufficient administrative budgetresources for this task. Monitoring efforts should alsodraw on external expertise about a post-conflict countryand make better use of ESW, which should include lon-gitudinal household and community studies. Consider-ing the need for completion information in often highly

volatile post-conflict settings, the Bank should sharplyreduce the interval between project closing and comple-tion report, with appropriate streamlining of theprocess. ICRs and audits must apply evaluation criteriawith greater sensitivity to the post-conflict political andeconomic environments.

The organizational, resource allocation, procedural,and staffing decisions made by the Bank’s managementand Board have important consequences for Bank effec-tiveness in assisting post-conflict reconstruction. Experi-ence should inform those decisions. The findings of thisassessment cover several aspects of the Bank’s institu-tional arrangements for post-conflict reconstruction.

Country TeamsThe staffing of country and resident teams is one of themost important sets of decisions that Bank managementmakes for a post-conflict country. Strong commitmentand consistent support from the highest levels of head-quarters management and a country director with a man-date to give substantial, or even full-time, attention to thecountry also affect performance, as illustrated in both theBiH and El Salvador cases. Attention to speed and qual-ity by the country director for BiH and the high commit-

38

ment of staff was important in meeting the compressedtimetable for project processing. A comfortable adminis-trative budget was also extremely helpful. The countrydirector for El Salvador during the period immediatelypreceding the peace accords played a critical role in get-ting the CG process off the ground and mobilizing sup-port from other, often reluctant, donors, as well as ablyleading a dedicated and effective country team.

Support and ReinforcementThe circumstances of post-conflict countries, includingweak government capacities and rapidly changing con-ditions, require greater on-the-ground implementationand monitoring support from the Bank. The absence ofresident missions and specialized staff has limited theeffectiveness of operations in Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti,and Lebanon.1 The speed and responsiveness of the BiHprogram demonstrate the advantages of a strong resi-dent mission headed by an able resident representativewith considerable Bank experience and stature, andstaffed with an experienced task manager for each oper-ation, as well as other staff dedicated to such functionsas NGO liaison and external relations. In addition, eachBiH resident task manager is supported by a counterparttask manager in Washington. Of course, not every post-conflict portfolio approaches the magnitude, complex-ity, and international visibility of the BiH program.Nonetheless, the contrast between the amply endowedBiH resident mission and those of other case study coun-tries is striking. Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Uganda havehad one resident representative drawn from headquar-ters (augmented by an additional headquarters profes-sional staff member in the case of the latter two mis-sions). These have been supplemented by varyingnumbers of local professional and support staff.2 Theseobservations should not be interpreted as downgradingthe role of local staff, who are invaluable at several lev-els. But the BiH experience does show what a well-staffed mission can accomplish.

No Universal PatternAs reconstruction is a multidisciplinary task, countryand resident teams need to reflect the range of skillsrequired, and managers need the vision to integratethose disciplines. Task managers in the case study coun-tries did not always have easy access to multidisciplinaryskills or have post-conflict experience themselves. Dis-continuity in staffing some positions in both Rwandaand Eritrea seriously impeded Bank performance. Given

the unprecedented nature of the tragedy that befellRwanda, management decisions regarding staffing wereparticularly critical during the first two years after thegenocide of mid-1994. Extensive Bank experience, ide-ally in the Africa region and with post-conflict countries,should have been an important criterion for the initialcore country team. This was not the case for a couple ofteam positions. Paradoxically, extensive experience inRwanda was not necessarily a good thing. Assigningprevious task managers to the same projects was notalways wise, particularly when knowing what had hap-pened to previous counterparts adversely affected moti-vation and the ability to forge effective working rela-tionships with new counterparts. In contrast, theassignment of BiH staff with experience in formerYugoslavia contributed positively to effectiveness. Thiswas true in the physical infrastructure sectors, wherestaff familiarity with the sector was instrumental to thesuccess of emergency infrastructure projects, and evenmore so on fiscal, financial, trade, and macroeconomicissues.

Give Teams the ToolsAll country cases demonstrated that successful imple-mentation depends upon effective partnerships with anumber of in-country agencies. However, substantialpowers were not regularly delegated to country and res-ident teams; this prompted complaints from partnersabout decisions having to be referred back to higher lev-els in Washington with inevitable delays. For example,inadequate awareness of the post-conflict context byheadquarters staff led to unrealistic provisions for pro-curement and disbursement in the Northern UgandaReconstruction Project (NURP). BiH has been an excep-tion on this point. There, the combination of significantdelegation of authority and strong staff support enabledthe resident representative to establish good workingrelationships with a wide range of groups—bilateraldonors, UN agencies, changing government institutionsat several levels, NGOs, and the UNOHR. The residentrepresentative in Sri Lanka has had significant delega-tion of authority and, pursuant to current policy in theSouth Asia Region of the Bank, has recently been desig-nated country director, with the accompanying budgetauthority.

Programming, Design, and ImplementationThe first stage in programming Bank country operationstypically involves developing a CAS. In an emergency


39

situation, however, a trade-off is required between theneed for speed and the legitimate desire for a systematic,well-prepared CAS. For some of the countries studied, aCAS was developed several years after the Bank re-engaged in the country. The key initial “strategy docu-ments” were a damage and needs assessment and anational reconstruction plan, which provided the frame-work for the first emergency operation(s). This is anappropriate approach that does not unnecessarily bur-den the country team (or the government) with staff-intensive CAS preparation and approval efforts duringthe critical early post-conflict stage. In such cases, theCAS could become a process rather than a product.Using the initial documents as points of departure, thisprocess could consist of a series of additional smallerpapers and workshops dealing with selected policyissues and involving relevant government officials. Theprocess could culminate with a more substantial docu-ment that would take into account the outcomes of theworkshops but that would largely be prepared by theBank. For example, the Bank and the EU prepared a BiH

“vision” document using a series of meetings and semi-nars with economists and government officials as aninput for refining the document and disseminating itskey conclusions. BiH officials have indicated that thisapproach was very successful in directing the attentionof decisionmakers toward key issues. The soundness ofthis approach rests heavily on the quality of the initialdamage and needs assessment and recovery strategy,which therefore merit the commitment of adequateresources and Bank management attention. Moreemphasis should be placed on the staff skills and train-ing required to strengthen the process of damage andneeds assessment.

Need is Only Part of the EquationSetting country assistance levels in the early stages ofpost-conflict reconstruction can be problematic becausethe demonstrated policy performance of a new govern-ment may not justify the levels of assistance implied byneed alone. During discussion of the Rwanda CAS Con-cept Paper, a substantial gap became apparent between

T h e B a n k ’ s I n s t i t u t i o n a l A r r a n g e m e n t s

Refugee camp, Guatemala

40

the three-year assistance level proposed by the countryteam and that implied by the performance and need cri-teria developed by FRM (Resource MobilizationDepartment). The country team argued that a post-con-flict program should not be judged by the same criteriaas one in a “normal” country. Instead, more weightshould be given to need and its assessment of probableperformance of the government, based on early evidenceof performance and commitment. The team also pointedout that even apart from the extraordinary levels ofassistance now being provided to BiH, the Bank haddeparted in the past from what performance criteriaalone would have justified in the case of the substantialinitial level of assistance provided for post-conflictMozambique. The response from FRM was essentiallythat (i) the FRM criteria were not in force when assis-tance to post-conflict Mozambique was initiated and (ii)the criteria should not be weakened, but performanceshould be reviewed annually and corresponding adjust-ments in levels made.

The volatile and fast-changing circumstances ofpost-conflict countries demand a high degree of flexibil-ity and speed in design and implementation. As noted inChapter 3, preparation and piloting funds (such asPHRD, CTF, and PPF) are critical to early reconstruc-tion work. While the existing trust funds are oversub-scribed, the PPF (Project Preparation Facility) consti-tutes an advance only on a reasonably well definedproject with a detailed project concept document. InEritrea, staff recommended a more flexible kind of facil-ity. Piloting funds might also have been usefullyemployed during the time it took to bring emergencyoperations from identification to effectiveness—tenmonths in Sri Lanka and two years in Lebanon. Evalua-tions confirmed that post-conflict projects need a“process” rather than “blueprint” design.

Recent Bank initiatives will help address these prob-lems. A Post-Conflict Program (PCP) has been estab-lished under the Development Grant Facility with initialfunding in fiscal year 1998 of US$8 million. The PCPwill finance activities relating to the Bank’s involvementthrough the early preparatory stages of post-conflictreconstruction. Although individual investments will berelatively small, the PCP is intended to leverage theenhancement of Bank understanding of the post-conflictsituation; preparing a strategy for early interventionwhere existing Bank instruments cannot be accessed;and developing best practices to help the Bank and otheragencies design interventions in new areas relevant to

post-conflict reconstruction (such as reintegration).3 Anew lending instrument, the Learning and InnovationLoan (LIL), provides a modest (up to US$5 million),speedy management-approved loan, available whereeither (i) institutional capacity needs building; (ii) pilot-ing a new idea would be helpful; or (iii) uncertaintyexists about technical or contextual issues concerning aproject. These factors were prevalent in the case studies.Another new instrument, the Adaptable Program Loan(APL), designed for use at the other end of the lendingspectrum, might be used to bridge the gap between loansin a reconstruction program. The Bank’s experience inlong-standing reconstruction programs such as Uganda,where recovery may take two decades or more, indicatesthe need for consecutive projects addressing continuingissues. APLs could be useful in ensuring continuity.

Processes Can Become ObstaclesStandard Bank procurement and disbursement processeshave often created stumbling blocks to post-conflictrecovery.4 Cumbersome procedures leading to theuntimely delivery of goods and tardy replenishment offunds were the norm in many of the studied countries,despite the emphasis in OP 8.50 on the need for stream-lined procedures. Project management and disbursementtended to be highly centralized, with implementing agen-cies having no independent access to funds. The experi-ence in many situations requiring decentralized deliveryof goods points to the need for flexible procurementarrangements in community-based projects, especiallywhen end-users contribute to the project costs. The situ-ation was particularly problematic in Uganda, where dis-bursements for several operations were slower thanexpected, partly owing to unforeseen political changes,but also because the procurement procedures chosen forthe credits were not conducive to rapid disbursement. Inthe First Economic Recovery Credit, disbursements weremuch slower than the three to four months estimated byBank staff. Despite the urgent need to obtain foreignexchange, the Bank emphasized the need to restore disci-pline to the foreign exchange allocation and procurementprocedures destroyed during the previous regime. Thisdecision made it very unlikely that the goal of rapid dis-bursement could be achieved.

Rapid disbursement of a program loan is normallyachieved by separating procurement and disbursementprocedures; that is, the proceeds of the loan or creditshould be used to reimburse the costs of imports procuredunder previously approved contracts. In the Uganda oper-


41

ations, however, disbursements were made against goodsprocured under new contracts. Even under favorable cir-cumstances it takes many months from the time animporter applies for a foreign exchange allocation untilimports arrive and the foreign exchange is reimbursed. Inthe Rwanda Emergency Recovery Credit, misunderstand-ings over procedures for selecting a procurement agencyfor public sector imports led to a one-year delay of a por-tion of the credit and eventual conversion to entirely pri-vate sector imports. Use of a pre-qualified list of procure-ment agents might have avoided the problem.

Typically, weak post-conflict administrations havedifficulty managing Bank procurement and disbursementprocedures, a burden that is often multiplied by the dif-ferent demands of various donors. This was apparent inEritrea, Haiti, and Uganda, where ministerial capacityshould have been strengthened before taking on complexpost-conflict projects. Harmonization of donor require-ments would be a substantial improvement for such min-istries. In general, country cases indicated the value ofprocurement training in advance, and increased in-coun-try presence by Bank experts to assist (although asEritrea demonstrated, insertion of a procurement expertin-country was no guarantee of success). The success ofimplementing the BiH emergency program has beenattributable in part to simplification of procurement pro-cedures, including higher thresholds for internationalbidding and reduced bid submission times.

Variable Results (PIUs and PMUs)Special project implementation/management units(PIUs/PMUs) were commonly used in the case studycountries to implement emergency and other post-con-flict projects. Such units provide a number of functions:monitoring progress, facilitating supervision, and aboveall, coordinating, but with widely varying effectiveness.In BiH, locally-staffed PIUs managed Bank projects indifferent sectors providing a coordinating vehicle forother donors, and overcoming fears about governmentinvolvement slowing implementation. Not all arrange-ments were so satisfactory. In Lebanon, the powerfulCouncil for Development and Reconstruction, whileproviding an effective counterpart for the Bank, waseffectively a super-ministry with far-reaching powersthat had to be divested to normal ministries. In theNorthern Uganda Reconstruction Project (NURP), aproliferation of sub-PIUs in each ministry reduced theflow of funds to activities in the field. In Eritrea, thePMU began with inadequate capacity and had to receive

special assistance, which it should have had from thestart through increased field presence.

In several countries, special implementation unitswere the main source of monitoring and therefore key toassisting Bank supervision visits. In many cases, however,such monitoring consisted more of enumeration than ofobjective assessment. In at least two cases (Eritrea ERLand Uganda NURP) it required a change of task managerto introduce new implementation procedures. Somelessons may be forthcoming from the current QualityAssurance Group study on project supervision, whichwill include some post-conflict projects. The BiH casehighlighted the issue of continuing PMUs/PIUs beyondproject completion. With the next phase of reconstruc-tion shifting to policy reform, these units should not nec-essarily become permanent fixtures in ministries.

Client and Staff Training and DevelopmentPost-conflict countries need staff development and par-allel client training. The assessment team found thatunderstanding among Bank staff of the circumstances ofpost-conflict countries and appreciation of their impli-cations for Bank operations—lending and non-lend-ing—is very uneven. Thus, there is a clear need forexpanded staff development activities, which could use-fully be accompanied by parallel or joint client training.Such efforts have until recently been relatively insignifi-cant and ad hoc in nature. The establishment of theKnowledge Network on War-to-Peace Transition andthe efforts of the network to promote and develop train-ing activities, along with those of EDI and the Learningand Leadership Center (LLC), should help strengthenstaff and client capacity.

How the Bank resolves the issues identified in thisassessment will have implications for long-establishedways of doing business in the Bank. A number of issuesare cross-cutting and involve areas of strong Bank com-parative advantage, such as strengthening the macroeco-nomic framework and coordination with other donorsand international agencies. It is therefore essential thatthe recently established Post-Conflict Unit acquire thestaff capacity to analyze and raise this range of issues. Inview of these considerations, the continuing attentionand, on occasion, active involvement of senior Bankmanagement will be required.

Implications for Monitoring and EvaluationPrevious sections have discussed some of the unique cir-cumstances of post-conflict settings and their implica-


42

tions for the design and implementation of operations.These considerations also have implications for moni-toring and evaluation.

The post-conflict context requires that operationsreceive more intensive monitoring to ensure the contin-ued relevance—as well as effectiveness and efficiency—of the portfolio. Country implementation capacity andknowledge of World Bank procedures may be especiallyweak, or political fragility may require daily attention tokeep projects on track (as in BiH). The effectiveness ofBank monitoring in the nine case study countries hasvaried. Findings indicate that monitoring needs to bemuch closer and more frequent than can effectively bemanaged without a well-staffed resident mission. Forexample, lack of a resident mission in Cambodia andHaiti, and inadequate field presence during the first two

post-conflict years in Rwanda, resulted in less effectivemonitoring and ensuing implementation problems. Incontrast, monitoring has been considerably more inten-sive and consequently effective in BiH.

Importance of ContinuityMonitoring also involves the development of knowledgeabout the socioeconomic and political dynamics of thepost-conflict country. A long hiatus in the Bank’sengagement with a country, as in Cambodia, seriouslyerodes its knowledge of the country. Even short con-flicts, such as the three months of genocide in Rwanda,may produce large discontinuities between the pre- andpost-conflict societies, economic prospects, and forms ofgovernance. A knowledge base can be developed by sys-tematically drawing on knowledge and expertise aboutthe country from the academic community, other gov-ernmental bodies, and NGOs, both outside and insidethe country. This has not been done to the extent desir-able. In particular, the Bank has yet to support efforts inCambodia to undertake integrated longitudinal studiesat the household level of socioeconomic rehabilitationand recovery trends and problems. The informationsuch studies could provide would be valuable for opera-tional design, monitoring, and evaluation—and it wouldhelp develop independent local social science researchcapacity.

Through a Different LensWhile the Bank’s evaluation process has identified certainlessons to remember when designing and implementingpost-conflict reconstruction operations, a comparison ofcompletion reports with Project Performance AuditReports (PPARs) reveals that the latter have not alwaysconsidered the post-conflict context when determiningthe success of projects. Annex 4 compares the ratings ofPCRs/ICRs with audits and evaluation memoranda (briefmemoranda prepared by OED after reviewing an ICR).The examples discussed here are all taken from Uganda,because PPARs on post-conflict reconstruction opera-tions have been completed only for that country.

The PCR for Uganda’s First Reconstruction Credit(C0983) rated the project as satisfactory, noting thatgiven the post-conflict situation, the implementation ofagreed policy and institutional reforms was satisfactoryand the economic impacts were generally positive. Thereport recognized that an unrealistic timeline for imple-mentation was set, and it discussed problems with theprocurement process. It also recognized that the project


Muslim women, Sorazade, Bosnia

43

was not designed as a comprehensive reform packagebut, rather, as an emergency response to assist withurgent reconstruction imports. Despite the implementa-tion delays, the policy reforms supported by the credit(devaluation was the only condition) helped to createan environment favorable to economic growth. Thecredit also contributed to the Bank’s knowledge ofUganda’s economy, allowed Bank staff to develop goodrelationships with the government, and laid a founda-tion for the follow-up Reconstruction II and III projects(pp. 28–32). When the PPAR was prepared a year later,it recognized that the credit was an initial contributionto the reconstruction process and had benefits that werenot easily quantifiable. The PPAR focused mainly onprocurement process problems and disbursement delaysand consequently downgraded the project rating tounsatisfactory.

The audit of the first Economic Recovery Credit(C1844) also lowered the PCR rating from satisfactory tounsatisfactory, citing the importance of seeking a rapidincrease in tax revenue to offset a decline in aid. As men-tioned in Chapter 6, the Uganda case study found severalproblems with this conventional wisdom. First, the pre-

diction of a decline in aid wasinaccurate: the net aid flow toUganda substantially increased insubsequent years and shows nosigns of diminishing. Second, theaudit analyzed the ERC as if it hadbeen a standard stabilizationproblem and failed to appreciatethe distinctive features of a post-war recovery. The case study

argues that the time frame for fiscal recovery in a post-war environment should be determined by the need torestore the taxable base of the economy. This, in turn,depends on such factors as the extent to which economicactivity has retreated into subsistence and on the degreeto which previous government revenue-raising policieshave been predatory. In Uganda both conditions applied,which implies the need for a prolonged period of lowtaxation. The attempt to raise tax receipts rapidly canactually delay the attainment of sustainability. In addi-tion, donors tend to be pre-disposed to accept that largeaid-financed fiscal deficits must be reduced as rapidly aspossible, and that failure to do so reflects reluctance of agovernment to make the requisite “tax effort.” The casestudy found that the endorsement in the PPAR of theFund and Bank emphasis on increasing tax effort rein-

forced an erroneous diagnosis of the recovery problemthat led to serious problems in fiscal policy.

