The Universe and God

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IntroductionGod -

Omni-EverythingMetaphysics

Justification

and

Equivalence

Justification EquivalenceFoundations

and OriginsFoundations Objections

OriginsScale, Time,and Curvy

Dimensions

FinalThoughts

The

Anatomy of

God

Three-Dimensionality

Standard andAlternate

AlgorithmsFundamentality

InfiniteComplexity

Science as

Communication

With God

DecomposingThe

Fundamental

ExperimentalScience

The Statue inThe Rock

The Problem

of EvilThe "Theory"

MetaphorThe "Drama"

Metaphor

Immaterial

BeingsLife in TheHeavens

Conclusion

The Universe and "God"

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we explore the similarities and

distinctions between the Universal Mind and more traditionalconceptions of God. We also touch on some of the most

intriguing cosmological implications that follow from

MM-Theory, shedding light on some of the details of thestructure of the universe that other papers left unaccounted for.

After comparing and contrasting the Universal Mind with theconcept of God held by most western religions, we define

metaphysics on the basis of the epistemology of experiences,outlining which experiences can be represented by sensations

and which can't. Before delving into the heart of the subject

matter of God, we formally define two important concepts:"equivalence" and "justification". We then plunge headlong

into the central questions of this paper: what is the UniversalMind in essence and whence did it come? The answers to

these questions will lead us to a formal definition of "God".Having conceptually encapsulated the essence of the universe

in this way, we will be in a position to explore the finer detailsof the fabric of existence and how it is structured. In particular,

we look at space and its three-dimensionality and the nature of

fundamentality, bringing the very existence of the latter intoquestion. This skeptical look at fundamentality will bring us

into a framework within which we can contemplate thepractice of experimental science as a method for asking God

questions and receiving his answers. Furthermore, we will

consider a view according to which the experimental method

is a way of creating more fundamental levels to the universe,

God's responses being more akin to approvals rather than

answers. The final two sections, before the conclusion, touch

on the problem of evil (though taking a different form than whatone usually encounters in traditional theology) and the

possibility of immaterial beings (spirits).

Introduction

M-Theory - The Universe and "God" http://www.mm-theory.com/god/go

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Everything we have looked at in this website so far, save the brief overviews of the neurosciences and

quantum mechanics, has been very speculative. This speculative approach is about to take a giant leap. We

can't escape speculation when it comes to philosophy and metaphysics, and it has been implicitly assumed

that the reader knows this and, if he/she has followed me this far, has tolerated it - maybe even took pleasurein it. But in this paper, there is an urgent need - one might even say an obligation - to make this assumption

explicit. The subject of God is a very touchy one, and it is rarely engaged in without some bias or emotional

sensitivity. Therefore, I have deemed it important to warn the reader what we are getting into here. This is

indeed a paper on this very subject, and there is no reasonable basis upon which to take what is written here

as even remotely close to Truth or objective argument completely free from bias and interpretation. In fact,

the approach we will take in this paper will not even be one in which we attempt to rigorously defend aparticular position to the exclusion of others. It will be much like in Determinism and Free-Will wherein weconsidered a variety of different views and approaches to the problem of determinism and free-will. So

although one might argue that our approach has always been quite speculative, and he/she would be right insaying this, this is especially true for this paper. What we are involved in here is such a vast and deep

subject that to think the human mind capable of grasping even a shadowy glimpse of it is to succumb to a

level of naivety only a fool could stoop to. So be forewarned - the reader is not to take the ideas and

proposals in this paper to heart without wearing his/her best critical thinking cap. In fact, the reader is not

even to take this as my official position on the subject. The reader is to understand that we are onlyentertaining possibilities in this paper, not answers.

Meaning

Having acquitted ourselves with this disclaimer, it should be added that there is one point this paper will

make that should be taken, if not in full seriousness, at least as seriously as everything else in this website,and that is the proposed answer we offer here to the question left unaddressed near the end of the Advanced

Theory. We left off saying that meaning may be enough to explain what sustains the existence of the universe,but it doesn't explain why there should be a universe in the first place - that is, how the universe came to

exist. Here we will offer an answer to this question. Once this last piece of the puzzle is put in place,

however, there will be very little left of our theory demanding immediate attention. This is not to say that

everything else is pure child's play, just that the theory could survive without it. Except for the last section of

this paper, we will be touching on aspects of our theory that could use some fleshing out and stronger

support. But overall, the greater part of this paper is meant to be taken relatively lightly.

The Universal

Mind

Needless to say, the purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to tie up all loose ends in our theory, and 2) to

address the uncanny resemblance between what we have christened the Universal Mind and what most

western religions understand as God. Now, before I got to work writing this paper, I struggled somewhatwith the issue of whether to embrace this resemblance wholeheartedly, revealing and defending as many

similarities as I could find, or to reject this resemblance outright, admonishing the reader not to equate our

theory with any form of institutionalized religion. What I settled on was honesty. The honest truth is that I do

cherish this idea - that I can say I believe in God and that my relation to Him (or Her) is a profoundlyintimate one - but at the same time I understand it to be a dangerous idea - if not for me, then for others who

might misinterpret or abuse it. Therefore, as much as the idea of God appeals to me (at least, as construed by

MM-Theory), I do recognize the responsibility that falls on my shoulders to point out what things can be saidabout the Universal Mind as God and what things can't - and further, what things should simply be left

unsaid. I have deemed the relation between these two concepts - the Universal Mind and God - as too

conspicuous not to be treated. If I didn't say a word or two about it, others undoubtedly would. Trusting in

this assumption, I feel the need to make it absolutely clear how the Universal Mind can be construed as God,

and to implore the reader not to construe it otherwise.

Another, less pressing, issue I lingered over was whether to use the traditional pronoun "He" when referring

to God. Why not "She"? After all , I've been careful to conjoin "he" and "she" together as "he/she" throughout

the rest of this website. Why not in the case of God? One thing that came to mind, soon after asking myself

this question, was simply to use "It". God, at least in the present context, is asexual. But that felt too out of

place. At one point, in reaction to the angst I felt over the mere use of the name "God" (which is why I felt itappropriate to put "God" in quotation marks in the title), I considered not even using the word, opting instead

for the "Universal Mind" throughout, and only describing it as god-like. But that, I figured, was going to an

extreme that risked defeating the entire purpose of this paper, and the use of the name "God" was

unavoidable in at least a few cases. After a while, I figuratively gave my head a shake and told myself to

snap out of it - I was blowing the issue way out of proportion. Right then, I decided to stick with tradition

and refer to God as "He", being careful to note, here in the introduction, that by use of this word, I by no

means intend to condone a male chauvinistic prejudice about God, but rather to allow my writing to flow

more naturally - for following tradition does come natural. I hope the reader can understand.


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Yet a third issue remained: in comparing and contrasting the Universal Mind with more traditional

conceptions of God, how global should I be? How global could I be? By "global", I mean how many

mainstream religions should I take into consideration? Having been raised by and now live in a culture

whose dominant religion is Christianity, I am foremost familiar with this religion. It would make sense,therefore, that my conception of the traditional God is closest to how the typical Christian thinks of God. I am

also familiar with the Jewish and Muslim God, but I would expect slightly less so. I am severely lacking in

familiarity with the gods of southeast Asia, and practically all tribal religions, and if I'm not mistaken, a few

of these (Buddhism and Taoism come to mind) don't even involve gods. What I have decided upon as my

formal stance on this issue is to say that if the religion in question depicts God (or a god) as objectified,

anthropomorphic, and individuated from the rest of existence, then this is the sort of god I'm concerned withcontrasting the Universal Mind against.

