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The U.S. Military. . . America’s Easy Button
by
Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Myers United States Army
20
17 A
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Under the Direction of: Dr. Marybeth Ulrich
United States Army War College Class of 2017
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The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by
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Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Myers United States Army
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Dr. Marybeth Ulrich
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Word Count: 6180
14. ABSTRACT
The United States continues to increase its military commitments to secure national interests at the
expense of implementing other instruments of national power, despite protections deliberately embedded
into the Constitution by America’s Founding Fathers to fight this outcome. The nation’s growing propensity
to use military force as the primary instrument of national power is rooted in three distinct phenomena: the
growing civil-military gap, Congress’s failure to exercise its constitutional prerogatives to declare war, and
the country’s failure to ensure citizen sacrifice to support its wars. The result is a country with an
empowered Executive that frequently employs the armed forces as the primary instrument of national
power to protect its interests. If not rectified, America will continue this trend due to the turbulent strategic
environment and growing threats from adversaries, which will likely jeopardize the nation’s standing and
reputation. This paper will discuss the causes of America’s growing reliance on the military and offer
solutions to better balance the nation’s use of all instruments of national power to return the country to a
state in closer alignment with the visions of the Founding Fathers.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Civil-Military Gap, Demographics, War Powers Resolution, Funding Wars
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The U.S. Military. . . America’s Easy Button
(6180 words)
Abstract
The United States continues to increase its military commitments to secure national
interests at the expense of implementing other instruments of national power, despite
protections deliberately embedded into the Constitution by America’s Founding Fathers
to fight this outcome. The nation’s growing propensity to use military force as the
primary instrument of national power is rooted in three distinct phenomena: the growing
civil-military gap, Congress’s failure to exercise its constitutional prerogatives to declare
war, and the country’s failure to ensure citizen sacrifice to support its wars. The result is
a country with an empowered Executive that frequently employs the armed forces as
the primary instrument of national power to protect its interests. If not rectified, America
will continue this trend due to the turbulent strategic environment and growing threats
from adversaries, which will likely jeopardize the nation’s standing and reputation. This
paper will discuss the causes of America’s growing reliance on the military and offer
solutions to better balance the nation’s use of all instruments of national power to return
the country to a state in closer alignment with the visions of the Founding Fathers.
The U.S. Military. . . America’s Easy Button
[The Founders] great advice was that we should structure ourselves as a country in a way that deliberately raised the price of admission to any war. With citizen-soldiers, with the certainty of a vigorous political debate over the use of a military subject to politicians’ control, the idea was for us to feel it – uncomfortably – every second we were at war.
—Rachel Maddow1
America’s Founding Fathers, fresh from removing the shackles of British Imperial
rule, strongly desired to create governmental and constitutional safeguards against
making war. Central to their concern was an understanding of European history where
monarchs repeatedly carried out warfare for personal gain or glory. Abraham Lincoln,
while serving his first term in Congress, reiterated the Founders’ concerns and their
intent:
The Provision of the Constitution, giving the war-making powers to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: kings had always been involved and impoverishing their people in wars. . . This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.2
Despite constitutional protections, the United States has increasingly turned to its
military to secure or maintain national interests. In fact, over the past 40 years, the U.S.
executed military operations in conflict zones over 190 times, roughly the same number
of military actions the nation conducted in the first two centuries of its history.3 One
explanation for this trend could be the era of U.S. hegemony that followed the Cold War;
a period where American power was relatively unchecked. Significant advances in
global communications, command and control, and transportation capabilities have also
facilitated military operations world-wide. However, a more innate and troubling
2
phenomenon within American society is likely to blame for the nation’s over-reliance on
its military.
The disincentives for war that the Framers built into the American political system
rely on citizens and Congress fulfilling their responsibilities to determine the military’s
role in pursuing the nation’s foreign policy pursuits. Today, U.S. citizens are less
connected to the military and less affected by decisions to commit armed forces to
hostilities than at any time in America’s history. To further complicate matters, Congress
has neglected its institutional responsibility for authorizing U.S. military operations.
Consequently, the Executive branch gained an unprecedented autonomy to use force.
Ultimately, the widening civil-military gap, Congress’s abdication of its
constitutional prerogatives for declaring war, and changing war-time fiscal policies have
created conditions where American citizens and their representatives no longer exert
meaningful influence on the military’s role in foreign policy. The result is a nation that
too often requires the military to achieve national interests – tendencies that the
Founding Fathers fought to guard against. This paper will examine the origins of these
conditions and propose measures to re-engage citizens and Congress on decisions to
employ the U.S. military – measures which should allow the country to better balance
the use of all instruments of national power and decrease its unhealthy dependence on
the military.