The two audits thus had in common a time frame fora postwar recovery that was unrealistic but which wouldhave been appropriate for a stabilization and liberaliza-tion program in a peacetime economy. They consequentlytreated the fiscal deficit as a major problem rather than asa response to the Ugandan post-conflict conditions. Iron-ically, the much-heralded Uganda economic recovery,already spread over a decade (and only approximatelyhalfway back to the prewar Ugandan economy) wasfinanced by credits rated unsatisfactory and marginallyunsatisfactory.

Developing ConsistencyA review of two ICRs on post-1994 lending in Haiti sug-gests a potential inconsistency in Bank evaluation ofpost-conflict operations and indicates the limitations ofproject-by-project evaluations in such circumstances.The ICR on the Emergency Economic Recovery Credit(EERC) gives the project a highly satisfactory ratingaccording to the emergency context. Such projects, itnotes, should have well-defined objectives focused onimmediate needs, and a simple streamlined design. Bycontrast, the ICR on the Seventh Transport Projectmakes only muted reference to the conflict, the maincause of its largely unsatisfactory outcome, and missesan opportunity to provide a useful lesson. Both ICRsfocus on project achievements against stated objectives.Subsequent Bank judgment on the overall reconstructionprogram (conceding little progress on improving infra-structure, social services, or the well-being of Haitians5)causes one to question the value of a highly satisfactoryproject in an unsatisfactory program. Ironically, the ICRon EERC noted this contradiction, yet it still gave theproject a highly satisfactory rating.

A recent DANIDA/DAC workshop6 on evaluatinghumanitarian assistance underscored the complexities ofevaluating post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In itsreview of good practice in evaluating humanitarianassistance, the workshop discussed how to measure per-formance when evaluating assistance. While conven-tional criteria such as efficiency, effectiveness, impact,sustainability, and relevance of objectives were dis-cussed, it was noted that during preparation of the JointEvaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, four“new” criteria were added.7

• Connectedness—the need to ensure that short-term emergency activities are carried out in a con-


Relatively fewreports are

prepared ontime. This is along-standing

problem.

44

text that takes longer-term and interconnectedproblems into account.

• Coherence—the need to ensure that the activitiesof the international community are carried outwith an effective division of labor among actors,maximizing the comparative advantages of each.

• Coverage—the need to reach major populationgroups facing life-threatening suffering whereverthey are, providing them with assistance and pro-tection proportionate to their need and devoid ofextraneous political agendas.

• Appropriateness—the need to tailor humanitarianactivities to local needs, increasing ownership,accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly.

Although the workshop did not reach consensus onthe use of new criteria to measure performance, the par-ticipants agreed that this is a critical issue for futureevaluations and that the DAC group will continueexploring the topic. While perhaps not entirely applica-ble to reconstruction efforts (“connectedness” replaced“sustainability,” as many humanitarian aid interven-tions are not intended to be sustainable), the new crite-ria do take into account some aspects unique to the post-conflict context that warrant consideration for futureBank evaluations of reconstruction efforts.

A final issue for evaluation of post-conflict recon-struction operations is timing. Considering the profoundeconomic and social changes that occur in post-conflictcountries, timely completion of post-conflict operationcompletion reports is a necessity, particularly for earlierreconstruction operations. Even for “normal” opera-tions, the Bank’s Operational Manual states that ICRsshould be issued no longer than six months after theclosing date.8 However, only nine (plus one in draftform) of the 65 completed post-conflict reconstruction

operations identified by the assessment team issued com-pletion reports within the six-month interval (anothersix projects closed on or after August 30, 1997, so werestill within the interval). The amount of time to issuecompletion reports ranged from six months to morethan nine years, with the average being 18 months. Toaddress this and the other issues discussed above, OEDshould develop guidance for staff on the conduct ofICRs and PPARs.

Returning to “Normal” OperationsAssuming the success of a post-conflict reconstructioneffort, the justification for such Bank operational fea-tures as: special procedures (e.g., for emergency opera-tions, procurement); addressing conflict-related issues instrategy and program documents; and for a larger-than-normal resident mission will diminish over time. How-ever, how long it takes a country to achieve a relativestate of normalcy is a difficult question to answer. Theassessment team grappled with this question during itsresearch, for example, debating whether to consider allassistance to Uganda as “post-conflict.” The speed ofthe return to normalcy and the benchmarks for evaluat-ing progress are not very well-developed, nor is theremuch available relevant guidance.9 Possible indicationsof this transition include: (1) macroeconomic stabilityand its probable sustainability; (2) recovery of privatesector confidence, as measured by the investment ratio;and (3) the effectiveness with which institutionalarrangements and the political system are coping withthe tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind theconflicts. The Post-Conflict Unit should examine thisissue and explore the development of indicators to deter-mine when the “post-conflict” period ends and “nor-malcy” begins.


45

Directions for FutureBank Policy

88

Post-conflict reconstruction is not a peripheral issue; it affects the Bank’s core activities. If

the Bank is to improve the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of its support to post-conflict

countries, it needs to adjust the way it conducts business to accommodate the special

needs of countries emerging from conflict. The April 1997 Framework for World Bank Involve-

ment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction provides some guidance under which such assistance may be

provided, but it does not constitute a firm policy statement. Thus, the study recommends that the

Framework be revised and transformed into an Opera-tional Policy. The revised Framework should addresshow the Bank designs its policy dialogue with a post-conflict country and how it assesses its performance. Itshould deal with the way the Bank develops a CAS, howit prepares and implements operations, and how it mon-itors and evaluates programs in countries recoveringfrom conflict.

Since 1980 the volume of Bank lending to post-con-flict countries has increased over 800 percent, with themost significant increase occurring in the first half of the1990s. The substantial growth of the post-conflict portfo-lio and the regional and sectoral allocations are discussedin Chapter 3. OP 8.5, the policy currently used for post-conflict reconstruction, focuses mainly on events of shortduration, such as earthquakes, floods or hurricanes,which do not affect institutions and which require a rapidresponse to rebuild physical infrastructure. Civil conflicts,on the other hand, are of protracted duration and theydestroy the social fabric of a country. Their causes typi-cally go back in time and result in situations that requirelong-term development efforts. Furthermore, unlike nat-ural disasters, civil conflicts require major efforts in deal-ing with institutional frameworks and macroeconomicconditions.

The main conclusion of this study is that the Bankneeds to revise its current policy guidance in A Frame-work for World Bank Involvement in Post-ConflictReconstruction, and transform it into an OperationalPolicy statement.1 The Post-Conflict Unit should handlethis task, modifying the Framework to take into accountthe finding of this assessment, and developing statementsof Bank Policy (BPs) and Good Practices (GPs) to guidestaff in providing such assistance. OP 8.5 should berevised to apply only to disasters that are unexpected andof limited duration such as natural disasters, or man-made ones (e.g., large-scale industrial accidents). The OP,BPs, and GPs should address the following issues:

• advice on the economic development implicationsof peace accord options;

• post-conflict aid coordination;• definition of priorities among macroeconomic sta-

bilization, infrastructure rebuilding, and restora-tion of human and social capital;

• macroeconomic and structural policy conditionality;• flexibility in programming, design, and implemen-

tation;• institutional arrangements;• monitoring and evaluation; and• promoting equitable development.

46

Peace negotiations. To the extent possible, and ifinvited, the Bank should be an active adviser to peacenegotiations rather than an observer. The main purposewould be to make the parties aware of the implicationsfor economic development, including economic benefitsand costs, of alternatives being considered by relevantparties during peace negotiations. The Bank played thisrole at the Dayton Accords negotiations for Bosnia andHerzegovina, and in Guatemala.

Early and active role in post-conflict aid coordina-tion. This does not necessarily imply leadership of theprocess, but it will probably call for leadership onmacroeconomic and external debt issues, strengtheningpolicy dialogue and policy reform, and mobilizingresources. The new BPs and GPs on post-conflict recon-struction should reflect that effective coordinationarrangements require active internal and externalinvolvement by Bank senior management and a well-staffed resident mission to ensure effective coordinationat the sectoral and implementation levels.

Priorities. Supporting the achievement of macroeco-nomic stabilization should be one of the Bank’s highestand earliest priorities in post-conflict situations. Thepursuit of other economic reforms should beapproached incrementally, taking into account the coun-try’s historical context and current policy and institu-tional enabling environment. The Bank should also beprepared to support the rebuilding of physical infra-structure, with adequate attention to necessary policyand institutional reforms. To participate effectively inthose areas, the Post-Conflict Unit, in cooperation withEDI and the LLC, should undertake training geared tostrengthening Bank capacity to lead damage and needsassessments that employ the most effective means ofgenerating needs information and draw on scholarlyexpertise on the sociopolitical environment. In definingpriorities, adherence to existing relevant guidelines, suchas the 1997 Operational Guidelines on Demining, is crit-ical. Thus, support for mine clearance should be alwaysintegrated with a specific development activity. TheBank should help post-conflict countries develop cost-effective strategies to restore human and social capital,especially in education and health. Early sector workand better use of social analysis is recommended toimprove project design. As the social sectors have notbeen an area of strong performance for the Bank, part-nerships with other agencies better placed to help restorehuman and social capital should be pursued. In provid-ing further support for demobilization and reintegration

of ex-combatants, the Bank should strengthen thecapacity it has acquired and incorporate the relevantexperience of other agencies.2

Conditionality. While a natural disaster responserequires policy conditionality aimed only at reducing thepotential impacts of future disasters (as indicated inOP8.5), the macroeconomic issues at stake in post-con-flict reconstruction call for more substantial policy condi-tionality. The new OP should include such conditionalitybut also indicate that its use requires a case-by-case analy-sis. Depending on country implementation capacity andthe political environment, it may not be appropriate tointroduce wide-ranging conditionalities all at once. Whilethe immediate post-conflict period can be a window ofopportunity to pursue policy reforms, especially thoseessential to macroeconomic stability, caution should beexercised in pursuing an ambitious reform agenda soonafter a major social collapse. Thus, loan and grant agree-ments in post-conflict as in other countries should containprovisions essential to accomplishing the developmentobjectives of recovery operations. In Uganda, the Fundand the Bank emphasized increased tax effort that, inview of the country’s history of predatory tax policy, maywell have depressed private investment.

Flexibility. Early post-conflict situations requiretimely and flexible programming, design, and imple-mentation. The new BPs and GPs should direct countrydepartments to make greater use of preparation andpiloting funds, and “action research” projects. Expedi-tious preparation, piloting and bridging funds, and loaninstruments (such as the new PCP, LIL, and APL) shouldbe resourced at sufficient levels to enable the Bank to beeffective earlier in post-conflict situations. From the ini-tial base of a well-prepared damage and needs assess-ment, the Bank’s reconstruction strategy should berefined over the following months and years through aseries of incremental efforts, such as workshops and pol-icy notes. A full CAS can be prepared when time, capac-ity, and resources permit. Mechanisms for rapid pro-curement and disbursement should be devised forpost-conflict situations, consistent with sound practice.

The Bank’s institutional arrangements. The newGPs should reflect that senior management must givehigh priority to staffing and structuring post-conflictcountry teams. The country director must have a man-date to give the country substantial if not full-time atten-tion and resident representatives need sufficient author-ity to make a wide range of programming andimplementation decisions in the field. Despite the high


47

D i r e c t i o n s f o r F u t u r e B a n k P o l i c y

up-front costs, adequately-staffed resident missions are apre-condition for successful Bank intervention in post-conflict situations.

Monitoring and evaluation. To implement post-conflict operations satisfactorily, the Bank must be pre-pared to allocate sufficient administrative budgetresources for adequate monitoring. Monitoring andevaluation should be accompanied by an ESW programthat includes household and community studies, prefer-ably longitudinal ones that address human and socialcapital issues as well as income-generation needs andconstraints. The overall Bank portfolio in a post-conflictcountry should be periodically assessed for relevance,that is, its contribution to sustainable peace and devel-opment. While under normal circumstances a CountryPortfolio Performance Review is conducted every 12 to18 months, in post-conflict countries the overall portfo-lio should be assessed at least every 12 months. Project-by-project assessments often do not provide the broaderpicture, although multisectoral or adjustment operationsshould certainly be assessed on their contribution to thelarger objective. Initial investments should be assessedon how they contribute to long-term reconstruction

objectives. The Post-Conflict Unit, in consultation withOED, should support the development of performanceindicators for assessing the contribution of the overallcountry portfolio to sustainable peace and developmentin a post-conflict setting. In view of the need for com-pletion information in often highly volatile post-conflictsettings, country departments should ensure that com-pletion reports for post-conflict operations are com-pleted promptly. This matter should be brought to theattention of the Bank-wide task force currently review-ing the ICR process. The new BPs should sharply reducethe interval between project closing and completionreport. Finally, OED should develop guidelines in con-sultation with the Post-Conflict Unit on how to applyevaluation criteria with greater sensitivity to the post-conflict political and economic environment when con-ducting completion reports. These guidelines should beillustrated in the new GPs.

Promoting equitable development. The case studiesrevealed several examples in which the Bank either didnot address emerging distributional imbalances or misseda significant opportunity to promote equitable develop-ment (see Chapter 4). While the Bank may be unable to

School children in Zenica, Bosnia

48

prevent conflict, it needs to recognize its potential toinfluence the course of pre-conflict events. Although itmay not be appropriate for the Bank to adopt an Opera-tional Policy on conflict prevention (as this may implycrossing the line in some cases into the realm of politicalissues that are inappropriate under the Bank’s mandate),Good Practices should be developed that encourage staff

to be sensitive to predatory and exclusionary behaviorthat adversely affects projects and shared developmentobjectives. The Bank should raise such concerns in itsdialogue with the government and other donors. TheBank should support and pursue economic and distribu-tional policies and programs that can avoid a slide intoconflict within deeply divided societies.


49

Chapter 11. Address to the 1997 World Bank Annual Meetings, Hong

Kong, September 23, 1997.

2. Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Pro-gramme. Good Practice Review: Evaluating Humanitarian Assis-tance Programmes. London: December 24, 1997 (draft).

3. Robert Muscat, “The World Bank’s Role in Conflict Pre-vention and Post-conflict Reconstruction,” internal World Bankpaper, prepared for the Task Force on Failed States, November 27,1995. Another study uses the term “collapsed states,” which aredefined as “situation[s] where the structure, authority (legitimatepower), law, and political order have fallen apart and must bereconstituted in some form, old or new.” See I. William Zartman,“Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in Col-lapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of LegitimateAuthority, edited by I. William Zartman (Boulder and London:Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1975), p. 1.

4. Muscat, op. cit., para. 2.9.

5. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda,“The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessonsfrom the Rwanda Experience,” published by the Steering Com-mittee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance toRwanda, March 1996.

6. The Committee on Development Effectiveness noted theimportance of analyzing conflicts from a regional approach andassessing the spill-over effects of conflict on neighboring countries.

7. These factors are based on those suggested in the previ-ously cited paper by Robert Muscat. An annex of the Muscatpaper delineates four factors determining the scope for continuingor resuming Bank operations in countries emerging from conflict.These are: (i) relative absence of internal conflict; (ii) legitimateand effective civil authority; (iii) freedom from large debt; and (iv)sufficient international interest for conflict resolution. The ninecase study countries represent a mix in such factors, but none wasso problematic for most factors that the Bank ruled out activeinvolvement.

Chapter 21. Christine Wallich, in a comment on a previous draft of the

assessment’s overall report, observed that “the current procedures(which eschew policy conditionality) seem much more applicableto rebuilding after an earthquake in a stable policy environment(where policies may be quite fine) than they do to post-conflict,where institutions have been destroyed.” (E-mail of January 5,1998, from Christine Wallich to Roger Slade.)

2. MOP for Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction Project (Report No. P-6804), para. 8.

3. A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, April 25, 1997, para. 34.

4. As of July 19, 1996, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia,Sudan, Yugoslavia, and Zaire had arrears to IBRD and IDA total-ing US$1740.50 million. BiH’s arrears were cleared as of June 14,1996, through refinancing by the Bank and remains in non-accrualstatus (“A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Con-flict Reconstruction,” Annex 3).

5. In Sri Lanka, the Bank has been involved in other parts ofthe country throughout the entire conflict. It got involved in theconflict zones in 1987 when it looked as if peace would prevailbut, in fact, conflict periodically escalated during the next threeyears and returned on a larger scale in 1990.

Chapter 31. World Bank, The Blue Book. The Planning and Budgeting

Department. (Washington: July 1995), p. 8.

2. There are, of course, a number of transitions, particularlyin the “northern tier” of Central and Eastern Europe countries,that have been relatively free of such difficulties.

3. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Repub-lic of Nicaragua. Social Investment Fund Project (Credit 2434-NI). Report No. 16428. Washington: March 28, 1997, p. i.

4. The Bank financed an Emergency Reconstruction andRehabilitation Project (C1883) in 1988 that only partly achievedits objectives, mainly because of the full-scale resumption of hos-tilities by 1990.

5. The 800 percent is based on the lending volume by fiscalyear of the 157 post-conflict reconstruction operations identifiedby the assessment team (listed in Annex 2). It includes amounts forRwanda that were reallocated from “normal” operations for post-conflict reconstruction.

6. Another reason these results would have limited ex ante“predictive value” is that the PCRs/ICRs for 6 of the 12 opera-tions were issued after the April–July 1994 genocide. However, theimplementation periods for these 6 operations were concentratedduring the early 1990s. See the Rwanda case study in Annex 1.

7. The Cambodia figure is based on recent estimates of the“Cambodia Genocide Project” that about 1.7 million people werekilled during the Khmer Rouge period, from 1975 to 1979.Reported in Susan Cook, “Documenting Genocide: Cambodia’sLessons for Rwanda,” paper presented at the Meetings of theAmerican Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C.,November 21, 1997 (New Haven: Yale University, 1997).

8. These declines are believed to overstate the actual drop ineconomic activity because the share of unrecorded activity is prob-ably greater during conflict. Nonetheless, these figures undoubt-edly reflect unprecedented declines in overall productive activity,as well as massive changes in the structure of economic activity.

9. Although conflict was not the only factor accounting forslower, or negative, growth during the conflict periods in thesecountries, it was certainly a directly and indirectly contributingfactor. It will take decades of sustained rapid growth in El Sal-vador and Sri Lanka to bring the economy to where it might havebeen had it continued growing at the same pace as during the 5-to-10 years before the conflict, and even longer if the impact ofpopulation growth on per capita income is considered.

Chapter 41. See World Bank, “Guidelines to Staff on Anticorruption

Report,” Memorandum from Joanne Salop, September 15, 1997,para. 13. On September 2, 1997, the Bank’s Board of Directors

ENDNOTES

50

discussed a report, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: TheRole of the World Bank, prepared by the Poverty Reduction andEconomic Management Network (PREM). The “Guidelines toStaff” drew from the Anticorruption Report and the 1997 WorldDevelopment Report: The State in a Changing World.

