The Welfare State of the Somali Nation - A Possible Solution to the Somali Dilemma

8/7/2019 The Welfare State of the Somali Nation - A Possible Solution to the Somali Dilemma

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PROPOSALTHE WELFARE STATE OF THE SOMALI NATION:

APOSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE SOMALI DILEMMA

Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe

This paper was presented at the Second Congres International Des Etudes Somaliennes

Pour Une Culture De La Paix En Somalie, 25-27 October 1995, Institut du Monde Arab,

Paris.

It was published in the book:Mohamed Mohamed-Abdi et Partice Bernard, (eds.)

in Pour Une Culture de la Paix en Somalie, (Paris, Association Europenne des Etudes

Somaliennes, 1997).


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CONTENTPages

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................1 THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS........................................................................................................................1

WERE THE SOMALIS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN

SOMALI STATE?............... ..................... ..................... .................... ..................... .................... ..................... 2TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE INSTITUTION OF THE SHIR (ASSEMBLY) ................ ......... 2WHAT SYSTEM IS SUITABLE FOR THE SOMALI SITUATION?..........................................................3

PROPOSAL: THE WELFARE STATE OF THE SOMALI NATION....... ..................... .................... ............ 3WHY A NO-PARTY SYSTEM?..................................................................................................................3AN ALTERNATIVE TO PARTIES.............................................................................................................4

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF A CANTON............................................................................................4COUNCILS AND ELECTIONS ......................................................................................................................5

VOTING AND ELECTION SYSTEMS.......................................................................................................5VOTING QUALIFICATION....................................................................................................................5HUMAN RIGHTS....................................................................................................................................5

CANTONAL LEVEL ................ ..................... ........................ .................... ..................... .................... ............ 6HOW THE CANTON COUNCILS ARE FORMED.....................................................................................6

ELIGIBILITY.................... ..................... .................... ........................ ..................... .................... ............ 7

HOW THE CANTONAL ASSEMBLY CAN BE ELECTED.......................................................................7THE CANTONAL ASSEMBLY..................................................................................................................7

THE CHAMBER OF COUNCILLORS..................... .................... ........................ ................. .................. 7THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES............................................................................................7THE POWER OF THE REPRESENTATIVES........... ........................ ..................... .................... ............ 8

THE CANTONAL COUNCIL................. ..................... .................... ........................ ................. .................. 8THE CANTONAL JUDICIARY COUNCIL ................. .................... ........................ ................. .................. 8

NATIONAL LEVEL .......................................................................................................................................9SEPARATION OF POWERS.......................................................................................................................9WHAT KIND OF LEGISLATURE?.................... .................... ..................... ..................... .................... ......9THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY........................ ................. ........................ ..................... .................... ....... 10

THE CHAMBER OF ELDERS..................... ................. ........................ ..................... .................... ....... 10THE CHAMBER OF CANTONAL COUNCIL........ ..................... ........................ ................. ................ 10

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ..................... ........................ .................... ..................... .................... .......... 10THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY COUNCIL .................. .................... ........................ ................. ................ 11

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM.................... .................... ..................... ....... 11ADVANTAGES.............................. ..................... .................... ..................... ..................... .................... .... 11DISADVANTAGE.............. ..................... ..................... .................... ........................ ................. ................ 12

Chart:

Administrative Chart ...................................................................................................................................5

Cantonal Chart.............................................................................................................................................6

National Chart .............................................................................................................................................9

Notes.................................. .................... ..................... .................... ..................... .................... ..................... . 13

References.............. .................... ..................... .................... ........................ ..................... .................... .......... 13


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1

INTRODUCTION

Like many African nations at the end of the eighties, Somalia faced economic, social and

political problems. Many of these countries are still struggling to survive through the upheaval, but

Somalia could not solve its problems as a healthy nation. Instead the problems which led to its

disintegration and dismemberment with a bloody civil war, have claimed more than three hundredthousand dead and wounded, with roughly four fifth of its population displaced. Nearly one fifth of the

population fled to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya as refugees, these displaced people have lost their past

and their future and that of their children. Subsequently, the country has been divided into fiefdoms

ruled by separate armed clans. Each clan group (or clan-family as is better known) are grouped in a

clan-security area. The international community as well as the Somalis are still pondering and

exhausting on how the Somali state will be revived. The memories of the dreadful fratricidal war still

linger in the minds of the Somalis thus creating major obstacles to peace. Any peace agreement, unless

it is seen in concomitance with the reality of today's Somalia and the background of the tragedy, cannot

be a sustainable one.