Origins of the Citizen-Soldier Concept
America’s Founding Fathers possessed profound beliefs on the form and
function of the nation’s military, shaped in large part by their experiences with British
occupation. Several Framers including Sam Adams expressed intense aversion to
maintaining a standing army which he deemed would be “dangerous to the Liberties of
3
the People.”4 Despite these fears, they acknowledged the fledgling nation’s need for a
capability to defend itself and agreed to grant Congress the exclusive right to maintain
and raise an army.5 However, the Framers decided to limit Congress’s ability to fund an
army for a period of only two years. As such, the nation’s mechanism for defending the
country in times of crisis would be wartime mobilization of the states’ militias in lieu of a
standing army.6
Despite authorizing an adequate defense capability against both internal and
external threats, the Founders remained adamant that systems of governance must
guard against any one individual or group waging war. As James Wilson stated to the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787, “this system [of government] will not hurry us
into war, it is calculated against it. . . and will not be in the power of a single man, or a
single body of men.” Ultimately, the Constitution became the Framers’ mechanism to
protect the nation from waging war frivolously. The Founders sought to make armed
conflict difficult by granting Congress the power to declare war and by ensuring the
public’s sacrifice through the use of an army comprised of citizen-soldiers. Over two and
a half centuries removed from these historic decisions that shaped America, many of
the safeguards the Framers instituted to prevent the nation from engaging in frequent
conflicts have been circumvented, removed, or degraded to such a degree that waging
war has become relatively easy.
The Widening Civil-Military Gap
In 1945, over 9 million citizens served in the U.S. military, which represented
over 9-percent of the total population. At the height of the Vietnam war, the U.S. military
was a 2.7-million-person conscripted force, with over 4-percent of the nation’s eligible
population having served in that conflict.7 Today, less than one-half of one-percent of
4
Americans serve in the armed forces. This trend indicates an unprecedented gap
between Americans and the military. It is important to note that a continual widening of
the civil-military gap is inevitable as the population rises and the military end strength
remains relatively stable. However, aside from decreasing proportions of American
veterans in the citizenry, several additional factors emerged over the past decades that
expanded the civil-military divide and placed the connection between American citizens
and its military in even greater jeopardy.
Exacerbating the Gap
Over the past 25 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) closed more than 350
military installations according to the Base Closure and Realignment Committee’s
(BRAC) recommendations.8 As a result, DoD consolidated personnel from the losing
installations to several of the military’s larger bases, creating a less geographically
dispersed military force. The Army installation at Fort Bliss, Texas is emblematic of the
military’s geographic consolidation that resulted from BRAC. Its military population grew
from 10,000 soldiers in 2005 to over 33,500 soldiers in 2014. Similar consolidations took
place at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Carson, Colorado. The
by-product of base reductions and the formation of mega-bases created a more regional
military (see figure 1). In fact, in 2015, over forty-nine percent of the U.S. military served
in five states: California, Virginia, Texas, North Carolina, and Georgia.9
As the nation’s military progressively moved South and West, recruiting efforts
and trends followed.10 Military recruiters shifted their focus to states with larger military
populations to capitalize on the existing military exposure and traditionally high
recruiting rates in those states. In fact, a 2014 Department of Defense report indicated
that over the past 35 years, military recruits from the South and West were over-
5
represented. Military recruits from the Northeast and Midwest, however, were under-
represented.11 The shift in military populations to the South and West further cements a
regionalized military that has progressively become less connected to American society.
Figure 1. Per-capita Military Enlistments from 2000 to 2010, Grouped by 3-digit Zip Code.12
Another aspect that deepened the civil-military gap is the reduction and
increasing regionalization of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at the
nation’s universities. The National Defense Act of 1916 initiated ROTC to prepare the
country for participation in World War I. Since then, ROTC has been the primary
commissioning source of American officers.13
ROTC programs have also served as a hedge against a civil-military divide,
providing a vital link between the military and society through institutions of higher
learning. Over the past 25 years, that vital link has been compromised as the number of
ROTC programs decreased significantly. In the 1980s, the U.S. Army maintained 420
6
ROTC programs. By 2016, only 275 programs remained.14 During recent decades,
economic and societal pressures forced universities and the military to reduce ROTC
representation nationwide and to focus programs in the South and West. This resulted
in greater regionalization of this vital commissioning source and severed a vital link
between some of the nation’s most prestigious universities and the U.S. military.
The unpopular Vietnam War and the military’s controversial but now defunct
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy served as two social catalysts for change, causing a
significant backlash against universities with ROTC programs and forcing a number to
close. Most notably, the Department of Defense shut down ROTC departments at some
of the nation’s most prestigious universities including Harvard, Yale, Stanford,
and Columbia. These schools have only recently re-established ROTC departments to
varying degrees.
In 2011, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia had a combined
population of 16 million, approximately the total combined populations of Virginia,
Alabama, and Mississippi.15 However, ROTC programs in those four cities numbered
14, while VA, AL, and MS hosted 35 programs.16 The reduction of ROTC programs in
the nation’s largest cities has removed a vital link between the nation and its citizens,
further increasing the civil-military divide.