2. See James Boyce, ed., Economic Policy for Building Peace:The Lessons of El Salvador, Chapter 13, “Conclusions and Rec-ommendations.” Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers,1996, pp. 280–81.

3. The Committee on Development Effectiveness emphasizedtwo principles for a potential Bank participation in peace negotia-tions: (i) such participation should be result of a specific invitation;(ii) the Bank should not be involved in discussions concerning thepolitical dimensions of peace negotiations.

4. The Committee on Development Effectiveness underlinedthe importance of partnerships in bringing about a flexible andpragmatic response to post-conflict situations.

Chapter 51. Daniela Gressani and John Page, “Reconstruction Efforts

in Lebanon and West Bank Gaza: Challenges for MacroeconomicManagement,” preliminary draft, paper prepared for the Confer-ence on Globalization and the Middle East and North Africa,sponsored by the Institut du Monde Arabe and the World Bank,March 14, 1997, Paris.

2. The Committee on Development Effectiveness noted theimportant linkages between infrastructure reconstruction and jobcreation and the relevance of both in post-conflict situations.

3. OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Develop-ment Co-operation, Paris, 1997, p. 14.

4. See Katarina Toll, “Needs and Potential,” in DHA News,No. 22, April/May 1997, p. 19.

5. World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina Local InitiativesProject. Pilot Phase Evaluation Report. May 1997.

6. OECD, op cit., p. 31.

7. The CODE strongly supported providing additionalemphasis to gender issues in post-conflict reconstruction.

8. Documented in Colletta, et al, The Transition from War toPeace. Directions in Development; and Case Studies in the Transi-tion from War to Peace: The Demobilization and Reintegration ofEx-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. World BankDiscussion Paper No. 331. Both Washington, DC: World Bank,1996.

9. Internal memo from Nat Colletta, January 20, 1998.

10. A recent UN study by Graça Machel, The Impact ofArmed Conflict on Children, reports that over the past 30 years,government and rebel armies around the world have recruited tensof thousands of children, most of them adolescents under 18 butalso children aged 10 and younger.

Chapter 61. In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, described in the

previous chapter, substantial public capital inflows in the form ofaid can be expected for Uganda for a number of years. Thus,

increased tax effort to offset declining aid does not turn out to bevalid in this case ( an argument used by the Bank and Fund).

2. These concerns are consistent with the three conditions forreform readiness delineated in a Bank study of global privatizationexperience, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politicsof Governmental Ownership, a World Bank Policy ResearchReport (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).The three conditions, based on both theoretical considerations andempirical evidence, are (i) reform must be politically desirable toleaders and their constituencies; (ii) reform must be politically fea-sible; and (iii) the government must be able to promise credibly tostick to the reform in the future. Ibid., p. 233.

Chapter 71. El Salvador has never had a Bank resident mission, and it

is uncertain whether one was needed during the early post-conflictyears. Staff involved at the time believe that the relative proximityof El Salvador to Bank headquarters and good travel connectionsto Washington made a resident mission unnecessary. Some staffbelieve that not having a resident mission even facilitated theBank’s role as “honest broker” in the critical stage of early aidmobilization and coordination. Others, including some Salvado-ran interlocutors and other Bank staff, believe the Bank wouldhave developed more constructive early relationships with localNGOs and civil society if it had established a resident mission inthe early 1990s.

2. The Sri Lanka resident mission has in recent years sub-stantially expanded the number of local professional staff and theRwanda mission plans in fiscal year 1998 to add one expatriateconsultant and two local staff.

3. See World Bank, Development Grant Facility: A Proposal,R97-185, (Washington: attached to Memorandum from Vice Pres-ident and Secretary to Executive Directors, July 29, 1997).

4. This study reviewed and discusses the procurement anddisbursement procedures now in place. The Bank is currentlyreforming these procedures.

5. World Bank, Haiti. Consultative Group Meeting. Reportto the Executive Directors, Report No. SecM97-299, (Washing-ton: April 21, 1997), p. 1.

6. The Workshop on Best Practice in the Evaluation ofHumanitarian Assistance was organized by DANIDA and DAC. Itwas held in Copenhagen on January 27, 1998.

7. The new criteria were borrowed from a paper by LarryMinear, The International Relief System: A Critical Review, avail-able from Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies(http://www.brown.edu).

8. World Bank, Operational Manual: Good Practices,“Implementation Completion Reporting,” GP 13.55 (Washington:April 1994), p. 4. A Bank-wide task force is currently reviewingthe ICR process overall and is expected to make recommendationson this matter.

9. The Bank Framework paper briefly mentions a “StageFive: Return to Normal Operations,” but defines it in vague termsas a stage “when the emergency phase is over and operations areonce more carried out under normal lending procedures, and the


51

consciousness of conflict begins to wane.…” It is also worth not-ing that most of the operations reviewed for this study were car-ried out under normal Bank lending procedures.

Chapter 81. The CODE endorsed this recommendation and noted the

need for a new policy on post-conflict reconstruction. The new

policy should highlight the importance of restoring social capitaland of addressing gender issues in reconstruction.

2. The CODE noted the important role that Executive Direc-tors can play early in post-conflict situations in discussing infor-mation with staff. They also emphasized the catalystic role playedby one Executive Director, Ms. Eveline Herkens of the Nether-lands, in promoting the Bank’s involvement in the reconstructionprogram for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

E n d n o t e s

53

Anderson, Mary B. Do No Harm: Supporting LocalCapacities for Peace Through Aid, Collaborative forDevelopment Action, Boston: 1996.

Azam, Jean-Paul, David Bevan, Paul Collier, Stefan Der-con, Jan Gunning, and Sanjay Pradhan. Some Eco-nomic Consequences of the Transition from CivilWar to Peace. Policy Research Working Paper No.1392. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994.

Ball, Nicole. Making Peace Work: The Role of the Inter-national Development Community, Washington: DC,1996.

Boyce, James (ed.). Economic Policy for Building Peace:The Lessons of El Salvador. Boulder and London:Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996.

Brown, Michael E. (ed.) The International Dimensionsof Internal Conflict: CSIA Studies in InternationalSecurity, No. 10, Cambridge: MIT, 1996.

Colletta, Nat, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer.The Transition from War to Peace. Directions inDevelopment. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996.

____ Case Studies in the Transition from War to Peace:The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combat-ants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. World BankDiscussion Paper No. 331. Washington, DC: WorldBank, 1996.

Collier, Paul. “On the Economic Consequences of CivilWar,” August 1996.

Collier, Paul, and Anika Hoeffler. “On Economic Causesof Civil War,” Oxford: Centre for the Study ofAfrican Economies, September 1996.

Cook, Susan. “Documenting Genocide: Cambodia’sLessons for Rwanda,” paper presented at the Meet-ings of the American Anthropological Association,Washington, DC, November 21, 1997. New Haven:Yale University, 1997.

Cuny, F.C. and V. Tanner. “Working with Communitiesto Reduce Levels of Conflict: Spot Reconstruction,Disaster Prevention and Management,” Vol. 4, No. 1,1995.

Donini, Antonio. “The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordi-nation in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda,”Occasional Paper #22, Providence: Thomas J. WatsonInstitute for International Studies, 1996.

Duffield, Mark. “Complex Emergencies and the Crisisof Developmentalism,” IDS Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4,October 1994.

Eriksson, John, et al. “The International Response toConflict and Genocide: Lessons from the RwandaExperience.” Steering Committee of the Joint Evalua-

tion of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March1996.

Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace andConflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo: Inter-national Peace Research Institute, 1996.

Gressani, Daniela and John Page. “ReconstructionEfforts in Lebanon and West Bank Gaza: Challengesfor Macroeconomic Management,” preliminary draftpaper prepared for the Conference on Globalizationand the Middle East and North Africa, sponsored bythe Institut du Monde Arabe and the World Bank,March 14, 1997, Paris.

Holtzman, Steven. “Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”Work In Progress Paper, Washington, DC: WorldBank, 1995.

International Monetary Fund. International FinancialStatistics. various annual editions.

____ Fund Involvement in Post-Conflict Countries.Washington: confidential draft, August 15, 1995.

Jean, François and Jean-Christophe Rufin (eds.).Économie des guerres civiles, Paris: Fondation pourles Etudes de Defense, 1996.

Krishna Kumar, et al. “Rebuilding Post-war Rwanda,”Study 4 in The International Response to Conflictand Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience.Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emer-gency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996.

Lautze, Sue. “Lives Versus Livelihoods: How to FosterSelf-sufficiency and Productivity of Disaster Victims,”Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, OccasionalPaper No. 1, March 1966.

Lautze, Sue and John Hammock. “Coping with Crisis;Coping with Aid: Capacity Building, Coping Mecha-nisms and Dependency, Linking Relief and Develop-ment,” UNDHA, December 1966.

Macrae, Joanna, Anthony B. Zwi, and Lucy Gilson. “ATriple Burden for Health Sector Reform: Post-ConflictRehabilitation in Uganda,” Social Science Medicine,Vol. 42, No. 7, 1996, pp. 1095–1108.

Mahling Clark, Kimberly. “Fostering a Farewell toArms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobi-lization and Reintegration of Combatants,” Washing-ton, DC: USAID, Center for Development Informa-tion and Evaluation, 1996.

____ “The Demobilization and Reintegration of Sol-diers: Perspectives from USAID,” Africa Today, 42(1–2).

Marshall, Katherine. “Emerging from Conflict: WhatRoles for International Development Finance Institu-

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tions?” Development Discussion Paper No. 587.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Harvard Insti-tute for International Development, June, 1997.

____ “A Special Partnership: UNHCR and the WorldBank.” Draft, April 1997.

Maxwell, Simon, and Margaret Buchanan-Smith (eds.).Linking Relief and Development, IDS Bulletin, Vol.25, No. 4, October 1994.

Minear, Larry. The International Relief System: A Criti-cal Review, available from Thomas J. Watson Jr. Insti-tute for International Studies (http://www.brown.edu).

Minear, Larry and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire:War and the Global Humanitarian Community. Boul-der: Westview, 1995.

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OECD. “Draft Policy Orientations: The Special Challengesof Assistance in Crisis and Recovery-Working GroupII,” DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Develop-ment Cooperation, DCD(96)10, August 30, 1996.

OECD/DAC. DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace andDevelopment Cooperation. Paris: 1997.

____ Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development,Draft Policy Orientations: Linking Development Co-operation to Conflict Prevention, Working Group 1,September 6, 1996.

Omaar, Rakiya, and Alex DeWaal. “HumanitarianismUnbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-mandateRelief Operations in Political Emergencies,” Discus-sion Paper No. 5 African Rights, November 1994.

Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian PolicyProgramme. Good Practice Review: EvaluatingHumanitarian Assistance Programmes. London:December 24, 1997 (draft).

Prendergast, John and Colin Scott. “Aid with Integrity.”Occasional Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: OFDA/USAID, March 1996.

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Randel, Judith and Tony German, (eds.). The Reality ofAid: An Independent Review of International Aid.Earthscan, 1996.

Srivastava, Ramesh. Reintegrating Demobilized Com-batants: A Report Exploring Options and Strategiesfor Training-related Interventions, Vocational Train-ing Management Studies. Geneva: InternationalLabour Office, 1994.

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UN General Assembly. “Supplement to an Agenda forPeace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on theOccasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UnitedNations,” A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 1995.

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World Bank. Action Plan for Education Lending: Edu-cation in Countries Emerging from Conflict. DraftStrategy Paper. Washington, DC: October 1997.

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55

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S e l e c t e d B i b l i o g r a p h y

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Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe Bank’s response to post-conflict needs in Bosnia andHerzegovina (BiH) was early and comprehensive. Itsrole in reconstruction and economic recovery is per-ceived to have been successful by BiH authorities, otherdonors, NGOs, and beneficiaries. The OED evaluationteam agrees with this assessment. The Bank’s non-lend-ing activities, including providing a framework forreconstruction and guidance to donors are appreciated.There is widespread recognition that Bank-supportedprojects were implemented quickly. Other elements ofsuccess include: a wide dispersion of benefits, both geo-graphically and to a broad range of beneficiaries;involvement of stakeholders; an early and balancedinclusion of social sector projects to rebuild human cap-ital; and a contribution to local implementation capac-ity. BiH authorities particularly appreciated the sense ofownership afforded them by Bank projects.

The peace implementation agenda dictated a com-pressed timetable for launching the reconstruction pro-gram. The Bank was able to adhere to this timetablebecause of the availability of planning resources; supportfrom the Netherlands’ ED; strong and visible supportfrom the Bank’s President; the Bank taking the lead rolein coordinating the planning work; its coordination withother actors; and superb staff quality and dedication.

In addition to speed, the special attention given tothe program within the Bank contributed to the overallquality of the program. A highly skilled country directorwas appointed solely for BiH. Her commitment to theprocess, attention to speed, and quality of work wasimportant in meeting the compressed timetable for proj-

ect processing. The resident representative was impor-tant in the process. His ability to deal with differing per-spectives and work with all involved parties in the reso-lution of issues is very much appreciated by thegovernment, donors and other agencies.

The OED mission found that the benefits of Bank-assisted projects to date are being felt throughout theFederation, and are increasingly reaching Republika Srp-ska. The range of benefits has been delivered quickly toa diverse set of beneficiaries, while involving stakehold-ers and building local implementation capacity. At thisstage the projects cannot be evaluated for sustainabilityor institutional development. Several factors contributedto success in the implementation phase, including earlyestablishment of a resident mission, streamlined projectprocessing and procurement procedures, sector diversifi-cation, pilot projects and project preparation, local own-ership, and widespread participation.

Of particular importance for the reconstructionwork of donors, especially for the World Bank, are theprovisions for fiscal strategy built into the Daytonaccords. The BiH experience demonstrates the impor-tance of incorporating into a peace accord, to the extentpossible, economic management provisions more likelyto enhance than obstruct the economic recovery process.Despite Dayton’s built-in obstacles to effective economicgovernance (and the continuing political tensions), thefirst year and a half of peace have seen substantial eco-nomic recovery. The Bank has been central in the mobi-lization and application of external resources critical tothis recovery.

ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES

ANNEXES

The nine case study countries are markedly diverse insocioeconomic characteristics, duration and intensity ofconflict, and resulting reconstruction needs. The Bank’sapproach to reconstruction of these countries can beconsidered equally diverse, ranging from comprehensivesupport of all major sectors coupled with non-lendingservices such as damage and needs assessment and aidcoordination; to more modest, strategic lending focusingon fewer areas; to efforts concentrating on economicstabilization. The results of these efforts have beenuneven. The Bank’s performance across the nine cases in

restoring macroeconomic stability was highly satisfac-tory: in promoting structural reform (liberalization) itwas marginally satisfactory. The Bank’s role in rebuild-ing economic sectors ranged from marginally satisfac-tory to satisfactory; in promoting the recovery of socialsectors, Bank performance ranged from unsatisfactoryto highly satisfactory; and in aid coordination it wasuneven. The staffing and management of country teamsand resident missions ranged widely from unsatisfactoryto highly satisfactory. The following is a summary offindings from each of the cases.

58

CambodiaThe Bank assumed a different task in the reconstructionefforts of Cambodia, which may be understandable aftera 20-year absence from the country. As one of manyagencies and donors contributing to the recovery, theBank appropriately participated in a division of func-tions and subjects, and played a more limited role in aidcoordination. Lending assistance has mainly focused onbudget support and macroeconomic stability, leavingnumerous areas for the lead attention of other donors.

In some important economic areas, however,greater attention by the Bank might have produced moresatisfactory outcomes. For example, as a revenue-gener-ator and export-earning sector in the long run, rubbershould be more important than the forestry sector, andwould seem to merit Bank/Fund attention at least as vig-orous as that accorded to forestry. The Bank assumedthat rubber sector reform could be brought about by thebilateral donor that took responsibility for that sector.After several years, the donor’s substantial efforts havenot succeeded. Another example is the neglect of theMinistry of Commerce, despite the Ministry’s impor-tance for external trade, domestic commerce, and Cam-bodia’s impending entry into ASEAN.

Human capital development is another area deserv-ing of more attention. To achieve good performance onmacroeconomic balances, the authorities underfundedsocial capital recovery and the maintenance of economicinfrastructure. The Bank could have done more to nego-tiate a commitment to macroeconomic recovery strategiesthat do not consign social capital recovery to the status ofmere policy residuals. The Bank has placed deservedemphasis on human resource development in its reports

to the donors, yet the Bank’s own strategy neglects thisarea. Unlike the first Country Assistance Strategy (CAS),the current CAS makes no mention of education, evenunder the high-lending scenario. Bank staff have not yetdeveloped a project concept that would put educationinto the pipeline before 1999—a major omission in Cam-bodia’s circumstances. A project on disease control andprevention is just beginning implementation.

Regarding civil service reform, it is unfortunate thatthe Bank has continued to put downsizing at the centerof the problems of administrative capacity. The installa-tion of a reduction process early in the life of the coali-tion arrangement—which was based on raising the sizeof the civil service in order to absorb large numbers ofthe incoming parties’ functionaries—was never politi-cally realistic and was quickly recognized as such bysome observers. This is only one example of severalproblems where the Bank did not correctly judge thepolitical feasibility of the policies being urged upon theauthorities.

A final area of Bank deficiency is failure to establisha resident mission. The dual track coordination systemthat evolved—the Bank externally coordinating thedonors at the level of resource mobilization and overallstrategy, and UNDP coordinating locally—had insuffi-cient interaction and left much to be desired. A Bank res-ident mission could have improved the interfacebetween the tracks and promoted better sequencing andoperation of local sector groups. Several staff membersof the country team believe that Bank design and imple-mentation work would have been carried out more effi-ciently if a resident mission had been established.


59

El SalvadorThe Bank’s assistance to El Salvador focused mainly onmacroeconomic reform, but included projects address-ing the health and education sectors to improve thecountry’s poor social indicators. Bank assistance wascritical to laying a sound macroeconomic foundation foran impressive economic recovery during the first half ofthe 1990s, as well as for mobilizing international eco-nomic support. While the Bank lagged behind severalother donors in the volume of its post-conflict assis-tance, its leadership of a series of four CG meetingsbetween 1991 and 1995 made a vital contribution topost-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery. Sev-eral high-quality lending operations and non-lendingservices made significant contributions. However, noeffort, with or without donor support, has yet shownany real promise for reversing a serious socioeconomiclegacy of the conflict: violent crime, or “microinsecu-rity,” of epidemic proportions.

By establishing effective working relationships withthe government a couple of years before the peaceaccords, the Bank was able to provide timely macroeco-nomic assistance and coordination support to El Sal-vador’s reconstruction program. The timing of theBank’s re-entry in El Salvador was propitious albeit notentirely intentional. Without the earthquake disaster, thepre-peace accords relationships between the govern-ment, the private think-tank, FUSADES, and the Bankmight not have developed as expeditiously and produc-tively as they did.

