The Theory of the Unity of God in Al Juwayni Al Irshad Al Juwayni Al Shafi

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THE THEORY OF THE UNITY OF GOD

IN AL-rowAYNI's AJARSHAD

by

Abdc1 HakimAjhar

A thesis submitted to

the Faculty ofGraduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree ofMaster of Ans

Institute of Ts1arnic Studics

McGillUniversity

Montreal,Canada

June 1995



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ABSTRAcr

AUTIIOR:

'l'ITLE:

DEPARTMENT:

DEGREE:

Ahdel Hakim Ajhar

The Theory of the Unity of Gnd in al-Juwaynï's al-Irshiid

McGiIl University - Institute of !slamic Studies

Master of Arts

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The conception of the unity of God in al-Juwaynï. one of the latest thinkers in

the carly Islamie kaliim. is the subject of this thesis. AI-Juwaynï. though an Ash'arite

thinker was quite open to Mu'tazilite thought. particularly that of Abü Hashim al

Jubbli'i. He was also inlluenced by the philosophers.

With al-Juw<lynï the kaliim's theory of the unity of God reached its ultimate

resolution. That is to say. the theory of the unity of God was based on specifie

epistemological grounds. in the early period of the kaliim. It had assumed its shape. and

was thercforc open to the possibility for establishing a new approach to the unity of God

in the ontological sense.

The first chapter deals with the long historical debate about the unity of God. It

introduces many aspects of al·Juwaynï 's thought. and touches on how al·Juwaynï.

proceeding from an Ash'arite background adopted many of the Mu'tazilite's themes. in

its BU\irian braneh.

The second chapter analyzes the theory of al-Juwayni on these issue and shows

his contribution to the notion of the unity ofGad in his book a/-Irshiid.

The third is a conclusion whieh throws Iight on the possibilities openecl by al

Juwayni to approaehing the unity of God from different ontologieal angles. Such

possibilities had. in faet. emerged in a1-Juwayni's thinking when he began to use



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dirrerent concepts. particularly in his hook .1I-''Aqi<1l1iJ .1I-Ni;rllmi.l'lIiJ. T'IlIS 1I1kr

proved in ul-/rshii<1 Ihat God is exislence i t ~ e l f . he generally avoided lISilig l ~ r m s

'110ms and accidents. Instead. he viewed the lIniverse as of Iwo kinds. neccssary Ilcillg

and possible beings. In this conlextthe allrihules of God as :.speels of 1lis essence wOllld

play l i dirrerent ontologieal l'Ole. eomprehended in Ihe term u l - r u k / J ~ i ~ .



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RESUME

AUTEUR:

TITER:

Abdel Hakim Ajhar

La Théorie de l'Unicité de Dieu selon ('al-lrslJad

DEPARTEMENT: Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Université McGiIl

DIPLOME: Maîtrise és Ans

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La conception de l'unicité de Dieu selon al-Juwayni, le dernier penseur du début

de la période du kalam Islamique est le sujet de ce mémoire. Malgré qu'il fut un penseur

Ash'arite, al-Juwayni était réceptif à la pensée Mu'tazilite, plus paniculiérement celle

d'Abü Hiishim al-Jubbâ'i. De plus, il était influencé par les philosophes.

Avec al-Juwayni, la théorie de l'unicité de Dieu selon le kalam a atteint son

apogée. Ce qui veut dire que la théorie de l'unicité de Dieu était basée sur des

fondements épistémologiques spécifiques pendant la premiére époque du ka/iim. Elle va

s'arroger sa forme et par conséquant, la théorie sera réceptive à la possibilité d'établir une

nouvelle approche de l'unicité de Dieu dans le sens ontologique.

Le premier chapitre se concentre sur le long débat historique concernant l'unicité

de Dieu. Il présente plusieurs aspects de la pensée d'al·Juwayni et retrace comment celui

ci a adopté cenains thémes Mu'tazilite de l'école de B ~ r a à partir d'éléments Ash'arites.

Le second chapitre analyse la théorie d'al-Juwayni à ce sujet et démontre sa

contribution dans son livre aJ-Irshifd à la notion d'unicité de Dieu.

Le troisième chapitre termine ce mémoire en mettant en lumière les possibilités



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dégagées par al-Juwayni dans l 'approche de l 'unici té de Dicu selon différents a n ~ l c s

ontologiques. En fait, de telles possibilités ont é m e r ~ e au sein de la pensée d'al-Juwaym

lorsque celui-ci a commencé à utiliser différents concepts: particulièrement dans son Iivrc

Ill-'Aqidah al-Nir-iimiyah, Ainsi, aprés qu'il eût prouvé dans son Ill-/rslwd que Dieu cst

l 'existence même, al-Juwayni va généralement éviter d'utiliscr Ics termes d'atomes ct

d'acc ident. A la place, il voyait l 'univers comme étant de deux sortcs, soit l'Eu'c

nécessaire et les êtres possibles. Dans ce contexte, les attributs de Dieu en Hmt qu',\spects

de Son Essence pourraienjouer un rôle ontologique différcnt, compris d.ms le tcrme IlI

takh$i$ .



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TRANSLITBRATION

The Arabie to English transliteration system used in this thesis follows that of the

lnstitute of Islamic studies. Il must be noted that hllmzah in the initial position is omited.

and simply appcars in the forms of a,i,u, according to its vocalization.

t = , 'ain

!> = ' bamzab

? = db

t:=ghut' = ,

- = c.g Hishim, al-]uwaynI, Saljllk.

b = t

oP = Q

o =q

b' =

CS = Y

C J = th

o = h IF .IDIIlbtJrsb

e =I.t



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Acknowledgments

It is hard to express in a few words. the v:lluable effort of support ami full

participation 1 have received from Sausan. my wife. or more precisely illY partner in

all things. To her 1 owe my e v e r l a ~ t i n g gratitude.

1would Iike to thank Professor U. Turgay. Director of Institute of Islamic Studies for

providing me with a fellowship for the academic year 1993-94; special thanks tll

Professor E. Ormsby. my teacher weil as my adviser; Professor 1. Boullata for

giving me sorne of his vaIuable time; Professor H. Landolt. and M. Estahlmi.

My greatthanks go also to the staff atthe Institute of Islamic Studies Iibrary for their

assistance. especially S. Ferahian and W. St. T h o m a ~ .The secretary of lnstitute V. Masse cannot be forgotten, thanks to her and to the

editors of this thesis Richard Cooper. Elizabeth Abbot, and Sh. Nanji in the computer

lab.

My friends deserve a1so my thanks for their constant care and help. And special

gratitude must he admitted for a Httle guy, my son Manar. who was understanding of the

importance of his calm during my work on this thesis. He waited till 1had finished my

work to start his demands and even cry.



•Abstraet

TABLEOFCONTENTS

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Resume iv

Translitcration vAcknowlcdgmcnts vii

Introduction- 1Chaptcr I- The Historieal Devclopment of the Problem 13

1.1- The Attempts at Creating One Method for Determining

ail Beings 14

1. 2- Other Aspects of the Problem 21

1. 3- The Logical Aspect 23

1. 4- New Strategy in the Mu'tazilite School 30

Chaptcr ll· AI·Juwayni's Theory in K. aJ-Irshiid 45

II. 1- The Theory of States (AQwiil) 49

II. 2- What it is Necessary to Say of God 52

II. 3- The Essential Attributes 57

II. 4- The Truth of Similarity and Difference 58

II. 5- The Negative Essential Attributes 64

II. 6- The Affirmation of Knowing the Attributes of Ma'iini 66

II.7-The Attributes that Necessitat their Qualifications 69

II. 8-The Benefit of UsingMa'iini 74

II. 9- TheMeaning ofGod's Names 75

II. 10-The Traditional Attributes (aJ-$iliir aJ·khabarïyah) 77

Conclusion 83

Select Biblography 91



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Introduction

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ln dealing with the history of the Ash'arite ka/üm, two thinkers reecive most of

the atlention, Ahu al·l;lasan al·Ash'ari (d. 324/946), the founder of this sehool, and

Ahu 1:lamid al·Ghazali (d. 5051111), who is considered most often as the great exponent

of his school against many others, philosophers, Mu'tazilites and Balinites. This

common understanding was in fact imposed by certain historical circumstanees duc

to the political and religiou\ clements. AbO al·l;lasan al·Ash'ari appeared in a very

anxious moment in Islamie history when there was connict hetween the Mu'tazilites,

who had fallen l'rom power but had not disappearcd l'rom the cultural and religious

presence, and the l;Ianbalites, the orthodox Muslims, who were resisting, both

religiously and politically their opponents' atlempts to summon.

Although al·Ash'ari's thought ean he traced baek in many points to the

previous tradition, his importance cornes l'rom his effort to formulate these issues

into one coherent theory. The theory of mll'iini, for instance, whereby the additional

and etemaJ attributes of Gad are different from His essenCe as weil as from each other,

is to he found in his predecessor Ibn Kulliib (d. 240/862) who was the lirst creator

of such theory. t The notion of uncreatedness (ghayr makhlüq) of the Holy Qur'iin ClIO

aJso he found as one of the Ibn Kulliib's views, as weil as Al;1mad Ibn I;IanbaJ.

With respect to the theory of how to interpret the arnbiguous passages in the

Qur'iin coneeming those passages which extemaJly, ?ahiran, Iiken Gad in sorne way to

His creatures, al·Ash'ari also adopted the view of Anas Ibn Miilik, the lirst to helieve that

these passages must he taken as they arc without asking how (biliïkllyf). Al·Ash'ari a1s0

recognized the issue of the possibility of the vision of Gad, which was pronounced by

aJ·I;Iiirith b. Asad aJ·Mul;tasibi (d. 243/665) in his book aJ·Tllwahum.2

Il is needless to seek here for the sources of aJl the issues that aJ·Ash'ari

mentioned. The conclusion we arc Irying to arrive at is that the great position aJ·

Ash'ari holds in Islarnic history is to he found. lirst, in his capacity to create a

baJanced view, taking into account bath revelation and the reason, with sorne



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inclination towards the former; and secondly, in his uhility 10 rcfute und criticil.e

his opponents ut u time in which u speciul son of person, polilieully und rcligiously

speaking wus needed.

Abü I;\iimid ul-Ghuzali cume inlo view in Islumic hblOly us u grcut Ash'urile

Ihinker when he fuced two fronts Ihat bec ume dangerous l'rom Ihe Sunni-Suljuk

state's point of view, Ihe Ismu'iIiles and the philosophers. AI-Ghuzlili's llehievemenl

can bc found in his reeslablishing the Sunni doclrine Ihal wus the ideology of the

Saljük stale, and in his criticism of the Balinites and philosophers. But l'rom u

different point of view al-Ghuziili did not present a syslemutie and coherent theory,

rather he offers many theories--whlch mostly contradict each other--in different fields

in the context of his evolving refutation of other groups. As Ibn Sab'in notes

describing al-Ghaziili: "He is mixture combining the contraries, and confusion

undermines people's hearts. Sometimes he is a mystic, at another he is a philosopher,

the third an Ash'arite, the fourth a jurist, and the fifth time he is confusing" 3.

Although al-Juwayni Iived in anxious times bctween two differcnt kinds of

states, the Buwayhi and the Saljük. and though he was Iike ail the Ash'arites ut that

time subject to the inquisition (miPnal. most of his writings werc completed in a

stable political situation, after Alb Arsliin and his vizir N i ~ a m al-Mulk had

rcconsidered the Ash'arites and brought them to their high position.

AI-Juwayni occupied a very important role in the Saljük-Sunni state. He

was. bcsides others Iike Abü al-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 4bS/I072l. head of the

education system instituted by N i ~ i i m al-Mulk. The importance of al-Juwayni

cannot, therefore•. bc sought chielly in his historical circurnstances nor in his

ability to attack bis opponents. ln other words. the historical position of al·Juwayni

alone does not help us so much in our attempt to understand his importance a

thïnker•

It might he said that because the most dominant method in the studies dealing with



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the history of Islamic thought still relies either on analyzing such thought in terms

of historical c i r ~ u m s t a n c e s or searching for the foreign clements that inOuenced this

thought, al·Juwayni has not had a great attention from the scholars. Apart from

these methods, which- in our view- arc not proper to discover the special structure

that any discourse trics to build. al-Juwayni should be studied in terms of his

position in the carly kll/üm's discourse. This is bccause. he represents the climactic

point of this discourse in the Ash'arites' line. Thus, in analyzing the contribution of

al-Juwayni to the carly kIl/üm with reference to the kIl/üm discourse itself. not

through historical or foreign elements, wc can arrive at a measure of his great

importance.

Needless to say. when we talk about the kll/iim discourse in this study we mean

the metaphysics of the ka/am from its establishing by Abü a1·Hudhayl a1·'Alliif (d.

235/857) to Abü a1-Ma'ii1i a1·Juwayni. The metaphysics which is built on the same

epistemological basis, namely bcings and their attributes.

By the method of analyzing the discourse in terms of the discourse itself is

meant seeking for the way that the discourse builds and arranges itself according to

certain principles. The aim here is to disclose the consistencies, harmonies and

contradictions. as weil as the disparities, whatever they may be. that the discourse

contains. That is to say, every discourse··philosophically speaking--even though its

attempt to create its own coherent system still suffers from the contradictions

bctween the concepts within it, from the gaps and inequalities bctween its levels.4

The development, evaluation or creation of a different system proceeds mostly from

these sorts of disparities. which are not overcome in the available discourse that is the

subject of this criticism. In other words the criticism, whether i t cornes from the

adherents of a particular discourse or from other fields of thinking, emerges from the

defects or disharmonies that this discourse a1lows to creep tbrough.

In elaborating the kalfm's thought according ta this type of analysis, we shall,



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surely. find out how the mutakallimün evalualed and developed Iheir discourse on the

basis of the same epistemological ground. We shaH further Cilld Ollt how the

mutakallimün (the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites) criticized and innuenced each other

and. more importantly for this study. we shaH discover the real position and

contribution of each of the mutakallimün in this long Hne of thinking.

Furthermore. our concern in this thesis. is 10 show Ihe place of al· Juwayni in the

philosophy of the ka/am in its relation to definite grounds and aims. We also intend 10

show how he treated the ka/iim issues. how he was open to both Ihe Mu'tazilites and the

philosophers and. more importantly how he overcame many of the kalüm problems.

pushing this discourse to ils ultimate resolution. In this case. then. al-Juwayni will IlOt be

pictured as a skiHed debater and refuter of his opponents in disquieting historical

conditions. as his school's founder al-Ash'ari and his student al-Ghazali are viewed.

Rather. al-Juwayni's involvement in argumentation against other thinkers is a

subordinate factor used in terms of his proving and supponing his own idea.s. Il might

be said. therefore. that because of aJ-Juwayni's success in forcing obstacles out of the

ka/iim. especially the Ash'arite one. he is considered as the latest thinker in the early

ka/iim. This point may interpret partly. why his student al-Ghazali opened a new

beginning in the kaliim. a beginning which was disturbed and confuscd.

There is no doubt that since Abü aJ-Hudhayl constituted the cosmological

system of the kaliim. aJl the later activity of themutakallimün was centered on this

system. either in amending or refuting il. This movement of the ka/am. which wa.s

working on Abü Hudhayl's system. couId be described as evaJuating and treating

the defects. lacks. disharmonies. and contradictions in Abü al-HudhayI's

metaphysics.

The basic issue in the kaliim as weIl as in the whole of Islamic thought wa.s

Gad. His unity and His relation to the attributes. Gad is the ontologicaJ foundation

of Islamic thought, and in every field of such thoughC mysticism. philosophy and



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ku/iim_ God and His attribules represenl lhe firsl onlological principle lhal heslows

upon ail other heings lheir exislence.

ln lhe ku/iim, lhe issue of lhe unily of God was nol merely a religious issue,

il was, slriclly speaking, an onlological and a logical one. Thal is 10 say, every kallün

lheory aboullhe unily of God inevilably enlails a special underslanding of crealion, on

one hand, and involves a definile lheory aboul lhe judgmenls (ulJkiïm) lhat can he

asserted about God, on the other hand.

Ali the MuCtazilites, for instance, agreed that the attributes of God are directly

due to and hence identical with God's essence. They ail except for Abü aI·Hudhayl aI-

cAllaf, said that these attributes are not maciïni, additional to or identical with God's

essence. Rather, ail propositions applicable to God are due to God's essence, ail

predicates in these propositions find their origin in God's essence. God knows and

wills, by virtue of Himself. The theory of the unity of God according to the MuCtaziiites

rigorously relies on the absolute uni'v of God; they reject any other entities, whatever

lhey may he, in association with the essence of God.

Because of their helief that the self·attributes ( ~ j f i j t aJ·dhiït) of God are identical with

His essence, the MuCtaziiites, therefore, were compelled to decide that the attribute of

will is a created attribute, not an eternal one. This helief in generated will was

necessary for the MuCtaziiites in order to justify the creation out of nothing. That is,

inasmuch as the physical world is created in time, the will as the means of creation

cannot he eternal. This is hecause the eternal attribute would necessarily entail eternal

creation as a result of God's action.

The MuCtaziiites, though they proved the absolute unity of God, were confused

about the logical aspect of the unity of God until the coming of Abü Hashim al·Jubba'i

(d. 321/943). The question was as follows: how can an additional predicate he put

heside the subject (God) in the propositions. God is knowing. powerful, hearing...etc.7

Different answers have becn advanced. as we shall sec in chapter one. to this question.



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Only AbO Hüshim under Ihe influence of Ihe Iheory of Ihe allrihulislS liS Prof. Wolfson

poinls oul,S admiled Ihal Ihe allribules of God lire stliles (u!III'II/) differellt frolll Ihe

essence.

The Ash'ariles' conlinuily wilh Ihe prcvious Irlldilion represented hy Ihn Kulliih,who is considered as one of Ihe Ihree greal founders of the Ash':U"ile sehool, hclieved

Ihal Ihe allribules of God are ma'ilni, addilional 10 God's essence; Ihey .Ire ncilher

idenlical with God's ,:.,sence nor olher than He. In Ihis way the t\sh'ariles prcserved Ihe

etemity of the allribute of will, and spcech in order to prove lliat the Holy Qur'iin is nol

created. According to the Ash'ari tes, because of the ahsolule freedom of God,

ontologically speaking, He can possess His will eternally and create Ihe physical

world out of nothing in a chosen moment of time.

A1though the logical aspect was c1earer and more Iinguistically appropriale, the

onlological aspect still suffered from a lack of conviclion. Although logically, ail the

predicates of God, such as being knowing, willing, hearing, powerful etc. arc derived

from the marifnj subsisting in God's essence, these mariini funclion as (ma$iidir) in a

merely linguistic sense, as prcdicales in propositions about God. There is no problem,

then, for the Ash'arites to admit addilional predicates to the subject (God).

After resorting for a long time to the theme of the etemity of God's will, al·

Juwayni provided this idea with a new philosophical interprelation. He maintains that

even the creation is generated by virtue of the eternal will; it is a result of a

particularization (takh$i$) of it. AI-Juwayni in this inventive conception gives an

ontologieal interpretation to the theory of marini. He holds that the mariini have two

aspects, one etemal and subsisting in God's essence, the other generated by its being

particularizcd in the sensible world.6 The same can be applied to the attribute of speech.

On the logical side, al-JuwaynI insists that these marani are merely mental

causes by which the propositions applied to God become possible; without these marini

such propositions c?uld not he understood. The predicates of God, therefore, are caused



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by ma'iini or 'ilal inherent in God's essence, Furthermore, these predicates or aW$üf

are states (alJwiï/) that cannot be said to be existent or non-existent. But contrary to

the view of Abü Hashim, the inventor of the theory of states, these alJwiïl are known.

One who knows the essence does not necessarily know the predicates of this esscnce; the

predicates arc hence known separately from the essence.

As it was for the predecessors of al-Juwayni, the problem is due to the way in

which the attributes of God can be ascribed to Him by a convenient justification. The

statements God is knowing, willing, anù so forth need to be rightly vindicated. The

logic of the mutnka/limün in general and the Ash'arites in particular was derived

from the grarnrnar of the Arabic language.

With reference to Arabic grammar, the controversy among the mutnkallimün

centered on the question of whence the attributes (aw$iif) such as knowing, willing,

powerful etc. were derived. For this reason we repeatedly read in the Ash'arite

literature the statement directed against the Mu'tazilites challenging them to answer

the question of the' infinitive of God's aW$iif. Are these aW$üf such as knowing,

willing etc., due to the essence itself or to infinitives which inhere in the essence?

For the Ash'arites, these aw$üf must, according to the Arabic language, be derived from

definite mll$iiclir; knowing should he derived from the mll$dar knowledge, willing

from will etc.

Though aI-Juwayni kept the fundamental belief of his SChOlll, which states that

the predicates applied to God are derived from ma cani, he adopted Abü Hashim's

theory that these predicates are alJwiil. In addition to this point aI-Juwayni strongly

emphasizes that these maciini, which are mll$iidir of derivation, are "mental causes"

(Ci/al Caq/iynh); they are mental existents (mawjüdat dhihniynh), absolutely different

from the essences, which are real existents, mawjüdiit f i a1-a'yiin. In this way aI

Juwayni avoided two big problems. The flfSt is that by negation no real entity can

possibly he ascribcd te Gad save the mental entities (maciinll without which the



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predication to God wou Id be impossible. The second is in escaping the dilemnm of

the predicates, i.e., whether or not these predicates arc different IlIv$iIf from God's

essence. Thus, in his adoption the theory of states, which presupposes that predicates

are neither existent nor non-existent, these predicates become aspects of God tlmt Ci\ll

be known separately but do not exist apart from the essence. Besides his emphasis on

the a1,Iwii/ as additional aspects in the epistemological sense, al-Juwayni also insists

repeatedly that without these a1)wii/ wc could not elaborate the sameness and

differences among things. Chapter two explains this.