The preamble of the Constitution of the Somali Republic promulgated in June 1961 stressed

that Somalia be a unitary republic with a representative democratic form of government. The

legislature was unicameral and it was composed of deputies elected by universal direct and secretsuffrage for a term of five years and representing the whole people. Thought the system was based on

liberal democracy, it did not define well the separation of power (e.g. the system did not separate the

executive from the legislative). In fact soon the system degenerated to anarchy and paved the way for

the military take over which soon transformed the Somali state into a police state. 1

After over a century of colonial defamation of Somali culture followed by a decade of feeble

governing and two decades of repressive centralised state control involving the manipulation of clan

mentality, the exploitation of traditional rivalry and suppression and collective punishment of any form

of rebellion a destructive instinct was created in society against the fabric of the Somali nationhood.

Consequently, the outcome triggered an unprecedented turning point for the Somali state, that people

should return to their clan "areas". Given the weakening of the foundations of national unity, it was

inevitable that the relative strength of lineage and clan loyalties, and their institutions to become the

dominant social structure.

Not only has the Somali state failed to replace the clan with a feeling of security for the

individual Somali, but it has also become a threat to his being. It was a natural regression therefore for

the Somali to go to his/her roots, i.e. the clan, which was eroded by the tides of social change and

political exploitation. These phenomena created resentment amongst the Somalis which turned into an

instinct of destruction towards the state and its institutions. The destructiveness was assumed to be

derived from "the unbearable feeling of powerlessness, since it aims at the removal of all objects with

which the individual has to compare himself."2

Life has an inner dynamism of its own and if it is curbed

it decomposes and transforms into energies directed towards destructiveness.3

The systematic

repression of the last two decades by the dictatorial military regime has thereby accelerated the process

of destructiveness in Somali society. Destructive political culture has been introduced into the political

thinking of the Somalis, changing the positive cultural values of the nationhood.4

THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS

An alien system introduced by the colonialists to manipulate the traditional Somali institutions

to their advantage was the beginning of the erosion of these institutions and this culture which in turn

created the landscape for the emergence of the modern leadership in the 1960s. The worst affected was

the leadership, as this practice, also known as the Aqil (Akhil) system, initiated the challenge of

linkages for the office of clan-head. The holder of the office was given a salary and some concessions

by the colonial administrative authority. The system was intended to corrode the Somali institution of

the shir(assembly) and traditional leadership as it intended to weaken the integrity of the clan, and with


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it the office of the clan leaders.5 To do this, was to depreciate and undermine the "traditional source of

leadership"6

which was to cripple the future leadership of the modern Somali state and as a result pave

the way for the breakdown of the Somali state institutions at the end of the 1990s.

From this frightening prospect is there a way out? Can Somalis build a new hope from the

rubble of the collapsed unitary Somali state? Unless an alternative to this situation is found there is no

way out from the current plight. To answer these questions I have attempted to put forward an

alternative solution as a way out from this nightmare.

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For convenience I will give examples on how should be created the main political institutions.

WERE THE SOMALIS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO THE

FORMATION OF THE MODERN SOMALI STATE?

A government is, in simple terms, an orderly way of running a community's affairs. In this

context there is no doubt that the Somalis, prior to the colonialists and prior to the rise of the modern

Somali state, had a government which consisted of the elders of the lineages. The elders and clan

leaders were vested in the context of the clans, with the responsibility of running their respective

community's affairs.

The Somali people have a strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity. Before independence in

1960, the ecological and economic life compelled most Somalis to lead a pastoral life, therefore, theywere widely dispersed and lacked the necessary organisations to form a single political unit.

Prior the formation of the modern Somali state, as kinship in the psychological sense is the

feeling of closeness to certain people that results from being related to them,8

for the Somalis, the clan

is the most important political unit in the traditional system. It is traced through males to a common

male ancestor from whom they take their clan name. Political alliance is therefore determined by

agnatic descent and political segmentation agrees to differences in agnatic origin.9

Descent units are

united by a bond of corporate commitments, the major one of these being that loyalties are to be

offered, first and foremost, to ones group unit.10

The traditional political loyalties are reinforced by a political-legal contract (xeer), an informal

legal contract where Somali society settles its legal and political disputes. The xeeris also the principle

defining the extent of the political community.

However, as a way to sanction the defined xeer, some form of coercion is applied such ascompensatory payment for an offence (xaal).

