CHAPTER II

A. Introduction

Plato’s Philosophical opera, the dialogues are taken to

be one of the greatest in the history of philosophy, that

none can equal it, with some notable exceptions as

Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and several

others. But what makes him matchless is his style and

spirit. Almost everything of his works are in conversational

form in which neither this author himself appeared, nor

speak as himself, but with the use of characters, that

appeared in history, especially Socrates as the primary

interlocutor, at least in the early dialogues, for the

reason that Plato wants to make tribute to his master; at

the same time he was greatly influenced by the latter.

The Dialogues are said to have undergone developments

and revisions (as can be observed in the dialogues, Plato

might have changed some, or completely abandoned others).

They were usually divided into three groups according to

chronology as late, middle and early. The early or more

popularly Socratic dialogues speak rather of the historical

Socrates’ views than Plato’s. The former did not have any

published work. He is concerned with ethics: on how to live

life morally. While the latter Socrates (character) does not

appear as the chief interlocutor, nevertheless he’s still

involved, but this time he does not only focus on morals,

but with other subject matters as well, e.g. mathematics,

arts, poetry, politics, etc.

In addition to, Plato becomes more astonishing because

at the same time, he accredited his master, but also the

pluralism of his era; synthesizing into a unitary scheme the

elements laid down by his predecessors and contemporaries.

1

Thus this way, Plato becomes seemingly obscure,

although encyclopedic, incorporating different sciences,

crafts and arts, such as astronomy, medicine, painting,

poetry, politics, religion; epistemological and metaphysical

theories that overlap in praxis or in value.

These things make it difficult for readers to approach

him. Conversely, in order to be understood as he should be,

he himself might have provided ways by which he can

communicate to his reader his philosophy. What is the gist

of Plato?

The keystone to Plato is the Theory of Ideas.

Idealism is a philosophical outlook postulating the

actuality of spiritual entities as causes of reality (Forms

or Ideas in Plato’s phraseology). It is also one of the

mainstream philosophical traditions. Idealists claimed Plato

to be their great forerunner, that subsequently some would

call themselves Platonists.

There are a number of passages that denote the Forms.

More likely the theory was not deliberated explicitly in any

dialogue. Several passages are then patched together to form

a systematic whole of the Theory.

B. The Definitory Requirement, Language and Logical

Sciences

Typically it is traced back from Socrates’ Definitory

requirements. “[…] and the primary weight of his discussions

falls of the question “what is …?””1 Thus, when Socrates is

found chatting with other characters, he and his companions

would be inclined over the matter that they argue about.

Usually, a reciprocal term is implied when asking about

1R. M. Dancy, “Platonic Definitions and Forms”, A Companion to Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 72

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something, then giving the definition of the term. The

interrogation would consistently follow the steps: first,

the subject matter is introduced; then it is defined by

giving the necessary condition; third, another condition is

given if the prior one does not suffice, then the

interrogation will again proceed from the beginning. New set

of definitions will be given, tested, ad infinitum. There

are no final definitions because it is either Socrates’

companion would leave him, or they are unable to.

A similar case may be found in the Euthyphro, Socrates

comes across Euthyphro who is going to court to indict his

father or charge him of impiety. However, he seems to be out

of his mind as if he knew very well the nature of impiety,

thus Socrates wanted to make clear what is it and its

opposite.

And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?

[…] And what is piety, and what is impiety?2

[…] Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.3

Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your

2 Plato, Euthyphro, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 79

3 Ibid. 80

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mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run Edition: current; Page: [93] such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.

Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told Jowett1892: 16him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.4

Similar passages take place. However in the later

dialogues as the Forms gradually unfold, to define something

would mean: to give the Forms of the participants. For

example ‘pious things are pious because of Piety.’ Here

‘Piety’ would denote the Form. The Form ‘Piety’ would then

acquire a status distinct from ‘piety’. The former is the

universal, the latter designates the particular occasions.

It would be quite peculiar if there was really a thing

called ‘Piety’ that causes Euthyphro’s father to be pious.

The primary reason for being pious is that because one

participates in the Eternal Form of Piety, as in ‘beautiful

things are beautiful because they participate in Beauty’.