Al-Juwayni thus provided the Ash'arite school with some philosophical

momentum by adopting certain Mu'tazilite themes and philosophical ideas such as

the necessarily Being (wiijib a/-wujüd) for God to distinguish Him from possible

beings which are known by the fore-knowledge of God.

In a/-Shiimi/ f i U$ü/ a/-din, al-Juwaynï constantly mentions two names as his

main sources, Abü Ishaq al-Isfara'ïnï. who was his teacher when he was young, and Abu

Bakr al-Baqilliinï (d. 403/1025) who espoused the philosophy of atomism and when was

the second major thinker in the Ash'arite school after ils founder al-Ash'ari. The implicit

but clear source for him in a/-Shiimi/ is the Mu'tazilite thinker Abü Hiishim al-JubbiPi.

Though he embraced many of his ideas al-Juwayni argues with him on those mallers

where he does not agree with him. In K. a/-Irshiid, an intensive and mature work, al

Juwayni does not mention his sources from his school. Rather he declares more frankly

bis objections to the founder of the Ash'arite school.

The first chapter of this study focuses on the heated historical controversy

among the MU'tazilites thernselves and later with the Ash'arites. A controversy which

always left the door open for more evaluation and development in the kaliim discourse.

this controversy in tbis chapter centers on two points: first, demonstrating the unity of

Go<! at the same time as applying to Him the attributes as predicates in propositions

about Him; second, an effort has been made to create a systematic view of the law



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of inference of the invisible (a/-ghii'ib) from the visible ( I J / - . ~ h i i h i d ) . This was the

major point in thc criticism directed by the Ash'arites to the Mu'tazilites.

AnalY1.ing and describing the theory of al-Juwayni_ how he tried to overcome

the lacks in both schools, how he combined many i d e a ~ from different sources

inlo one theory, and drove the ka/am discourse to ilS ultimate points_ is the subject of

the second chapter.

Finally, the conclusion allempts to touch on both aspects of al-Juwayni's

lhought, the completion and overcoming of the troublesome points in the ka/am in

general and in the Ash'arite school in particular, and how this allempt threw the ka/am

discourse into a new crisis that couId only he resolved by creating a fundamental

shift in many aspects.



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I l

1 Ibn Ku\liib, Abü Sa'id al·Qa\liin (d.240/862) Iived in Ihe lime of Ihe Abbasl cllliph, IlI·MIl'mun

(191·211/813·833), and w.. . one of Ihe most imponanl figures in lhe hislory of lsIamic kll/iïlll, 10 whumore due mosl of the Ash'orile issues. He criticizcd the school of Johm b. ~ u f w i i n and Ihe Qiillirilcs. Ilewas conlemporary 10 al·Mu!)iisibl, and une of Ihe mllslers of Ihe Sufi Ill-Junllyd. Ihn Kullahmainlained thal lhe world is generated and has a beginning, and God is IInnsccndel1l nhovc 1111anlh",pomorphic qualilies and should hc described in the same way lhal Hc dcscribes lIi '"self. Ihn

Kulliib believes in Ihe possibilily of lhe vision of God, Ilnd in Ihe uncrealedness of Ihe huiY Qur'an,Moreover, lhc Iheory of Ihc allribules of God os ma'ilni was hcld by Ibn Kullllb. Sec Ibn TllymiYllh,

Minhiij ohl ol·sunnoh, cd. M.R. Slllim, (Clliro, 1385 hl, vol. 2, p. 251. Ilnd al-Subki, T"h"'I"' III-shiif'iyuh ol·kubrii, (Cairo, 1 3 ~ 4 hl, vol. 2, p.51. Ibn 'Asflkir, TI/hyin klldllih 1l1-IIIUll'lll, ell. Il . Qudsl,(Damascus, 1347hl, p.116. and al-Ash'ari, Moqiiliir ol.i.<liilll;yln, cd. Il . Riller, ( ISlllnbul, Wicshaden,1980l, p. 517.

2 AI·Shohrasliinf mentions in his ol·Milol, vol. l, p. 93. lhal lhe" filS! three lhinkcrs whu 8uI

involved in discussing the ko/iim issues, apon from the people of the llUd/th (IIhlnl-hndilhl, ore IhnKulliib, Abü al·cAbbiis al·Qaliinisl and al·Mu!)ibib!. These were Ihe mlljnr kalilm sources to lheAsh'orile kuliim, and began 10 suppon the lenets of the predecessors al·s Idn( in kulalll argumenlalionand trodilional demonsllalions briihin u ~ ü l i y u h .

3 Ibn Sab'in, Bud al·ciirif, cd. G. Kalloüroh, (Beiru!: Diir al·Andalus and Diir al·Kindi, 1978l,

p.I44"

4 Here 'conlladiclion' is not meanl in the Hegelian sense, whereby philosophical discnurse,according to him, is polorized inlo IwO major concepls opposite eoch olher. Ralher, whal is meant here isail the disporilies and disharmonies thatthe discoursc includes, ail inconsislencies Ihallhe discourse failsloovercome. The queslions here an analylic, sceking 10 crilicilO the discoursc.

5 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy o(the Ka/iim, (Cambridge.A.M: lIavDld Universily l'rcss,

1976l, p.210.

6 AI·Juwayni in his book al·cAqidah o/·ni1Amiyuh mosl oflen uses Ihe lerm 'world' instclld of

Ihe common usage in lhe kallm, nornely, aloms and occidents. Moreover, al·Juwaynl in lhis bookadvances a new proof of lhe notion of creolion. He believed thal inasmueh as every existent in Iheworld Jocks necessity in ilself, il is absolutely subjCCI only 10 the possibililY. Then Ihe world os awhole Jacks an agent 10 create i l (fiI'iI or mu'aththirl. Il is cie. . then thalal·Juwaynl went beyunll theka/lm conceplions loward new lerms such os the necessDlily exislenl and lhe possibly exislcnt. Sce al·'Aqidah o l . n i ~ i y a h , cd. M.Z. ol·Kawthon, (Coiro, n.d). p. 12.



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Chapter 1- The Historical Developmentof the problem



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Most reports dealing with the history of the kIIl1Im consider Jahm h. Safwall

(d.128n46) lhe first lheologian to speak widely about the issue of the lInity ofGod. The

same reports do nol mention, in regard 10 the same issue, the opinion of his contempomry

W ü ~ i 1 b. 'Allü' (13In48),the founder of the Mu'tazilite school, with lhe exception of al-

Shahrastüni who makes a very short stalement about W ü ~ i 1 ' s notion. According 10 al·

Shahrastüni:

W ~ i 1 negaled God's allributes, such as knowlcdge, power, will and Iife, hutthisrudimentary statement was undeveloped, so W ü ~ i 1 maintained his opposition 10

those who believed in the reality of allributes, lhat he who posits a marna as anelemal attribute ~ i r u h , posits two gods. 1

Regardless of whether this short statement was really made by W ü ~ i l or is seen

through the eyes of the later Mu'tazilite thinkers, it is not extensive enough in order tn

fumish an approach to the emergence of the question of God's unity. By c o n t r a . ~ l , in the

case of Jahm b. 1;iafwün we have various detailed reports concerning the question

mentioned above. Thus, we read in al·mi/al of al·Shahrastani, the following p a . ~ s a g e :

Jahm believed that it is not pennilled to describe God in terms by which Hiscreatures can be described too. We cannot say,God is existent, living, knowing,witling , because these terms can be predicated upon bath God and man; howeverwe can say that God is creator, actor, powerful, because these terms can only he

predicated upon God 2

The point to be noticed, with respect to this beginning, is that the unity of God

had been established upon bath positive and negative s t a t e m e n t ~ . In positive statements,

the terms which belong only to Gad Hirnself can be applied, whereas negative terms are

applied in order to exalt Gad abave ail other beings, and to formulate the unity of God in

an absolutely transcendent way.

This early allempt indicates that the unity of Gad may simultaneously realize

two goals, to deprive Gad, on the one hand, of ail predicates that can possibly Iiken Him



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14

to other bcings, and, on the olher hand, 10 de termine God in some partieular predicatcs

belonging only 10 Him, by which God can be underslandable, especially bccause Jahm

bclieves that truc bclief is 10 know GOd.3 Therefore, the point hcre is that, in his use of

positive as weil as negative terms, Jahm inlended in a primitive way to predicate upon

God the allributes that olher bcings do not have, as weil as to determine God as having

His own particular allributes by virtue of Himself, with no other being participating

with Him in such allributes. This point will bc the basic ground upon which ail

later mUlukallimün would base their efforts to create a proper formula conceming the

question of the determination of God's unity .

ln addition to those beginnings which emerged with Jahm b. ~ a f w a n , the last half

of the second and the first half of the third century of the Hijroh are considered the

formation pcriod of kaliim and a founding era in the history of Islamic theology. In

Ihat period we encounter the three great thinkers, Abü al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d.

235/857), Mu'ammar b. 'Abbad (cl. 220/842), and Ibn Kullab (d. 240/862), whose

Ihought inlluenced the whole following movement of the kaliim.

'Ibc attemptsal

creating one method for determining aIl beings:The Mu'tazilite Abü aI-Hudhayl aI-'Allar, (d. 235/857) is considered, according to

most available sources, the founder of the cosmological philosophy of the kaliim, the

philosophy upon which ail the mUlakallimün in the early period, Mu'tazilites and

Ash'arites, depcnded, and the philosophy by which the kaliim formulated its own

view conceming the determination of being.

A central idea in the Qur'an is the concept of the oneness of God ( Taw{lid),

which wa.s understood by the kaliim, and ontologically established by Abü al· Hudhayl,

a.s a means of purifying God from ail elements or conceptions that may disturb

such absolute transcendental Unity.

Two significant points must he understood in relation to the view established by



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Abu al-Hudhayl: the concept of the unity of God. and the concept of a physical thing

or body. For the former. Abu al-Hudhayl affirmed "w'tini as allrihutes of God. hut

he identified such ma'iiIIi with God's esscnce:4 since, for Ahli al Hudhayl. Goll knows

by virtue of a knowledge. this knol"ledge is He. and the sUlnc hoilis truc for the rest of

altributes.s ln dealing with the physicalthing. Ahu al-Hudlmyl eSlilhlished the kll/mll's

atomie philosophy. whieh wouId constitue the cosmologieal altitude of ail mlllaJGlllimll1l

in the carly period. Mu'tazilites and Ash'ari tes alike. Sueh philosophy regards the

physical world as a sum of things or bodies. each thing as composed of group of

atoms together with their accidents. Eaeh atom is considered as the ultimate constituent

element. and sueh an element is charaeterizcd. on one hand. as non-divisihle and. on

the other. as capable of receiving accidents. In other words. ail existents in Ihe context

of Abu al-Hudhayl's philosophy including God Himself. are trcated as hipartite: the

thing and its attributes or qualities.

Abu al-Hudhayl depieted the general view of the universe and elaborated the

world as the sum of things: every thing is constituled from an cssence wilh its

attributes. with respect to God. and from atoms with their accidents. with respect to

physical things.6 ln his philosophy. Abu al-Hudhayl although he also viewed the whole

of existence as separated units called things or beings. adduced two manners of

determination of these beings. God as the only perfect being is determined by and in

Himself. nothing can affect His essence. nothing can grant Him His altributes. while

the physical thing as a completely subordinate being is totally engendercd.

The qualities or accidents of physical thing are ail non-essential and

constantly changing by virtue of the other level of existence. Ail accidents including

the akwan-composition. separation. motion and rest-are occasioned by virtue of the

will ofGoo;7 while the attributes ofGod are all essential. fixed and absolutely identified

with the essence.

Abu al-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy though it was accepted in general by both



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16

Mu'ta1.ililes and Ash'arites was a1so subjecllo reformalion, modification and even hard

crilicism by bolh. Two major poinls in Abü al-Hudhayl's view would bc a subjecl of

work for laler mutukul/imün. The firsl is Ihe relation bclween God's essence and Ils

altribules, since Abü al-Hudhayl was influenced by Arislol1e who says Ihal God is

wholly life and knowledge, elc. 5uch a belief in Ihe altribules as ma'iini and an

idenlification of essence and ma'iini would open up a greal conlroversy among

succeeding mutakaJJimün. The second point is to be found in the basic kaliim law,

which is the inference of the invisible on the basis of the visible. (qiyiïs u/·ghiPib 'ulii u/-

.çhiihid). That is, mutakallimün • especially the Ash'arites, proceeding from the

philosophy of the thing, he Id the principle of the analogy the invisible level from the

visible one in order to deal, equally on the same principles, wilh ail bcings in exislence.

ln other words, such a law allows us to understand and regard God by means of Ihe same

foundations on which other beings. the physical ones. can be regarded. On this basis the

Ash'ariles criticized Abü al-Hudhayl's prescription of two methods in the determination

bcings: the determination of and by essence itself with respect to God. and the

determination by means of something additional in regard to physical things. Thus the

philosophy of Abü al-Hudhayl was criticized as not bcing a systematic philosophy.8

Abü al-Hudhayl's great contemporary. Mu'arnmar b. 'Abbad (d. 220/842).

altempted to provide a harmonized view of ail bcings in the universe. including Gad

Himself. on the basis of Abü aI-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy. He established a very

important and signilicant theory conceming the determination of bcing. Abü aI·Hudhayl

had struggled to balance two different relations bctween the thing and its qualities, thus

sacrilicimg a consistent altitude towards the universe. Mu'arnmar reformulated the

relation between the two sides by means of a philosophically inventive theory in the

history of thought. For Mu'arnmar. the accidents or (u/-akwun)-composition. separation.

motion. rest and ail other accidents that determine being-occur by means of ma'iini. In a

passage reported by aI-Ash'ari in aJ-Maqiilift we read the following:



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17

A body, when it is moved, is moved only on uecount of u ml/'ml, which is the[cause of the] motion. Were it not for this, there would he no reason for this body,rather than for another body, to he moved at the time at which it is moved rulherthan to have heen moved at some prior time. Since Ihis is so, it may similarly hereasoned with regard to the motion that, if lhere was no ml/'nii on accounl ofwhich it was the motion of the body moved, there would he no reuson for il to hethe motion of the body rather than the motion of some other body. And so thisma'na is a ma'nii of the motion of the body moved on account of still anothermarna, but there is no totality and sum 10 the ma'iin;; and they luke place nI nsingle time. The same holds true of blaek and white, lhal is of the fact thut il isthe black of one body rather than of anolher and it is the white of one rUlher thnnof another.9

From Abü al-l;Iusayn al-Khayyat (d. 280/902), the Mu'tazilite lhinker, we hnve

another report coneeming MU'ammar's theory of ma'iini. Al-Khayyal states that:

Mu'ammar supposed that if there were two bodies at rest, and one of them shouldstart to move rather than the other, that he, Mu'ammar, believes that a ma'mlshould abide in one and not in the other. Mu'ammar adds that if this is a eorrectjudgment, there is then certainly another marna, by which the former ma'niihas abided in the body and caused the motion, and that if some one asks, whatcauses the second ma 'na, my answer (Mu'ammar says) will he the same answerwhich was given in order to explain the first ma 'na, and so those ma'üni causeeuch other in an infinite way.lo

These ma'iini, as al-Shahrastiini explains are not the accidents. Rather ma'iin;

cause the accidents, since every single accident abides in a substrate, and it abides by

marna which necessitates it.11 This reasoning, of course, led to a helief in successive

order, or the daim in the causality, and Mu'ammar adds that motion differs from other

accidents not by itself (la bidhariha), but by the marna which necessitates the

difference. Furthermore, the theory of ma'iini inte1Jrets difference and sameness in

own particular terms. That is to say,

Two things which are mutually other (aJ·ghayrayni) are mutually other by meansof a marna and the same holds true of two like things or two contrary things (aJ·çliç/(iini) or two different things (aJ·mukhraJilàni). It can he said, therefore, that



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18

Mu'ammar and his followers mainlain lhal lhe ma'nii musl inevilably bc olherlhan anylhing cise, from whenee il follows lhal ils olherness from anylhing elseis due 10 a second ma'nii exisling by means of lhe firsl ma'nii. Now lhis secondmarnii musl inevilably bc eilher like anolher marnii or olher lhan il and differentfrom il. Bul ils likeness as weil as its olherness and difference is due to a third

ma 'm, existing by means of the second ma'nii.12

What is quile readily seen from the above passages is that, a1though Mu'ammar

proceeds from the same kaliim tenets. namely, that the world is composed of substances

(atoms) and accidents, he argues that accidents are nol the direct creation of God, since

Gad docs not create anything but bodies. 13 Accidents occur or are occasioned by means

of ma'iinf. which reflect the causes of accidents. Mu'ammar. then, held the same structure

lhat was cosmologically established by Abü a1-Hudhayl. This structure was theoretically

based on belief in the atomic view: that a thing consists of two levels, one of them

representing the active cause or deterrninant principle.14 while the other is caused and

detennined. This laUer cannot bc isolated by and in itself; it is a1ways dependent upon

the fonner. the detenninant principle. and must a1ways bc fonned according to action of

efficient cause. 'Abd al-Qiihir al-Baghdadi likewise insists that the mariini cause the

accidents. from outside the body. and we find in a1-Baghdadi the passage which reads:

AI-Ka'bi, in his trcatise, reports in the narne ofMu'arnmar that motion, accordingto him. differs from rest only by virtue of a marnii outside of it and in the sarneway rest differs from motion in vinue of a marnii outside of it, and these twomariini differ from two mariini other than themselves. This reasoning accordingto him. maygo on to infinity.ls

Mu'arnmar. in order to theorize upon the deterrnination of a thing in its particular

bcing. replaced the direct creation by God of accidents, by an infinite chain of mariini,

while maintaining the idea that accidents are pennanently caused by something else. This

something else as a cnuse is a1ways imminent with the accident as a caused thing, since

marnii is onen tnken as lb l equivalent of the tenn "cause" (riIla).16



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There is no doubt thatthe relation between the two levels bccame with Mu'amllUir morc

philosophical and doser than wilh Abü al-Hudhayl. The poinl here is Ihnl Ihe Icrm 11111"1111

nearly always means, in one sense or another, an inlrinsic, delerminant COlUSC uf somc rCOII

aspect of the being of Ihe subjecl. 17 Thus with Mu'ammar's theory, Ihe rCOII attcmpt 10

define determination of bcing could take place and, furthermore, attcmpts 10 OIpprOilch 01

being in its particular existence could be given new momentum.

Interestingly. we notice that Mu'ammar overcome Abü 1 I 1 - H u d h n y l ' . ~ dcfccl in

regard to the issue (lf the determinalion of bcing. Mu'ammar systcmatically, for thc first

time, applied '.lis theory of ma'ani, to all beings including God Himsclf. 1t is this which

gives his theory additional importance in the history of Islamic Ihoughl. We arc told Ihnl

Mu'arnmar said:

God is knowing by virtue of knowledge, and His knowledge, belongs 10 Him byvirtue of a marna and this marna occurred in virtue of another marna, and thalgoes on in infinite succession, and the same holds true cuncerning ail of God'sattributes.18

This text helps us to realize the extent to which Mu'ammar's theory would

influence the Ash'arite school on the issue of the unity ofGod.

Regardless of the adjustments made to Mu'arnmar's theory in the later ka/am,

this theory, in its structure and ils way of understanding, thoroughly influenced the latter

mutakaJlimün , Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. And as we shall sec, the first usage of

Mu'arnmar's theory would appear with the first opponent of the Mu'tazilites on Ihe issue

ofunity of Go<!. This was Abü Sa'id al-Qalliin, who was called 'Abd Allah b. Kullab (d.

240/862). He was working twenty years after Mu'arnrnar's death, and he is bclieved to

be the first to espouse. with sorne profound adaptation, the theory of ma ' fini as

distinguishable causes of the attributes of God. He is the founder of a particular theory

about the issue of the unity of Go<! since Go<! is, according to him, co-eternal with His

attributes. Gad possesses these attributes by virtue of eternal ma'iini. The term eternal



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here means, withoul beginning (qudim).19

According 10 al-Ash'ari, who adopted Ibn Kullâb's opinion, Ibn Kullâb and his

followers said: "Thal God is uneeasing (lum yuzul), wilh His names and altributes,

unceasing as knowing, powerful, living, seeing, hearing, generous, great. and having

majesly". He further states that Ibn Kullâb and his followers "altributed to God.

knowledge, power. hearing. vision,life and speech."2a ln another text, al·Ash'ari explains

Ibn Kullâb's theory of God's altributes as being of affirmed and superadded ma'iini; by

saying that Ibn Kullâb considers ail these altributes as altributes of essence ($ifiïl

dhül). He docs not distinguish hetween an essenee's attributes and attributes of action

($ifiil uPül). and aceording to him. the attributes of God are the same as His names. Ibn

Kullâb takes two attribules as heing identical with God's essence, namely existence

and thingness (aJ-shay'iyah). God is nol existent in vinue of existence, and He is a thing

not in the sense of having anything; other than these two altributes. existence.

thingness. The rest of the altributes can neither be said to be identieal with God's

essence. nor not to he identical with His essence. The same also holds true conceming the

altributes themselves; these attributes cannot he said either to he identical with each

other, or not to he identical with each other.21

Ibn Kullâb deals with matiini as heing applied to bath kinds of heings, God and

bodies. This is also a systematic view. by which ail beings in existence, including God

Himself. are determined in the same manner. But while ma'nii is an equivalent to

altribute ($ifah) with respect to God, it is equivalent to accident ( 'araçl) with respect to

the body. In the case of bodies. ma'iini subsisting in them are called. by Ibn Kullab.

things. attributes ($iÎal) and accidents.22 For additional information conceming the term

attribute. we rearl in aJ-Maqiiliit that the attribute according to Ibn Kullab "cannot he

descrihed or qualified (aJ-$ifah Iii tÜ$aI). and cannot subsist in virtue of itself. rather it

must subsist in the essence (dhiit) ofGod.23 The theory of matiini. therefore. as aJready

stated. was re·formulated with Ibn Kullab. The notion of the infinite causality ofma'iini



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is strietly avoided by him.

