Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND 1

TheUseofSocialMediainColombianDemocraticSpaces:ADouble-EdgedSword

DianaDajer1

Abstract

Theworldisfloodedwithnewsofhowsocialmediaisbeingusedtoinfluencedemocracyinconflict-affectedareas,forbetterorworse.Colombiaisnotanexception.Theeraofsocialmediabringsopportunitiesandchallengestoabroadrangeofstakeholdersinthiscountry,toharness thepowerof technological innovationto fosteramoreopenandtransparentdemocracy in themidst of conflict. Thispolicybrief examines thepositive andnegativeinfluenceofsocialmediainthreecases:(i)the2016plebisciteabouttheendorsementofapeaceagreementwiththeFARC-EPguerrilla;(ii)thepresidentialelectionsof2018;and(iii)thethreatsandcrimesagainstsocialleaderssincethepeaceagreementwassigned.Basedon thecasesanalysed, thedocumentdrawsrecommendations fordifferentactorsat thelocal,nationalandinternationallevels,tobothminimisetheharmandmaximisethegoodofusingsocialmediainColombiandemocraticspaces.

1ThispolicybriefispossiblethankstothesponsorshipoftheTodaPeaceInstitute.Thedocumentincludesval-uableinsightsfromFernandaBedoya,RenataCabrales,BeverlyGoldberg,NicolasHernandez,CarlosJunca,Mi-chaelMonclou,andDanielaSanchez,providedduringaworkshopcarriedoutinAugustof2019,withthesup-portofPolicentricoandtheOpenSocietyFoundations.Theworkshopwasheldtodiscussapreliminaryversionofthisbriefwithstakeholdersfromthepublic,privateandinternationalsectors.TheauthoralsoappreciatestheinsightfulcommentsofJuanDavidGutierrez,andtheassistanceofMarıaCamilaSierraduringtheprocessofdatacollectionoftheresearch.Theusualcaveatsapply.

PolicyBriefNo.61

November2019

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1. Introduction

‘Weinvitethecommunitiestoceasetheiractivities’,statedtheAutodefensasGaitanistasdeColombia,aColombiancriminalgang,invoicenotesandflyersdistributedviaWhatsAppandothersocialmediachannels.2Thegroupwasannouncinganarmedstrike inseveralmunicipalities of Antioquia, Cordoba and Sucre by the end of March of 2016. Theinformation spreadquickly.During thedaysof the strike, the threatened townsseemedabandonedduetofearofretaliationfromthearmedgroup.3Sincethen,inmanyaffectedmunicipalities, the police have created alliances with civilians to use social media andmobilephonestoenhanceanearlywarningsystemtofightcriminalgroups;4thishasal-lowedtheauthorities,forinstance,totacklefalserumoursofanewarmedstrike,spreadviaWhatsAppaudiosinAugustof2016.5

Theworldisfloodedwithnewsofhowsocialmediaisbeingusedinconflict-affectedareas,forbetterorworse.Colombia isnotanexception.By Januaryof2019,ColombiahadanInternetpenetrationof68%,withanequalpercentageofsocialmediauserswhospentanaverage of three and a half hours per day in platforms such as YouTube, Facebook,WhatsApp,Instagram,andTwitter.6Informationandmisinformationspreadthroughthesechannelshashelpedshapemanyviews,emotions,narratives,anddecisionsaboutpivotalinternal political processes, such as the armed conflict, peace negotiations with armedgroupsandelections.

Astheuseofsocialmediarises,sodothestudiesaboutitsnegativeandpositiveimpactondiverse democratic scenarios. For instance, at a global level, specialised research hasanalysed issuesasvariedasthespreadofviralextremistmisinformationonInstagram7,userinteractionwithelectoraljunknewsinFacebookandTwitter8,theimpactofYouTube’salgorithm on radicalisation9, and the use of socialmedia channels to support collective

2 Revista Semana, “Clan Ug suga usa Twitter, Whatsapp y Facebook para causar terror”, September 4, 2016,https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/clan-usuga-usa-twitter-whatsapp-y-facebook-para-causar-ter-ror/468659.3VerdadAbierta,“ZozobraenUrabayBajoCaucaporparodecretadoporAutodefensasGaitanistasdeColombia”,March 31, 2016, https://verdadabierta.com/zozobra-en-uraba-y-bajo-cauca-por-paro-decretado-por-autode-fensas-gaitanistas-de-colombia/;ElEspectador,“ParoArmadodelClanUg sugasevivioen36municipiosdelpaıs”,April 1, 2016, Redaccion Polıtica, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/paro-armado-del-clan-usuga-se-vivio-36-municipios-del-p-articulo-625021.4CaracolRadio,“Desmientensupuestoparoarmado:Desvirtuananunciodesupuestoparoarmadoenapoyoacamionerosdifundidoporredessociales”,August18,2016,https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2016/08/18/sin-celejo/1471556980_090782.html;CanalMonterıaDigital,“CuentelealcomandantedelCAI,Estrategiareacti-vadaporlaemisoradelaPolicıaNacional”,2017,http://www.canalmonteria.com/cuentele-al-comandante-del-cai-estrategia-reactivada-por-la-emisora-de-la-policia-nacional/.5AndresdePablos,“ElaudiodeWhatsAppqueamenazaconunnuevoparoarmadoenUraba”,Pacifista,August17, 2016, https://pacifista.tv/notas/el-audio-de-whatsapp-que-amenaza-con-un-nuevo-paro-armado-en-uraba/.6HootsuiteandWeAreSocial,“Digital2019:Colombia”,2019,https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-colombia/.7 Taylor Lorenz, “Instagram is full of conspiracy theories and extremism”, The Atlantic, March 21, 2019,https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/instagram-is-the-internets-new-home-for-hate/585382/.8NahemaMarchaletal.,“JunknewsduringtheEUparliamentaryelections:Lessonsfromaseven-languagestudyofTwitterandFacebook”,DataMemo(Oxford:OxfordInternetInstitute,2019).9 Kevin Roose, “The making of a YouTube radical”, The New York Times, June 8, 2019, https://www.ny-times.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html; Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, “How

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action inauthoritariancountries.10InColombia, there isalsoagrowing literatureontheinfluenceoftheuseofplatformssuchasWhatsApp11,Facebook12andTwitter13ondifferentinternalpoliticalprocesses.Still,socialmediaplatformsmovemuchfasterthantheschol-arshipproduced,andthereisplentytolearnandanalyseabouttheireffectsondemocracy.

Thispolicybriefaimstocontributetothecitedscholarshipbyanalysingbothcrosscuttinganddistinctpearlsandpitfallsoftheuseofsocialmediainthreespecificdemocraticspacesin Colombia. The three cases are characteristic of mechanisms for, respectively, directdemocracy, representative democracy and citizen and political participation in publicmatters.The firstcase is the2016plebiscite toendorseapeaceagreementbetweentheColombianGovernment and the FARC-EP guerrilla. The second case examines the 2018presidentialelections inColombia.The lastcaseexplores the threatsandcrimesagainstsocialleaderssincethepeaceagreementwassigned.Basedonthecasesexamined,thebriefdraws recommendations for conflict transformation in future similar Colombian demo-craticscenariosthatmayfaceanalogoussituationsorevenhazardsyettocome.

Asamethodologicalapproach,thebriefusesqualitativeandquantitativedatatoexaminethe following overarching question in the three cases:What are the opportunities andchallengesoftheuseofsocialmediainthedemocraticspacesunderexamination?Primaryandsecondarydocumentaldataandsocialmediarecordsandstatisticswereanalysedtoanswer the central query. Likewise, the preliminary results of the case studies andrecommendationswerediscussedinaworkshopheldinBogotáinAugustof2019,withthesupportofPolicéntricoandtheOpenSocietyFoundations.Theparticipantsgavevaluableinsightstocomplementtheinitialfindingswithcollaborativecriticalperspectivesthatareincludedinthisfinalversionofthebrief.

Given that Internet penetration is limited in certain municipalities of Colombia and tospecificsocio-economicsectors,especiallyinruralareasofthecountry,theanalysisinthisbrief cannotbegeneralised to theareasandpopulationswhere there isadigitaldivide.Furthermore, more quantitative and qualitative studies, among others, of social mediasentimentanalysis,thespreadofjunknewsandpolarisation,areneededtounderstandthescope and range of how the use of specific social media platforms shaped democraticdecision-makingprocessesinthecasesanalysed.Hence,thisbriefonlyenvisionstodepictpreliminary exploratory results to trigger a conversation and discuss possiblerecommendations.

Thedocumentisstructuredinthreesections.Afterthisintroductorysectionthatportraysthecontext,policyproblemaddressed,objectiveandmethodologicalapproach,sectiontwo

YouTube radicalized Brazil”, The New York Times, August 11, 2019, https://www.ny-times.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html.10MarcLynch,DeenFreelon,andSeanAday,“Onlineclustering,fearanduncertaintyinEgypt’stransition”,De-mocratization24,no.6(2017):1159–77.11CarlosCortesandJosePenarredonda,“Politics(onWhatsApp)isdynamic:Disinformationandthespreadofpolitical‘chains’inColombia”,(Bogota:LinternaVerdeandFLIP,2018).12GladysAcosta,“Gestiondepasionesypolarizacionenlasredessociales.UnanalisisdelaplicativogruposenFacebook”,Discurso&Sociedad6(4)(2012):684–719.13AndresMarınandJessicaQuintero,“ConfianzaenelprocesodepazenColombiaenTwitter”,RevistaMexicanadeSociología80,no.1(2018):115–37.

