André Mommen

The transformation process of Belgian capitalism and the rise of Flemish populism

Conference paper

GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CLASS FORMATIONSeptember 17-18th, 2011

Academy of SciencesPrague, Czech Republic

Sponsored by the Global Studies Centre, PragueGlobal Studies Association of North America

1

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse the rise of Flemish populism represented by the right-wing Flemish N-VA and the breakthrough of a Flemish nationalist ideology having gained support from public opinion makers. The underlying hypothesis will be the decisive impact of a radicalisation process of Flemish public opinion on the malfunctioning of the Belgian Welfare State (WS) and the federal institutions in combination with profound economic and social changes having occurred in Belgium since the 1960s. The globalization process which went hand in hand with increased openness and liberalisation policies and privatisation of state-owned companies have created the preconditions for the decay of the traditional political parties (Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists) having led the country during the past century.

Introduction

The actual transformation of the Belgian federal bi-cultural state is due to the growth of populism at the right spectrum of the political scene, the liberalisation of capital movements and the increased role of the commercial media in politics. In Belgium, a debate is now going on about the future of the federal state and the funding of the Welfare State (WS). Sometimes a possible “divorce” between the Flemish and Walloon parts of the country are discussed. One easily refers in that case to the divorce of Czechs and Slovaks in 1993 or the falling apart of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Since the last parliamentary elections of June 2010, no federal government could be formed. The Flemish and French-speaking communities oppose each other on a reform of the state with more attributions to the regions and the communities. No compromise could be found about the position of Brussels and the French speaking minorities in the sub-urban area surrounding Brussels. The future of Brussels as bilingual capital and the system of money transfers from the rich Flemish North to the poor Walloon South and to Brussels is also linked to the universal WS. Meanwhile. the disappearance of the Belgian financial and industrial bourgeoisie as a result of the transnationalisation process of capital has caused an ongoing process of ideological, political and social destabilization in both parts of the country. Especially in Flanders, the middle classes want to get rid of federal social solidarity with its built-in WS mechanisms between the regions. Like the Lega Nord in the North of Italy, Flemish communitarians of different origins with their representatives in Parliament are now pressing for separatism and a thoroughgoing restructuring of the WS on neo-liberal financial principles.

Unlike other parties of the (extreme) right in Europe, these communitarian protagonists of Flemish independence are not belonging to the racist and neo-fascist currents represented by Vlaams Belang (VB – Flemish Interest) in the Parliaments. They are not opponents of the EU, but in favour of a reformed EU built on the identitary regions. In principle they favour the import of well-educated workers and specialists sustaining their communitarian project tainted by neo-liberal economic theory. In the recent past, they had pointed to the “success” of Ireland’s fast economic growth because of low taxation of (foreign) investment and the country’s openness to Europe and the global economy. After the financial implosion of Ireland’s real-estate market and the country’s state bankruptcy, the same ideologues prefer

2

referring to Germany, where economic recovery has been realized thanks to an austerity programme and a reform of the WS (Harz IV). In addition, many Flemish nationalists are still admiring Bavaria as a model sub-state as well, where Conservatism and regional development policies have engendered durable economic growth based on high technology industries and durable consumers goods. Hence, these Flemish nationalists are dreaming of a transformation of Flanders into a “Bavaria at the North-Sea coast” where the Conservative Right will be in power.

1. The rise of populism: origins and causes

Popular discontent combined with social demands has always fuelled populist movements and parties representing social groups and classes such as workers, peasants, aged people, ethnic or religious minorities, urban middle classes, etc. These populist parties suddenly appear, but after a while they also will disappear when having lost their appeal to the protesting groupings of voters. These populist parties do not carry with them a clear-cut ideology or view on society. On many an issue their propaganda remains vague. In many cases political and social problems are reduced to a single issue and remedy. The ruling political elites and their political parties are depicted as corrupt and incapable to solve real problems - high taxation, bureaucracy, immigration, unemployment, pensions, an inefficient health care system, spoiling of public money, etc.. In general, these populist parties are seriously tainted by Poujadism, because they focus on tax problems as well. As they reject paying for social solidarity organised by the WS, they are challenging the very basics of the post-war social and economic system too. The rise of populist parties and movements during the past decennia should also be linked to growing irrationalism (“perception”, “emotions”), individualism and xenophobia receiving attention in the media. In addition, identitary nationalism has gained increased support within all social players opposing economic globalisation and multiculturalism after the breaking up of the WS and the end of Keynesianism. Even in the Scandinavian countries, which are well known for their generous WS provisions and economic regulation, populist parties of the Right are gaining electoral support of an increasing number of voters.

The recent rise op populism in Western Europe is caused by several factors. The EU and the opening up of the national economies and neo-liberal policies have led to fast economic re-adjustments and social changes. Governments were the protagonists of privatisation and liberalization policies in combination with reforms affecting the architecture of the WS. The capitalist globalisation process induced major changes in the productive sectors and created instability on all levels of economic and social life. Liberalization of financial markets hollowed out governmental control over the financial system. Rising welfare costs due to an ongoing process of social modernization were now pressing all governments to privatisation of strategic parts of the state system and previously state-owned services such as public transport, communications, higher education, health care, housing and pensions.

Economic openness meant increased competition on the local labour markets, growing cross-border labour mobility and problems of managing and financing the WS as well. Neo-liberal policies led to increased social insecurity and a creeping policy of financialisation of all welfare provisions. The influx of low-qualified workers and their families from the Third World, especially from Muslim countries, created religiously and culturally inspired strives and fostered xenophobia instrumentalised by the far Right mobilising the vote of the old

3

working-class in the cities and petty-bourgeois people elsewhere. In additional, persistent pockets of poverty in the main cities led to a sharpening of social and cultural contradictions among the population. Meanwhile, successful programmes increasing the general educational level of the local population created a watershed between the qualified labour force and the low- or non-qualified local working class and the overwhelming majority working force and the immigrated population. However, both were depicted now as groups “profiting” excessively from the WS provisions destined to the (working) poor (housing, unemployment benefits, social programmes).

Apart from this process of social disintegration, the regional economic and political divide added much to the politicisation of differences between the rich Flemish north and the poor Walloon south. From the 1970s on, Flemish nationalists could convince a good part of the Flemish voters that Wallonia was a “bottomless barrel” profiting from the richer “hard working” Flemish people. IN the beginning, Flemish nationalists blamed subsidies paid to the Walloon steel industry. Then, when the federal state was realised, they criticised “social transfers” from Flanders to the jobless in Wallonia. Breaking up this mechanism of “consumption federalism” based on universal social rights should be a “logical” step to protect Flemish prosperity (employment, pensions, collective services, healthcare, education, fringe benefits). In addition, out of these savings one even could finance higher real wages and entrepreneurial profits by lowering taxes and welfare contributions. These proposals would feed become popular in Flemish entrepreneurial organisations, “service clubs” and in business papers.