Now. with Abü al-Hudhayl's atomie philosophy Ihal regards the thing as essence

and qualities, Mu'ammar's the ory of ma'üni, and Ibn Kullub's particular underslanding

of that theory. we beeome aware of the major features that wholly form Ihe fUlure

discussion and development in the ka/linl .

Other aspects of the problem :

The general features of this line of Ihinking, as given abave, which eoneern Ihe

unity of God or the determination of being, were not the sole line of thinking in the

ka/am, Indeed many attempts had been made in order propcrly to formulale a slanee,

from whieh one couId draw an adequate view of the issue of unity of Gad .

The line of thought established by the aforementioned thinkers represenls Ihe

more philosophieal attempt. and the more aeeepted one. whieh beeame laler on Ihe

subjeet of thorouhgoing discussion among Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.

Regardless of the standpoints expressed by anthropomorphists (a/-mushabbihal. and by

those who believed that God is a body (a/-mujassimahl, sueh as Hisham b. al-l:Iakam,

our eoneem here is to trace the major direction of thought that widely dominated Ihe

Islamie kaliim and had ils outeome in aI-Juwayni's formulations.

There is no doubt that the B ~ r i a n sehool of the Mu'tazilites played the main role

in this partieular line's development. but apart from this line of thinking. we Iind within

the Mu'tazilite school many points of view taken in order to realizc the true unity of

Gad.

A I - N ~ and J;>irir expressed an attitude whieh ean be ealled "negation by

means of affirmation" mcaning that ail God's esscntial attributes must be negated. God

is knowing. willing. powerful, in virtue of Himself, but if positive attributes sueh

knowledge and power are attributed to God. it is only to negate the opposite attributes

sueh as ignorance or powerlessness. because these attributes are not allowed to be



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applied to GOd.24 Sorne of the Mu'tazilites argued, however, that God has attributes such

as knowledge and power, "J these attributes arc not predicated upon His essence, but

rather upon their objects, the object known and willed (a/·ma'1üm wa/ maqdür). Sorne of

them considered that any kind of attribution to God whether, positive or negative, is

delinitely wrong, and by contrast they refused to say either that God is knowing, willing,

or living, or that God is ignorant, powerless, or dead.2s But a11 of them were in

agreement on the fact that the truc unity of God must be understood in terms of the

negation of any additional or positive attributes. They admitted that God can be or

should be described in terms of other positive attributes, because God deserves these

attributes in virtue of Himself, not in virtue of ($iïat) or ma'iini superadded to His

essence.

The previous points of view, particularly those of Abü a1-Hudhayl, Mu'ammar

and Ibn Ku11iib, on the determination of being either by means of itself or through ma'iini

superadded to il, and the issue of the determination of being in general and the unity of

God in particular, awaited new discussion and new contributions, especially by Abü 'Ali

al· Jubbii'i, who theorized the Mu'tazilites' position and gave it a more philosophical

slant, and Abü a1'l;Iassan a1-Ash'ari. who reacted against his master Abü 'Ali and leaned

towards Ibn Ku11iib's theory. That is to say. a1-Ash'ari. who established the second

major school next to the MU'tazilites in the Islamic kaliim. fo11owed Ibn Ku11ab's stand,

though with sorne adaptation.

The efforts of the mutakallimün fo11owing these threc thinkers would be centred

upon formulating a coherent and systematic view of being to actualize the kaliim's

favorite law, "the analogy from the visible to the transcendental world" (qiyiis al-ghiï'ib

'alii al·shiihid). This meant that the ka/iim's endeavor should be to achieve the rules by

which a coherent picturc of the determination of being could be realized while keeping

at the same time the unity of God absolutely transcendental and pure. Therefore, in

order to solve such a difficull question according 10 the kaliim's way of thinking,



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Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites wouId fight with as weil as influence ellch llther; this

conflict and influence wou Id be manifested in the constant contributions presented by the

great thinkers from both schools. The debate about the above question WIlS Illllillly

among the Ash'arites and the MU'tazilites, and in our dealing with the signifiCllllt

thinkers of the kil/am, especially in the B a ~ r i a n branch, we meet Abu 'Ali ul-Jubbll'i.

Abü 'Ali al-Jubbii'ï (d. 303/913), WIlS one of the grelltest musters in the B I I ~ r i l \ n

Mu'tazilite school, and it was to him the presidency of this school went, lifter Abu 111-Hudhayl al-'Alliif.26 AI·Jubbii'ï systematized what was implicit in his predecessllrs'

efforts, by reformulating many aspects of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine, particullirly

conceming the issue of the unity of God .

First, with Abü 'Ali, the formula of how the attributes belong to God's essence is

expressed in a different way from that of Abü al-Hudhayl. God, according to Abü 'Ali,

deserves His attributes (knowing, powerful, living, existent) $ifiïlll/-dhiil for Himself.27

This formula means that God deserves to be described as knowing, willing, living and

existent not by means of mll'iini superadded to His essence, and not in terms of saying

that God's attributes are God Himself as weil; rather God by His very nature deserves

these attributes.

In fact this change in the formula does not present a perfect solution to the

specific relation between the essence and its attributes. We can find similar s t a t e m e n l ~ in

scattered Mu'tazilite writings which indicate that the main problem of how the allributes

can be predicated of God's essence was still difficult to solve. Do these attributes

reflect or identify the essence itself'? Or are they parts of this essence, or do they reflect

sorne things additional to the essence? If the former is the case, then the essence, besides

the fact that il is not independent, is also presupposed to be plural or to contain

plurality; if the latter is the case, the attributes indicate something else existing eternally

beside God, and God in this case is lacking other entities outside of Himself to be

determined.



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The l o ~ c a l aspec! in a l - J u b b i i ~ i ' 8 view:

AI-Jubbii'i gives the follow ing description ofGod knowing:

The meaning of one's describing God as knowing (ma'nii al·wa$fi liJJiihi biunnuhu 'iilimun) is (a): the assertion of His reality (ilhbiilUhu); (b) : that He is

contrary to whatever cannot know, that he who says that He is ignorant states afalse proposition; (c): an indication that therc arc things that He knoWS.28

The Mu'tazilites' view as depicted by al-Jubbii'i is based on two major categories,

whereby the being can he detennined. These two main categories are the being itself

and the quality that helongs to it. The thing as either essence (al-dhiil) or thing (shay'L

God is called a thing as welUs treated as the basic unit in the whole of the kaliim's

philosophy; the universe is nothing else than things (ashiyiP), essences (dhawiil), each

essence having its own qualities or attributes that make it different and distinguishable

from other things.29

For the quality or the prcdicate of the subject (the thing), the dilemma that was

faced by the thrce previous thinkers concerning the way in which the unity of God

must he detennined naturally led the mulakalJimün to another question, this lime about

the logical aspect. In all the attempts prcsented by the three theologians, the attributes

of Go<! descrihed as ma'iini, were sometimes identical (Abü al-Hudhayl), sometimes

superadded (Mu'ammar and Ibn Kullab). The term marna i tself inspired the next

generation of the mulakalJimün to ask the question: what are these ma'iini and then

what are these qualities derived from Ihem? are they entities like essences, or do they

have some other sortof

being?

Al-Jubba'i who was trying to formulate philosophically his school's contributions,

and who was aware of the defects of Abü al-Hudhayl's philosophy, attempted to avoid

assigning the attributes of God any kind of particular existence. Abü Hudhayl had

understood the attributes as ma'iInï, whereas al-Jubba'ï was focusing on negating such



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an underslanding. lnslead. he slaled Ihal Ihe allribules arc absolulety subordimllc 10

essence ilself. since the allribules of God arc affirmed. in order 10 express cilhcr Ihc

assertion (ithbiit) of the essence of God. or to express thc "posilivc" ncglllilllt

characterislic of God (1I/-slI/b) as knowing and nol ignorant. BUI ahhough Ihis lInswcr

the queslions: What are Ihese altribules? How do Ihey belong to God's esscncc? Do thcy

represent something additional 10 the essence or Ihey arc the esscnce itsclf" Thc

question slill awaited a more thorough and logically rigorous answer.

ln order 10 approaeh Ihe logical aspect of the problem. wc have to dent briel1y

wilh the Iinguislie and logieal sources that were available 10 the mutllkllllimun II I that

time. and to show the degree of influence that these sources had upon them.

The first major account Ihat we can deal with is to be fourd in at-Ftirahi's

explication of the definition of the ealegory of quality. al-Fariibi (d. 339/950) stales Ihat

"The whole account in responce to the question. How is the thing? is properly staled in

terms of the response to the question. what is the thing?" These queslions aim to

determine a thing as distinguished from other things by means of its qualities. Thus. by

these questions. the formula of the thing is elicited. this formula is divided into two

categories:

These qualities are used either in terms of the external formulas of the thing. or

in terms of knowing the formula of the essence of the thing; and. then. the

formulas that express the essence of things. when they arc taken in terms of theresponse to the question what is the thing. indicate what makes the thing

distinguishable in its essence frorn other things; and the formulas that express the

external aspect of the thing indicate what distinguishes the thing in its slates

(I$wiilihl) from other things. Distinguishing a thing in its essence from another

thing is like distinguishing the palm as such from the c1ass .... and distingusihing

one thing from another in its states is Iike distinguishing Zayd from 'Amr. in so

far as Zayd is a good man and 'Amr is a bad man.30

As long as these qualities express two aspects of a thing. the essential qualities

express the formulas by which the thing is distinguished in vinue of its essence from

the other things. while the external qualities express the formula by which the thing is



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dislinguished from olher lhings in virtue of ils slales (aQwaJihi). Eisewhere al-Farabi

explains lhal lhese qualilies which answer lhe queslion of what is the thing or how it is

are the same as the differentiae and property. That is to say, the differentiae express the

cssential quality of the thing, and the property expresses the thing in its slatc which is

oUlside the essence of the thing. The properties are also of two kinds: those which are

absolute predicates, permanently inherent in the thing, such as 'laughing' for 'man'; and

non-absolute predicates, which are not absolutely inherent in the thing such as the

'engineer' for 'man'.31

The purpose of citing the texts mentioned above is to show that God's attributes

according to the Mu'tazilites cannot easily be subsumed under the previous Aristotelian

lerms. Professor Wolfson argues that the attributes of God in the Islarnic kalam are

nothing other than properties in the Aristotelian sense.32

The properties, according to Aristotelian logic explained by al-Farabi, always

belong to an external aspect of the being in bath the case of the absolute inherence and

that of the non-absolute inherence. In the Aristotelian sense properties are the states of

things and do not represent the essence of thing. Property is defined by Aristotle as "a

predicate which does not signify the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing

alone".33 The Mu'tazilites, however, consider the attributes of God as belonging to the

essence of God (b i dhatihi or li nafsihl). The Mu'tazilites in general and aI-Jubba'i in

particular believed that God's attributes must essentially issue from and be manifested

by the very essence of God, though at the sarne time these attributes must not

constitute this essence, because of the absolutely pure unity of God. Therefore the

question of attributes cannot be understood in terms of borrowed philosophical elements,

but only in terms of the kaliim's context.

Many similarities can be found between attribute in the kaliim's sense. and

property in the Aristotelian sense. but they are not completely interchangeable. Property

is a universal term belonging only to one species. inherent in it absolutely or not



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absolutely. but in both ca,es not essentially. The main feature of a property is 10 he

convertible with the thing that it belongs to, that is, the proposition 'A man is u luughing

being' is the same as the proposition: 'A laughing heing is mun'; or 'A mun is cupuhle of

learning grammar and science', is the same as, 'The heing who is cupuhle of leurning

grammar and science is man'; eonsequently, the subjeet and its predicahle propcrty ure

interchangeable.34 It is clear thatthis view was totally rejected hy the Mu'tazilites. Ahu

a1-Hudhayl, who posited the extreme position concerning God's allributes hy saying thul

God knows in virtue of knowledge. and that this knowledge is identical with GIllI

Himself. rejected the idea that the knowledge is God Himself.3s According to the

mutakallimiin • God as a subject in a proposition cannot he interchangeable with His

attributes because God's essence neither absorbs nor is in any way constituted by Ils

attributes.

The second source available to the mutaka/limiin , besides the philosophical

worlcs, was the Arab grammarians' writings. Among them the question of the relation

between the subject and its predicates was a subject of contention. Two standpoints

concerning that problem dealt with its logical-Iinguistic character. The discussion among

the grammarians proceeded from their concern with establishing a the sentence or

linguistic proposition, such as 'Zayd is knowing'. In the grammarians' account we find

two different points of view. One of them was stated by al·Mubarrad (d. 285/898)who

said that the predicate is something other than the subject; while the other view w a . ~

expressed by Sibawayh (d. 177n93) who believed in opposition to al-Mubarrad that the

predicate of a nominal proposition must be something identical with the subjecl. 36

In order fully to explore a1·Jubbii'i's view of predicates we have to recite his

theory of attributes and his classification of them. The attributes are:

1. That which a thing is called by virtue of itself (li-nafsihl). that which names or

describes the thing essentially and specifically as that which it is. This is expressed when

we say that "the atom is an atom" or that "God is Etemal". God's essence, thus, is His



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Eternity. He exists without beginning or end and His non-being is impossible. In the

case of contingent bcings, these predicates are true and valid even though the thing does

not exist in actuality, since, each individual has its bcing as real object ofGod's knowing

and power.

2. That which a thing is called by virtue of some other entity whose actuality in being is

the cause ('illa) or referential basis (ma'na) of the judgment (Qukm) which affirms a

predicate. These he divides into two classes: a) predicates which are true by virtue of

a "cause" which exists within the thing (Ii-'il/atin fihi), as when we say 'Zayd knows'

asserting thus anna lahu 'i/man, and, (b) those which are true by virtue of a 'cause

which is not in him' (li 'iJJatin /ii fihI), as, e.g. 'Zayd is mentioned' (Zaydun madhkürun)

asserting thus the existence of a statement or other kind of utterance .

3. That which a thing is called "by way of stating that it has reality in bcing" (ikhbiirnn

'an ithbiitihi), as when it is termed ka'in (bcing), mawjüd (existent), and the like.

4. That which a thing is called by virtue of its coming to be after not having been (Ji.

hudüthihi), e.g. hiidith, mUQdath (temporally, contingent), or because of its being existent

it is the act (fi'l) of an agent, as when it is termed mnPü/ (made) or mnkhJüq (created).

S. That which is called simply by way of distinguishing classes of beings, as when we say

that a particular motion is an accident ('arnç/) or that black is a colour.

6. That which is called simply because it can be spoken of and a true statement made

concerning it, that it is a being (shay',thing). This is the ultimate and most universal

category, embracing ail beings, the real and the possible. 37

With aI·Jubbli'i, the Mu'tazilite's school in ilS B ~ r i a n branch had, for many reasons,

reached an impasse.

The philosophy of the Mu'tazilites concerning the deterrnination of being was still

suffering, first, from lack its of success in depicting the deterrnination of being in a

systematic manner, and in positing the most generai principles by which a being at the

visible and invisible levels can he deterrnined; and secondly, in delineating an adequate



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stance towards the presentation of the absolute purity and transccndcnce of God.

AI-Jubbii'i's philosophy proceeding from its own foundations. as mentioned

earHer. was unable to solve these problems. Inherent problems in IWO major poinls

continued to challengc al-Jubbiï'i as wcll as thc MU'taziiite school. The firsl one is

related to the nature of the relation between God's essence and Ils predicales: the second

is Iinked to the first. for the determination of being was still treated as being rudically

different at the invisible and the visible levels. AI-Jubbii'i differentiates in Ihe contingent

world between the being as the ground of ma'üni. and the ma'iini as entities existing

beside their objects; while, with respect to God. he removes the intermediate entilies

ma'iini and allows only the direct relation between the subject which is God Himself and

the act of description.

ln order to justify such differentiation. al-Jubbii'i discusses propositions such as

God is knowing, God is powerful, God is existent, etc. in terms of distinguishing betwecn

the language which is the subjective expression and the being which is an objectivc

entity. He held that the act of attributing is the altribule ( a J - w a ~ f huwa a J - ~ ; f a h ) and Ihat

the naming is the name, or in other words thal the attributes of Gad do nol poinl to

anything other than God; rather, they are merely our mode of speech.3B

The Ash'arites, as we shall see lalter, make a separalion between Ihe ~ ; l i l h

(marni) and the act of description which is our stalement; therefore, our saying or

proposition could be either true or false, but nevertheless the being would objectivcly

exist with its attributes.39 By contrast, aI-Jubbii'i treats the sifah, the descriptive term. as

a word within the convention of language; within the particular context of its use, it

reflects the mind's grasp of the thing.40

With respect to the ontological aspect of aI-Jubba'i's theory concerning God's

attributes, we notice that the relation between God's essence and Its attributes is

demoralized. That is to say, in the case of God's being knowing, the predicate. in al·

Jubbli'i's view is taken to assert only the reality of the subject in its simple identity with



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itself. 1\ followed that al·jubbii'i was then unable to discuss ontologically the difference

hetween heing knowing and being. as such. and how in the othemess that is indicated in

the statements. they are one in GOdAI Put another way. al·Jubb;ï'i did not present a

specific view by which God can bc maintained as a pure and simple essence and can be

determined by means of His altributes. On the other hand. the Mu'tazilites' theory in

general. and al-Jubbii'i's in particular. implies the possibility of imputing plurality to

God's essence with statements such as:

God is knowing in virtue of Himself (l i nafsihl). powerful in virtue of Himself ' etc.

indicate that God's Essence is knowledge and power. because the reality of the

knowledge is in virtue of bcing that by which the knower is knowing; and the reality of

the power is in virtue of bcing that by which the powerful is powerful.42

Conceming the systematic view. al-Jubbii'i offers two manners of determining

bcing. The visible and sensible world is determined not by itself. but by something else.

namely by ma'iini, e.g. 'Zayd is knowing in virtue of ma'ni, that is a specific knowledge,

white God is determined by Himself, God is knowing in virtue of Himself (bi-dhiitihi).

Having adhered to this way of reasoning, the Mu'tazilites continued with the same

method in their elaboration of topical notions from Abü a1-Hudhayl to al-Jubba'i (with of

course sorne shift of meaning in the vocabularies and sorne small shift in the

elaboration).

New strategy in theMuCazilite school:

With Abü Hashim (d. 321/933), son of al·Jubba'i, the Mu'tazilite school.

underwent a profound transformation in order to reform and overeome the defects in the

system. That is, the framework of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine was inadequate for

exhibiting a systematic view that would elaborate the two levels in the universe by the

sarne principles of determination and a1so solve the dilemma of the relation bctwccn the

essence of God and His a t t r i b u t ~ without denying that thcsc attributcs nccd to have sorne



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form and realily.

As we have seen, lhe Mu'lazilites in their emphasis on lhe deniul of attrib,ltes us

having some form and reulily Iimiled lhemsclves onlologicully 10 one uspecl of

existence. This aspect is :he essence (ul·dhü/) or the thing (ul·slwy'). Such denial of

attribules led the Mu'tazililes 10 undersland God us mere essence, und 10 consider Ihe

determination of this essence as a Iinguislic matter, or mere human understunding Irying

to grasp what it cao l'rom lhis essence.43

The a c h i e v - ~ e n t of Abü Hüshim, the resull of long debate bclween attribulisls

and antiattributists, is expressed in the admission thal the attribules, corrcsponding 10 the

view of the attributists, especially the theory proposed by Ibn Kullüb,44 ure somelhing

other than the subjeet. Abü Hüshim called this kind of attribute, stale «(Iü/), und it lies

behind the existent essence. It is not the essence itself, rather it is somelhing differl;nl;

yet, corrcsponding to his own sehool. this (lü/ does not represent an independent und reul

existence.

Abü Hüshim denies that these attributes are real entities. They are not lhings

(ashyii'),4S which means that Abü Hüshim is still faithful to the Mu'lazilites' heriluge.

Rather they are mani festation l'rom the essence itself; for instance. the proposition' GmI

is knowing' means that Gad is knowing in virtue of Himsclf ( l i dhü/ihl). The attribute

'knowledge' cannot be known as separate and independent l'rom the essence; rather, it is

known as predicated of the essence and issuing l'rom the essence. In this wuy Abu

Hüshim affirmed states as attributes. These states cannot bc said either to bc existent or

not existent and can neither be said to be known nor to be unknown. This means lhey

eannot be known as separated entities. but f'oIther as existing a10ng ""ith the essence. Abû

Hüshim says that reason apprehends the necessary difference between the thing such

in its purity and the tbing described and qualified by means of attributes. Therefore. one

who knows the essence (aJ-<1hifl) does not necessarily know that this essence is knowing•

and one who knows the substance does not necessarily know that this substance occupies



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space.46

Il is apparenl thal Abü Hashim pioneered a differenl and new path between

allributists and antiallributists. Abü Hashim's new theory was both a denial of the

extreme reality of allributes as conceived by the allributists and a denial of the extreme

nominal nature of allributes as conceived by Ihe antiallributists. Utilizing the old

Kullabite formula, but changing Ihe lerm 'allribule' 10 'state', Abü Hashim says of slales

Ihallhey arc "neilher God nor olher than God".47

ln facl, Ihis change in stralegy by Abü Hashim under Ihe influence of Ihe

allribulisls led naturally 10 dealing in a differenl way wilh Ihe queslion of Ihe

delerminalion of bcing in general and Ihe transcendence of Gad in particular.

Abü Hiishim allempled 10 reform his falher's bclief in Ihe difference bclween Ihe trulhs

(a/-t1aqiPiq), on Ihe unseen level and in Ihe malerial world. The unily of Ihe t1aqii'iq is

Ihus partly reslored by Abü Hiishim in lerms of the proposilion (he is knowing) innahu

<ii/imun. This proposilion is underslood, in ail cases, 10 refer 10 Ihe altribule ( ~ i f a h ) and 10

nssert ils aClualily;48 Ihe realily of an altribule as somelhing differenl from ils subjeci is

laken 10 bc applied 10 ail trulhs.