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studiesthepositiveandnegativeeffectsoftheuseofsocialmediainthethreeselectedcases.Thethirdsectionincludesasetofactionablepolicyrecommendationsforfuturecases.Anannexattheenddefineskeytermsusedinthisbrief.

2. TheInfluenceofSocialMediaUseinColombianDemocraticSpaces

Thissectionstudiestheinfluenceoftheuseofsocialmediainthethreecasesunderexami-nation.Althoughthethreecaseshavedistinctdynamicsandcharacteristics,therearethreecross-cuttingelementsfoundinallofthem,thatcouldcontributetothecreationofpatternstodevisefuturepolicies,strategiesandrecommendationstotackletherisksandcapitaliseonthebeneficialeffects.Allthreeareinterrelated.First,inallthecasessocialmediahelpedtotriggerandshapeemotionsofcitizenswithaninfluenceontheirdecisions.Second,inthethree cases, information and misinformation, spread through social media platforms,appearedtoaffectthepoliticalchoicesmadebymanycitizens.Third,inthethreeevents,onlinepoliticalpolarisationwasinfluencedbyfilterbubblesandechochambersthatfedpolarisation.

Thenextparagraphsdiscussindetailthementionedeffectsanddistinctdynamicsofeachcase,bydescribingtheunitofanalysis,examiningthesocialmediaplatformsusedandhowtheywereused,andstudyingthepositiveandnegativeeffectsoftheuseofsocialmediaintheeventsobserved.

2.1. Abattleofemotions:Socialmediauseduringthe2016plebiscitetoendorsethepeaceagreementwithFARC-EPguerrilla

'Wewantedpeopletovotewhiletheywereenraged',saidJuanCarlosVélez,themanagerofthecampaignagainstthe2016peaceagreementbetweentheColombianGovernmentandtheFARC-EPguerrilla,duringaninterviewaboutthestrategyofthe‘no’movementintheplebiscite.Vélezexplainedthat,duringthecampaign,theydiscoveredthe‘viralpowerofsocialmedia’,which theyused to trigger citizen’s feelings against the agreement.Whenaskedaboutwhytheyusedthatstrategy,hementionedthatthesupportersoftheagree-mentdidthesame.14Infact,many‘yes’campaignersalsoaimedtomobilisebothpositiveandnegativeemotionstoencouragecitizenstovote in favourof theaccord;whilesomecampaignsboostedamessageofhopetowardsthepossibilityofendingthewarwithFARC-EP,otherstriedtotriggerfearofawariftheagreementwasnotendorsed.

The peace agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC-EP guerrilla wasofficially announced to the public on August 24, 2016, after four years of confidentialnegotiationsbetweenthepartiesinHavana,Cuba.The297-pageagreementaimedtoendafifty-year-oldconflictwithFARC-EP,theoldeststandingguerrillaoftheAmericas,byreach-ingaconsensusbetweenthepartiesaboutissuesatthecoreofthebeginning,durationandendofthewar.Thetopicssettledincludedlandreforms,mechanismsfordirectandrepre-sentative democratic participation of former combatants and traditionallymarginalised

14LaRepublica,“Estabamosbuscandoquelagentesalieraavotarverraca”:JuanC.Velez,ElColombiano,October6, 2016, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-farc/entrevista-a-juan-carlos-ve-lez-sobre-la-estrategia-de-la-campana-del-no-en-el-plebiscito-CE5116400.

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populations,theconditionsforaceasefireandtheprocessofreintegrationofdemobilisedcombatants,provisionstoendillegaldrugtrade,transitionaljusticemechanismstosatisfytherightsofthevictims,andmeasurestomonitor,implementandendorsetheagreement.

Oneof the conditions set in the agreement to trigger its implementation,was its publicendorsementbyColombiancitizensinamechanismfordirectparticipationcalledaplebi-scite,anelectionsummonedbythePresidenttoallowcitizenstodirectlysupportorrejectadecisionoftheexecutivepower.15Inthiscase,thequestionputforcitizenconsiderationtovoteonOctober2,2016,wasayesornodecisionabouttheapprovalofthepeaceagree-mentwithFARC-EP.Itwasadeeplycontentiousissuegiventhat,duringthefouryearsofnegotiationsthatledtotheaccord,asectorofsocietyledbyprominentpoliticalfiguressuchasformerpresidentofColombia,ÁlvaroUribeVélez,washarshlyopposedtothetalks.

Socialmediaplayedapivotal role in shaping theemotions,perceptionsandopinionsofcitizensduringthepeaceprocess,theone-monthcampaigningperiodbeforetheplebiscitewasheld,andthesubsequentstageofrenegotiationstosettleanewaccord.Thefactthatthepeacetalkswereconfidential,lengthy,andinHavana,madeiteasierforspeculationstospreadabout thecontentof theagreement. Informationandmisinformationwereeasilyscatteredthroughabroadrangeofsocialmediaplatforms.Whentheplebiscitewasheld,theemotionstriggeredbythecontentsharedweresoinfluentialonthefinalresultsthatVladdo,a local caricaturist, sarcasticallyproposed touseFacebook’s reactionsonanewplebiscite’sballotasawayforcitizenstoexpresstheirviewsaboutthepeaceprocess.ThisisshownbelowinFigureA.

During the month that the campaign for and against the agreement lasted, YouTube,WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and other social media channels were actively used bysupportersandopponentstotheaccord.16Theyprimarilyusedmemes,pictures,hashtags,voicenotes,textsandvideostoexpresstheirviews.Oncetheoutcomesoftheelectionwereannounced,theseplatformswerealsokeenlyemployedbyabroadrangeofstakeholderstoshareopinionsabouttheresultsandtopressurethenegotiationandendorsementofanewaccord.Thedaysaftertheplebiscitewasheldalsotriggeredabroadrangeofsentiments.Thesupportersof theagreementcalled thisperiod theplebitusa, inEnglish ‘aplebisciteheartbreak’.17

15Incontrast,thereferendumsinColombiaareelectionsthatcanbeactivatedbyeitherpublicauthoritiesorcitizensforthepeopletoapproveorrejectthecreationofanewnormortheabolitionofanalreadyexistingnorm.16Cf.StephanieSalazar,“Laconversacionsobreelplebiscitoderefrendacionenlasredessociales”,inMediosdecomunicaciónyplebiscitoderefrendacióndelosacuerdosdepaz(MOE,2017);IvanRıos,MonicaPerez,andSol-beyMorillo,“LaagendasettingenlaredsocialFacebook:CampanadelplebiscitoporlapazenColombia”,Kepes15,no.17(2018).17DeissyPerilla, “LaPlebitusa:Movilizacionpolıticade lasemocionesposplebiscitopor lapazenColombia”,Maguaré32,no.2(2018):153–81.

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FigureA. Vladdo’scartoonproposalforanewplebiscite’sballot.

Source:RevistaSemanano1799,2016.18

2.1.1. Misinformation,covertnessandpolarisationatthevergeofuncertainty

The years during which the peace process lasted were a time of great uncertainty forColombians.Severalfaileddialoguesprecededthesetalks,whichhadmanyupsanddownsthat,respectively,createdbothoptimismandpessimismabouttheoutcomesofthepeacetalks in Havana. When the final agreement was announced, and the campaign for andagainstitsendorsementstarted,socialmediainteractionsonthisissueincreased.19Someoftheexchangescausedthreemainharmfuleffectsondemocracy:

• Thediscretecharmofjunknews:Someofthemostprominenttraitsofthepeaceagreementwereitscomplexity,technicallanguageandextent.20Thismadeitchalleng-ingfornon-expertstograspthescopeandlimitsoftheaccord,whichinturnfedtheopportunityofspreadingjunknewsabouttheagreement’scontent.Mostofthemisin-formationsharedincludedimagesofsportsfigures,singersandpoliticianswithfalsemessagessupportingorrejectingthepeaceagreement.21

Furthermore, some of the opposition’smessages aimed to spark religious concernsaboutthedeal,byclaimingthatithadanagendacalled‘genderideology’.Intheirview,thisagendaaimedtochangetheroleofmenandwomeninsocietyandgivemorerightstowomenandtheLGTBIpopulation,whichtheyarguedwasopposedtotheirreligious

18 Vladdo, Nuevo lenguaje, October 22, 2016, Vladdomanıa, Revista Semana no 1799, https://www.se-mana.com/caricaturas/articulo/vladdomania-edicion-1799/499709.19Salazar,“Laconversacionsobreelplebiscitoderefrendacionenlasredessociales”.20RevistaSemana,“Elacuerdoparaterminarlaguerra”,2016,http://especiales.semana.com/acuerdo-para-la-paz/index.html.21LauraCeron, “Campanasucia,unode losmalesdentrodelplebiscitopor lapaz",UniversidaddelRosario,September 16, 2016, https://www.urosario.edu.co/Periodico-Nova-Et-Vetera/Analisis/Campana-sucia,-uno-de-los-males-dentro-del-Plebisc/.

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beliefs.22OthersintendedtoactivatepublicfearsabouthavingFARC-EPcombatantsaspoliticalleadersoroftheeconomicconditionsdecreasingduetoFARC-EP’saffiliationwithcommunistpoliticalideas,forinstancecomparingColombiawithVenezuela.

Someofthesemessageswerefeaturedbothinonlineandofflinescenarios,suchasinthecaseofFigureB,whichshowsabillboardadinthecityofSantaMarta.ThepostershowcasedapictureofTimochenko, FARC’smain leader, claiming that a yes to theplebiscitewouldgivehimthechancetobeColombia’spresidentwiththesupportofCubaandVenezuela.Apictureoftheadvertisementwaswidelysharedinabroadrangeofsocialmediaplatforms.