2. Regional populism: some conflicts and problems

The history of Flemish populism goes back to the late 19th century when the popular vote was introduced and the vote of the Flemish petty bourgeoisie and peasantry became strategically important to the ruling Catholic Party in order re-equilibrate the growing influence of Socialism in the industrial areas, especially in Wallonia. However, soon dissidences appeared in areas and provincial cities insufficiently controlled by the Catholic Conservatives. During the First World War, Belgium was practically completely occupied by the Germans, who promised independence of Flanders to a group of young Flemish intellectuals having already broken with Belgium. Flemish nationalism was born. After Germany’s defeat, the Belgian Government severely repressed collaboration with the enemy, but the Government could not prevent the appearance of a Flemish Nationalist Party formed by former officers and soldiers having fought in the Belgian Army in the trenches and propagating pacifism (“no more war!”). Though this Party of Flemish Front Soldiers could conquer some Parliamentary seats, it had as a “protest party” little impact on political development. Already in the early 1930s The “Front Party” disintegrated when the appeal of Fascism became stronger and the formation of a Flemish Fascist party, the Vlaamsch National Verbond (VNV), became attractive to the majority of the “Fronters”. During the Second World War, the VNV collaborated with the German occupier.

Although “history” has remained a reference in Flemish nationalist rhetoric, the N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, New Flemish Alliance) has banned all crude references to Fascism. The N-VA leadership has adhered to neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideas also cherished by other regionalist parties in Europa, especially in Northern Italy and Catalonia. In the latter regions, the wealthy middle classes forming the economically more dynamic layers

4

of society are representing the exporting small firms in niche markets, the skilled and educated working force, many media workers and in particular managers and professionals. They are very critical to the politically centralised state being a source of corruption and inefficiency. They are devoted to the logic of global capital. Hence, they believe that only the “market” should determinate the accumulation process of capital, They oppose the influence of organised labour, especially the central bargaining system by which the “social partners” (entrepreneurs and trade unions) are regulating wages and welfare benefits. Although they criticise the centralised state, they nonetheless in favour of a “strong” state defending business interests by easing entrepreneurial initiatives. Lowering production costs by transferring production lines outside Belgium where wages are much lower (Central Europe, Asia) is for them a “good practise”. However, most Flemish small firms producing building materials, carpets, garment, sanitary, radiators, etc. are depending on the local markets. Flemish subcontractors producing components for the motor-car industry or the appliances industry are even in an even less comfortable position. They also oppose both big capital and the trade-union movement. They are working with family capital and workers living in the Flemish villages, where they usually have built their manors.

Flemish nationalism can be considered as a grass-roots phenomenon. During the 1930s, the VNV gained the support of some 16 percent of the popular vote in Flanders. At the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, its successor party, the Flemish People’s Union (VU – Volksunie) succeeded in mobilizing some 19 percent of the popular vote in Flanders. With the breakthrough of the VU, regionalist political parties were formed in Wallonia and Brussels. Walloon regionalists who were united in the Rassemblement Wallon (RW), had got a mass support by attracting already mobilised workers and intellectuals having adhered to the Walloon Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire Wallon – MPW) led by Socialist syndicalist André Renard wanting to stop economic decline. In Brussels, a Democratic Front of French Speakers (Front Démocratique Francophone – FDF) was organising white collars and shop keepers against bilingualism in the 19 municipalities of Brussels.

As a consequence of the rising electoral impact of these three regionalist parties, the three “traditional parties” (Catholics, Socialist and Liberals) drafted after 1968 a compromise reforming the state in a federalist sense. A more thoroughgoing federalisation of the Belgian state was discussed a decade later. In 1993, Belgium became a federal state. Particular to the Belgian Federal State was that Wallonia and Flanders were unilingual and that Brussels was bilingual. The German speaking minority in the East Cantons formed a community integrated into the Walloon region. All French speakers in Wallonia and Brussels formed a French-speaking community. All Flemish speakers in Brussels and Flanders belonged to the Flemish Community. Meanwhile, Brussels was promoted to the rank of a region. Many matters – but all of minor importance - had not been regulated.

As a matter of fact, the regionalist parties VU, RW and FDF were losing popular support in the wake of this transformation process. Already in the late 1970s, the RW lost its right wing to the Walloon Liberal Party. Syndicalist workers returned to the Socialist Party. FDF survived in the wealthier municipalities of Brussels, now defending the linguistic demands of white-collar workers also living in the villages adjacent to Brussels. In the late 1970s the VU lost its Fascist wing to the dissenting Flemish Block (Vlaams Blok - VB). Then, the VU leadership wanted to transform the party into a progressive Democratic Party, but without any success. Finally, in 1993, a the Liberal wing of the VU joined the Party of Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten – VLD) formed by Guy Verhofstadt (leader of the Party for Liberty and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Voortuitgang – PVV).

5

Though VU still existed, everybody questioned about its survival chances. Hence, the Flemish Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij – SP) tried to attract the progressive wing of the VU. In 2001, the VU disintegrated completely into factions. Only a hard core grouping fundamentalists decided to form a new party, the N-VA, striving for an independent Flemish State (see further).

After 1999, all French-speaking parties opposed delegation of more competences from the federal to the regional levels. For several reasons, all Flemish parties estimated now that a new state reform delegating new competences and powers to the regional governments had become necessary. The problem was that no agreement could be reached between the French-speaking parties and the Flemish-speaking counterparts on an general reform programme. This would determine the political climate when in 2007 an electoral campaign of the general parliamentary elections were started. The Flemish Socialists demanded regionalisation of the employment policy, the Flemish Greens claimed for a regionalisation of health care and family policies, while the two allied parties of CD&V and N-VA wanted to regionalise other domains such as employment and mobility, tax policies and justice. In their manifestoes, all major Flemish parties reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining national solidarity for the social security system. However, the tiny N-VA and the large VB (now Vlaams Belang) wanted a break-up of national solidarity anchored in the Belgian social security system.

3. Some problems of Belgian Federalism

When Belgium seceded from Holland in 1830, the newly formed independent state did not change its judicial-administrative structure inherited from the Napoleon state. Though people in the North (later known as “Flanders”) spoke various Dutch dialects, French became the sole official language in which all important decisions and laws were registered. Only for practical reasons Dutch was used when communicating with the Flemish speaking population. As all educated people in the North and the South used to speak French, the latter language could also function as a “vehicle” for people climbing the social ladder. Only poor people used a vernacular. However, no clear rules existed in Flanders about this practised bilingualism. As secondary schools and universities were only teaching in French, it was clear that French was the language the educated class normally used in all important affairs.

3.1. Flemish pressures in favour of unilingual regions

In 1893, a multi-vote system for was introduced, allowing the working classes and the peasantry Parliament. Several Bills concerning the use of Dutch in administrative matters and at the courts were passed. Finally, in 1932 a Bill regulating the use of the French and Dutch languages in administrative affairs was passed. Except for the agglomeration of Brussels, a unilingual system was introduced in Wallonia (French) and Flanders (Dutch). In Brussels, however, the municipal administrations were free to choose in which language they would organise their internal services and in which language they would deal with the central administration. The principle of unilingualism served Walloons and Flemings very well. For the Flemish nationalists, the principle of uniligualism meant an important victory for school teaching in French must disappear. For the Walloons, the situation did change. One called in

6

1932 this deal also a compromise of the Belgians”, because the leaders of the three national (Liberals, Catholics and Socialists) had agreed on it.