Abü Hiishim, in his new theory, wished 10 re-classify Ihe altribules, and he tried

to presenl Ihis c1assificalion as a general principle Ihal can bc applied 10 ail bcings. In

Ihe same Iheory of nltribules, he offers a theory of delerminnlion. This theory must deal

with a bcing by means of ail the possible rules by which Ihe bcing is determined in ail ils

aspeCIS. Firsl. Ihe bcing is delermined in ils being in ilself, in ils identily, by virtue of

ilself; and secondly, il is delermined by virtue of something else, by means of eilher the

marna or a/-liï<il.

This c1a.'iSificalion was pUI by Abü Hiishim as follows:

(1) The attribules of the essence, the thing being ilself- the way it is in ilself (mii

huwa <a/ayhi l i dhlftihl); this is expressed in our saying "the atom is an alom" or

"Gad is Etemal".

(2) The essential attribute which belongs to a thing "by virtue of the way it is in



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itself' (Ji-mii hUW.1 '1I/lIyhi fi nllf.çiM, that whose actuality is entailed (muql"'/UII)by the aUribute of the essence when it exists, as, for eXllll1ple, Ihc nlom'soccupying space orGod's being living and knowing, etc.(3) Those attributes whose actuality is caused (mu'/ü/) by lin entitntive cnuse (/i'iJJu, Jj-mu'nii), as, for example, Z,Jyd's being knowing or li hody's hcing inmotion.(4) Those attributes whose actuality is, or results direclly l'rom, thc lIclion of linagent or l'rom one of its stales which qualifies the performllnce of ils lICI. (5)These are lhosc which arc termed /iiJi-naf.çihi wa /a Ji. 'il/a .49

Although Abu Hâshim's theory represents the demarcation poinl belween two

stages of the ka/iim, and although this theory is considered as a the most importnnl

anempt that had been made to systematize the Mu'tazililes' protracted efforts, il is slillll

subject of criticism in a numberof

respects. Thc first point of criticism is thlll while

Abu Hlishim sets forth in his classification of attributes as the most general rules and

principles according to which a being can be determined, he offers different applications

of these principles. For example the knowledge, Iife, will, power, and the vision ofGod

belong to the second kind of attribute, which is ( ~ i f i ï t naf.çiyah) or the anributes of the

essence. In the case of Zayd, they belong to the third kind of anribute, (Iii(ul

ma'niiwüyah or ~ i f i ï t al-ma'iini). According to Abu Hiishim there are two kinds of

determination, necessary and possible determination. In the case of the former, the

essence (aJ-dhiit) necessarily must be qualified by such and such an attribule, and the

issue here is especially related to the seven essential aUributes, knowledge, living,

hearing, seeing, power, will, elC.istence. God necessarily must have these aUributes

without any kind of causes or ma 'iini causing them. As for the laUer-the possible

determination-a being could have or could not have these attributes. (knowing) can be or

not be predicated ofZayd. This kind of determination is causcd by mll'iini, so by possible

determination is meant the determination Ihat occurs as caused by ma'iini or olher

eauses. It follows thal Ihe altribule of knowing, for inslance, is predicated of God as

necessary (bil parürah), while the same attribute may be predicated of Zayd as possible.

The knowledge of Zayd is a possible attribute. Zayd may or may nol have il, bccausc for



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Zayd to be knowing he must possess the prepouderance of knowledge, but it is

impossible to apply this condition to G o d . ~ o Il could be said that these two kinds of

determinations. the necessary and possible, constitute a shi ft in meaning for the old

Mu'itazilite bclier in the two kinds or attribution.

The second point or criticism that should be mentioned here is duc to the term

'state' (/,Iii/). This tenn had been used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle, as weil as in

the Arabic grammar, to indicate what is contingent and changed. As quoted earlier, al

Fiiriibi's explication divided the category of quality (al-kayffyah) into two parts: the

pennanent quality that bclongs essentially to the thing, and indicates the essence of the

thing and makes it distinguishable from others; and the contingent quality which

belongs accidentally and extemally to the thing. The latter is called 'state' (/,Iii/). For

example, Zayd dirfers from 'Amr because of his state of being a good man, while 'Amr

dirfers from Zayd because of his state ofbeing a bad m a n . ~ 1The grammarians as weil used the tenn J;üïl to indicate situations that are

constantly changing. The term /,Iiil in grammar... is used chiefly to denote the function

of several nominal fonns that occur in the accusative in a variety of situations. Thus. for

example, al-Mubarrad says: when you say Zayd came to me walking, you do not intend

that it he primarily understood that he was walking, but rath;:r you state the proposition

that his coming took place in this situation (/,Iiïl) and your statement does not indicate

what was his situation (ma huwa fflu) before or after this moment (/,Jiil). The /,Iiil, thus, is

that wherein the act is performed (al maPülu ffhi). You state simply that his coming

occurred in the situation (/,Iiil) of walking . I t is the same with '1 passed Zayd laughing'

and '1 met your brother r i d i n g ' . ~ 2

Abü Hiishim. in order to avoid the two extreme positions of the attributists and of

the antiattributists employed the tenn /,laI. The motive that lies behind this

employment is to be found in two respects. First, state is something that does not identify

the essence in the sense of Abii Hiishim's predecessors; rather it is a kind of



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manifestation of the essence. Second, state is not an entity or thing, so (wulking of

Zayd) is a kind of situation expressed or manifested by Zayd, but il is absolulely nol un

entity in itself. Abu Hashim did not adopt the term /,JiiJ as defined in Logic and

Grammar. He shifted its meaning and dealt with il as a kind of essenlial allribule, as

issuing from the essence even if it does not renect Ihis essence. Allributes such us

knowing, Iiving,etc., issue from the essence, butthey are different from the essence and

cannot be said to be identical with the essence, since al-u/,Jwiil are something differenl

from the subject upon which they are predicated.

The third point of criticism has its origin in the fact that the allempt stands on the

pivotai point between keeping essence absolutely pure and t r a n s ~ e n d e n t on the one hand,

and determined and ~ t t r i b u t e d on the other hand. Abu Hashim is creative in his emphasis

on the state as standing in the middle area between being an attribute and something

different from the essence, on the one hand, and being deprived from any kind of

thingness and beingness, on the other hand. He gocs far in his description of the state,

describing it as not existent and not non-existent, not known and not unknown, not

mentioned and not non-mentioned, not etemal and not generated.s3

In order to negate a/-/,liil as being an entity, Abu Hüshim answered, when he

was asked whether he knew the /,laI or not. that he did not know the /,liIl because any

admission as to the possibility of knowing al-/,liIl would lead to the admission that 11/-

/,liil is an entity .S4

Abü Hiishim's theory of attributes established a significant answer to a particular

existential question, which is very Islamic in ilS nature: How can a being be determined

without violating it and white conserving its specifie identity as it is7 However, Abu

Hüshim maintained the states in an awkward position between being affirmed and not

arfmned. fixed and not fixed, existent and not existent, known and unknown. This dual

position led aI-Juwayni to adjust the theory of states and to malte the attributes known.

The available sourees indicate that the theory of states was rejected by aI-Jubbli'i.5S the



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father and teacher of Abü Hashim, weil as by Abü al·l:Iasan al·Ash'arï (d. 321/935),

the founder of the school of the Ash'arites. AI-Ash'arï, in contrast to al-Jubba'ï's as weil

as 10 Abü Hashim's point of view, adopted the theory of Ibn Kullab, the theory which

contends that the altribules of God are mll'iûIï subsisting in God's essence, since God is

knowing by a knowledge, powerful by a power, living by a Iife, etc. These altributes are

etemal and cannot he said to he identical with God Himself, nor to he other than He.56

In affirming that God's attributes are mll'iûIï, entities (llShyiP), al·Ash'arï tried to

approach the problem of the relation between the essence and its attributes in a different

manner. That is to say, al·Ash'arï, in order to demonstrate the unity of God in Its very

specifie identity Ils a transcendental essence, separated this Essence as such from its

altributes. He deall with the essence Ils a pure unity subsisting independently in itself,

and with attributes Ils distinct mll'iûIï subsisting not in themselves but in God's essence.

By reviewing aI-Ash'arï's arguments against the MU'tazilites, we can touch upon

how far he was concemed to prove that God's essence must be One and be

transeendental. In his al·Iblinah aI·Ash'arï argues against Abü al-Hudhayl. I f the

knowledge of God is God Himself, can one say: "Oh knowledge of Gad, give me your

merey"? Abü al-Hudhayl however refused to accept this argument.s7

In his aJ-Lumll', al·Ash'ari puts this argument in a diaiecticai manner by saying:

Gad necessarily must know either in virtue ofHimself (bi nafsihi), or in virtue ofknowledge separated from His essence. As a resull, if he knows in virtue of

Himself, His self, then, must be a knowledge. In this case, therefore, it

must either he said that the knowledge is knowing (hecause God isknowing); or it must he said, that this knowledge does not know, and therefore

Gad does not knoW.5S

So apparently neither condition, according to aI·Ash'arï, may properly be applied

to Gad. This led to his affirmation that Gad knows in virtue of knowledge, and it is

impossible that this knowledge be Gad Himself.

Wc might presuppose that Gad is knowing, neither in virtue of Himself nor in virtue of



•

•

knowledge. Al·Ash'ari respond to this assertion by saying that if we allow Ihe previolls

statement, the result will he as follows: in the proposition "God is knowing", "knowing"

as used here either does not indieate God Himself or does not indieate the atlrihllte Ill'

knowledge as such. 59

The significance of the argument here is very clear. AI-Ash'ari atlempts tll c\arify

the distinction hetween the essence of God such, outside of any kind of mingling, and

to remove l'rom it any possibility that might signify a sort of plurality in God's essence.

and the attributes as superadded ma'iini.

Another argument raised by the Ash'arites against the Mu'tazilites' notion thal

"Gad is knowing by virtue of His essence" is that such a proposition wouId lead us tll

believe that God's attributes are identical with eaeh other since ail of thcm are idenlical

with the essence. Il would lead us to believe as weil that "God is knowing by virlue of

His will, and willing by virtue of His power",60 and so on.

In order to determine the types of attributes that bclong to God's essence, al

Ash'ari divided the attributes into three classes:

1. Those expressions ( a w ~ i i f , asmiP) which name or implicitly refer to the thing itself, the

thing's self (nafsuhu), tadullu 'ala naf.çj a/ m a w ~ ü f . AlIiïhu mawjüdun (God exists) or

al·/,Iarakatu 'ara(lun (this particular motion or, every motion is an accident) al-Ash'ari

takes simply to mean jthbiitu nafsj a / - m a w ~ ü f ( t h e assertion of the existence of the entity

is denoted by the subject term). Statements of this type refer to the self of the m a w ~ ü f .2. Those predicates which refer to a marna (pl. ma'anj). AI-Ash'ari seems to prefer this

term to 'iJJa, although the two are synonymous in the context. These entities, whose

being is implied by predicates of this class (the ma'iini or 'ila/), are frequently, and in

some contexts normally, referred to as ~ j f a = ma'na= 'illa, "attributes".

3. Those predicates whicb refer to and therefore assert the reality of an action performed

by the subject. These kinds of predicates, in contrast with the ficst two, are generated

(mu/,ldath). They are not eternal, and Gad can be described by one of these attributes



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38

weil by ils contrary.

AI-Ash'ari in this classification scheme was influenced by al-Jubbli'i, his teacher

for many years when al-Ash'ari was a Mu'tazilite. Yet, al-Ash'ari speaks most often in

terms of a/-dalalah, that is to say, each one of these attributes indicate but is not identical

with, the indicated object. The first one indicates the identity of the essence, the second

the mn'iini, and the third indicates the actions.61 The significant point hCl'e in the use of

the term "indir:ation" (dnlii/ah) is to be found in al-Ash'ari's allemptto keep the essence

of God as a pure and absolu te unity. The allributes according to al-Ash'ari are not

identical with God's essence (in opposite to the Mu'tazilites), nor are they to be

complelely separated from Him (this avoids the possibility of stating that other entities

stand beside God's essence).

The main point of contention between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites is

particularly association with the second kind of attribute, the attributes of mnCiini. AI-

Ash'ari in opposite to the Mu'tazilites, as mentioned above, asserts that God's attributes

are derived from macani superadded to God's essence. AI-Ashcari himself, although

affimling the reality of attributes, avoided saying that these attributes are existents; he

also refused to discuss what kind of being belongs to God's attributes.62 At any rate, we

are able to trace al-Ashcari's opinion conceming God's attributes through his scallered

statements.

The main statement al-Ash'ari depended upon in terIns of his positing of the

theory is to be found in his saying that "God's attributes are neither His essence nor

other than the essence".63 A1though tbis statement is not new and had been employed by

many theologians, such as Ibn Kulliib; al-Ash'ari gave the statement the meaning that

scrved his viewpoint. By the first part of a statement. al-Ash'ari meant that God's

allributes are not identical with God's essence. This was intended to keep the

transcendental unity of God complctely pure. Nothing can he asserted on behalfof this

essence, whcthcr this assertion is (knowlcdge) as AbD al-Hudhyal believed. or (Etemity)



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39

as al-Jubbii'i set forth. Nothing can be mixed with God's Self. Ali attributes indicalc

(tadu/lu) but are not identical with God Himself. The allributes of Ill/l'uni ( ~ i l i l t

ma'niiwiyah) indicate ma'jjni which are signified by the verbal noun or gcrund

(ma,çiidir) and thus are revealed as possessing an ontological position. As for the second

part of the statement, al-Ash'ari a s s e r t ~ the reality of allributes. This assertion, however,

does not mean that for him these allributes are separable from God's essence or are other

than He.64 in terms of having an independent reality. They are eternal (qlldillWIJ) and

additional (zii'idah), but solely through being assoeiated with God's essence. They are

not other, beeause otherness (aJ-ghayriyah), according to al-Ash'ari's definition is thut

"of every two existents, one of them possibly detaehed (mufiiriq) from the other; if this

detaehment oceurs in nothingness, a/-'adam, existence,time or pluce."6' This definition

of othemess removes any possibility that the attributes are other than God's essence.

As a result we are led to conclude that God's attributes do not subsist in und hy

themselves, but within God's essence. while God's essence subsists in itself. In other

words, God's attributes are not essences (dhawiit) since the only Etemal essence is God

H i ~ e l f , 6 6 but they existentially subsist and associate with essence.

By asserting the attributes as ma'iini, superadded to the object that they reside in, al

Ash'ari succeeded in advancing systematic theory conceming the determinution (lf being

whether this being is God Himself or the human being:

Against al-Jubba'ï. aI-Ashcarï insists that. for any given expression. the /Jaqiqah isinvariant. That is. ciilim cannot be ~ i f i i t u narsin when used of God. and $ifiituma'nii when used of Zayd. The paraphrase of any given term is always the sumeand so its referent: the ithbiit is. in ail cases. either of the m a w ~ ü f a.ç such. of amacnii, orof an action ( /iC] ).67

The systematic view presented by aI-Ashcarï, does not lead in any way to the

conclusion that the two levels of existence. God and His attributes and the physical

world. are the same; aI-Ashcarî deliberately distinguishes between them. In Zayd the



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40

~ i r u h or altrihute is a contingent entity. Il is an accident ('aruçf), contingent both in itself

and its relation to the body which is Zayd. Il is, thus, a being dislÎnct from him and so

strictly speaking, "other th an he" (ghuyruhu). God's altributes, however, arc Eternal,

neither contingent as such nor in rcspcctto His being.68

But despite the systematic position, al-Ash'ari's point of view still suffered from many

weaknesses. For example: (a) AI-Ash'ari, in order ultimately to affirm the attributes

as additional mu'iini ( ~ i f i î t zii'iduh), insists that the attribute of everlasting (al·baqii') is

ma'nii, and so God is everlasting by virtue of ma'niiwhich is baqii', this exaggeration

disaJlowed by his follower aJ-Juwayni. (b) AI·Ash'ari did not propcrly answer the

question of the kind of existence the attributes have since he treated these attributes

as not subsisting in and by themselves. As they arc not essences (dhawiit), the

statements which can be applied to materiaJ substances as weil. Al-Ash'ari did not

adduce a propcr answer concerning the nature of entity the attributes have. This fact

pushed aJ·Ash'ari's fol1owers (aI·Biiqilliini and al-Juwayni) to adopt the theory of states

(aQwiil) to negate any possibility of fixing the attributes as existents associate God's

essence. (c) The manner of treating the attributes of God in terms of indication (al-

duliiluh) was also a subject of doubt. For that reason we notice the fol1owers of aI-

Ash'ari hesitating to take the master's theory as it is.

These weaknesses in fact pushed and provoked al-Ash'ari's fol1owers to

reform the master's theory and to he open to the opponents' arguments. Al·

Juwayni, in achieving such a reform, adopted sorne of the Mu'tazilites' terms, as we

shal1 see.



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41

I.Abd al·Karlm al·Shahm.'loni. K. nl·milnl w n l · n i ~ I J / . vol. 1, cd. by M U ~ l I m l l l l , , 1 SIIYll III·

Kiloni. (Beirul: Dar al·Ma'rifah. n.d J. p.80.

2. al·Shahra'loni. Ibid. p. 90.

3. Abü al·l;lllSan al·Ash'ari. MnqlUiit nl·is/iimiyln wn·ikhtiliif I J / · m u ~ I J l l i n . cil. by lIellnlllRiller. (Islanbul. Weisbaden. 1929'33 J. p.279.

4. al·Shahrastonl. nl·Milnl. vol. 1. p. 50.

5. al·Ash'ari. Mnqif/iit. p. 188.

6. Richard M. Frank. The Metnphysics ofCrented Being AL'L'on/ing ru Abü nl·/Il1dhnyll·'Alliff (Istanbul: Nederland Hislorisch·Archaeologisch Inslitule in Hel Nabije Ooslen. 1966 J. p. 15.

7. R. Frank. Ibid. pp. 16-23.

8. Dy Ihe tenn systemalic which is expressed in Ihe law of inference of Ihe invisible from the

visible. is meant in the contexl of the knliim, the derivation of the judgemenl n l ' ~ u k m , Ihal is. according

to the Ash'arites the true propositions thal are said of Gnd musl he bllSed upon Ihe same principles thal

by means of which the propositions employcd of zayd. Therefore. in a.much a. the descriptions sllidof zayd are derived from accidents which are mn'ifnl subsisiting in zayd, the same thing is 10 heapplicable of Gnd, thal Gnd's propositions such lIS, knowing, willing, powerful. musl he derived fmmma'iInl abiding essentially and etemally in Gnd's essence. Ihal are knowledge, will.

9. aI·Ash'ari, Maqiilift, p. 372. Sec also Harry H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Knliim. p151.

10. Abü al·l;lusayn al·Khayyot. K. a l · i n t i ~ , cd. and Irans. by A.N. Nader (Beirut: al·Maklnbahal·Sharqiyah. 1957 J. p. 46.

II . al·Shahrastlini, al·Mital, vol. 1. p.67.

12. Fakhr aI·Din aI·Riizi, M u ~ ~ afkiir ni .mutnqaddim/n wa·l·muta'akhkhirln. cd. hy

Taha Sa'd (Cairo: Maktnbatal·Kulliyiil, 1323 h J. p.I44. And RA. Wolfson, The Phi/o.,ophy of the

Ka/iim. p. 156.

13. aI·Shahrasllini, al·Mital. vol. 1. p. 66. And al·Ash'ari, Mnqiiliit, p. 54g.

14. R. M. Frank. "AI·ma'nif: Sorne Renections on the Technical Meanings of Ihe Tenn in Ihe

Ka/iim and ils Use in \he Physics of Mu'ammar." Journal of the American Oriental Socieaty, 87, (1967 J,

pp. 248-59.

15. 'Abd al·Qiihir al·Baghdiidi. a/·Farq bayn al·/iraq. cd. by M u ~ a m m a d M. 'J\bd al·

I;lamid. (Cairo: Maklabal M u ~ a m m a d S u b a y ~ , n.d J. p. 153. And H.A. Wol/son. The Philosophy of\he Ka/iim. p. 154.

16. 'Abd aI·Jabblir aI·HamadhiInl. al·Mughnl fi abwiib al·taw/,Jld wa7-'adl. 16 vols. cd. byAI,unad F. Abawlinl and Ibrilhlm Madkür. (Cairo: Wazliral aI·Thaqiifah. 1965 J. p. 253.

17. R Frank. A/·ma'na. p. 252.

Ig. aI·Ash'ari. Maqilift. p.488.

19. 'Abd aI·Jabblir, SharIJ al'Il$OI al·khamsah. cd. by 'Abd al·Karim 'Uthmlio. (Cairn:

Maktabal Wahbah. 1965 J. p.183.

20. aI·Ash'arf. Maqilil. p. 546.



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42

21. al·Ashlar!, ihid, 546.

22. lIi·Ashlar;, Ibid, p. 370.

23. al·Ashluri, Ibid, p. 370.

24. at·Ashluri. ibid, pp. 386-87.

25. Majid Fakhry, A Hisrory of /sJamic Philosophy. "ans. by Kamül al·Yüziji (Beirul:American University. 1947). p. 92.

26. Ibn a l · M u r t a ~ ü , rabaqiir aJ·mu"/aziJah. cd. S. Diwald (Beirut: n.d). pp. 80-85.

27. 'Abd al·JabbÜr, SharQ, p. 182. And aJ·Majmü' fi aJ·muQïl bi'J·/aklif, cd. J.J. Houben,vol.1. (Beirut: Imprimerie Calholique. 1965). p. 100.