FigureB. Image shared on social media of a billboard claiming that Timochenkowouldbecomepresidentiftheplebiscitewasendorsed.

Source:ElTiempo,2016.23

• Facingemotionswithdataandconfrontation:Duringboththeagreementnegotia-tion process and during the plebiscite campaign, the Colombian Governmentmadenumerouseffortstoexplainitscontenttothecitizens.Someoftheseinitiativeswerespreadinsocialmediathroughvideos24,infographics25andhashtagstofosterconver-sations,answercitizen’squestionsandencouragetheirsupportandcampaigning in

22AndreiGomez-Suarez,Eltriunfodelno:Laparadojaemocionaldetrásdelplebiscito(Igcono,2016).23 El Tiempo, “Centro Democrático no permite desmontar valla de 'Timochenko'”, September 21, 2016,https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/valla-de-timochenko-presidente-en-santa-marta-3443824See,forinstance:OficinadelAltoComisionadoparalaPaz,AcuerdosalcanzadosenlaMesadeConversacionesdeLaHabana,2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lxwl81HvT3U;OficinadelAltoComisionadoparalaPaz, ¿Qué contiene el acuerdo solución al problema de las drogas ilícitas?, 2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpO3Sh0bKgs;OficinadelAltoComisionadoparalaPaz,¿QuédiceelpuntosobreparticipaciónpolíticadelAcuerdodePaz?,2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj6CeBDkU-4&t=1s.25SomeoftheinfographicscanbeseeninthiswebpageoftheGovernment:OficinadelAltoComisionadopara

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favouroftheagreement.26Likewise,theColombianGovernment,throughitsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerofPeace,ledmanyeducationalcampaignstoinformabroadrangeofpopulationsaboutthepeaceprocess.

Mostofthecontentsharedwasinformationintendedtoenlightenthepublicabouttheagreement.Inonlyafewcases,suchasinavideocontrastingtheexperiencesoftheconflictbetween rural andurbanadolescents, the informationwasalso intended totrigger citizens’ positive emotions.27 In other cases, the use of social media by theColombianGovernmentboostednegativeemotionstowardstheagreementbydissem-inatinginformationthatdirectlyconfrontedthepoliticalopposition.Thisisthecase,for instance,of thecampaignMitosyRealidades sobreelProcesodePaz (MythsandRealitiesabout thePeaceProcess), shown inFigureC.This initiativeused tweetsofmembersofthepoliticalopposition,suchasformerpresidentialcandidateÓscarIvánZuluaga,andlabelledthemasmyths.

Another governmental campaign used videos that featured the story of a cartooncharacter called ‘Inocencio’ (equivalent toMr.Naive),whowasangrywithnewshereceivedonsocialmediaaboutthepeaceprocess.Themessagesechoedsomeoftheoppositions’socialmediacontentabouttheprocess,suchasacommonideaknownas‘peacewithoutimpunity’,thatopposedlegalimmunityfordemobilisedcombatants.Inthevideos,afriendofInocenciocommunicatedtohimthatthenewswasfalseandthatheneededtostopbeing‘naive’bybelievinginthem,giventhatthemembersofFARC-EPwouldbeprosecuted.28

Socialmediawasapowerfulmethodtocommunicatewithcitizensduringthepeaceprocess.Still,theuseofsocialmediabytheColombianGovernmentbeforeandaftertheplebisciteshowamainlyreactiveinsteadofproactiveapproach,basedmostlyonrational arguments that were not enough to understand, build trust, inform andmobilise public opinion in favour of the agreement. This confrontational strategysometimesevenincreasedthedistrusttowardstheaccord.29

la Paz, “Todo lo que necesita saber sobre el Acuerdo de Paz”, 2018, http://www.altocomisionadoparala-paz.gov.co/herramientas/Paginas/Todo-lo-que-necesita-saber-sobre-el-proceso-de-paz.aspx.26Thiswasthecase,forexample,ofthecampaign#AcuerdoDePaz.Cf.UrnadeCristal,“Informedelacampana#AcuerdoDePaz”(PresidenciadelaRepublica,2016),https://estrategia.gobiernoenlinea.gov.co/623/articles-51941_archivo_04.pdf.27 Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, La paz está en nuestras manos, 2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RCA8nJ3YhOc.28PresidenciadelaRepublica,Guerrillerossíseránjuzgadossegúnloacordadoenelprocesodepaz#Inocencio,2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcp-YHtMLZ8.29Salazar,“Laconversacionsobreelplebiscitoderefrendacionenlasredessociales”.

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FigureC. ExampleofmessagesspreadinthecampaignMythsandRealitiesaboutthePeaceProcess.

Source:www.mitosyrealidades.co,2015.

• Runningtotheextremes:InColombia,polarisationtowardsthepeaceprocesswithFARC-EP has been a determinant issue in direct and representative democraticelectionssince2014. In thepresidentialelectionsof2014, themain topicofdebatebetween the leading candidates was the peace process. In those elections, formerpresidentJuanManuelSantoswasre-electedwith50.98%ofthevoteswiththeprom-iseofcontinuingthetalks,againstaturnoutof44.98%infavourofÓscarIvánZuluaga,whoopposedthenegotiationsledbySantos.Inthe2016plebiscitetoendorsethepeaceagreement,theopponentshad50.21%ofthevotes,whereasthesupporters49.78%ofthem.Thepresidentialelectionsof2018showasimilartrend.IvánDuque,thecandi-dateof the rightandcurrentpresidentofColombia,wonwith53.98%of thevotes,whereasGustavoPetro,thecontenderoftheleft,hadaturnoutof41.81%.

Echo chambers and filter bubbles during the peace process and plebiscite fosteredonlinepolarisation.Inthesecases,junknewsspreadthroughsocialmediabothforandagainsttheagreement,creatingamixofemotionsthattriggeredcitizenstosharethecontentintheirnetworks.Thecontentshared,inturn,fedthealgorithmsthatdeter-minedwhattheysawintheirsocialmediaplatforms.Inmanycases,thefilterbubblesgavecitizenstheimpressionthattherealitywasthenewstheywereconsumingonline,

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whichtheydiscussedwithlike-mindedorextremelyopposedpeople,whichnurturedpolarisation.30

2.1.2. Knowledge, deliberation and action to end the conflict with the FARC-EPguerrilla

Notalltheuseofsocialmediawasharmful.Therearealsothreeexamplesofbeneficialusesofsocialmediaduringthepeaceplebiscite:

• Increasedinformationandreachofthecontent:Amidthedebatesaboutthemean-ingofsomeofthesettlementsreachedbytheparties,abroadrangeofinitiativesledbycivilsocietyflourishedinsocialmedia,toinformthepopulationabouttheagree-ment. The strategies ranged fromWhatsApp and Facebook groupswith experts toanswerquestionsaboutthedeal, to imageswithshortmessagesthat includedbasicinformationabouttheaccord.31Oneexamplewastheinitiative297p,ledbytherockband Rompefuego, which live-streamed videos of collective sessions to read anddiscusstheaccord’scontent.TheseinitiativesweremainlyrunbycitizensconcernedwithmorepeopleknowingthefactsaboutthedecisionthatColombianshadtomakeintheplebiscite.

• Fosteringdialogueandreconciliationbetweencitizenswithdifferentviews:Abroadrangeof socialmedia initiativesencouragingdialogueandreconciliationalsoemergedduringthecampaigningdaysbeforetheplebiscitevoteandaftertheresultswere announced. These strategies aimed to boost informed discussions about thepeaceprocess,whileencouragingempathyandrespectbetweencitizenswithdiverseopinions. For instance, the project Diálogos Itinerantes de Paz (Itinerant PeaceDialogues),usedsongstoencourageconversationsaboutthepeaceagreementinthemunicipalityofSuárez,Cauca.32Thistypeofinitiativehelpedtoconfrontpolarisationandshowcasecontentthatcould,tosomepoint,amelioratetheadverseeffectsoftheechochambersandfilterbubbles.

• Triggering citizen participation and mobilisation: For the agreement to beendorsedintheplebiscite,the ‘yes’ballotsnotonlyhadtoattainamajority,butthepeoplewhovotedinfavourhadtosurpass13%oftheelectoralroll.Thiswasahighbet,giventhatusuallyabstentioninColombiaexceeds50%forelectionsofrepresenta-tivedemocracy,anditisevenhigherinmechanismsofdirectdemocracy.Forinstance,apublicconsultationheldin2018inColombiatofightcorruptionhadaturnoutofonly32%.Although99%of thevoters endorsed themeasures, the consultationwasnotapprovedbecauseitrequired33.3%ofthevoterturnouttobeofficiallyaccepted.

Theriskofabstentionwassohigh,thatbeforedecidingoninitiatingtheplebiscitetheCongressapprovedareformchangingitsrulesregardingvoterturnout.Theoriginal

30WilliamRincon,“Redessocialesenelplebiscito:Elfenomenodelyoconyo”,RevistaSemana,October4,2016,https://www.semana.com/tecnologia/articulo/plebiscito-por-la-paz-la-burbuja-de-las-redes-socia-les/497814;Salazar,“Laconversacionsobreelplebiscitoderefrendacionenlasredessociales”.31CamiloQuiroga,“Loslazarillosciudadanosparaelplebiscito”,LaSillaVacía,October13,2016,https://lasilla-vacia.com/historia/los-lazarillos-ciudadanos-para-el-plebiscito-57931.32MaryDıaz,Diálogositinerantesdepaz,2016,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAox27x65fA.