Although important institutional changes were implemented, no revision of the Constitution was decided. The limits of both territories (Flanders and Wallonia) and that of Brussels were subjected to a revision when the linguistic character of the population of a municipality had changed. Hence, the linguistic frontier could easily move to the north because of the process of “Frenchification”. Only in 1963, the linguistic frontier was definitively fixed. Provincial borders were corrected according to the use of languages. The driving force splitting up the country according to the language spoken was the Flemish petty bourgeoisie being aware of the importance of fixing linguistic borders and cultural homogeneity. There was nonetheless an important problem that was not yet tackled: the Université Catholique de Louvain. This university had become a bilingual institution situated in Flanders. Finally, a revolt conducted by radicalised Flemish student movement would oblige the political class to split the university of Louvain and to settle the French-speaking branch in Wallonia. Subsequently, the government prepared a cosmetic revision of the Constitution instituting Cultural Councils grouping Flemish and French-speaking members of Parliament having to deal with educational and cultural matters separately. Education and culture were spending departments financed by the central government.

3.2. Walloon pressures for economic regionalisation

Until the 1960s, Wallonia was the industrially most developed region of Belgium. However, its industrialisation was still based on basic industrial products and equipment, such as coal and steel, heavy metal construction, rolling stock, glass, soda, fertilizers, etc., which were responsible for Belgium’s slow economic growth (Lamfalussy 1961). The decline of heavy industry was already noticed in the 1930s, especially in coal mining. Investment in heavy industry was always targeted at rationalising the existing production lines or plants, not in developing special steel products or pharmaceuticals. After World War II industrial decline was considered now as an acute political problem by the Socialist trade-union movement now calling for “structural reforms” which had to be carried out by the state after nationalisations. Meanwhile, multinationals started industrialising the green fields of Flanders, while the Belgian Government financed the expansion of the port of Antwerp where the petrochemical industry expanded. A modern steel factory was established nearby the city of Gendt. Hence, the Walloon activists started imputing the decline of their region to the Belgian State dominated by the Flemish Christian Democrats and their pressure groups pressing for increased employment in their own (Catholic) region.

Especially the Socialist working class believed that the Flemish majority was imposing its will on the Walloon minority. In addition, it was said that the holding companies owning most steel mills and collieries had lost any interest in investing their capital in these old industries. Therefore, the workings class organisations asked for a regionalisation of the economic policy to be carried out by a Walloon government (Nova 1970). That multinational investors were preferring the green fields of Flanders to the old industrial areas of Wallonia, that was mainly due to demographic and spatial factors as well, but this choice was misunderstood by most Walloons. They were now pleading for having industrial zones established in Wallonia too in order to attract multinationals and to boost the accumulation process of capital in function of job creation in the crisis-ridden areas. The in 1959 instituted Office of Economic

7

Programming was reformed in 1970. Regional economic councils were set up. European money was received to pay for economic social reconversion of Wallonia. Of course, the results of these initiatives were by far too timid to convince all Walloon regionalists (Nova 1970). They asked for more: direct investment by the Government in new sectors such as the petrochemical industry and oil refineries. Walloon Socialists in Government signed an accord with Iran for having an oil refinery (IBRAMCO) established in Liège. This project was defeated by the Flemish Christian Democrats fearing for a growing state interference in the oil industry…

3.3. The federalist consensus

A federalist consensus could easily grow from the moment on all Belgian political parties had split up in the 1970s along linguistic lines. Meanwhile, the Flemish nationalist succeeded in maintaining high pressure on the Christian Democrats, while the Walloon syndicalists and Socialists wanting to save the Walloon steel industry adopted a federalist strategy as well. Both strivings matched thus at the political and ideological level when a federalist solution could appear as the outcome of a “irreversible logic”. Meanwhile, however, the influx of multinational capital slowed down after the first oil shock of 1973 and then the Belgian holding companies remained openly unwilling because incapable to invest anymore in their heavy losses making industries (Mommen 1993a; 1994). It meant the end of the Belgian bourgeoisie as the hegemonic class as well. During the 1980s all major holding companies (Coppée-Rust, Empain-Schneider, Groupe Bruxelles-Lambert) went bankrupt and/or were taken over by raiders, restructured or dismantled and their subsidiaries sold. In 1988, the leading holding company, the Société Générale de Belgique, was finally acquired by the French Compagnie de Suez (Dethomas and Fralon 1989; Vanden Driessche 1988).

Now that the French-speaking bourgeoisie had lost much of its economic and financial power, the accumulation process of capital was entirely transmitted to the discretion of multinational capital, leaving the Flemish bourgeoisie still in a powerless minority position. In this period, the idea of reforming the state on a real federal base could easily gain the support of the political class. Only the French-speaking middle classes in Brussels refused abandoning their “Belgian” identity, because they felt that they were losing in a federal state much of their social prestige. Though a common language linked them to the Walloons, their social-economic position was nonetheless quite different. As Wallonia impoverished with the further decline of its industry and the rise of unemployment, most French-speaking white collar workers and small businessmen in Brussels became more an more interested in acquiring the status of a “full region” for Brussels. Meanwhile, Brussels had also become Europe’s capital where also many international organisations and multinational companies were establishing their headquarters. This reinforced the bargaining position of Brussels vis-à-vis Flanders as well.

The Belgian government decided in 1978 to refloat or to close down all ailing industries there were grouped into five “national sectors” (coal, steel, textiles, hollow glass, ship yards). Publicly owned investment companies were founded in order to finance this restructuring operation. A Fund for Industrial Renovation was set up. Regional investment companies saw the daylight. The Flemish textile industry which, apart from the cotton spinners, was composed of small and medium-sized family-owned firms, succeeded in surviving the crisis of the 1980s by modernizing and upgrading with public aid its produce and sustain foreign

8

competition. All coal mines and ship yards were closed. The Walloon steel factories were regrouped in the giant firm Cockerill-Sambre and its production facilities were integrated and modernized in order to meet the demands of especially the motor car industry. In the 1990s, two small steel mills (Boël, Forges de Clabecq) ware bought by the Brazilian steel maker Duferco. The Belgian State sold its participation in Cockerill-Sambre to French Usinor. Usinor forming in 2002 with Arbed (Luxembourg) and Aceralia (Spain), the steel giant Arcelor, that was taken over in 2006 by the Indian steel firm Mittal Steel, now forming Arcelor Mittal.

4. Neo-liberal reforms

Neo-liberal reforms introduced in the 1980s were of crucial importance to the new state of mind in a period the holding bourgeoisie lost its impact on Belgian politics. Although the central state had replaced the Belgian (holding) bourgeoisie as the major actor in refunding and restructuring the ailing five industrial sectors, the Government was not intended to acquire a stake in these sectors. Financial constraints and rising unemployment inspired the governing Christian Democrats and Liberals to trust on neo-liberal tax incentives in order to refund all sectors. With this policy the Belgian Government followed the policies already having been designed with the coming to power by Ronald Reagan (“Reaganomics”) and Margaret Thatcher (“Thatcherism”) after 1979 in Great Britain and the USA and the supply-side and monetarist economists having gained a foothold at the Belgian universities and entrepreneurial pressure groups (especially the Flemish Economic League – Vlaams Ekonomisch Verbond, VEV). This meant the end of Keynesianist policies having been implemented in the early 1960s by the Socialist and Christian-Democratic (“Roman-Red”) coalition governments. Meanwhile, multinational companies tried to lower their overall costs by in-depth investment in robotics and Japanese management techniques (“Toyotism”, just-in-time production). Investment in low-wage countries or sub-contracting labour-intensive production were other options. All these neo-liberal reforms, including freezing wages and increased labour flexibility, created unrest among industrial workers. Notwithstanding all these innovations, unemployment remained nonetheless too high (about 10 percent), while the average yearly spending deficit was well above 10 percent (Mommen 1987).