Early operations, including the two SALs, and theSocial Sector Rehabilitation Project were well-timed. Inthis the Bank pursued comparative advantages in policyand institutional reform in its programming. The donorcoordination role played by the Bank just before thepeace accords and in the first few years of post-conflict

reconstruction was indispensable. The holding of a CGmeeting before the peace accords were signed and thecommitment of experienced and capable Bank leader-ship to the process contributed significantly to the effec-tiveness of coordination. It was important that theGOES gave priority to donor coordination and endorsedthe Bank’s supportive role.

In the social sectors, the Bank seized a window ofopportunity in supporting EDUCO, the community self-managed education initiative of the government. Thisexpanding initiative promises to correct and reversesome basic deficiencies in the pre-conflict educationalsystem of El Salvador. The EDUCO experience providesa good example of post-conflict support not being lim-ited to reconstruction but entailing a redirection ofdevelopment. However, the Bank’s experience in provid-ing support to the health sector in El Salvador during theearly post-conflict years has been mixed, and has not yetled to a full follow-on project.

A high degree of capability, experience and continu-ity combined to develop an effective Bank country teamin the crucial years just before and after the El Salvadorpeace accords. This team made a critical contribution tothe Bank’s performance in a tense environment. For acountry as close to Bank headquarters in Washington asEl Salvador, it was not essential to have a resident mis-sion during the reconstruction period. The Bank mayhave been better able to play its lead role in aid coordi-nation and as interlocutor between the government anddonors without a resident presence in El Salvador. How-ever, opinion is not unanimous on this point. A numberof interlocutors, as well as Bank staff, believe the Bank’simage and relationships with civil society and otherdonors would be enhanced by its establishment of a res-ident mission.

A n n e x e s

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EritreaFollowing its prolonged war of secession from Ethiopia,Eritrea had the makings of a promising “reconstructionclient” for the Bank, with a victorious and motivatedadministration leading a united nation into post-conflictrecovery with ample international commitment. TheBank, through a flexible adaptation of procedures, pre-pared and approved an emergency recovery project inadvance of the country’s membership. This innovativeengagement of the Bank was very successful, but thesubsequent retreat into a more traditional operationmode caused those early gains to be lost. Progress hasbeen slow, with delayed implementation of the emer-gency project, a disappointing Consultative Group meet-ing and a number of subsequent projects being dropped,reflecting continuing difficulties between the govern-ment and donors and a lack of shared vision on thedevelopment of the country. Renewed military-politicaltension with Ethiopia and Sudan may yet threaten someof the gains that have been made.

With no project implementation completion reportsor audits, and future activities under discussion, findingsmust be tentative at this stage. Nevertheless, some lessonsare already emerging. First, the style of conducting oper-ations with a suspicious and inexperienced post-conflictgovernment was as important as the content of the oper-ations. The Eritrean government has clearly been cir-cumspect about Bank involvement. They have rejectedthe second Recovery and Rehabilitation Project and anumber of other sectoral loan projects. Technical assis-tance was taken up with little enthusiasm or commit-ment. As an implicit client comment on Bank services this

merits investigation beyond the limits of a desk review. Itseems that the government wanted a Bank loan, on itsown terms, and was wary about conditionalities linkedto economic measures to which it was not fully commit-ted. Only follow-up with the government itself will clar-ify these client perceptions and apprehensions.

Second, considerations of economy of scale havelimited any comparative advantage for the Bank. Gov-ernment-donor relations and lending operations proba-bly necessitated more field presence, but for one ERLthis was not considered viable. The Bank made the mostof early engagement, but like the rest of the donor com-munity found it hard to sustain work with an ambiva-lent government, and turned to more rewarding clients.The Bank should have invested more up-front resources,as a form of risk capital, both in products and staff fieldpresence to build government capacity and confidence indeveloping the overall reconstruction program. Greaterinvestment in “hand-holding” with the governmentthrough the first five years of reconstruction (as theBank has done with the Eritrean Community Develop-ment Fund) might now be reaping greater rewards.

Finally, if the reconstruction period is understood asa decade or more of activity, measures to restore humancapital, which may not appear a priority to fledglingpost-conflict governments, will need incremental sup-port and long-term commitment. Although the Bank hasnever had a mandate from the Eritrean government toaddress human capital issues comprehensively, it shouldprovide the government with cogent advice on the pri-ority of such investments.


61

HaitiHaiti illustrates well the difficulties of working in deep-rooted conflict where there is no simple war-to-peacelinear progression. Though never an all-out civil war, the1991–1994 crisis in Haiti exhibited all the signs of acomplex emergency, including political, social, and eco-nomic collapse. Once the political and security condi-tions permitted the return of the international develop-ment community, efforts were designed not so much toreconstruct Haiti, but to restore growth forgone in theembargo years.

Since returning in 1994, the Bank’s commitment toHaiti has increased, but its performance has receivedmixed reviews. The Bank planned for an early returnthrough preparatory work in 1993, and following therestoration of democratic government in 1994, swiftlyprepared and implemented an emergency economicrecovery credit. Further measures were slower to develop.Three suspended projects were revived, and five morewere approved. Implementation of projects has been gen-erally slow and problematic. With only two completionreports, findings on post-conflict lending activity are pro-visional. Overall, developmental prospects are still in thebalance. Lack of progress in reform measures could dis-courage further investment, reduce donor support andjeopardize both political and economic recovery.

The Bank was clearly not a nimble or knowledge-able institution in this volatile developmental context,and was dependent on other agencies in the interna-tional system to conduct early reconstruction activities.Comparative advantage for the Bank was more in itspotential to mobilize resources and skills from Washing-ton, than in any short-term impact from a minimal fieldpresence. In this context, the Bank grew into the coordi-nation role, rather than assuming an overall leadershiprole from the start. The Bank did not strategize the ini-tial, overall reconstruction program, nor did it coordi-

nate every sector. In fact, it expected the IDB to takemore of a leadership role. The 1996 CAS appears tohave consolidated a wider role for the Bank and abroader perspective. However, the CAS was still tenta-tive on Bank involvement, stating an intention to con-tinue its role “selectively as an integral part of a large-scale international effort.”

Given the number of agencies involved and the polit-ical context, coordination presented a difficult and com-plex task for all institutions. The Bank had little presenceto perform an early, in-country coordination role, buthas nevertheless mobilized and coordinated externaldonor resources, and CGs have identified sectoralresponsibilities. The CG meetings have been innovativeand responsive to the overall needs of government, bene-ficiaries and donors. The participatory CG of April 1997presents a model for other post-conflict programs.

In-country, operational and sector-by-sector coordi-nation of activities has proved difficult for the govern-ment and the donors, who have found problems in shift-ing from a geographical to sectoral division of labor.Effective partnership with the many NGOs at work inHaiti is critical, but has also proved difficult. Overall, theBank has been drawn into an expanded coordinationrole, possibly contrary to its original wishes, but it nowperforms this role willingly and competently.

A critical aspect of this coordination role is communi-cation about the program to the public. Strong communi-cation programs with outreach activities to NGOs, parlia-mentarians and other main stakeholders, and good mediarelations are integral to politically sensitive recovery pro-grams. This was lacking in earlier Bank activities, and therectification achieved by the April 1997 CG should con-tinue. As the chair of the CG, the Bank needs to maintainthe delicate balance between messages of optimism and thenegative potential of unmet expectations.

A n n e x e s

62

RwandaThe tragedy that befell Rwanda during three months in1994 is beyond comprehension and unprecedented.Although Bank staff and management were aware ofdiscriminatory and opportunistic behaviors, the writtenrecord contains little evidence or analysis of such factorsin Rwanda during the seventies and eighties. The Bankdid not identify and question increasing ethnic discrimi-natory and exclusionary practices but, at least in theMutara Projects, it rewarded with a follow-on projectsuch practices as the diversion of project benefits to thepolitically-favored groups that exerted the discrimina-tion. In this respect, the Bank was no better or worsethan other donors assisting Rwanda during this period.By the early nineties, however, violence and corruptionbecame increasingly obvious. By 1993 the Bank beganscaling-back assistance, although even then not expect-ing the genocide unleashed in April 1994. More thanhalf of the population of 7-to-8 million were directlyaffected as a result of death, displacement, injury, rape

and other brutalities. While the international commu-nity did not respond to prevent the genocide—eventhough plans for it had been reported—it respondedimpressively to the aftermath. The Bank respondedquickly in August 1994 with one of its rare EmergencyAssistance Grants.

Implemented through four UN agencies, the Grantwas both relevant and timely, as well as relatively effec-tive and efficient. But implementation suffered frominsufficient initial awareness on the part of the agenciesof the lack of capacity in government and civil society asa result of the war and genocide. Inadequate engage-ment of the new government in the Grant’s planning andimplementation led to misunderstandings and resultedin the Grant not making the positive contribution toBank-government relationships that it might have. Infact, the government was not made aware of Bank sup-port for the Grant until mid-way through the 19-monthimplementation period.


LebanonJudging the Bank’s performance in the reconstruction ofLebanon depends on which yardstick is chosen: whetheran expanded reconstruction role might have achievedmore, or how the more circumscribed role was actuallycarried out. Two areas of strength stand out: (i) theBank’s ability to mobilize resources and legitimize theinternational donor community in the eyes of the gov-ernment; and (ii) the Bank’s expertise in helping to cre-ate an appropriate macroeconomic framework. A thirdpotential area of advantage, coordination, has only par-tially been fulfilled. The Bank’s role in damage assess-ment, although valued, appears to have been limited andthe Bank’s own documents report underestimation ofdamage. Speed of response was not a Bank strength, atleast in relation to so-called emergency lending.

Measured by the more modest objectives of infra-structural repairs, economic stabilization, rebuildinginstitutional capacity and the alleviation of social hard-ship and poverty, the Bank has recorded progress on allbut the last goal. The Bank’s overall role has thus beenlimited by a narrow understanding of reconstruction—albeit reflecting government’s priorities—concentratingon physical infrastructure within the wider recoveryprocess seen as the realm of the private sector. A watch-

ing brief during the conflict period might have helped theBank engage more speedily and effectively with the over-all recovery program and other international agencies.

The Bank’s coordination role although valuable waspartially constrained in-country by institutional atti-tudes characterized by caution and lack of opennesswith partners. The Bank’s role in damage and needsassessment was clearly valued by other reconstructionagencies, some of whom would like to have seen theBank extend this knowledge into a more assertive coor-dination role. Concern with executing Bank programsmay have limited the degree to which the Bank couldlead a common reconstruction strategy. The absence ofa resident mission probably constrained an expandedcoordination role in-country.

Six years after re-entry, there has been no systematicindependent evaluation of the Bank’s performance inLebanon. Regarding project management, there is awealth of lessons to be learned from the operations of theCouncil for Development and Reconstruction and sectoralimplementation units. These operations should be exam-ined by future ICRs and PARs which should take accountof the special post-conflict context in which the Bank oper-ated, and not judge by traditional evaluation criteria.

63

Subsequent post-conflict reconstruction efforts bythe Bank, including an Emergency Recovery Credit andrestructuring of the previous project portfolio, althoughrelevant to Rwanda’s needs, encountered problems thatdelayed their effectiveness and implementation. TheBank did not take adequately into account the new gov-ernment’s lack of capacity and the need to work inten-sively with it to build mutual confidence and to ensurefull understanding of Bank requirements and proce-dures. In the selection of a procurement agency for the1995 Emergency Recovery Credit, a greater effort by theBank to make sure that their Rwandan counterpartsunderstood Bank procurement procedures might haveavoided an impasse.

Implementation problems also stemmed from lessthan optimal staffing assignments in both headquartersand the field. Work on Rwanda required staff with pre-vious experience in the Bank, preferably in Sub-SaharanAfrica or another post-conflict country. However, staffwith experience in Rwanda were not necessarily the bestcandidates to re-assign to Rwanda because of the trau-matic impact that the genocide had on these staff. Andlack of continuity, both in the Kigali and Washingtonteams, impaired the important implementation monitor-ing responsibility role that resident mission staff shouldfulfill.

The absence (until January 1995) and then intermit-tent presence (until June 1996) of a resident representa-tive hampered the Bank in playing as active a role in aidcoordination as it might have at the beginning of thepost-conflict period. Bank-UNDP relationships havebeen strained, especially in Kigali. A division of laborhas recently taken place, with the Bank, at the govern-ment’s request, leading aid coordination on macro-economic matters.

Although Bank policy on emergency assistance recog-nizes that emergency situations such as in Rwanda are notconducive to major macroeconomic or sector policychanges, structural reforms can also be embodied in projects. This was the case with Bank-funded energy andtelecommunications projects in Rwanda. The timing ofpost-conflict restructuring attempts at privatization inthese projects can be questioned. Restructuring can pro-vide a window of opportunity to raise such issues, but thepace of action must take into account the political-eco-nomic environment and the state of counterpart readinessand capacity to undertake measures such as privatization,which are often difficult, complex and politically contro-versial. After initial restructuring efforts, which weremarked by differences and tensions over the privatizationissue, the Bank and the government have agreed on amore incremental approach to privatization.

Government capacity in the Ministries of Educationand Health remains weak. Health is in a relatively bet-ter position, partly owing to timely assistance fromWHO in the two years following the genocide. NGOshave played a major role in re-establishing rural healthclinics. UNICEF provided vital emergency assistanceimmediately after the genocide, and most primaryschools are now in operation. The sub-grants from theSpecial Emergency Assistance Grant to UNHCR,UNICEF and WHO provided significant help in the ini-tial rehabilitation of the health and education sectors.Recovery of the secondary system, weak to begin with,has been much slower and quality at all levels is typicallyvery low. This reflects in particular the extreme shortageof qualified teachers, few of whom have an educationbeyond the primary level. At the government’s request,the AFR region has undertaken a study of post-conflictexperience in trying to restore education.

A n n e x e s

64

Sri LankaOwing to the largely localized nature of the conflict, andin contrast to many post-conflict situations, in Sri Lankathere was no hiatus in the Bank’s program or in the pres-ence of its resident mission during the 1983-87 period ofintense conflict. This facilitated the Bank’s promptresponse to the government’s request for assistance in mid-August 1987, two weeks after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accordwas signed. The Bank moved quickly to help prepare theEmergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programand to help mobilize resources from other donors in sup-port of the balance of the Program. However, the Bank’sfinancial contribution to the overall program, the ERRProject, did not become effective until mid-June 1988,some 10 months after the need for it had been identified.In the meantime, two planting seasons had elapsed, and anopportunity had been lost to deliver benefits that couldhave enhanced popular support for the Accord.

Bank efforts in providing assistance for infrastruc-ture resulted in little sustainable accomplishment in SriLanka owing to sabotage and re-destruction of much ofwhat had been restored. Assistance provided directly tohouseholds had a more lasting effect.

The presence of a resident mission (now called a“field office”) in Sri Lanka greatly facilitated the Bank’srole in efforts related to post-conflict reconstruction andthe possibility of post-conflict reconstruction. The recentexpansion of field office staff and the relocation of thecountry director position from headquarters to the fieldoffice are timely in view of the need for in-countrycapacity to support and monitor a new reconstructioneffort, including the government’s sweeping devolutioninitiatives currently being considered by Parliament.

Effective reconstruction assistance requires a clearunderstanding of the roles of local bodies, includinggovernmental bodies and NGOs. This was deficient inSri Lanka, on the parts of both the government and theBank. On the government’s side, there was delay in pro-mulgating Provincial Councils. For its part, the Bankcould have insisted on the involvement of local NGOsand community-based organizations in the design andimplementation of the ERR project. The volatile securitysituation, especially in the North, re-erupted into full-scale conflict in 1990.


65

UgandaBank involvement in the reconstruction efforts ofUganda has been particularly comprehensive. In the firstfive years after the conflict (1987–1992), the Bank sup-ported approximately 25 lending operations amountingto more than US$1 billion, and closely coordinated withinternational donors. The Bank’s role was key instrengthening the Ministry of Finance and the CentralBank, removing the monopoly of the Coffee Board,assisting in sugar rehabilitation, and rebuilding roads.

Despite good performance in reforming and rebuild-ing the economy, Bank involvement could have beenimproved in several respects: insufficient attention toconsensus building; excessive use of conditionalities; andmost important, a seriously dysfunctional emphasis onraising taxation. The Bank did not always fulfill itspotential comparative advantage, for example, in thepower sector, a key element in recovery. Nor did it fullyconvert its coordination role into creating an overallstrategy for reconstruction, or a sector-by-sector plan.

The Bank’s performance was relatively poor in socialsectors, particularly in strengthening health and educationinstitutions. Investment in the social sectors was oftenpremature, implemented through weak Ministries andwith little forethought given to the nature of the servicesthe Bank was trying to support. The post-conflict periodrequired major health sector reforms: these fell short ofneeds. Education investment was equally disappointing,with only an estimated 37 percent of funds reachingschools. Too much dependence was placed on the existingbureaucracy, and not enough use made of NGOs.

Regarding Bank processes and institutional arrange-ments, project design did not fully reflect the need, givenUganda’s unsettled institutional environment, for a flex-ible, process-oriented project design. This was particu-larly evident in the social sectors, where the Educationand Health Ministries were too weak to accommodatespending, and where supervening events like decentral-ization and renewed conflict changed priorities. Changesin key resident mission staff, task managers and govern-ment staff were inevitably disruptive at times. Bank staffwere not generally familiar with working in conflictcountries nor with the international relief and rehabili-tation system. Staff resources and time were mainly con-centrated in Kampala. This led to little understanding ofand contact with international and local NGOs.

A final shortcoming of Bank projects was that,where they were not sequential, many were too short toaddress the projected length of recovery. At least twodifferent time-tables in post-war recovery are well-man-ifested in Uganda. The first is the real-time duration ofthe recovery process, which typically requires at leasttwo decades of sustained effort, with the risk of war arecurrent reality. The second time-table is set by donorconsiderations, which may be guided by different objec-tives, and may become manifest through programswhich do not necessarily consider the very long recoveryprocess. Government has to observe both timetables,weighing the political expediencies of short-term mea-sures to provide security and boost confidence againstthe needs for longer-term recovery.

A n n e x e s

66


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3/95

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L35

621

5/30

/96

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/AT

otal

lend

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538

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L40

657/

11/9

642

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929/

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31/9

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9/30

/97

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ate

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C25

419/

9/93

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6/30

/99

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2388

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9/30

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HT

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and

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-inv

estm

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C17

965/

14/9

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TA

LM

V10

/31/

97Pu

blic

sec

tor

Stud

ies

man

agem

ent:

3.4

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rgy

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2456

2/9/

9325

.4*

SIL

PD12

/31/

98So

cial

sec

tor:

67.

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blic

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erpr

ise

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orm

C21

133/

27/9

03.

4*SI

LB

R4/

15/9

6Te

leco

mm

unic

atio

ns: 8

.4Se

cond

Com

mun

icat

ions

Pro

ject

C21

8912

/11/

908.

4*SI

MC

C12

/31/

98T

rans

port

: 34.