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE INSTITUTION OF THESHIR (ASSEMBLY)

As in all kinship systems, the Somali political authority was spread through the community as

a whole. There was no centre for political control. This reflected the Somali's extreme independence

and individualism.

Clan leaders dealt with people politically on a face-to-face basis. This traditional authority

might have extended over people with whom they did not come into contact, but only if kinship

relationship existed between the leaders and the others. They were responsible for all affairs

concerning the clan and its relations with other clans. They claim no rights as rulers over their people.

They presided, not ruled over people to whom they were related. I M Lewis reiterates this matter in APastoral Democracy, "... even the office of clan-head is generally little more than a nominal title

corresponding to the degree of social and territorial exclusiveness which the clan more than other orders

of grouping possess".11

Although, the clan-leaders (Suldaan, Garaad, Ugaas, Malaaq, Iimaam, Islaan, Beeldaaje,

etc.) preside over the assembly of elders (shir), they have little executive power and do not make deci-

sions (Ugaaska wuu guddoonshaaye, ma gooyo).12

The Somali pastoral-nomads have no hierarchical system like their brothers, the agro-nomads.

When the clan-head dies an assembly (shir) is held to elect another leader.


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Somali egalitarianism is a fundamental social concept in which every man has the right to a say

in communal matters. The issue is discussed in the institutionalised shir (assembly) which Lewis

defines as, "The fundamentals of government, which has no formal constitution, except that

membership of the lineage concerned, no regular place or time of meeting, and there are no official

positions on it."13

After lengthy discussion and analysis of the matter concerned, a decision in the shiris decided

by consensus. This is what is known as pastoral democracy,

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a democracy where everybody has theright to take part. All adult males are elders and they are empowered by contractual treaty to direct the

policies of the lineage.

The narrow colonial concept of democracy was incapable of understanding the centuries old

democratic concepts and institutions evolved by indigenous people such as the pastoral Somalis.

To ease the running of their administration in the territories, both British and Italian colonial

authorities appointed a chief for each clan. For example, the introduction by the British Administration

of the "Local Authorities Ordinance" in the British Somaliland in 1950, was opposed by clan leaders as

the system challenged their authority. This practice, also known as the Aqil (or Akhil) system, caused

lineages to contest the office of clan-head. The Aqil (holder of the office) was given a salary and some

concession by the administrative authority.15

They helped the District Commissioners in running the

territory. The system was intended to create competition among the lineages and weaken the integrity

of the clan and, with it, the office of the clan leaders. This undermining of the "traditional source of

leadership"16 was to cripple the future leadership of the modern Somali state and paved the way for the

breakdown of state institutions in the early 1990s.

WHAT SYSTEM IS SUITABLE FOR THE SOMALI SITUATION?

The alternative to a unitary system is a semi-federal system. The country is currently divided

into 4 or 5 parts or, in other words, into cantons (or states). It is unrealistic to reconstruct a new

Somali state (or the Second Republic) from the old system whose legacy created the current crisis.

However, from the current reality it is possible to create a semi-federal state system which could also

be a possible solution to the Somali plight.

PROPOSAL: THE WELFARE STATE OF THE SOMALI NATION

This system, which I called the Welfare State of the Somali Nation (WSSN),17

is based on a

no-party system of government. In other words, it is a modernised version of the centuries old

democratic practices of the Somalis social institutions. It is based on Somali traditional democratic

values where the issues which concern the society are discussed in the institutionalised shir(assembly),

and after deep discussion and analysis of the matter concerned, a decision is reached by consensus.

This is what is known as pastoral democracy, a democracy which everybody has the right to take part.

The stimulation of political attitudes as a basis for political participation is of special importance in a

society whose governmental system depends on popular participation. Political socialisation is a

continuous and cumulative process of learning. Voting behaviour and political attitudes are the product

of a wide variety of influences, some of them in existence before an individual is born, and which are

transmitted to their children.

WHY A NO-PARTY SYSTEM?

The political party is the ultimate source of power and permeates all aspects of the political

system and the state institutions.18

The majority of one-party states have the party's monopoly

enshrined within the constitutions. Similarly, in ostensibly multiparty states, legal control will

sometimes favour the dominant government party, making life for opposition groups difficult which can

lead to other social tension. In the Somali context, politics is sometimes personalised and the dominant

party may be interpreted as a dominant clan or lineage over the other. Opposition means a group (or


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clan) who are outside the government and in effect, this can create a negative impression at this crucial

time in Somali history.

