The Split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939-1948

THE SPLIT IN STALIN’S SECRETARIAT, 1939–1948

HISTORY • RUSSIAN STUDIES

“Jonathan Harris renders in The Split in Stalin’s Secretariat, 1939–1948 a highly

detailed insight into the workings of the highest echelons of the Soviet regime under

Stalin. This book convincingly charts how personal rivalries among Stalin’s favorites

were reflected in the USSR’s political course during World War II and in the opening

moves of the Cold War.” —KEES BOTERBLOEM, University of South Florida

Jonathan Harris shows that the leaders of Stalin’s Secretariat clashed sharply over

the nature of the Communist Party’s “leadership” of the Soviet state in the period

between 1939 and 1948. The term “party leadership” is generally misunderstood;

it does not refer to the activities of the party as a whole but to the efforts of its

full-time officials (the “inner party”) to direct the activities of the members of the

party who manned the Soviet state (the “outer party”). This study argues that

Andrei Zhdanov and Georgii Malenkov, the two junior secretaries of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) who directed the two

major bureaucratic divisions of the Secretariat for most of the period under review,

supported diametrically opposed conceptions of the leadership to be provided by

the party’s officials. Zhdanov argued that they should give priority to the ideologi-

cal education of all members of the party and should allow the Communists who

manned the state considerable autonomy in their administration of the five-year

plans. In direct contrast, Malenkov, who directed the cadres’ directorate for most

of the period under review, had little sympathy for ideological education and

urged party officials to engage in close and detailed direction of the Communists

who directly administered the five-year plans.

Through a careful examination of the public discussion of this issue in the various

publications controlled by the major divisions of the Secretariat in conjunction

with recently published archival materials, it is possible to pinpoint the linkages

between the leadership conflict within the Secretariat, the shifts in the ongoing

public discussion, and Stalin’s role as the final arbiter in the dispute.

JONATHAN HARRIS is professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2605-9ISBN-10: 0-7391-2605-9

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Jonathan HARRIS

THE SPL IT IN STAL IN ’S SECRETARIAT , 1939–1948

HARRIS

SplitStalin'sSecretariatLITHO.in1 1SplitStalin'sSecretariatLITHO.in1 1 6/24/08 4:07:25 PM6/24/08 4:07:25 PM

The Split in Stalin’sSecretariat, 1939–1948

The Split in Stalin’sSecretariat, 1939–1948

Jonathan Harris

LEXINGTON BOOKS

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ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

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The split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939–1948 / Jonathan Harris.p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2605-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)ISBN-10: 0-7391-2605-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)1. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1936–1953. 2. Political leadership— Soviet Union—History. I. Title. DK268.4.H37 2008320.94709'043—dc22 2008022020

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v

Preface vii

1 The Split in the Secretariat 1

2 Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939 15

3 Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941 31

4 The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943 47

5 The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945 61

6 The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946 77

7 Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946 103

8 Confusion and Compromise at the Top, 1947 121

9 Zhdanov’s Last Months: January–July 1948 141

10 Conclusion 153

Bibliography 163

Index 177

About the Author 183

Contents

vii

This study attempts to identify the ideological and political differences be-tween the leading full time officials of the All-Union Communist Party (Bol-sheviks) (VKP(B) in the years between 1939 and 1948. It focuses on the con-flict between A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov, Stalin’s junior lieutenants in theSecretariat of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) over the definition ofparty officials’ priorities and responsibilities.

This study conceptualizes the relationship between “the party” and “thestate” in the political system differently from much Western scholarship onthe USSR. Many Western scholars, following the terminological usage of theleaders of the VKP(B), refer to these institutions as if they were separate bu-reaucratic agencies. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the members of theVKP(B) were simultaneously employees of the immense Soviet state andwere subject to the orders of the full time officials of the party subordinate tothe Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VKP(B). These officials, whowere responsible for the management of the party as a whole, usually did notsimultaneously hold positions in the state. (There were important exceptionsto be discussed below.) To underline this fundamental characteristic of the po-litical system, this study refers to the full time officials as the “inner party”and uses the term “outer party” to refer to those members of the party whoheld positions in the state. The leaders of the VKP(B) used the term “partyleadership” of the Soviet state to refer to the officials’ ongoing efforts to leadthe party’s rank and file.

This study also attempts to demonstrate that public sources provide ampleevidence of ongoing conflict over party officials’ role and responsibilities.Local party officials responded swiftly to the reports and speeches made byStalin and his lieutenants, to the numerous decrees issued in the name of the

Preface

Central Committee, and the perennial discussion of “party leadership” in pub-lications that appeared under its aegis.

This study builds on the existing Western, Soviet, and more recent post-Communist Russian scholarship on the period from 1939 until 1948, and I amdeeply indebted to the authors of the monographs listed in the bibliography.While they do not refer directly to the discussion of the conflict over officials’priorities, their analysis of the political context surrounding this issue hasproved to be invaluable. Most important, I would like to thank ProfessorWilliam Chase of the department of history at the University of Pittsburgh forhis extensive and intelligent review of an earlier and more primitive versionof this study.

viii Preface

1

This study attempts to demonstrate that the leading members of Stalin’s Sec-retariat, the executive organ of the Central Committee of the All Union Com-munist Party (Bolsheviks) (CC/VKP(B), clashed sharply and continuouslyover the nature of “party leadership” of the Soviet state between 1939 and1948. Western scholars have generally regarded the term “party leadership”as referring to the activities of the VKP(B) as a whole. Our analysis of Sovietleaders’ discourse reveals that they used this term to refer to the efforts of theparty’s full-time officials, who generally held no position in the state, to pro-vide leadership to the thousands of Communists who manned the state. Todramatize this distinction, this study refers to the former as the “inner party”and the latter as the “outer party.”1

This study argues that A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov, the two junior Secre-taries of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) during most of the period un-der review, supported diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of theleadership to be provided by the party’s full time officials. Zhdanov, who di-rected the agitprop directorate of the CC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secre-tariat during most of this period, insisted that they give highest priority totheir “party political work”—the selection, appointment, ideological educa-tion, and supervision (kontrol) of party members activity. (Party officials of-ten referred to this cluster of activities as “internal party work.”) Zhdanovconsistently stressed the overriding importance of party members’ ideologi-cal education and urged party officials to allow the Communists who mannedthe state considerable autonomy in their administration of the five-year plans.

In direct contrast, G. M. Malenkov, who headed the cadres directorate of theCC/VKP(B) for most of the period under review, urged party officials to givepriority to their “economic work”—the detailed direction of the Communists

Chapter One

The Split in the Secretariat

in the state who administered the five-year plans. Malenkov had little sympa-thy for the ideological education of party members and he gave far greater em-phasis to the inculcation of Soviet patriotism.

THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION: 1930–1941

This study seeks to demonstrate that evidence of this conflict can be found inthe public discourse of the party’s leaders and subordinate officials. Stalin andhis lieutenants publicly discussed the relative importance of these two spheresof party work in some detail during the 1930s and until the Nazi invasion ofthe USSR in June 1941. During the 1930s, Stalin adopted contradictory posi-tions on the subject; sometimes he implied that the Secretariat’s leaders andtheir subordinates should shift their emphasis from one sphere to the otherand sometimes he warned them that the two spheres were “inseparable” andneither could be neglected. During this period, Stalin explicitly linked his def-inition of officials’ priorities with his conception of the proper organization ofthe various departments and directorates subordinate to the Secretariat. In1930 his stress on the importance of officials’ “party political work” had ledto the formation of “functional” divisions of the CC/VKP(B) to deal with per-sonnel management, ideological education, and the supervision of party or-ganizations’ fulfillment of previous decrees. This structure had been designedto prevent party officials from becoming “preoccupied” with industrial andagricultural production and to permit the Sovnarkom and its subordinate com-missariats to administer the five-year plans without undue “interference”from party officials at the center and at the regional and city level.

However, in 1934 Stalin evidently became concerned with the pace of in-dustrial growth under the leadership of the Sovnarkom, concluded that partyofficials’ “economic work” had been neglected. He called for the dissolutionof the “functional” departments and the establishment of “production branchdepartments” in the central and local apparatus to allow party officials to givemore immediate attention to economic development. But soon after the as-sassination of Kirov in late l934, Stalin evidently became dissatisfied withthis system and launched a campaign to restore the primacy of ideological ed-ucation and personnel management that culminated in his report on behalf ofthe CC/VKP(B) to the 18th Congress in March 1939.

Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress established the organizational and ide-ological basis for the subsequent dispute over officials’ priorities. Stalin im-plied that the Sovnarkom and its subordinates should enjoy direct responsi-bility for the administration of the five-year plans and that the Secretariat andits subordinates should give greater stress to all aspects of their party politi-

2 Chapter One

cal work. Stalin dramatized the Sovnarkom’s industrial responsibilities with avigorous defense of the state’s role in economic development and he empha-sized the centrality of party political work by his massive attention to the ide-ological education of party members and “work with cadres.” Most impor-tant, he called for the establishment of two new “functional” directorates foragitprop and cadres to replace the “production branch” departments for in-dustry and transport.

Zhdanov was named the director of the directorate of agitprop at the 18thCongress and he presented his views in his report on the party’s rules at theCongress. In 1937 he had explicitly declared that party officials should giveprimacy to “party work” and he elaborated his views in his report to the 18thCongress. He regarded all elements of party political work as important, buthe clearly regarded the ideological education of party members as of para-mount importance. Following Stalin’s lead, Zhdanov insisted that all mem-bers of the party were obliged to “master Marxism-Leninism” in order to de-velop the proper perspective on both their own activities and external eventsand defined this study as the basis for all practical success. He also sought tolimit party officials’ capacity to “interfere” in the administration of industryby calling for the abolition of the industrial and transport departments estab-lished in 1934.