0T

rans

port

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tor

Proj

ect

C21

365/

22/9

034

*SI

MT

T12

/31/

98W

ater

: 3.8

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1783

4/28

/87

3.8*

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6/30

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erge

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/31/

98T

otal

lend

ing:

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* re

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cate

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vol

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by s

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STR

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CA

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DY

CO

UN

TR

IES

ANNE

X 2:

(CO

NTI

NU

ED)

69

A n n e x e s

ANNE

X 2:

(CO

NTI

NU

ED)

L/C

AP

PR

OV

AL

AM

OU

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LE

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by s

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0983

2/19

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72.5

ER

LM

Y12

/31/

82A

gric

ultu

re: 3

31.1

Tech

nica

l Ass

ista

nce

C10

7712

/2/8

08

TA

LB

B12

/31/

85E

duca

tion

: 106

.6W

ater

Sup

ply

Eng

inee

ring

C11

103/

17/8

19

TA

LW

U1/

31/8

7E

nvir

onm

ent:

23.

9Ph

osph

ate

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ring

C12

284/

13/8

23.

9T

AL

NN

10/3

1/85

Fina

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100

.0R

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stru

ctio

n C

redi

t II

C12

525/

25/8

270

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6/30

/85

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165

.5A

gric

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ral R

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C13

282/

24/8

366

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30/9

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g: 3

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duca

tion

III

C13

292/

24/8

332

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12/3

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r: 7

70.0

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ns

C13

675/

17/8

322

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CC

6/30

/87

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and

gas:

4.5

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: 153

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C14

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6/30

/92

Publ

ic s

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ighw

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C14

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onst

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745/

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428

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28.8

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PH12

/31/

93W

ater

: 139

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C15

613/

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54.

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94T

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lend

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230

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stry

Reh

abili

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1824

6/17

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94E

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over

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1844

9/15

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C18

691/

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ater

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98L

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125

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and

5/

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30/9

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Rec

over

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2420

9/3/

9241

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lth

C24

905/

11/9

319

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12/3

1/98

Soci

al A

ctio

nC

2802

12/2

1/95

24SI

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, HY

, WY

12/3

1/00

Bur

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Em

erge

ncy

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ista

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Prog

ram

C26

6812

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9414

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6

Eth

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mer

genc

y R

ecov

ery

and

C23

513/

31/9

214

1.3

ER

LM

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30/9

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stru

ctio

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C I

C25

266/

29/9

325

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LM

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30/9

6

Moz

ambi

que

Rur

al R

ehab

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tion

C24

793/

30/9

320

SIL

AD

12/3

1/98

Seco

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cono

mic

Rec

over

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2628

6/16

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200

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CO

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UM

EN

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CT

OR

DA

TE

CA

SE S

TU

DY

CO

UN

TR

IES

ANNE

X 2:

(CO

NTI

NU

ED)

71

A n n e x e s

Oth

er E

AP

Lao

, PD

RA

gric

ultu

ral R

ehab

ilita

tion

and

C

0760

12/2

7/77

8.2

FIL

AI

9/30

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Dev

elop

men

tH

ighw

ay I

mpr

ovem

ent

C22

183/

21/9

145

SIL

TH

6/30

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Oth

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Cro

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Em

erge

ncy

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

L37

606/

21/9

412

8E

RL

UY

3/31

/98

Hea

lth

L38

432/

14/9

540

SIL

HB

12/3

1/98

Hig

hway

Sec

tor

L38

694/

20/9

580

SIM

TH

12/3

1/00

Tajik

ista

nIn

stit

utio

n B

uild

ing

Tech

nica

l C

2861

05/

16/9

65

TA

LB

I12

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00A

ssis

tanc

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gric

ultu

ral R

ecov

ery

and

C29

170

9/12

/96

50R

ILA

A9/

30/9

7So

cial

Pro

tect

ion

Pilo

t Po

vert

y A

llevi

atio

nC

2946

4/10

/97

14.7

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30/0

0

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EN

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est

Ban

k an

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Em

erge

ncy

Reh

abili

tati

on I

I4/

25/9

620

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MY

OT

- E

mer

genc

y R

ehab

ilita

tion

IC

W00

15/

26/9

430

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TH

, PD

, EP

Mun

icip

al I

nfra

stru

ctur

e T

2605

75/

30/9

640

SIL

UU

, TH

, WW

Dev

elop

men

tE

duca

tion

and

Hea

lth

T26

065

6/20

/95

20SI

LH

BR

ehab

ilita

tion

Wat

er a

nd S

anit

atio

n Se

rvic

es

T26

056

7/2/

9625

SIL

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in G

aza

Oth

er L

AC

Nic

arag

uaU

rban

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

C09

651/

4/80

22E

RL

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6/30

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Indu

stri

al R

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ilita

tion

Cre

dit

C20

286/

25/8

130

FIL

IR3/

31/8

4E

cono

mic

Rec

over

y C

redi

tC

2302

9/26

/91

110

SAL

ME

2/25

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Soci

al I

nves

tmen

t Fu

nd (

FISE

)C

2434

11/1

7/92

25SI

MSF

, HN

9/30

/96

Eco

nom

ic R

ecov

ery

Cre

dit

IIC

2631

6/21

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60SA

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E4/

24/9

7Se

cond

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ial I

nves

tmen

t Fu

nd

C27

677/

11/9

530

SIM

SA12

/13/

97(F

ISE

II)

TO

TA

L P

RO

JEC

TS:

157

L/C

AP

PR

OV

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AM

OU

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CL

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NG

CO

UN

TR

YP

RO

JEC

T N

AM

EN

UM

BE

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AT

E(U

S$M

)IN

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UM

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OR

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DY

CO

UN

TR

IES

ANNE

X 2:

(CO

NTI

NU

ED)

72


ANNEX 3. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY

World Bank

Bosnia and HerzegovinaHans J. ApitzWei DingAndras HorvaiZlatko HurticBaelhdaj MerghoubMadalene O’DonnellPedro RodriguezBarbara SantosMary SheehanChristine Wallich

BiH Resident MissionClaudio DomenisPatrice DufourSarah ForsterMirjana KarahasanovicMichael KochZorica LesicSaumya MitraRory O’SullivanMarie-Theres SchurrerIlona SzemzoEnn VasurFatmir Zeneli

CambodiaChristopher Chamberlain, EA1HREnrique Crousillat, EA1INGuy Darlan, EA1COJessica Einhorn, EXCMustapha El-Erian, LEGEABernard Funck, EC3C1Koji Kuroda, EA1INChristopher Redfern, EA1AEBlake Ratner, consultantDavid Steedman, ASTHRMichael Ward, IECDD

El SalvadorAna-María ArriagadaIan BannonMichael Baxter, (by phone)Nancy Cooke, ECA (formerly LAC)Luis Derbez, SAS (formerly LAC)Madalena Dos SantosGloria GrandoliniUlrich Lachler, LAC (Mexico; by phone)Cora ShawSally Zeijlon

EritreaFakhruddin AhmedSubhash DhingraLaura FrigentiWoldai FuturEjaz GhaniStephen O’BrienLee Roberts

HaitiT. Anderson WhiteWendeline De ZanStefan FluckigerLuc MoreauAlice Morton Axel PeukerJamil Salmi

LebanonAlastair McKechnieMichel PommierKaren RasmussenLars RasmussonEzzedin Shamsedin, Adviser to Executive Director

World Bank New York Office

Judy Grayson, Liaison OfficerAlfredo Sfeir-Younis, Special Representative to the UN

RwandaFrancisco Aguirre-Sacasa*Jerome ChevalierIain ChristieMichel Devaux*

Jean Doyen*

Linda EnglishPaul IsenmanChukwuma ObidegwuJean-Louis Sarbib*

Michael SarrisRichard SenouNils TcheyanUlrich ThummR. Venkateswaran*Interviewed in 1995 in connection with research for the Joint Evalu-ation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, op. cit. No longer with theBank, Mr. Aguirre-Sacasa was Director in 1993 and 1994 of theRegion Country Department that included Rwanda, and Mr. Devauxwas Country Economist for Rwanda from September, 1992, toAugust, 1995.

73

Sri LankaPedro AlbaJ. Roberto BentjerodtArnold Clift*Iain ChristieChandra GodivitarneArnaud GuinardPaul IsenmanSarwar LateefLinda LowensteinManuel PenalverMenahem PrywesDavid Thomas*

George WestLorene YapRoberto Zagha

*Retired from World Bank. Mr. Clift was Country Operations Divi-sion Chief covering Sri Lanka, 1987–1989. Mr. Thomas was ResidentRepresentative in Colombo, 1978–82.

UgandaMarc BairdJohn ClarkSabine CorneliusRandolph HarrisYitzhak KamhiPetter LangsethRitva ReinikkaJohn RiversonIraj TalaiGaiv Tata

AFTU2Alberto Harth

DECSunita KikeriMartin Rama

EAPVPKatherine Marshall

EDIGordon ApplebyPeter MiovicPatricia Weiss Fagen

Post-conflict UnitBetty Oyella BigombeNat CollettaSteven Holtzman

HDNEDEluned Roberts-Schweitzer

LACAnnika Tornqvist

Geneva Consultations

IDNDRPhillippe Boulle, DirectorTerry Jeggle, Senior Officer

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)Rudolph von Bernuth, Executive Director

International Federation of Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies (IFRC)Peter Rees, Desk Officer for Former YugoslaviaPeter Walker, Director, Disaster Policy andMethodology

Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the Office of the UNEveline Herfkens, Permanent Representative of theKingdom of the Netherlands to the Office of theUnited Nations (former ED representing BiH to the Bank)

Swiss Directorate for Development Cooperation andDevelopment Aid (SDC), BerneUrs Herren, Program Officer, Development Policy andResearch DivisionStephan Nellen, Minister, Deputy Assistant DirectorGeneral SDC, Cooperation with Eastern Europe andthe CISJürg Zumstein, Program Coordinator for the Horn ofAfrica, Division of Humanitarian Aid

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs(DHA)Martin Griffiths, DirectorPaul Hebert, Senior Humanitarian Affairs OfficerDeborah Saidy, Secretary to the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee

UNHCRHarriet Bengstsson, Americas BureauJeff Crisp, Centre for Documentation and ResearchRaymond Hall, Head, Inter-Organizations Affairs andSecretariat ServicesLarbi Mebtouche, Head, Reintegration and Self-RelianceE. MorrisN. MorrisKazu Nagasaha, Asia BureauMorten Pristed, Associate EconomistMs. Rianawati, Asia BureauConstantin Sokoloff, Senior Officer, Inspection andEvaluation

A n n e x e s

74

UNOPSChristophe Bouvier, Chief, Rehabilitation and SocialSustainability UnitTomas Paquete, Senior AdviserAlfredo Lazarte Howle, ILO

War-torn Societies ProjectMatthias Stiefel, Director

New York Consultations

DHAAntonio Donini, Lessons Learned UnitSusan Lantze, ConsultantJohn Rogge, Chief, Policy and Analysis Division

DPAAlvaro de Soto, Assistant Under-Secretary-GeneralMamdou KaneAnita MathurHiroko MiyamuraShigeru MochidaAlex MtsoukaZdeslaw NicinshiVictor PoliakovVladimir ShagodaDettef Wilke

DPKOChristopher Cloeman, Policy and Analysis UnitLeonard Kapungu, Head, Lessons Learned UnitElizabeth Linden-Mayer, Assistant for Africa to theUnder-Secretary-GeneralMasimba Tafirenyika, Lessons Learned UnitShashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General

UNDPHugh Cholmendeley, ConsultantFrank O’Donnell, Deputy Director, EmergencyResponse Division

UNHCRSoren Jessen Petersen

UNICEFKate Alley, Office of Evaluation, Policy and PlanningDavid S. Bassiouni, Senior Policy AdviserNigel Fisher, Director, Office of Emergency ProgramsTom FranklinSawon Hong, Senior Programme Officer, EvaluationOfficeIan Hopwood, Chief, Evaluation OfficeAngela Raven RobertsNora Yaler

UN Office of Internal OversightFrance Owarish, Chief

UNOPSBisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive DirectorReinhart Helmke, Executive Director

Bosnia and Herzegovina Field Mission

PresidencyKasim Begic, Adviser to the Chairman of thePresidency for Economic Issues

Council of MinistersNeven Tomic, Deputy Chairman

Ministry of Foreign AffairsAziz Hadzimuratovic, Head of Department forReconstruction and International AssistanceAlida Sofic, Adviser

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic RelationsMirsad Kikanovic, Special Adviser to the MinisterBerina Selimovic Mehmedbasic, Assistant MinisterIvica Miodrag, Adviser

Central BankSerge Robert, GovernorKasim Omicevic, Deputy Governor

Office of the President of Republika SrpskaRajko Tomas, Adviser to the President of RepublikaSrpska for Economic Issues

Mass MediaSenada Mavric

OHRVictor MassenaEgbert Gerkin

UNAlexander IvankoPierre-Francois PirlotKathy Walker, UNHCRBill Thomas, Logistics Officer, UNHCR

SFORTerry Carter, Liaison Officer

EBRDZsuzsanna Hargitai, Deputy Resident Representative

USAIDMichael Stievater, Office of Transition Initiatives

NGOsDianne Cullinane, Liaison Officer, Soros FoundationGeorge Devendorf, Country Director, ICVAElizabeth Hughes, Program Officer, WorldVision


75

Jim Kelly, Country Director, CRSJennie McCann, Deputy Director, Programs,International Rescue CommitteeKlaus Mock, Adviser, German Advisory OfficeCatiba Rekic, Programme Director, Plavi MostGoran Todorovic, Head of Office, Care InternationalRamiza Velic, Project Manager, Plavi MostBill Warnock, Country Director, WorldVision

International Crisis GroupHrair Balian, DirectorChristopher Bennett, Deputy Director

BlagajHandzar Dzevad, Director, Fish Farm

JablanicaResad Malovic

Project Implementation UnitsNikola Duric, Housing ProjectZorica Milos, War Victims RehabilitationMehmedalija Sijaric, SarajevogasZlatko Zvirac, Housing Project

French EmbassyPierre Boedoz

International Management GroupKevin Mannion, DirectorBruno Silvestrini, Head of Office, MostarDino Bicciato, Manager Director Designate

Chamber of Economy of BiHMensur Smajlovic, PresidentIzet Starcevic, SecretaryJozo Soric, DirectorElektropriveda of BiHReas Maolovic, Manager

ECAnna Maria Corazza MartiniDavid HardmanCharles PalantPatrick Renaud

Cambodia

Far East Economic ReviewNate Thayer

International Human Rights Law GroupLaura McGrew

International Monetary FundScott Brown

Johns Hopkins University, School of AdvancedInternational StudiesFrederick BrownNaranhkiri Tith

USAIDJames Vermillion

El Salvador Field Mission

CARE (international NGO)José Ignacio Claros, Technical Assistance Manager

FRENTE (FMLN) Opposition PartyRuben Zamora, National Assembly Candidate(candidate for President in 1994)

FUNDE (research and advocacy NGO)Alfonso Goitia, Executive DirectorRoberto Rubio, Research Director

FUSADES (private development think tank andconsulting firm)Eduardo Nuñez, Chief Executive DirectorJaime Acosta, Assistant Director, Economic SocialStudiesMauricio Gonzalez Orellana, Economist

German EmbassyChristian Much, Commercial Attaché

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)Fadrique Otero, Acting RepresentativeMarcelo J. Valenzuelo, Sectoral SpecialistFernando Manoel Costa, Coordinator for El Salvador

Land BankJose Ernesto Mancía Salinas, Director

Ministry of EducationAbigaíl Castro de Perez, Vice MinisterRoberto Morán Argueta, Director, InternationalCooperation Projects Office

Ministry of External RelationsHector González Urrutia, Undersecretary ofCoordination and PlanningRina Costellanos de Jarquín, Director, ExternalCooperation Programs

Ministry of FinanceManuel Enrique Hinds, Minister

Ministry of Planning (merged with Ministry of Financein 1995)Mirna Liévano de Marques, former Minister 1989–95Jose Marques, ConsultantEvelyn Jacir de Lovo

A n n e x e s

76

PRISMA (local NGO for research on environment anddevelopment)Herman Rosa, Senior Researcher

RCS (radio station devoted to dialogue on political-economic developments)Salvador Samayoa, Executive Director (former peacenegotiator for FMLN)

Sacdel (local NGO for local development and training)Mauricio Silva, Executive Director (Ministry ofPlanning 1979–80)

Social Housing FundFrancisco Bertrand Galindo, President

UNDPFredy Justiniano, Principal AdviserRene Hernandez, Program Officer

USAIDKen R. Ellis, Acting Mission DirectorTully R. Cornic, AdviserMary C. Ott, Chief, Economic Growth OfficePeter F. Krantsover, Planning and Programming OfficeRichard McCall, Chief-of-StaffCharles Costello, Director, Democracy Center (ElSalvador Mission Director 1993–94)Kathleen Smith, Country Officer for El Salvador

OtherGabriel Siri, Consultant (former Director of ECLAC,Mexico City)Rainer Steckhan, Director General, Loans, SocialDevelopment Fund Council of Europe, Paris (phoneinterview; former Country Department Director, LAC,World Bank)

Haiti

Interamerican FoundationBob McGuire

Washington Office on Latin AmericaHugh Byrne

OtherNancy Taylor (Consultant for UNDP and IDB ongovernance issues)

Lebanon

United NationsSenior UN staff were interviewed who requestedanonymity.

Rwanda

Brown University, Providence, Rhode IslandPeter Uvin, Department of Sociology

US Agency for International DevelopmentRichard McCall, Chief of Staff

Uganda Field Mission

British High Commission (ODA)Petra Byrde, First Secretary (Aid)

CARENick Ritchie, Country Director

Central BankLouis Austin Kasekende, Director, Research and PolicyCharles Kikonyogo, Governor

DANIDADaniel S. Iga, Program Officer

European UnionJohn Croswaithe, Counselor (Economics)Marja Laine

Luwero (field visit)Chairman, District CouncilDistrict Inspector of EducationDistrict Planning Officer

Ministry of EducationNoreda Kiremire, Deputy Director, PIUPatrick Makumbi, Director, Project ImplementationUnit

Ministry of FinanceE. Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary

NURPErnest Oloya, CoordinatorMargaret Ajju

OxfamAntony Burdon, Country Representative

Palissa (field visit)Chairman of the CouncilMasaba Justine, RCV’s OfficeG. Kayongo, Chief AdministratorOmaido Enoch, DTLOMr. Shaine, Chairman, Education Committee

ParliamentHon. Norbert Mao

Prime Minister’s OfficePeter Uchanda, Permanent Secretary


77

A n n e x e s

Save the Children Fund (UK)Richard Mawer, Field Director

SNV (Holland)Evelyn Nyakoojo, Program Officer

Ugandan Red CrossPeter Oryema, Secretary General

Uganda Veterans Assistance BoardCapt. Francis Apiko (Rt.), Program ManagerMaj. Gen. Emilio Mondo (Rt.), Executive Secretary

UNDPLawrence Nkooto Bategeka, National Program OfficerEugene Owusu, Resident Economist

UNICEFKathleen Cravero, RepresentativeKeith Wright, Chief, CCA Program

USAIDPatrick Fine

WorldVisionMoses Dombo, Policy AdvocacyEdward Mubirau, Program Officer

78


ANNEX 4: COMPARISON OF PCR/ICR RATINGS WITH PPAR/EVM RATINGS

El Salvador: SAL I (L3293)Support the government’s 1989–1994 Economic andSocial Development Program, focused on economicrecovery adjustment, maintenance of a consistent macro-economic policy framework, and the nutrition compo-nent of a social safety net.