28. al·Ashluri. Maqiilii/. p. 531. And R. l 'rank. Beings and their allribules (Albany: SlateUnivershy of New York, i978), p. 15.

29. al·Shahrastüni. Nihiiiya/ aJ·/qdiim fi 'ilm aJ·kaJiim, cd. by Alfred Guillaume (Baghdiid:

Maktabat al·Mulhthanii. n.d) . p. 135.

30. Abü N ~ r al·Fiiriibi. K. a J · A J ~ aJ·mus/a'maJah fj'J·manJiq, cd. by Muhsin Mahdi(Beirul: Diir al·Mnshriq. 1968), pp. 52-3.

31. al·Fürübi. a J · A J ~ . pp. 75-6.

32. H.A.Wolfson. The PhiJosophy. p.277.

33. H.A.Wolfson. Ibid. p.227.

34. Man/iq ArisJü. cd. by 'Abd al·Ra!)miin Badawi. vol. 3. (Kuwail: Waqiilat al·Malbü'iil. andBcirul: Diir al·Qalam. 1980), p. 110. And J.M. Bochenski. A His/ory of FormaJ Logie (Indiana:Univershy of Notre Dame Press). p. 52. And al·rariibl. aJ·AJIiq. p. 76.

35. al·Ash'arl. Maqiilii/. p.482. And al·Baghdiidi. aJ·Farq. p. 127.

36. al·Mubnrrad. aJ·Muq/ar,fab. cd. M.A.Adima. vol 4. (Cairo: 1386). p. 127. and Sibawayh. aJ·Ki/iib, (Cairo: Büliiq. 1316) vol 1. p.287. In R.Frank. Beings. p. 15.

37. R. Frank. A/tribu/e. Artribu/ion. and Being: Three Islamic Views. In The Philosophies of

Exis/ence. cd. Parvis Norewedge (New York: l'oldham University Press. 1982). p. 262. and al· Ash'arl.Maqiilii/. p. 522.

38. al·Ash'arl. Maqiilii/. p.529. And R.Frank. Beings. pp. 18-19.

39. Abü Bakr al.Biiqilliini. aJ·Tamhld. cd. Richard J.McCanby (Beirut: al·Maktabah al ·

ShaJqiyah. 1957 ). p. 213.

40. R. Frank. Beings. p. 18.

41. R. Frank. Ibid. p. 17.

42. 'Abd al·Qihir al·Baghdidi. U$üJ aJ-djn. (Istanbul: Madrasat al·Dahiya\, Diir al·Funun. 1928 ).p.92.

43. R. Frank. Beings. p. 19.



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44. H.A.Wolfson. The Phi/o.,r.;>hy. p. 210.

45. R. Frank. AI/ribule. Altribulion. p 267.

46. al-Shahra.,tiini. al-Mi/al. p. H2.

47. H.A.Wolfson. ThePhi/o.,ophy. p.211.

4H. R. Frank. Attribu/e. Artribulion. p.267.

49. R.Frank. ibid. pp.267-8.

50. 'Abd al-Jabbiir. Shar/J a / - u ~ ù / . p.231.

51. al·fiiriibi. a/-A/Iii? pp. 52-3.

52. R. Frank. Bdngs. p. 20.

53. al-Shllhr. .tiini. a/·Mi/aI. p.52. And al-Baghdiidi. aI-Farq. pp. 195-6.

54. al-Baghdfidi. al·Farq. p. 196.

55. al-Shllhrastiini. Nihiiiyat. p. 131.

56. al-Shllhrastiinl. a/-Mi/aI. p. 95.

57. al·Ash'ari. aJ-/biinah 'an u ~ ù / a/-diyiinah. cd. by Fauqiyllh H. M u ~ m ü d (Cai",: 1977). p. 42.

58. al-Ash'ari. K. aI·/uma' Ii'/ radd 'aJii ah/ a/-zaygh wa·/-bida'. In Thcology of al-A.h'ari. cd.and Irans. by Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique. 1952). p. 14.

59. ai-Ash'ari. Ibid. p. 14.

60. al·ShIlhrastiinl. aI·Mi/al. p.95.

61. R.Frank. Arrribule. Attribulion. p.269

62. R. Frank. Ibid. p. 270.

63. al-ShIlhrastiinl. a/-Mi/aI. p. 95.

64. Michel AUard. Le Prob/eme des Attributs Divins dans la Doctrine d'al As/"arl(Beyrouth: Imprimiere Catholique. 1965 J. p. 243.

65. Abü al-Ma'iili al-Juwaynl.aI-Shiimi/1i u ~ ù / a/-din. cd. by 'Ali S. al-N. .hshiir. F a i ~ 1 B. 'Awnand Sllhlr M. Mukhllr. (Cairo: Munsha'at a1-Ma'iirif. 1969 J. p. 332.

66. Sa'd al-Dln al·TaflaZlnl. Shar/J al"aqll'id al·nasaliyah. (Cairo: Malba'at M u ~ . m m a d~ u b a y l ; l . 1939 J. pp. 77·8.

67. R.Frank. Arrribute. allTibution. p.270.

68. R.Frank. Ibid. p. 270.



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Chapter fi: al-Juwaynï's Theory in K.

al-Irshad



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Based on Ihe Egyplian edilion of 1 I 1 - l r . ~ h i i d , M. Allard, in his lung sludy le

Problème des allribuls Divins dans la doclrine d'al-As'ari, believes Iiml ul-Juwllyni

presents two oullines conceming God's llllribules. The Iirsi one is as fulluws:

1. what il is necessary 10 SllY of God: pp.30-39 and 52-164.

2. what il is impossible to say of God: pp.39- 51 .

3. what it is possible to say of God: pp.165-186 .

The second oUlline is as follows:

1. The essential allributcs ( ~ i f i j l n l l f . ~ i y a h ) : pp. 30-60 .

2. The attribules of mll'iini ( ~ i r l Ï l mll'nllwiyah): pp. 61-140 .

3. The names of God and their meanings: pp. 61-140 .

4. The anthropomorphist allributes and vision of God: pp.155-186.1

Significantly, neither of these outlines can be taken or studied

separately. Each includes the other, and any allempt that aims to follow one

seheme exclusively wou Id he inadequate. The Iirst Olle lacks adequale justilication

from aI-Juwayni himself. Moreover it is very abstract and al-Juwayni ducs not

help us towards a deeper understanding of it. 2

The second outline is easier to approach, and it more or less expresses

the standpoint of the Ash'nrite schoo\. Il is bascd on the major concepls upon

which bolh Ash'nrites and Mu'tazilites are in agreement. Nevenheless, despite

these difficulties, this second outline must nol he elaborated separollely, bUI must he

taken in conjunction with the first one.

I f we rely upon both the Egyptian and Luciani's editions, and examine al

Juwayni's division of his book aJ·lrshad, we find that he divides the titles of the

subordinate chapters into three main headings.

The most general heading is indicated by the w o r d . ~ .. bab al qawl fi .....(the chapter of saying of ...), this bab in tum is divided into many subheadings,

each one of these subheadings is called .. bab aJ·..... (the chapter of ...\, and each



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lIne lIf lhese suhheadings is divided as weil inlo many ilems called sections

( / Î I ~ u / ) .

Whal must he menlioned here is Ihat. although al- Juw:.ynï follows lhis

melhod lIf division in his book. in sorne places he violales his own melhod. For

whalever reason. he docs nol consislenlly follow lhe plan Ihal he sel oui in his

writing. This viollition can he juslified if wc rcmemher Ihal al·Juwaynï's wrilings

Iry 10 achieve many goals al Ihe same lime. Thal is 10 say. al-Juwaynï. firsl of ail.

is an Ash'arile Ihinker; he primarily had 10 main tain Ihe main ideas of his school.

Secondly. al-Juwaynï had adopled sorne MU'lazilite poinls. and Iherefore he was

Irying 10 insert Ihesc adopled nOlions in Ihe body of his wrilings wilhoul harming

basic Ash'arile lenels. For inslance. in Ihe chapter on Ihe essenlial allributes al

Juwuynï lulks aboui Ihl'ee kinds of altribules. Sorne of Ihese arc negalive altribules

deul wilh in his chapler on "whal il is impossible 10 altribule 10 God". Such a

seclion rcminds us of Ihe Mu'lazililes' definilion of God's altribules which slales

Ihal sorne of God's altribules should he viewed in an essenlially negalive way as we

hllve seen in Ihe firsl chapler. As anolher example. a1·Juwaynï c1assified Ihe altribule

of aJ-bllqii' (Everlasling) in Ihe chapler on Ihe altribules of marini. Ihough he

considercd il as an essenlial altribute ( ~ i f a h nafsiyah). Il is c1ear here. Ihen. Ihal al·

Juwuyni adopled Ihe MU'lazilile sland on Ihis poinl. He did nol PUI this altribule

in the chapler on the essenlial allribules mercly in order 10 maintain the basic

shape of c1assificalion of attributes which was held by his school's founder, a1-

Ash'ari, who helieved Ihal aJ-baqii' is an altribule of marna.

According to Ihe divisions mentioned above, al·Juwaynï begins dealing

wilh God's attributes in aJ-Irshad under the heading of "bab aJ·qawl fima yajib li-

ll;ïhi tariï/ii min aJ- ~ i f i ï t " (Ihe chapler on asserting whal il is necessary 10 altribule

10 Gad). In Ihis chapler a1-Juwaynï explains thal whal is necessary 10 he altribuled

10 God is of two kinds: Ihe essenlial altribules ( ~ i f i ï t nafsiyah) and Ihe altribules



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of ma'üni ( ~ i f a t ma'nawiyalJ). For the nrst group of <lllrihules, <l1-Juw<lyni

implicitly subsumed il <lS <1 bab. With respect to the second group <l1-Juwuyni

explicitly pUI il in <In independenl bah. und of course e<lch of lhese hallS is

ramified into many f u ~ ü / .

Thus concerning the theory of God's allrihules. <l1-Juw<lyni presents his

analysis in three m<ljor eh<lpters: 1. The chapler on asserting wh<l' il is necess<lry

ta allribule ta Gad: pp. 30·78. 2. The chapter on affirming of knowing <lllrihules

(bab a/-qaw/ f i itlJbiit a/-ci/m biJ ~ i f i j t ) : pp. 79-140. 3. The me.ming of God's nmlles:

pp. 141-165.

The first main chapter is divided into lhree subhe<ldings: <1. biib a / · ~ i f l i t .u-

nafsiyah (the essential attributes). b. bab al-cilm bil wa/,Jdüniyah (the knowledge of

the unity of Gad). c. bab ilhbiil a/-ci/m bi/ ~ i f i j t al-macnawiyah (affirming lhe

altributes of macüni).

The unity of Gad. according ta al-Juwaynï. must bc understood in terms of

two aspects. external and internaI. Externally. "it is willed by numing Gad as

One-that there is no similar and comparable (na?:ir) ta Him.") Internully "Gad is

the thing which is not divided...He is not compound; bccause if it were so

supposed... every part of Him wouId subsist in itself us knowing. living.

powerful. and that would bc a declaration of the affirmation of two gadS."4

ln dealing with the whole of al-Juwayni's stand on the unity of Gad in its two

'aspects we have ta approach his theory of the altributes. which is according to

him, the "basic issue forthe people of the unity of Gad" {Cumdalah/ a/-law/,Jic/).s

AI-Juwayni advanced his contribution using material from both theories. the Ash'arites.

and the Mu'tazilites. investing and incoporating the long-standing debates bctween

them. Although he was an Ash'arite thinker. he was open ta his school's opponents.

and ta material which helped him in his effort ta find a mature view about the

issue of the unity of Gad in particular and the issue of the determination of the thing



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48

( . ~ h u y ' ) in general.

The existent had been viewed in the philosophy of the ku/iim as essenee (dhiit)

and qualities ( , ~ i l i i l ) . Il was the object of a very tough controversy among the

mUluku//imiin. Proceeding from its own grounds and principles, each school

presented its understanding of both matters: the nature of the allribute itself, and the

relation of such an attribute to the essence. It is obvious here that any formulation that

can be made of these two mallers would, as weil, give a different concept to the

existent itself.

The theory of states (li-abwi1):

Before starting a discussion of al-Juwaynï's point of view on the attributes,

we have to deal with his theory of states (II./Iwii/). This theory is presented in al-Irshiid

in the section on the allributes of ma'iini under the subheading biib al quwl fi ithbiit al'ilm bil $iliit, but because of the necessity of first knowing the primary theory we have

to begin with il.

As we have seen in the first chapter, the controversy among the Mu'tazilites and

the Ash'arites was centred upon the question of attributes. Do these attributes belong

to and, therefore, are to be identified with the essence itself (the Mu'tazilites), or they

are supcradded to the essence (the Ash'arites)? The theory of states was created by Abü

Hïïshim in order to solve this connicl. Abü Hashim had taken a middle position

between the two schools. He held that the attributes are manifest from and entailed

directly by the essence, but they are not the essence in the sense heId by his

predecessors. They are, rather, different from il. States, according to him, have

forfiS and reality.

The Ash'arite's school represented by al-Baqilliini was hesitant in dealing with

such a theory, but in the final stages al-Biiqilliini overcome his hesitation about

adopting the theory of states,6 and bis follower al-Juwayni did so as weIl.



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AI-Juwayni's adoption of the states comes first of ail as Il solution 10 Ihe

dilemma of the rellltion between the essence: and altributes. That is to say, .. /-llllII'II/,

according to al-Juwayni, arc nothing other than "aspects ( IVUjU/WII) of the essence". 7

These aspects must not be understood in relalior to the concepls of eilber the

Mu'tazilites or the Ash'ariles, They arc neither identical Wilh nur superudded tu Ihe

essence. They arc, ralher, inherent in very nature of the essence.

These aspects, although not essences, form addilional and differcnt entities

l'rom thc e ~ s e n c e . AI-Juwayni placed much emphasis on thc fact th,1I thc states arc

entities which arc independent of the essence, besides focusing on the fact Ihat the

attributes arc aspects of the essence. He maintains that "our doctrine is that Ihe

objects known (a/-mar/ümiit) are divided into existence (lVujüdl, nothingncss

(radam), and an attributc of existence ($ifiït wujüd) which cannot be described as

either existence or nothingness".8

Two points, then, arc made by ai-Juwayni in order to harmoni7-c thc theory of

states with his school's tradition. The first deals with essence's aspects as forming

independent entities, and considers that the ~ i i / is a known object, though it is

neither known nor unknown in Abü Hashim's theory. Morcover, for Abü Hashim thc

states cannot be apprchended independently since they arc known to be prcdicated

upon the essence. On the contrary, ai-Juwayni, with his understanding that Ihe states

are objects, believes that "the states as aspects of being can be known independently

apart l'rom the essence."9

Socondly, al-Juwayni adopted the theory of states in order to deul properly

with the question of similarities and differcnces among things. He constantly places

emphasis upon the fact that "the negation of s t a t e ~ J ~ to the impossibility of an

elaboration on this similarity and difference."lo That is, "everything by which

similarity and difference occur conceming the essences and mariini is an additional

/,141:' Il According to ai-Juwayni the similarity and difference within things cannot be



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explained except in terms of admission of the u1;Jwlil, hecause uJ·u1;Jwlil represent the

substantial a ~ p e c t s of the essence r.nd, at the same time, are additional to il. They are

not the same the essence itself. al-Juwaynï says that

if we negate the states ... our aim hecomes c1ear in disassociating the similarityfrom sorne a ~ p e c t s with the difference from the other aspects; so in ournegation of the states, we negate the additional aspects and the attributes of theesscnce.12

Il can be said, therefore, that the attributes as being u1;Jwlil are necessarily

associated with the essence they belong to, and every single entity has its own

particular aspects. Such aspects are never separated from the essence. Theyparticularize and distinguish such an essence from ail other essences; they form its

identity and reflect the very nature of il.

Concerning other characteristics of the states, al-Ju','!aynï says that "state

cannot he defined except by analysing its parts as caused and uncaused."13 The

qualification of astate, then,

cannot he either in the definition (pad) or in the description (rasm) butbymentioning its parts and levels, hecause the definition and description must he

equal to the object defined neither more specific nor more general, or elsethis leads to a regress.14

As for the emphasis on the fact that the state is an aspect of the essence

known scparately, aI·Juwaynï as a mutakallüm does not accept the notion that the Qlil

can occupy the position of a Platonic idea or an Aristotelian definition. That is to say,

the Greek philosophical systems were based on either the hierarchy of ideas or the

classification of definitions, and both were rejected in the early kaliim. For this

reason aI·Juwaynï, although helieving that the states are independent aspects by

which the sameness and difference among things can he realized, refused to he

involved in . , cating a definition of the /;IiI in order to avoid the aforementioncd



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positions.

The state, therefore, is divided into two parts. the caused and uncauscd,

mu 'al/al wa ghuyr mu'aJ1al. By the tirst one is meant the altributes occurring by

virtue of mu'üni, whercas the second one helongs to the essence necessarily without

any kind of additional causes. The lalter refers to the essential ultributcs ( u J - ~ i I 1 l / 111-nafsiyah).15

For example. the uncaused altributes arc to he found in the csscntial

altributes of God, sueh as Eternity. Everlastingness. and Oneness. They can also he

found in the essential attributes of atoms that arc ealled ~ i f i j t u l - a j n ü . ~ , such as the

oeeupaney of space of the atom and its having accidents. On the other hand. the

cllused attributes can he seen in every case in whieh the essence can he a . ~ s u m e d to

exist apart from and without the attribute. God can he imagined as existing without

heing knowing. The negation of the attribute of knowing does not mean negation of the

essence itself; this kind of attribute is called caused (mu'aJ1aluh). The altributes occur

by virtue of ma'üni residing in the essence and eausing the corresponding altributes.

Though. the negation of an uncaused essential altribute leads to the negation of the

essence itself. the essence of God eannot he if the attribute of Eternity is negated.

Wbat il is neœsslI1'Y 10 say ofGod (the essential attributes):

Concerning the essential attributes. aI-Juwayni detines al-$ifah a J - n a f . ~ i y a h

foIlows:

Every attribute that affirrns the essence is inhercnt with it as long theessence exisls. and is not eaused by virtue of causes rcsiding in the attributed

object... so "oceupying space" is an attribute inhercnt along with the substanceinasmueh as the essence of substance lasls. and it (the attribute of occupancy)is not caused by virtue of something supcradded to the substance. 16

Under the title of essential attributes (aJ-$ifiit aJ-nafsiyah) aI-Juwaynï implicitly



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inscrts three groups of attributes without c1assifying them in a definite way, but it

can he easily seen that these three groups of essential allributes arc as follows:

1. What can be called the essence itself. 2. The affirming allributes which are

additionalto the essence. Once again it must be mentioned here that al-Juwayni does

not use the term "additional" in the same sense as Abü Hashim; rather, he means that

these allributes can be known separately apart from the essence, in contrast to Abü

Hiishim who held that the essential states cannot be apprehended apart from the

essence). 3. The negative attributes.17

By the first kind, al·Juwayni means the "existence". He refused to call it an

allribute because, according to him, the allribute in ail cases must be something

additional to the essence, it is known separately while the existence is not additional,

it is the essence itself. lt is not an attribute in the MU'taziiites' sense.

AI-Juwayni argues thatthe existence is completely the same as the essence. One

is not an allribute of the other; rather, they are synonymous with each other. To

understand this view, we have to trace the ontological source from which al-Juwayni

proceeded and follow its developmenl.

ln the philosophy of the ka/am, at least before al-Juwayni, the question of

existence means exclusively the question of the existent, that is, What is the existent?

The problem of existence was a point of great controversy among the Mu'tazilites and the

Ash'arites. Each school proceeded from its own understanding of creation towards

theorizing a view of existence, a view that reflected cosmologically two different

approaches which, incidentally, influenced many other important issues in the the

ka/iim.

Because we do not have the writings of the early mutaka/limün , sufficient reports

arc not available about the origin of the question of What is the existent? According to

al-Ash'ari, the question had been raised for the most part in terms of the problem of

God's attributes, "Can God be called a thing (shay') or not?"18 Al-Ash'ari states that ail



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the mutakaJ/imün except Jahm b. ~ u f w ü n ugreed thut God cun be culled u thing (shlly'l.

The problem urnong them, however, wus in delining the meuning of the existent. Some

of the mutakllllimün suid thut

The meuning of God us being u thing is the sume us the rneuning of God :IS

being existent; this is the doctrine of the people who suy thut the thing isexistent. Dthers said thut the meuning of God us bcing u thing is uflirming Him;those people bclieve thut things (1I1-ashiyiPl ure things und uflirmed liS Il thingsbcfore their existence .. , this is Il suying of ul-Khuyyül.19

It is noteworthy thut in terms of discussion of the mellning of the thing, the

Mu'tazilite thinker a1-Khuyyül delines the thing as whut is uflirmed (1I1·muthblltl, which

meuns that the thing eun be ealled u thing even bcfore its existence. AI-Jubbü'i gives

unother delinition of the thing, but still is in line with al-Khuyyül; he says that

"saying 'thing' is u feature of everything thut is known (1I1-qllwl shllY' . ~ i m l l t u n /ikul

mll'lüm) for everything eun bc mentioned und cun bc told about."20

In order to deline the thing in the eontext of the controversy concerning God's

attributes, the discussion led the mutakllllimün to two different views. The lirst one is

expressed by the Mu'tazilites und was c1eurly represented by al-Jubbü'ï, who delined

the thing as a known object. This explicitly led to the consideration thut even the

nonexistent (1I1·ma'düm) cun bc called a thing, bceause the nonexistent cun he known

und therefore it is a thing. This Mu'tazilite view expressed by a1-Jubbü'ï was established

upon the Qur'iinic passage, "Surely the earthquake of the Hour is a mighty thing."21

The Mu'tazilites urgued that Go<! nurnes the Hour as a thing though it docs not yet exist,

whieh meuns that the nonexistent is a thing too.