The stock market reactivated in 1982 by tax rules favouring investment in shares, was draining to speculative transactions. Co-ordination centres made of Belgium a tax heaven for multinationals as well. Firms applying to set up a co-ordination centre must be part of a multinational group with subsidiaries in at least four different countries for a period of at least two years. A 20 percent cross shareholding was sufficient to make a company a member of the group. Normal Belgian corporate income tax rates are up to 33.99 percent, but the co-ordination centre are taxed on between four and ten percent of its total business expenses. Co-ordination centres are not paying taxes imposed on outgoing dividends, royalties or loan interest remitted by a co-ordination centre unless the recipient is a resident individual or non-profit making exempt company. Five percent of the dividends received by a Belgian corporate shareholder from a co-ordination centre were taxed at the standard corporate income tax rate (33.99 percent). Even then the Belgian corporate shareholder was not taxed on dividends received unless he held at least 5 percent of the share capital of the co-ordination centre. This concession applied to all qualifying Belgian holding companies and was not unique to co-ordination centres.

On 19 October 1987, the day of the crash on Wall Street, the Christian Democratic – Liberal Government led by Wilfried Martens fell. A Roman-Red Government, once again led by

9

Martens, broke with neo-liberal policies. However, social forces backing the Government, could not but compromising on marrying supply-side economics to a kind of revised Keynesianism creating better investment conditions to private investors. Privatisation schemes were developed to open state-owned companies active in television, telecom, high-speed railways, air carriers, personal credit, ferries, etc. to private investors wanting to finance investment in new products and services. Market-driven forces took now the lead in all domains of the public sphere. The Roman-Red coalition government aimed at returning to financial orthodoxy in a period that the economy was booming, but the spending deficit was still 6.5 percent, combined with an overall public debt of 121 percent of GNP in 1989 (in 1980 only 55.9 percent). Stopping the autonomous growth of the public debt was still a necessity underlined by all financial experts (Quaden 1987), only increased economic growth could help avoiding state bankruptcy. Hence, a Keynesian policy mix was designed in order to increase domestic demand and help creating 50,000 additional jobs a year in order to absorb the reserve army of 420,000 people. Again, the government had to counter capital flight by tax reduction on dividends, a policy the neo-liberals had also pleaded for. Industrial investment and the expanding construction activities became substitutes for public investment which remained at an extremely low level.

The major problem of the Belgian Government was state bankruptcy (Lammens 1993). The latter could only be avoided by selling its assets to private investors. Especially the saving and investment banks (ASLK-CGER; Gemeentekrediet-Crédit Communal, NMKN-SNCI; NIM-SNI, etc.) and telecom firm Belgacom1 monopolising the domestic market were very attractive to private capital. Privatisation schemes had already been studied during the Christian-Democrat/Liberal coalition governments in the 1980s, but only carried out by the Roman-Red coalition governments (1988-99). Meanwhile, post-materialist expectations creating new social demands had acquired some prominence because of the rise of a new middle class. This new middle classes working in ICT, financial services (banks, insurance companies, investment funds), health care and higher education considered themselves mainly as consumers of high-quality products, not as ordinary wage workers. Many of them backed the emerging Green parties in Flanders (Agalev) and Wallonia (Ecolo). In Flanders, low-qualified workers turned their back to the Socialists. In 1991 they voted for the racist VB now gaining some 11 percent of the popular vote in Flanders. Though the new middle classes did not oppose the fundamentals of the WS, they could live with the perspective of less state and, thus, with increased individual purchasing power. As higher education financed by the Government touched already about one-third of the school leavers, the new middle class had become a socially and economically dynamic factor. Good jobs were for them and dead-end jobs were the part of the industrial and services workers. Especially the latter workers would become extremely sensitive to the call of the two racist parties VB and FN capitalising on general discontent engendered by economic, social and cultural exclusion.

5. Declining Flemish populism

In the 1980s, federalising the Jacobin Belgian state had become a necessity. Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels should thus acquire elected parliaments appointing themselves their governments. In 1993, Belgium would become a federal state (Mommen 1993b). All these changes occurred without any popular enthusiasm or street manifestations. Apparently, this completely “legal” revolution remained unrecognised by the population. Hence, Flemish Nationalist Hugo Schiltz concluded that the federalisation process ‘was not the outcome of an

1 One had to wait until 2004 for the privatisation of Belgacom, but the Belgian State kept a majority stake of 51 percent in Belgacom’s capital.

10

intellectual process on the level of constitutional thought’ (Schiltz 1993: 108). According to Schiltz, the state reform process covering the period of 1988-93 had been a ‘revolution post-factum and that does not provoke fireworks’ (ibid. 125).

However, not all problems had been solved by the state reform of 1993. Federalisation helped solving at least one important issue: the future of the state-owned financial institutions. By privatising and selling them to private partners they could easily “disappear” from the political agenda and, that was more important, the central government could cash in order to lower its debt (De Ruyter et al. 1994). That happened without any debate. Apparently, everybody was well aware of the disastrous financial situation and an overall public debt reaching 130 percent of GDP. Lowering overall public debt to 60 percent of GDP and reducing the spending deficit to 3 percent were two targets the European Commission had set as a condition for joining the announced European Monetary Union (EMU). This condition would incite the Belgian Roman-Red coalition government to draft a “Global Plan” encompassing measures of austerity and higher taxes. All these internal and external pressures combined with a growing uncertainty about the future of the WS fuelled popular discontent as well. However, no alternative was formulated to these austerity measures by the working-class organisations. It appeared that the sources of working class radicalism had been rapidly exhausted now that social protest had any chance to be heard by the governing Roman-Red coalition. In addition, Christian Democrats and Socialists were also fearing the transformation of the Flemish Liberal Party PVV into a populist party of the Right when Guy Verhofstadt launched his party of Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) by absorbing a large part of the Flemish Nationalist VU and some Socialist and Christian-Democratic defectors. However, Verhofstadt failed to win the federal elections of 1995. Hence, the governing Roman-Red coalition government could remain in power for some more four years carrying out a neo-liberal programme of liberalization of the financial markets and privatisation of state-owner companies in accordance with the neo-liberalised international environment. The 1991 parliamentary elections day was also called Black Sunday because of the large working-class protest (about 10 percent) vote collected by the racist VB, an event that changed the political landscape in Flanders profoundly. In order to prevent the VB playing a role in politics, the democratic parties concluded an accord excluding this party from exercising authority in any government or municipality. That accord did not stop the electoral growth of the VB collecting now also protest votes in all parts of the Flemish country.

Now that all political forces had accepted the principle of federalism and that workable federal structures had been installed, a modus vivendi was growing between Walloons and Flemings. In Wallonia, the Socialist Parti Socialiste (PS) had absorbed the vote of the working-class regionalists, while in Flanders the VU, having lost its “Liberal wing” to the Liberal VLD, was loosing electoral ground. Flemish Socialists thinking about the future of their party in a depolarising political landscape now opened discussions about the formation with the Greens and Flemish Nationalists to form a Progressive Party of the Left. This electoral operation would finally fail because the Socialist trade-union movement was not convinced of its urgency. Tony Blair’s “Third Way” had meanwhile also enticed some Socialist leaders and convinced them that opening the door to the defeated Liberals would offer some promising perspectives on ethical questions. Under Wim Kok’s leadership the Dutch Social-Democrats had formed together with the two Liberal parties a “Violet” coalition government in order to reform the Dutch WS on a market-driven principle. Creating “work” (Kok’s slogan was “Work, Work, Work”) by using market-conform incentives instead of paying unemployment benefits was the basic principle of Kok’s reforms.