One last point to mention before we begin is the following. In the greater part of this paper, it might seem asthough our discussion digresses from the topic of God and merges into cosmology. If we were to adopt the

standard conception of God (i.e. an objectified, anthropomorphic, individuated deity), this would indeed be

an unnecessary digression. But since MM-Theory identifies the Universal Mind as God, cosmology becomes

more or less synonymous with theology. This is not to say we will discuss cosmology with a theological

flavor - that is, when discussing cosmology, we will stick as close to areligious and scientific terminology aspossible, the phrase "Universal Mind" coming in only when necessary. Nonetheless, it will be implicitly

assumed that the reader understands that what we say about cosmology can be, and for all intents andpurposes is meant to be, translated into theological concepts. After all, if God and the universe are one, then

almost anything said about the universe is also said about God.

God - Omni-Everything

Entailment

Our first task, then, is to formally declare that if the Universal Mind is to be construed as a god of sorts, no

link can be drawn between it and the god of the Bible or any other world renowned holy book. This is not

the god that created the world in six days, this is notthe god that parted the Red Sea, this is notthe god that

appeared before Moses as a burning bush, this is notthe god that created Adam and Even, this is notthe god

that sent His only begotten son to man in order to save him from his sins, and this is notthe god that castsjudgment upon our souls and sentences us either to Hell or Heaven after we die. The god referred to in the

Bible, the Quran, the Torah, or any other religious text borne from western culture is an objectified,anthropomorphic, and individuated deity. He created the universe but is not one with it - He remains outside

of it. He sometimes intervenes in human affairs and performs miracles, and as a consequence, suspends the

laws of nature in so doing. Once every so often, He chooses a special someone and speaks to them through a

human language. Sometimes, He imparts sacred knowledge to these people, knowledge that can be written asprophecy, and is supposedly destined to be realized sometime in the future. MM-Theory says nothing of this

sort. It makes no such predictions, and in fact, speaks against the notion that such things are possible. Our

theory says that the experiences of the Universal Mind - of "God" - coincide with the nature of the physical

world as we understand it in a scientific context. It says that, for all practical purposes, there really isn't any

rational basis upon which to believe that these experiences would ever entail in such a way that we would

witness the sorts of miracles proclaimed in most religious texts. There isn't even a rational basis upon whichto believe that these experiences are at all remotely like human experiences, in which case we can't say, with

good reason, that God thinks this or that about human affairs. He doesn't necessarily think. He doesn't

necessarily feel emotions either. We can't very well say, in that case, that He feels this way or that abouthuman affairs, for He doesn't necessarily feel anything. We can't attribute such mental states to God in

regards to any human experiences. The only sense in which this is not entirely accurate is in that we are apart of the Universal Mind and therefore, as God, we can only say that He experiences human mental states

insofar as those experiences are had by us.

To put this point more succinctly, we have no right to identify any one god, like the Universal Mind, with

another god, like the biblical one, unless it can be convincingly shown that the concepts of each have a

common source. The source for the concept of the traditional God of western religion is the set of holy texts

belonging to these religions (the Bible, the Quran, and the Torah). The source for the concept of God as theUniversal Mind is MM-Theory. So unless the account the above holy texts give for God can somehow be

interpreted as the same account our theory gives, and more importantly that this interpretation is not similarmerely by coincidence, there is no basis upon which to claim that the Universal Mind is the one and only

God referred to in these holy texts. To claim otherwise would be to posit that the words of the saints,

prophets, and other messengers of God, written in the holy texts of western religion, are more or less the

same words we have written in our theory. This is highly doubtful, not only because our theory is very

specific and depends greatly on the neuroscience known only in the twentieth century, but because such a


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claim could never be known with certainty. The God of the western religions is conceptualized today based

solely on their central texts, and if the authors of those texts had anything in mind even remotely close to what

our theory says, it was lost in translation, never to be known again. The only relics we have of their insights

are these texts, and upon giving them a good read, one quickly realizes that they say nothing like what ourtheory says.

Be that as it may, we also want to compare our God with these more traditional Gods to see what they have

in common. The great majority of commonalities are features that can be described with "omni"-words - that

is, words like "omniscient", "omnipotent", "omnibenevolent", "omnipresent", and so on. There are a few

other commonalities, but these omni-words cover the most ground. Let's take a look at some of them to see inwhat sense the Universal Mind is omni-this and omni-that. Let it be known that for most of them, it is only ina very specific sense that our God can be said to possess these traits, and in other senses He clearly cannot.

Omnipotent: The Universal Mind is clearly omnipotent, but the meaning of even this word can be

ambiguous. The Universal Mind is not as powerful as the God of the western religions. Although theUniversal Mind is responsible for everything that happens, it cannot perform miracles. It cannot preempt its

own laws whether those laws be physical or mental. Our theory says that everything that happens is due to

the necessity of entailment. The God of western religion, however, can preempt His own laws. On the other

hand, it could be said that whereas the God of western religion leaves some things to their own devices -

such as the autonomy of man - the Universal Mind is always the driving force behind every single event. This

might put our God in a more favorable light with respect to His omnipotence. However, this speaks more

about His agenda - that is, whereas the Universal Mind seems hell bent on controlling everything, the God of

western religion seems to take a more hands-off approach when it comes to the affairs of the universe, or at

least man. But He could involve Himself in everything, like the Universal Mind does, if he really wanted to.In fact, having said this, it stands to question whether the Universal Mind even has a choice in the matter -

that is, a choice of whether or not to let the universe be without imposing its control. Our theory would

certainly say not. Even if we brought in some of the considerations of free-will we looked at in Determinism

and Free-Will, we still wouldn't be able to tear Him away from the universe itself. Our theory clearly takes

the two to be the same entity. It is therefore impossible for our God to separate Himself from the universe,

much less relinquish any control over it. If we are to describe the Universal Mind as omnipotent, it might be

better to phrase this as "He does everything" rather than "He can do anything". The latter sounds as though it

presupposes a choice - and moreover an extraordinary ability to violate the laws of nature, which the

Universal Mind clearly cannot do.

Quantum

Mechanics

There is the interpretation ofquantum mechanics we offered in Determinism and Free-Will, which leads

one to wonder whether the laws of nature are really all abiding as we've just described. In fact, it says

they're not. So to a certain extent - and it is an incredibly small extent - the Universal Mind is notbound by

its own laws. Whether this infinitesimal scintilla of freedom constitutes a will or simple randomness isanother level of interpretation that one can add at his/her own choosing. In any case, this level of freedom is

hardly enough to account for the sorts of miracles the God of western religion is credited with performing.

Lucky if just one ever happened at all throughout the whole history of the universe.

Omniscient: The Universal Mind is notomniscient. If the meaning of "omniscient" is "to know everything",

then the word itself is fraught with internal contradiction when it concerns MM-Theory. The great majority ofexperiences in the universe - which are all there are to know if one is to know anything - do not even entail

knowledge of themselves. They cannot be known. Yet there is another sense in which we might rightfully say

that the Universal Mind is omniscient. If by "omniscient" we mean, "to have all knowledge there is, was, andwill be" then the Universal Mind is omniscient. Knowledge, in whatever form, is an experience, and so the

Universal Mind always has it. But by this interpretation, knowledge is limited - not merely in the sense thatsome experiences don't entail their own knowledge, but in the physical sense in which some events in our

universe - what a small rock might be doing in a neighboring galaxy, for example - will never be known by

any intelligent being, which is in contradiction to the way western religion depicts the omniscience of God.These events will always correspond to an experience had by the Universal Mind, of course, and so we mustsay that the Universal Mind experiences everything, and in this crude sense we might get away with

attributing omniscience to It, but since these experiences are not knowledge (not necessarily), this really isn't

the proper use of the word "omniscient".

Omnipresent: This one is really straightforward. Omnipresence is the attribute of being everywhere at once

- like space or time. The Universal Mind is all there is, so of course it i s omnipresent. The very experienceof an extended spatial medium in which all physical events take place is an experience belonging to the

Universal Mind. It does not fill the physical universe as a ghost might fill a body, paralleling it withoutbecoming one with it; it is the bare and fundamental experience of the physical universe and all parts of it.

