The Sticky Cycle: Bridewealth and Interracial

Relationships

Christine Horne

• Gender norms in Africa • (with Francis Nii-Amoo Dodoo and Naa Dodua Dodoo)

• Racial integration in the family • (with Justine Tinkler)

Bridewealth and Gender Norms

Bridewealth

• What is it?

• Who practices it?

Bridewealth, cont’d

• What are the consequences? • The rights to the woman’s reproductive and domestic labor transfer to the

man • The rights to the children transfer to the man’s lineage (in patrilineal

societies)

Hypothesis

Bridewealth Payment

Normative Constraints

Data

• Vignette experiment (patrilineal, rural Ghana) • Manipulations

• Bridewealth status (not paid, partially paid, completely paid) • Woman’s behavior (business domain, reproduction domain)

• Measure • Expectations of how community members will react

• Man’s family, woman’s family, men in community, women in community, participant • Response scale

• 1=very bad; 10=very good

Results

• Bridewealth payment increases normative constraints (expectations of disapproval) in the reproductive domain

Mean Normative Constraints on Women’s Reproductive Autonomy

No Bridewealth Mean (s.d.)

Partial Bridewealth Mean (s.d.)

Complete Bridewealth Mean (s.d.)

Man’s Family 2.50 (2.58) 1.91 (1.36) 1.48** (1.05)

Men 2.78 (2.32) 2.33 (1.91) 1.89* (1.10)

Woman’s Family 5.24 (3.74) 3.07*** (2.53) 2.74**** (2.10)

Women 3.93 (3.16) 3.17 (2.26) 2.52** (1.53)

Participant 4.39 (3.79) 2.20*** (2.32) 2.02**** (1.63)

Note: N = 46 per condition. Standard deviations in parentheses. Higher numbers indicate greater approval of the woman’s behavior. P-values were obtained using OLS regressions in which participant mean responses were the dependent variable, and bridewealth was included as dummy variables with no bridewealth as the omitted category. These results thus show effects of partial and complete bridewealth. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ****p < .0001 (two-tailed tests).

Mean Normative Constraints on Women’s Business Autonomy No Bridewealth

Mean (s.d.) Partial Bridewealth Mean (s.d.)

Complete Bridewealth Mean (s.d.)

Man’s Family 2.26 (2.16) 3.07 (2.77) 2.02 (1.73)

Men 2.80 (2.15) 2.61 (1.79) 2.63 (2.06)

Woman’s Family 6.15 (2.53) 4.28* (3.11) 3.98** (3.27)

Women 5.74 (3.17) 4.30* (2.97) 4.59 (3.08)

Participant 5.33 (3.62) 4.28 (3.46) 3.67* (3.23)

N = 46 per condition. * p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests) Higher numbers indicate greater approval of the woman’s behavior. P-values were obtained using OLS regressions in which participant mean responses were the dependent variable, and bridewealth was included as dummy variables with no bridewealth as the omitted category. These results thus show the effects of partial and complete bridewealth.

Results

Bridewealth Payment

Normative Constraints

What are the implications for efforts to empower women? • Possible institutional changes

• Abolish bridewealth? • Schooling?

Norms Research

• Factors affecting expectations of reactions • What Is (descriptive norms)

• People expect others to react more positively to typical behavior than to unusual behavior

What Is

Bridewealth Payment

Normative Constraints

Experiment 2: Descriptive Norms

• Vignette experiment • Manipulations

• Bridewealth status (no payment vs complete payment) • Descriptive norms

• Frequently use contraception to space children • Rarely use contraception to space children

• Measures • Expectations of reactions

Results

• Bridewealth has main effect on normative constraints • Descriptive norms have main effect on normative constraints

Effects of Bridewealth and Contraception Frequency Man’s

Family b (s.e.)

Men in Community b (s.e.)

Woman’s Family b (s.e.)

Women in Community b (s.e.)

Female Participant b (s.e.)

Intercept 4.67**** (.387)

3.83 **** (.342)

6.86 **** (.367)

6.56**** (.360)

6.43**** (.417)

Bridewealth Payment

-2.34**** (.447)

-1.46*** (.394)

-3.54 **** (.424)

-2.82 **** (.415)

-3.15**** (.481)

Contraception Frequency

.740+ (.447)

.860* (.394)

1.08 * (.424)

1.16 ** (.415)

1.35** (.481)

R-Square .13 .09 .28 .21 .20

N=200. + p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001; **** p<.0001 (two-tailed tests)

What Is

Bridewealth Normative Constraints Behavior

Racial Integration in Adoption

What Is: Segregation

Desegregation Laws

Assessment of Prospective Matches

Normative Constraints

Race Integration Experiment

• Adoption scenario (Amazon Mechanical Turk) • Manipulation

• Race of child and prospective adoptive parents (black vs white) • Descriptive norms

• Highly integrated community • Highly segregated community

• IV Measures • Expectations (favorable/unfavorable to transracial families)

• DV Measure • Evaluation of prospective parents as a good match

Race Integration Experiment

• Results • People rated transracial matches more negatively in the segregated than in

the integrated condition • This effect was mediated by normative constraints

Effect of Integration on Normative Constraints Coeff (s.e.)

Intercept 4.84**** (.184)

Monoracial (=1)

.223 (.212)

Integration (=1)

2.13**** (.213)

R-Square .20 N=401. **** p<.0001 (two-tailed tests)

Effect of Integration & Normative Constraints on Rating

Model 1 Model 2 Coeff (s.e.) Coeff (s.e.)

Intercept 6.62**** (.72) 5.17**** (.242) Monoracial (=1) 2.38**** (.244) 2.30**** (.227) Integration (=1) 1.54**** (.244) .890**** (.241) Monoracial x Integration

-1.67**** (.344) -1.65**** (.320)

Normative Constraints

---- .300**** (.0378)

R-Square .23 .34 N=401. ** p<.01; **** p<.0001 (two-tailed tests)

Racial Integration in Adoption

What Is: Segregation

Desegregation Laws

Assessment of Prospective Matches

Normative Constraints

Conclusion