In a stabilised political democracy, it can be taken for granted that social and economic politics

will work out by and through parties, even when "one party replaces another after an election it would

overturn everything that its predecessor has done"19

as this relies on a broad consensus between the

parties about the nature of the economic and social system.20

However, in this critical time, the still

born political democracy of Somalia cannot be trusted on parties.For two depressing decades Somali society did not experience any form of democratic exercise.

Worst, the new generation had never had any chance at all to do so. The party polity of the first decade

of independence (1960s) fell short of what the Somali people expected to get from the democracy

exercise. Instead the circumstances generated tense hostility among clans and lineages in the whole

country. The unity which the country needed most was going to erode.

Both elections which were held in the civilian governments, March 1963 and in March 1969

respectively, were marred by violence. In the social context the elections opened old wounds among

lineages and sub-lineages as the traditional rivalries found new means of expression. Some sub-

lineages or lineages put forward one of their own members as a candidate. Parties became an

instrument for forwarding clan interests; at the close of the 1960s, the country had 64 parties because

of the attempts to satisfy the various clans or lineage interests.

The democratic parliamentary process which was 'expected' to go well with the traditional

political institutions turned sour.21 Emphasis had been placed on party politics rather than on

mobilisation for national needs22 and the system definitely facilitated anarchy.23

AN ALTERNATIVE TO PARTIES

The system described below emphasises interest groups' to promoting their interest in a

national framework. In this sense an interest group is "an association of people who come together, or

are brought together, to represent, promote and defend particular interests or sets of interests"24

There should be two groups: (1) a cause group whose interests aim to promote and defend a

much wider section of society, and (2) a pressure group who is a group representing an interest group

which seeks to achieve its aim by putting pressure on the government either on the canton (for

convenience I will use the word canton or in the Somali word Waax) or national level.

Sovereignty should reside in the cantons (Waax). The national government should exercise onlythose powers vested on it by the constitution. As democracy is for the people by the people, this

system focuses the need to decentralise the power to enable the Somalis to take their political live in

their hands and at the same time stimulates the participation of the people in the cantonal and national

affairs.

The cantons have to contribute part of their revenue to the running of the national government.

The national government has to divide, in equal terms, any kind of aid obtain.

Each canton has to preserve its own separation of powers based on: (1) the Legislative, (2) the

Executive, (3) the Judiciary

Here the concept of the separation of powers is designed to ensure that the Executive and

Legislature are not integrated, but interrelated, keeping each other in check.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF A CANTON

For administrative purpose each canton shall be divided into four administrative centre;

1. The village is considered to be a permanent settlement slightly bigger or smaller than a district the

hamlet depending on the size and population number (the size of a hamlet is not defined here).

2. The district shall be the third administrative unit after hamlet and village. It shall be composed of

several hamlets (nomadic or district hamlets).

3. The hamlet shall be the smallest administrative unit and it is:


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a The nomadic hamlet (beel miyi) shall be a group of nomadic households settled in a

given area. Administratively it will be part of the district whose jurisdiction covers the

area in which the given nomadic hamlet is situated.

b The district hamlet (beel degmo) shall be the division of a district.

4. The region shall be the largest administrative centre of a canton as it shall be composed of districts,

villages, district hamlets and nomadic hamlets.

COUNCILS AND ELECTIONS

VOTING AND ELECTION SYSTEMS

The voting system has to be the simple plurality, or "first-past-the-post", method, secret

suffrage and direct only at the district level councils.

VOTING QUALIFICATION

Anyone who reaches the age of 18 shall be eligible to vote. However, the criteria for those

standing for office will vary according to the office in question (not defined here).

As this system emphasises that the democratic process of the country should come from the

grassroots, the nucleus of the power lies in the regions, districts (and its hamlets) and village levels.

Therefore, each of these political units has to elect its own councils.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The laws of the national and cantonal administration have to comply with the Principles of

Islam, and that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adapted by the General Assembly of the

United Nations on 10th December 1948.

Respect shall be given to the fundamental rights of the citizens, social equality, political and

judicial grantees.

Autonomous Cantons

Regions

Districts (and their Hamlets)

Villages

The Federal State


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CANTONAL LEVEL

HOW THE CANTON COUNCILS ARE FORMED

The system stresses that there must be four level of canton council, these are: the hamlets

(nomadic or district hamlet), the village, the district and the region.