For the Mu'tazilites, therefore, there is a distinction bctween the thing und the

existent, since these two terms ure not equivalent to each other. 'Thing' is a more

general term thun the 'existent' because the term 'thing' includes the nonexistent as weil.

For that reason the term 'object known' (aJ-ma'lüm), which is equivalent to 'thing', is



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the mo.t gen.:ral category in the Mu'tazilites' thought.

The Mu'tazilites thus bclieved that things arc things befme their actual existence. This

altitude is called the "thingness of the nonexistent" (shlly'iYllt IlI-mll'düm), which was

established by a l - S h a ~ ~ i i m and arter him, adopted by the B a ~ r i a n Mu'tazilites who

followed him.22

AI·Ash'arï and his followers in the classical period simply deny the distinctionwhich is made by the Mu'tazilites between the essence and the existence. Thepossible (al-ma'düm) simply is not. God's essence, thus, is His existence, whosenon·bcing is impossible (yasta.!JiJu 'adamuhu). Ibn Kulliib, as we have earlierseen, says that He is existent "not through an act of existence" (mawjüd la bi·wujüd) and is a bcing (shay') "not by a mil'na by virtue of which He is abeing" ( la li- ma 'na lahu kiina shay'an). 23

As for the Ash'arites, they contend that the most general category is not

al·ma'/üm, the object known, but rather the existent (al-mawjüd). AI·Juwaynï

presents this philosophical point as follows:

The people of truth (ahl a/-Qaqq ) have arrived at the fact that the truth of

a thing is existent; every thing is an existent and every existent is a thing,and what cannot be described as a thing can not be described as an

existent as weil, and what cannot be described as an existent can not bedescribed as a thing too... while the Mu'tazilites believe that the truth of

thing is a/-ma'/üm, the object known ...and accordingly they say that everynonexistent is a thing.24

The Ash'arites, although identifying the thing and the existent and denying,

therefore, the distinction between the essence and the existence, still believed

existence to be an attribute. This attribute, however, according to Ibn Kulliib does

not occur by a ma'na; rather, it is an essential attribute ( ~ i f i j t nais). Existence (a/.

wujüd) is an attribute belonging to those attributes

which refer,to the being itself·the thing's Self nalsuhu, is conceived, it wouldseem, in contrast to the Mu'tazilies, more as object \han as essence): tBdullu'a/a nals a / · m a ~ ù f . Thus, with Allihu mawjüdun (Gad exists) or a/·Qarakatu



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'Maqun (the motion is an accident) al-Ash'ari takes simply as ithbiIru nats 11/-

m a l v ~ ü f (the assertion of the existence of the entity denoted by the subject term);they refer to the self of the m l l w ~ ü f . 2 S

The basic starting point in al-Juwayni's thcory of the unity of God is to he

found in his fundamental belief that the existence is not an allribule but is

God Himself. He says in his al-Irshiid, "the convenient thing is to consider the

existence not as an altribute, that is, the existence is the essence ils-self, it is

not as the spatiality of the substance, because the spatiality is a superadded

attribute to the essence of the substance".26

Here al-Juwayni as an Ash'arite thinker, and because of the doctrine of

his school that t!>ere is no difference between the essence and the existence of

God, pushes this principle as for as it will go. Al-Juwayni was aware of his stand as

being different from his masters' altitude and felt that his masters "were prolix

(mutawasi'ün) in considering existence as one of God's altributes".27

From this fundamental starting point we can now apprehend the importance of al-

Juwayni's contribution in regard to the determination of God's essence.

The problem of the determination of the essence of God was a great dilemma

in the ka/am; and a huge part of the discrepancy between the Ash'arites and the

Mu'tazilites proceeded from the question What is the essence of God?

After he detennined the essence of Gad as the existence, al-Juwayni gocs on to

talk about the rest of the essential attributes ( ~ j f i ï t nafsiyah). These essential altributes

are employed by him to define as wellto detennine the nature of the existence of God.

5uch a detennination must he made because on his view, existence is the most

common or inclusive term in the universe; though existing both Gad and the physical

world participate with each other.

God's existence. thus. is distinguished from other sorts of existence by His own

essential attributes. These attributes are of two kinds: affirmative altributes and



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negative attributes.

The essential affirmative attributes that bclong only to God arc: a. Eternity

(ul-qidum), b. Aseity, God subsists by virtue of Himself (qiyi im AI/i ihu bi nu{sihl),

c. Everlastingness, (al-buqii'), and d. Oneness (ul-wubdiiniyuh). These attributes arc

inherent in God's essence, they certainly and positively refer to the essence of

God. The essential attribules arc the mosl specifie attributes by which essence

possesses ils particular identity, yet at the same time distinguish this essence from ail

other essences (dhawiit).

The essence or being can be delermined. after its being existent. by the

essential attributes. the attributes which are indissoluble from the being as long as

the being exists. These attributes then intrinsically give the being ils particuliarity;

through them the existents can be seen as being different from each other. even though

they ail have existence in common. God. therefore, is distinguished and possesses

His identity by virtue of His particular essential attributes. which are. Oneness.

Etcrnity, subsisting in Himself, and Everlastingness. By virtue of these attributes

God is determined as possessing His special existence.

'The essential attributes, 1l-8Üàl Il-Nsfsïysb:

By the attribute of Eternity aI-Juwaynï means that God's being is

beginningless (ghayr muftata.(l).28 To support his view ?J-Juwayni presents two

arguments; the first one is expressed as follows: "i f God's being is generated He

would then be lacking a generator (mubdith). the same thing can be said of his

generator. and thus the same can be applied to beginningless events. but it can be

seen that this prove to be futile".29

The second argument depends. interestingly. on a special notion of time.

'Eternity' is described in terms of aI-Juwayni's understanding and in contradiction to

those who maintain that Elernity means an endless succession of tÎme. A1-Juwaynï



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states that "times are expressed by existents heing compared with olher exislents,

and if each existent is viewed in comparison wilh othcr exislcnls. Ihe lalesl willlhen

be its lime,"3o Viewed in Ihis way. Etcrnily does not mean a succession of lime

because God is incomparable wilh other existcnls hefore the creation of Ihe world.

Concerning the allribute of subsisting by Himself. al-Juwayni helieves in

agreement with his masters that this atlribute means the transcendenee of Gml

from being lacking to substratum. And the proof "is that if God occupics space,

and His existence is lacking in that place. this place wouId he eternal too and

would be an atlribute of God. as every place is atlribuled to the object which

Decupies it." 31

By mentioning these affirmative atlributes. al-Juwayni points to the essential

attributes which determine primarily the particular nature of God's essence ur the

nature of the existence of God. the existence being distinguished by ils special

identity from all other beings.

AI-Juwayni gocs on to insist upon the difference of God's essence from

other essences by reciting the third group of essential atlributes. These are the

negative ones. That is. "one of God's essential atlributes is His difference from

generated objects; God is eompletely dissimilar from them. and not one of them

resembles Gad."32

But before dealing with the negative attributes al-Juwayni begins the section

( f a ~ / ) . with a philosophical introduction that elarifies his important view on

difference and similarity.

The truth of sirni1arity and difference :

The theory of similarity and difference arrived with al-Juwayni at the highest

point to be reached in the philosophy of the kaliim. With al-Juwayni we cao see how

this problem was solved on the basis of developing issues in the kaliim; or, in other



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wllrds, based on the fundamental shifl in the kuliim's view conceming the concept of

thing, al-Juwayni was in a position to present u mature theory of similurity and

difference. The dominant standpoint beforc al-Juwayni was the view of the universe

as the sum of things.

ln arder to prove the difference of God from other beings, kuliim avoided

dealing with common concepts or terms and therefore bclieved that every thing is

completely different from all other things. "The one determincd single thing docs

not include in any respect participation, and so the common and general thing

docs not exist at all.")) AI·Juwayni, instead changed this standpoint from bclief

only in difference to a conceptual theory that rcgurded the possibility of similarity

within bcings.

Flrst of all. al-Juwayni states that existence is the most common term

among things. Il is the ontological ground of ail bcings, including Gad Himself. AI-

Juwayn: counters those who contend that Gad cannot bc describcd by any kind of

common terms and cannot bc "describcd in terms of existence, bccause if this is

done Gad will bc similur to generated things (uJ-/;Iawiidirh).")4 by saying that

If you con tend that participation in one of the affirmative allributesnecessitates participation in ail the other attributes. your contention is false.bccause wc know that black and white participate with each othel bybcing accidents. bcsides the fact that they are differcnt from each other byone of them bcing black and the other white ...Rather, even if they admitparticipation in one attribute. Ihis docs not necessitale participation in

other attributes. It can bc said to them: What is the objection to stating thatgenerated bcings and the Etemal Being pdlticipate with each other in theattribute of existence. for Gad is particularized by the attributes of bcinglord and gad. adjectives, and since participation in existence docs notindicate participation in generation.)s

Inasmuch as ail bcings participate with each other in existence. the real

difference bctween things depends upon the identity of every single being. This

identity is constituted by virtue of essenlial attributes (aJ-$ifiït al-nafsiyah). Such



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altributes indicate thal lhe being is as il is in ilself. These allributes arc nnl causcd

by any kind of causes, that is, "the essential allribute is every aftïrll1utive ullribule

related to the essence (dhiIt) not 10 superadded ma'nll of il.".lh It is inherenl ami

appcrtains to the very essence of the being, "the essenlial allribule is every allrihule

which cannot be dclusively negated. with assuming that the essence exists... .11 If,

therefore. the essential allribule is hypothelically removed the essence ilsclf

wouId vanish weil.

B a ~ e d on lhe aforemenlioned definilion of identily. al-Juwayni works nul his

theory of similarity and difference. That is, the substantial similarity between two

things occurs if "sorne of them can be instead of the other" (id/III . ~ l I d d a

a!Jlldllhumii mllSsoddll al-iIkhar).38 One exislenl can be similar to another exislent if

both are equal to each other in ail essential altributes. if one of lhem identifies

eompletely the olher. Otherwise. there are two differcnt things: "in the case of

every two existents. sorne essential attributes have been affirmed 10 one of them,

and not to the other". 39 The word "som.:" herc means that Ihe difference is not

judged in the same way as the similarity, since if the similarity requires absolule

identification bctween ail essential attributes of two things, the difference. on the

contrary. dces not rcquirc absolute distinction between two Ihings.

The differcnce bctween two differcnt Ihings cannot be evalualed in lhe sameway Il s the similarity; that is. the truth of similarity is in the equality of Ihe

two similar describcd things in ail their essential attribules. while lhediffercnce dces not rcquirc the differcnce in all such altributes, since lhedifferenee cannot bc realized except bctween two existents, so Ihe nccessityof talking about the difference requires approaching the participalion of twodifferent Ibings in the existence.40

The important point to bc noticed .11 aI-Juwayni's veiw is that. the idenlily of

an existent cannot bc determined by only one essential attribute; being is

detennined ralber by all the essential attributes Ibat the bcing possessess. This



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leads us ta say that "in arder ta illustrate lhe similarity, it is necessary ta

enumerate ail the essential attributes."41

Such a point of view is more open than the MU'taziiites' view that was

still faithful ta the nOlion crealed by al·JubblPi and adopted by his son Abü

Hashim and his followers. This notion stated thal the sameness among things is due

ta one specific allribule, the attribute of the Essence ($ifiïlU ul-dhiil), black bcing

black and Gad bcing Elernal. AI·Juwayni. rather, holds that the sirnilarity and

difference are delermined by a group of allributes, the group which essentially

determines the identily of bcing.

Il can be said then that bolh principles. the principle already mentioned

and the one which states that the difference between two things indispensably

requires the sameness in sorne other aspects. allow a view of the world in its

particular variety and interference. Such variety and interference are adrnited for

every bcing in its difference and as bcing distinguished by its nature and identity

from other bcings.

Besides the terms similarity (ul·mumiilhuluh) and difference (al·ikhtiliil),

which are determined by the essential attributes. a1-Juwayni talks about the concept

of participation (al-rnushiir:lkuh). With this concept al-Juwayni deals with the

universals.42 According ta hirn. things participate with each other in virtue of

different groups of allributes; they are the allributes of muCiini. AI-Juwayni

maintains that every essential attribute is uncaused (lu lucallal), it is permanently

unseparated frorn its own essence. and every single identity is constitutionally

particularized by its specific essential attributes. There is no distinct cause by

which Gad can bc Eternal or a substance can he occupying space. An attribute

such as knowing is considered as a caused attribute ($ifuh mu'allaluh). It occurs

by virtue of mucni. such mucni causing the judgrnent or proposition of "Gad is

knowing" and. in the sarne way, "Zayd is knowing". Knowledge, then. is a



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general concept. God and Zayd can he altribuled Wilh il by virtue (lf which God

and Zayd are deserving of Ihe same judgmenls Ihal ure cuused by Ihe same lerm.

AI·Juwaynï helieves Ihal "a lhing can purticipale wilh whal is differenl from il in

certain generul altribules. Black, for example, conlrasls wilh while; bul il purticipales

wilh Ihe while in exislence, and by virlue of Iheir being Iwo accidenls und

colours."43

Whal mUSI he always noliced in al-Juwayni's underslanding of Ihe geneml

altribules is lhal Ihey ure conslanlly accompanied by IWO fundamenlal nolions.

These nolions are Ihose of Ihe judgmenl or qualificalion (al·l.JUkm) and cause ('ilIa).

The altribules of ma'iini as Ihey are superadded 10 Ihe essence cause and provide

Ihe essence wilh specifie predicales; knowledge, Ihus, is deuil wilh as a general

altribule, and as a delerminanl principle, causing a deljnile judgmenl for bolh Gad

and Zayd.

Il is obvious, then, Ihal Ihe general ma'iini, in al-Juwaynï's view, ure

employed in order 10 solve Ihe debalable issue of Ihe judgmenls Ihal are said la

he of bolh Ihe Visible (al·shiihid) and Invisible (al·ghii'ib). Thal is, proceeding

from Ihis principle, Ihe trulhs are varianl in IWO levels. The Mu'lazililes declined

10 apply Ihe same judgmenl 10 bolh God and man; Ihey conlended Ihal Gad

necessarily has His own altribules by virtue of Himself, while man may possess

Ihe same altribules in a probable way.

Gad is knowing by virtue of Himself (bi dhiIliM, w h e r e a . ~ man is knowing

by virtue of somelhing else. This is Ihe malter which is considcred by Ihe

Ash'ariles as violaling the mosl fundemenlal basis of Ihe kalam, Ihe b a . ~ of Ihe

anulogy of the Unseen le' el in lerms of :he visible one, and breaking up Ihe

syslematic cosmological treaUDenl of ail heings in Ihe universe. AI-Juwaynï r e f u l c . ~

the Mu'tazililes' notion thal stales thal a judgmenl can he caused al one lime (in

respecl of man), and uncaused al another lime (in respecl of Gad). By saying



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Ihat "the biggesl of your mistakes and the most clear confusion and ignorance is

your distinction belween Ihe visible and invisible in the judgment of cause (f i

1,Jukm a/-'i/la)," al-Juwayni adds Ihat "such a stand is regarded as arbitrary."44

The judgmenl of cause or reason (1,Jukm al-'illa), is regarded by al-Juwayni as the

same al both levels.

If il is accepted that a judgment is caused in virtue of cause in Ihe Seenlevel.... Ihe conneclion of the cause and the caused (a/-ma'lül) in balh thevisible and invisible levels must he decided so thatthey are inseparable fromeach olher. and one of them must be negated if the olher is negated. Inthis way we can state that knowing (a/-'iilim) at the seen level is aknowing heing caused by the knowledge.4s

Il is remarkable Ihat aI-Juwayni does nol approach. like the Mu'tuzilites.

the problem of judgment in the context of necessity (in respe':t of God) and

possibility (in respect of man). By contrast. he holds that the cause and the object

caused are necessarily Inherent within each other in ail cases, if one of them exists

the other. by necessity. exists too. This is what is called the rotation (aJ-dawarJn),

or the coextensiveness and coexclusiveness (fard wa 'alcs), and which means thatthe

1,Jukm tums around the 'illa and is bound to its existence and nonexistence.46

The ma'iini. thus, are not independent entities existing in a different world

apart from the concrete existents, whether this world is the Platonic or the mental

world. They are not objective substances as weil as subjective categories; they

simply exist as long as the being deserves to be qualified by such and such an

altributc. and do not exist if the thing is not qualified by such and such an attribute.

They are general because the 'illa as weil as being a defining quality is coextensive

(IIJUllll1"id), which means that it is applied to ail individual cases of the object for which

it was destined, and it is coexclusive. (mun'akis) which means that is excludes every

other case of an object withoutthis special 'illa.47

Despite the resultant similarity and difference in the flfSt sense (which is built



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on Ihe allribules of Ihe identity of the thing). participation (:I/-mus/liimk:llIl is

viewed in al-Juwayni's case as bcing rcprcsented in Ihe general (lUkm. (qulliiticalionl.

in lerms of which mllny beings ure qUlllilied. Things can bc differcnt L'om eaeh

other in lerms of Iheir particulur essences, which are conslituted by virlue of the

essenlial allribules. BUI Ihings can participllle wilh each olher in the same !lUkm if

Ihey arc classilied under the sarne mll'nü or 'illll. God is llbsolutcly distinguished bl'

His particulur idenlily but He participales wilh Zayd in the same /.Jukm by bcillg

knowing. Such a sla!emenl can bc similurly applied ta ail other bcings.

Il musl bc said herc Ihal, Ihe general /.Jukm docs nOI lead la Ihe abrogalion of

the differences bclween Ihe individual cases of applicalions. i.e. God is knowing

and Zayd is knowing. These Iwo proposilions cannat be underslood in Ihe same way:

ralher, Ihe same /.Jukm Ihal is applied la Gad and la Zayd implies a difference in

degree and maybc in nalure of Ihe mll'nü of knowledge which is causing Ihe same

/.Jukm la bo prcdicaled bolh of Gad and of Zayd.

Afler elabomling upon the posilive aspecls of Ihe '$scnlial allributes (the U . ~ p c c I S

which delermine Ihe nalurc of Ihe essence of Gad and aflirm His particulur identily).

al-Juwayni cornes la Ihe negalive aspecls of Ihe essenlial allribules in order to

emphasize the differcnce of Gad l'rom ail olher bcings.

The negative essential attributes :

Under Ihe {II$/ "Whal il is impossible la say of Gad", aI-Juwayni lisls four

negalive altribules: 1. The impossibilily of describing Gad by Ihe allribule of

occupying space, 2. Gad, contrary la the Kaniimiyah, is nol a body, 3. Gad docs nol

conlain accidents, 4. Il is impossible for Gad la bc a substance.4K

Il is in Ihe conlexl of whal il is impossible la say of Go:!, aI-Juwayni \reat' Ihe

negalive allribules. He subsumes Ihese altribules under aJ-$iîat al-nafsiyah la show

how Ihe essence of Gad is distinguished l'rom ail Ihe beings of the world of



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generation, and to place emphasis on the ultimate transcendence of God. This in

spite of the fact that God's essence is viewed in the same context as the

determination of beings in terms of having (and being determined by) both kinds of

allributes (the essential and the mu'üni ones) and is seen as "participating a10ng with

generated heings in some of the affirmative allributes."49

God's essence must not he picturcd in any kind of rcprcsentational or eoncrcte

form. God, therefore, is not a substance, because God, as an absolutely pure and

transcendental heing, cannot he thought of as heing thrce fundamental characteristics

of substance:

1."God is elevated above occupying space and heing particularized in dimensions."so

The anthropomorphists (al-mushubiha) and al-Karramiyah were guided by the sura,

"The all-Compassionate seated Himself upon the Throne"(xx, 5) and held that God is

particularized in specific spatial dimensions. AI-Juwayni maintains, against such

heliefs, that

The heing who occupies space possibly adjoins other bodies, and every thingadjoining other bodies can indispensably he either equal to their quant;ties or

equalto the quantities of their parts, or sorne sides of God adjoins them; 50,

cvery principle which leads to consideration of God as a quantity or toportioning Him is an apparent infidelity.sl

ln contrast to al-Ash'ari, the founder of his school, al-Juwayni takes the

position of the Mu'tazilite school and interprcts the sura as a Iinguistic metaphor. By

isuwii' according to him, is meant domination and overcoming.s2

2. The second feature of "God is not a substance" is to he found in the unacceptability

ofGod's possessing a substrate of accidents. Since, depending on the basic source

in the kuliim, the very nature of accidents is to he found in their renewal and

generation, a1-Juwayni denies that God can possess a substrate of continuous

generation. According to a1-Juwayni every generated heing whatsoever, cannot



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precede the things generated. If a generative process bclongs to God this slutement

wouId mean that God is also a generaled bcing.53

Beside lhe previous two negalive atlribules which ail dcny God is Il

substance. al-Juwayni also negates the bclief thut God is a body.54 Procecding from

his major concern. the complete difference between the Eternlll and pure Being IIml

Ihe generated world. al-Juwayni refules such Il Karrümiyan urgumellt by suying IIUlt:

The body is the compounded bcing. to speuk truly ... and ifyou [the speech is

directed to the Karriimiyan sect] name God as a body and affirm of Him therealities of bodies. you face IWO choices: either to negate the proof of thegeneration of the aloms. thal is, its struclure based on their acceplanee of

composition, juxtaposition and difference; or to generalize and decide the pronfof the generation of the Crealor.55

Th-=c=--.=af=fi=1lID=a=ti=·o=n::.....::;o=-f--=kn=o=-w=in::cg'--=th=cc...;a=t=tr1=·b=u=t""'cs:......:o=..f--,ma=.CiiJ.i=-.,_ -=tl=.--,;taLsl:

ma :nBwtfab::

The attributes of ma'iïni. in facto are considered to bc one of Ihe most imponant

pans in the ka/iim's literature. Because of them conllicts and cleavages took place.