Zhdanov evidently believed that the Secretariat and its subordinate offi-cials could lead the members of the “outer party” who manned the state byconcentrating on their recruitment, assignment, ideological education, and su-pervision of their activities. If the party’s officials dealt with these matters ef-fectively, Zhdanov argued, party members would be assigned in accord withtheir own capacities and the system’s overall needs, would develop a properunderstanding of their own responsibilities and therefore implement the five-year plans without “petty tutelage” by the party’s officials. Party officialsthemselves would be free from the immediate details of administration to fo-cus on the development of what was defined as “political leadership.” This in-cluded the coordination and supervision of a wide range of economic andnon-economic activities.

Zhdanov clearly feared that party officials’ “preoccupation” with the im-mediate tasks of the five-year plans could blur the vital distinction betweenthemselves and the Communists who staffed the state and would underminetheir own capacity for leadership of a far wider range of activities. Zhdanovworried that party officials’ undue concentration on the search for supplies ofraw materials, labor, and an excessive focus on immediate administrativeproblems would make them neglect their own and others’ ideological educa-tion, ignore the recruitment of new members, and the assignment and super-vision of party members essential to the continued dynamism of the party.

The Split in the Secretariat 3

“Preoccupation with economic work” would make officials into “narrowminded practicalists” indistinguishable from the Communists in the statestructure. Focus on party political work would assure the proper division oflabor deemed essential to retain the sense of direction and purpose essentialto the party officials’ leadership of the VKP(B) as a whole.

Stalin named Malenkov director of the cadres directorate at the 18th Con-gress in 1939 but his report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in Febru-ary 1941 indicated that Stalin had made him responsible for the supervisionof industrial production. In his report Malenkov sought to extend party offi-cials’ responsibility for the implementation of the five-year plans; he explic-itly called for the appointment of specialized secretaries for industry andtransport who would “share” authority for industrial development with theappropriate state agencies.

In his report and in some of his rare subsequent public statementsMalenkov also implied that party members learned more from practical anddirect experience than from the formal study of Marxist-Leninist texts.Malenkov could hardly declare that ideological education was useless, butcircumstantial evidence suggests that he periodically attempted to shift agit-prop workers’ attention to “mass work” in support of production.

Malenkov clearly regarded party political work as an inadequate basisfor party officials’ leadership of the party members in the Soviet state, andhe insisted that officials could provide “real” leadership only through ac-tive participation in the solution of problems of production. Malenkov hadno qualms about blurring the lines of responsibility between party officialsand the Communists in state agencies and evidently believed that party of-ficials had to intervene on a regular basis to assure the fulfillment of thefive-year plan. What Zhdanov criticized as party officials’ “petty tutelage”and “substitution” for state officials, Malenkov regarded as “operative man-agement.”

THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE 1940s (1941–1948)

During the period from 1941 until 1948, Stalin and his junior Secretaries didnot refer to these issues in their rare public statements. However, the formu-lations and definitions presented in the leaders’ prewar reports were repeatedad infinitum and without change in the publications of the CC/VKP(B) andincorporated into the various decrees issued in its name. This study attemptsto demonstrate that this public discussion reflected the continued conflict be-tween Zhdanov and Malenkov and their allies and subordinates over the na-ture of “party leadership.”

4 Chapter One

The analysis of these materials presents some problems. On the one hand,many important party officials did express their views on this subject and thusidentified with one or the other junior Secretary. On the other hand, most ofthe materials published in the organs of the CC/VKP(B) remained anony-mous or were written by authors whose bureaucratic position was not identi-fied. In attempting to cope with this secrecy, this study attempts to identifythe alternative “tendencies of articulation” dealing with the definition of offi-cials’ priorities and the nature and content of ideological education that ap-peared in the decrees and publications of the CC/VKP(B).

Is it possible to identify these tendencies with the position of the two jun-ior Secretaries? Since Malenkov and Zhdanov rarely addressed these issuespublicly we sought to determine whether or not there was an association be-tween their relative standing in the leadership as shown in the press coverageof their public appearances, on the one hand, and the shifts in the “tendenciesof articulation” on the other.2 Public sources often, but not always providedevidence of this association, while archival materials published in the collec-tion Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) I sovet ministrov SSSR, 1945–1953 often pro-vided evidence of such linkage. For example, they reveal that Zhdanov’sperennial ill health often forced him to take extensive leaves of absence fromthe capital and that these absences from Moscow had an impact on the ongo-ing debate over officials’ role and the nature of ideological education. Whenhe was away from Moscow, public support for his views in the publicationsof the CC/VKP(B) was sharply reduced. The most dramatic example of thisoccurred near the end of his life. In the summer of 1948 Zhdanov became illonce again. On July 1, 1948, Stalin restored Malenkov to his position as aSecretary of the CC/VKP(B) (he had fired Malenkov from this position in thespring of 1946) and Zhdanov’s doctors recommended that he be given a two-month vacation on July 5, 1948. These events were not reported at the time,but the issue of Bol’shevik that was approved for publication on July 5, 1948,sharply criticized Zhdanov’s orientation in its lead editorial, and on July 10,1948, the Secretariat and its subordinate agencies were reformed in keepingwith the definitions presented by Malenkov in his report to the 18th Confer-ence of the VKP(B) in 1941. Archival materials also indicate that Stalin’s ex-tended absences from the capital in the fall of the first years after World WarII sometimes, but not always, had a dramatic impact on the ongoing debates.

During the 1940s, both of Stalin’s junior Secretaries were relatively young.Zhdanov had been born in 1896. In 1934 he was named to the Orgbureau andreplaced the murdered Kirov as first secretary of the Leningrad obkom andgorkom. In 1939 he was named a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) and memberof the Politburo of the CC/VKP(B). From early 1939 until September 1940he was the director of the agitprop directorate established in 1939 to provide


ideological education to the members of the party, to control the party’s me-dia, and to direct the cultural and intellectual life of the country. He lost di-rect control of the directorate in September 1940 to his deputy G. F. Alek-sandrov for reasons that remain obscure. After the Nazi attack on the USSRin June 1941 Zhdanov remained in Leningrad and did not seem to play a cen-tral role in the activities of agitprop, which fell under the supervision of A. S.Shcherbakov, who served as Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) from 1941 until hisdeath in 1945. Zhdanov gave up his leadership of the Leningrad party in 1945and gradually regained full responsibility for the agitprop directorate afterWorld War II. Stalin granted him full responsibility for agitprop only in thespring of 1946.

G. M. Malenkov had been born in 1902 and served as a member of theOrgbureau, a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B), and director of the cadres direc-torate from 1939 until the spring of 1946 when Stalin removed him from thelast two positions. He was named a full member of the Politburo in 1946 andregained his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) in the summer of1948. He had served as a member of the State Defense Committee from 1941until 1945 and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSRfrom 1946 until 1953. Malenkov was one of the few leaders of the USSRother than Stalin who sometimes simultaneously held the position as a Secre-tary of the CC/VKP(B) along with a post in the Council of Ministers.

During the 1940s, Stalin remained silent on officials’ responsibilities buthis public comments on other matters seemed to influence the ongoing pub-lic discussion of officials’ priorities and ideological education. In his wartimecomments on such holidays as Red Army Day (February) and the anniversaryof the Bolshevik revolution (November), Stalin adopted two distinct posi-tions. At times Stalin seemed to stress the importance of various elements ofSoviet patriotism and at other times he implied that Marxism-Leninism wasmore significant.

While it is obviously impossible to determine whether or not Stalin actu-ally sought to influence the dispute in these comments, the subsequent pub-lished reaction to them suggests that they were regarded as significant politi-cal cues by the subordinate party officials. In particular, Stalin’s periodicreferences to the “leading role” of the VKP(B) and its “inspirational” activi-ties was invariably followed by an increase in published support for Zh-danov’s definitions in the CC’s various publications and the incorporation ofthese formulations in the Central Committee’s decrees. Conversely, Stalin’speriodic endorsement of Soviet patriotism as a “driving force” of Soviet so-ciety was followed by increased public support for Malenkov’s formulationsand a reduction of support for Zhdanov’s views in the CC’s publications anddecrees.

6 Chapter One

After the war, Stalin spoke rarely in public but his statements continued tohave an impact on the published debate, whatever his intent. His address dur-ing the election campaign for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February1946 made no reference to officials’ priorities, but his reversion to a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the nature of “imperialism”(however qualified) may wellhave been interpreted by at least some officials as an endorsement of Zh-danov’s formulations. His subsequent interviews with foreign dignitaries andjournalists sometimes seemed to have had the opposite effect. In particular,his declaration that he was “not a propagandist but a man of practical affairs”in his interview with Harold Stassen in 1947 was followed by a sharp reduc-tion of published support for Zhdanov’s orientation.

The apparent impact of these statements on the public debate raises a dif-ficult question—were the shifts linked to the junior Secretaries’ orientationson foreign policy as well as or instead of their views of party officials’ prior-ities? The author initially hoped to explore this relationship, inspired at leastin part by Professor William McCagg’s intriguing conclusion that Stalin’s de-cisions on foreign policy during this period often reflected his efforts to reinin the aspirations of “party revivalists.”