This is called participation. (methexis)

While, there is a need to define terms as such, Plato

uses the definitory requirement to disapprove all kinds of

4 Ibid. 94

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sophism, criticizing the poets and rhetoricians. According

to him, those latter mentioned cannot give valid accounts

(λογος) of what they believe to be true. They are involved

in paralogisms or linguistic inconsistencies, and logical

fallacies. The sophists likewise, merchants selling

knowledge as a commodity for a living are incompetent of

going further than the legerdemain of language professing

knowledge that are already embodied in language. Thus, they

are merely engrossed or preoccupied in a vain ostentation of

words. They appear to be knowledgeable.

That is why Plato, also a language theorist embarked on

a journey, adopting the Socratic requirement for

definitions. Indeed he proposed to categorize beings,

whereas Aristotle made it more systematic in the Categories.

Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.5

The naive version of the theory favors a position that

seems to postulate a Form for every existing being. So that

every dog, rock must have Forms for themselves.

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct

5 Plato, Sophist, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 386

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from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not? 6

Consequently, every being of the same kind would then be

clustered into one (supposing that they have a common nature

or essence (ουσια)). So that there is a succession of

species, together with their logical descriptions and

characteristics comprehended under a higher species or

genus. These things, like dogs, cats, mouse, animals or

abstract concepts like piety, beauty, justice are just few

of the things that are said to occupy the realm of Forms.

They are names that serve as stepping stones to that which

is above.

The essences are results of the dialectic that happens

both externally and internally through the rational faculty.

The former is being employed by Socrates and his

interlocutors, and the latter is what takes place inside

their thought. Thus, spoken language must necessarily be

parallel to the mechanisms of the mind. (Or brain)

[…] thought and speech are the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself. […] but the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech.7

For this reason,

“[…] Plato’s main philosophical method, dialectic, the systematic use of question and answer to eliminate falsehoods and arrive eventually at truths. Plato’s worldview thus places an altogether pivotal importance on the gift of spoken language: as the basis of dialectic, it is a privileged means to philosophy.”8

6 Plato, Parmenides, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 49

7 Plato, Sophist, 400

8 David Sedley, “Plato on Language”, A Companion to Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 214

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Thus, Plato establishes the languages and logical

sciences on a more stable foundation.

C. Mathematics and its relation to the Forms; The Theory

of Recollection

Aside from the Logical Sciences, Plato as well stresses

the significance of mathematics. As he puts it in the

Divided Line, mathematics obtains an in-between position

with the higher Forms and the physical world. There is also

an indispensable relationship between mathematics and

language and logic.

In Ancient Philosophy, mathematics is traced back to

the Pythagoreans for they supposed that everything is

number.

According to Aristotle,

[…] they devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things.[…] almost all other things are numerically expressible.9 They viewed it that way because all things can be

counted, and that everything can be collectively measured by

unity. Says, Wilbur Knorr (who is a Greek mathematics

historian): “mathematical studies” have already obtained

autonomy while “philosophy draws support and clarification

from mathematical work.”( Knorr 1982:112)10

Consequently Plato advocates that it should be included

in the curriculum of the Academy (also of the training of

guardians, but not just of guardians, in his Ideal society).

Why? Because it provides a step up to the higher Forms.

However, he does not advocate a downward mathematics. He is

9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, The complete works of Aristotle, ed. By Jonathan Barnes( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) 1559

10 Cf. Michael J. White, “Plato and Mathematics”, A Companion to Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006)229

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not after the object of mathematics, but with the method

employed in it.

Arithmetic and Geometry, for example analyzes abstract

things or concepts called numbers or geometrical figures.

Their value are only represented, approximated through

symbols; that when a number ‘4’ written on the blackboard is

erased, still ‘4’ does not cease to exist. Likewise, Forms

are abstracts that cannot be grasped by the senses, but by

the ‘eye of the soul’: the intellect. They are independent

of sensation. They do not exist factually. […] That

arithmetic has always a very great and elevating effect,

compelling the soul to reason about abstract number 11[…]

numbers which can only be realized in thought.12

Like in dialectic, the analysis happens internally or

inside the mind (this is properly taken by psychology as its

subject matter) but needed are objects for illustrations and

equations that can demonstrate a proof. Like a child who

just started learning how to count by using sticks, or his

fingers, he cannot do so without. But, as he is natured, the

brain aptitude goes higher and higher, and the mind can

already analyze without such things as aid. So that, a good

mathematics student is said to be well-trained through mind

exercises. Thus, a philosopher-king can be guided to what is

truth, what is truly real by studying mathematics,

contemplating the abstracts.