Proceeding from a different understanding. each sect advanced its own view on the

issue of the unity of God. The real talV/,Jid. according to the mutakallimün. b a ~ e don the method of treating the question of whether Ihe seven affirmative positive

attributes (life, will. power, knowledge. hearing. vision and speech) are identical

with God's essence (the Mu'tazilites ) or the ma'iïni ure superadded to the essence (the

Ash'arites. and the Maturidies).

Al-Juwayni, who came after a long historical debate bctween the Mu'tazilites

and the Ash'arites, atlempted to reconcile their theories through adopting the more

convineing aspects of each view and avoidin1! other aspects that were the subject nf

hard criticism. He maintained his school's tradition in conlirming that the attributes

$ifiit in its infinitive formulae such as knowledge. power,etc.- are ma'iïni. But on the

other side, the essence which is attributed or caused by sueh ma'lini is called the



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66

essence with uQwiÜ ('u/ii uQwiÜ). Or in other words, al-Juwayni harmonized the

theory of his school in ilS belief in mU'iini as allribules in the sense that they are

mu,\'iidir from wich the predicates can be derived; and the Mu'tazilite thinker Abü

H i i . ~ h i m in the theory of IIl,1wiil. The lheory which confirms that the prellicates of

God such as power. will. knowing. etc. are aspects of God's essence, states of the

essence ul,lwiilun iii dhiil. The major goal of al-Juwayni's adoption of the uQwiÜ is to

create a method by which the relations among things that are based on sameness and

difference can he aClualized. That is to say. in affirming the uQwiil the upholders of

such theory affirm the essence and its additional a ~ p e c t s . By these additional aspects

which are inseparable from the essence the sameness and difference among things can

he realized. Al-Juwayni says:

What is convenient in terms of the III,1Wiil is that if we describe something inexistence. we therefore, affirm that it has. after its existence. attributes such asthe atom occupying space or accident such as knowledge, ignorance. will. orpower. These attributes are additional to existence for the people who affirmthe uQwiÜ. and they are the same as the essences for the people who negatethem.s6

lt can .. said, then. that without admission the uQwiÜ. the assemblage of

different things into one truth is impossible. which means therefore that "the negation

of l,liÜ leads to the abolition of the mental causes and of ail the truthS."S7

ln dealing with the attributes of mll'iini al-Juwayni divides the chapter into two

parts: affirm knowing in the qualifications of attributes, II/-'ilm bi al,lkiim 1I/-$ifil,

and affirm knowing in the attributes that necessitate their qualifications. a1-$ifilll/

müjibah Ji al,lkiimihii.ss By the first. al-Juwayni means the necessary predications that

one must affirm of God. since God positively must he predicated upon such attributes

as powerful. willing. knowing,etc. A1though most of the mUlakallimün agree on such

necessary propositions,s9 this part represents a controversial issue in the kll/iim,

particularly against those who reject the thesis that if it is possible to predicate the



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altributes upon God. then His creatures can he so predicated too. Some philusophers

and helievers in the interiority (Büliniyah) say. for inslance. "we do not deserihc God

as existing, because in doing so. we would descrihe Him as heing similar to generaled

objects."60 Jahm b. ::;afwan, as weil, who was under I.he influence of Newplatonisl11

refuses to altribute God in the attributes by whieh others ean also he deserihed. such

as existent, living, knowing and willing.61

AI-Juwayni emphasizes the necessity of altributing to God positive und

affirming attributes, thereby eountering the so-called groups of al-mu'aliJah. people

who disallow the attribution to God of positive attributes.62

In this chapter. al-'ilm bi aMüm al-$ifiït. al-Juwayni discusses the Mu'tazilites in

the attribute of will. that both Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites agreed on the necessily of

ascribing willto God, they disagreed with each other about considering will elemal or

generated. AI-Juwayni argues against the Mu'tazilites with regard to the altribute of

will beeause of the different meanings given to such an attribute.63 Both agreed on the

proposition of "God is willing", but the meaning of such a proposition was subject to

rigorous Iilutual eriticism. While the Ash'arites believed that the will of Gad is an

etemal attribute Iike the rest of $ifiït al-dhüt, the Mu'tazilites maintained that the

will of God is a generated attribute. God crt:;ated it in no substratum (l à fi

ma{!all).64

AI-Juwayni discusses many veiws eonceming the proposition "God is willing",

he first r e f u t e ~ Abü Qasim al-Ka'bi who says that God cannot he altributed

willing in the truth ( 'al i al-/,Iaqiqah), and of al-Na.üar who attributed Gad as willing in

a negative way: "the meaning of 'God is willing' is that He is not dominated and

overcome." 65 AI-Juwayni then presents his argument, the argument that is considered

as a development to the Ash'arites school's view in proving the etemity of will.

In contrast to the philosophers, the mutakallimün , as is weil known, believe that

Gad created the physical world out of nothing. ~ ~ : h a cosmological altitude was the



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basis of division concerning Ihe altribule of Will among Ihe Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.

For the Mu'lazilites, Ihe will of God is a generated allribllte. God produced His will al

Ihe lime of His decision to create Ihe world. The Ash'ariles, on Ihe olher hand,

mainlained Ihat Ihe allribule of will is elernal. Bul while a1-Ash'ari himself relied on

Ihe dialectical argumenl in order 10 prave Ihe elernily of God's will, he slill argues

that: "if the living being does nol will any Ihing, il is necessary Ihal il be allribuled 10

the inverse of will Ihrough infirrnilies such as absenl-mindedness, hated. elc."66 Al

Juwayni de fends the elernily of will in a different argumenl of his own invenlion,

holding thal Ihe elernal Will of God particularizes or specifies Ihe crealion al a

definile lime ralher Ihan others.67 According 10 a1-Shahrasliini, Ibn Rushd. and Luciani.

Ihe idea of specificalion had been invenled for Ihe first time by al-Juwayni,68 who

gave Ihe argumenl of the elernity of will new onlological aspeCls and momentum.

Saving Ihe freedom of God. al-Juwayni conlends Ihat God, the necessary Being

elernally possesses His attribute of will. and at a moment of His own chossing J.le

partieularizes (yukhll$i$) it in crealing the physical world.

The attributes that nccessitate their qualifications. (al-mt al müjibah li

!!b1ciïm;bs):

Wilh respecl 10 the attributes of ma'anï al-Juwayni kepl 10 the traditional

allilude of Ihe Ash'arite school. wbich was persistence of the long time of thinking.

and great vareity of veiws. slarting with Abü al-Hudhayl. passing to Mu'ammar and Ibn

Kulliib. This tradition was always subject of justification and adaplation. A1-Juwayni,

in tum, presenled his own theory which is not meJ'l" reptition 10 bis maslers, al-Ash'arï

or al-Bâqilliini. rather he reformulaled and reinvented the theory of ma'iüü in order to

make it more conveneint to bis other opinions Iike bis theory of states. That is,

according to him. Ihe seven affirrning attributes. in a simple statement. are ma'iüü

superadded to Ihe God's essence. BUI. in facl, al-Juwayni does not follow such a



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tradition without adding sorne justifications. The method of dcaling wilh the

allributes of mu'Mi remains as it is: the being or Ihing acquires some of ils

characteristics by virtue of additional "entilies" which cause these features. Thal is,

al-Juwayni, though holding to the shape of the Ash'arite conception, pinces

emphasis on the logical aspect of this understanding. since for him the 1II/1"/ln; IIrc

not ontological entities. Rather they are, significantly, "mental causes" ('i/al

'aqlïyah).69 such mental causes necessitate qualifications for their substratums (llJjihu

aMiiman l i ma/;Jiïlliha).70

AI-Juwayni, as representing the climax of the early Ash'arite kull1m, made

every effort possible to apply consistently the rule of qiyil$ al-ghil'ib 'ulil 11/-shiilJid 10

ail beings in the universe including God Himself. For him, every being in the univcrsc

has two kinds of determinations: the specifie ones, those which pertain pcrmanently

and absolutely to the being and determine its identity; and the determinalion Ihat

cornes from additional ma'iini. This laller kind of determination is not necessary in

terms of a existence of the being itself.71 The nature of the atom, for instance,

necessarily has its identity as a being occupying space and n:ceiving its accidents,

while such an atom can accidentally be at rest or motion only in ternIS of additional

ma'iini affecting il. ln other words. the essential allributes express the very essence of

being and reflect its truth in the way that it is. while the attributes of ma'lÏ1Ii do not

have the same logical or ontological function; they do not express and do not manifesi

the truth of being as the essential ones do. A1-Shahrastiini explains this idea a.s follows:

We say. with respect to God, that He is the Eternal existent. subsisting in virtueof Himself. rich. one. infinite in His existence and essence (dhilt). and allthesc

attributes belong to one truth; but to attribute to God the qualities of living.knowing. being powerful. these belong to different truths and distinguishablepropertics. every one of which is particularized in a restricted aspect and truth.and has;ts peculiar benefit. which il indicates. and its own nexus (muta'aliq).So if truths differ from each other with respectto these aspects. then they differfrom each other in their essences and one of them cannot be instead of the other.The reason. (a1- taql) therefore. distinguishes these matllni in virtue of thescaspects...,so it is impossible for reason to combine different properties in one



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truth.72

AI-ShahrastÜlli c1early distinguishes bctween the identity of a bcing as one truth

which identifies itself, and the superadded qualities that a bcing is entitled to or is

qualified to obtain on the basis of its pre-established essential existence. For, the

essential attributes manifest always the same truth, or definite bcing. Etemity cannot

be for any bcing but God, the accidents cannot exist except in the atom. However

knowledge, power, life, etc. can bc ascribed to many bcings; they express different

truths and entities; and this leads to the statement, according to the Ash'arites, that

what reflects different truths is not essential in any sense.

These ma'iînï are not objective ideas such as those of Plato, nor second

causes which are essences, such as those of the MusFm philosophers; rather, they are

mental entities, demonstrating and justifying the characterization of a bcing by this

or that kind of quality. These ma'iînï are absolutcly not essences and they do not have

in any sense the qualifications of the essences. Moreover, the ma'anï cannot be

understood as being arranged in a vertical order in terms of causing one another,

in either the ontological (example of Plato) or logical (example of Aristotle) senses.

They are, rather, dealt with in a horizontal manner, and this is the chief departure

from Mu'ammar's theory.

Ma'anï, then, ascribc to a bcing specific qualifications. A bcing is knowing

in whom knowledge resides, al-'iilim man qiima bibi aJ.'iJm. The knowledge as a

ma'na and as a "mental cause" ('illa) is inseparable from its caused object (ma'1ül),

and it is not possible to assess one of them without the other.13 Our statements 'God

is knowing', and 'Zayd is knowing', cannot he true without assessment of the

knowledge as a cause causing such propositions. Likewise, it is not possible to

assess the knowledge without assessing ils substratum as a knowing being.14

This inseparable relation between cause and caused object must be understood,



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as al-Ju\\'ayni constantly emphasizes, in the logicul context, und not in the

on\ological con''::<.t us the Mu'tuzilites ulwuys try to critsize the Ash'urites with.

That is, the necessituting, or the term " n e c ' ~ s s u r i l y cuusing," does not IIlcun th.1I

God is cuused to be attributed us knowing. AI-Juwuyni, in order 10 cl uri l'y snch

un importunt position distinguishes between whut is rehlted to the "quulificlllion"

(/,lUkm) and what is related to the "existence" (wujüd), the lIlullcr which secms to

hpve mi sied the Mu'tuzilites.

For the Mu'tazilites, any being that oblains its attrihutes hy virtue nI'

something cise (for instance, the mu'iini) is a needy being lacking unolher cntity

in order to bestow upon it such attributes. God, however, because of His richness

docs not need anything else; it is impossible that He needs m'l'iini to get sOllle of His

attributes.

AI-Juwayni in the context of his rcsponsc. argues that the Mu'tazilites arc

confused: they mix up the "qualification" of necessity and possibil ity with the

neeessary and possible "existence." ln existence. God a necessary being cannut he

caused or affected by anything else. in contrast to generated beings; whereas, the

ma'iini necessitate only their qualifications (Cüjibu al,Jkiimuha) and do not necessitate

either the existence or the essence of God. Al-t:l'Ii/ does not mean creation ur

innovation; rather. al-ta'lil means mental entailing (iqtiç/ii' 'aq/i). and the Irue

inherentness (al-tuliizum al-l,Jaqiqi). Necessity and possibility do no then prevent thc

understanding of the inherentness and entailment. So, accordingly. it is mcnlally

possible 10 cause ta'liJ. the necessary being by necessity and the possihle being by

possibility.74

The other argument that al-Juwayni raises against the Mu'tazilites is about

possibility and necessity. The Mu'tazilites contend that beings obtain their attributes

not in the context of: ~ i f i j t nafsiyah and , ~ i f i j t ma'nawiyah, but in the context of:

necessity and possibility; that is to say. sorne of attributes belong to sorne beings



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neeessarily while lhe same allribules belong 10 otber beings p o s ~ i b l y . God is

knnwing by necessily. Zayd is knowillg in possible way. because in tbe case of God

we cannnt assume Gnd's bcing wilhout bcing knowing. whereas we can do so in case

nf Zayd, ln nlher words. a/·ra'/il (or applying ma'an; as causes) according 10 Ihe

M u C l a ~ . i l i l e s cannol be applied exeepl in lhe case of possibk Ihings. whereas in lhe

case of necessary Ihings ra' /il is nol .i1lowed.75

AI·Juwayni replies lhal the meaning of knowledge necessilates ilS

qualification. is inberent in il. inseparable from il. and as sueb uucs nol serve as Ibe

relation bctween Ihe rower and ilS object. Furthermore. if we presuppose lb al Ihe

qualificalion occurs wÎlhoul a C ~ I ! ~ C necessilating il. il is lile same as presupposing

a cause wilhoul necessilating ils qualificalion.76 This )rolds implieitly to positing

independent ma'iill; or enlities apart from Ibings or objects. an idea whicb wa;

completc1y rejected by the murnkallimûn .

Moreover. the same qualification in God is knowing, Zayd is knowing. ducs

not mean in any sense that the cora.enl of such propositions is the same in buth cases.

The marna knowledge when is predicaled upon two different beings ducs not lead

10 the decision that these two beings have the same content of knowledge.71 Godand Zayd participate with each other only in the form of the I.JUkm, but each one

of them has his own knowledge in different content and context. God's knowledge is

comprehensive, universal. while Zayd's k n o \ · . i e d ~ e is Iimited. finite, conditioned.

AI·Juwayni. in his allempt to generalize the law of qiytis al ghti'ib 'alti al shiihid. to

cover ail beings in the universe, relutes the Mu'tazilites' standpoint that trcats the

unity of God in an arbitrary way apart from ontologieal and logical laws.78

ln order to makc the fundamental law of "What is approved in al-shiihid

musl be applied to al-ghii'ib "79 contain ils full meaning, Our thinkcr POSils four

roles by which the application of the law of qiyiis al ghti'ib 'alti al shiihid in terms of

l'i!iït al ma'iilli. can he absolutely true.



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These four rules are as follows:

1. The cause. or the relation of eause and efreel. Ir it is del1lunslmted tlml the

bukm is caused by virtue of a cause ut the visible level. it is neeessury tu upply sueh

a bukm to bolh the visible and invisible levels.

2. The condition. the relation of the conditiun und eunditiuned. If the lil/km is

conditioned by virtue of u condition in the visible level. it is neeessury lu upply such u

relation to the invisible level. For instunce. the knowing tu he knowing he lIlust he

conditioned by virtue of a condition of life: this relutiun. thercfore. is truc in both

levels.

3. The truth. or definition of the relation of llUkm with the essence. If u truth

has been posited at the visible levei. it is necessary to el(tend this truth 10 the

invisible level. Concerning the trulh of knowing that it is a subjeet in wholll the

knowledge resides. al-Shahrastiini el(plains that

If the conditions of the definition are available und true the definiliun eall heel(tended to all beings that deserve this definition: the definition of kllowing.that one possesses knowledge (badd al 'iilirn annahu dhu ri/ml. of heingpowerful that one possesses power. and of willing that one possesscs a will....it is necessary. therefore. to apply such definitions to the invisible levcl sinee

the truth does not differ at both levels.Ko

4. The sign. (al daliJ J. of the relation hetween the sign and what it symholi7.cs. If a

sign indicates an object. this indication must also he true on IWO levels. KI Our

predieate "knowing" indicates the marna of knowledge that resides in the knowing:

sueh an indication is true on hoth levels.

The bencfit {lf using ma'Bni:

By virtue of the theory of ma'iini. the Ash'arites in general and al-Juwayni in

particular were able to present their own solution to sorne problematic issues in the

ka/am, that is, the issues relating to attributes that have an ontological aspect. In otber



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words, in Icrms of the unity of God and His altributes sorne of God's altribules were

more central and /IIore focused than others. The imponance of such altributes

cornes fll1rn the nalure of these altrihutes. That nature consists of two aspects. The

:Iltrihules are will, knowledge, power and speech; each oneof

thern has two

dimensions, one belongs to the essence of God, the other is related to something

other Ihan Gad.

Based on their belief that the attribules of God are nol ma'iini, but God owns

such altrihutes by virtue of Hirnself (bi dllâtihi or li dhiilihl), the Mu'tazil iles were

confronted with one of two solutions: either to say that God used His will in the

eternal (which rneans that the world is eternal 100 because of the essential

connection bctween God's essence and His altributes), or to say that this attribute

is generated as is the altribute of speech. It is weil known that the Mu'tazililes

chose the second solution.

For the Ash'arites. will, knowledge, power and speech are not essenlial; rather.

they are ma'iini. They bclieved that these altributes are eternal ma'iini in one aspect

and temporal in the other. More precisely. these altributes pnain to God eternally.

but God used them at a definite moment in time, or God reveals their other

dimension with regard to the world and man.

As mentioned earlier. God's will is eternal in one aspect and temporal in the

moment of panicularization ( t a k h ~ i ~ ) in the other. As sreech. "the doctrine of

people of the trulh is that God speaks by vinue of eternal and bcginningless

speech."H2

Such speech is a ma'na subsisting in the God's Self. This aspectof

speech isneither lelters nor sounds. and the etemal speech connects (yata'allaqu) withail the abjects of speech though its unity. It is arder with the ordered abjects.prohibition with objects prohibiled. news with objecls bcing lold. The speech

can bc joined ta ail renewed objects. without any renovation in Itself.83



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Knowledge. power. and will share Ihe smne jllnclion in a\·Jllwayni's

IInderstanding. That is. God's knowledge has Iwo aspects. as a 1lI11,"1II in its elerna\

IInily and in its nexus with generaled objecls; the same holds lrue for Ihe will lIIu\

power.s4

The chapter of discourse on the meaning of ~ ' 8 _ l J . a . J R e 8 :hab al gawl fi maCinf asma""' Anib tacaIii:

The tapie of the meaning of God's names is considercd as Ihe fllndamenta\one

in the conflict bctween the Mu'lazilites and the Ash'arites. Ils importance cumes l'rom

the philosophical background of each group in conceptualizating ils view on the lInity

of Uod. Accordingly. this tapie refiects the justificatory and demonslralional aspecls

of each schoo\'s defence of this attitude ta the unily ofGad and His allriblltes.

Consistent with their belief that the attribules of Gad arc identica\ with His

essence and that at the same time. Gad is absolutely pure and nol compound. Ihe

Mu'tazilites were faced with a pcrp\exing alternative. that is. they had either tu

admit that our language about the attributes of Gad i n d i c ~ . l e s Gad Himself. which

means that Gad is approachable by our understanding. or la consider Ihat our talk

of Gad is merely human language and nothing more.

The Mu'tazilites. who held that language is human convenlion ( i . ~ l i I ' I / l W.I

muwiiçla' ah). and does not include any myslical dimension. were "virtuaHy furccd

la treat the attributes formally as linguistic phenomena."s5 Abu 'Ali al·Jubba'i

explains this stand by saying "the act of attributing is the allribute (lI/·wa$f huwa al·

$ifah) and that the naming is the name. i.e.....when one wouId say. 'The Eternal is an

attribute'. he wouId say. 'That is wrong. for the Eternal is the thing describcd (al·

m a w ~ ü f ) . while the attribute ( ~ i f a h ) is our saying "Gad" and our saying "the

Etemal"."86

Meanwhile though the Mu'tazilites identified the attribute and the act of



•

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76

amibuting ( u l - w u ~ { wu a l - ~ i { u h J , the Ash'arites, who proceeded from a different

standpoint and wh" he Id that the language is traditional and auditory (Iuwqi{ wa

. ~ U I I I I I ' J, and held that the allributes are lIIa'lini reside in the essence of God,

disCllnnected the allribute and the act of allributing. AI-Biiqilliini explains the

Ash'arites' allitude:

The allribute 1l1-$ifuh is the thing which exists in the object described (al-

I I I U W \ ~ Ü { . J .. and grants it the attributing (Il1.WU$f) that issues from the attribute ...The attributing is the saying of the attributor to God or to sorneone else thatHe is knowing, living. powerful... Such attributing, which is heard speech orstatcmcnt about it. is other than the attribute which subsiMS in the essence ofGod, that by virtue of which He is knowing, powerful and willing. Aiso oursaying 'Zayd is living, knowing and powerful' is an attributing ( w ~ f ) of Zayd

and news about his being in the way that attributes entail him: such sayingcan be trUe or false, but the knowledge and power of Zayd ltl'C twc attributesexisting in Zayd's essence since the act of uttributing issues from them.s7

Clearly, the Ash'arites distinguished between the attrib.Jte which lies beyond

our language and h a . ~ a kind of objective existence beside the being described itself.

and the act of attributing which is the effort of attributor. and expressed through

speech. Such speech can be wrong or right, while the described object with its

objective allributes remains the same apart from our linguistic attempts to

approximate il.