But this effort was abandoned for a number of reasons. First of all, our re-examination of the materials cited by Professor McCagg as evidence of a“party revival” led us to the conclusion that they were actually reflections ofthe sharp debate over the ideological education of party members. Secondly,recent Russian scholarship dealing with the postwar period reveals that de-spite bouts of ill health and extensive absences from the capital, Stalin wasvery much in command of the USSR’s foreign and domestic policy. Thisscholarship also reveals that his lieutenants, who were responsible for direct-ing different divisions of the bureaucracy, were not independent actors butloyally followed Stalin’s lead. Finally, the junior Secretaries’ discussion offoreign policy was far too sporadic to provide a coherent view of their orien-tations. In the late 1930s Zhdanov had made a number of explicit commentson foreign affairs that may have influenced his position in the leadership. Buthis statements on foreign policy in the years 1946–1947 shifted ground con-siderably and simply seemed to follow Stalin’s lead. Initially conciliatory, in1946 he became increasingly hostile toward the USA and UK, culminating inhis well-known discussion of the emergence of two hostile camps in his re-port to the first meeting of the Communist Information Bureau in September1947. It is even more difficult to infer Malenkov’s views from his brief re-marks. He was more belligerent towards the USSR’s wartime allies than Zh-danov in his own election speech of February 1946, but his remarks to thefounding conference of the Communist Information Bureau in September1947 seemed to follow Zhdanov’s lead.


This study reconstructs the dispute over officials’ priorities and ideologicaleducation by analyzing the formulations that appeared in the binding decreesissued by the Politburo and in the name of the CC/VKP(B) and by a compar-ative analysis of the major publications of the CC/VKP(B). These includePartiinoe Stroitel’stvo, Partiinaia Zhizn’, Bol’shevik, Propagandist, Kultura IZhizn’, and Pravda.

The decrees issued in the name of the CC/VKP(B), which was rarely con-vened during this period, not only reflected the leadership’s priorities butwere binding orders for subordinate party officials. The decrees were identi-cal in format; the first section outlined the “shortcomings” in the activities oflocal party officials that had been identified by an investigation of local prac-tices. The second section explicitly outlined the measures deemed necessaryto eliminate these errors and identified those officials responsible for imple-menting them. The final section often included specific deadlines for imple-mentation and reporting to higher authorities.

Archival materials indicate that these decrees were drafted and redrafted inthe various departments of the CC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secretariat andthe Orgbureau. Produced at the highest level of the VKP(B), they invariablyreflected the balance of influence between the supporters and opponents of al-ternative positions at a particular time. Sometimes the decrees reflected thepreferences of a particular group of officials in the leadership while in otherinstances the decrees balanced the formulations supported by the rival fac-tions in a variety of ways.

These orders not only provided specific directions at a particular time, butserved as benchmarks for the subsequent discussion of officials’ priorities inthe publications of the Central Committee. The proponents of the prioritiesand definitions embodied in the decree invariably launched a campaign intheir defense in at least one of the major publications of the CC/VKP(B)while those who questioned or had doubts about these definitions expressedtheir resistance in a variety of ways in other publications of the CC/VKP(B).It is possible to reconstruct the various phases of the debate over officials’ pri-orities and the ideological education of Communists by comparative analysisof these articulations.

The various publications of the Central Committee seemed to play differ-ent roles in the debate over officials’ priorities in the period from 1939 until1948. Initially they seemed to serve as the “house organs” of the two majordirectorates of the Central Committee but subsequently became major arenasfor political conflict. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo was the house organ of the cadresdirectorate. It was edited by Malenkov until September 1940 (and possiblylater as well) and generally endorsed his position in the years between 1939and 1941. Although it ceased publication during the first six months after the

8 Chapter One

German attack on the USSR in June 1941, it resumed publication in early1942 and continued to endorse his position until he was dispatched to Stalin-grad in the second half of 1942. When Malenkov was in Stalingrad and aftera major reform of the apparatus in mid-1943, the journal gave increased butsometimes grudging support to party political work but it shifted back to en-dorse Malenkov’s views whenever Zhdanov seemed to suffer a loss of polit-ical status. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo ceased publication in mid-1946 shortly af-ter Malenkov temporarily lost his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B).

In November 1946 a new CC journal entitled Partiinaia Zhizn’ began pub-lication to replace Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Propagandist. While its edito-rial board initially remained secret, the lead editorial in its first issue impliedthat it was the house organ for the cadres directorate and possibly the new di-rectorate for verification of party organs. Its first issue supported much, butnot all, of Zhdanov’s orientation but the journal adopted a more ambiguousand contradictory stance in the winter of 1946–1947. In June of 1947 it si-multaneously revealed that its editorial board included a number of officialsidentified as allies of Malenkov and endorsed his orientation, but it soon be-came a battleground for the alternative definitions until the first meeting ofthe Cominform in the fall of 1947. Both Zhdanov and Malenkov attended theconference as representatives of the leadership of the VKP(B) and Malenkovsurprisingly endorsed much of Zhdanov’s position in his own report on theactivities of the CC/VKP(B). In the following months Partiinaia Zhizn’ en-dorsed Zhdanov’s position, wavered, and then ceased publication in April1948 without explanation.

Bol’shevik, officially defined as the theoretical and political journal of theVKP(B), initially served as the house organ for the agitprop directorate andchampioned Zhdanov’s orientation during most of the period between 1939and 1941. But once Stalin made an overt appeal to Soviet patriotism in theface of the German invasion in June 1941 Bol’shevik followed suit and gen-erally ignored the need for the Marxist-Leninist education of party membersuntil the last months of the war. While Bol’shevik’s conversion to Soviet pa-triotism temporarily deprived Zhdanov’s allies of a media outlet, in 1942 theywere evidently given control over Propagandist, the journal of the Moscowparty organization. It generally endorsed Zhdanov’s position and clashedsharply with Bol’shevik over ideological education until its unexplained de-mise in mid-1946.

Immediately after Propagandist ceased publication, the agitprop direc-torate began to publish Kultura I Zhizn’ as its official journal. It generally en-dorsed Zhdanov’s position during most of the period under review, but some-times was far less supportive of his priorities when his authority in theleadership seemed to weaken.With the emergence of Kultura I Zhizn’as the


house organ of the agitprop directorate, Bol’shevik’s role became unclear. Itoften seemed to avoid the debate over officials’ priorities, but with the demiseof Partiinaia Zhizn’ in the spring of 1948 it seemed to assume a more au-thoritative position in the last months before Zhdanov’s incapacitation.

In contrast to the journals discussed above, Pravda was always an arena forthe ongoing conflict over officials’ priorities. Its lead editorials and signedfeatures on the affairs of the party shifted dramatically and frequently in theperiod under review. In addition, Pravda consistently published the pictorialand other evidence of the frequent changes in the political status of Zhdanovand Malenkov in Stalin’s ruling group.

The comparative analysis of these materials is made possible by the ex-traordinary rigidity and repetitiousness of the public discussion of party offi-cials’ priorities and ideological education. The decrees and publications of theCentral Committee repeatedly used a limited number of formulations drawnfrom Stalin’s reports to the Congresses of the VKP(B) in the 1930s, from thereports by Malenkov and Zhdanov to the 18th Conference and 18th Congress,and from the decrees and resolutions adopted at these two meetings and onspecific issues such as the proper use of the Kratkii kurs istorii Vsesoiuznoikommunisticheskoi partii (Bol’shevikov), henceforth cited as the Kratkii kurs.

This short history of the VKP(B) published in the fall of 1938, was essentiallythe “bible” for the program of ideological education of party members through-out the period under review. It incorporated a Stalinist version of party historyup until 1937 and his own summary of the basics of dialectical materialism. Theproponents of ideological education insisted that the study of this text would pro-vide a guide to action for all Communists whatever their sphere of activity. Thisclaim was obviously spurious but it could not be overtly challenged.

The incorporation, modification, or exclusion of these formulations in thepublic discussion expressed the degree of support or opposition to the alter-native definition of priorities. Unqualified and prolonged support for one orthe other contending “tendencies of articulation” in the publications of theCC/VKP(B) was rare. When it did occur, the formulations identified with oneof the rival orientations were incorporated into the decrees of theCC/VKP(B), in more than one of the publications of the CC, by the simulta-neous disappearance of the formulations identified with the rival tendencyfrom the same sources, and sometimes by pictorial or other indicators of oneor the other Secretary’s significant improvement in status. For example, in thefirst months after the German attack on the USSR, Malenkov was named tothe State Defense Committee and Zhdanov was not, the Central Committee’sjournals endorsed party officials’ role in the development of industry, laudedthe decisions of the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in 1941 and ignoredthose made by the 18th Congress, expressed enthusiasm for Soviet patriotism,

10 Chapter One

and ignored both the ideological education of party members and other ele-ments of “party political work.”

In direct contrast, in early 1948 the CC journals endorsed Zhdanov’s viewson the centrality of ideological education, ignored the importance of Sovietpatriotism, and repeatedly denounced party officials’ excessive interferencein the state officials’ administration of the economy. At the same timePravda’s pictures and references to Stalin’s inner circle portrayed Zhdanov asclosest to Stalin and Molotov.

But these periods of unambiguous support were not the norm. The CCsjournals and decrees indicated that the conflict between the proponents of thetwo rival tendencies continued unabated from 1939 until 1948. This dis-agreement was expressed in a variety of ways:

(1) Overt disagreement between the journals over party officials’ priorities.For example, in many instances when Bol’shevik defined the ideological ed-ucation of party members as of paramount importance, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvowould not only ignore it but insist that officials should focus on the morepractical economic issues.