The last factor contributing to the civil-military divide is the growing trend of multi-
generational soldiers. In 2011, a Pew Research Center survey of veterans and the
general public indicated that 77-percent of adults over the age of 50 had an immediate
family member who served in the U.S. military compared to only 57-percent of those
between the age of 30 to 49. The number decreases to 33-percent for those under the
7
age of 30.17 The same survey reports that close to 80-percent of veterans have a parent
or sibling who served in the military, and these same veterans are “twice as likely as
members of the general public to have a son or daughter who has served.”18
In 2008, nearly 60-percent of the military’s general officers had children serving
in the armed forces.19 Additionally, as of 2011, nearly 100,000 military members were
married to another service member.20 The Pew survey paints younger generations as
having fewer interactions with and less understanding of the military while also
describing an increasingly insular, multigenerational military. Both of these outcomes
are cause for alarm as they further separate the citizenry from the military and
exacerbate the civil-military gap.
While today’s smaller, more regionalized, and increasingly multi-generational
military has resulted in a wider divide between U.S. service members and citizens, it is
important to comprehend how this separation manifests itself in American society. The
2011 Pew survey highlighted a number of discouraging revelations. The study revealed
that 84-percent of surveyed post-9/11 veterans believed that the public did not
understand the problems that they or their families experience.21 Conversely, 71-percent
of non-military survey respondents admitted that they did not understand the problems
faced by the military or their families.22
More alarmingly, roughly 50-percent of the surveyed public did not believe that
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were worth the cost. Additionally, only 25-percent of
respondents admitted that they followed these wars closely, confessing that the conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq had little impact on their lives.23 Perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the survey was the public’s acknowledgment of a significant burden-sharing
8
gap between the U.S. military and civilians over the past 15 years of conflict. While 83-
percent of surveyed adults stated that military personnel and their families have made
significant sacrifices since 9/11, 43-percent believed that the American people have
also made substantial sacrifices.24 Strikingly, only 26-percent of those surveyed felt as if
the sacrifices made by military personnel were unfair and 70-percent considered it a
natural result of serving in the military.25
The Pew survey highlights significant cause for concern as it describes an
admittedly ill-informed American public who are disinterested in the U.S. military and
how it is employed around the world. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Michael Mullen outlined his concerns on the widening civil-military gap in his
address to the West Point Class of 2011:
This great republic of ours was founded on some pretty simple ideas – simple but enduring. And one of them is that the people. . . will determine the course the military steers, the skills we perfect, the wars we fight. But I fear they do not know us. I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we return from battle. This is important because a people uninformed about what they are asking the military to endure is a people inevitably unable to fully grasp the scope of the responsibilities our Constitution levies upon them.26
Admiral Mullen’s concerns are still valid today. As the connection between the American
people and its military continues to fray, so too has the public’s influence over the role of
the military.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the public’s acknowledgment and willing
acceptance of the large disparity between the sacrifices made by military service-
members in support of the nation’s wars as compared to the public at large. These
conditions strongly diverge from the beliefs of the Founding Fathers who sought to
ensure “a vigorous political debate” over the use of the military subject. They also
9
wanted the citizenry to “feel [war] uncomfortably – every second” the nation is engaged
in war.27
In fact, as Rachel Maddow attests, with servicemen and women deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan for over 15 years since 9/11, the nation has never “been further from. .
. the idea that America would find it impossible to go to war without disrupting domestic
life.”28 Congress and the Executive branch, armed with a professional All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) that does not require Americans to sacrifice to support the nation’s
conflicts, have shifted the burden for the common defense to the nation’s military.29
These conditions have enabled the Executive branch to disproportionally rely on and
wield military power to address security challenges and pursue national interests.
Authorizing the Use of Force
While the American public and its military have gradually drifted apart, the civil-
military gap in Congress has also grown. For much of America’s history, military service
was practically a prerequisite for membership in Congress. Today, fewer veterans serve
as representatives than at any time in the nation’s recent past. The 95th Congress
(1977-1978) proved to be the high-water mark for veteran representation with 77-
percent of the Congress having served.30 In 2016, the total number of veterans fell to
less than 19-percent of Congress.31 What impact does the growing civil-military gap in
Congress have on its decisions to use force to pursue U.S. foreign policy?
Congress maintains the exclusive authority to declare war on behalf of the
nation. This power was vested in its hands to ensure George Washington’s vision; that
the nation’s representatives would vigorously debate and formally authorize force before
any military expeditions. In 1806, in the United States v. Smith, the Supreme Court
solidified this responsibility by ruling that decisions regarding whether the nation was at
10
peace or at war was “the exclusive province of Congress to determine.”32 Throughout
recent history, a number of presidents have balked at the requirement to involve
Congress when employing military forces overseas. As a result, Congress passed the
War Powers Resolution in 1973 over the objections and veto of President Richard Nixon
to strengthen its war-making authorities. This act exemplified the real struggle between
the executive and legislative branches on the authority to use military force.