11

However, some minor communitarian problems had not yet been solved. First, their was still the status of the French-speaking minority in several municipalities surrounding the agglomeration of Brussels. Flemish nationalists wanted to suppress all linguistic facilities conceded to these French speakers in these six municipalities where already a cleat-cut majority of French-speaking inhabitants had grown. Secondly, the electoral constituency of Brussels including also the Flemish counties Vilvoorde and Halle, was not yet split alongside the already fixed linguistic frontier. This allowed French-speaking voters there to cast their votes to French-speaking candidates. Why not split this constituency? But what with the six municipalities with their French-speaking voters? Third, Brussels as a bi-lingual region was geographically situated in Flanders, but the proportion of Flemish-speaking inhabitants was progressively disappearing, while the French-speaking population in all municipalities surrounding Brussels was still growing. Thus the day would come that Brussels be connected to Wallonia by a large corridor of French-speaking municipalities still belonging to Flanders. How to stop this sociological transformation process? First of all, the Flemish authorities reacted by a series of repressive measures – to be interpreted as a kind of administrative harassment - against French-speaking “immigrants” in Flanders obliging them to “adapt” to the Flemish social and cultural environment. Cultural presence of the Flemish-speaking minority in Brussels was heavily subsidized. More important was that the Flemish parties now also pressed for an “immediate” scission of the electoral bilingual district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. The latter measure could only be implemented with the accord of the French-speaking parties having to support such a reform. This support was, of course, refused because contrary to the interests of the French-speaking inhabitants of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde.

A totally different “question” to be discussed was of economic and financial nature: the questionable financial transfers going from rich Flanders to poor Wallonia. The Belgian state had paid until the 1990s most investment in infrastructures (highways; ports) with loans. This applied also to investment in the ailing steel industry in Wallonia and the coalmining industry in Flanders. These practices were now stopped because they had led to mutual compensations per region, which was criticised by Flemish nationalists as being expensive and inefficient. Remained the “problem” of the financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia under the regime of WS solidarity. Higher unemployment rates and poorer health of the aging Walloon working classes had led to financial transfers to Wallonia. In the rods of the Flemish nationalists the “lazy” Walloons were now sucking the living forces of the Flemish nation. They wanted to stop these transfers. But how? It was clear that breaking social solidarity with Wallonia would be their only solution to this problem. Putting this claim on the political agenda would, however, be opposed by the working-class organisations and all progressive forces defending inter-regional solidarity and fearing a general break-up of the universal WS provisions. At the other hand, an economic revival in the South could undoubtedly much contribute to a gradual decrease of these transfers going to Wallonia. But without breaking with the yet applied neo-liberal policies forbidding state-guided investment initiatives, this would be impossible in a period multinational capital was still reluctant to invest in Wallonia.

6. The neo-liberale takeover…

In 1993, he Flemish government promised to excel in good governance and openness (Vanden Brande et al. 1992). About its economic and industrial policy no guidelines were proposed. However, there was much ado about the rapidly changing international economic situation which was worrying trade unions and entrepreneurial organisations. In 1988, the raid on the Société Générale de Belgique had provoked some panic. The French Compagnie de

12

Suez was now its majority shareholder and started stripping the holding’s assets. Compagnie Maritime Belge, Union Minière, Recticel, etc. and other important industrial participations were sold to other investors. Suez kept the energy (Electrabel) and engineering (Tractebel) firms. In 1994, Tractebel2 acquired Distrigas, a natural gas distributing firm. From now on all decisional power concerning the energy market would be concentrated in Paris. In Flanders, opinion makers started a debate on the Flemish “anchoring” of enterprises in strategic sectors in Flanders by using state regulations (De Ruyter et al. 1994; Brockmans 1993, 1995). This discontent was also fuelled by the fact that some Flemish investors were meeting difficulties to have their bid accepted.3

This selling out of Belgian assets was accompanied by a privatisation of all state-owned credit institutions and banks, which gave birth to a further expansion of the banking sector (Kalisz 1996). Two major bi-national financial companies emerged: Fortis and Dexia. In 1996, Dexia was formed by a merging of Gemeentekrediet-Crédit Communal with Crédit local de France. Fortis was formed in 1991 by a fusion of Dutch AMEV with Belgian Generale Bank/Générale de Banque which acquired in 1999 privatised ASLK-CGER. Led by Count Maurice Lippens, Fortis wanted to acquire a leading financial position in the Benelux. In 2007, together with Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander, Fortis tried to buy the much larger Dutch ABN AMRO Bank. This takeover would fail because Fortis had critical difficulties when financing its own part of this joint acquisition. After receiving a bailout from the Benelux governments, its Belgian banking operations were sold to BNP Paribas. Fortis retained the rest of its insurance operations and changed its name to Ageas. Its insurance and banking subsidiaries in the Netherlands were nationaliserd by the Dutch Government and renamed ABN AMRO. Dexia was severely hit by the American real-estate credit crunch after having taken over Financial Security Agency (FSA) in the United States. In 2006 the average stock-market price of Dexia shares was as high as 20.8 euro, but in 2010 they were worth only 2.6 euro. Dexia had to be refloated by its institutional shareholders and to get rid of FSA.

These transformations of the financial sector starting under a Roman-Red coalition government were further eased by the Liberal-Socialist coalition government having been formed with the help of the Ecologists in 1999 after a historical defeat suffered by the Flemish Christian Democrats. Belief in the end of history and the triumph of globalising capitalism had accompanied this political reorientation of a profound ideological impact for Christian-Democracy could now be regarded as old-fashioned. Optimism combined with stock-market opportunities formed a promising span transformed politics in a debate on the introduction of market-related incentives for the creation of jobs ans social promotion. Multiculturalism and ethical reforms (marriage of homosexuals, euthanasia, etc.) completed that optimism now that stock market was booming, the interest rates were historically low and real-estate prices were rising. The believe in the virtues of a liberal Europe was practically unlimited.

7. … and the origins of popular discontent

The social base of two Liberal-Socialist coalition governments led by Verhofstadt between 1999 and 2007 was much narrower than its electoral support suggested. First of all, the racist VB was still growing to about 25 percent of the popular vote. The Liberal VLD was internally divided, because its traditional (“dark blue”) wing of small businessmen, managers and professionals disagreed with Verhofstadt’s turn to the Left. Soon dissidents of the Liberal Right left the party. It proved that about 40 percent of the VLD’s membership opposed the

2 . In 2007 Tractebel Engineering was absorbed by Electrabel.3 Among them was the Flemish holding company Ackermans & Van Haaren.