(2) Direct challenges and direct criticism of the rival definition of priorities.For example, Propagandist expressed its opposition to Malenkov’s definitionsby urging secretaries responsible for industry to give more attention to non-economic questions. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo challenged Zhdanov’s definitions byurging agitprop officials to give more attention to “mass work” or the cultivationof patriotism. The major journals often criticized the allegedly baneful effects ofthe decisions associated with one of the junior Secretaries. Bol’shevik and Pro-pagandist sometimes charged that the decisions of the 18th Conference in 1941led officials to neglect ideological education and lapse into “practicalism.” Par-tiinoe Stroitel’svto sometimes assailed the decisions of the 18th Congress of1939 for limiting party officials’ capacity to work effectively with industry.

(3) Failure to endorse a particular position or principle identified with therival tendencies. For example, an editorial or feature published in Pravda onindustrial administration that ignored the Soviet state’s critical role in the con-struction of socialism was an indirect assault on Zhdanov’s position. A decreeof the CC/VKP(B) or article in a journal of the CC/VKP(B) on the same sub-ject that ignored the role of officials’ industrial responsibilities was a slap atMalenkov.

(4) A balanced discussion of officials’ priorities in the same editorial or fea-ture article or decree. This seemed to reflect a temporary deadlock betweenthe the supporters of the rival tendencies and was expressed by lumping to-gether formulations identified with each tendency in the same text.

(5) Open conflict within the same journal reflected by simultaneous publi-cation of materials supporting rival tendencies in the same issue of a journal.


All of the materials published in the organs of the CC/VKP(B) containedextraordinarily slavish praise for Stalin as the “leader” of the country who os-tensibly transcended his official positions as General Secretary of theCC/VKP(B) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (after1941). He was repeatedly portrayed as a genius in every field, the majorsource of “creative Marxism-Leninism,” as the author of the programs of in-dustrialization and collectivization, the Stalin Constitution, of the victories ofthe USSR in World War II, as an inspiration for every citizen of the country,and so forth. These formulations have been excluded from the following dis-cussion.

In addition to these primary sources, this study builds on the existingscholarly literature on conflicts within the leadership of the VKP(B) duringthe period from the 18th Congress of 1939 to Zhdanov’s death in 1948.Merle Fainsod’s analysis of the organization of the Secretariat in his classicstudy of Stalinism, How Russia Is Ruled provides the starting point for thediscussion. Fainsod demonstrated that the two junior Secretaries differedsharply over the proper organization of the apparatus of the Secretariat, buthe made no attempt to explore the ongoing debate over party officials, pri-orities after the 18th Congress of the VKP(B). Subsequent monographs onpolitics in the USSR during the postwar period have dealt with the variouselements of the conflict between the two junior Secretaries, but they did notexamine the dispute over the proper relationship between the members ofthe “inner party” and the “outer party.” William McCagg’s extraordinarystudy Stalin Embattled: 1943–1948, which sought to explain Stalin’s for-eign policy as an outgrowth of internal political discord, examined their al-leged role in this process. Werner Hahn’s excellent Postwar Soviet Politics:The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953, provided anextremely detailed study of Zhdanov’s relationship with other members ofthe leadership, their disagreements over the proper allocation of resources,over proper agrarian, industrial, cultural, and foreign policies and an in-valuable directory of party officials and their responsibilities. Ra’anan’s In-ternational Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional Disputes during theZhdanovshchina provided a similarly nuanced discussion of differencesover foreign policy. The most recent study of Stalin’s ruling group, ColdPeace:Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 by Yoram Gorlizkiand Oleg Khlevniuk provides a detailed picture of the relationship betweenStalin and his closest lieutenants based on archival materials. The most re-cently published work on this period, Kees Boterbloem’s excellent The Lifeand Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948, provides an extraordinarily com-prehensive discussion of all of Zhdanov’s activities and of his exact posi-tion at various points in his career. Boterbloem concludes that the disagree-

12 Chapter One

ments between Zhdanov and Malenkov did not begin until after World WarII and that it is incorrect to trace their differences to the period before thewar. However, his study, which is based largely on archival sources, doesnot examine the sharply contrasting definitions of officials’ responsibilitiesthat the two junior Secretaries presented in their respective reports to the18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939 and the 18th Conference in 1941.

NOTES

1. Martin Malia reports that George Orwell made this distinction. See MartinMalia, The Soviet Tragedy (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 389.

2. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), Chapter X.


15

Stalin’s own views on the proper role of the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) inthe political system not only established the setting for the disagreements be-tween Malenkov and Zhdanov and their respective supporters but also pro-vided them with the ideological formulations to support their own definitions.During the 1930s and 1940s, Stalin’s Politburo (and the various sub-groupsthat Stalin established after World War II) was composed of two major sets ofofficials: (1) the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) who directed the bureaucraticdivisions subordinate to the Secretariat and subordinate party officials (thePolitburo/Secretaries); (2) the leading people’s commissars in the Sovnarkom(the Politburo/Commissars—Politburo/Ministers after 1946). Some of thePolitburo/Secretaries also simultaneously held positions as people’s commis-sars (Ministers after 1946) but this was rare. Kaganovich had this distinctionin the 1930s and Malenkov and Shcherbakov in the 1940s.

Stalin’s public statements reveal that he changed his conception of theproper division of labor between these two groups during the 1930s. In 1930Stalin seemed to assign the Politburo/Commissars direct responsibility for thedevelopment of the new five-year plans and urged the Politburo/Secretariesand their subordinates to focus on the various components of party politicalwork. In 1934, evidently concerned with lagging production, he decided toextend the capacity of the Politburo/Secretaries and their subordinate partyofficials to intervene more directly in the Sovnarkom’s administration of theeconomy. But he reversed himself during the purges in the late 1930s, andurged them to give more attention to party political work. This led to a returnto his original stress on its overriding importance for the Secretaries of theCC/VKP(B) and their subordinates in 1939.

Chapter Two

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

In early 1930 Stalin established “functional” departments of theCC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secretariat for cadres, political education, andverification of fulfillment to assure that the Secretariat and its subordinate of-ficials focused on these internal questions1 and he stressed the importance ofthis reform in his report to the 16th Congress of the VKP(B).2 At the sametime, he also stressed the importance of the Soviet state in the construction ofsocialism. First of all, he called for a massive extension of state power on theideological grounds that the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was the“mightiest and strongest state that has ever existed” had to be strengthenedbefore it could even begin to “wither away” as Engels had predicted.3 Sec-ondly, he vigorously defended the authority of the factory directors over theirrespective enterprises (edinonachalie) against the incursions of both tradeunions and primary party organizations.4

Later that year Stalin emphasized the Sovnarkom’s direct responsibility forproduction by intervening personally at its meetings to demand higher tar-gets5 and by increasing the number of members of the Politburo with respon-sibilities in the Sovnarkom. V. M. Molotov gave up his position as a Secretaryof the CC/VKP(B) to assume Rykov’s position as the chairman of the Sov-narkom; V. I. Kuibyshev, a member of the Politburo who had reportedly en-dorsed Stalin’s targets for industry as the Chairman of the Supreme EconomicCouncil was named chairman of Gosplan and vice chairman of the Sov-narkom; S. Ordzhonikidje, who assumed Kuibyshev’s place, also joined thePolitburo at this juncture.6

Immediately after these changes in personnel, Stalin gave even more at-tention to the responsibility of the Sovnarkom for industrial production. Earlyin 1931 he stressed the government’s responsibility for the allocation of re-sources, reaffirmed his support for the principle of edinonachalie as essentialto industrial growth, and urged the directors of factories to “master tech-nique” to accelerate industrialization and to assure the effective direction oftheir enterprises.7 In mid-1931 Stalin explicitly stressed the responsibilities ofthe people’s commissariats for technical education, for the supply of goodsand services to the population, and for improvements in labor productivity.8

At the same time, he seemed to imply that at least some full-time officials inthe party had not fully grasped the role of the state in industrial production;he attacked their alleged failure to give sufficient weight to technical skills inthe assignment of personnel.9

From 1931 onward, the Sovnarkom seemed to enjoy immense authorityover the development of industry; it issued hundreds of binding decrees in itsown name on questions of planning, governmental reorganization, and the al-location of resources between branches of the economy and between the var-ious regions of the USSR.10 Although many of these decrees may have orig-

16 Chapter Two

inated in the Politburo, the Sovnarkom apparently had far more direct controlover the economy than even the most powerful regional officials. A biogra-phy of S. Kirov, the ill-fated leader of the Leningrad party organization, amember of the Politburo and briefly a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) revealsthat he was always obliged to appeal directly to the Sovnarkom or to individ-ual Politburo/Commissars in his periodic efforts to increase Leningrad’s shareof resources.11

Stalin reaffirmed the Sovnarkom’s responsibilities in his report on theprogress of the five-year plan in January 1933.12 But by early 1934 Stalin ev-idently had become dissatisfied with the pace of industrial growth under itsleadership and he decided to broaden party officials’ responsibility for eco-nomic development. In his report to the 17th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1934Stalin charged that the “functional” departments of the apparatus had ham-pered industrial progress and he explicitly ordered party officials to give moreattention to industrial problems.13

The Congress reacted quickly to Stalin’s criticism; its resolution on organi-zational questions charged that “functionalism” had made “operative leader-ship of the economy” virtually impossible and called for the establishment of“production branch” departments for industry, transport, and agriculture in thecentral and local apparatus. The “functional” departments were eliminated andnew production branch departments, which included numerous specializedsubdivisions for various sectors of industry and transport, were made respon-sible for organizational work, personnel management, and verification withintheir sectors. A new department for culture and the propagation of Leninismwas made responsible for the theoretical education of members of the VKP(B).