1. TWO TYPES OF HAMLETS : There shall be two types of hamlet and they are as follows:

a. Nomadic Hamlets

The nomadic hamlet occurs when nomadic people settle as a group in an given area (the

number is not determined here). These hamlets shall be part of the district whose jurisdiction

covers the said hamlet at the time of the election. For example, each hamlet can elect itscouncil of 11 members (7 active, 4 reserve ). The Hamlet Council shall select a chairman from

within who shall be the Elder of the Hamlet (Duqa Beesha) for a period of three years.

b. District Hamlets

Each district shall be composed of a number of hamlets, depending on its size. For examples,

each district hamlet shall elect its district hamlet council of 11 member (7 active, 4 reserve).

Each district hamlet shall select from within a chairman who shall be the Elder of the District

Hamlet for a period of three years.

2. THE VILLAGE (TUULO)

For examples, each village shall elect its village council of 11 member (7 active, 4 reserve). The

Village Council shall select from within a chairman who shall be the Elder of the Village (Duqa

Tuulada) for a period of three years.

3. THE DISTRICT (DEGMO)

Each district shall be composed of nomadic hamlets (see above) and district hamlets. The District

Hamlets Councils (nomadic and district hamlets, and the village council) shall sit together to select a

District Council. Then the District Council shall select a chairman who will be called the Elder of

the District (Duqa Degmada) for a period of three years.

4. THE REGION (GOBOL)

Each regional council, namely hamlet, village and district councils, shall elect a Regional

Council from within which in turn, its chairman shall be selected who shall be called the Elder of the

Region (Duqa Gobolka).

Cantonal Level

The Cantonal CouncilThe Cantonal Assembly The Cantonal JudiciaryCouncil

The Cantonal Cabinet

CouncilThe Chamber of

Councillors

The Cantonal Courts

The Chamber of

Representatives Adminstrative

Departments


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The region shall be the third centre of administration of a canton (Waax) and it shall be

composed of several districts which shall be determined by the population size of the region.

ELIGIBILITY

Any Somali citizen can give his/her vote anywhere within a canton only if he/she can prove

residence of that area for not less than a prescribed period (no period is defined here).Any Somali citizen at the age of 21 years can contest to a public office unless he/she has been

convicted of criminal offences against humanity or the Somali nation.

HOW THE CANTONAL ASSEMBLY CAN BE ELECTED

Each canton shall have its own separation of powers based on: (1) the Cantonal Assembly, (2)

the Cantonal Council, and (3) the Cantonal Judiciary Council.

THE CANTONAL ASSEMBLY

A legislative power, which shall be confined at cantonal level, shall be vested in a Cantonal

Assembly which shall consist of two houses: (1) the Chamber of Councillors, and (2) the Chamber ofRepresentatives.

THE CHAMBER OF COUNCILLORS

The Chamber of Councillors shall be made up of representatives of the regions of a canton.

Each region shall elect 5 Emissaries (3 active and 2 reserve.) However, the size of this chamber will be

determined by the population of each district. The larger a district is, in demographic terms, the larger

its representation in this chamber shall be.

a) The three active members have the power to vote and they take part in all activities of the

Chamber of Councillors.

b) The two reserves (sugayaal) are only observers during parliamentary debates. They can obtain

voting power only when they replace member(s) of the active deputies. The two reserves are listedfirst and second according to the votes they received during election. When the seat of an active

member is declared vacant, the Speaker of Chamber of Councillors shall proclaim the first reserve

as an active member. The same process shall be followed in the case of another member vacating

his/her seat.

c) The Chamber of Councillors shall be elected every two years.

d) This chamber's voting powers shall be limited only to two occasions: (i) in the case of

impeaching a member of the Cantonal Council and National Council or (ii) when amending the

constitution.

THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Chamber of Representatives shall be made up of representatives of all districts electoral ofa canton. Each district shall elect 5 Emissaries (3 active and 2 reserve). However the size of this

chamber will be determined by the population of each district. The larger a district is, in demographic

terms the larger on average the size of its representation in this chambers).

a) The three active member have the power to vote and they take part in all activities of the

Chamber of Representatives.

b) The two reserves (reserve) are only observers during parliamentary debates. They can obtain

voting power only when they replace member(s) of the active deputies. The two reserves are listed

first and second according to the votes they received during election. When the seat of an active


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member is declared vacant, the Speaker of the Chamber of Representatives shall proclaim the first

reserve as an active member. The same process shall be followed in the case of another member

vacating his/her seat.

c) The Chamber of Representatives shall be elected every four years by the canton's district

electoral bodies. It is divided into various sub-committees, e.g. Financial and Economic, Foreign

Affairs, Security and Defence Affairs, Social and Cultural Affairs. The number of sub-committees

will depend on the needs of the Cantonal Assembly. These sub-committees shall monitor the day-to-day activities of the Cantonal Council and their administration.