13

party’s multicultural and ethical stance and preferred tax breaks to welfare spending. Already before the general elections of 2007 the liberal populist Jean-Marie Dedecker, a former successful judo coach, founded after being ousted his own Right-wing Liberal Party campaigning for more Flemish autonomy and tax breaks. Dedecker defended the idea of a Flemish Republic going its own way within Europe. In his own words, Dedecker represented the “hard-working Fleming” having no interest in supporting anymore the “lazy” Walloons and the middle-class yuppies with a university degree. Looking for a larger platform and financial support, Dedecker talked to both VB and N-VA for an alliance, but thanks to a Poujadist campaign in 2007, his independent LDD (Lijst Dedecker) got 6.5 percent of the popular vote in Flanders and 5 seats in the federal Parliament, all at the expense of his former party, the Liberal VLD. This meant the end of the Liberal-Socialist coalition government of Verhofstadt. Dedecker’s success was largely due to the media having adopted him as the little self-made man fighting the “arrogant party elites” representing the urban yuppies in the expanding commercial, financial and high-tech sectors.

Dedecker’s fortuitous and short-living electoral success translated a broad discontent of the middles classes. The global stock market crash of 2000 caused by the “new economy” bubble had hit Flanders as well and caused popular discontent among middle-class investors after the bankruptcy of Lernhout & Hauspie (L&H), a firm selling language technology. At its peak, Lernout & Hauspie had a market capitalization of almost US$10 billion. Especially petty-bourgeois investors – there were about 100,000 small L&H shareholders in Flanders - had invested in L&H shares promising a speculative high return on investment. The firms bankruptcy in 2001 fed popular discontent against banks, financial advisors and some politicians having promoted investment in L&H shares.4 Even more serious was the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008. due to failures of large financial institutions in the US that. The big three Belgian bank&insurers Dexia, Fortis and KBC (the former Kredietbank) were severly hit by this crash, making the Belgian bourgeois class loose a good part of its wealth. All this contributed to the political realignment of the Flemish bourgeoisie as well. The economic downturn with shrinking profit margins in combination with havey losses on portfolio investment boosted Flemish nationalist resentiments and made claims for a thoroughoing financial restructuring of the federal state more acceptable to the Flemish population.

Normally, the Flemish bourgeoisie (also known as the families owning KBC) had always backed the Flemish Christian-Democratic Party CVP. Flemish nationalism was, in general a petty-bourgeois phenomenon opposing the French-speaking bourgeoisie, without any influence on the business world.5 For the CVP, federalism could not be an option. As the Flemish population outnumbered the Walloon population, the principles of majority rule should be applied.

That large parts of the Flemish bourgeoisie stopped backing the CVP had much to do with the party’s sclerosis after many decades of leading the Belgian governments and exercising power at all levels. The historical defeat of the CVP in 1999 should be interpreted as the end of an epoch. It left the Christian-Democratic politicians in disarray. The example of the implosion of the Christian Democracy in Italy was present in all minds when the CVP started discussing on a new profile and a new identity. In the mean time, the CVP lost several of its leading 4 For instance, the Flemish regional government had becme a major investor through a venture capital holding company. During one of Lernout & Hauspie's cash shortages, it guaranteed 75 per cent of a bank loan to the company.5 ‘The Flemish Movement, Flemish Nationalist leader Hugo Schiltz remarked, remained in essence a petty-bourgeois affaire.’ (Schiltz 1993: 119)

14

politicians to the Liberal VLD as well. A new name, CD&V (Christelijk, Democratisch en Vlaams - Christian, Democratic and Flemish) was adopted, making clear that one would not break with the Christian source of inspiration, however, any reference to the “pillars” or “estates” having previously constituted the party’s structure was avoided. CD&V would be a “modern” party not subjected to pressures coming directly from Christian interest groups claiming seats in Parliament.

In addition, the Flemish bourgeoisie was well aware of the fact that the renewed party’s appeal to the Flemish voters was shrinking because of growing individualism, urbanisation and secularisation. Hence, the Christian Democrats could not claim being the “state-supporting party” of Belgium. Especially the Flemish entrepreneurial class confronted with shrinking benefits, was now won over for the idea of “keeping Flemish money in Flemish pockets”. The regional financial drain from Flanders to Wallonia (and Brussels) should be stopped by implementing a thoroughgoing reform of the federal state with increased responsibilities for the regions. Increased autonomy – maybe independence – of Flanders had become in the mean time more attractive to a Flemish bourgeoisie facing increased foreign competition. In its opposition role to the Verhofstadt Government CD&V played down the Flemish card. Meanwhile, the Flemish bourgeoisie had understood the advantage of having Christian-Democratic conservatism completed with a Flemish identitary revival mobilising the voters in the villages against the so-called arrogance of the French-speaking minorities in the municipalities adjacent to Brussels and against the “lazy” unemployed Wallons. Why did not these jobless want to commute to Flanders and have a job there? Thus, after having modernised its programme, CD&V allied in a cartel with the remnants of the Flemish nationalist party now grouped in N-VA and won with Yves Leterme as their leader the elections for the Flemish Parliament in 2004. Yves Leterme became Minister President of the Flemish Government. Then, CD&V leaders decided to have Yves Leterme as Verhofstadt’s challenger in 2007 (Van Driessche and De Lobel 2011). As the election date was approaching Liberals and Socialists started quarrelling about questions the Liberal electorate detested (the immigrant vote and naturalisation of foreigners). Hence, Leterme could emerge as serious a candidate Prime Minister. Together with the allied N-VA he now campaigned also for a reform of the Belgian state and having the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde split. In 2007 Leterme collected about 800,000 preference votes. Then he was invited to form a new coalition government including also allied N-VA.

8. The saga of Bart De Wever

The N-VA was formed in the autumn of 2001 after the implosion of the VU. The party’s history cannot be understood without analysing the role played by its actual political leader Bart De Wever (Mommen 2010; Sel 2011). In no time this young historian developed himself as the oracle of Flemish nationalism and as the uncontested leader of Flemish discontent. As a populist leader having married Right-wing populism with identitary rhetoric he conquered the party leadership in 2004 with 95 percent of the votes.6 Born in a Flemish-Nationalist family with a Fascist past he is able to sell his person in function of an electoral strategy targeting the average Flemish voter and promoting Flemish identity as a source of strength in a rapidly changing and globalising world. He changed the party’s profile into a socially and ethically conservative and economically neo-liberal formation preparing for Flemish independence.

The party’s start was nonetheless difficult, which was mainly due to marginal popular support and media attention. Initially, the N-VA was depicted by the media as the party of the losers

6 In 2011, he was re-elected as Party Leader with 99.35 percent of the votes.

15

hardly able to take the 5 percent threshold. Indeed, at the federal elections in 2003 N-VA received only 3.1 percent of the votes and gained only 1 seat in the Federal Parliament. Hence, its leaders were desperately looking for an electoral alliance and a Leader with media appeal. An opportunity was offered by the “radicalised” CD&V since 2003 led by Yves Leterme. Both parties ran together in 2004 for the regional elections and in 2007 for the federal elections, winning both. In 2007, the N-VA received a total of 6 seats in the federal Parliament thanks to the cartel with CD&V. N-VA stepped into a coalition government under Leterme’s leadership. However, on 21 September 2008 the N-VA lost its “faith” in the federal government led by Leterme because there was no progress made in the reform of the state and the following day Minister Geert Bourgeois (N-VA) resigned. In a press conference he confirmed the end of the cartel CD&V/N-VA. This electoralist stance proved to be the right one. In 2009, Bart De Wever’s N-VA and Leterme’s CD&V won the elections for the Flemish Parliament. N-VA’s electoral score was as high as 13.1 percent (16 seats). N-VA had taken over a fair share of the vote usually going to the racist VB (see Table 1).