The Physical sciences, astronomy and physics- study of

the movement of celestial and physical bodies(laws of

nature), arithmetic- all that includes numbers cannot be

truly scientific in Plato’s mind, because they do not go

11 Plato, Republic, Book VII, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 227

12 Ibid. 228

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away with perceptible infinities(things that cannot be

easily counted), things that are passing. Their end, object

has always been physical bodies.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

[…]The starry heaven which we behold is wrought

upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.13

A passage in the Meno introduces a paradoxical position

indicating the object of knowing:

I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.14

The capability to define something, as Plato must have

thought, must also entail a background knowledge of the 13 Ibid. 232

14 Plato, Meno, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892)39-40

9

entity sought after. If not, there is no use for searching

what does not exist at all.

The passage is employed as a transition then to

introduce a theory of recollection, which at least follows a

mathematical method of analysis. A preceding statement is

hypothesized so that it can be validated. E.g. “whether

virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice”15 The Theory

of recollection teaches that the answers someone gives must

essentially be derived from an innate knowledge that might

have been encountered by the soul in its state of

preexistence. This is demonstrated by Socrates by calling in

Meno’s slave boy to be grilled with questions.

The slave boy is uneducated in the matter, so Meno and

Socrates presumed that he will be incapable of giving right

answers. However, it turned out that he gave the correct

ones, even though he stumbled upon it the first time.

Although at the end of the cross-examination, the slave boy

recognized his ignorance that he simply does not know the

answers to the proceeding questions. Socrates tries to show

that an advance of knowledge can only be gained when one

recognizes his own ignorance. When he asks for definitions,

he is rather not after nominal ones, but the Real.

The interrogation that happened is just like the common

situation in a mathematics class: ‘What is the arithmetic

mean of the grades of a student on six examinations: 89, 95,

83, 77, 94, and 82?’Suppose, a student answers 86.67, he

will then proceed to prove his answer by illustrating the

equation. Thus,’X= ∑X /N= 89+95+83+77+94+82/ 6 = 520/6=

86.67.’In this dialogue Socrates was just trying to prove

whether the thesis ‘virtue is teachable’ is correct.

15 Ibid. 27

10

The theory will appear several times, probably three

times, the others in the Phaedrus and Phaedo. Finally, in

the latter, it serves to introduce the Forms, respectively

they are the answers that are sought for. The soul in a

previous state of being beheld them that is why they can be

summoned when needed. Plato makes clear that they are not

the objects of the senses. Although they teamed up with

matter, they can only help in stimulating the mind.

Contemplation leads someone to knowledge of the Forms, those

that seemingly cannot be known because they are formless,

indefinite Forms.

D. On distinguishing what is Real from what seems.

The third point to be discussed is quite controversial,

since it is about sensation. Sensation is often identified

with a psycho-physical activity in which changes in the body

are communicated to the soul.”16 There are five senses and

each has its proper object: olfactory, auditory, gustatory,

touch and sight which is of greatest importance among them.

Why? Because it is through seeing, looking at the immense

wonder of the cosmos (κοςμος) that man “began to

philosophize” and so “to know.”17 In respect to this,

sensation, sense-perception, experience, sense- phenomena

and other words suggesting the same meaning became a

debatable issue most particularly in the Modern period or

pre-Kantian. Its status as knowledge is not readily

accepted by Plato.

It all started with Descartes who held an extreme view

about sensation. Of course he is best known for his methodic 16 Deborah K. W. Modrak, “Plato: A Theory of Perception or a Nod

to Sensation” A Companion to Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 143

17 Aristotle, “Metaphysics”, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, trans. by. W.D. Ross( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) 1554

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doubt. On the other side Plato does not seek to doubt the

senses only in view of their delusive character, but because

it hinders someone in the contemplation of truth. However

there is an inconsistency with this position, for in some

passages, they suggest that the senses help somehow.