The War Powers Resolution represented Congress’s effort to clarify and
reinforce constitutional statutes and responsibilities on the use of force, and to “ensure
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President [applied] to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”33 This resolution mandated
reporting requirements for the executive branch to Congress. Additionally, the resolution
established a 60-day limit for the deployment of military forces without congressional
approval, which only Congress could extend.34 However, despite its inherent
constitutional authority and the additional powers granted by the War Powers
Resolution, Congress has repeatedly failed in its duty to deliberate and authorize U.S.
military interventions abroad.35
Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, the United States has increasingly
deployed its military to conflict zones, a number of which involved combat to include
operations in Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.36 None of these
were approved by a declaration of war. In fact, Congress last sanctioned a formal
declaration of war in June 1942 against Romania during World War II.37 Of the
numerous military operations conducted since the creation of the AVF, only three were
11
officially sanctioned by Congress when it authorized the use of military force against
Iraq in 1991 and 2002, as well as in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The past two presidents have used Congress’s 9/11 authorization to wage a
global war on terrorism, far beyond the scope of the Joint Resolution. Despite surging
military operations and the tendency of recent presidents to liberally apply the 9/11
authorization to expand their war-making abilities, Congress has demonstrated
ambivalence in fulfilling its role to approve military actions. This phenomenon begs the
question as to why Congress is seemingly unwilling to exert its institutional prerogative.
While answers to this important question are beyond the scope of this paper, they are
relevant to the discussion.
Two explanations to this question appear plausible. The first reasonable
justification centers on the American public’s relative disinterest in engaging its
representatives on the issue of using military force. Absent pressure from
constituencies, U.S. representatives may choose a politically safe approach and avoid
deliberating military operations so as to not be held accountable for military failures.
The second and more troubling explanation involves the relationship between
U.S. military interventions abroad and the American military industrial complex.
America’s wars and increasingly frequent military deployments tend to support the
military industrial complex. In fact, since the height of the Vietnam war, shares of the
main U.S. arms manufacturers have risen over four times the rate of the overall
market.38 The post 9/11 wars have been good business for many American
corporations, providing thousands of jobs and supporting local economies. Additionally,
the defense industry spends millions of dollars annually in lobbying efforts to garner
12
congressional support for its military programs. These programs are, in turn, aided by
the increased military operations pursued by recent presidents. The military industrial
complex has also been a prime player in the campaign contribution business. In fact, in
2016, the top ten defense companies contributed over $18.5 million to congressional
candidates and their respective parties.39 Despite these two logical explanations, the
decreasing veteran presence in Congress plays a larger factor to rationalize its inaction
for approving military operations.
A 21st century Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) survey examined the
gap between the military and American society. This project aimed to determine
whether an individual’s familiarity with the military influenced his views on U.S. national
security and foreign policy. The examination studied survey results of four distinct
populations: Elite Military, Elite Civilians who attended Professional Military Education
Courses but had no actual military experience, Elite Civilians with military experience,
and Elite Civilians with no military experience.40 The TISS study provided a significant
conclusion regarding the civil-military gap in Congress and how this gap might influence
U.S. foreign policy. In comparison to military elites and civilians with military service,
civilian elites with no military experience were more approving of an interventionist
approach in terms of the range of issues they supported using military force.41
Rather remarkably, the TISS study also concluded that as veteran presence in
the executive and legislative branches increased, the probability that the U.S. would use
military force to settle disputes decreased by 90-percent.42 The study postulated that as
veteran presence in the executive and legislative branches continued to decline, the
13
United States would increasingly use military force as the principal instrument of
national power to address foreign policy aims.
The TISS survey and its findings are over a decade old. While no subsequent
studies exist that confirm or refute its propositions, Congress’s decreasing veteran
presence and America’s increasingly interventionist posture appear to lend credence to
the study’s findings. Whether Congress’s rising tendency to support military
interventions is a function of its members’ fundamental beliefs on the use of military
force or due to its acquiescence on military matters in general, neither is positive. The
result is a country whose foreign policy fails to balance the use of all instruments of
national power.
The byproduct of Congress’s egregious failure to execute its constitutional
responsibilities has been the unprecedented strengthening of the Executive’s ability to
commit the nation’s military. Congress, as Thomas Friedman describes, “either meekly
bows to the wishes of the executive or provides the sort of broad authorization that
amounts in effect to an abrogation of direct responsibility.”43 The result is arguably a
nation where the only real struggle for waging war is between the White House and the
Pentagon, where war has become an almost natural condition of the American state.44
Paying for War
A third phenomenon that has enabled the country to drift frequently towards
conflict is the government’s recent departure from levying taxes on current generations
to pay for war. America has a profound legacy of contesting taxes, particularly in its
early years as exemplified by the Revolutionary War. However, over the course of its
history, the country has accepted taxation as a means to fund conflicts and to share the
sacrificial burden of war with its citizens. In fact, the government used taxation to fund
14
the first three major conflicts in its history: the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World
War I.
The most poignant example of American wartime financial sacrifice took place
during World War II. Facing the inexorable prospect of entering the struggle in Europe,
the U.S. government committed to a dramatic overhaul of the nation’s tax system to
support the anticipated financial burdens of the looming conflict.45 Less than one year
following U.S. entry into World War II, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1942,
effectively expanding the federal income tax from a “class tax” to a “mass tax,” a system
that resembles today’s tax structure.46 The establishment of this fiscal sacrifice served
as a profound departure from a long-standing aversion to government taxation of its
citizens. Remarkably, however, approximately 90-percent of Americans surveyed
deemed that the monetary sacrifice was fair.47 Americans supported the nation’s entry
into World War II and did not shy away from personal sacrifice on behalf of the country.
America sustained the tradition of fiscal sacrifice during the Korean War.