Thus, this is one trait the Universal Mind certainly shares in common with the western God.


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Omnibenevolent: Now this trait is probably one of the most controversial of the omni-words. Believers

have faith in God's inexhaustible and undying love for man, while many non-believers despise the concept ofGod on the grounds that if such a deity would create a horrific place such as Hell, torment us with

temptations and unreasonable rules, and allow grotesque massacres to happen, then He would be more aptly

described as a sadistic psychopath rather than an all-loving father. Both views, however, rest on the

assumption that God can be anthropomorphized. It's only when we cast God in our own image that feelings of

intimate closeness or hatred and aversion come to the surface. It's only the likeness of human beings thatelicits in us the inclination to offer affection or cast blame. But how angry can one be towards a natural

disaster such as a tornado or an earthquake? How motivated does one feel after these catastrophes to shoutand rant at the tornado or earthquake? Not much. Yes, we will always go through the trials and tribulations of

frustration and anguish over our losses, but this does not come through as blame or anger towards the

disasters that brought them upon us. Why not? Because we recognize them as non-human, and so there is

nothing in us wanting to exact revenge or cast judgment on them. That's the stance one ought to take towards

anything that is best captured as non-anthropomorphic, and it is the stance MM-Theory takes towards theUniversal Mind. It is true that the Universal Mind is conscious, and even that it is directly responsible for all

natural disasters (even social disasters), but it lacks the essential characteristics of human nature so

profoundly that it is the equivalent of a tornado or an earthquake. We have just as little reason to feel

animosity towards it as we do the tornado and earthquake. In fact, the tornado and earthquake are physical

representations, at least in part, of the Universal Mind. And to whatever degree the deterministic course that

these disasters play out through, the same degree carries over to the determinism of the Universal Mind - and

it may very well be that the Universal Mind has no choice in the matter. So although there is a conscious

force behind these catastrophes, our relation to it is not the sort that exists between and among human beings

- it is the sort of relation we have towards the indifferent and mechanical forces governing nature.

Footprints in The

Sand

But there is a sense in which we can describe the Universal Mind as omnibenevolent. It is not in that It wants

to please us, or wants what's best for us - it is in the sense that when It does bring pain and suffering to us, It

feels it just as much as we do. If we are all a part of the Universal Mind, then all our experiences are Its

experiences. Everything we feel, it feels. So It couldn't be doing it out of some kind of sadistic pleasure or

scorn - there must be some other reason. But what this reason is is a tricky question to answer. It's not

entirely clear. It's not even clear whether it feels loathsome to bring pain and suffering to us and Itself, or is

resolute about doing so. It even sounds rather absurd - that It would be self-driven to inflict pain and

suffering upon Itself. This is a matter that deserves much elaboration, and we will do so in the section titledThe Problem of Evil below. For now, we can take comfort in the thought that when we go through pain and

suffering, God, as construed by our theory, "understands", in a manner of speaking, our plight, for He feels ittoo.

Subjective

Reality

Omnicreative: The God of western religion is omnicreative in that He created everything and can createanything. The Universal Mind simply is everything. Is It or is It not, then, omnicreative? Well, at any one

point in time, the Universal Mind is in a particular state. At that precise point, It has no choice in the matter.

A thing in a certain state can't be in any other mutually exclusive state at the same time (quantum mechanicsnotwithstanding). The next state that follows in time, however, is under Its control, and so we can say that It

creates that state. This is true regardless of whether the control the Universal Mind has over its future states

is predetermined (as a compatibilist view would have it) or freely exercised. So the Universal Mind is in a

perpetual process of creating and recreating Itself - and therefore creating and recreating everything. We can

also express the omnicreativity of the Universal Mind in regards to all subjective realities. The elemental

experiences that are fed to us by the Universal Mind are our sensory experiences. Our minds use theseexperiences to build a subjective reality. The effort is a joint one, of course, since we must take credit for the

speculations and theories we construct in order to make sense out of the things we otherwise don't understandand can't verify, but our efforts are also those of the Universal Mind since we and It are one. So in that sense,

the Universal Mind is the creator of our subjective realities.

These are the omni-words that come to mind when I think of the similarities between the God of westernreligion and the Universal Mind. There may be others, but the above are a fair sample to demonstrate the

way in which we ought to compare and contrast the Universal Mind with the God of western religion.

However, we can expand the list if we consider some alternatives to omni-words - words like the following.

Entailment

Eternal: The God of western religion is eternal. He has no beginning and no end. What about the Universal

Mind? The origin of the Universal Mind is a big question, and a significant portion of this paper is devotedto it. This question is made more complicated by the fact that time is properly understood in a specific way

in the context of our theory. In the Advanced Theory, we explicated what time as we experience it represents

outside the mind - namely, those relations between experiences characterized by entailment. So to trace the

Universal Mind back through time in order to find its beginnings, we would effectively be tracing Its


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experiences back through their antecedents. We'd be looking for the fundamental experience(s) from which

all other experiences throughout the rest of time are entailed. Does it even make sense that there should be

such an experience? We shall see in the appropriate section. We shall see that one possibility is that the

Universal Mind is eternal. Will it go on forever as well? That is, can experiences ever cease to entail furtherexperiences? This is another deep and perplexing question, and unfortunately, we will notanswer it in this

paper, except to say, right now, that we don't know. But one thing we know for certain is this: we can always

take the perspective that, from an abstract point of view, all experiences, even those of space and time as we

know them, are members of the universal set of all experiences. Speaking abstractly, this set, like any set as

defined in the formal mathematical tradition, is spaceless and timeless, and thus the Universal Mind can be

considered eternal if, by "eternal", we mean timeless in this sense - having no temporal beginning and notemporal end. We could even consider the Universal Mind timeless in the same sense withoutconstruing it inthe abstract sense of set theory if we were to consider only those experiences that time and space as we

experience them represent - that is, subtracting our experiences of space and time. Although this may not atfirst seem warranted since any consideration of the Universal Mind as a whole ought to include all its

experiences - those of space and time as we experience them among the latter - upon a second consideration,

we realize that all time- and space-bound experiences - such as those of physical systems, and time and

space themselves - are founded on those experiences beyond time and space as we know them (the former

represent the latter, after all). Therefore, even if the physical universe did have a beginning or will have anend, it would be a fleeting outgrowth coming out of the timeless ground that is the Universal Mind, which is

there outside time - eternally - though always connected to time from emergence to oblivion.

Supreme: God is often referred to as the "supreme being". What does "supreme" mean? Any dictionary you

consult will give you a myriad of definitions. When we say of God that He is supreme, we usually mean that

He is the greatest being there is. But even the word "great" eludes an obvious definition. One possiblemeaning we could give it would be how encompassing of existence that which is great so happens to be. For

example, the Universal Mind is all encompassing of existence, and therefore is the greatest thing there is.

The God of western religion, in virtue of His individuation from the world He created, does not encompass

all of existence, and therefore is not the greatest thing there is - the world He created coupled with Him is

greater. But there is another meaning of the word "great" according to which the latter image - the coupling of

God with His creation - is not the greatest thing in existence, and God Himself is. That meaning is that

greatness is the measure of the superiority of a thing. Superiority may be defined in any number of ways -

intelligence, virtue, might, status - but they all entail the same thing about how that which is measured

compares to other things by the same measure. For example, man could be said to be superior to the rest of

nature in virtue of the fact that he measures higher in intelligence. Other things in nature - like rocks, trees,

water, air - and even nature herself, not only fall short of matching the intelligence of man, but lackintelligence entirely. Therefore, man, in this sense, could be said to be greater than nature. In the same sense,

the God of western religion could be said to be greater than everything else, not only in intelligence, but in a

whole slew of measures of superiority. Can we say the same of the Universal Mind? Well, if we can say thatman is greater than nature in this sense, then since nature is the physical representation of the Universal

Mind, we can say that man is greater than the Universal Mind - at least, in certain measures of superiority.