Table 1: Flemish Elections 2004-2009

Parties

2009 2004 difference

% seats % seats % seats

CD&V (Christian Democrats 22,9 31 26,1 28 -3,2 +3

VLD (Liberals) 15,0 21 19,8 25 -4,8 -4

Vlaams Belang (VB) 15,3 21 24,1 32 -8,8 -11

SP.A (Socialists) 15,3 19 19,7 22 -4,4 -3

Lijst Dedecker (LDD) 7,6 8 - 0 +7,6 +8

Groen! (Greens) 6,8 7 7,6 6 -0,8 +1

N-VA 13,1 16 - 6 +13,1 +10

UF (Union des Francophones) 1,2 1 - 1 +1,2 =

16

Sociaal-Liberale Partij (ex-VU) 1,1 0 - 4 +1,1 -4

Others 1,7 0 0 - =

Total 100,0 124 100,0 124 0,0 0

As a consequence of this electoral victory, N-VA received the presidency of the Flemish Parliament and two seats in the Flemish Government. The portfolio of Finance, Budget, Labour, Environment and Sports went to executive-manager Philippe Muyters of the Flemish entrepreneurial organisation VOKA (Vlaams netwerk van ondernemingen).7 The latter had previously joined N-VA as a party member, but reputedly he belonged to the Liberal Party.

In 2010, N-VA gained plurality in the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium with 28 percent of the popular vote in Flanders, becoming the largest party in both Flanders and Belgium altogether8 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Parliamentary Elections 2007-2010

Results of the Flemish-speaking party lists for the Chamber

Parties

2010 2007 difference

% votes seats % seats % seats

N-VA 27,8 1.135.617 27

29,6 30 +15,5 +14

CD&V 17,3 707.986 17

SP.A 14,6 602.867 13 16,3 14 -1,7 -1

VLD 13,6 563.873 13 18,8 18 -5,2 -5

Vlaams Belang (VB) 12,3 506.697 12 19,0 17 -6,7 -5

Groen! 6,9 285.989 5 6,3 4 +0,6 +1

7 VOKA was formed in 2004 after the merger of VEV and the 8 regional Flemish Chambers of Commerce.8 N-VA was running separately in 2009 in the Flemish elections, gaining 16 seats, and the European elections gaining 1 seat. N-VA is currently holding 2 out of 9 minister portfolios in the government.

17

LDD 3,7 150.577 1 6,5 5 -2,8 -4

Others 3,8 69.174 0 1,8 0 +2,0 =

Total 100,0 4.022.780 88 100,0 88 0,0 =

Results of the French-speaking party lists for the Chamber

Parties

2010 2007 Difference

% votes sets % setas % seats

PPS 37,6 894.543 26 29,5 20 +8,1 +6

MMR 22,2 605.617 18 31,2 23 -9,0 -5

CDH 14,6 360.441 9 15,8 10 -1,2 -1

Ecolo 12,3 313.047 8 12,8 8 -0,5 =

PP 3,1 84.005 1 - +3,1 +1

FFN 1,4 33.591 0 5,6 1 -4,2 -1

Others 8,8 213.343 0 5,1 0 +3,7 =

Total 100,0 2.504.587 62 100,0 62 0,0 =

Valid votes 6.527.367

Blanco & invalid 402.488

Turn over 6.929.855

Voters 7.767.552 150

18

From now on it became clear that only the N-VA become the major player in the communautarian game. The N-VA, now fearing a sudden decline of its populary in the polls, refused obstinately agreeing on a compromise with the French-speaking political parties. Meanwhile, the “Belgian crisis” was “locked in”. A Flemish-nationlist identitary discourse conquering practical all Flemish political parties, was now making a serene debate on the reforming and refunding of the federale state impossible.

What is the real character of the N-VA? Is it an ordinary party of the populist Right like many others in Europa trusting on xenofobia and anger? Or does the party belong to the “decent” centre-Richt? At any rate, the N-VA is not explicitly anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant like the VB in Flanders or the PVV of Wilders in the Netherlands. Its anti-Semitism is limited to some “harmless” jokes or remarks concerning orthodox Jewery in Antwerp. The party is not anti-European or “Euro-sceptic” like the Fidesz in Hungary or the PVV in the Netherlands. The party’s enemy is the French-speaking bourgeoisie in Brussels and the “lazy” Walloons in the poor South. At the European level, N-VA has joined the European Free Alliance (EFA) that consists of regionalist or minority parties. The EFA forms a parliamentary group together with the European Green Party. However, the N-VA is at least a party of the Conservative Right. The N-VA has been invited to move to the European Conservatives and Reformists group, after party leader Bart De Wever was invited to talks with David Cameron in March 2011. That move may surprise. The N-VA is still cherishing contacts with the Scottisch National Party (SNP) and the Catholics in Ulster. However, De Wever who likes talking to everybody, is not really interested in these related partners belonging to the Celtic fringe. De Wever is an ideologue guiding his people to the promised land: an idependent Flanders. He is reading Burke. As a self-declared adept of British ultra-conservatism he has outsourced his refusal of the acquis of the French Revolution: the Jacobin state. As a historian, De Wever is mainly interested in the history of Flemish nationalism, especially its dark side, i.e. Flemish collaboration with the German Nazi’s. With the demagogues of the VB he shares a common ideological ground and interest as well. Like most Flemish Nationaoists, a mild form of anti-Semitism is his. Members of his N-VA have still contacts with some VB militants and leaders. They participate in common public manifestations.

However, De Wever is not a declared friend of this racist comrade in arms. He likes operating like a “honorable” Flemish Nationalists whose aim is to unite all Flemish Conservativs and Nationalists into one big party. A conservative “Bavaria at the North Sea” is still popular in right-wing circles in Flanders, but until now, however, these rather wild ideas never could acquire a broad support in the media. The media are only interested in his person and everything that is nearby the common man watching or reading pulp. They want to stress De Wever’s tast for fat food and beer or his holdays in Bavaria or Austria. De Wever presents his N-VA furthermore as a party of “honorable” men and idealists in politics preparing for Flander’s independence, but without giving a deadline for that event. He believes that the challenges of the 21st century can best be answered by strong communities and by well-developed international co-operation, a position which is reflected in the party slogan: ‘Necessary in Flanders, useful in Europe.’ Identitary communities should be used as protectors of the socially deprived and the weak members of the community. But at the other hand, his party is pleading for compulsory measures against immigrants and French-speaking Belgian citizens in Flanders. In addition, N-VA’s party programme shows many similarities to that of the Flemish entrepreneurial organisation VOKA. During the debates on the formation of a new federal government in 2010, party leader Bart De Wever announced that ‘if VOKA is not satisfied, I am not satisfied.’