The resolution adopted by the Congress explicitly declared that the reformof the apparatus would allow local officials to give proper attention to prob-lems of production.14 Merle Fainsod’s excellent study of the Secretariat andits subordinate agencies in the l930s concludes that the establishment of thesenew departments at the center and in local party organizations did permitparty officials to intervene more directly and effectively in the Sovnarkom’sadministration of the economy.15

Stalin had also discussed ideological education in his report to the 17thCongress in 1934. He warned that “capitalist encirclement” threatened to fos-ter the revival of anti-Leninist views because party members’ concern withpractical problems had led them to neglect their theoretical study.16 Stalinurged the members of the party to give more attention to the study of Marx-ist-Leninist theory,17 but the 17th Congress evidently did not pass any decreeon the subject. Whatever the reason for the Congress’ silence on this issue,18

the assassination of S. Kirov provided the rationale for the ruthless elimina-tion of all those who ostensibly held “anti-Leninist views.”19

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939 17

It is not generally recognized that the massive purge of the VKP(B) in thesecond half of the 1930s was accompanied by a concerted campaign to shiftits officials’ attention away from economic work and toward the ideologicaleducation of party members and other components of party political work. Al-most immediately after Kirov’s assassination in December 1934, Bol’shevikurged members of the party to study the history of the VKP(B) and its earlierresponse to “anti-Leninist elements” in order to improve their vigilanceagainst its enemies.20 Bol’shevik was evidently responding to a secret circularof January 1935 that had called for the study of the history of the party in justthese terms. As the campaign gained momentum, Bol‘shevik cited Stalin’scomments at the 17th Congress on the importance of ideological education asmandating this new emphasis on correct consciousness.21

In early 1935, as the purges broadened their scope, the leadership of theVKP(B) gave increasing attention to “work with cadres”—the other majorcomponent of party political work. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) issued in Feb-ruary 1935 established new departments for cadres in sixty-three gorkom inorder to “enliven organizational and propaganda work” within the party.22

Bol’shevik’s comment on the decree declared that the new departments wouldhelp local officials to become “effective political leaders” focusing on themanagement of personnel and on political education.23

A. Zhdanov, who had succeeded Kirov as the head of the party organiza-tion in Leningrad, clearly endorsed this campaign. In late March 1935, thegorkom in Leningrad issued a decree asserting that the assassination of Kirovhad dramatized the glaring inadequacies in the ideological training of mem-bers of the party. It explicitly charged that officials’ preoccupation with im-mediate economic problems had not only undermined their organizationaland educational work but also had sapped their vigilance against the “ene-mies” of the party.24

In May 1935 Stalin underlined the overriding importance of “work withpeople” with his famous declaration that “cadres are decisive.”25 His pro-nouncement evidently accelerated the campaign to assure greater attention topersonnel management and the study of Marxism-Leninism. A new depart-ment of the Central Committee for cadres headed by N. I. Yezhov, with G. M.Malenkov as his deputy was probably established at this time.26 In June 1935the kultprop department was divided into separate departments for party ag-itprop, press, schools, cultural and mass educational work, and science in or-der to improve the “level of ideological educational work.”27

In the same month, the CC/VKP(B) issued a decree designed to improvethe ideological education of members of the party by creating more special-ized study circles, improving the education of agitprop workers, and com-manding party officials to directly supervise the ideological-educational pro-

18 Chapter Two

grams.28 In October 1935 the CC/VKP(B) sharply assailed the obkom inSverdlovsk for ostensibly neglecting the ideological education of members ofthe party.29 In November 1935 the CC established a new central educationalinstitution for the training of propagandists.30

The political standing of both Zhdanov and Malenkov improved dramati-cally during this campaign. First of all, Zhdanov was increasingly representedas Stalin’s leading specialist on ideological matters. In early 1936 all of theCentral Committee’s journals simultaneously published a critique of existinghistory texts that had ostensibly been prepared in the summer of 1934 byStalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov. At this juncture Zhdanov was named the directorof a new commission to assure the implementation of this critique.31

Secondly, at approximately the same time, G. M. Malenkov, who had beennamed the director of the Central Committee’s department for leading partyorgans sometime in 1934 replaced Yezhov as the editor of PartiinoeStroitel’stvo.32 At this juncture, it fully supported the campaign for the re-sumption of ideological education and did not provide any indication of dis-agreement between Malenkov and Zhdanov over party officials’ responsibil-ities and priorities.33

During the second half of 1936 there was a lull in the campaign for ideo-logical education as all national media focused on the introduction of the newConstitution of the USSR that had been published in draft form in the middleof the year and ratified by the Supreme Soviet at the end of the year.34 Thenew Constitution’s explicit endorsement of the economic responsibilities ofthe Sovnarkom complemented the campaign to shift party officials away from“excessive” concern with the details of the economy. The Constitution ex-plicitly defined the Sovnarkom as the “highest executive and administrativebody of the state” responsible for the direction of the people’s commissariats,the administration of the five-year plans, and for the establishment of neweconomic organs whenever necessary.35

Shortly afterwards, the campaign to give priority to officials’ political workwas resumed. In early 1937, Zhdanov publicly adopted this position in an ad-dress to the bureau of the Leningrad obkom. Zhdanov explicitly stated that“the gorkom was forced to take on a number of economic questions which weconsider wrong and abnormal, especially now when it is demanded from usthat the party organization in earnest turn to party issues, to issues of politi-cal leadership.” In the process, he noted that the CC had removed the leaderof the Rostov party organization for dulling political vigilance and “prioritiz-ing economic issues to the detriment of party-political ones.”36

When the Central Committee was convened in February/March 1937, bothZhdanov and Stalin explicitly insisted on the primacy of party officials’ partypolitical work. Zhdanov declared that officials’ “passion for economic detail”


had produced a disastrous “loss of taste for party work, a weakening of partywork,” insisted that the “major function of party workers is party work” andimplied that the Sovnarkom and its subordinate agencies could deal with pro-duction effectively without party officials’ constant interference.37

Stalin’s discussion of the priorities of party officials was far more ominous—he implied that their preoccupation with problems of production had under-mined their vigilance against the enemies of the VKP(B):

“The problem was that our party comrades were totally absorbed in eco-nomic activity during the past few years, were carried away by economic suc-cess, were so carried away by these matters that they forgot about everythingelse. Carried away with economic successes, they regarded them as the be-ginning and end of everything and such problems as the international positionof the USSR, capitalist encirclement, strengthened political work of the party,sabotage, were ignored or regarded as secondary or tertiary questions.”38

Stalin urged party officials to give far more attention to “internal” work onthe grounds that the “stability and duration of economic success is utterly andcompletely dependent on the success of party organizational and party-political work, that without these conditions, economic success may prove tobe built on sand.”39 Stalin also dramatized the importance of ideological ed-ucation by ordering the Central Committee to adopt the slogan “master Bol-shevism” to replace the slogan “master technique,”40 and by insisting that thestudy of Marxism-Leninism by members of the party was the very key to itssuccess.

“I think that if we could prepare our cadres (from top to bottom) ideologi-cally and thus steel them politically so that they would be able to orient them-selves freely to the internal and international situation, i.e. if we could makethem into really mature Leninists, Marxists able to solve problems of leader-ship of the country without serious error, then we should have solved nine-tenths of our problems.”41

In his concluding remarks to the CC, Stalin added that he had not meant toimply that party officials’ should ever “neglect” economic questions, insistedthat it was not really possible to “separate economic and political questions”and dangerous to give exclusive attention to either sphere of activity. But heexplicitly ordered party officials to “stop substituting for economic organsand depriving them of their responsibilities (particularly in regard to land or-ganizations),42 insisting that “party leadership” of the economy was con-ducted through the state structure. Finally, he called for the assignment ofmore qualified personnel to state institutions to free party officials from theirpreoccupation with economic details.43

The CC did not issue any decree on officials’ priorities, but its major jour-nals clearly regarded Stalin’s remarks as demanding a limitation on party of-

20 Chapter Two

ficials’ intervention in the state’s administration of the economy, despite hiscaveat about the dangers of “ignoring” economic work. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvonow explicitly urged party officials to focus on “party work”44 and chargedthat their “substitution” (podmena) for the state’s economic administratorshad undermined both the latter’s responsibility for the fulfillment of the planand the party’s vigilance.45 Bol’shevik declared that the meeting of the Cen-tral Committee would encourage officials to eliminate their “narrow mindedconcerns” with production.46

In May 1937, Stalin’s critique of existing histories of the VKP(B) was pub-lished, prompting Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo to give more attention to ideologicalquestions.47 It published the new interim guide for ideological education pub-lished by the agitprop department and in October 1937 launched a concertedcampaign to improve the training of agitprop personnel.48

Stalin’s apparent effort to limit party officials’ intervention in economic ad-ministration and to broaden the authority of state agencies was also reflectedin his own public statements and in subsequent decrees of both the CentralCommittee and the Sovnarkom. In late October 1937 Stalin explicitly praisedthe role of state administrators in industrial management49 and in January1938 the Central Committee limited the capacity of party officials to inter-vene by explicitly prohibiting officials at the gorkom level from hiring andfiring enterprise directors subordinate to all-union commissariats.50 PartiinoeStroitel’stvo’s comment on the decree charged that local party officials had ig-nored Stalin’s strong endorsement of the principle of one-man managementin 1929.51

The leadership’s effort to broaden the Sovnarkom’s responsibility for thefulfillment of the five-year plans was reflected in the sharp decline in thenumber of Central Committee decrees on industrial matters,52 by the publica-tion the Sovnarkom’s decrees as those of the “government of the USSR,”53

and Chairman Molotov’s special praise for the people’s commissariats at ameeting of the Supreme Soviet in 1938.54 At the same time the number of de-crees urging attention to various elements of party political work increased.The notorious decree of the Central Committee of January 1938 that con-demned the “unwarranted expulsion” of members of the party during the pre-vious three years implied that greater stress on “internal work” would preventthe possibility of injustices in the future.55

During the second half of 1938, the leadership’s stress on the improvementof the ideological education of members of the party became particularly pro-nounced. The journals of the Central Committee gave massive attention to thesubject in the spring and summer56 and the long-awaited revision of the offi-cial history of the VKP(B), the so-called Kratkii kurs, produced by a com-mission headed by Zhdanov,57 was published with immense fanfare in the fall


of 1938. The new text contained the following formulations on the impor-tance of the study of Marxism-Leninism that were repeatedly cited (oftenwithout attribution) in the subsequent debate over the relative significance ofideological education.