Does it change anything to consider man and the Universal Mind as one? After all, if man's superior intellect

and other virtues are incorporated into the Universal Mind, then doesn't this trait also belong to the UniversalMind? It may, if one looks at it this way, but we must also consider when it is appropriate to attribute a

property belonging to a part to the whole and when it is not. For example, if I were six foot five but I hadreally short fingers, then just because my fingers hold the property of being short does not mean I can

attribute that property to myself and say that I am short. We have to think carefully about attributing thegreatness of any one part of the Universal Mind to the Universal Mind Itself. Would we be making the same

error as in the example above? We will not answer that question, but instead draw the conclusion that the

greatness of the Universal Mind, and therefore Its supremacy, is subject to interpretation. There are manyways in which we can construe it as supreme, but other ways in which we can't. I leave it to the reader to

make the decision on this matter.

Providence of an afterlife: According to western religion, when we die, our soul will move on to another

world and it will remain there forever. God, in this view, is the great overseer of this process. There is an

afterlife in our view as well. According to our view, there is no end to experience. Experiences continually

morph and transform without rest, and they do so even after the body dies. When our bodies die, they usually

decay. The trillions of molecules that makeup the body will be dispersed into nature - some taking root in the

dust, others being taken up by other organisms, and still others being carried by the winds to far-off places.

What might this experience be like? If we consider this process as the dilution of ourselves into nature, the

experience might be like becoming one with the mind of nature, sharing in its experiences and perhaps

remembering that we were once from nature (assuming it experiences memory).


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Epistemic

Awareness

Acknowledgements

But in all probability, there would be no more "you" - that is, no more sense of selfhood. The experiences

that constitute our lives are marked by our individuation, which in turn, as the Advanced Theory makes clear,

is based on the epistemic awareness we have of our experiences. This epistemic awareness is what allowsus to attribute our experiences to ourselves - claiming them as "ours" - and thus furnishing us with a sense of

selfhood. So unless the experiences of the afterlife are somehow capable of entailing epistemic awareness of

themselves (via acknowledgements), chances are that we will lose our individuation, and consequently lose

our "selves". Whether nature herself, or the Universal Mind as a whole, provides a sense of an even greater

self to replace this loss is anyone's guess.

Another guess that belongs to anyone is whether the experience of the afterlife is a pleasant one, a painful

one, or one that fits neither description. On the face of it, it certainly sounds blissful - the notion of becoming

one with the universe, or one with God, must be a fulfilling and enlightening experience, we're inclined to

think. But our theory explicitly states that this experience is completely unimaginable to us. We cannot

surmise by any stretch of the imagination what it might be like. The only thing we can say with any amount ofcertainty is that we cannot be prepared for it.

The above characteristics are enough to get the point across - namely, that the Universal Mind is not the God

of the Bible, or the Quran, or the Torah, or any other holy text, but They do share some features in common.

Even then, however, one has to be cautious about the sense in which these commonalities hold. For example,

we've seen that although the Universal Mind can be described as omnipotent in that It is responsible for

everything that happens, it is closer to impotent when it comes to performing miracles. We've also seen that

although the Universal Mind seems to have no reservation about inflicting great pain and suffering upon us,

and therefore hardly seems omnibenevolent, under a different light - namely, in that It always partakes in thepain and suffering it inflicts upon us - It could be said to be omnibenevolent. These are obviously

perspectives, not facts. Therefore, I leave it for the reader to decide whether the Universal Mind really is

omnipotent, omnibenevolent, or any of the other characteristics we considered.

Metaphysics

St. Augustine

Plato

The reader may have noticed that we failed to mention one very obvious similarity between the UniversalMind and the God of western religion in the preceding section, and that is the property of being metaphysical

(or non-physical). This is because metaphysics is a subject that deserves so much more than a paragraph ortwo. It deserves its own section - this section. The first to attribute the property of being metaphysical to God

was St. Augustine, and he in turn borrowed the idea from Plato. Plato's notion of

metaphysics is essentially a realm of ideal forms that all things in the corporeal worldapproximate. This realm is a perfect realm, unlike the realm we call physical reality.

Things in physical reality are imperfect. They're shoddy, rugged, clumsy, chipped,

dirty, tarnished, crooked, and so on. The things in the metaphysical realm don't have

any imperfections like these. The best way to exemplify this is with a geometrical

construct like a triangle. Let's say it's a right triangle. Therefore, one of its corners is a

perfect 90 angle. Also, the length of the hypotenuse squared is exactly, not

approximately, equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides. But try finding such a

perfect right triangle anywhere in the physical world. You can't. No matter what you

find, as close as it may seem to a right triangle, there will be some fine degree of imperfection. You may

have to look very closely, maybe even under a microscope, noticing the tiny offset of the angle from 90 or

the slight meandering of the sides from perfectly straight lines, and indeed you will find mild imperfections.

And if you can't find a perfect right triangle lying about, maybe you can draw one - but even then, you're

drawing skills don't measure up. You may have the steadiest hands in the world, capable of drawing ever so

straight lines and amazingly accurate angles, but they are not perfect. There will be very slight flaws in yourtriangle. So do perfect right triangles exist? How do we know about them if they aren't to be found in the

world of physical objects? What are we referring to when we talk about right triangles? Plato tells us that we

are referring to another realm besides this one - that is, another realm besides the physical one. This is the

realm of perfect forms, of things that don't bear any imperfections whatsoever. The right triangle we are

referring to is here. Its sides are perfectly straight, and its right angle really is exactly 90.

Plato says that the physical world is filled with things that aim to approximate their perfect counterparts inthe metaphysical world. The world that we see is just a shoddy imitation of this perfect world. How do we

know it exists? Plato tells us that the mind is such an extraordinary instrument that it sees directly into themetaphysical world. When we talk about a right triangle, the reason we are able to tell it apart from all other

right triangles - that is, the ones we find in the physical world - is because we have a mental connection to


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the metaphysical world where we can see the perfect right triangle and compare it to other right triangles we

find in the physical world. The metaphysical world contains all sorts of perfect forms ranging from circles,

squares, and other polygons, to houses, boats, and shoes, to birds, dogs, and other living creatures - including

people. The metaphysical world parallels the physical world, and all things in one world bear a one-to-onecorrespondence to things in the other.

Now, the metaphysical world, if it is indeed that which we see with our mind's eye, is obviously

non-physical. Physicality, according to Plato, is the essential mark of imperfection, and so all metaphysical

things can't be physical. He says that whereas physical things are sensible (i.e. they can be sensed),

metaphysical things are intelligible (i.e. they can be understood). The reader may notice a similarity betweenthis distinction and the distinction we drew between visualization and conceptualization in TheInconceivability of Consciousness. This distinction is more or less the same (the only exception being that

the physical world is known to us by sensation rather than mental visualization). This is the classicalconception of metaphysics and it has carried through the ages with little modification.

St. Augustine (circa 354 - 430 AD) took this idea and attributed it to God Himself. He

says that when we look at these perfect forms with our minds, we are looking into

God's mind. It is as if God had a blueprint of the world, a sketch of how everythingshould be - how triangles should be, how stars should be, how fish should be, and even

how humans should be - and what we see when we think of things in their ideal formsis what God has laid out, in His mind, as the blueprints of His creation. Since God is

perfect, Augustine says, He takes only a metaphysical form, and it is the same form asthat taken by those abstract purely conceptual things we see in our minds, perfect and

ideal in all their features.