El Salvador: SAL II (L3646)Support the Structural Adjustment Program, designed to:lay the analytical framework for a public sector modern-ization effort; deepen reforms in areas of taxes, privatiza-tion, trade, financial sector, social sector and poverty alle-viation; and strengthen public expenditure, civil service,and environmental management.

Lao, PDR: Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development(C0760)Alleviate constraints and increase food production inVientiane Prefecture and Province.

Uganda: Reconstruction I (C0983)Provide quick-disbursing foreign exchange in support ofthe government’s first period of reconstruction.

Uganda: Technical Assistance (C1077)Assist the government in preparing suitable developmentand rehabilitation projects as well as in strengthening rel-evant ministries and agencies in planning and projectpreparation.

Uganda: Reconstruction II (C1252)Increase agricultural exports and domestic production inhigh priority areas and strengthen the government’scapacity to formulate and implement policies in areascritical for Uganda’s economic recovery.

Uganda: Technical Assistance II (C1434)Help the core economic ministries and agencies designand implement a progression of economic reforms;strengthen systems and capacities of those agencies.Linked to Reconstruction II and III and ERC I and II.

Uganda: Reconstruction III (C1474)Provide financing for essential imports, continue to sup-port policy and institutional reforms, and generate coun-terpart resources for the government budget.

Uganda: Highways IV (C1803)Protect capital investment and increase the service life ofessential roads serving local and transit traffic to otherland-locked countries; improve maintenance planningand operations of rural/feeder roads serving agriculturalareas; strengthen institutions responsible for projectimplementation.

Outcome:Sustainability:Institutional dev.:









SatisfactoryLikelySubstantial

SatisfactoryLikely Substantial

UnsatisfactoryNot availableNot available

SatisfactoryNot availableNot available

SatisfactoryNot availableModest




SatisfactoryLikelyModest



UnsatisfactoryUncertainModest

UnsatisfactoryNot AvailableNot Available


UnsatisfactoryUnlikely Modest


UnsatisfactoryUnlikelyModest

SatisfactoryUncertainNegligible

PROJECT NAME/OBJECTIVES RATINGS: PCR/ICR PAR/EVM

79

A n n e x e s

ANNEX 4: COMPARISON OF PCR/ICR RATINGS WITH PPAR/EVM RATINGS

Uganda: Forestry Rehabilitation (C1824)Increase production of woodfuels and wood products;conserve soil fertility; manage natural forests for sustainedtimber and charcoal production by the private sector;increase productivity of softwood plantations; create themanagement and information base for long-term planningand conservation of Uganda’s forest resources.

Uganda: Economic Recovery I (C1844)Support the GOU’s Economic Recovery Program, whosegoals were to: bring about internal financial stability andlower the rate of inflation; reduce the imbalances in theexternal accounts; and promote growth.

Uganda: Sugar Rehabilitation (C1893)Restore sugar production of Kakira Sugar Works to his-torical levels; strengthen the role of Ministry of Trade andIndustry in monitoring the performance of the sugarindustry; support the liberalization of sugar marketingand processing in Uganda.

Uganda: Technical Assistance III (C1951)Help core economic ministries and agencies design andimplement a progression of economic reforms; andstrengthen systems and capacities within those agencies.Linked to ERC I and II and SAC I.

Uganda: Public Enterprises (C1962)Strengthen the government’s capacity to sustain economicrecovery by increasing productivity and output and reduc-ing financial losses in public enterprises.

Uganda: Education IV (C1965)Maintain momentum of the government’s educationalrehabilitation efforts at the primary education level andensure their sustainability; strengthen key institutionsinvolved in improving and monitoring educational qual-ity; and help prepare a more extensive project to imple-ment the emerging educational strategy.

Uganda: Economic Recovery II (C2087)Support the third phase of the government’s EconomicRecovery Program.

Uganda: Program for Alleviation of Poverty and SocialCosts of Adjustment (C2088)Immediately address some of the most pressing social con-cerns of Uganda’s most vulnerable groups; strengthen theinstitutional capacity of the government to identify, for-mulate and maintain interventions for assisting the coun-try’s most vulnerable groups.











SatisfactoryLikelyNegligible

SatisfactoryUncertainSubstantial



SatisfactoryUncertainNegligible

SatisfactoryUncertainNot available

UnsatisfactoryUncertainNegligible

UnsatisfactoryLikelyModest




SatisfactoryUncertainModest



PROJECT NAME/OBJECTIVES RATINGS: PCR/ICR PAR/EVM

80


ANNEX 5: IBRD/IDA LENDING COMMITMENTS BY REGION (WITH DETAIL OF POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES)BFY80 BFY81 BFY82 BFY83 BFY84 BFY85 BFY86 BFY87

IBRD/IDA ($m) 11,481.7 12,291.0 13,015.9 14,477.0 15,522.3 14,384.4 16,318.7 17,674.1

Africa 1,546.6 1,812.4 1,801.5 1,794.0 2,368.3 1,597.3 2,046.5 2,097.7Angola 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Burundi 30.0 56.0 21.2 15.8 5.1 30.4 37.3 12.3Eritrea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Ethiopia 0.0 75.0 30.0 27.0 105.0 166.0 67.5 91.0Liberia 12.0 9.0 45.5 15.3 18.1 7.6 0.0 0.0Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 20.0Namibia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Rwanda 21.0 22.5 40.9 36.3 9.0 16.3 59.1 36.5Sierra Leone 2.5 30.5 5.0 20.0 21.5 0.0 5.3 0.0Somalia 18.0 10.2 15.0 23.0 31.5 20.6 34.3 48.7South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Sudan 170.0 73.0 56.0 130.0 91.4 37.5 62.6 47.0Uganda 72.5 17.0 109.0 124.0 123.0 71.9 0.0 31.0Total AFR post-conflict 326.0 293.2 322.6 391.4 404.6 395.3 266.1 286.5% of Africa lending 21.08 16.18 17.91 21.82 17.08 24.75 13.00 13.66% of overall lending 2.84 2.39 2.48 2.70 2.61 2.75 1.63 1.62

East Asia And Pacific 2,528.9 2,413.4 2,823.4 3,800.6 3,356.7 3,132.9 3,595.2 3,363.4Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Lao People’s Democratic Republic 13.4 0.0 15.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 3.9 25.8Myanmar 160.0 55.0 100.0 92.0 54.7 32.3 30.0 14.0Total EAP post-conflict 173.4 55.0 115.0 98.2 54.7 32.3 33.9 39.8% of EAP lending 6.86 2.28 4.07 2.58 1.63 1.03 0.94 1.18% of overall lending 1.51 0.45 0.88 0.68 0.35 0.22 0.21 0.23

South Asia 2,276.5 2,476.2 3,024.0 2,887.2 3,645.9 3,526.8 3,601.0 3,965.4Afghanistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Sri Lanka 151.5 167.0 128.7 32.0 67.1 134.0 85.0 70.6Total SAS post-conflict 151.5 167.0 128.7 32.0 67.1 134.0 85.0 70.6% of SAS lending 6.65 6.74 4.26 1.11 1.84 3.80 2.36 1.78% of overall lending 1.32 1.36 0.99 0.22 0.43 0.93 0.52 0.40

Europe And Central Asia 1,422.0 1,537.0 1,319.1 1,621.7 1,600.5 1,388.7 1,412.5 1,529.4Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Croatia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Cyprus 16.0 14.0 12.2 26.2 43.8 7.0 20.0 0.0Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Russian Federation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Total ECA post-conflict 16.0 14.0 12.2 26.2 43.8 7.0 20.0 0.0% of ECA lending 1.13 0.91 0.92 1.62 2.74 0.50 1.42 0.00% of overall lending 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.05 0.12 0.00

Middle East And North Africa 1,023.7 898.8 1,060.0 913.9 1,525.3 1,040.5 892.3 1,566.2Algeria 120.0 110.0 0.0 0.0 418.0 262.0 0.0 464.0Iraq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Lebanon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0West Bank and Gaza 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Yemen, Republic of 56.7 65.0 61.5 71.1 73.4 42.1 46.4 55.2Total MENA post-conflict 176.7 175.0 61.5 71.1 491.4 304.1 46.4 519.2% of MENA lending 17.26 19.47 5.80 7.78 32.22 29.23 5.20 33.15% of overall lending 1.54 1.42 0.47 0.49 3.17 2.11 0.28 2.94

Latin America and Caribbean 2,684.0 3,153.2 2,987.9 3,459.6 3,025.6 3,698.2 4,771.2 5,152.0El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Guatemala 17.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 50.0 44.6 81.0 23.0Haiti 0.0 21.2 18.0 56.0 19.1 32.1 0.0 63.0Nicaragua 52.0 38.7 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Total LAC post-conflict 69.0 59.9 34.0 74.5 69.1 76.7 81.0 86.0% of LAC lending 2.57 1.90 1.14 2.15 2.28 2.07 1.70 1.67% of overall lending 0.60 0.49 0.26 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.49

Total lending to post-conflict countries 912.6 764.1 674.0 693.4 1,130.7 949.4 532.4 1,002.1

% of overall lending 7.95 6.22 5.18 4.79 7.28 6.60 3.26 5.67

81

A n n e x e s

BFY88 BFY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY9819,220.7 21,366.8 20,701.7 22,685.5 21,705.7 23,695.9 20,836.0 22,521.7 21,352.2 19,146.7 34,219.2

2,928.7 3,924.7 3,932.9 3,394.2 3,973.6 2,817.3 2,807.9 2,284.3 2,740.1 1,736.7 3,481.20.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 143.9 81.9 0.0 0.0 24.0 0.0 5.0

153.5 54.1 71.2 22.8 79.7 13.5 0.0 35.9 0.0 0.0 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 6.3 98.6

103.0 157.0 75.2 0.0 150.0 346.0 74.8 142.2 155.7 0.0 669.20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

85.9 199.0 143.1 69.1 289.3 122.9 427.0 0.0 98.7 100.0 29.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.00.0 51.9 44.4 145.7 19.1 26.0 27.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 57.40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 64.4 81.3 50.2 36.3 55.3 0.2 0.0

18.0 89.0 54.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.0 0.0

139.7 95.0 82.2 0.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0142.4 141.0 214.5 276.7 263.4 223.8 262.4 82.0 42.0 137.1 196.1642.5 787.0 685.2 537.3 1,025.8 920.4 841.4 346.4 393.2 339.6 1,065.321.94 20.05 17.42 15.83 25.82 32.67 29.97 15.16 14.35 19.55 30.603.34 3.68 3.31 2.37 4.73 3.88 4.04 1.54 1.84 1.77 3.11

4,213.6 4,101.9 3,718.5 4,563.2 5,446.5 5,569.8 6,034.4 5,693.8 5,420.1 4,866.0 10,268.40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.7 37.0 80.0 57.4 30.7

14.1 53.5 44.7 45.0 40.0 55.0 48.4 19.2 60.7 48.0 33.063.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.077.1 53.5 44.7 45.0 40.0 55.0 111.1 56.2 140.7 105.4 63.71.83 1.30 1.20 0.99 0.73 0.99 1.84 0.99 2.60 2.17 0.620.40 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.53 0.25 0.66 0.55 0.19

3,922.9 4,680.0 3,504.4 3,604.8 2,998.8 3,416.2 2,370.0 3,005.7 2,932.5 2,011.6 5,009.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

179.5 63.7 143.4 358.6 69.5 110.1 0.0 39.0 156.1 57.8 120.3179.5 63.7 143.4 358.6 69.5 110.1 0.0 39.0 156.1 57.8 120.3

4.58 1.36 4.09 9.95 2.32 3.22 0.00 1.30 5.32 2.87 2.400.93 0.30 0.69 1.58 0.32 0.46 0.00 0.17 0.73 0.30 0.35

1,728.9 1,342.3 2,190.2 3,867.0 2,143.3 3,843.9 3,726.4 4,498.8 4,226.8 5,054.9 7,131.60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.8 83.0 34.9 106.60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 197.6 209.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 128.0 120.0 31.5 239.0 206.1

65.0 0.0 25.0 30.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 103.1 90.8 68.7 113.60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,370.0 1,520.0 1,741.3 1,816.0 1,715.6 2,428.60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 62.0 69.1

65.0 0.0 25.0 30.0 32.0 1,370.0 1,648.0 2,046.2 2,036.3 2,317.8 3,133.13.76 0.00 1.14 0.78 1.49 35.64 44.22 45.48 48.18 45.85 43.930.34 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.15 5.78 7.91 9.09 9.54 12.11 9.16

1,162.6 1,475.8 1,391.0 2,019.6 1,482.0 1,880.2 1,150.6 978.7 1,595.2 914.8 1,410.7391.0 341.0 457.5 431.0 215.0 240.0 140.0 331.0 428.0 89.0 400.0

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 175.0 77.1 90.7 70.0 191.1 123.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

35.6 54.3 67.5 95.6 47.2 46.3 33.0 0.0 166.3 70.2 122.2426.6 395.3 525.0 526.6 262.2 461.3 250.1 421.7 664.3 350.3 645.236.69 26.79 37.74 26.07 17.69 24.53 21.74 43.09 41.64 38.29 45.742.22 1.85 2.54 2.32 1.21 1.95 1.20 1.87 3.11 1.83 1.89

5,264.0 5,842.1 5,964.7 5,236.7 5,661.5 6,168.5 4,746.7 6,060.4 4,437.5 4,562.7 6,918.365.0 0.0 0.0 101.0 11.0 40.0 52.5 0.0 165.0 24.0 143.029.0 61.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 140.0 0.0 9.4 0.0 46.0 140.60.0 44.0 39.6 23.9 26.1 0.0 0.0 90.0 50.0 33.5 97.00.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 120.3 33.5 126.6 63.3 60.8 30.0 95.0

94.0 105.5 39.6 124.9 157.4 213.5 179.1 162.7 275.8 133.5 475.61.79 1.81 0.66 2.39 2.78 3.46 3.77 2.68 6.22 2.93 6.870.49 0.49 0.19 0.55 0.73 0.90 0.86 0.72 1.29 0.70 1.39

1,484.7 1,405.0 1,462.9 1,622.4 1,586.9 3,130.3 3,029.7 3,072.2 3,666.4 3,304.4 5,503.27.72 6.58 7.07 7.15 7.31 13.21 14.54 13.64 17.17 17.26 16.08

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Operations Evaluation Department, World BankSwiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank

Conceptual Framework and Workshop GoalsOED’s assessment of The World Bank’s Experience inPost-Conflict Reconstruction extracts lessons for ongo-ing and future efforts of Bank assistance to post-conflictreconstruction. An important finding of the study wasthat effective coordination and partnerships with allactors in the reconstruction process are key to the effi-ciency and effectiveness of reconstruction efforts. In thiscontext, and as part of the methodology of the OEDstudy, a workshop was jointly sponsored by OED, theSwiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC),and the Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit. The workshopfocused on issues of partnership in post-conflict coun-tries and how donors, multilateral institutions, interna-tional agencies, NGOs, and other stakeholders can bet-ter coordinate their efforts to address the challengesfaced by countries emerging from conflict. In connectionwith the OED study, a related aim of the workshop wasto share the findings of the study, and to discuss the roleof the Bank as an effective partner in providing recon-struction assistance.

Workshop ProceedingsThe workshop discussed the theme of partnership inconnection with several different issues, over two days,June 23 and 24, 1998, in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The for-mat consisted of six panels; the main focus and conclu-sions of each one follow below.

Panel 1: Governance and Conflict ResolutionThis panel discussed promoting equitable developmentand preventing conflict. The group discussion focusedon the intersection between political and economicobjectives, and in particular, the degree to which eco-nomic interventions can serve the political ends neededto secure peace as a basis for reconstruction. Main con-clusions of the sessions include the following:

• There is a need for reconstruction agencies toconfront and engage the politics of the context inwhich they are working, without oversteppingtheir mandates.

• Reconstruction programs are multisectoral, andthe disciplines required for reconstruction willvary from case to case. Reconstruction partner-ships need to maintain a balance of the necessarydisciplines for each case.

• An important issue for the international system ishow it can move from the “lowest commondenominator” of coordination to the ‘highestcommon factor.’ There is clearly a need for anintegrated framework, within which the recon-struction agencies can apply their comparativeadvantages. Such a framework would have tocorrespond to the realist interests of the interna-tional system.

Panel 2. Links between Relief and DevelopmentThe second panel focused on how the stages of relief,reconstruction, and sustainable development inter-relateand affect one another; and how effective partnershipscan facilitate the transition between stages. Discussioncentered on the nature of post-conflict reconstruction,and its practical relationship with emergency or reliefactivities. Major points include:

• There is confusion over terminology, but thisreflects some real conceptual and operationalissues, often reinforced through separation ofbudget lines.

• The term “post-conflict” is somewhat ambiguous,and post-conflict reconstruction involves boththe dynamics of relief and the substance of

development.• The outstanding issue is how to reach a frame-

work where all the tools in the toolbox can beused in appropriate combinations.

Panel 3. Rebuilding the EconomyThis session presented lessons from the OED study onthe Bank’s contribution to rebuilding post-conflicteconomies, an area regarded as its traditional strength.The main conclusions are as follows:

• The International Financial Institutions (IFIs)should have a seat at the peace negotiations tableto advise on the economic consequences of spe-cific provisions of peace accords.

• In restoring or creating sound macroeconomicframeworks, the post-conflict period may presentuseful opportunities for reform. However, there


ANNEX 6. PARTNERSHIP IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION WORKSHOP/ DUBROVNIK, CROATIA, JUNE 23–24, 1998

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may be a folly in automatically applying conven-tional wisdoms; the value of each measure shouldbe careful considered in each individual case.

• Likewise, in restoring or building economic sec-tors, the Bank (or any reconstruction agency)should think through the implications of ortho-dox interventions. These may risk producing out-comes that are as inequitable as the situation theywere trying to remedy.

• The IFIs should be prepared to negotiate hardwith governments, who are not the only stake-holders in countries emerging from conflict.

• There is some evidence that microcredit schemesare productive and can be administered effectivelyin post-conflict societies. They are good at stimu-lating small-scale enterprises, and in particular,can assist women who tend to suffer dispropor-tionately in conflicts.

Panel 4. Rebuilding Human and Social CapitalThe loss of human and social capital, although oftenunmeasured, is at the core of destruction wrought bycivil conflict, and its restoration is critical to the overallrecovery. The main discussion points for this session areas follows:

• The philosophies and methods of restoringhuman and social capital are various, still beingtested, and coincide with mainstream debatesabout the nature and efficacy of developmentassistance.

• There are some useful indications of progressthrough social funds, particularly in addressinggender issues, although they may have limitationsin scope (numbers reached) and timing (speed ofimplementation).

• It was felt that the Bank should make social sec-tor support a priority of post-conflict activity,notwithstanding its uneven performance evi-denced in the case studies of the OED report.