“The history of the party reveals that the party of the working class is un-able to fulfill its role as the leader of its own class, to fulfill its role as the or-ganizer and leader of the proletarian revolution, unless it has mastered the ad-vanced theory of the workers’ movement, if it does not master Marxist-Leninisttheory.

“Only a party that masters Marxist-Leninist theory is able to confidentlyadvance and lead the working class forward. And conversely, a party thatdoes not master Marxist-Leninist theory is forced to grope its way, loses con-fidence in its own actions and is unable to lead the working class forward.

“The power of Marxist-Leninist theory gives the party the capacity to ori-ent itself in any given situation to understand the internal links of unfoldingevents, predict the course of events and to perceive not only how they are un-folding at present, but also how they will develop in the future.”58

But the text also contained formulations that were cited repeatedly by thosewho subsequently challenged the priority given to the study of Marxism-Leninism. The Kratkiii kurs denounced the crude “memorization of slogans”insisting that Marxists were not “pedants and dogmatists” who regarded the-ory as a “collection of dogmas,” that Marxism-Leninism was “not a dogmabut a guide to action” that had to be modified in the course of developingevents. Lenin was praised for his “creative development” of Marxism-Leninism. Two examples were cited: (1) his conclusion that the system of so-viets established in 1905 and 1917, rather than a system of parliamentary de-mocracy provided the best form for the development of the “dictatorship ofthe proletariat”; (2) his conclusion that socialism could be constructed “in asingle country” rather than simultaneously in a number of countries.59

The decree of the Central Committee of November 1938 on the proper useof the new text provided the ideological and organizational basis for the agit-prop directorate established by the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March1939 and the basic rationale for the advocates of ideological education. The de-cree declared that “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the absolute prerequi-site for success in every field of “socialist construction” and insisted that mem-bers of the party could acquire such mastery by the “independent study” of theKratkii kurs supplemented by lectures provided by agitprop and by periodicconsultations with specialists in ideology working in the so-called partkabi-net.60 The decree also made the agitprop department responsible for the widevariety of publications and demanded that Bol’shevik be made into a “real the-oretical journal” providing Marxist-Leninist analysis of current events.61

22 Chapter Two

The decree also provided additional ideological support for the primacy ofparty officials’ internal work by stressing the responsibility of the state for thedirection of the economy. It explicitly declared that careful study of theKratkii kurs would help members of the party to overcome their continued“underestimation” of the state’s role as the “major weapon of the workers andpeasants in the construction of socialism and the defense of capitalist encir-clement.”62

The campaign to foster party officials’ concern with the various elementsof party political work which had begun shortly after Kirov’s assassination in1934, culminated in Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) inMarch 1939. In his report Stalin explicitly called for a reform of the CentralCommittee’s apparatus to force the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) and theirsubordinates to focus on the ideological education of members of the partyand on personnel management. At the same time, Stalin now provided anelaborate ideological rational for extending the state’s economic role.

Stalin charged that many members of the party had a “negative orientation”toward state power that had hampered the development of a coherent defini-tion of the state’s positive role in socialist construction. In outlining his ownview of the state’s vast authority, Stalin engaged in some striking revision ofclassical Marxism. He dismissed Engels’ conclusion that the state would“wither away” as inappropriate for the USSR on the grounds that the USSR,as the first socialist state, was faced with the dangers of capitalist encir-clement! Stalin declared that the Soviet state would not only retain its puni-tive and defensive functions well into the future but would also become in-creasingly concerned with “economic organizational and cultural-educationalwork.”63

Stalin’s formulations on the state implied that the Sovnarkom would enjoyincreased responsibility for management of the economy and his discussionof the means to “strengthen the party” emphasized the overriding importanceof the ideological education of members of the party and personnel manage-ment. He insisted that the proper selection, promotion, and assignment of per-sonnel was essential for effective implementation of policy and called for theestablishment of a new directorate for cadres in the apparatus of theCC/VKP(B) with subordinate departments at the republic, krai, and oblastlevel.64

At the same time, Stalin declared that the ideological education of mem-bers of the party was the absolute prerequisite for its success and called forthe establishment of a central directorate for agitprop to implement the Cen-tral Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the newKratkii kurs.65Although Stalin had also called on the party to “develop andcultivate Soviet patriotism” in his discussion of internal developments in the


USSR, this formulation (which was to receive particular stress during WorldWar II) was overshadowed by his vigorous defense of the study of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin’s formulation on this subject was to be cited repeatedly dur-ing the subsequent conflict over officials’ priorities.

“If the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if ourwork of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres lags, and thecadres themselves stop showing interest in the prospect of our futureprogress, cease understanding the truth of our cause and are transformed intonarrow minded plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carryingout instructions from above, then our entire party and state work must in-evitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the politi-cal level of Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of stateand party work, the better the work and its results. And vice versa: the lowerthe political knowledge of the workers and the less they are imbued with aknowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of dis-ruption and failure, of the workers becoming shallow and degenerating intonarrow plodders, of their complete degeneration.”66

In response to Stalin’s report, the 18th Congress abolished the productionbranch departments of the Central Committee’s apparatus and establishedtwo new directorates for personnel and agitprop. This structural reorgani-zation provided the bureaucratic foundation for the subsequent disagree-ments between Zhdanov, the director of the directorate of agitprop, andMalenkov, the director of the directorate for cadres, which evidently ab-sorbed the personnel departments that had been dispersed among the pro-duction departments. Malenkov reported to the Congress on behalf of theCredentials Commission but he did not discuss the new directorates or theirresponsibilities.67

In direct contrast, Zhdanov outlined his definition of officials’ priorities inhis report to the Congress on changes in the rules of the VKP(B). Zhdanovclearly regarded the agitprop directorate’s educational activities as the key tothe VKP(B)s success in every field:

“In order to cope successfully with the principal task of the five-year plan,namely the communist education of the people and the elimination of the sur-vivals of capitalism in the minds of men, in order to cope with the practicalproblems of socialist construction and in order to be equipped for the strug-gle against the surrounding capitalist world and its agents, our cadres must bearmed with theory, with a knowledge of the laws of social development andof political struggle.68

“Our whole work of building socialism, our entire educational work is de-signed to remold the minds of men. That is what our party exists for, that iswhy we strove for and achieved the victory of socialism. That is why we are

24 Chapter Two

undertaking the tasks of communist development, namely to remold people,their egos.”69

Zhdanov clearly regarded Stalin’s report as sanctioning the elimination ofthe departments for industry and transport throughout the apparat. As Zh-danov declared:

“Nowadays the production branch departments do not know what theyshould be concerned with, they allow the responsibility of the economic or-gans to be undermined, they compete with them and this leads to a loss of re-sponsibility and irresponsibility in work.”70

Furthermore, in keeping with Stalin’s emphasis on the Sovnarkom’s eco-nomic responsibilities, Zhdanov sought to limit the role of the primary partyorganizations (PPOs) that had been formed in each people’s commissariat. Heinsisted that the PPOs would have the right to “signal” higher bodies aboutshortcomings in the commissariat’s administration, but would not enjoypravo kontrolia, i.e., the right to closely monitor and to provide explicit sug-gestions for improvement to the commissariats themselves.

But while Zhdanov sought to limit party officials’ capacity to control theactivities of the peoples’ commissariats, it would be a mistake to concludethat he wanted to eliminate completely party officials’ capacity to interveneon economic issues. In fact, he sought to bolster their authority in individualenterprises by stressing the primary party organizations’ pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the administration and defining the PPOs’ responsibilities in very broadand ambiguous terms.

“Experience has shown that the PPOs have worked well whenever theyhave been able to combine party-political work with the struggle for the ful-fillment of production plans, for the improvement of the work of the state ap-paratus, for the mastery of new technique, for strict labor discipline, for thedevelopment of the Stakhanovite movement, for the promotion of new cadresto party and economic-administrative positions. And vice versa, where thePPOs have held themselves aloof from production problems, confining theiractivity to agitation and propaganda, or wherever the PPOs have taken uponthemselves the unwarranted function of direction (rukovodstvo) of economicaffairs, assuming the duties of economic-administrative bodies and detractingfrom their responsibilities, there the work has inevitably suffered.”71

The 18th Congress proved to be a triumph for Zhdanov—his definition ofparty officials’ responsibilities was incorporated into the party rules adoptedby the Congress; the formulation that “the party is guided in its work by thetheory of Marxism-Leninism” was added to its preamble; the study of theorywas made a primary obligation for all members of the party and the previousreference to technical education was dropped, and his definition of pravo kon-trolia was included in the rules governing PPOs.72


The 18th Congress’s reorganization of the apparatus seemed to bolster theauthority of the Sovnarkom in the administration of industry. The PolitburoCommissars enthusiastically endorsed Stalin’s comments on the economicrole of the state in their speeches to the Congress.73 Moreover, the weight ofthe people’s commissars in the Politburo was increased when L. Kaganovichgave up his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) to serve as DeputyChairman of the Sovnarkom.74

But Zhdanov’s triumph proved to be short lived. The limitations imposedon party officials’ capacity to intervene in economic administration evidentlyproved to be unsatisfactory to Malenkov and other leaders of the VKP(B). Asa result, within a month after the 18th Congress had endorsed Zhdanov’s ori-entation, Malenkov and his associates began to charge that its stress on inter-nal party work was “one sided” and sought to broaden party officials’ eco-nomic responsibilities.