However, this trend cooled notably during the Vietnam conflict, as then President
Johnson first balked and then reluctantly accepted an income tax surcharge to support
the growing war costs. Three decades later and months prior to the 9/11 attacks,
President George W. Bush brought a sharp divergence from taxation to fund war when
he enacted significant tax cuts despite initiating what would be the longest war in
American history.
It seems remarkable that in the months that followed, despite entering what
appeared to be a lengthy conflict in Afghanistan and with a war in Iraq looming, neither
the administration nor Congress made any significant pleas for tax increases. What
15
proved even more astonishing and unprecedented were the subsequent tax cuts
enacted in March 2003, just days after the U.S. military initiated the ground invasion of
Iraq. In 2011, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of the Bush tax
cuts totaled roughly $1.3 trillion in reduced government revenue, ironically almost the
same cumulative cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2011.48
During the subsequent Obama administration, taxes remained low and, at times,
decreased further. In fact, the average effective tax rate for all U.S. taxpayers ranged
between 16.8 and 17.2-percent throughout the Bush and Obama administrations, with
no increase in taxes to fund the post 9/11 wars.49 In stark contrast, average tax rates
during World War II and the Korean War rose sharply to fund the nation’s conflicts.
Remarkably, the effective tax rate for a typical American rose from a 1.5-percent in
1940 to 15.1-percent at the end of World War II, increasing federal revenues three-
fold.50 With decreased revenues from lower taxes, both the Bush and Obama
administrations turned extensively to unparalleled financial borrowing from foreign
nations to fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.51
Instead of levying the responsibility to pay for the nation’s wars on current
generations, the Bush and Obama Administrations charted a dangerous course with two
distinct and damaging outcomes. First, they effectively transferred the immense costs of
the post-9/11 wars to future generations who cannot influence the current political
process. In doing so, they removed the burden of paying for our nation’s wars from the
American citizen. Second, by pursuing war funding via Continuing Resolution, the
Executive branch practically circumvented the responsibility of budgetary oversight from
Congress. In essence, Continuing Resolutions establish permanent appropriations that
16
do not navigate traditional congressional appropriations processes, creating
disincentives for Congress to provide effective oversight.52 As a result, the government
further encouraged an already uninterested public to remain unengaged in U.S. foreign
policy. Furthermore, with a diminished interest to oversee military spending, Congress
further disengaged from decisions to authorize force, effectively deferring military
matters to the Executive branch.
Future Implications
As the nation progresses through the 21st century, several phenomena
may strengthen its tendency to rely on the military to achieve foreign policy aims.
First, the volatile and unpredictable security environment is made increasingly
complicated by the rapid rise of non-state actors. These entities do not respond
in traditional manners to diplomatic, economic, or informational instruments of
national power, fostering the likelihood of increased U.S. military interventions.
Additionally, rising powers such as Russia and China are progressively
contesting U.S. hegemony and the current state of global affairs. U.S. reactions
may intensify the potential for conflict due to the chance of misperceptions and
miscalculations, particularly if the country continues to rely on the military at the
expense of other instruments of national power.
The second factor that enables America’s over-reliance on its military is the high
regard that the public places in the armed forces. The U.S. military is arguably the best
trained, educated, disciplined, and well-equipped force since the advent of the AVF.
Naturally, Americans expect a high return on their investment. These high expectations,
however, are further exacerbated by the increasing divide between citizens and the
military. This dynamic can be seen in the nation’s legislature as well where a Congress
17
who does not possess the same appreciation for the military institution or its culture, is
disinterested in conducting insightful or firm scrutiny over military matters.53 The obvious
concern with the American public and Congress maintaining an unhealthy regard for the
U.S. military is that they will not effectively scrutinize future military operations, further
aggravating an over-reliance on American military might.
The final element that supports increased American military interventions is the
rapid pace of technological advancements. Constant technological improvements over
recent decades have reinforced increased military operations and also intensified
Americans’ expectations for military success. Unmanned platforms, precision weapons,
and the prospects of autonomous weapons and “super soldiers” expand U.S. military
capabilities and promote a change to the character of war, where casualties and overall
risk to U.S. military forces will be lower.