• A major issue for post-conflict operations iswhere to prioritize scarce resources in social sec-tor initiatives where existing service provision isweak and sustainability of services questionable.

Panel 5. Post-Conflict Indicators and EvaluationPanelists presented examples of meta-evaluation and thebenefits of evaluating the entire international response(as opposed to individual project or agency responses) topost-conflict programs. The need for different indicatorsto normal development operations was also discussed.Indicators of return to normalcy might include invest-ment and trade growth, school attendance, IDP numbersand returns, the functioning of judiciaries and a numberof other proxy measures. Main conclusions of the ses-sion include:

• Where resources are tight, a premium should beplaced on joint or inter-agency evaluations.

• Considerable work was required on factoring inbeneficiary assessment of post-conflict programs.

• A post-conflict situation presents an opportunityto redirect development strategy so as to moreeffectively address the root causes of conflict,such as poverty and inequitable access to oppor-tunities and resources.

Panel 6. Building PartnershipsThere was a consensus that building partnerships withinthe international and national response is critical toachieving policy coherence and program complementar-ity. The Bank’s new Post-Conflict Unit was presented asone locus of forging partnerships, with specific opportu-nities through a post-conflict fund, and working groupson training, tools for assessment, best practice studies andimproved information systems. The UN system is alsoworking on improved partnerships, with UNOPS beingone clear example. NGOs, international and national,present a major source of partnerships, particularly forimplementation of projects, although the large numbersand cultural variety of organizations at times pose a chal-lenge. The main conclusions of this session are:

• Building partnerships is an essential, yet time-consuming and painstaking process.

• Future operations will have to seek the optimumpermutations of partners, mindful that post-conflict governments may have weak capacity to carry out a coordination function.

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Directory of Participants

Howard AdelmanProfessorYork University64 Welles Hill Ave.Toronto, Ontario M5R 3A8 CanadaTel.: 416-533-5012Fax: 416-533-3144E-mail: <[email protected]>

Howard Adelman has been a Professor of Philosophy atYork University in Toronto since 1966. He was thefounder and Director of the Centre for Refugee Studiesand editor of Canada’s periodical on refugees, Refugeuntil 1993. He has served in many university positions,including Acting Dean of Atkinson College and twoterms as Director of the graduate program in philosophyat York University. In 1996–97, he headed the researchunit on Prevention/Early Warning at York University.Currently, he hosts a new TV show, Israel Today, editsthe new electronic journal, Contemporary InternationalIssues and directs a research team on the study of thehumanitarian intervention in Zaire in 1996. He has beenthe recipient of numerous awards and grants and hasauthored and edited 18 monographs, edited books andspecial editions of journals, as well as 31 chapters inedited books and 45 articles in refereed journals. He haswritten extensively on the Middle East, humanitarianintervention, membership rights, ethics, refugee policyand early warning. His two most recent co-edited vol-umes were: (1) Immigration and Refugee Policy: Aus-tralia and Canada Compared, University of MelbournePress and University of Toronto Press, (2) AfricanRefugees, Westview Press. In 1996, his study, co-authored with Astri Suhrke, Early Warning and ConflictManagement: the Genocide in Rwanda, DANIDA,Copenhagen, was published. His co-edited book withAstri Suhrke, The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Cri-sis from Uganda to Zaire is due for publication in thefall by Transaction Books.

Margaret ArnoldWorld Bank1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-473-1378Fax: 202-522-3123E-mail: <[email protected]>

Ms. Arnold has been working since November 1996 inthe World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department as aresearch analyst and writer on the OED assessment ofThe World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Recon-struction. Before joining OED, she worked in the UrbanDevelopment Division as Coordinator of the Bank’s par-ticipation in the Second UN Conference on Human Set-tlements (Habitat II) and Program Officer for the jointWorld Bank/UNDP Urban Management Programme.Prior to joining the World Bank, she worked in the non-profit sector on health and education issues. She has aMasters degree in International Communication from theAmerican University’s School of International Service.

Christopher BennettDirectorInternational Crisis GroupSarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaTel.: +387 71-200-447Fax: +387 71-200-448E-mail: <[email protected]>

Christopher Bennett directs the expanded Balkans Pro-ject for the International Crisis Group (ICG). ICG is amultinational, non-governmental organization chairedby Senator George Mitchell. It was founded in 1995 toreinforce the capacity and resolve of the internationalcommunity to head-off crises before they develop intofull-blown disasters and has operations in Europe,Africa and Asia. Mr. Bennett was a journalist in the for-mer Yugoslavia before the outbreak of war in June 1991and remained in the Balkans covering the conflict for thefirst 14 months of fighting. He has taught Yugoslav his-tory at London University and is also author of the bookYugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse.


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John BortonHumanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development InstitutePortland HouseStag PlaceLondon SW1E 5DP UKTel: +44 (0)171 393 1614Fax: +44 (0)171 393 1699E-mail: <[email protected]>Website: http://www.oneworld.org/odi

John Borton trained in Geography and Agricultural Eco-nomics and then worked as a Planning Officer in theMinistry of Local Government and Lands in Botswanafrom 1980–83. In 1982, with the start of a prolongeddrought in Botswana he became the Planning Officer forthe National Drought Relief Programme based in theFood Resources Department. After a short period asassistant to the Chief Agricultural Economist in the UKOverseas Development Administration, he joined theLondon-based International Disaster Institute in 1985which subsequently joined with the Oversea Develop-ment Institute where John became a Research Fellow.Since 1985 he has worked continuously on research,evaluation and policy studies of disasters and humani-tarian programmes. In 1993 he founded the Relief andRehabilitation Network (RRN). During 1995 and early1996 he was Team Leader of Study 3 ‘Humanitarian Aidand Effects’ of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assis-tance to Rwanda. In 1997 he established the ActiveLearning Network on Accountability and Performancein Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP) and currentlyheads the ALNAP Secretariat. He is a Council memberand Trustee of Oxfam GB, a Council member of the UKDisasters Emergency Committee and a member of theInternational Advisory Panel of the British Red Cross.

J. Christophe BouvierChief, Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability Unit(RESS)United Nations Office for Project Services11-13, chemin des Anémones1219 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel.: +41 22-979-9384Fax: +41 22-979-9062E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Bouvier has a degree in rural economy/sociologyfrom the Institut National Agronomique of Paris. He

worked for two years (1978–1980) in Brazil with theFrench bilateral cooperation. From 1980 to 1989 heworked with the FAO, first in Brazil (1980–1983), thenin China (1983–1985), and finally in Mexico,Guatemala, and Belize from 1985–1989. From1989–1995 he managed the UNDP/OPS Central Amer-ica refugee and reintegration program in New York.Since 1996, he has been the Chief of the Rehabilitationand Social Sustainability Unit in Geneva. He has carriedout missions to Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, sixCentral American countries, Haiti, Mozambique, Soma-lia, Ukraine (Crimea), and Sudan.

James BoyceProfessor, Department of EconomicsUniversity of MassachusettsAmherst, MA 01003USA Tel.: 413-545-3815Fax: 413-545-2921E-mail: <[email protected]>

James K. Boyce is professor of economics at the Univer-sity of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the editor of Eco-nomic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Sal-vador (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), an outcome ofthe Adjustment Toward Peace project which he coordi-nated on behalf of the United Nations Development Pro-gramme. He is the author of The Philippines: The Polit-ical Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in theMarcos Era (London: Macmillan, 1993), AgrarianImpasse in Bengal (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1987), and co-author of A Quiet Violence: View from aBangladesh Village (London: Zed, 1983). He is cur-rently studying the role of international financial institu-tions in post-conflict transitions, funded by the Peaceand International Cooperation Programme of the JohnD. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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Louisa ChanWorld Health OrganizationCH-1211 Geneva 27 SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (22) 791-2111Fax: +41 (22) 791-4844E-mail: <[email protected]>

Dr. Chan is a graduate of the University of California Fac-ulty of Medicine, and the London School of Hygiene andTropical Medicine. From 1987, she undertook severalfield health missions in war-affected countries as clinician,project manager and health coordinator on behalf of theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, and the WorldHealth Organization in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herze-govina, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Haiti. Since 1994, shehas worked in the WHO Emergency and HumanitarianAction Division. She has designed and managed emer-gency and post-emergency programs in Africa (Angola,Great Lakes, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone) andEurope (Albania, Caucasus, CIS/NIS, former Yugoslavia).She currently represents the organization in humanitarianforums and policy debates. Dr. Chan is particularly inter-ested in the linkages between relief and development, andthe challenges of institutional change.

Nat CollettaManager, Post-Conflict UnitThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-458-8435Fax: 202-522-3123E-mail: <[email protected]>

Jeff CrispSenior Policy Research OfficerUNHCRGeneva, SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (22) 739-8810Fax: +41 (22) 739-7367E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Crisp gained a PhD in Political Science and AfricanStudies at the University of Birmingham in the UK. Afterworking with the British Refugee Council and the Inde-pendent Commission on International HumanitarianIssues, he joined UNHCR, where he has held positions inthe Public Information Section, Central Evaluation Sec-tion and Centre for Documentation and Research, where

he is currently Senior Policy Research Officer. His publi-cations include Refugees: The Dynamics of Displacement(Zed Books, 1986), The State of the World’s Refugees: InSearch of Solutions (OUP, 1995) and The State of theWorld’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (OUP, 1997).One of his primary interests is the return and reintegra-tion of displaced populations, and in this context he hascompleted studies of UNHCR operations in Cambodia,Iraq, Mozambique, Nicaragua and other countries.

Niels DabelsteinHead, Evaluation UnitDANIDA2 Asiatisk PladsDK-1448 Copenhagen K, DenmarkTel.: +45 33-92-00-39Fax: +45 33-92-04-93E-mail: <[email protected]>

Niels Dabelstein holds a masters degree in developmenteconomics from the Copenhagen School of Economicsand Business Administration. Since 1988 he has headedDanida’s Evaluation Secretariat. During 1994–1996 heled the international Joint Evaluation of Emergency assis-tance to Rwanda and has since been active in national andinternational humanitarian forums promoting improvedstandards and accountability in humanitarian assistance.In December 1996 he chaired the VOICE/ECHO Forumon Ethics in Humanitarian Aid. He has worked forUNIDO in Indonesia, DANIDA in India and at the WorldBank in Washington. He is currently chairman ofOECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation.

Sean DeelyInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties (IFRC)17, chemin des CrêtsPetit Saconnex - GenevaTel.: +41 (22) 730-4222Fax: +41 (22) 733-0395

Sean Deely is a Masters student at the Post-war Recov-ery and Development Unit (PRDU) at York University.During the past five years he has worked in the field forthe International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cres-cent Societies in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, andTanzania. He is currently conducting research on Inter-national Federation operations in post-conflict situa-tions for his Masters dissertation.


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Patrice DufourSenior External Affairs CounsellorThe World BankH. Kresevljakovica 1971000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaTel.: +387 (71) 440-293Fax: +387 (71) 440-108E-mail: <[email protected]>

John ErikssonThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-458-8435Fax: 202-522-3123E-mail: <[email protected]>

John Eriksson was Director of the USAID Center forDevelopment Information and Evaluation in Washing-ton as well as Director of the USAID Field Mission inThailand. After his retirement from USAID in 1995, hehas consulted for the Operations Evaluation Depart-ments of the African Development Bank and the WorldBank. In the latter capacity he participated in the OEDassessment of The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction and prepared the case studieson El Salvador, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. He was the pri-mary author of the “Synthesis Report” for the JointEvaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

Alcira KreimerThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-473-3205Fax: 202-522-3123E-mail: <[email protected]>

Alcira Kreimer is a Principal Evaluation Officer with theOperations Evaluation Department of the World Bank.She has been with the World Bank since 1983, where,she has worked on project evaluation, policy develop-ment and operations. She is the author of several Bankreports and evaluations on post-conflict reconstruction,the environment, urban development, and reconstruc-tion after natural disasters. Before joining the Bank shewas a staff officer at the National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences, and was a faculty mem-ber at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

She holds a Ph.D from the University of California atBerkeley and graduate degrees from the Centre forUrban Research in Paris and the University of BuenosAires.

Krishna KumarPPC/CDIE/POAUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC 20523-1802Tel.: 202-712-5072Fax: 202-216-3124E-mail: <[email protected]>

Dr. Kumar is a senior social scientist and the team leaderfor the democracy and humanitarian assistance sectorsat the Center for Development Information and Evalua-tion in the US Agency for International Development.He is currently directing a series of cross-national evalu-ation studies on the political rehabilitation of war-tornsocieties. Before joining USAID in 1985, Dr. Kumardirected a program of studies and research on transna-tional economic cooperation at the East West Center inHawaii. Earlier he taught at Michigan State University.He has extensively consulted with international organi-zations such as the World Bank, the International Fundfor International Development, the UN Center onTransnational Corporations and the World Food Pro-gram. Dr. Kumar has written or edited ten books onevaluation research, economic development and thepolitical rehabilitation of war-torn societies. His latestbook (ed.) “Post-Conflict Elections, Democratizationand International Assistance” (Lynne Reinner Publica-tions) will be out in June 1998. He has extensively pub-lished in a wide range of professional journals and writ-ten numerous monographs and reports.

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Helena LaaksoEvaluatorEvaluation UnitDG VIIIEuropean CommissionRue de la Lai 2001049 Brussels, BelgiumTel.: +32 (2) 299-2497Fax: +32 (2) 299-2912E-mail: <[email protected]>

Ms. Laakso received her Masters degree in Political Sci-ence from the University of Vaasa, Finland in 1988.From 1990–1994 she was program officer for UNFPA inNew York and then Niamey, Niger. From 1994–1996she was assistant to the UNDP Resident Representativein Moroni, the Comoros. She is currently an evaluationofficer in the Evaluation Unit of DG VIII Development,European Commission, where she is responsible forevaluation of rehabilitation and post-conflict actions inAfrican, Caribbean and the Pacific states.

Vincent Lacour73 rue Alexandre Nereau91120 Palaiseau, FranceTel.: +33 (1) 4322-3800Fax: +33 (1) 4322-4800E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Lacour has 25 years of development experience inthe infrastructure and housing sectors of which sevenyears were with the World Bank. In 1996 and 1997 hewas Deputy General Manager of IMG in Bosnia andHerzegovina. An inter-governmental organization, IMGwas instrumental in putting together the $5 billionreconstruction program for which it now assumes fieldcoordination. Mr. Lacour devised the methodologiesand set up the field coordination mechanisms in closepartnership with UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOsand the Bosnian government. His other post-conflictreconstruction experience includes the joint Israeli-Jor-danian infrastructure rehabilitation program. In January1998, he was asked with his partner Jacques Vaysse toreview the institutional framework and to set up theplanning methods for the reconstruction program inAzerbaijan. Mr. Lacour is a civil engineer and an urbanplanner by training.

Robert Muscat2357 S. Queen StreetArlington, VA 22202Tel.: 703-685-8669Fax: 703-685-0663E-mail: <[email protected]>

Robert J. Muscat is an economist and Executive Direc-tor of the Institute for Policy Reform in Washington,DC. He has been a visiting scholar at the East AsianInstitute of Columbia University, Economic Advisor tothe Thai Government’s development planning agency,Undersecretary for Economics in the Malaysian Trea-sury, and Program Policy Director in UNDP. In USAIDhe has held positions in missions in Brazil, Kenya, andThailand. He served as the India desk officer inUSAID/Washington, and was the agency’s Chief Econo-mist from 1972 to 1975. He has written and consultedfor the World Bank, various UN agencies, the HarvardProgram on Refugee Trauma, and other organizations.He has authored books and articles on Cambodia, Thai-land, technical assistance, nutrition, and other subjects.In recent years his work has focused on problems ofpost-conflict reconstruction.

Stephan NellenMinister, Deputy Assistant Director General SDCCooperation with Eastern Europe and the CISSwiss Agency for Development and CooperationEffingerstrasse 77CH-3003 Berne SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (31) 322-4403Fax +41 (31) 324-1696E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Nellen has a degree in economics and businessadministration from the University of Berne/Switzer-land. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1976as a diplomatic training officer and spent his trainingyears in Berne, Geneva and Rome. In 1978 he becameDeputy Chief of Mission at the Swiss Embassy inLagos/Nigeria. In 1981 he was transferred to NewDelhi/India as the head of the economic and commercialdepartment at the Swiss Embassy. From 1984 to 1986 hewas the deputy spokesman of the Swiss Ministry of For-eign Affairs. In 1986 he was seconded to the SwissAgency for Development and Cooperation as diplomaticadvisor to the Division for Development Policy, Plan-ning and Multilateral Cooperation. In 1989 he joined


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the Swiss Embassy in Washington as Financial Coun-selor and Deputy Head of the Economic and FinancialDepartment, in charge of, among other, entities, theBretton Woods Institutions. From 1989 to 1991 he was,in addition to his main task, Alternate Director forCyprus, the Netherlands and Switzerland in MIGA. In1993 he was transferred to Lisbon/Portugal as DeputyChief of Mission at the Swiss Embassy. In 1995 he wasseconded again to the Swiss Agency for Developmentand Cooperation as Deputy Assistant Director Generaland Deputy Head of the Division for Cooperation withEastern Europe and the CIS.

Zerubabel Ogom OjooDirectorManagement Systems and Economic ConsultantsP.O. Box 8424Kampala, UgandaTel.: +256-41-236682Fax: +256-41-530721E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Ojoo is an economist. He is currently Director ofManagement Systems and Economic Consultants, a con-sulting firm specializing in development and management.

Rory O’SullivanResident RepresentativeThe World BankH. Kresevljakovica 1971000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaTel.: +387 (71) 440-293Fax: +387 (71) 440-108E-mail: <[email protected]>

Margherita PaoliniHead of Italian Government Cooperation in Bosnia andHerzegovinaItalian Ministry of Foreign AffairsItalian Embassy SarajevoCekalusa 39Sarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaTel.: +387 (71) 208-414Fax: +387 (71) 667-227E-mail: <[email protected]>

Margherita Paolini has worked with the Italian NationalOil Company in Africa and the Middle East. She has 15

years of experience in emergency and development activ-ities with the Italian government cooperation. As anofficial in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she held sev-eral positions in African and Balkan countries. From1992 to 1996 she was in charge of emergency and reha-bilitation activities in the former Yugoslavia. Since 1996she has been the head of government cooperation inBiH, based in the Italian Embassy in Sarajevo. Ms.Paolini is a civil engineer, an architect and a journalist.