NOTES

1. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 4, Book 2 (1971), 34; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 168.

2. I. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: 1952–1954), Vol. 12, 336–38. L. Kaganovich,who was a Secretary of the Central Committee at this time, told the Congress that thereform of the Secretariat and apparat in January of 1930 had already begun to solvethe problems of personnel management. XVI s’ezd VKP(B) Stenograficheskii otchet(Moscow:1930), Tom 1, 155.

3. Stalin, 342.4. Stalin, 338. The 16th Congress also approved the CC decree of September 5,

1929, on edinonachalie. This was the first of many efforts to define the division of la-bor between the party’s primary party organization and the factory’s administration.For the text see KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh I resheniiakh s’ezdov,konferentsii I plenumovTsK (Moscow: 1971–1972), Vol. 4, 310–17.

5. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1971), 103.6. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (vtoroe izdanie), Tom. 26, 620–21, Tom.

31, 171–72.7. Stalin, Vol. 13, 34–43.8. Stalin, 46–52.9. Stalin, 70.

10. Only a minority of these decrees appeared as joint decrees of the Central Com-mittee and the Sovnarkom. See Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR:1917–1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 182.

11. S. Krasnikov, Sergei Kirov: Zhizn’ I deitel’nost (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1964),182–84.

26 Chapter Two

12. Stalin referred to the “firm leadership of party and government” as responsiblefor industrial growth. Stalin, Vol. 13, 218.

13. Stalin, 375.14. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 154–56.15. Fainsod, 171.16. Stalin, Vol. 13, 356.17. Stalin, 371–73.18. Krasnikov’s biography of Kirov implied that there was serious opposition to

Stalin at the Congress and that his critics had hoped to transfer him to another posi-tion. Krasnikov, 194.

19. For N. S. Khrushchev’s account of Stalin’s reaction to Kirov’s assassinationsee Current Soviet Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), Vol. 2, 176

20. “Bol’she revoliutsionnoi bditel’nost,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1935). Approved forpublication January 19, 1935. “Znat istoriiu partii lenina-stalina,” Bol’shevik, no. 2(1935), 9–12. Approved for publication January 31, 1935.

21. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “O dvurshnichestve I o bor’be partii s vsemi ego proiavle-niami,” Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1935), 66–74. Approved for publication March 15, 1935;“O vazhnosti izucheniia posle oktiabr’skogo perioda istorii nashei partii,” Bol’shevik,no. 6 (1935), 56–69. Approved for publication April 3, 1935.

22. “Postanovlenie TsK VKP(B),” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7 (1935), 47.23. “Partinuiu rabotu-na pervyim plan,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1935), 3. Approved for

publication April 15, 1935.24. “Postanovlenia leningradskogo gorkoma Mart. 29, 1935,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 8 (1935), 7–13.25. I. Stalin, Sochineniia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), Vol. 1

(XIV), 62.26. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Ran-

dom House, 1971), 407.27. “O reorganizatsii kultprop TsK VKP(B). Iiun 8, 1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 11 (1935), 47. The director of the new agitprop department was A. Stetskii, whobecame the editor of Bol’shevik at this juncture and held that position until April 1938.A.S. Shcherbakov, who later became a Secretary of the Central Committee and su-pervised agitprop work during World War II was named director of the department formass work. For commentary on the reorganization stressing the improvement of ide-ological work see “Vyshe ideinuiu voorozhennosti,” Bol’shevik, no. 11 (1935), 11–14.Approved for publication June 8, 1935; “K realizatsii direkhtivy TsK o propagandist-skoi rabote,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1935), 1–7. Approved for publicationJuly 7, 1935.

28. The decree was not dated. See “O propagandistskoi rabote v blizhaisheevremiia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1935), 43.

29. “O sostoianii partiinoi propagandy v sverdlovskoi oblaste, Oktiabr 13, 1935,”Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19/20, (1935), 70.

30. “O organizatsii vyshei shkoly propagandistov pri TsK VKP(B), Noiabr’ 21,1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1935), 56.


31. See Bol’shevik, no. 3 (1936) for all of these materials.32. See Politicheskii slovar (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1940), 326. Compare Parti-

inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5 (1936). Approved for publication March 4, 1936 with no. 6(1935). Approved for publication March 17, 1936

33. Both major journals gave massive attention to the improvement of ideologicaleducation. M. Rubinshtein, “Nedostatki v prepodavanii istorii VKP (B),” Bol’shevik,no. 8 (1936), 32–42. Approved for publication April 13, 1936, with G. Gak, “Vyshekachestvo propagandistskoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1936), 47–51. Ap-proved for publication May 16, 1936.

34. For the comment of the Central Committee’s journals, see A. Stetskii, “Stalin-skaia konstitutsiia sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13(1936), 56–68. Approved for publication June 16. 1936. “Konstitutsiia sotsialistich-eskogo gosudarstva rabochikh I krestian,” Bol’shevik, no. 11 (1936), 1–7. Approvedfor publication June 4, 1936.

35. Source Book on European Governments (New York: 1937), V-107-130.36. Quoted in Kees Boterbloem, The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov,

1896–1948 (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2004), 148.37. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5 (1937), 16–17.38. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1 (XIV), 193–94, 205.39. Stalin, 209.40. Stalin, 211–12.41. Stalin, 220.42. Stalin, 227.43. Stalin, 227.44. “Istoricheskii povorot I zadachi partii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1937),

5–12. Approved for publication March 25, 1937.45. A. Skokin, “Vrednaia podmena khoziaistvennykh organov,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1937), 25.46. “Podniat politicheskii uroven partiinykh mass,” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1937), 1–12.

Approved for publication April 28, 1937.47. For Stalin’s comments see Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1 (XIV), 248–52. For typ-

ically slavish comments on Stalin’s remarks see “Gluboko izuchat istoriiu bol’she-vizma,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1937), 16–21. Approved for publication May20, 1937; A. Kuznetsov, “Razoblachat vragov na ideologicheskom fronte,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1937), 23–26. Approved for publication July 2, 1937; D. Bu-lamov, “Za ovladenie bol’shevizmom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 14 (1937). Ap-proved for publication July 15, 1937.

48. For the new guide see Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1937), 49–63. For an ed-itorial on the subject see “Neustanno ovladevat’ bolshevizmom,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 19 (1937), 12–17. Approved for publication October 4, 1937.

49. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol 1 (XIV), 253–55.50. “O nepravil’nom postanovlenii Iaroslavskogo gorkoma VKP (B), Ian 3, 1938,”

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1938), 62.51. M. Alekseev, “Sochetat partinuiu rabotu s khoziaistvennoi,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1938), 53–58.

28 Chapter Two

52. Towster, 182.53. Towster, 277.54. Doklady I rechi na pervoi sessii verkhovnogo soveta (Moscow: 1938), 71.55. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 303–12.56. L. Tandit, “Bolshevistskoe vospitanie molodykh kommunistov,” Bol’shevik,

no. 10/11 (1938), 62–79. Approved for publication May 31, 1938; M. Rylskii, “Vy-bory partiinykh organov I voprosy propagandii I agitatsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 12(1938),73–82. Approved for publication June 18, 1938; V. Kudriavtsev, “Za uspeshnoeovladeniia bol’shevizmom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15 (1938), 25–28. Approvedfor publication July 28, 1938.

57. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, Book 1, 28.58. Istoriia vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Bol’shevikov) Kratkii kurs

(Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950), 339.59. Istoriia, 341.60. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 3 (1954), 316.61. KPSS, 324–25.62. KPSS, 318.63. XVIII s’ezd VKP(B) Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gospolitazdat), 1939,

35.64. XVIII s’ezd, 30.65. XVIII s’ezd, 30–31.66. XVIII s’ezd, 31.67. XVIII s’ezd, 146–50.68. XVIII s’ezd, 531.69. XVIII s’ezd, 523.70. XVIII s’ezd, 532.71. XVIII s’ezd, 53372. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh . . . Vol 5, (1971), 160–61, 381–82, 394.73. XVIII s’ezd, 144–45; 212; 268; 397; 500.74. Politicheskii slovar, 236, 506.


31

Stalin and his two junior Secretaries did not discuss party officials’ roles inpublic during the period between the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March1939 and the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941. However,the publications of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) provided indirectevidence of the growing disagreement over this issue between Malenkovand Zhdanov and their respective supporters. During this period, PartiinoeStroitel’stvo (which was edited by Malenkov until September 1940), emergedas the leading critic of the definition of officials’ priorities adopted by the 18thCongress, while Bol’shevik, edited by Zhdanov’s deputies in the agitprop di-rectorate, generally defended the definitions of the 18th Congress. Pravda’slead editorials, its pictorial coverage of the leaders’ public appearances, andthe decrees issued by both Politburo and Central Committee provided indica-tions of the relative political support for the two major orientations.