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ruleorderedthatplebiscitescouldonlybevalidifmorethan50%oftheelectoralrollvoted,eitherwithayesorano.Thenewlawloweredtherequirement,toallowtheresultsofthepeaceplebiscitetobevalidifmorethan13%oftheelectoralrolevotedyes.Attheendoftheday,thevoterturnoutintheplebiscitewasonly37.43%oftheelectoralroll,but18%ofthosevoterscasttheirvoteinfavouroftheagreement,makingtheelectionbinding.Althoughtheabstentionwashigh,initiativesinsocialmediathatencouragedcitizens tovoteand toparticipate indemocracyhelped toboost citizenparticipationintheplebiscite’selections.Thisisthecase,forinstance,inthecampaign#ColombiaSeAbraza (in English #AHugforColombia), that included messages ofreconciliationtoencourageyoungadultstovote.

Oncetheresultsoftheplebiscitewereannounced,citizensbothinfavourandagainsttheagreementusedsocialmediatopressurethepartiestorenegotiatethedeal.Someof these initiatives included massive country-wide demonstrations organised onWhatsAppandFacebookgroups.33Thepressureappearedtobeeffective.Anewdealwas signed by the parties on November 24, 2016 and endorsed by the ColombianCongressonNovember30,2016.Aftertheagreementwasendorsed,newcitizen-ledinitiativesemerged inColombia tomonitor, supportandoppose its implementationwiththeuseofsocialmedia.

2.2. Newmedia,newpoliticalcampaigning:TheColombianpresidentialelectionsof2018

In2018,Colombiaheldthreedistinctpivotalrepresentativeelectionsthat,forthefirsttimeinhistory,featuredFARCasapoliticalparty.InMarchof2018,Colombiancitizensvotedforrepresentatives inCongress. InMayof2018, the first roundof thenationalpresidentialelectionwasheldandfivecandidatesfromvariouspartiescompetedforthepresidency.InJuneof2018,asecondroundofthepresidentialelectiontookplacebetweenIvánDuqueandGustavoPetro,thetwocandidateswhoobtainedthemajorityofthevotesinthefirst-roundelectionofMayof2018.

Astheuseofsocialmediaincreases,sodoesthecapacityofpoliticalcandidatestousesocialmediaplatformsinfavouroftheirpoliticalcampaigns.Since2010,paralleltoanincreasedscepticismtowards traditionalmedia,Colombiahas seenagrowth in theemploymentofsocialmediaplatformstoinfluencetheelectionsforallthedifferentpositionsofrepresenta-tivedemocracyavailableinthecountry.Duringthe2018democraticelections,messagesspreadthroughWhatsApp,YouTube,Facebook,Twitterandothersocialmediaplatforms,shared content that aimed to influencepeople’s decisions at thepolls. This second casestudy analyses the positive and negative influence of social media on the Colombianpresidentialelectionsof2018.

33Perilla,“Laplebitusa:MovilizacionpolıticadelasemocionesposplebiscitoporlapazenColombia”.

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2.2.1. Junknewsandbreachestorightsinthemidstofpolarisation

ThepoliticalpolarisationthatColombiaexperiencedduringthepeaceprocessandplebi-scitecontinuedduringthe2018presidentialelections.Polarisationinfavourandagainstthefinalagreementprovedtobeasuccessfulelectoralstrategyinthepreviouselections.Thus, exploiting this division became a signature feature of many 2018 presidentialcampaigns.Inthisdividedpoliticalarena,socialmediauseencouragedtwopracticesharm-fultodemocracy,giventhattheydeceivedcitizen’sfreedomofchoice.

• Awarofmisinformation:Similartothespreadofjunknewsduringtheplebiscite’scampaign, the2018presidential elections also featured abroad rangeof false viralcontentthatwassharedthroughdifferentsocialmediachannels.Itisdifficulttomeas-ure the impact of how this content actually influenced people’s votes in favour oragainstspecificcandidates.Still,asCortésandPeñarredondaassertinastudyonjunknewsspreadthoughWhatsApp,althoughinsomecasespeoplearereluctanttosharethiskindofcontent,thedistributionofthesemessagesinclosedelectionscouldmobi-lise the vote of a good enoughnumber of people to decisively change the electoralresults.34Furthermore,junknewswassharednotonlyinWhatsApp;othersocialmediaplatformswerealsoemployedtospreadthiscontent.

Hernándezet al. identified fourdistinct citizen reactionswhen receiving junknewsduringtheseelections.First,citizensreceivejunknewsandaccept itastrue,eveniftheylaterseecontentthatdisprovesit.Second,userseliminatecontentsharedwhichspreadsjunknewsoncetheylearnitisfalse,butdonotexplaintotheirnetworkswhythemessage was erased. Third, a minority of users share with their networks thereasonswhythe junknewsreceived is false.Lastly,amajorityofusersdueto filterbubbles and echo chambers never receive information discrediting the junk newsreceived.35

Someof the junknewsspreadduring theelections included falsecontentabout thecandidates’ policies. Likewise, certain junk news untruthfullywarned that the pensprovidedinthevotingpollshadanerasableinktoeasechangingtheballots’results,whileothersportrayedasupposedaffiliationofthecandidateswithillegalgroups.36Forinstance,analteredviralphotospreadinseveralplatformsgavetheimpressionofformer FARC-EP guerrilla members supporting the presidential candidate GustavoPetro.37Thisdiverserangeofjunknewsspreadthroughechochambersshapedbyfilter

34Cortes andPenarredonda, “Politics (onWhatsApp) isdynamic:Disinformationand the spreadofpolitical‘chains’inColombia”,20-21.35FabianHernandezetal.,“Impactodelasredessocialesenelprocesoelectoralcolombiano”,inMediosdeco-municación,redessocialesydemocracia:Eleccionespresidencialesylegislativas2018(MOE,2018),33.36CarlosGonzalez,“EltopdelasnoticiasfalsassobreeleccionesparalaRegistradurıa”,ColombiaCheck(blog),2018,https://colombiacheck.com/chequeos/el-top-de-las-noticias-falsas-sobre-elecciones-para-la-registradu-ria.37ElTiempo,“Lasnoticiasfalsasquecircularondurantelajornadaelectoral”,June17,2018,https://www.el-tiempo.com/elecciones-colombia-2018/jurados-y-votantes/fake-news-difundidas-durante-la-segunda-vuelta-presidencial-231116.

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bubbles, triggering citizen’s emotions, fostering polarisation and influencing theirdemocraticdecisions.

Giventhatjunknewsiseasytodisseminateinsocialmedia,tacklingitseffectsislengthyandcomplex.Infact,asHernándezetal.show,duringthe2018electoralcampaigns,itusuallytookfromtwotofourdaysforthemessagestobeverifiedandconfronted.Still,more often than not, the online communities that shared the junk news were notconnectedwiththeonesthatdisprovedit,challengingthecapacitytocontestit.38Thismadeitdifficultforsomecitizenstodistinguishtruefromfalseordeceitfulinformation,ultimatelyaffectingthepopulation’scapacitytomakeaninformedchoice.

• Possibletransgressionstorights:Asecondsignificantharmfuleffectofsocialmediaemploymentduringthe2018presidentialelectionsrelatestothreekindsofpotentialbreachestorights,bothoftheelectorateandthecandidatesduringthecampaigningandelections.First,inmanycasesthecontentofthejunknewsaccusedthecandidatesofcommittingcrimesorbeingassociatedwithcriminalactivities.39Hence,thefirstkindofpossiblerights’breachalignswithaninfringementofrightsrelatedtothegoodname,personalintegrityandreputationofthecandidates.

Asecondfeasible infringementofrightsrelatestothedataprivacyof thevoters.AsPeñaredondaargues,many2018electoralcampaignsusedpersonaldataoftheColom-bian citizens obtained though Facebook andwebsite tracking tools, to advertise infavourofcertaincandidateswithoutexplicitconsentandusingwebsitesvulnerabletosecurity risks.40Although there are several denouncements of data rights infringe-mentsduringthe2018electoralcampaigns,thescopeofthepossiblebreachesisyetunknown.41AsinthecaseofCambridgeAnalytica,inmanycasesthecitizensdidnothaveinformationonhowthecampaignsobtainedandusedtheirdata.Still,in2018theColombianDataProtectionAgencyblockedtheservicesoftheapplicationPig.gi,whileitinvestigatedclaimsofFacebookdatabreachesagainstColombiancitizens.42

Ultimately, this contravened the personal integrity of the candidates and the dataprivacyofthecitizensinapolarisedcontextwherejunknewsdesignedtomanipulatepeople’sopinionsisthenewnorm.Thissituationsparksquestionsaboutinfringementsontherightstofreedomofinformationandchoiceofcitizenswhoseperceptionswereaffectedduetothementionedmix.Thescenarioisevenmorecomplicatedconsideringthat,inmanycases,thecampaignshavenotdiscloseddataabouthowtheyuseddigitalpublicity.

38Hernandezetal.,“Impactodelasredessocialesenelprocesoelectoralcolombiano”,29–32.39Hernandezetal.,“Impactodelasredessocialesenelprocesoelectoralcolombiano”,27-28.40JosePenarredonda,“Eleccionesydatospersonales,unestudiodelaseleccioneslegislativasde2018”(Funda-cionKarismaandTacticalTechnologyCollective,2018),12-17.41MOE,“IrregularidadeselectoralesenColombia:InformefinalPilasconelVotoeleccionespresidenciayCon-greso2018”(Bogota:MOE,2018),59-61.42SuperintendenciadeIndustriayComercio,“Comomedidapreventiva,Superindustriaordenabloqueodeapli-cacion Pig.Gi”, March 28, 2018, https://www.sic.gov.co/noticias/como-medida-preventiva-superindustria-or-dena-bloqueo-de-aplicacion-pig-gi-por-su-aparente-vinculacion-con-posible-tratamiento-ilegal-de-datos-per-sonales-de-colombianos.