Projection

That's Augustine. At this point, we will break from discussing the traditional conception of God and focus

solely on the Universal Mind. We will be concerned mainly with what it means for the Universal Mind to be

metaphysical. It is unfortunate for us, in this day and age, that the whole subject of metaphysics is so down

played and looked upon with derision. We live in an age of hard science, and this makes for an atmosphere

in which materialism has staying power and religion and spiritual matters - into which, to a large extent,

metaphysics is intertwined - are significantly undermined. On a more positive note, however, our brand of

metaphysics is very different from that passed down from Plato and Augustine. It deserves serious

reconsideration. Whereas the

Platonic/Augustinian concept

of metaphysics stands in stark

contrast to physicality, oursnot so much. The concept of

metaphysics our theory offers

is one in which physicality is

more of an instance, or a

special form, of the greatermetaphysical universe in

which it is rooted. Our theorysays that all physicality is

reducible to sensoryexperiences, and experiences

in general are the metaphysical basis for, not only physical things, but any form of existence whatsoever.

Experiences are the basis for truths and facts as they project from cognition. They are also the basis for

value and morality as they project from emotion. They are also the basis for beauty and ugliness as they

project from higher functional sensory processes. Experiences are the basis for those forms of existence that

are beyond any human subjective reality. They are the basis for existence period, and as such, they constitute

the metaphysical groundwork upon which all existence, in its numerous forms, stands.

The Roots of

Metaphysics

Physicality

Now, according to this understanding, everything is metaphysical - even the world of physical objects that

we sense. Perhaps, then, the word "metaphysical" is a misnomer since it derives from the Greek "met"

(after) and "physik" (physics) - meaning that which is beyond, or not, the physical (see sidenote ).

Perhaps, then, for the sake of this paper, we ought to understand, by the word "metaphysics", only those

experiences that do not project themselves in physical form. Although they may still be experiential at base,

our theory is monistic, and what this means is that, when it comes to physical things, there is no separate

non-physical basis for them. Experiences in the broadest context are metaphysical things that can become

physical, and when this happens, they cease to be metaphysical. Physicality becomes the sole attribute they

possess and it defines their essence. Therefore, when wetalk about metaphysics in the context of our theory, we are


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Beyond The

Bubble

referring to a realm of experience beyond the physical, or

sensory, world. This realm may give rise to our sensory

experiences through entailment, and it may be that which

our sensory experiences represent (vis--vis theformulation of the correlation between mind and matter

given in the Advanced Theory), but it is, for all intents and

purposes, non-physical. The visualization exercises we

practiced in the Advanced Theory, particularly the 2D

scenario in which we imagined we were at the center of a

bubble and the entire sensory world was painted on theinterior surface, helps us a great deal here. What we get, inthis visualization, is a sense that we are engulfed by a

physical world and outside it, a metaphysical world that isbeyond the reach of our experience and knowledge.

Immanuel Kant

Phenomena

Noumena

Subjective

Reality

Human

Experiences

Knowledge of the metaphysical is a key concern for us. It was a key concern for

Immanuel Kant, the 18th century philosopher, as well. In fact, he had a vision much like

our bubble scenario. Instead of bubbles, however, he proposed the world of

phenomena. Phenomena, according to Kant, are things just as they appear - that is, they

constitute the world as defined by our experiences of it, much like our concept of a

subjective reality. Beyond the phenomenal world is the noumenal world - the world of

things as they really are. To know this world was impossible, according to Kant, sincewe can't get passed the phenomena that stand between it and us - that is, we can't have

any sort of direct connection to the noumenal world since to do so would entail having made such a

connection without experience - an oxymoron indeed. So if we equate the phenomenal world with the

physical world, this makes the noumenal world the world of metaphysics. Kant knew that since we have no

epistemic access (nor experiential for that matter) to the noumenal world, the prospect of gaining knowledge

of the metaphysical is slim to none. This opens the door for a whole slew of wild speculation to flood in. If

we can't see beyond our bubbles, who knows what lies there? Formally speaking, our theory states that the

experiences we do have access to - namely, the human experiences - represent experiences beyond them,

experiences that entail them. So as far as we're concerned, we do reserve the right to propose that themetaphysical world is filled with experiences and nothing more (this is a proposal, remember, not

knowledge proper). So far, we have been talking about our theory as though the physical world (the world of

sense) maps onto the whole of the Universal Mind - that is, that there is nothing, no experience, in the

Universal Mind that can't be represented in some sensory form, either directly or indirectly, in our subjective

realities. What we will consider now, however, is the possibility that some experiences exist in theUniversal Mind that aren't, or even can't be, represented to us in this manner.

Neutrinos

Electromagnetic

Radiation

To begin with, we can say, without much confusion, that there are those experiences that are directlyrepresented by our sensations, and those that are indirectly represented. An example of a directly represented

experience would be that corresponding to a tangible macroscopic object that we can immediately sense, infull vividness, before us - something like a household blender or a lawn ornament. These experiences will

always avail themselves to sensory representation so long as we are capable, in principle, of focusing ourattention on them. Then there are the indirectly represented experiences, an example of which is an entity or

force whose presence we can only infer from its effects - something like neutrinos or waves of

electromagnetic radiation. We don't sense these things directly. We only sense their effects on other things -things like measuring devices. In effect, the only way to sense these effects is if indirect experiences entail

direct experiences - otherwise they would have no effect on our senses. This is a general rule of thumb - thatindirect experiences always entail direct experiences - that goes into defining them.

Metaphysics and

Sensation

Definition: Direct vs. Indirect Metaphysical

Experiences

1) Direct Metaphysical Experiences (a.k.a. Direct

Experiences): Those experiences, other than

sensations, that are capable of reliably and


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consistently entailing perceptions of physical

systems.

2) Indirect Metaphysical Experiences (a.k.a. Indirect

Experiences): Those experiences that only entail

perceptions of physical systems indirectly - that is,

by first entailing direct metaphysical experiences.

At first glance, it sounds as though these definitions are painting a picture of direct and indirect experiences

as easily pigeonholed into discrete categories. The reality, however, is that there is plenty of gray area. For

example, one of the examples we gave above for direct experiences was a household blender. But isn't it

really the light reflected off the blender that directly affects our sense of vision? But if we can say that, we

can go a step further and say that it's really the optic nerve that has the most direct effect on our vision. Butthen why not say it's the neurotransmitters that mediate the signal between our optic nerve and area V1 in the

back of the brain where vision officially occurs? In fact, it would seem that, in this line of questioning, we

contemplated the possibility that the light reflected off the blender was more direct than the blender itself,

and since light is an example of electromagnetic radiation - corresponding to an experience we deemed to beindirect - the distinction might not only be fuzzy, but very confused. Well, as an example of an indirectexperience, the intended use of electromagnetic radiation is only valid in the case where such radiation isn't

on a direct course onto our retina - that is, if the radiation in question is simply traveling from one point inspace to another (which isn't our eye), there is no other way we can be signaled to its presence than by its

effects. Butregardless

of whether

we treatthe

experience

corresponding to electromagnetic radiation as a direct or indirect one, this doesn't clear up the muddied

distinction between direct and indirect experiences overall. The point I want to make in defining these terms

is that we need a way of talking about metaphysical experiences (i.e. non-sensory ones) that maps directly

and without confusion onto the physical world. What I want to allow for is an easy way of saying that if anexperience corresponds to a physical phenomenon that we can sense directly (like a chair, a box, a window

sill, etc.), then that experience is itself direct. And likewise, if it corresponds to a physical phenomenon thatwe can't sense directly, but through its effects only (like neutrinos or electromagnetic radiation), then that

experience is itself indirect. In other words, whether it's the blender that we sense directly, or the lightreflected off it, or the signals channeled through our optic nerve, or the neurotransmitters that react in

response to the latter, they are all direct. They are all direct because they are all reliably and consistently

represented by our sensory experiences. There is always going to be a simple topological correspondencebetween them and what we sense. Only when this topology breaks does the experience fall under the

category of indirect.