The promise of more swift and sterile conflicts will undoubtedly raise the public’s
expectations for military success and further reinforce a belief that the “horrors of
combat are things of the past.”54 As a result, Americans may not comprehend the
difficulties associated with future wars and acquiesce without significant debate to the
U.S. military engaging in perilous operations. These conditions increase the nation’s
vulnerability due to what prominent political journalist and author William Greider
describes as “presumptions of unconquerable superiority,” that will “lead [the country]
deeper and deeper into unwinnable conflicts.”55
National Service
While the conditions that have allowed for an increasingly military-dominated
American foreign policy may appear bleak, they can be remedied. The first step the
country must take to better balance its use of the military is to instill in its citizens a
18
greater sense of service and commitment to the nation. Influential figures to include
GEN (Ret) Stanley McChrystal and U.S. Representative Charles Rangel have
advocated to re-institute a military draft to reinvigorate a service culture in American
society and to extend the sacrificial burden to a greater percentage of Americans.56
However, there are many who debate whether the cost of losing the professionalism
and unparalleled efficacy of the All-Volunteer Force would outweigh the benefits of
increased national service and sacrifice. In addition to promoting a return of the military
draft, Representative Rangel also encouraged national service programs as a method
of sharing the costs and benefits of American freedom to all.57
Rangel’s Universal National Service Act proposed mandatory registration for
selective service and two years of compulsory service for all citizens between the ages
of 18 to 25.58 Men and women could complete their obligation in any number of
occupations such as schools, hospitals, airports, or the military. Rangel’s proposal
sought to ensure that “all Americans are involved in our defense [and that] every family
will fully engage in any decision to use force.”59
Several other notable figures such as Hillary Clinton and Senator John McCain
have proposed similar mandatory service programs, although none of these
recommendations have gained significant traction in Congress. Incentivizing, rather
than mandating national service may be a more feasible approach to garner increased
sacrifice from Americans. General McChrystal recently called for such incentive
programs, proposing that the nation encourage colleges and corporations to promote
national service. His idea envisions that the government incentivize “schools [to] adjust
their acceptance policies and employers their hiring practices to benefit those who have
19
served.”60 Ultimately, any measure the nation adopts to inculcate a greater sense of
service should strengthen Americans’ participation in the political process and intensify
national debate on the appropriate use of military force.
Narrowing the Civil-Military Gap
The civil-military gap will continue to widen as the U.S. population grows. The
nation must, however, undertake meaningful efforts to gain improved military
representation from across the nation to reconnect society with its military. The U.S. can
first begin by rebalancing ROTC programs across the nation, particularly in the
Northeast and in the largest urban areas. Fortunately, the military has already begun
efforts to address this issue. In 2013, U.S. Army Cadet Command announced that it
would be closing 13 ROTC programs to shift financial resources to 56 different markets,
to include Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago.61
Additionally, Cadet Command expanded scholarship opportunities to recruit
students from inner-cities, announcing an urban scholarship initiative to better reflect the
“geographic and demographic diversity of the country.”62 While ongoing movements to
rebalance officer recruitment from across the nation are essential, the military must also
gain better geographic representation for its enlisted population. To accomplish this, the
military must expand recruitment efforts beyond the historically strong South and West
regions. Creating a more geographically representative force is a vital step to more
effectively bind the public to the military, and to ensure for expanded public engagement
and debate on future decisions to use force.
Reform the War Powers Resolution
The Constitution clearly states that Congress has the prerogative to authorize a
non-defensive war, a power that it has increasingly failed to assert. Although Congress
20
passed the 1973 War Powers Resolution to affirm its control over war-making decisions,
in practice, this law has failed to curb the Executive. In fact, no president has
recognized the constitutionality of the War Powers Act and recent presidents have
blatantly ignored Congress’s role in authorizing force. To complicate matters further, the
resolution’s 60-day limit on committing military force for hostilities without congressional
approval has proven to be a critical flaw.63 This stipulation, in effect, recognizes the
president’s ability to unilaterally engage in war-making. Furthermore, the 60-day limit
strongly ties the hands of the Legislative branch as options to recall forces once
deployed are often severely limited by political pressures.
There have been recent efforts in both the House and the Senate to reform the
War Powers Resolution. U.S. Representative Chris Gibson recommended a 48-hour
requirement for the President to report to Congress following any introduction of armed
forces into hostilities, repealing the existing 60 and 90-day timelines.64 Senators John
McCain and Tim Kaine proposed reducing the period where the President could commit
military forces to seven days before both houses of Congress would vote to authorize
continued military operations.65
However, neither of these recommended amendments is sufficient. The previous
two administrations liberally applied the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use of
Military Force in Response to the 9/11 attacks to justify military actions world-wide, far
beyond the scope of the original authorization. Moreover, Congress has repeatedly
demonstrated an unwillingness to countermand the Executive once military forces are
employed. The War Powers Resolution must be amended to require congressional
approval prior to the deployment of the military short of the immediate defense of the
21
nation, as the Founding Fathers envisioned.66 Furthermore, due to the increased role of
non-state actors and frequent U.S. counter-terrorism campaigns, any amendment to the
War Powers Resolution must insist upon a very strict definition of war to prevent the
Executive from taking advantage of ambiguous situations where conflict may result.67
Funding Future Military Actions
The aforementioned proposals are meaningful remedies that can help the
country re-balance its use of the military with the other instruments of national power.
However, the most effective measure the nation must take is to change the manner in
which it pays for war. Taking action to ensure that American citizens share in the
burdens of war would force a much needed and long-overdue debate concerning when
and where America’s military should be employed. The current practice of transferring
the costs of war onto future generations who cannot yet vote is a troubling
development.68 Increasing taxes or reducing government benefits or consumption are all
practical approaches to more appropriately fund the nation’s wars. However, to solidify
this remedy and to fundamentally change how America funds its wars, Congress must
pursue legislation that prohibits military deployments to conflicts without an established
and approved funding source.