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2.2.2. Increasedcitizenoversight,awarenessandparticipationindemocracy

Despite the harmful uses of social media during the 2018 presidential elections, socialmediaalsohadpositiveeffects.Forinstance,socialmediaallowedcitizenstohavedebatesanddiscussionsaboutthecandidates.Furthermore,severalcivilsocietyorganisationsledinitiatives tohelp thevotersunderstandandcompareavailablepoliticalproposals.Twomainbenefitsofsocialmediaondemocracyaredistinctinthiscasestudy:

• Fightingsocialmediawithsocialmedia:Buildingonthelessonslearnedaboutsocialmediauseduringtheplebiscite,the2018presidentialelectionsfeaturedabroadrangeofinitiativesledbybothcivilsocietyandStateagencies,tousesocialmediaplatformstotackleadverseeffectsofitsuse.Twomainactionsstandout.First,projectsaimedatfact-checking junknewsspreadonsocialmedia.Someofthepioneerprojectsaboutthis issue were led by La Silla Vacía and ColombiaCheck.43 This example was alsofollowedbytheColombianNationalCivilRegistry,whichistheauthorityinchargeofguaranteeingthetransparencyandfunctioningofthenationalelectoralprocesses.44

Second, initiatives touse socialmediaas ameans for citizens todenouncepossiblecriminalactivitiesduringtheelectionsalsoarose.ThisisthecaseofthecampaignPilasconelVoto(MindYourVote),runbytheNGOMOE,asaspaceforcitizenstoreportelectoral irregularities. For the 2018presidential elections, theMOE received 2119casesofpossiblebreachesfromallthenationalterritory.45Bogotáwasthecitywiththemostcomplaints,with347.

• Adatewithdemocracy:Oneofthemainconsequencesofthecombinationofpolari-sation,junknewsandemotionsactivatedduringthe2018presidentialelections,wasalowqualityofdemocraticdebateaboutthepoliciesthatthecandidateswereproposing.Abroadrangeofinitiativesemergedtoinformcitizensaboutthecandidate’sproposalstoencouragetheirparticipationbeyondthevote.OneofthemwasCandiDater,aweb-basedplatformranbyViceColombia.Theprojectinformedvotersaboutwhichcandi-datesweremore alignedwith their political viewsbasedon a tinder-likequestion-naire.46

AnotherexampleisSiFueraPresidente(IfIWerePresident),adigitalplatformcreatedby Seamos and Change.org, to allow citizens to make proposals for candidates toincludeintheirpolicyprogrammes.47AloPorFavorColombia(Hello,MayIspeakWithColombia?),wasasimilarcitizen-leddigitalstrategyspreadthroughsocialmedia,that

43 Pablo Medina, “In Colombia, a WhatsApp campaign against posverdad”, 2018, https://wilsonquar-terly.com/quarterly/the-disinformation-age/in-colombia-a-whatsapp-campaign-against-posverdad/; Colom-biaCheck,“SobreNosotros|ColombiaCheck”,2019,https://colombiacheck.com/sobre-nosotros.44RegistradurıaNacionaldelEstadoCivil,“Reportedenoticiasfalsas”,2018,https://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Redes-Sociales,4329-.html.45MOE,“IrregularidadeselectoralesenColombia:InformefinalPilasconelVotoeleccionesPresidenciayCon-greso2018”,37.46 Vice Colombia, “Todo lo que debes saber sobre CANDIDATER”, Vice (blog), April 10, 2018,https://www.vice.com/es_co/article/a3ynd8/sobre-candidater.47¡Pacifista!,“‘SiFueraPresidente’:unaplataformaparainfluenciaraloscandidatos”,May21,2018,https://pa-cifista.tv/notas/si-fuera-presidente-una-plataforma-para-influenciar-a-los-candidatos/.

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committed presidential candidates to have one-to-one, ten-minute public conversa-tionswithcitizensparticipatingintheproject.48

2.3. Threatsandcrimesagainstsocialandpoliticalleaderssincethesignatureofthepeaceagreement

The exclusion of social and political leaders in democratic spaces through threats andcrimeshasbeenaconstantintheColombianconflictfordecades.Inmanycases,criminalgroupsactagainsttheleadersasawayofexercisingpoweroverthewholegroup.SincethesignatureofthepeaceagreementwithFARC-EPguerrillain2016,themenacesandoffencesagainst these individualshave increased,given territorial,economicandpowerdisputesbetweendifferentgangsthatwanttocontroltheareasleftwithavacuumofpowerbythedemobilisedcombatants.

Givenabroadrangeofdifficultiesintheprocessofdatagathering,therearedifferencesinthe existing databases regarding the exact number of leaders threatened, attacked andmurderedsince2016inColombia.However,thestudiesagreethatthethreatsandattacksagainstleadersincreaseduringpre-andpost-electoralperiods.49Thishasbeenthecaseforthe current electoral year, starting on October 27, 2018, and running up to the localelections of mayors, governors, councillors and other regional electoral positions onOctober27,2019.

Forinstance,accordingtoMOE,sinceOctober27,2018,anduntilAugust27,2019,therewere 364 cases of violence against social and political leaders in Colombia. From thisnumber,91peoplewerekilled.ThenumberofcrimeshasincreasedsinceJuly27,2019,whentheperiodforcitizenstoregisterascandidatesintheelectionsended.50Althoughinmany cases the authors of the crimes are unknown, most of the time the offences arecommittedbyparamilitarygroups,followedbyguerrillas,non-identifiablecriminalgangsandevensomemilitarymembers.51

TheStatehasreactedbyprosecutingsomeofthecases,providingprotectiontosomeofthevictims,givingsomevisibilitytothephenomenonandcreatingastrongerregulatoryframe-work for theprotectionofsocialandpolitical leaders.Nevertheless, theState-ledeffortshavenotbeenenoughtotacklethispervasiveissuethatthreatensthecorebasisofdemoc-racyinColombia.Inthisscenario,socialmediausehasinfluencedboththeprotectionandthreatsofsocialandpoliticalleaders.Thisisexaminedinthenextsubsections.

48Alo,¿porfavorColombia?,“Alo,¿porFavorColombia?”,2018,https://www.aloporfavorcolombia.com/.49PatrickBall,CesarRodrıguez,andValentinaRozo,“AsesinatosdelıderessocialesenColombiaen2016–2017:Unaestimaciondeluniverso”,2018;CCJ,IEPRI,andAECID,¿Cuálessonlospatrones?Asesinatosdelíderessocialesenelpostacuerdo,2018,http://iepri.unal.edu.co/fileadmin/user_upload/iepri_content/boletin/patrones6.pdf;CarlosGuevara,“PanoramadelaspersonasdefensorasdederechoshumanosylıderessocialesenriesgoenCo-lombia,2018-2019”(InstitutoColombo-AlemanparalaPaz–CAPAZ,2019).50MOE,“Informesobreviolenciapolıticadesdeeliniciodelcalendarioelectoral”(MOE,2019).51CCJ,IEPRI,andAECID,¿Cuálessonlospatrones?Asesinatosdelíderessocialesenelpostacuerdo,29-55.

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2.3.1. Onlineintimidationandmassificationoftheterror

Offlinemethods, suchas theuseofpaperpamphlets,havebeenusedbroadly to spreadthreats and fear in Colombia. Social media has allowed the amplification of thesemechanismsandcreatednewmeanstocreatepressureanddisseminateterror.Twomainsituationsareidentified:

• Newmedia,newthreats:Thefirstscenarioofharmfuluseofsocialmediahastodowiththeemergenceofnewsourcesofriskforpoliticalandsocialleaders.Withtheriseofsocialmedia,thedigitaldataofsocialandpoliticalleadershasbecomeadangeroussource of information that allows criminals to identify, follow and threaten theirvictimsmoreeffectively.Moreover,sometimesdigitaldeviceswithGPSsystemsgivento victims by the State to enhance their protection have been infiltrated by illegalgroups tomonitor theirmovesandspyon their conversations.52Inothercases, thedigital information of journalists and human rights defenders to make visible thethreatsagainstsocialleadershasbeenstolen.53Theseperilshavealsoencouragedself-censorship.

• Massivespreadoffear:Anonymouscontentdisseminatedthroughsocialmediacan,inseconds,spreadthreatsandrumoursagainstsocialandpoliticalleaders.Thethreatsaffectthesafetyofleaders,andalsocreateageneralalarmintheirfamiliesandcom-munities.

2.3.2. Support,visibilityanddefence

Socialmedia employment has also been a valuable source to provide support to socialleaders,amplifytheirmessagesandsufferingsandcreatemechanismstopreventcrimesagainstthem.Twocategoriesaredistinctive:

• Aleaderinmyplace:Since2018,abroadrangeofcitizen-ledsocialmediastrategieshavearisen,aimedatsupportingsocialleaders.TheseinitiativeshavemostlyemergedinColombia’sbiggestcities.Someprojects’ambitionistoexposetheurgencytoprotecttheleadersandtopressuretheStatetotakefurthermeasurestotacklethesituation.Thisisthecase,forexample,fordemonstrationsorganisedthroughsocialmedia.