THE POWER OF THE REPRESENTATIVES

The day-to-day working of cantonal government policies is monitored by the Cantonal

Assembly. The Coordinator General of the Canton and his/her colleagues of the Canton Council have to

get the Cantonal Assembly's vote of confidence for the appointment of their cabinet and for the Canton

Judiciary Council judges. This function empowers the Cantonal Assembly to steer, with their power of

check and balance at the canton level, the Canton Council's appointees.

THE CANTONAL COUNCIL

The Cantonal Assembly Members (CAMs) with all the canton's councils (regions, districts,

villages and hamlets) shall sit together to elect a Cantonal Council, from which, in turn, it shall elect a

chairman, who will act as Coordinator General of the canton. The chairmanship shall rotate within the

Cantonal Council every one year (the tenure of this office shall depend on the number of Cantons to

make it possible for each member to have his/her turn to hold chairmanship). The other members of

this council shall serve as vice-chairmen in equal power.

In case of the removal of the Coordinator General of the Canton from office, of his/her death,

resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the secretary of state's office, the same

shall devolve to the next Vice-Chairman in line.

The Coordinator General of the Canton has to get the Cantonal Assembly's vote of confidence

for the appointment of his/her cabinet and for appointees of the Canton Judiciary Council judges. This

function empowers the Cantonal Assembly to steer, with their power of check and balance at the canton

level, the Cantonal Council's appointees.

THE CANTONAL JUDICIARY COUNCIL

This council is vested with limited judicial power as it reviews and determines whether acts of

the canton government conflict with the Constitution. It is selected every six years by the Coordinator

General of the Canton and presented to the Canton Assembly for confirmation. This council is

composed of professional judges who are qualified to perform such tasks (the number is not determined

here).

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity at the canton level, however,

where a matter rises between the Canton Judiciary Council and the National Judiciary Council, the

latter will have pre-eminence over the former.


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THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a National Assembly (which is

technically the national legislative council of the National Somali State), and shall consist of two

chambers: (1) the Chamber of Elders, and (2) the Chamber of Cantonal Council.

THE CHAMBER OF ELDERSThe Chamber of Elders shall be composed of members chosen by their clan or lineage. This

chamber's purpose is to ensure that all clans and lineages are presented at the highest echelon of the

power of the nation. The members of this chamber can be replaced by their respective lineage or sub-

clan groups.

This chamber's voting powers shall be limited only on two occasions: (a) in the case of

impeaching a member of the National Council and (c) when amending the constitution.

There is no time limit for Chamber of Elders membership, except in cases where a member

reaches the age of compulsory retirement (not specified here) or in the case of a member being mentally

unsound, in which circumstance the member automatically loses his/her membership.

THE CHAMBER OF CANTONAL COUNCILThe Chamber of Cantonal Council (Aqalka Waaxaha) shall be composed of four senators from

each canton of the Somali State (2 active and 2 reserve). The Chamber of Cantonal Council shall

choose their Speaker and other officers.

a) The two active member have voting powers and they take part of all activities in the Chambers

of the Canton Council.

b) The two reserves (reserve) are only observers during parliamentary debates. They can acquire

voting powers only when they replace a member of the active canton representatives. The two

reserves are listed first and second according to the votes they received during election and replace

accordingly. When the seat of an active member is declared vacant, the Speaker of The Chamber of

the Cantonal Council (Af-hayeenka Aqalka Waaxaha) will proclaim the first reserve as an active

member. The same process will be followed if another member vacates his/her seat.

THE POWER OF THE CHAMBER OF CANTONAL COUNCILThe Chamber of Cantonal Council (Aqalka Wakiillada Waaxaha) will be elected every two

years by the canton councils (see below). It shall be divided into various sub-committees, e.g. Financial

and Economic, Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Affairs, Social and Cultural Affairs. The

number of sub-committees will depend on the needs of The Chamber of the Cantonal Council (Aqalka

Wakiillada Waaxaha).

The National Council has to get The Chamber of the Cantonal Council's confirmation for the

appointment of their cabinet and for appointees of the National Judiciary Council judges. This function

empowers the Chamber of the Cantonal Council to steer, with their power of check and balance, the

National Council's appointees.