Representative Gibson’s offered House Resolution 560 lays out a feasible course
for paying for future wars. His proposal prohibits funds “from being obligated or
expended for introducing the Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, in the absence of (1) a
declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency
created by an attack or imminent threat of attack upon the United States, its territories
or possessions, or the Armed Forces.”69
22
Some argue that the unwillingness of the Bush and Obama administrations to
raise taxes to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was linked to fading public support.
Admittedly, raising taxes or reducing government spending is a controversial activity in
Washington. However, if America is to re-balance its use of the military with other
instruments of national power, it must be willing to re-examine how it funds military
actions. By tethering future military actions to approved funding, the nation would force
its citizenry and Congress to re-engage in the political process and decide whether the
stakes of proposed military actions are worth the cost.70 America would be wise to follow
John F. Kennedy’s advice and be prepared to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet
any hardship” to wage war or endeavor to find another solution.71
Conclusion
America finds itself far removed from the nation that reluctantly entered, yet
strongly supported World Wars I and II, where the country largely mobilized, maintained
tight connections between the citizenry and the military, and exercised sustained
sacrifice. As the civil-military divide has grown over the past decades, both the public
and Congress have largely abdicated their roles in the political process for determining
the role of the U.S. military. Additionally, both the Legislative and Executive branches
have progressively failed to ensure citizen sacrifice to support the nation’s wars. The
consequence of these failures is an empowered Executive branch that frequently
employs the armed forces as the primary instrument of national power to protect the
country’s interests.
Despite these alarming trends, America can return to conditions in closer
alignment with the original views of the Framers. Pursuing national service programs
and developing a more geographically representative military will decrease the civil-
23
military gap and better connect Americans with their military. Generating greater
constituent participation should result in improved congressional oversight on military
activities, reinforced by a strengthened War Powers Resolution. Furthermore, ensuring
that Americans sacrifice financially via war taxes or reduced government spending or
consumption will further solidify their participation in the political process.
U.S. military operations remain vital to preserving national security or fighting
tyranny. However, America must reinvigorate deliberative processes to decide when
and where to use military force, and in doing so, ensure that both its citizens and
Congress are active participants. These aforementioned proposed measures should
assist the nation better implement all instruments of national power in its foreign policy
pursuits, and ultimately return America to a state in closer alignment with the beliefs of
the Founding Fathers.
Endnotes
1 Rachel Maddow, Drift (New York: Broadway Books, 2012), 202.
2 Paul M. Angle and Earl Schenck Miers, The Living Lincoln: The Man and His Times, in His Own Words (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1992), 110-111.
3 Barbara Salazar Torreon, Instances of Use of the United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1978-2016 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 7, 2016), 10-34, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf (accessed December 19, 2016).
4 Samuel Adams Heritage Society, “Samuel Adams Letter to James Warren, 1776,” http://www.samuel-adams-heritage.com/documents/samuel-adams-to-james-warren-1776.html (accessed December 6, 2016).
5 The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section VIII, Clause II, http://constitutionus.com (accessed December 6, 2016).
6 The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section VIII, Clause XV, http://constitutionus.com (accessed December 6, 2016).
7 David Zucchino and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Military and Civilians are Increasingly Divided,” Los Angeles Times Online, May 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-warrior-main-
24
20150524-story.html (accessed November 7, 2016).
8 GlobalSecurity, “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/brac.htm (accessed December 7, 2016).
9 Zucchino and Cloud, “U.S. Military and Civilians are Increasingly Divided.” 10 Mark Thompson, “The Other 1%,” Time Online, November 21, 2011,
(http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,2099152,00.html# (accessed November 7, 2016).
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2014 Summary Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), 21, http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/2014%20Summary.pdf?ver=2016-09-14-154051-563 (accessed December 4, 2016).
12 James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” The Atlantic, January/February 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/ (accessed October 18, 2016).
13 Cheryl Miller, “Underserved: A Case Study of ROTC in New York City,” May 2011, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ROTC-Final-May-2011.pdf (accessed December 4, 2016), 8.
14 Zucchino and Cloud, “U.S. Military and Civilians are Increasingly Divided.”
15 Miller, “Underserved: A Case Study of ROTC in New York City,” 10.
16 Ibid.
17 Pew Research Center, “The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections,” http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/23/the-military-civilian-gap-fewer-family-connections/?src=prc-number (accessed November 7, 2016).
18 Ibid.
19 Miller, “Underserved: A Case Study of ROTC in New York City,” 10.
20 Thompson, “The Other 1%.”
21 Pew Research Center, “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era,” October 5, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era/ (accessed November 7, 2016).
22 Pew Research Center, “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era.”
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
25
26 Admiral Mullen, “Address to the West Point Class of 2011,” speech, West Point, NY,
August 2011, http://www.rememberdaren.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/JCS-Speech-at-West-Point-Graduation.pdf (accessed November 16, 2016).
27 Maddow, Drift, 202.
28 Ibid.
29 Thomas L. Friedman, “The Home Team,” New York Times Online, February 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/opinion/the-home-team.html?_r=0 (accessed December 12, 2016).