Otherinitiativesaimtoamplifythemessagesandvoicesofthecivicleaders,whichhavebeenindifferenttoabroadrangeofcitizensinthecountrywhoarenotdirectlyaffectedbyviolence.Forinstance,thecampaign#UnLíderEnMiLugar(#ALeaderInMyPlace),hasinspired journalists, influencers andTVhosts tooffer theirplatforms for leaders tospeakabouttheirsituation.AvideoontheYouTubechannelofDanielSamperOspina,whocreated the initiative, sparked theactionsbygatheringcivic leadersandsocial

52CCJ,IEPRI,andAECID,p.189.53RedaccionColombia2020,“Estanrobandoinformacionalosperiodistasquecubrenelconflicto”,ElEspectador,September 10, 2018, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/estan-robando-informacion-los-pe-riodistas-que-cubren-el-conflicto-articulo-857126.

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mediainfluencersinamusicvideodenouncingthethreatsandcrimesagainstthelead-ers.‘Perhapsyouwillseethemiftheyaredigital’,weresomeofthesong’slyrics,enti-tled‘Thereggaetonofthesocialleaders’.FigureDshowsanimageofthevideo.

FigureD. Imagefromthevideo‘Thereggaetonofthesocialleaders’.

Source:DanielSamper,2019.54

• Newmechanismsofprotection:Socialmediahasalsobeenusedbythecivilsocietyto trigger strategies to prevent the crimes against social leaders. In some cases,hashtags such as #MiPecadoFueSerLíderSocial (#MySinWasToBeASocialLeader) insocialmediaplatformsareusedtomakevisiblemenacesagainsttheleaders.Inothers,web-basedapplicationssuchasColidérate(Let’sLeadTogether),provideoptionstoalertclosenetworks ifasecuritybreachis takingplaceandprovide informationforleadersabouthowtohandletheriskandreportthreatstoauthorities.

3. ConclusionsandRecommendations

ThisbriefpresentedanexploratoryanalysisofhowsocialmediausehaspositivelyandnegativelyinfluencedColombiandemocracyinthreecases.Thebeneficialandharmfulef-fectsportrayedsparkseveralquestionsaboutthenatureofdemocracyintheeraofsocialmedia.Theusesexaminedalsoshowthat,althoughemotions,viralisationofthecontent,polarisationandcollaborativeapproachesconvergeinthedifferentsituationsanalysed,theemploymentofsocialmediaindemocraticscenariosisdynamic.55Thismeansthattherisksandsafeguardscontinuouslychangeandtherearemoreyettocome,suchasthespreadof

54 Daniel Samper, El reggaetón de los líderes sociales, #HolaSoyDanny, 2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZORIqVo_RL4.55Cf.CortesandPenarredonda,“Politics(onWhatsApp)isdynamic:Disinformationandthespreadofpolitical‘chains’inColombia”.

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deepfakevideosofpoliticalcandidatesorthecreationofcollaborativeinitiativesthatmixAIsystemswithhumanmoderationtotacklejunknewsmorequicklyandeffectively.56

Moreresearchisneededtoenrichtheresultspresentedinthisbrief.Still,thefindingsareusedinthisconcludingsectiontoofferevidence-basedandactionablepolicyrecommenda-tionsforcivilsocietyorganisations,Stateagencies,techcompanies,andinternationalcoop-eration,tominimisetheharmsandmaximisethegoodsofsocialmediauseinColombiandemocraticspaces.

3.1. Adoptamulti-stakeholderstrategytoapproachsocialmediause

Oneofthemainlessonsinthedifferentcasesanalysed,isthatthereisnotasilverbulletinitiativethatauniquestakeholdercanimplement,onceandforall,tounleashthepowerof socialmedia to foster amore open and transparent democracy amid the Colombianconflict. In contrast, there is a need for a collaborative multi-stakeholder coordinatedstrategythatgathersdifferentactorstoimplementadiversesetofprojectswiththesameoverarchingobjective.

TherearemanyexamplesinColombiaofhowthiscollaborativeapproachcanhelpdeviseideasandstrategiestocopewiththechallengesthatsocialmediaposestodemocracy,whileharnessing its power to enhance democratic processes. To name one case, RedCheq, anetworkofadiversesetofalliesledbyColombiaCheck,waslaunchedin2019toexaminetheveracityofjunknewsspreadinsocialmediaplatformsduringtheColombianregionalelections.57

Likewise,duringthe2018elections,manypresidentialcandidatessignedanethicalagree-ment ledby theNationalCouncilofPeace,ReconciliationandCoexistence,amulti-actoradvisory commission. The deal obliged the candidates to condemn violence against theothercontendersandusesocialmediaresponsiblyandwithtolerance,andtoencouragetheirsupporterstodothesame.AstudyofMOEshowsthatthisstrategyappearedtobeeffectiveintacklinghatespeechduringtheelections,withadecreaseinhateconversationsafterthepactwassigned.58

Similardeals,bothagainstfakenewsandpoliticalviolenceduringtheelections,havebeenendorsedbydiversecandidates, civil societyorganisationsandState institutions for the2019electoral campaigns. Still, therearemanymoremulti-actor joint andcollaborativeeffortsneeded.Someactionablerecommendationsforthesekindsofinitiativesinclude:

• Increase actions to tackle online polarisation and junk news during non-electoralperiods:Theeffectofmisinformation,breachesofdataprivacy,polarisation

56RobertChesneyandDanielleCitron,“Deepfakes:Aloomingchallengeforprivacy,democracy,andnationalsecurity”,CaliforniaLawReview,no.107(2019);GianlucaDemartini,“Users(andtheirbias)arekeytofightingfakenewsonFacebook–AIisn’tsmartenoughyet”,TheConversation,September22,2019,http://theconver-sation.com/users-and-their-bias-are-key-to-fighting-fake-news-on-facebook-ai-isnt-smart-enough-yet-123767.57 RedCheq, “¡Nace RedCheq!”, ColombiaCheck, 2019, https://colombiacheck.com/investigaciones/nace-redcheq.58Hernandezetal.,“Impactodelasredessocialesenelprocesoelectoralcolombiano”,22.

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andcrimesandthreatsagainstleadersismuchmorepervasiveduringelectoralperiods.However,thisinfluencebuildsonpolarisationandhatespeechnurturedduringnon-electoral times.Hence, it is recommended toadoptamulti-stakeholderapproach toboostactionstocommitdifferentactors,notonlycandidates,tofosteratransparentuseofdata, fight against junknewsandhate speechand condemnviolence againstsocialandpoliticalleadersinnon-electoraltimes.

Although it has proven effective that political leaders sign deals committing tocondemn junknews and violence during elections, inviting citizens to also endorsethesepactsandcommitting toeverydayeasyactions to tackleharmfuluseofsocialmedia,couldbeevenmoreeffectiveandcreatefurtherawarenessaroundthesituation.Someoftheactivitiescouldincludeverifyingthesource,dateandinformationofcon-tent received in social media before spreading it, and creating social sanctions topoliticalleaderswhenengagedinhatespeech,suchasunfollowingtheiraccounts.

• Createmulti-actornetworksofprotection, supportandmonitoringof threats:One of the cases examined that particularly needs a cooperative strategy betweendifferentstakeholdersistheprotectionofsocialandpoliticalleaders.Initiativessuchasacollaborativeplatformtoreport threatsandcrimesagainstsocial leaderscouldhelpsurpassthecurrentchallengesregardingtheavailabilityofdataaboutthecases.Likewise,thecreationofnetworksofprotectionsupportedbysocialmediaplatformsto coordinate citizens, civil society organisations and State institutions on an earlywarningsystemcouldhelppreventthematerialisationofsomemenaces.

• Addresscollectiveemotions:Across-cuttingissueinthethreeexaminedcasesisthepowerofemotionstoshapepublicopinionanddecision-makingprocesses.Neverthe-less,thereisnotyetapublicmulti-stakeholderconversationandpolicyinColombiaonhowtohandletheinfluenceofemotionsondemocracy.Thereisaneedforcollabora-tiveapproaches,tohelpaddressemotionsthatmayleadtopolarisation,suchasfear,hate, intoleranceandanxiety,allverycommon in theColombiancontextdue to theconflict.Thismayinclude,forinstance,policiesledbyStateagencieseducatingpeopleonhowtohandletheseemotions,supportedbycitizen-ledarts-based,behaviouralandculturalprojects thathelpcommunities toaddress trauma,understandandmanagecollectiveemotionsandfosterreconciliation.

3.2. Harnessthepowerofcivilsociety

In the Colombian democratic system, the ultimate source of power is the people. Yet,althoughthereisavibrantconversationinthecountryaboutpoliticalinnovationanddigitaldemocracy,civilsocietyinitiativesontheuseofsocialmediatosupportdemocracyarestillscarce and atomised. The following recommendations are suggested to support civilsociety’seffortsonsocialmediaanddemocracy:

• Think and act collaboratively: As is the case with amulti-stakeholder approach,citizen-leddigitaldemocracyprojectshaveamoresignificant impactwhentheyareimplementedbetweenseveralorganisations.Thismaybeachallenge,givendiverse

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agendas, competition for resources and transactional costs onpartnershipmanage-ment.Still,thefruitsinthelong-termcouldpayofftheshort-termcaveats.Initiativesthat might be particularly useful if several organisations lead them are the onesintendedtotacklefilterbubblesandechochamberswhentheallianceiscomprisedbyindividualsofdiverseandevenopposedviews,thatcometogethertoengageinonlinedialoguesandspreadcontenttodepolarisedigitalspaces.ThesekindofinitiativesledsolelybythecivilsocietyorganisationscouldbehelpfulincontextswhereotheractorssuchasStateagenciesarenottrusted.

• Donotpreachtothechoir:Duringtheplebiscite’scampaigns,acommondifficultyfacedbymanycitizen-ledsocialmediainitiativeswasthattheydidnotreachpeoplewithdifferentviews.Itisrecommendedtoadoptauser-centreddesignapproachwhendevisingdigitaldemocracyprojects,tounderstandbettertheaudiencestheinitiativeshouldreachandhowtoreachthem.