The National Council has to get the confidence of the Chamber of the Canton Council for the

appointment of their cabinet and for appointees of the National Judiciary Council judges.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

Executive power shall be vested in the National Council. Each Canton Assembly member and

its councils (canton, region, district and village councils) shall elect one member to the National

Council for every five year period. The National Council shall choose its Chairman who will be the

National President of the canton for a period of one year.


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Thought the executive powers of the national government is vested on the National Council it is

counterbalanced by the National Assembly and the National Judiciary Council.

In case of the removal of one of the National Council members from office, e.g. by death,

resignation, or the inability to discharge the powers and duties vested on him/her, the Canton of the said

person has to elect another member to the post within a period of sixty days. In the cases where the

said person had held the chairmanship of the National Council, the post will be filled by the member

next in succession to the chairmanship.The Chairman of the National Council shall also be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of

the National Somali State during his/her office. The National Council shall have power, and with the

advice and consent of the Chamber of the Canton Council.

They shall from time to time give to the Chamber of the Canton Council information on the

state of the nation, and recommend to their consideration such measures as the National Council shall

judge necessary and expedient.

THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY COUNCIL

The National Judiciary Council is the third state power. Judicial power is vested on this

council as it reviews and determines whether acts of the national and cantonal governments conflict

with the Constitution. It is a counterbalance to the National Council and the National Assembly. It isthe guardian of the Constitution and of the individual rights. It is selected every six years by the

National Council and presented to the Chamber of the Canton Council for confirmation. This council is

composed of professional judges who are qualified to perform such task (the number is not determined

here).

The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices under conditions of

good behaviour (to be specified). The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM

This system is presented as a possible solution to the current nightmare of the Somali dilemma,

where the country is fragmented into fiefdoms ruled by separate armed clans. This system has manyadvantages as well as disadvantages, and they are as follows:

ADVANTAGES

1. As the name defines, this system recommends adapting a semi-federal system of government as

a possible solution to the Somali plight. The country is currently divided into 4 or 5 parts which in

turn can to be interpreted into cantons or states and its unrealistic to reconstruct Somalia on the old

system (a unitary system of government) which was a factor in the creation of the current crisis. On

the contrary, the current reality presents an opportunity to create a semi-federal state.

2. The system emphasises the decentralising of power within the individual cantons and within the

federation. It emphasises the separation of the three powers of state, namely legislative, executive

and judiciary of both levels (canton and national). The purpose is to avoid these powers falling intoone hand which could lead to dictatorship.

3. The nucleus of the power lies in the hamlets or villages. This gives strength to the claim that is

a "pure democracy".

4. It can give the people the right to choose their representatives in the government. It can also

give an opportunity to supervise and control their representatives. This practice can stimulate a

positive political culture which can change the destructive instinct which has affected the people in

the last two decades and which caused the erosion of the foundations of the Somali nationhood.


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5. This system entrusts four levels to be represented by the people: district, region, canton and

elders (or traditional leaders). The district and region lies in the canton level, and the later two

represent the autonomous cantons and the traditional leaders.

6. The national executive (National Council) is a collegiate whose presidency rotates each year.

This collegiate is composed of a member from each of the canton who becomes president of the

federation.

7.

Each autonomous canton shall have its own bi-cameral assembly (Cantonal Assembly): (a) theChamber of Councillors and (b) the Chamber of Representatives. Both chambers will give both the

regions and the district electorate the chance to be represented.

8. At the national level there is the National Assembly which is composed of two chambers: (a)

the Chamber of Elders and (b) The Chamber of the Canton Council. The main purpose of the two

cameral pattern is to ensure that the cantons and the lineages or clans are properly represented in the

law making "factory" of the nation. On the other hand it can be helpful in solving regional

differences of interest. Regional interests which might object to a central government are to some

extend pacified by the knowledge that they are formally represented at the centre.

9. A no-party system could be a healing device for the Somali crisis. Currently, the Somalis are

divided across clans and lineages. Taking a party system, as experience has shown previously, can

lead to a division across clans or lineage which could further exasperate the Somali crisis. A

political party can be the ultimate source of power and permeates all aspects of the political system

and the state institutions. The majority of one-party states have the party's monopoly enshrined

within the constitutions. In the same ostensibly multiparty states legal control will sometimes favour

the dominant government party, making life for opposition group difficult, and it can lead to another

social tension. In the Somali context, politics is sometimes personalised and the dominant party may

be interpreted as the dominant clan or lineage.