More Ambiguity

Of course, a similar topology exists between indirect experiences and our conceptual models of things as weassume them to exist in the physical world, things that we can't directly sense, but this topology is much less

reliable and consistent. For example, nearly everyone has a rudimentary conceptual model of the atom. This

model is a cognitive representation of experiences in the Universal Mind, and because we can't sense atomsdirectly, these experiences are indirect ones. Through the ages, the model of the atom has gone through

revision after revision, as more and better scientific experimentation yields data that can be put towardsrefining this model. This revision process will undoubtedly continue to go through change as we head into

the future. This is not surprising since our conceptual models cannot reliably and consistently represent


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indirect experiences - at least, not necessarily. Nonetheless, as unreliable and inconsistent as these

conceptual models may be, we do have a loose connection to these indirect experiences, and they do affect

us in one way or another.

Meaning

Human

Experiences

The question we want to ask now is: is it possible that there are experiences in the Universal Mind that have

no effect on our sensory experiences, either directly or indirectly, whatsoever? What would such an

experience be like? It would have to be inherent in the meaning of the experience that the grounds don't exist

for entailing, by itself, either direct or indirect experiences, which in turn could then affect us in a sensoryway. It would be like a premise to an argument that has no way of leading to a particular conclusion, that

conclusion being the counterpart to our sensory experiences. Is it possible for such an experience to be had?If it is possible, then the entire chain of experiences following from it (via entailment) would be equally

disjointed from, not only the human experiences, but all direct and indirect experiences in the Universal

Mind. Otherwise, they could have indirect effects on our sensory experiences. In effect, it would have to be

part of a network of experiences that constitute their own independent existence from the network consisting

of all direct, indirect, and human experiences. This might sound absurd at first if we imagine these networks

having absolutely no relation to each other whatsoever. To imagine such a state of affairs would effectivelybe to imagine two separate whole existences - two separate Universal Minds - which is not only absurd, but

contradictory. The contradiction lies in the meaninglessness of such a notion - that there could be two wholeand independent existences in existence. That is, there cannot be an existence in an existence (unless both

existences are one and the same), let alone two. For the Universal Mind to be the entirety of existence itself,there can only be one such universe. That's the case if we imagine these two experience networks as fully

independent and separate - but does it need to be this way for there to be experiences of the sort we're

considering now? Are there experiences that simply can't entail, either directly or indirectly, human

experiences even though they have a place in the same Universal Mind as these human experiences?

The answer to this question, as we will see, is yes, it is possible for such experiences to exist. In fact, there

is more than one scenario that makes them possible. But before we consider these scenarios, we need a wordto refer to them. We will call them "irrepresentable experiences" due to their elusiveness to topological

representation in our subjective realities. For that matter, we will also define representable experiences as

both direct and indirect experiences.

Definition: Irrepresentable vs. Representable

Experiences

1) Irrepresentable Experiences: Those experiences

that cannot be topologically represented in our

subjective realities due to their inability to entaileither direct or indirect metaphysical experiences.

2) Representable Experiences: Direct and indirect

metaphysical experiences.

What we said above was not so much that irrepresentable

experiences must exist as part of a fully separate and independent

network of like experiences, none of which could ever have any

relation to representable experiences. What we said was thatirrepresentable experiences, and those following it through

entailment, could have no such relation. But this has no bearing on

the experiences that preceded them in the chain. Indeed, it isconceivable that a representable experience could branch in the

process of entailing, one branch maintaining its representable statuswhile the other veering into the irrepresentable variety. The latter

branch would have to be outcaste from all representableexperiences forever, but as they (the irrepresentable and

representable experiences) have a common predecessor, they stilltake place in the same Universal Mind.

Another way in which irrepresentable experiences may exist is if

they follow from human experiences. That is, given that the

experiences that typically exist in the human mind continue to flow


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Flow

even after they leave the mind (this process corresponding to heat

loss, efferent signals deployed to muscles and other organs,

extraneous physiological processes, etc.), there is no reason to

suppose that some of these experiences can't, eventually, becomeirrepresentable. After this point, however, they would have to be

lost to representation in our subjective realities forever. This, of

course, is just a different rendition of the previous scenario - that is,

a scenario in which a representable experience, in this case a human

experience, eventually leads to an irrepresentable one, but there is

one important difference that concerns our relation to theseirrepresentable experiences. That difference is that in the formerscenario, we have absolutely no control over them, whereas in the latter, we do.

A third way concerns a point we made in the Basic Theory - namely,

that in order to entail a particular experience, some experiences

require the cooperation of at least one other experience. The

example we used in that paper was the syllogism: All diamonds are

carbon. This is a diamond. Therefore, this is carbon. We can neverconclude that the inferred object is carbon if either of the premises -

that all diamonds are carbon, or that this is a diamond - are absent.Now imagine an experience that was entailed by a previous one,

both of which are representable, and that the previous experience isreducible to two component ones. If neither of these component

experiences can entail, on their own, the ensuing one, then it's quitepossible that at least one of them, perhaps both, are irrepresentable.An interesting implication of this is that there may actually be

irrepresentable experiences in the midst of, not only representableones, but direct ones too. In fact, we will have more to say about this in the section Fundamentality below.

So we have partitioned experiences into three categories - direct, indirect, and irrepresentable. What's the

point? Well, besides clarifying the position we're taking on metaphysics, these distinctions will be important

when we consider the multitude of cosmological scenarios that may be possible for the Universal Mind. It is

important to understand, from this point on, that when we talk about the Universal Mind, we are talking about

the sum total of all experiences - representable and irrepresentable alike. This may seem obvious at first, butit makes a difference when we ask the question: is the Universal Mind exhaustively represented by all the

physical systems we are capable of sensing, directly or indirectly, or is there more to the Universal Mindthan what can be represented by these physical systems? If the former is the case, then we don't even need to

bother with the idea of irrepresentable experiences. Otherwise, we have to keep in mind what can and can'tbe said about how these irrepresentable experiences relate to the representable ones and the human ones.

What we have said about this here will having implications for questions concerning whether anything came

before the Big Bang, whether experiences can be further reduced below the level corresponding to the most

fundamental particles, whether experiences can correspond to physical systems beyond the three dimensions

of known space, and so on. We will not lay out these implication overtly, but instead advise the reader tokeep what we have said here in the back of his/her mind as we explore other ideas throughout this paper.

Justification and Equivalence

Meaning

Real Things

The meaning we have attributed to the word "metaphysics" should be fairly clear at this point. We now need

to make clear the meaning of two more words: "justification" and "equivalence". By "justification", what we

mean, in the context of this paper, is that which upholds the being of a given experience. It is more or less thesame as what's conveyed by the word "meaning" - that is, the basis upon which an experience, as a real

thing, can be sustained - but intended for a different context. The difference in context is as follows.

Whereas the meaning of a given experience is unique to that experience alone, its justification belongs more

to the class of which that experience is a member. For example, the meaning of a particular thought about the

weather may be "if it is raining outside, I ought to bring an umbrella", but it's justification is that it is logical

or that it makes good sense to do so. No other thought has the particular meaning just expressed, but many

thoughts find their justification in logic and good sense. Logic and good sense belong to the whole class ofsuch thoughts - not all thoughts, of course, as there are others such as memory or fantasy, but logical thinking

does define a whole class unto itself.


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And what about "equivalence"? Equivalence is a bit more complicated a concept. Equivalence is a word we

need to use quite frequently when comparing similar experiences. We need to use it in contexts where it

might seem more intuitive to use the word "identical". We will show that in our theory, it makes little sense

to talk about two or more experiences being identical unless those experiences are literally one and thesame. But we will see that there are certain special cases where only the meaning of two or more

experiences are identical even though their qualities may not be. In that case, we ought to say that they are

equivalent. Both words - "equivalence" and "justification" - will receive their due elaboration in this

section, and in the next, we will finally apply these words to the question of why there is existence and how

it came to be.