AI-Juwayni basicaJly maintained the same Ash'arite distinr.tion between the

allribute and the act of allributing. since "the attributing is the saying of an

allributor, ( a J - w l I . , ~ f huwu quwl aJ-wii$if J. and the attribute is the object indicated by

the attributing."ss AI·Juwayni harshly criticized the Mu'tazilites' identification of the

allribute with the act of attributing and their belief that bath the nurne and the attributeare the sayings of attributors. for Ihis would leads us to say that God has no nurnes

and attributes from the Etemity because "there is no saying from the Etemity. and

he who pretends that God in His Etemity has no attribute of Godness. he departs

from religion."s9



•

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77

ln spite of his criticism, al·Juwayni sharcs wilh the Mu'luzililes lheir helief lhul

language is a human convention (muwiiç/a'ah ).90 Il is neilher holy nor mysliclll. Ile

thus renects Il philosophical trelltment to the issue of the unily of God und lIis

lItlributes, smce if l:.e atlribute is l i lhing indicllled by our lunguuge, slIch utlribllle is

/;liil and is not, as mentioned earlier, an objeclive entity which cunnol he suid lu he

eilher existent or nonexistenl.

The traditional attributes (al-sifft al-samciyah or li-khabarïysJJ):

Once aguin, on this issue, a1-Juwayni m a l ( l ~ s a significant departure l'rom his

school. The issue of 1I1-$ifiït aJ-khllbarïYllh was a very controversiul point Ihut ul·

Ash'ari strongly maintained against the Mu'tazilites, who did not uccept thcse

atlributes as they arc, and interpreted them otherwise. AI·Ash'ari maintains that u/-$ililt

khllbarïyah must he taken as they arc mentioned in the Qur'lin, withoUI inlerpretatiun

and (without asking how) (bilii kayf).9\ AI-Juwayni took the side of lhe Mu'tazilites

though he did not reject his master's attitude without reviewing il. AI-Juwayni c1early

reveals his stand by saying: "some of our masters helieved that hands, eyes and face

arc Iixed llttributes and they affirm it by way of tradilion rather than by reason, bul

the truth for us is that the hands means power, eyes sight and the face existcnce...·J2

AI-Juwayni refused to accept these completely anthrcpomorphic atlributes in

order to avoid any possibility of likening God to His creatures. In so doing he

rejected his school's stand a'ld took the position of their opponenls t o w a r d ~ finding a

more intellectual view apart l'rom representational pictures.



•

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78

1. Michel Allard, I.e P " , b / ~ m e des Attribut.. Divin.. dan la Doctrine d'al·Ash'aTI(Ileyrnulh: Imprimerie Calhulique, 1965), pp. 384·85.

2. Ihid, p. 3ri5.

3. al-Juwayn), al·lrshiid iliI qawiili' al·adillnh fi u ~ ü l al·j'tiqiId, ed. by: M. Y.Musii and A. A.'Abdal·l;Iamld (Cairn: Ma,ba'alal·Khunjl, 1950), p. 52.

4. Ihid. p. 52.

5. Ibid, \-. 61.

6. al·Shahra.-tlinl. 'Abd al·Karlm. al·Milal wa'i ni/lal. vol.l. ed. by: M.S. al·Kiliin). (Beirul: Diir al·Ma'rifah, n.d). p. 95.

7. Ibid, p. 82.

8. Ibid, p. 82.

9. Sayf al·Dln al·Âmidl. GhiIyat al·mnriim fi 'ilm al·kaliim, ed: H. 'Abd al·La'if (Cairn: al·Majlis al·NUi. 1971). p.30.

10. al·Juwaynl. nJ-Shiimil fi u ~ ü l al·din. ed. by: •. al·Nashshiir, F.B. 'Awn and S.Mukhliir.(Cairn: Munsha'al al·Ma'iirif. 1969). p. 294. 316. 320.

II . al-Âmidl. GhiIyal. p. 28.

12. "I·Juwayni. nJ·Shiimil, pp. 315·16.

13. al·Juwaynl. al·lrshiid. p. 80.

14. a\·Âmidi, GhiIyal. p. 27.

15. al·Juwaynl. nJ·Shiimil, p. 629. 650, and a\·Âmidi. GhiIyal. p. 29.

16. al·Juwayni. nJ·Shiimil. p. 30.

17. Ibid. pp. 30-60.

18 . al·Ash'nrl. MaqiI/iIl al·is/amiyin wa ikhlilaf al·mu$allin. ed. by: H. Ritter. (Istanbul.Weisb.len. 1929·jj). p. 518.

19 . Ibid. p. 518.

20. Ibid. p. 519.

21. The Korin lnleeptelcd. lrans and inlro by A.L. Arberry (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. 1991). XXII. 1. p.333.

22. a\.Juwaynl. nJ-Shiimil. p. 124.

23. R. Frank. Aruibule, AluibulÎon and Being: Th= lslamie views. In The Philosophies of

Existence. cd. by: l'.Norewcdge (New York: Fordham University Press. 1982) p.271.

24. a\.Juwayni. nJ-Shiimil. p. 124.

25. R. Frank. Allribelte. p. 269.



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79

26. nl.luwnynl. n/·frshiJd. p. 31.

27. Ibid. p. 31.

28. nl·luwayni. n/·frshiid. p. 32.

29. Ibid. p. 32.

30. Ibid. p. 32.

31. Ibid. p. 34.

32. Ibid. p. 34.

nl·Shnhrnslani. NihiIynr 1/·;qdiIm fi ti/m n/·kn/iIm. ed. by: A. Guillaume (lIl1ghdad: MlIklllhlllnl·Mulhthl na. n.dl. p. 132.

34. nl·luwnynl. n/·Shiimi/.I'. 318.

35. Ibid. p. 320.

36. Ibid. p. 301\.

37. Ibid. p. 308.

38. Ibid. p. 292. nnd nf·IrshiId. p. 34.

39. nf·IrshiId.p.34.

40. Ibid. pp. 38-9.

41. nf-IrshiId. p. 35.

42. The universol in nJ-Juwnynl's view ennnoi he e1nbornted excepl in lerm.' of the pmp".iti"n.

the universnl is not on entity exisûng nport from heing predicated upon l ~ i n g ; in other WON'. III dealwith lhe common lerms. nccording 10 nl-Juwnyni. we hnve III .1. . . . fi::;l. Irom the lhing il.elf and.second. to regard the predicnles thnt lhis thing gnins in the conleXI of nttribulion and. lhird. we have 10

seek the cnuse thnt is tI,e common term which cnused such predicalion 10 this thing nnd olher lhings.

43. nf-IrshiId. pp. 36-7.

44. nf-Shilmi/. ilp. 297-98.

45. nf-Irshlid.... 1'.83.

46. Josef Von Ess. "The LogicnJ Slruclure of Islamic Theology". in L08Ï<' in CI.. , i c n lIsfamie Cufrure. ed. by G.E. von Grunebnum. (Los Angcles: Univcrsity ofCalifomia. 1967).1'.39.

47. Ibid. 1'.39.48. nf·JrshIid, pp. 39-51.

49. Ibid. p. 39.

50. Ibid. 1'.39.

5J. Ibid. p. 40.



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80

S2. Ibid, p. 40.

H Ibid, pp. 44-S.

Ibid, pp. 32-43.

SS Ibid, "p. 42·3.

S6. al·Sh5mi/, p. 630.

S7. Ibid, p. 633.

SR. al-Irshiid, p. 61.

S9. NiMyat ,p . 170.

60. al·Shiimi/, p. 31 R.

61. Maqii/iit, p. 494·9S. a/·Farq, p. 211-12, and a/·Mi/al, 1,86.

62. The Mu'tazililes, mislakenly, arc accused or being mu 'alli/ah, people who suspendauributing posilive auributes to God, on the con lrar/, Ihe Mu'tazilites posilively affirm such

proposilions (alJkiim a l · ~ i f j j t ) as: Gad is Powerfu', Knowing,etc, bUI they negate the view that thea!tribules as ma'iini necessilate these propositions. Mu'alli/ah in ract must correctly bc those who

rcject even the posilive propositions (Gad is Knowing,elc), such as Jahm b. ~ a r w i i n .

63. al·Riizi, M u / J ~ ~ a l afkiir al.mulaqaddimin wa'i muta'akhkhirin. cd. by: T.R. Sard. (Cairo:Maktabat a)·Kulllyat, 1323.h) p. 168.

64. al-Shahrastiint, NiMyat, p. 244.

6S. al·lrsMd, p. 63, and NiMyat, p. 238.

66. al-Ash'arI, K. a/·/uma' fi '1 rndd 'a/iiahl a/-zaygh wa/·bida'. In Theo/ogy ofa/-Ash'lUi. cd and

lmns by: R. McCanhy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 19S2) p. 18.

67. a/-lrshiid, p. 64.

68. l;Iusiim al-AIOsi, l;Iiwiir bayn al-fa/asifah wal mutakallimin (Beirut, al-Mu'assasah al·'Arubiyah, 1980), p. 140.

69. al·lrshiid, p. 83, and a/·Shiirni/, p. 642.

70. a/·Sh5mil, p. 646.

71. al·1rshiid. pp.S4-S.

72. Nihiiyat ,p . 193.

73. a/·lrshiid. p. 88.

74. Ibid, p. 89.

7S. Ibid. p. 84.

76. NiMyat, pp. 183-84.



•

77. nl·lrshiJd, p. 85

78. Ibid, p. 89

79. Ibid. p. 85..

80. NiMynt. p. 190.

81.1rshiid, pp. 83·4.

82. Ibid. p. 98.

83. Ibid. p. 127.

84. Ibid, pp. 99-137.

85. R. Frnnk. Beings nnd Their Attribute.•. (Albany: Siale Univ."ily of New Yurk. 1978) p.19.

86. Ibid. pp. 18-19.

87. nl-Bliqilllini, K. al-Iamh/d, pp. 213-14.

88.1rshiid. p. 141.

89. Ibid. p. 141.92. nl·lrshiid. p. 155.

JO. af-5hiimi/. p. 632.

91. AJ, Wcnsinck. The Muslim Crced (London: Cambridge Universily Press, 191>5). p.86.

92. af·Jrshiid. p. 155.

KI



•

•

Conclusion



•

•

Concerning the unity of God. al-Juwayni presents his conlribution us a

solulion 10 some issues which were points of connict among the lIIU1akallimulI . The

transcendental unily of God was the subjecl of heated discussion among Iheologians.

Il had been understood and inlerprcted from differenl points of view. The Mu'tilZilites

and the Ash'arites relied. dispite their differences. on the same prime grounds in the

ka/iim. Both disagreed with the exaggeration and the extremist positions taken by

some mutaka//imün in terms of cither elevating God above any possible positive

description (for example. Jahm b. $afwün) or depicting God Wilh very human

features (for example. Hishiim b. al-l;Iakam). The Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites were

troubled in creating a convenient formula for the nolion of the transcendent unity of

God in terms of its relation to the attributes. The Mu'tazilites. according 10 their bclief

that God is ttle only true being. werc disinclined to actualize this formula in a way Ihat

did not safeguard the unity of God apart from any kind of entities that might

accompao:y Him. whatever these entities might be. They thus differed from the

Ash'arites who weI':" seeking for a true explanation of the positive descriptiuns that

ought to be applied to God. This is because positive predicates. such knowing.

willing. being powerful etc., should be recognized as separ.lte qualifications thal arc

derived from their real infinitives. according to the logic of the Arabic language.

Even though the Mu'tazilites succeeded in formulating the true unity of God.

they were troubled when it came to explaining the logical aspect of the positive

attributes. and most of them. as we have seen, explained such positive allributes in

terms of the dialectical way, that is. they employed these predicates in on..cr either

to prove (ithbiit) the essence of God or to negate the opposite of Him. God. for

instance, is predicated as being powerful just to negate any kind of powerlessness (al

'ajz) in Him. In their beHef in the ma'iIni the Ash'arites aimed to achieve two p o i n L ~ ,

the flfSt was. to purify the essence of God from any kind of admixture. That is to say,



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84

in sellling on the ma'iini as bcing different from the essence, the Ash'arite s thought

that they had found the proper formula against the Mu'tazilites, who identified the

allributes with God's essence and thereforc mixed the essence with its attributes and the

allributes with each other, The second point is logical, namely, that the positive

predicates according to the Ash'arites arc derived from thesc ma'iïni as bcing ma.,çadir

appcrtaining in this way the philologists (ahl al-lughah),

The thcory of states invented by Abu Hashim came into view in order to treat

the problem of the positive allributes as predicates in propositions about God in

Mu'tazilite thoughl. With Abu Hashim the formula for these positive allributes had

changed. God is not qualilied as knowing, powerful etc. in virtue of Himself (b i

nll(sihi or bi dhiilihi), but He is qualified according the way that He is (Ji mii/lUwa 'alihi

fi nll(sihi).1 Abu Hashim admitted. then, prcdicates additionalto the essence: one who

knows tbe essence does not necessarily know the allributes of that essence. The

essence for Abu Hlishim possesses its state aç an attribute stands behind its existence as

an essence1

The theory of states in fact remedied the problem of the positive attributes in

Mu'tazilite thought that was a subject of criticism from other schools such as th:

Ash'arites and the Maturidies. But the problem of derivation of u.ese attributes still

remained without a prc!lCr answer. Otherwise. the Ash'arites who believed in the

mll'iïni as ma:;adir subsisting in God's essence still suffered from their opponents'

criticism that they associated other etemal entities with God .

AI-Juwaynï in his effort to overcome these obstacles emphasized two points.

The first one is about the ma'iïni. He strongly stresses that these ma'iïni arc intellectual

('lIqliyah) and stand aç causes for the derived prcdicates of Gad. These ma'iini arc not

entities exi,! Ilg in the extemal world, nor arc they metaphysical causes Iike the

intelligences of the philosophers. nor does Gad lack them as attributes. They arc only

mc:ntal existents without which we cannot justify logically the propositions about Gad.



•

•

The second poinl is to be found in al-Juwayni's adoplion of the theory of stutes

in order to emphasize once again thal thc prcdicales of God are uspccts of Him known

separately from the essence but thatthey do nol el(ist 'lpUrt from il.

The importance of al-Juwuyni's theory of Ihe unit y of God COllles, on Ihe one

hand. from being shaped und formulated on the b'isis of how the Ash'urite school

invested Ihe whole kalüm's heritage and ail the mulak'lllimun 's contributions in the issue

of the unily of God. On the olher hand. al-Juwayni's theory represented i l trunsitionul

slage belween Iwo pcriods in Islamie Iheological discourse. We can say thui. tirstly, with

al-Juwayni Ihe kaliim's discourse succeeded in reforming itself and tinding rcmedies to

Ihe problems encountered by Ihis discourse. secondly. and in terms of this development

the kaliim's diseourse was faced with other questions cmcrg:ng from thc nature of the

atomic view that bound this discourse.

For the first major problem. the nature of the relation betwcen the cssence and its

attributes. al-Juwayni surpassed both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites in dealing with

it. He felt that remaining in the traditional discussion about whether the allributes arc

identical with the essence or not would not lead to any propcr exit. As a consequence,

he shifted the vocabularies and c o n c e p t ~ that were means of treatment for hoth

schooIs and replaced the notion of 'identification' with the notion of inherence (.1/-

ta/üzum). The attributes of God. according to him, el(isting as permanent and

inseparable aspects. Ol'e innate and ingrained; they are absolutely indispensahle.

pertaining to the essence of God, God being as such by his very nature in the highest

sense.

These attributes are of two kinds. renecting two kinds of trulhs as weil. The !irst

kind. though it is expressed by many words, points to one truth that is the essence of

God. Our saying Etemal does not indicate a truth different from that indicated by

saying Subsisting by virtue of Himself. The same is true of saying that God is

Everlasting (biiqin). as He is beginningless.



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116

Naturally, inasmnch as these attribules indicale one truth, und us particularil.cll

to one essence. they ure essentially inhercnt with thut essence. their occurrcncc

connected substantially with the essence. They ure not, if the essence is nut, lhey are

inherent in the essence as long as the essence exists. In other words they arc nol causcd

by any kind of causes.

The second kind of attributes, expresses many different truths. Knowledge is

not the same as will and power; speech is differcnt from life. These uttributes indiculc.

therefore. different truths and because of this these aUributes cannot essentiully

embody the very nature of God's essence. The essence must be one truth. pure,

uncompound, without corruption. as it is EtemaI.

Beside these two kinds of attributes, aI-Juwayni, as we have seen, ultimately

insisted upon the absolu te identification between the essence and existence of God.

Existence is not an attribute of God. but God is the same existence. God

existence itself could then be described as the Prime, the Etemal. unlimited by any

kind of places. subsisting in Himself. This Prime existence is not undetermined maUer;

it is, rather, pure existence. It is One in the sense of being completely simple.

Furthermore, aI-Juwayni apparently maintains that Gad as existence pnrticipates wilh

ail existents in the generated world in the attribute of existence.

A1-Juwayni argues against those who believe that such participation (eads to

admission that Gad is a subject of generation too. There are two kinds of existence:

One. Etemal, Uncompounded. Unlimited. the Origin and Creator of the other; the

second. limited. composite from atoms and accidents. occasioned in time and thus

generated. The relation between these two kinds of existence. determined through the

attributes ofmacw. or more specifically. the world as being created, is a result of

particularization of the attribute ofwill. The will of Gad is Etemal in one aspect and is

connected. in terms of the notion of specification (al.talch$IJ), with the generated world

at a definite moment chosen by Gad. in the other aspect. Speech. as weil. is etemal



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87

allribule in one aspect and determined in terms of leUers and words to he revealed to the

human heing in the other aspect.

As a rcsult al-Juwayni in his trcatment the problems of the ka/iim advances a

specifie understanding based on the same epistemological grounds as the ka/iim. He

derived his views an ultimate Iimits from what the Ash'arite ka/iim discourse couId

afford. In short, God is the existence itself, this existence has its essential attributes, it

is Eternal, Unlimiled, and Existent by virtue of itself, from which, and through the

pnrticulnrization of the attribute of ma'nii, which is the attribute of will, the generated

world emerged. The attributes of maCjjni are mental (CaqJiyah), causing the positive

prcdicates which are additional aspects to God's essence, through which God can he

involved in the various relations of similarities and differences with the rest of

existents.

This understanding, produced by a1-Juwayni in order to remove the obstacles in

the Ash'nrite ka/am, is contradicted by the epistemological ground in the ka/iim that

a1-Juwayni proceeded from. More precisely, the basic issues in the early ka/iim, such

as the notion that regards the whole universe as the sum of things, including God

Himself, and the methodological law that infers the invisible (a/-ghii'ib) from the visible

(a/-shifhid), would stand in contradiction to a new understanding that regards God as

the existence itself and the world as a result of the particulnrization of the attribute of

Will. The will is an aspect ofGod's essence. This contradiction hecomes valid in the

history of discourse when it reaches to a bigh degree its goals and therefore faces the

possibility of constructing a new strategy. The case with a1-Juwaynï is the same. That

is, the philosophy of atomism or the philosophy of the universe as the sum of things

can no longer be a valid ground after the division of the universe into two kinds of

existence: the absolute unlimited existence etemaIly prior to ail other beings, and

the generated one, limited and compound. Ai-Juwaynï bimself in bis Iater writings

avoided mentioning the atoms and their accidents as the constituents of the worId;



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88

rather. he inclined to talk about the notion of world.)

This contradiction or crisis of Ash'urile discourse embodied in al·Juwuyni's

thinking interprets purtly utleast the confused effort mude by his studcnl ul·GhllzÜli 10

establish a coherent system. and interprets the destiny of the kali/III discourse in ilS

demanding uJliance with philosophy. us reprcsented by ul-Rüzï und ul-Ijï.



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89

1. 'Abd al·Jabh6r. Shurll a / · u ~ a I a/·k,humsuh. cd. by 'Abd al·Karim 'Ulhm5n. (Cairo: MaktabalWahbA. 1965I.P. 182.

2. 'Abd al·Karlm al·ShahrasI5nl. K. a/·milal wal·nibal. vol. \, cd. by Mubammnd Sayd al·Kiliinl.<Rcirut: D5r al·Ma'rifuh. n.dl. p.82.

3. R.M. Frank. Dodies and Aloms: The Ash'urile Analysis.ln Islamie Philosophy and Theo/ogy.cd. M. Mannura. (Albany: Slale University of New York. Press. 1984). p. 40·2. And sec F. MubmDd.u1·Juwaynl: Imllm al·l;lurumaln. (Cairo: al·Hay'uh a l · M ~ r i y a h . 1970). p. 196-202 .



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90

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by M.Y. Miisa, and A.A. 'Abd al-l;Iamid. Cairo: Maktabat al·Khanji, 1950.

___.al-KiIflyllh Ii'J-jlldll/. Edited by F.M.MaI}miid.Cairo: Maktabat al·l;Ialabi,

1979.

__ Luma' al-adillllh. Edited by F.M.Mabmiid. C a i r o : a ) · M u ' a . ~ s a s a h a l · M i ~ r i y a h ,

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___.al·ShamiJ f i u$iiJ al-din. Edited by A.S.al·Nashshiir,F.B.'Awn, and S.Muk)ltiir.

Alexandria: Munsha'at a)·Ma'iirif,1969.

Sources in Arable

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Cairo: MaktabatWahbah, 1965.

__ al-Majmii' f i al-muQir bj'J-takJif. Edited by J.J. Houben. 2 vols. Beirut:

Imprimerie Catholique, 1965.

___• al·Mughni fi abwiib al·tJl"NQid wa'J-'adJ:. vol. 1: al-tawtJid. Edited by A.a)

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Cairo: al·Majlis al· <ala, 1971.



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a l - A n ~ ü r i , Abü al-Qüsim. ul-Ghunyah fi u$ül ul-din,MSIlI Ahmet no. 1916.

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Documents

The Theory of the Unity of God in Al Juwayni Al Irshad Al Juwayni Al Shafi