30 Andrew Rugg et al., “Vital Statistics on CongressData on the U.S. Congress – A Joint Effort from Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute,” January 9, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/vital-statistics-on-congressdata-on-the-u-s-congress-a-joint-effort-from-brookings-and-the-american-enterprise-institute/ (accessed February 8, 2016).
31 Jennifer E. Manning, Membership of the 114th Congress: A Profile (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf (accessed February 13, 2017).
32 United States v. Smith, July, 1806, https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F.Cas/0027.f.cas/0027.f.cas.1233.pdf (accessed December 19, 2016).
33 U.S. Code Title 50, Chapter 33, Section A, War Powers Resolution, section 1541, 310, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title50/USCODE-2011-title50-chap33 (accessed December 17, 2016), 310.
34 U.S. Code Title 50, Chapter 33, Section C, War Powers Resolution, section 1541, 318, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title50/USCODE-2011-title50-chap33 (accessed December 17, 2016).
35 Maddow, Drift, 210.
36 Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 18, 2014), appendix B, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf (accessed January 16, 2017).
37 Ibid., 1.
38 James Petras, “The Soaring Profits of the Military-Industrial Complex, the Soaring Costs of Military Casualties,” June 24, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-soaring-profits-of-the-military-industrial-complex-the-soaring-costs-of-military-casualties/5388393 (accessed March 8, 2017).
39 Open Secrets.Org, “Defense: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates, Parties, and Outside Groups,” https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?ind=D (accessed January 16, 2017).
26
40 Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military
Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004), 36-37.
41 Ibid., 6.
42 Ibid., 7.
43 Friedman, “The Home Team.”
44 Maddow, Drift, 203.
45 Steven A. Bank, Kirk J. Stark, and Joseph J. Thorndike, War and Taxes (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 2008), xiv.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Glenn Kessler, “Revisiting the Cost of the Bush Tax Cuts,” The Washington Post Online, May 10, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/revisiting-the-cost-of-the-bush-tax-cuts/2011/05/09/AFxTFtbG_blog.html?utm_term=.4f1d5c9ac262 (accessed March 7, 2017).
49 Ritchie King, “Check your US Tax Rate for 2012 – and Every Year Since 1913,” Quartz Media LLC, April 14, 2013, https://qz.com/74271/income-tax-rates-since-1913/ (accessed November 7, 2016).
50 Bruce Bartlett, “The Cost of War,” Forbes, November 26, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/25/shared-sacrifice-war-taxes-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html (accessed February 13, 2017).
51 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “What Americans Don’t Understand about Their Own Military,” Defense One, May 6, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/05/what-americans-dont-understand-about-their-own-military/112042/ (accessed November 7, 2016).
52 Jessica Tollestrup, Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 20, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41948.pdf (accessed March 8, 2017).
53 Thompson, “The Other 1%.”
54 Karl W. Eickenberry and David M. Kennedy, “Americans and Their Military, Drifting Apart,” The New York Times Online, May 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/opinion/americans-and-their-military-drifting-apart.html (accessed December 19, 2016).
55 William Greider, “The Fatal Flaw in American Foreign Policy,” The Nation, September 4, 2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/fatal-flaw-american-foreign-policy/ (accessed January 16, 2016).
27
56 Josh Rogin, “McChrystal: Time to Bring Back the Draft,” Foreign Policy, July 3, 2012,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/03/mcchrystal-time-to-bring-back-the-draft/ (accessed December 12, 2016).
57 Charles Rangel, “All Americans Have a Duty to Defend our Nation,” USA Today Online, February 15, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/02/15/two-years-compulsory-service-rangel/1922597/ (accessed February 13, 2017).
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Conor Friedersdorf, “The Case against Universal National Service,” The Atlantic, June 26, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/the-case-against-universal-national-service/277230/ (accessed February 21, 2017).
61 Alan Binder, “R.O.T.C. Making Cuts to Expand Recruiting,” The New York Times Online, October 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/making-cuts-to-expand-recruiting-for-rotc.html?_r=0 (accessed January 16, 2017).
62 Ms. Vickey Mouze, “New Army ROTC Scholarships Anticipate Future Leadership Needs,” September 27, 2013, https://www.army.mil/article/112298/New_Army_ROTC_scholarships_anticipate_future_leadership_needs (accessed January 16, 2017).
63 Center for Constitutional Rights, Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution (New York: Center for Constitutional Rights, 2009), 1, https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf (accessed February 13, 2017).
64 H.R. 560 – War Powers Reform, 114th Congress, January 27, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/560 (accessed February 13, 2017).
65 Ramsey Cox, “Senate Bill Amends War Powers Act,” The Hill, January 16, 2014, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/195704-senate-bill-amends-war-powers-act (accessed February 13, 2017).
66 Bacevich, The New American Militarism, 210.
67 Friedman, “The Home Team.”
68 Sapolsky, “What Americans Don’t Understand About Their Own Military.”
69 H.R. 560 – War Powers Reform, 114th Congress, January 27, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/560 (accessed February 13, 2017).
70 R. Russell Rumbaugh, “A Tax to Pay for War,” The New York Times Online, February 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/opinion/a-tax-to-pay-for-war.html (accessed February 13, 2017).
71 Bartlett,” The Cost of War.”