19

N-VA’s social and economic agenda is clearly tainted by free-market liberalism and supply-side economics. N-VA adhers to a Thatcherite breakup of the funamentals of the WS and a strict budgetary and monetary control. The international organisation (IMF, OECD, World Bank, European Commission) are always quoted in order to defend austerity measures. Easily firing workers, wages according to efforts paid, the ending of early retirement privisions, more market and less state, a significant lowering of company taxes… that all are presented as instruments in order to increase economic growth and to reduce the spending deficit as well. In addition, the spending deficit should also be reduced by means of budget cuts (“less bureaucracy”) and performing services to the public. Personal taxes should be paid directly to the regional state. Taxes on employed labour should be lowered to prevent multinatonal companies running away to low-wage countries. Growth of health-care expenditures should be contained. Unlike VB, N-VA is in favour of protecting the rights of homosexuals. On other issues a “compassionate” conservativism stressing the importance of individual responsibility, respecting the community and the environment is defended. However, compassion is also linked to old virtues like “hard working”, “property”, “family”, “order”, “leadership” and “community” against moral decay, individualism and capitalist globalisation.

Conclusions

As we saw, some profound structural economic and social changes have occurred in Belgium during the postwar era. They all prepared for the breakthrough of Flemish Nationalism under Bart De Wever’s populist leadership. At least five factors should be highlighted: 1) Flemish grass-roots resistance to the Frenchification process of public life in Flanders; 2) the decay of the Belgian bourgeoisie as a garant of Belgian unity; 3) the decay of Christian Democracy and its radicalisation at the turn of the century; 4) the role of the commercial media promoting populist political leaders like Bart De Wever; 5) petty-bourgeois resistance against the capitalist globalisation process.

First of all, Flemish nationalism is an ideological substrate of linguistic demands mixed up with social discontent and it articulates a revolt against French-speaking predominance in politics and bussines. In the 1960s, Flemish Nationalists could mobilize these masses in the streets. The VU was then the only party pleading for federalism. Declining heavy industry in Wallonia was in the 1960s at the origins of Walloon regionalism stressing the necessity of bringing economic power in Walloon hands. Both regionalist movements challenged thus the unitarian character of the Belgian Jacobin state. Both were very critical to the economic and financial power centralised by the Belgian holding companies. However, Flemish regionalists had their base in the petty bourgeoisie and they were socially and culturally conservative, while the Waloon regionalists represented the radicalised miners and metal workers being influenced by Socialism and Communism.

Secondly, the decay of the financial and economic power of the Belgian bourgeoisie permitted the Flemish bourgeoisie with its rural roots operating in light industries (textiles, knit-ware, carpets, sub-contracting, building materials, food processing) to grow stronger. This Flemish bourgeoisie was unable to break really through in new sectors. Economic openness and financial liberalisation were endangering its position as well. Therefore, the Flemish bourgeoisie backed the Flemish Christian Democrats as long as this party was hegemonic.

Thirdly, state reforms led in 1993 to the formation of a federal state. The Volksunie (VU) had played an important role in this process of federalisation and disappeared in 2001. In the mean

20

time, the Christian Democrats lost political power and voters. The Flemish rural bourgeoisie and the traditional middle classes backed them when their leader Yves Leterme allied with the N-VA in order to fight back by designing a radical programme promising a thoroughgoing state reform.

Fourth, the commercial media played since the end of the 1980s an ever growing role in communicating political, cultural and social views. The entertainment industry was now filling the television screens, integrating politicians in their programmes as comedians and mediatising political events as parts of a soap. The Flemish population, who used to watch also Dutch television until the late 1980s, gradually returned to their Flemish television channels with soaps using the Flemish vernacular.

Fifth, the common ground for De Wever’s identitary project had already been prepared by the neo-liberals in their critics on the WS and their propaganda for more and better entrepreneurship. Hence, the “hard working” Fleming could be portrayed as the saviour of the Flemish economy and the garant of people’s wellfare. Not the WS, but entrepreneurship combined with traditional values and respect should offer solutions to all challenges. Finally, only an independent Flanders would be the logical outcome of this struggle. References

Brockmans, Hans (ed.) (1993) Vlaanderen: een Franse kolonie?, Louvain: Davidsfonds.

__________________ (1995) 200 jaar filiaal. De Franse greep op de Vlaams economie, Louvain : Davidsfonds

Dandoy, Régis, Geoffroy Matagne and Caroline Van Wynsberghe (2009) ‘The Future of Belgian Federalism through the Eyes of the Political Actors’, ECPR Potsdam General Conference, 10-12 September 2009, Section: Territorial Politics, Panel: The Future of Belgian Federalism

De Ruyter, K., S. Michielsen and J. Mortelmans (1994) België verkoopt. De stille privatisering van de Belgische overheidsbedrijven, Groot-Bijgaarden: Scoop.

Dethomas, Bruno and José-Alain Fralon (1989) Les milliards de l’orgueil. L’affaire de la Société Générale, Paris: Gallimard.

Kalisz, Serge (1996) Les banques en Belgique, Brussels : EVO.

Lamfalussy, Alexandre (1961) Investment and Growth: The Case of Belgium, London: Macmillan.

Lammens, André, La Belgique en faillite. L’histoire d’une dette publique de 10.000.000.000.000 de francs, Antwerp/Amsterdam: Roularta Books.

Mommen, André (1987) Een tunnel zonder einde. Het neo-liberalisme van Martens V en VI, Antwerp: M&I NV.

______________ (1993a) ‘The neo-liberal experiment and the decline of the Belgian bourgeoisie’, in Henk Overbeek (ed.) Restructurering Hegemony in the Gobal Political

21

Economy. The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s, London and New York: Routledge.

_______________ (1993b) ‘La régionalisation de la Belgique. De la question linguistique á la réforme de l’État’, in Janusz Sługocki (ed.) Regionalism in Europe. Traditions and New Trends, Bydgoszcz and Geneva: European Centre for Regional and Ethnic Studies ; European Cultural Centre.

_______________ (1994) The Belgian Economy in the Twentieth Century, London and New York: Routledge.

_______________ (2003) ‘Recomposition, remembrement ou relotissement politique en Flandre’, in Cahiers marxistes, no. 224, avril-mai.

_______________ (2010) ‘La fin de la Belgique ?’, in Cahiers marxistes, no. 241, nov.-déc.

Nova, W. (1970) Dossier pour un gouvernement wallon: fédéralisme et perspectives économiques, Liège : Éditions de la Fondation André Renard.

Quaden, Guy (1987) ‘Les finances publiques’, in Guy Quaden (ed.) L’économie belge dans la crise, Brussels: Ëditions Labor.

Quévit, Michel (1978) Les causes du déclin wallon. L’influence du pouvoir politique et des groupes financiers sur le développement régional, Brussels: Éditions Vie Ouvrière.

Schiltz, Hugo (1993) ‘De geruisloze overwinning van een minderheid”, in Geert Van Istendael (ed.) Het nut van België, Amsterdam and Antwerp: Uitgeverij Atlas.

Sel, Marcel (2011) Les secrets de Bart De Wever, Brussels and Paris: Les éditions de l’arbre.

Van den Brande, Luc, Norbert De Batselier, Theo Kelchtermans, Hugo Weckx, Luc Van den Bossche, Johan Sauwens, Leona Detiège and Wivina De Meester-De Meyer (2002) Vlaanderen-Europa 2002. Een project van de Vlaamse regering, Tielt: Lannoo.

Vanden Driessche, Martine (1988) Poker d’enfer. O.P.A. sur la Générale de Belgique. Les coulisses d’une affaire exemplaire, Paris : Fayard/Marabout.

Van Driessche, Wouter and Peter De Lobel (2011) ‘Tien jaar geleden veranderde de oude CVP van naam. Godverdomme dagen bij CD&V’, in De Standaard, 6-7 August 2011.

22