• Pursue new sources of finance: A common challenge to civil society initiativesintended to enhance socialmedia use is to secure economic support. Often, digitalprojectsneedapilotstagethatrequiresseedcapitalbeforeproducinganyimpact.Thisis usually not alignedwithmany grants and funding opportunities available,whichtypicallywant to support alreadyproven ideas.The situation is evenmoredifficultconsideringthat,moreoftenthannot,thiskindofinitiativedoesnotproducerevenue,so relies on external sponsorship to happen and sustain in time.Nevertheless, thiscouldcreateanopportunityfororganisationstofindcreativewaystofinancetheiniti-ativesandevenmakethemself-sustainable.Forinstance,oneoftheissuesdiscussedduring theworkshopwas the need for informing citizens about the legal risks andconsequencesofhatespeechandtheirdataprivacyrights.Thismaybeaprosperousscenarioforgeneratingconsultancyofflineandonlineservicestoeducatecitizensandenterprisesabouttheirrights,duties,legalconsequencesandpossibleactions.

• Partnerwithacademia:Academiahasastrategicroletoplayinstudying,analysingand theorising the way social media is changing democracy, so as to devise andimplement specific evidence-based policies and educational strategies. Hence, it issuggestedtonurturepartnershipsbetweencivilsocietyandacademiainprojectsthatuseparticipatoryactionresearchtohelpaddresschallengesontheuseofsocialmediaindemocraticscenarios,whileengaginginprocessesofcriticalthinkingandreflectionon the situations being dealt with and the approaches used. These collaborationsshouldalsoconsiderthatthelanguageofacademicpublicationsinmanycasesdiffersfromtheoneusedbypolicy-makers,civilsocietyorganisationsorinternationalcoop-eration. Consequently, it is recommended that academics increase the creation ofinformationtargetedtoabroadrangeofaudiencessotheycanapplymoreeffectivelytheinsightsproducedinacademia.

3.3. EncourageStateactionbeyondregulation

Regulation is usually a suspect word in Colombia whenever State action is discussed.However, in theworldof the Internet, thatwordoftenraisesmanyeyebrowsbecause itusuallyinvolveslimitingtherighttofreedomofspeechormeansprohibitingconductsthat

Diana Dajer The Use of Social Media in Colombian Democratic Spaces 21

are difficult to enforce. This section proposes recommendations for State agencies toimplementorcomplementalreadyexistingnormsordevisepoliciestoattainastrongerimpactofthecurrentmeasures:

• Increasetheprosecutionofonlineoffences:Thefirstrecommendationisstronglyrelatedtoaquestionaboutwhatrealityis.Inmanycases,itiscommontofindaviewthatthedigitalworldisseparatedfromtheofflineone,asifacitizencouldhavebothadigitalandananaloguepersona.Inthewordsofaparticipantoftheworkshop:‘Thecrimescommittedinsocialmediaplatformsdonotlosetheircapacityofbeingcrimesjustbecausetherearecarriedoutinthedigitalsphere.Digitalimpunityneedstostop’.For State action, thismeans that there should be a stronger effort fromColombianagencies to enforce already existing rules for offline scenarios in offencesrelatedtotheuseofsocialmedia.Forinstance,byincreasingtheprosecutionofonlinehatespeech,murdermenaces,andbreachestotheregulationoncampaignpublicityforelectoral candidates, such as paying influencers for promoting a candidatewithoutdisclosingtheinformationaboutthedisbursement.

• Enforcedataprotectionpolicies:Thebiggestassetinsocialmediaispersonaldata.TherearemanycurrentStateeffortsandregulationstoprotectthedatarightsofthecitizens, such as the 2012 Law on Data Privacy and the prosecution of complaintsagainstcandidatesforbreachingcitizens’datarights.Still,inmanycases,theactionsarenotenough,andthecitizensdon’tevenknowtheirrights,whilethelawbreakersare not dissuaded nor punished. Therefore, it is recommended that the Stateimplementsmoreeffortstoincreasepublicliteracyondatarightsandquickreactionstoinvestigateandsanctionthewrongdoers.

• Educatefordigitaldemocracy:ThepubliceducationalpoliciesinColombianeedtoaddress more effectively the challenges of social media use for democracy. ManycitizensdonotknowhowtheInternetworks,norhowtheechochambersareproducedorhowfilterbubblesshapetheirpreferences.Furthermore,thedigitaldivideisstillveryhighinthecountry.Thus,whenmanyColombiansareintroducedtosocialmedia,theydonothaveenoughdataliteracytounderstandtheroleofalgorithms,artificialintelligence or junk news, so they can be easily deceivedwith disinformation. ThiscreatesapivotalburdenontheState,tomakesurethattheeducationalsystem,insideand outside classes and for younger and older populations, prepare individuals tounderstandsocialmediaandmakeresponsibledecisionsonhowtouseit.

3.4. Nurturesocially-responsibletechcompanies

Socialmediaistheproductofabroadrangeoftechenterprisesthatofferservicesthatallowpeopletocommunicatemoreeffectively.Thewaythesecorporationshaveshapedonlinealgorithms,dataprivacypoliciesandstrategiestoattractusersandincreasetheemploy-mentof theirproductshasalso influencedsomeof thebeneficial andharmfuleffectsofsocial media in the cases analysed. Social media companies could help to positivelyinfluencedemocracyifthey:

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• Increase transparency: Just recently, anddue to severe breaches of data security,socialmediacompanieshavestartedtocreateandimplementrigorousdataprivacypolicies.Yet,thereisanecessitytoincreasetransparencyonhowcompaniescollect,store,useandsharethedatacollectedfromusers.Moreover,thetermsandconditionsofsocialmediaplatformsareusuallylengthyandcomplex.Abroadrangeofusersdonotunderstandorevenreadthem.Thereisaneedforcompaniestoeducatetheirusersontheobligationsandrightsofemployingtheirproducts,sotheycanunderstandwhattheyareacceptingwhentheysignthetermsandconditions.

• Understandandaddresstheeffectsofsocialmediauseondemocracy:Companiesalso have a responsibility in researching, understanding, managing, mitigating andsharing the knowledge acquired about the risks that the use of their productsmayimply for democracy. Therefore, they should investmore in researching how theirproductsaffectdemocraticdecisionsandeducatingthepublicontheirfindingssomoreresponsibleuseofsocialmediaisnurtured.

3.5. Increasetheinternationalsupporttodomesticandglobalconcerns

Manychallengestodemocracyfromsocialmediause,suchasjunknewsandpolarisation,are being experienced in many countries worldwide. International cooperation is animportantallytotacklethesedifficulties.Thefollowingproposalsarerecommendedforthistypeofactor:

• Fostermorespacestosharebestpracticesandlessonslearned:Giventhateverycountryhasdistinctdynamicsandparticularities, thereshouldn’tbeacookie-cutterstrategyonhowtohandlesocialmediauseindemocraticspaces.However,therearemany innovative approaches to manage the situation that could provide insightfulperspectives to other cases, such as the use of online bots in the United States todecreaseonlinepolarisation.59Internationalcooperationshouldfostermorespacestosharelessonsandbestpracticesbetweendifferentstakeholdersandcountries.

• Risestrategicfinance:Aspreviouslymentioned,financinginitiativesonsocialmediaanddemocracyiskeytoadvancingunderstandingofthediversephenomenaaboutthisissueanddeviseevidence-basedstrategies.Thus, it isrecommendedto increasethestrategic finance of international donors for projects that address the use of socialmedia in Colombian democratic spaces, especially the ones that use exploratoryapproachesand,thus,areunderfinanced.

The recommendations proposed are only preliminary suggestions to trigger a broaderconversationonsocialmediauseanddemocracy.Likewise,theproposalsaimtosparkamulti-actor approach to address challenges common to adiverse rangeof stakeholders.Theircoordinatedworkcouldhelpdevisemoreeffectivestrategies toseek thecommon

59BuildUp,“BuildingTheCommons”,February27,2018,https://medium.com/@howtobuildup/building-the-commons-dc60e6ee7b69.

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objectiveofcreatingamoreinclusiveandtransparentdemocracyinthemidstoftheColom-bianconflict.

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Annex:KeyTerms

Thissectionincludesdefinitionsforkeywordsusedthroughoutthedocument,relevanttounderstandingtheeffectsofsocialmediauseinthecasesexaminedandthepolicyrecom-mendations.Whenappropriate,themeaningsprovidedalsoincludeexplanationsonhowtheyapplytothecontextofColombiaorindemocraticscenarios.