Justification

As we just said, "justification" is a word that applies to whole classes of experiences. But even outside the

context of our theory, this is true. For example, whereas mathematicians and logicians might talk about

justifying proofs and theorems, lawyers may talk about certain actions being legally justified, moralists maytalk about certain actions being morally justified, economists might talk about the most cost effective course

of action being economically justified. This can make the meaning of "justification" somewhat ambiguous iftaken in too broad a context. Although this is true outside the context of our theory, it is also true within it as

well. We already covered one example - namely, logical justification, or justification of good sense - butthere is also a sense in which emotions are justified and sensations as well. There are times when we are so

moved by our emotions that we feel that the situations invoking them or the actions that they drive just have

to be right - or, conversely, that to go against them can'tbe right based on how wrong it feels. In many such

cases, we take this feeling to reflect the moral standing of the situation or action, and thus to be morallyjustified or unjustified. While it may not be correct in all such situations to describe emotionally ladenexperiences as having moral standing per se, the general form that justification takes in these situations is

certainly that of value. That is, although emotions don't always justify situations or actions morally, it is quiteproper to describe them as reflecting value - either goodness or badness - which lends such situations and

actions a certain brand of justification akin to morali ty. In fact, this same brand of justification even extends

to physical pleasure and pain - that is, pleasure and pain of the sensory variety. Physical pleasure and pain

may not always have moral standing per se, but we certainly deem them, in some sense, to be good and bad

(respectively). So whereas moral justification does describe a narrow class of emotional, and perhapshedonistic, experiences, it is also part of a much broader class of justification that belongs to value laden

experiences.

Real Things

Sensations other than pleasure and pain also have their brand of justification, but in a slightly less

identifiable way. What I mean by "identifiable" is that we can't always identify, or point out, the justification

in and of itself, but sensations always do come with the sense of being justified. I call this kind ofjustification "existential justification" because it evinces itself through the shear existence of the things being

sensed. Putting this another way, we are confronted with

the justification of our sensations simply by the fact that we

see the real things they project themselves as to reallyexist, to really be there. That is, we are faced with the fact,

whether we understand it or not - that is, whether weunderstand how it is justified - that these sensations are

justified. If it exists - if we are experiencing it - there mustbe a reason for it, there must be something that necessitates

it, there must be something that justifies its being there. The

reason why we don't always understand how oursensations are justified is because their justifications stem

from the experiences that came before them - that is, the

experiences that entailed them - and because theseexperiences exist prior to our having the ensuingsensations, they are necessarily beyond our minds. So we

are confronted with the justified status of our sensations, but without experiencing what it was that justified

them.

The justification of sensation is much like a passport in that it allows one to enter a foreign country withouthaving to explain or prove that one acquired the passport by legitimate means. In this analogy, the person

seeking passage into the country is like the sensory experience, the country itself like the mind the sensory

experience seeks passage into, and the passport like the justification carried by the sensory experience.

Customs agents require that one produce a passport, but as long as one is able to do this and the passport

appears legitimate, the customs agent puts no further demands on the one seeking passage, demands such as


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proving the passport was acquired by legitimate means. The customs agent isn't concerned about this. It isn't

his/her job to question its legitimacy beyond a fair inspection. He/she simply assumes that if such

identification was produced and seems legitimate, then it is legitimate - or justified. The production of the

appropriate form of identification is like the encounter with the ontological standing of the things we sense -that is, it is like seeing, first hand, that the things we sense are indeed real, and therefore must have earned

their justification by some means unbeknownst to us. We don't feel the need to verify how - we just take it for

granted. So long as our sensations are able to demonstrate their own justification (by demonstrating their

inherent realness), that's good enough for us, and we don't probe further into the source of this justification.

Flow

RepresentableExperiences

Now, although we can't understand the type of justification that upholds our sensory experiences, we aregiven a representation of it, and that representation is the laws of nature. We already understand that physical

systems are sensory representations of experiences beyond our minds and flowing into our minds, and we

can now understand that, if this is the case, then the laws of nature through which they seem to play out are

the justifications underlying them. But this is a rather broad class of justification. The laws of nature cover an

incredibly vast array of phenomena in the universe, phenomena we sense either directly or indirectly - in

fact, the whole array it would seem. That is, it covers all representable experiences. There's nothinginconsistent or misconstrued about classifying this type of justification, a type we might call "physical

justification", in this way, but it does put it in a light that makes it seem very much like an "other" category -that is, the category in which we place all forms of justification that we can't understand. This is important to

understand, because if we refer to this type of justification as "physical justification", we don't mean to implythat the laws of nature justify the physical states of things they bring about. The laws of nature may be

causally necessary (or as close to necessary as the principles of quantum mechanics allow for), but causal

necessity is not the same thing as justification - not even according to our customized definition. A

justification, as we are defining it, carries with it, not only the necessity of the experiences it gives rise toand upholds, but the reasons why as well. But we are not given these reasons where the laws of nature areconcerned - we are only informed that they exist. Therefore, if we are to classify all experiences represented

by our sensations as physically justified, we must understand this to bear a representational connotation aswell - that is, physical justification is a term that represents a form of justification of which we really have

no conception. It is the form missing from the existential sort of justification that comes with our sensory

experiences - the hidden "why" of the existence of physical things.

A Point on

Identity

Of course, not all sensory experiences are like this - that is, not all sensory experiences hide from us themeans by which they are justified. Higher level sensory processes, such as object recognition or 3D spatial

perception, draw their justification from lower level sensory processes such as spot detection or simple lineand angle detection. We looked at an example of this in the Advanced Theory when we showed how the

perception of a linear sequence of points morphs into the perception of a straight line. In the context of

justification, we can say that the linear sequence of points justifies there being

a straight line. This form of justification is not logical justification, eventhough it may sound like it is based on the way we express it. Logical

justification is that form of justification that manifests itself through our

rational thoughts, and we can recognize this form of justification when wefind ourselves engaged in rational thinking. But no thinking is required to

recognize a straight line from a linear sequence of points. This recognition

depends only on the sensory experience itself. This kind of justification might

be described as justification by identity - that is, the presence of a straight line

is justified by the shared identity between it and the linear sequence of points.

In other words, there is a straight line only because the linear sequence of

points is the straight line - their identities are one and the same (but see sidenote ). This is more or less

the same kind of justification as the existential kind we spoke of earlier, except that there is more tojustifying the presence of the straight line than the simple existence of the linear sequence of points. When we

see a straight line, we see that its existence is justified (the existential sort), but we also see where it draws

this justification from - namely, the linear sequence of points. We recognize this link as one of identity - thatis, the justification that underlies the straight line is that it is the same entity as the linear sequence of points.

This type of justification sometimes carries through to other experiences such as when sensations give way to

knowledge and memory. Knowledge and memory belong to a class of cognitions that are unlike the onejustified by logic and good sense. Their justification is more or less unaltered from when they were rooted in

sensations themselves. They are based on the fact that something was experienced to exist and therefore must

be themselves justified on the same grounds. For example, we take our memories to be true and accurate

reflections of events that were real because that is precisely how we experienced them when we were in

their midst - that is, when we were actually sensing them. Same with knowledge. The truth of our knowledge

is taken to be justified because it is derived from things or events we once sensed. And what about fantasy -

that is, the thoughts we fabricate with a full sense of freedom and play? This class of thought is experienced,


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not so much as reflections of facts or an independently existing system of logic, but as tools that are at our

full disposal. That is, in recognizing our fantasies as such, we know them to be our own fabrications, and

thus we have a sense of control over them and a sense that their only existence is rooted in our inventing

them. Therefore, their utility is plain for us to see - and that is in their potential to be made into ideas that canbe put towards solving problems of one sort or another. These problems can run the gamut from the personal

to the public, and the urgency to solve them from self-gratification to altruism. Therefore, if we deem the

ideas we invent while fantasizing to be useful towards this end, then they are justified. That is, the type of

justification fantasy bears is utility. If it serves some purpose for us, there is justification in its use.