He made a distinction between opinion and knowledge and

advocates that knowledge must be knowledge of being and not

of becoming. Opinion is characterized as between not-being

and being. Becoming is a state of uncertainty. Following the

line of argument, what is being offered by the senses fail

the requirements to be knowledge, because sense datum are

momentary, subject to alteration, thus imperfect or

uncertain, and relative to the perceiver.

Heraclitus thought “[…] All things are in motion and

nothing at rest; [..] And compares them to the stream of a

river, and says that you cannot go into the same water

twice.”18 For him, what changes is. But for Plato it is not

and it is at the same time. Implied from Heraclitus,

sensible phenomena is nothing but a succession or flow of

sense experiences, experiences that occur at a given moment

but cease to be as soon as another succeeds. Thus, if this

is the case then no sense datum would be correct. It would

be correct only in relation to the circumstance, although it

is actual. So it can then be implied: Protagoras’ thesis

that ‘man is the measure of all things’ for what he

perceives is necessarily true for him, but may not for

others. But, on the other hand the sense data may be true

objectively.

The fault is not on the senses but on the perceptual

judgment. It is a phenomenal activity, in which there is

18 Plato, Cratylus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 1, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 345

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subject-object involvement and are often switching places.

In other words, whereas physical objects act upon the body,

the body remains passive but can also be the contrary.

Therefore, the “‘object-as-perceived’ is a consequence of an

interaction between the perceiver and the external

object.”19 That is why anything experienced in the natural

or physical order may appear differently to two individuals

(perceivers). But, often bodily condition, or a biased

perceiver may also alter what he has seen. A good example is

given in the Theaetetus:

“Let us take you and me, or anything :—There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick...The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?...the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue...

But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?

The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?...

There is no other object of which I shall ever have  the same perception, for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.”20

19 Modrak 143

20 Plato, Theaetetus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 214-215

13

There are two reasons why sense data fail. First,

because there is an error in judgment, consequently the

realm of sensible phenomena itself is imperfect. This

suggests of the Forms being paradigms or models. This is

also a mode of participation, which is called ‘imitation’

(mimesis) Likewise, physical things participate, or partake

in the nature from their models, but not perfection. So that

a thing constantly undergo a process of becoming, although

it is the same substance (nominal), but its qualities

change. This can be seen in the Timaeus, wherein the

demiurge chose those models that constitute perfection,

immutability, etc.

First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect. 21

The paradigms are the Forms, criteria or standards for

judgment because the Forms are, and they are not time-space-

relational, granting that there is no test of the truth or

falsity of the sensations themselves. Memories, stored

sense-data of previous experience are summoned to be

21 Plato, Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 448

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compared. Then they are generalized. This is a process of

correction, and abstraction. What are abstracted are not the

sensible qualities, but those truths that are not simple

sensible.

E. Summary

To summarize, there is a line made by Plato symptomatic

of that there is an epistemological or metaphysical rankings

of reality. Starting from the least constituting of truth:

conjectures, or illusions, likenesses; physical things or

opinions about them; then goes on the lower Forms such as

the Paradigms, Criteria for judgment- equality, smallness,

greatness; fourth the Higher Forms or moral. Finally,

everything partakes of the Universal or Ultimate: Goodness.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal1 parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?Yes, I understand.Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everthing that grows or is made.Very good.Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?Most undoubtedly.Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.In what manner?Thus:—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be

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hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images2 as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?Yes, he said, I know.And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?That is true.And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value. 22

22 Plato, Republic, Book VI, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3, trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 211-212

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He makes a clear distinction between what is genuinely

real and what is seemingly real and uses an analogy: the

Forms are the works of the Divine Artificer, while, physical

things are made by humans, patterned after the divine Forms,

then there are likenesses of things made by a painter or

imitator in general. It would appear then from these

evidences that the world, the sensible is unreal because it

is a mere copy of the Original which is real. (The two-world

theory) This would imply that all is only an illusion. While

the Forms can be known through recollection, and it is made

possible because they reveal themselves as paradigms, in

which everything sensible are patterned.

He thought that knowing them, or being able to

contemplate upon experience, people can make use for it for

a good living. For if not they are merely like prisoners

living in an underground den. Living a life that is only an

illusion, they name things, but they have not seen the

things themselves, cannot grasp reality.

.

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