• Artificialintelligence(AI):Thisconceptisembeddedinthedefinitionofintelligence,whichiscommonlyunderstoodastheabilitytolearn,processinformationandmakedecisions. Artificial intelligence refers to the ability of a machine-based system togatherdata,interpretit,learnfromit,anduseittosolvecertainproblemsandcarrydeterminedtaskswithflexibility.60ColombiaispartyoftheOECDrecommendationsonartificialintelligence.Theciteddocumentidentifiesprinciplesfortheresponsiblestew-ardshipoftrustworthyAI,astheneedforatransparentdisclosurearoundAIsystems.Likewise,thetextmakesrecommendationsfortheStatesparty,suchastoinvestinAIresearchanddevelopment.61

• Echo chamber: An echo chamber describes a situation that happens in an online

networkdiscussion, inwhich the groupdivides into clusters of peoplewith similarbeliefs and ideas. The ideas in the subgroups are then amplified and reinforced byinteractionwith like-minded individuals.Echochambers influencedemocracygiventhat,insomecases,theycontributetothepolarisationofcitizensintoextremes,affect-ingtheirtoleranceforotherideasandtheinformationtheyreceive.62

• Filter bubble: Online algorithms inmany platforms usually personalise the digital

experienceofusers,byprovidingcontentbasedontheinformationthatthepersonhasalreadyexplored,soastopredicttheuser’sconsumptionpatterns.AfilterbubbleisatermfirstcoinedbyEliParisertodescribeasituationinwhichthisonlinepersonalisa-tionofcontentonlyprovidesindividualswithinformationthatreinforcetheirbeliefsandisolatesthemfromotherpointsofview.63Filterbubblesposechallengestodemoc-racydependingontheunderstandingofthenatureandvalueofthedefinitiongiventodemocracy.Forinstance,foraliberalunderstandingofdemocracy,filterbubblesmaylimitthefreedomofchoiceofindividuals.64

60AndreasKaplanandMichaelHaenlein,“Siri,Siri,inmyhand:Who’sthefairestintheland?Ontheinterpreta-tions,illustrations,andimplicationsofartificialintelligence”,BusinessHorizons62,no.1(January1,2019):15–25,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.004.61OECD,“RecommendationoftheCouncilonArtificialIntelligence”(2019),https://www.oecd.org/going-digi-tal/ai/principles/.62JonathanBright,“Explainingtheemergenceofpoliticalfragmentationonsocialmedia:Theroleofideologyand extremism”, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 23 (2018),https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmx002;MartaBarrios,LinaVega,andLuisGil,“Whenonlinecommentaryturnsintoviolence:TheroleofTwitterinslanderagainstjournalistsinColombia”,Conflict&CommunicationOnline18,no.1(2019):1–16.63EliPariser,Thefilterbubble:WhattheInternetishidingfromyou(London:Viking,2011);TienT.Nguyenetal.,“Exploringthefilterbubble:Theeffectofusingrecommendersystemsoncontentdiversity”,inProceedingsofthe23rdInternationalConferenceonWorldWideWeb(Seoul,Korea:ACM,2014),677–86.64EnginBozdagandJeroenvandenHoven,“Breakingthefilterbubble:Democracyanddesign”,EthicsandInfor-mationTechnology17,no.4(December1,2015):249–65,https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9380-y.

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• InformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs):Thesoftware,hardwareandsystemsthatenabletheaccess,production,storage,managementanddisseminationofinformation. This includes a broad range of technologies such as television, radio,mobilephonesandtheInternet.65Theinfluenceoftechnologyonthewayinformationissharedandcommunicatedindemocraticscenariosisreceivingincreasedattentionworldwide. 66 The most common information and communication technologies inColombia include television, radio, mobile phones, and laptop and desktopcomputers.67

• Junknewsandfakenews:Oneofthemainfeaturesofsocialmediais itspowertospreadcontenttomillionsofusersinjustseconds.Thatcontentmaynotnecessarilybeaccurateinformationinallthecases.Afewyearsago,theterm‘fakenews’acquiredincreasedpopularitytorefertomisleadingcontentspreadinsocialmediawithanap-pearanceof veracity.Therearegrowing critiquesof theuseof theexpression ‘fakenews’torefertothementionedmisinformation,giventhatithasbecomeapoliticisedconcept.68Instead, there is a risinguseof thephrase ‘junknews’ toname the citedpractice,whichemphasisestheviralityofthecontentinsteadofthemisinformationitcontains.69Thisisthetermprimarilyadoptedinthisbrief.InColombia,junknewswithcontent thatmay influence democratic decision-making processes has beenwidelyspreadinsocialmedia.

• Politicalpolarisation:Thistermdescribesaseparationofpublicopinioninoppositeideological extremes. Using data from the Americas Barometer, the Observatory ofDemocracy atAndesUniversity claims that political polarisation inColombia is notaboutideologiesofleftandright,butaboutspecificissuessuchasthepeaceagreementwithFARC-EP.70Likewise,studiesinColombiahaveshownthatsubgroupdiscussionsbetween like-minded individuals in social media have contributed to boost onlinepolarisation.71

• Sentimentanalysis:Alsocalledopinionmining,sentimentanalysisisatechniqueforexaminingandprocessingdatabyusingsystems to identifyandcategorisepeople’sopinions,emotionsandsentimentsincludedinimages,texts,soundsandothersourcesofdata.SentimentanalysisofcontentsharedonsocialmediaduringthepeaceprocesswithFARC-EPandelectionshasbecomeincreasinglypopularinColombia,giventhe

65JenGaskelletal.,“UsesofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)forEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding”,WOSCAP(LSEandBuildUp,2016).66Eran Fisher, “E-governance and e-democracy: Questioning technology-centered categories”, inThe OxfordHandbookofGovernance(OxfordUniversityPress,2012).67HootsuiteandWeAreSocial,“Digital2019:Colombia”.68DimitraLiotsiou,BenceKollanyi,andPhilipNHoward, “The JunkNewsAggregator:Examining junknewspostedonFacebook,startingwiththe2018USmidtermelections”,ArXivPreprintArXiv:1901.07920,2019.69TommasoVenturini,“Fromfaketojunknews:Thedatapoliticsofonlinevirality”,DataPolitics:Worlds,Subjects,Rights,2019.70 Observatorio de la Democracia, “¿De que va la polarizacion en Colombia?”, 2019, https://obsdemocra-cia.org/publicaciones/noticias/de-que-va-la-polarizacion-en-colombia/.71Acosta,“Gestiondepasionesypolarizacionenlasredessociales.UnanalisisdelaplicativogruposenFace-book”;Barrios, Vega, andGil, “Whenonline commentary turns into violence:The role ofTwitter in slanderagainstjournalistsinColombia”.

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roleplayedbyemotionsincitizen’sdecision-makingprocessesandtoshapethepublicopinion.72

• Social, civilorcommunity leaders: Community-based individuals that carryoutapublicdefenceofpositive collective interestsof their communitiesor groups.Theircommunitiesrecognisethemfortheworktheyimplement.73

• Socialmedia:Although this is an evolving concept given the speedatwhich socialmediachanges,thisexpressionreferstothebroadrangeofplatforms,applicationsandwebsites,mostlyenabledbytheInternet,thatallowuserstointeractwitheachotherin onlinenetworksby creating and sharing content.74By2019, 68%of Colombianswereactivesocialmediausers.Todate, themostpopularsocialmediaplatforms inColombiaare, inorderofpopularity,YouTube,Facebook,WhatsApp, InstagramandTwitter.75

72JhonAdrianCeron-GuzmanandElizabethLeon-Guzman,“AsentimentanalysissystemofSpanishtweetsanditsapplicationinColombia2014presidentialelection”(2016IEEEinternationalconferencesonbigdataandcloudcomputing(BDCloud),socialcomputingandnetworking(socialcom),sustainablecomputingandcommu-nications(sustaincom)(BDCloud-socialcom-sustaincom),IEEE,2016),250–57;VıctorGil,LinaMontoya,andIs-abelPuerta,“SentimentanalysisonpostconflictinColombia:Atextminingapproach”,AsianJournalofAppliedSciences(ISSN:2321–0893)6,no.02(2018).73CCJ,IEPRI,andAECID,¿Cuálessonlospatrones?Asesinatosdelíderessocialesenelpostacuerdo.74JonathanA.ObarandStevenS.Wildman,“Socialmediadefinitionandthegovernancechallenge-Anintroduc-tiontothespecialissue”,SSRNElectronicJournal,2015.75HootsuiteandWeAreSocial,“Digital2019:Colombia.”

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TheAuthor

DianaDajer is a social entrepreneurworking in the intersectionbetweenparticipatorydemocracy,innovationandpeacebuilding.SheisaPhDcandidateattheUniversityofOxford,a Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship Research for Action Awardee, a ColcienciasScholar, and thedirector and founderofPolicéntrico, a start-up that fosters sustainabledevelopmentandparticipatorydemocracyinColombia.Inclusioninpost-conflictsocietiesisDiana’sbiggestinterest.HercareerisrootedinColombiaandLatinAmerica’sstate-build-ingefforts,workinginprojectsinvolvingdemocraticinnovation,humanrightsandtransi-tionaljustice.Untilrecently,shewasaBuildPeaceFellow,wheresheconductedaresearchforactionprojecttodesignOurDevelopment,aparticipatorybudgetinggameandtechtoolforMedellín.ShehasalsoworkedasanadvisorfortheColombianMinistryofInterior,asProject Manager of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Rule of Law Programme for LatinAmerica,asaresearcherfortheToledoInternationalCentreforPeace,andasaconsultantat Purpose. She holds a degree in law, a graduate degree in administrative law, and amaster’sdegreeinpublicpolicy.

TodaPeaceInstitute

TheTodaPeaceInstituteisanindependent,nonpartisaninstitutecommittedtoadvancingamorejustandpeacefulworldthroughpolicy-orientedpeaceresearchandpractice.TheInstitute commissions evidence-based research, convenesmulti-track andmulti-discipli-naryproblem-solvingworkshopsandseminars,andpromotesdialogueacrossethnic,cul-tural,religiousandpoliticaldivides.Itcatalysespractical,policy-orientedconversationsbe-tweentheoreticalexperts,practitioners,policymakersandcivilsocietyleadersinordertodiscerninnovativeandcreativesolutionstothemajorproblemsconfrontingtheworldinthetwenty-firstcentury(seewww.toda.orgformoreinformation).ContactUsTodaPeaceInstituteSamonElevenBldg.5thFloor3-1Samon-cho,Shinjuku-ku,Tokyo160-0017,JapanEmail:contact@toda.org