Definition: Justification

The common underlying basis upon which a whole

class of experiences can be entailed and projected.

I hope this serves to establish an adequate understanding of what we mean by "justification". All experiences

are justified in one sense or another. Justification permeates the entirety of the Universal Mind. Everything

that exists is justified in its existence, and if the Universal Mind can be summed as one grand unified

experience, then we can say that the existence of the Universal Mind is justified. Now it is important to keep

in mind our customized definition of "justification", for when we say that the Universal Mind is justified, thisis not intended to be taken in any of the conventional meanings of the word - not necessarily, at least. To say

that the Universal Mind is justified doesn't necessarily mean that it is logically justified, nor morally

justified, nor justified in any one particular sense. The kind of justification that underlies the ultimate

experience that is the Universal Mind is a complete synthesis of all forms of justification, the forms that

underlie each and every experience therein. As simple and finite beings, we humans understand only a few

instances of the numerous types of justification that an experience can be grounded on. This is hardly enough

to claim something as bold as an understanding of what justifies the Universal Mind as a whole. We can say

that it is justified, based on the fact that our theory leads us to this conclusion, but not how, or even what

constitutes this justification.

Furthermore, there are complications to consider. It so happens that, based on the definition we have given

the word "justification", there can be conflicts. There are scenarios in which a particular experience can be

justified in one sense but unjustified in another. Physical pain is such an experience. It is justified in the

existential sense - that is, when experienced, it is felt as though it is simply there and that it was given by

some source out of our control, and we might even reach beyond existential justification and appeal to

physical justification to name this source. On the other hand, it is unjustified in the moral sense - or at least,

in the sense that it has no value, or even negative value - that is, it is experienced as something that shouldn't

exist yet does. This poses a problem for us. It means that as it concerns the grand justification underlying the

Universal Mind, it is rife with conflicts between certain types of justification. Pain exists. We know that.

Therefore, the Universal Mind consists, in part, of pain. Thus, it consists of experiences whose justification(the existential sort) conflicts with other forms of justification (the moral or value-based sort). This is a

problem we need to deal with. We will deal with it in the section The Problem of Evil below.

Equivalence

There are a couple conditions under which we say that two or more things are identical. We say this whenthe things in question are actually one and the same thing, or when all their properties are identical in quality

and proportion. In the latter case, the things in question are not onething, but several, and it's the fact that they cannot be told apart

except for where they exist in space and time that we call themidentical. For example, two baseballs that are exactly the same interms of their size, their color, their cleanliness, the quality of the

stitches and other materials, and all other features can be said to beidentical, but if they are indeed two, then there will always be a

difference in their place in space and time. It stands to question,therefore, whether they could still be said to be two distinct objects

should we somehow take away the properties of space and time that

they bear. If their places in space and time are the only features

distinguishing them, then to take them away would be to make them

unconditionally indistinguishable, and therefore one and the samething. Although it makes little sense to propose this for physical


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things like baseballs, it makes more sense for metaphysical things - things like numbers, for example. When

we talk about numbers, we are not talking about tangible, physical things that exist in the outer world. There

is nothing called "a 5" or "a 9" out there. Because of the metaphysical status of numbers, it makes little sense

to say of them that there are two or three that are identical. Either they are different numbers, in which casethey are not identical in any sense, or there is only one of them. There is no "a 5" or "a 9", there is the

number 5 and the number 9. The only kind of identity that makes sense with numbers is the kind in which

there is only one of the number in question. This is true of any metaphysical entity whatsoever, the reason

being that metaphysical things do not take physical form, and therefore lack the properties of having a place

in space and time, which in turn means they can't be distinguish on this basis.

The

Objectification

Process

Projection

Needless to say, this is true of experiences as well. We can easily imagine scenarios in which this doesn'tseem to be the case, such as when two individuals come up with the same idea. To think of these ideas as

entities in the minds of each individual is to think of them as objectstaking a position in space and coexisting simultaneously. This is a

misapplication of the objectification process of course.Experiences are poorly understood when objectified. They are

better understood when thought of in their projected forms. The

ideas had by the two individuals in the preceding scenario, forexample, are, when projected, experienced more akin to absolute

platonic truths. That is, it is experienced as though it belongs to themetaphysical realm of pure abstract ideals, the realm Plato believed

to be truly outer there, beyond the physical realm but accessible to

the mind's eye. In this realm, there is only one such truth, one such

idea. This is why when these two individuals encounter each otherand express their similar ideas, they might say something like "hey,that's my idea" - as if there could only be one, as if the one "stole" it

from the other. And if they choose to work cooperatively with each other, agreeing to share in the credit forthe idea, they present it as one body of thought on which they both collaborated - not as two distinct ideas

that so happen to be identical in their content.

There is a good reason why one might think that two identical ideas, each in separate minds, are indeed

distinct entities. That reason is that each idea corresponds to a MOD in the brain of the individual whoseidea it is. With two separate physical counterparts, distinguished by their locations in space and time, one

might be led to believe the corresponding ideas, as metaphysical as they may be, must also be separate anddistinct. This reason is not good enough, however, for it overlooks one crucial point. The MODs the ideas

correspond to are merely representations in physical or sensory form. It is true that their physicality is what

permits them to occupy a place in space and time, and thus distinguish themselves from each other, but as

representations, they serve the same denotative function as written symbols on paper denoting, say, thenumber 5 or the number 9. We may have hundreds of such symbols on one sheet of paper, each representing

exactly the same quantity. The symbols themselves, in virtue of their physical form, can coexist at many spots

on the sheet of paper, but what they symbolize cannot be so enumerated. There can only be one of the entitysymbolized.

Meaning

But perhaps the best way to understand the non-quantified nature of experiences is to think of them in terms

of the meaning that sustains them. Meaning is not a tangible thing of which there can be many instances. We

always talk about the meaning of an idea, a statement, a work of art, and so on. If we ever find that the

meaning of one thing, say a poem, is exactly the same meaning conveyed by another thing, say another poem,we say that the poems mean the same thing, not that there are two meanings, one per poem, that so happen to

be identical. So the meaning of an experience is much like numbers in that it has no instances - it only has itsown unique, and metaphysical, identity. And because meaning is the underlying basis upon which all

experiences justify their realness, the same non-quantified nature belongs to experiences as well.

Independent vs.

Dependent

Models of Reality

Now, although the manner in which we project our thoughts about truths and logically based ideas can bedescribed as platonic, we are not fully subscribed to platonic theory - at least, not in the context of an

independent model of reality, as Plato was. It's all right to think of the existence of this metaphysical realm

of ideal forms as real insofar as we understand that it derives its realness from our own minds, and that it is

always dependent on our experiencing it as such. This metaphysical realm really is "out there" insofar as this

"out there" is also a product of our minds. In other words, Platonism can be grounded within dependent

models of reality such as or theory, but it is important to understand what this means. It means that to say thatthe platonic realm of ideal forms is really "out there" and to say that it is really "in our heads" is actually two

different ways of expressing the same thing. This is important to keep in mind for our present discussion

because it means that we can't think of concepts as references to something beyond themselves. The entity in

our heads - the concept - is not something distinct from the entity "out there". Note the difference between


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this and the assertion that beliefs are references to things other than themselves. The difference between a

belief and a concept vis--vis their referentiality is, as noted in the Advanced Theory, the difference between

a reference and the referent - that is to say, the belief refers to the concept (if it doesn't refer to some other

human experience), but the concept in turn refers to nothing. It just is. The relation, therefore, between aconcept and the platonic entity it is taken to be about is not a referential on

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The Universe and God