10. As an alternative to parties, this system emphasises interest groups as a device with which to

promote a group's interest within the national framework. In this sense an interest group is "an

association of people who come together, or are brought together, to represent, promote and defend

a particular interest or set of interests." In case of the removal from office, or death, resignation, or

inability to discharge the powers and duties vested on a councillor (of every level, e.g. national,

canton, regional, district, village, etc.) this system has a mechanism which makes it easy to replace

the member by the "reserve". As the reserve shall take part in the debates, this can also assure

continuity of the business led by the replaced council

DISADVANTAGE

1. The system gives limited power to the national level. A strong central government might be

needed at this crucial time to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction which the country

desperately needs.

2. Only the National Council and the Cantonal Council will be elected indirectly rather than by

universal suffrage. This means that they are elected by councillors which are being delegated by

their respective areas.

3. The alternative to parties will be interest or pressure groups. It might be difficult for the

pressure group to spearhead a national issue. They can handle only a limited interest which will

have limited spotlight.4. It is commonly believed that it is difficult to exercise without party in a truly democratic

procedure . It is also difficult to see the opposition as there is no party to express their opinion.

5. Anybody who stands for an office, whether cantonal or national level, has to stand as a private

or group candidate. For the electorate this will be confusing as it will not be easy for them to see the

candidates policy.

6. This is a new system which has never been applied before, and it is hard to forecast the

complication which might arise during its implementation.


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NOTES

1. Much of the introduction I have taken from Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 1994).

2. Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, 1980, pp.155-56.3. Ibid., p.158.4. Maxamed D. Afrax, The Mirror of Culture, in Catastrophe to Renewal? ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, 1994, pp.233-

251.

5. Ibid, p. 239.6. Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 1988, p.49.7. I have worked out this alternative in January 1990. Because of the change of the situation in Somalia and the

subsequent collapse of the Somali unitary state system, I had to alter few detail to meet the new development.8. Eli Sagan, At The Dawn of Tyranny, 1986, p.225.

9. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, 1961, p.1.

10. Mohammed I. Farah, From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity, (Doctoral Dissertation at Uppsala University,

Uppsala 1993), pp.43-44.11. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit. pp.36-89.12

. Ali Moussa Iye, Le Verdic de L'Arbre (Go'aankii Geedka), by Lidwien Kapteijn in Hal-Abuur, Vol.I, No.1,

Summer 1993, pp.33-35.13. Ibid., p.198.14. Though it can hardly be called democratic as women and other marginalized group are excluded from the

meeting.

15. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy,op. cit., pp.196-20016

. Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, op. cit. p.49.17 The Somali version: Qaranka Daryeelka ee Ummadda Soomaaliyeed (QDUS).18. J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, World Political System, 1991, pp.150-60.19 Charlotte Waterlow, What is Federalism? 1994, p.7.20

Ibid., pp.7-8.21. I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, 1980, p.205.22. Ali Mazrui, and Michael Tidy; Nationalism and New States of Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984). p.226.23. Ibid, p.7624

. J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, World Political Systems, op. cit. p.175

REFERENCES

Afrax, Maxamed D. ; The Mirror of Culture: Somali Dissolution Seen Through Oral Expression in TheSomali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, (Boulder, Colorado:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

Derbyshire J. Denis; and Derbyshire, Ian; World Political Systems: An Introduction to Comparative

Government, (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1991).

Farah, Mohammed I.; From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity: A Study of State Penetration among the

Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern Kenya, (Doctoral Dissertation at Uppsala

University, Uppsala 1993).

Fromm, Erich; The Fear of Freedom, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paule, 1980).

Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M; The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy,

(London: Haan Associates, 1994).

Kapteijn, Lidwien; Le Verdic de L'Arbre (Go'aankii Geedka): Le Xeer Issa, etude d'une "Democratie

Pastorale", by Ali Moussa Iye, in Hal-Abuur, Vol.I, No.1, Summer 1993.

Lewis, I M ; A Pastoral Democracy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

------- Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (London: Longman, 1980).

Mazrui, Ali; and Michael Tidy; Nationalism and New States of Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984).

Sagan, Eli; At The Dawn of Tyranny: The Origins of Individualism, Political Oppression, and the

State, (London: Faber and Faber, 1986).

Samatar, Ahmed I.; Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality, (London Zed Books Ltd, 1988).

Waterlow, Charlotte; What is Federalism? An Outline of Some Federal Constitutions, (London: A One

World Trust Publication, 1994)..

Documents

The Welfare State of the Somali Nation - A Possible Solution to the Somali Dilemma