Paul PeterDivision Chief, South-East EuropeSwiss Agency for Development and CooperationEffingerstrasse 77CH-3003 Berne SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (31) 322-4416Fax: +41 (31) 324-1696E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Peter has a Masters degree in Rural Engineeringfrom the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology inZurich. From 1974 to 1977 he was an Assistant Lec-turer at the Department of Civil Engineering of the Uni-versity of Dar es Salaam. From 1998 to 1986 he headeda unit of specialists in rural development in a consultantfirm in Basle, conducting missions to Africa and Asiawith emphasis on rural infrastructure. He joined theSwiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)in 1987 as senior program officer for infrastructure pro-jects in Africa. In 1990 he became Head of the Waterand Infrastructure Service of SDC where he was incharge of the Swiss contributions to the UNDP/WorldBank Water and Sanitation Programs, the Sub-SaharanAfrica Transport Program, the Water and SanitationCollaborative Council and the International Forum forRural Transport and Development. He held advisorypositions in the governing bodies of these programs andparticipated in a number of mid-term reviews andappraisal missions of projects co-financed with theWorld Bank and IDA. Since the end of 1995 he has beenDivision Chief for South Eastern Europe responsible fortechnical cooperation of SDC. He is a member of thesteering board of the Swiss special program for the assis-tance to the voluntary return of refugees to Bosnia andHerzegovina and is currently preparing possible Swisscontributions to support return in Croatia.

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Christiaan PoortmanCountry Director, Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-473-3011E-mail: <[email protected]>

Alessandro RubinoPM-Partnership and Emergency Assistance UnitWorld Health OrganizationVia F. Crispi, No 10Rome, ItalyTel.: +39 (06) 487-7538 or 487-7550Fax: +39 (06) 487-7599E-mail: <[email protected]>

Dr. Rubino received his degree in medicine and surgeryfrom the University of Napoli, and a specialization ingeneral surgery from the University of Bologna. From1981–1985, he served as Government Medical Officerin Zimbabwe. In 1986 and 1987, he was Coordinatorfor the Italian Medical Team in Makalle, Ethiopia forthe Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Technical Coop-eration Department. From 1987–1991, he was MedicalOfficer responsible for the countries in the AfricanRegion and part of the Asian Region with WHO. In1991, he coordinated the Italian Medical Health Coop-eration Programme in Jamaica. From 1992–1996 heserved as Coordinator for the Technical Unit of the Ital-ian Cooperation attached to the Embassy of Italy inHarare. Since 1996 he has been Program Manager ofItalian-funded projects, Partnerships in Health andEmergency Assistance at WHO. He is a member of theItalian Society for Tropical Medicine, the Italian Med-ical Council, the Zimbabwean Medical Council and theEthiopian Medical Council.

Robert ScharfTask Force CoordinatorOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development2, rue André-Pascal75016 Paris Cedex 16, FranceTel.: +33 (1) 45 24 90 27Fax: +33 (1) 45 24 19 96E-mail: <[email protected]>

Robert Scharf is responsible for security and develop-ment issues in the Development Co-operation Direc-torate of the OECD. In this capacity, he coordinates thework of a special OECD/DAC Task Force, charged withformulating recommendations for improving policies inconflict prevention and peacebuilding. Mr. Scharf servedas one of the editors, and principal contributors to theDAC Policy Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Develop-ment Co-operation (OECD 1998), and was responsiblefor the OECD response to the Multi-Donor Evaluationof Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Before this, heworked on aid issues in the OECD Centre for the Co-operation with the Economies in Transition, and ontrade interests in the US Department of Commerce. Hereceived an MA in Conflict Analysis from the Universityof Kent at Canterbury (UK) in 1994.

Colin ScottThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-473-6884E-mail: <[email protected]>

Colin Scott has been working over the last two years inthe World Bank on post-conflict issues and operations,and is currently located in the Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit.Previously, he was an independent consultant in develop-ment policy and communications, having spent a numberof years working in NGOs and local government.


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Gabriel Siri5518 Westbard AvenueBethesda, MD 20816Tel.: 301-215-7886E-mail: <[email protected]

Mr. Siri has a Masters degree in economics from Yale Uni-versity and did his Ph.D. studies at the University of Penn-sylvania. His work experience includes a number ofassignments related to post-conflict situations. In 1980,he led a World Bank mission to Nicaragua following theoverthrow of the Somoza regime. As head of the Sub-headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean in Mexico City, he superviseda number of studies and maintained a close dialogue withhigh level authorities in countries in natural disaster andpost-conflict situations (Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua,and Guatemala). As a consultant for the World Bank, hehas assisted in the design and appraisal of a social invest-ment fund in Angola. In 1997, he prepared a study forthe IDB on a strategy for reducing poverty in four CentralAmerican countries, three of them in post-conflict situa-tions. In March 1988 (with USAID) he advised the gov-ernment of Indonesia on the rationality of establishing asocial investment fund in that country.

Roger SladeManager, Sector and Thematic EvaluationOperations Evaluation DepartmentThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433Tel.: 202-458-1293Fax: 202-522-3123E-mail: <[email protected]>

Bill WarnockCountry DirectorWorld Vision/Bosnia and HerzegovinaMuvekita 2/III71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and HerzegovinaTel.: +387 (71) 204 415 or 90-136204 (mobile phone)Fax: +387 (71) 204 418E-mail: <[email protected]>

Mr. Warnock has a BA in European Studies from the Uni-versity of Colorado/Boulder-East, a Masters in Interna-tional Affairs from Columbia University, and a Dip.S.M.from Trinity College, Bristol. From 1966 to 1978 heworked with the Institute of International Education inNew York. Since 1980, he has served World Vision in var-ious posts: from 1980–1986 he was the Director of Evalu-ation for World Vision International; from 1987–1996 hewas the Country Representative for WorldVision/Jerusalem; and since 1997 he has been the CountryDirector of World Vision/Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr.Warnock is also currently the Chair of the Liaison Com-mittee of the NGO Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Takako YasukawaTechnical OfficerWorld Health OrganizationEHA/WHOCH-1211 Geneva 27 SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (22) 791-2903Fax: +41 (22) 791-4844E-mail: <[email protected]>

Dr. Yasukawa has been working for eight years with theWorld Health Organization (WHO), at headquarters andin the field, in the emergency program (Emergency Pre-paredness and Response, Rehabilitation and Reconstruc-tion of the Post-war Countries) which has involved plan-ning, managing, monitoring and evaluating of theemergency programs as well as policy setting. JoiningWHO, Dr. Yasukawa worked as a pediatrician and apublic health officer for seven years in Japan. Dr.Yasukawa is currently responsible for interagency coop-eration and a project on the post-conflict health inter-ventions at WHO, developing policies and strategies forpost-conflict health interventions, and working on thedesign and monitoring of case studies of countries inpost-conflict transition.

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ANNEX 7. THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION/MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Management Response

The paper prepared by staff entitled, “A Frame-work for World Bank involvement in Post-ConflictReconstruction” was endorsed by the ExecutiveDirectors in May 1997 and represents the Bank’spolicy on post-conflict reconstruction. We agreethat a new OP/BP/GP should be initiated whichtransforms this policy document into a more con-cise set of guidelines. The purpose of a newOP/BP/GP will be to articulate this policy within theexisting Operational Handbook in a form whichprovides detailed guidance for operations and clearinstructions to staff working in post-conflict situa-tions. Decisions regarding how best to amend OP8.50 to take account of post-conflict emergency pro-cedures will take place within the process of draftingthe new OP on post-conflict work.

We agree with the issues to be covered which, again,would be distilled from the existing frameworkpaper. In addition, we would add the followingissues which are detailed in the framework: integrat-ing displaced persons (as well as demobilized ex-combatants) into society; and methodologies for inte-grating conflict analysis into development activities.

We endorse OED’s recommendations regarding theadjustments to procurement, disbursement, and audit-ing procedures to permit a rapid, flexible, and effec-tive response in countries emerging from conflict. Theframework paper already notes that new guidelinescould include “streamlined procedures for procure-ment, audit, disbursement and other matters.”

We also endorse the role and function of the Bankin providing technical advice to peace negotiationsin areas related to development within the contextalready set out in the framework paper which notes:

Recommendations

1. Based on its accumulated experience and Boarddeliberations, the Bank should transform its currentpolicy guidance, A Framework for World BankInvolvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction intoan Operational Policy (OP) statement. It shoulddevelop a stand alone BP setting out Bank proce-dures applicable to the internal processing of post-conflict assistance. The provision of post-conflictassistance should not be handled under OP 8.50which should be recast to apply only to natural dis-asters (as well as man-made disasters of an unex-pected and limited duration, such as large scaleindustrial accidents). The revised BP/GP shouldhighlight the priority of human and social capitalrestoration; the complexities related to reintegratingex-combatants into society; the risk of misguidedapplication of operational policies designed for con-ditions of normalcy; the need to restrict Bank lend-ing to areas where it has a comparative advantage(e.g., with respect to demining); and the advantagesof a flexible set of lending instruments and partner-ships to meet diverse situations.

2. While a case-by-case approach will continue todominate Bank post-conflict work, the new policyshould address the following issues:

(a) Readiness to provide economic policy adviceduring peace negotiations.

(b) Coordination of aid.

(c) Leadership on macroeconomic and external debtissues in collaboration with the IMF and keyexternal donors.

(d) Capacity to support and guide damage andneeds assessments covering physical and institu-tional needs and drawing on suitable expertise.

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“Peace treaties and their execution require coordi-nation with reconstruction and economic stabiliza-tion measures to underpin their objectives. TheBank’s expertise can be critical contributing a recon-struction and development perspective and provid-ing practical advice on immediate matters such asthe implications for economic governance, budgets,economic incentives, and so on of proposed govern-ment structures, taxation arrangements, and demili-tarization and demobilization arrangements.”

A critical area relates to the question of fundingpost-conflict reconstruction, both in terms ofresources for programs in the field and for Bankoverheads to adequately perform the various func-tions detailed in the OED evaluation. The newPost-Conflict Fund (PCF) procedures also needreview to make them more responsive to staff needs.

We concur with the greater use of preparation andpiloting funds, which is already occurring with threeearly LILs approved for community-based recon-struction in Rwanda, Angola, and Colombia. Mech-anisms for rapid and flexible procurement are alsobeing adapted from earlier social fund approaches,and lessons from Bank experience in Bosnia andGaza-West Bank should be further elaborated.

We support the emphasis on monitoring withshorter intervals for CPPR’s in post-conflict coun-tries. We also support a focus on the overall con-tribution of the portfolio to sustainable peace anddevelopment. We have models for this in Bosniaand Guatemala where the Bank provided advice tothe peace deliberations and our portfolio is closelylinked to the implementation of the peace accords.

We agree that the completion reports need to beprepared in a more timely fashion in post-conflictcountries and that the appropriate vehicle foraddressing this issue is the Bank-wide task forcecurrently reviewing the ICR process.

We would add to the above list, that there is a need

(e) Selectivity in macroeconomic and structural policy conditionality.

(f) Flexibility in programming, design, and imple-mentation.

(g) The division of labor between headquarters andfield staff.

(h) The importance of monitoring and evaluation.

3. Bank Procedures should emphasize the following:

(a) Country Departments facing post-conflict recon-struction should make greater use of preparationand piloting funds, mechanisms for rapid pro-curement and disbursements, and training in-country entities responsible for procurement.

(b) Country departments should allocate adequateresources for monitoring. While under normalcircumstances a Country Portfolio PerformanceReview is conducted every 12 to 18 months, inpost-conflict countries the overall portfolioshould be assessed at least every 12 months forits relevance, that is, its contribution to sustain-able peace and development.

(c) Country departments should make sure thatcompletion reports for post-conflict operationsare completed promptly. The standards for suchwork should be tackled by the Bank-wide taskforce that is currently reviewing the ICRprocess.

A n n e x e s

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for increased social and economic analysis within theCAS and ESW on the interaction between conflictand development, a point which is stressed in theframework paper. Here, work is required to identifykey indicators and measures of conflict, and methodsto assess the potential impact of country strategy andportfolio on peace and sustainable development.

In addition, the GP should provide more detailedguidance to staff on good practice in operationaliz-ing the stages of Bank involvement set out in theframework paper, e.g., watching briefs, transitionalsupport strategies and early pilot reconstruction, andexplore in more detail the types of activities and bestpractice in each of these stages. Particularly impor-tant is guidance for staff on strategies for design andimplementation of “watching briefs,” which repre-sent a relatively new area of Bank activity.

Treatment within the GP of the various innova-tive sources of quick financing for post-conflictwork would also be useful, with examples of theuse of IDF, PCF, INFODEV, ad hoc grants fromsurplus, and the potential role of adaptable lendinginstruments and LILs.

The Post-Conflict Unit has been involved in trainingin this area with LLC and EDI for the past year. EDIsponsored a multi-agency colloquium on reconstruc-tion in Washington in 1997, and several groupwaresessions and a technical consultation have beenundertaken to ascertain training needs of staff invarious sectors. A conference bringing together ahost of key international actors on post-conflictreconstruction was held in cooperation with theCarter Center last Fall. A major Bank-sponsoredEuropean meeting on post-conflict reconstruction isplanned for April 20-21 in Paris. The PCU in part-nership with the Africa region is planning work-shops in Southern-Central Africa in September 1998and West Africa later. There is also a plan todevelop training for officials of post-conflict govern-ments to enhance their ability to work with externalagencies, international NGOs, and civil society.

4. The Good Practice (GP) statement or handbookshould illustrate:

(a) high quality damage and needs assessments andtheir linkages to the definition of judiciousreconstruction strategies;

(b) examples of efficient and effective implementa-tion; and

(c) examples of timely and participatory implemen-tation completion reports.

5. The Post-Conflict Unit, in cooperation with theLLC and EDI should undertake training geared tostrengthening the Bank’s and partners’ capacity tolead damage and needs assessments and to definean efficient and equitable reconstruction strategy.


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The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict ReconstructionOn June 10, 1998, the Committee on DevelopmentEffectiveness (CODE) reviewed a report prepared bythe Operations Evaluation Department (OED) entitled,The World Bank’s Experience with Post-ConflictReconstruction (SecM98-395), and the draft Manage-ment Response. Members welcomed the reports andgenerally endorsed their findings and conclusions, whilenoting that the factual record in the case studies wasincomplete in some instances. The Committee alsonoted that virtually all the recommendations set out inthe OED report are already present in the Frameworkfor World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Recon-struction prepared by staff, and endorsed by the Boardover a year ago. Speakers stressed that the Bank neededto proceed sensitively and flexibly in post-conflict situ-ations with active involvement of the Board, especiallythe Executive Director concerned. They also empha-sized that it was time for the Bank to formulate an oper-ational policy that will guide staff in responding topost-conflict situations.

Highlighted below are some of the issues raised dur-ing the Committee’s meeting:

Priorities and Bank’s Comparative Advantage in Post-Conflict Situations:The OED report identified macroeconomic stabiliza-tion and aid coordination as the Bank’s comparativeadvantages. Speakers indicated that the Bank shouldgive more priority to issues of demobilization and theneed for quick action to rebuild social and human cap-ital, as well as infrastructure development over themore conventional aspects of structural reform in post-conflict countries.

DeminingThe Committee concurred with OED’s recommenda-tions which supports landmine clearance in the contextof a specific development activity, and is consistent withthe February 1997 Bank Operational Guidelines onDemining. Members also indicated their agreement withManagement’s recommendation that an evaluation bedone on demining in partnership with the UN and otheragencies. The Committee asked that OED study theissue further and apprise it of the findings.

Bank Involvement in Peace AccordsThe Committee noted the report’s recommendation andManagement’s support for the Bank’s involvement inpeace negotiations when invited by all parties to a con-flict. The Committee remained skeptical that the Bank,if involved, could refrain from getting involved in polit-ical issues. However, members agreed that the Bankcould play a useful role in coordinating aid. This, in fact,was an area where the Bank’s involvement has beenhighly valued by its partners.

Bank Involvement in Conflict PreventionThe Committee was generally supportive of Management’seffort in this area. It looks forward to the upcoming studyon pre-conflict to be done by OED. In this connection, theCommittee referred to a section in the OED report whichmentioned the Colombia CAS as an example where vio-lence reduction was included as a key development objec-tive. The Committee was interested to know how Manage-ment planned to achieve that objective in Colombia.

Flexibility, Field Presence, Monitoring and FundingThe Committee supported the report’s recommendationfor a strong field presence, flexibility and monitoring,given the often weak government capacity in post-con-flict countries. However, the Committee was cognizantof the cost related to this initiative. While the net incomedebate underscores the overall constraints on the Bank’sresources, members raised the issue of whether fundingfor Post-Conflict activities should be considered outsidethe ambit of the DGF, given sensitivities about the latterand questions about the relevance of its criteria.

Post-Conflict UnitThe Committee raised the appropriateness of includingthe newly established unit under the DGF umbrella as anissue for further discussion, perhaps in the context of thefirst annual review of the DGF.

Operational PolicyThe Committee welcomed Management’s proposal tore-evaluate the Bank’s policy instruments with regard topost-conflict situations, and develop a new OperationalPolicy which would provide detailed instructions andbest practice guidance to staff working in post-conflictcountries. Members felt it was timely for the Bank toundertake this given the difference between natural and

A n n e x e s

ANNEX 8. REPORT FROM CODE/ COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

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manmade disaster reconstruction. The Committeestressed that CODE and the Board should review thepolicy in draft.

Surendra SinghChairman, CODE


The Operations Evaluations Department (OED), anindependent evaluation unit reporting to the WorldBank’s executive directors, rates the development impactand performance of all the Bank’s completed lendingoperations. Results and recommendations are reportedto the executive directors and fed back into the designand implementation of new policies and projects. Inaddition to the individual operations and country assis-tance programs, OED evaluates the Bank’s policies andprocesses.

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OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS DEPARTMENT PUBLICATIONS

OED Study Series

Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension (1998)

1997 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (1998)

India: The Dairy Revolution (1998)

The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1998)

Financial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance (1998)

Rebuilding the Mozambique Economy: Assessment of a Development Partnership (1998)

Agricultural Extension and Research: Achievements and Problems in National Systems (1997)

Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending (1997)

Reforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to Market (1997)

Paddy Irrigation and Water Management in Southeast Asia (1997)

1995 Evaluation Results (1997)

Zambia Country Assistance Review: Turning an Economy Around (1997)

The Aga Khan Rural Support Program: A Third Evaluation (1996)

Lending for Electric Power in Sub-Saharan Africa (1996)

Industrial Restructuring: World Bank Experience, Future Challenges (1996)

Social Dimensions of Adjustment: World Bank Experience, 1980–93 (1996)


Ghana Country Assistance Review: A Study in Development Effectiveness (1995)

Evaluation and Development: Proceedings of the 1994 World Bank Conference (1995)

Developing Industrial Technology: Lessons for Policy and Practice (1995)

The World Bank and Irrigation (1995)


Structural and Sectoral Adjustment: World Bank Experience, 1980–92 (1995)

Gender Issues in World Bank Lending (1995)

The World Bank’s Role in Human Resource Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Education, Training, and Technical Assistance (1994)


New Lessons from Old Projects: The Workings of Rural Development in Northeast Brazil (1993; contains summaries in French, Portuguese and Spanish)

World Bank Approaches to the Environment in Brazil (1993; contains summaries in French, Portuguese, and Spanish)

Trade Policy Reforms under Adjustment Programs (1992)

World Bank Support for Industrialization in Korea, India, and Indonesia (1992)

Population and the World Bank: Implications from Eight Case Studies (1992)

The Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakistan: Second Interim Evaluation (1990)