Stalin’s silence from the 18th Congress until the German attack on theUSSR in June 1941 obviously makes it impossible to determine directly hisviews on this issue. However, if we assume that the shifts in the public dis-cussion of officials’ priorities and in the relative standing of Malenkov andZhdanov in the leadership were not opposed by Stalin, then it seems plausi-ble that he supported Zhdanov’s orientation until the outbreak of World WarII in September 1939 and then shifted his support to Malenkov’s positionshortly afterwards. This pattern suggests that Stalin’s preferences were linkedto his anxieties about an increasingly threatening international situation.

But in the immediate aftermath of the 18th Congress, the Central Commit-tee’s publications indicated both substantial support for Zhdanov’s positionand provided the first evidence of serious disagreement between the leadersof the two new directorates. On the one hand, Pravda’s editorials gave first

Chapter Three

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

priority to the ideological education of party members,1 explicitly citedStalin’s own formulations on the significance of study of Marxism-Leninismin support of this position, and G. F. Aleksandrov, Zhdanov’s deputy directorat agitprop, lauded the study of theory in an article published in PartiinoeStroitel’stvo.2 On the other hand, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not endorse thisposition editorially, which may have been one of the first public indicationsthat Secretary Malenkov was skeptical of the utility of such study.

Furthermore, the discussion of the transition from socialism to commu-nism, which had ostensibly begun at the 18th Congress, may well have re-flected differences between the leaders of the new directorates. Bol’shevik’sdiscussion of the prerequisites for this transition gave highest priority to thestudy of Marxist-Leninist theory while Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’ ignored Marx-ism-Leninism completely. Bol’shevik declared, in keeping with Zhdanov’s re-port to the 18th Congress, that the “center of gravity of all of our work in in-ternal affairs can be reduced to an educational character.”3 In contrast,Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo insisted that improved work with cadres and the partyofficials’ direction (rukovodstvo) of the economy were the vital prerequisitesfor the transition to communism.4

This reference to the “direction” of the economy by party officials may bethe first published indication that Malenkov sought to broaden their responsi-bilities for “economic work.” It is more than likely that Malenkov and hissupporters were able to take advantage of Zhdanov’s absence from the capi-tal during his extended tour of the Far East 5 to directly challenge the defini-tion of priorities that had been adopted by the 18th Congress in March. Inearly May a decree of the Central Committee sharply castigated local partyofficials for ostensibly neglecting their industrial responsibilities.6 In addi-tion, materials published in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo suggest that the leaders ofthe cadre directorate had sought to encroach on the authority of the org-instruction department of the CC/VKP(B) over the verification of fulfillmentof previous decisions.7

But upon Zhdanov’s return to the Kremlin, this assault on his priorities wasevidently beaten back. When Zhdanov reappeared in public in mid-May1939,8 both Pravda and Bol’shevik reaffirmed their support for his definitionof priorities. Pravda published a series of essays that repeatedly stressed theimportance of the study of the Kratkii kurs for all members of the party andinsisted that the PPOs pravo kontrolia should not be allowed to undermine theultimate responsibility of factory directors.9 Bol’shevik urged members of theparty to “master theory” in particularly strong terms.10

The meeting of the Central Committee later that month provided additionalevidence of Zhdanov’s status in the leadership. It seemed to block the effortsof the cadre directorate to encroach on the org-instruction department by bol-

32 Chapter Three

stering the authority of the Commission of Party Control to supervise the ful-fillment of decisions by both party and soviet economic organizations, to ver-ify the activities of local party organs, and to discipline all those who had bro-ken the rules of the party.11 Whatever the exact role of the commission,Zhdanov emerged from the meeting of the CC/VKP(B) with renewed stature.In early June Pravda endorsed his views on ideological education and the sig-nificance of pravo kontrolia and gave front-page coverage to his report to theLeningrad party organization on the decisions of the Central Committee onagriculture.12

On June 29, 1939, in the midst of negotiations between representatives ofthe USSR and the British and French governments,13 Pravda published an ar-ticle by Zhdanov who was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commissionof the USSR Supreme Soviet, which openly questioned the sincerity of theBritish and French negotiators. Zhdanov explicitly recognized that other lead-ing officials in the USSR did not share his skepticism toward the British andFrench, and charged that the Western delegations were not really interested inan agreement with the USSR. He cited Stalin’s warning (in his report to the18th Congress) that the USSR would not do the “dirty work” for others, andaccused the British and French of seeking an agreement with Nazi Germanyat the expense of the USSR.

Zhdanov’s public assault on the British and French seemed to bolster hisstanding in the leadership. In July Pravda gave particularly forceful supportto his views on officials’ priorities14 and repeatedly gave him front-page cov-erage at a time when Malenkov did not appear in public with other leadingofficials.15 In this context, the leaders of the agitprop directorate seemed tobecome more aggressive in pressing their campaign for the study of Marx-ism-Leninism. In early August Bol’shevik assailed members of the party andofficials who had ostensibly neglected their study of theory because of theirpreoccupation with “practical work.”16 Most important, on August 16, 1939,the CC/VKP(B) issued a decree that sharply condemned the leadership of theCommunist party in the Belorussian republic and the leaders of the obkom inKursk and Orlovsk for their alleged neglect of both their own and their sub-ordinates’ study of Marxism-Leninism.17 At the same time, PartiinoeStroitel’stvo seemed to mute its enthusiasm for the industrial responsibilitiesof party officials.18

On August 23, 1939, the leaders of the USSR and Nazi Germany signedtheir notorious non-aggression pact. While the Soviet leaders probably hadhoped that this agreement would keep the USSR free from entanglement in afuture “inter-imperialist” war, they were clearly anxious about the USSR’snational security. On the same day that the pact was signed, the Politburoacted to bolster the loyalty and morale of the USSR’s armed forces that had

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941 33

been seriously weakened by the purge of its officer corps; it ordered the im-mediate selection of four thousand members of the party to be transferred intothe military as “political workers.”19

The actual outbreak of the war on September 1, 1939, and the dramatic ad-vance of Germany’s armed forces obviously made the leaders of the USSReven more anxious. Whatever their exact assessment of the international situa-tion had been on the eve of the war, they now became increasingly concernedwith defense production. In this context, published support for Malenkov’s def-inition of party officials’ priorities increased dramatically. Although Pravdacontinued to endorse Zhdanov’s views in early September,20 Pravda’s lead ed-itorial of October 17, 1939, entitled “Party organizations and the direction ofthe economy” ordered local party organizations and primary party organiza-tions to intervene directly in the details of production to improve enterprise per-formance and declared that “non-intervention” was inimical to Bolshevism!

Pravda now assailed those local party officials who ostensibly had “not un-derstood” that the decisions of the 18th Congress had significantly “increasedthe responsibility of party organizations” for the fulfillment of the plan. It ex-plicitly attacked the party officials in the obkom in the Stalinskii and Dnen-propetrovsk regions for their ignorance of the actual conditions in the majormetallurgical enterprises, their alleged failure to link “mass political work”with immediate problems of production, or to mobilize the PPOs to use theirpravo kontrolia to good effect. Pravda insisted that pravo kontrolia was themost effective way to “combine party-political and economic work” and nowcited Stalin’s insistence on the “inseparability” of the two spheres of partywork in support of this position. Failure to “penetrate deeply” into all of thedetails of production was represented as akin to wrecking, and Pravda gavethe PPOs in Leningrad high marks for their direct intervention to deal withproblems of production.

The following week Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo revived its campaign to broadenlocal officials’ responsibility for industrial production,21 and in early Novem-ber the CC issued a series of decrees mandating such a shift in orientation.The first decree (November 4, 1939) assailed party officials at all levels (theobkom, gorkom, raikom, and PPOs) in the Donbas coal mining region fortheir “superficial” approach to economic questions, for their failure to dealwith the shortfalls in production and productivity, with the ineffectiveness ofexisting wage norms, with the miners’ alleged hostility to the introduction ofnew technology, and to help the PPOs use their pravo kontrolia effectively.The decree also attacked the officials for their failure to provide adequate in-formation to higher authorities on the deterioration of local living conditions,to develop an effective system of recruitment into the party, and a program ofmass political work to improve production.

34 Chapter Three

The CC ordered the Stalinskii and Voroshilovgrad obkom to end the“breach” between mass political work and production problems, to assurethat the PPOs used their pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the mine administration, toreplace the “formal and declaratory approach” to production with a focus onimmediate problems, and to assure that the mines were ready for winter. Mostimportant, the CC ordered the obkom to establish new coal departments ledby second secretaries to assure the direct supervision and intervention in pro-duction and to report back on their progress to the CC within two months.22

On November 9, 1939, the CC issued an almost identical decree dealingwith the failures of obkom officials in Dnetropetrovsk, Stalinskii, and Che-liabinsk, the major centers of metallurgical production in the USSR. TheCentral Committee ordered the leaders of obkom, gorkom and raikom, andPPOs to provide “daily” concrete leadership for every factory in their re-spective regions and demanded that the local secretaries report on the situ-ation in the lime quarries (which provided essential raw materials to themills) every five days.23

Pravda’s coverage of the leadership of the VKP(B) in November 1939 sug-gests that Malenkov’s status in the leadership had improved with the promulga-tion of these decrees on party officials’ industrial responsibilities. Malenkov’sstanding in the leadership was probably also helped by Zhdanov’s growingpreoccupation with the planning and execution of the war against Finland inthe winter of 1939–1940 that demanded his frequent presence in Leningrad.Although Zhdanov had been shown with Malenkov greeting various delega-tions to Moscow in early November, Zhdanov did not appear at the cere-monies marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution although he re-portedly was in the capital at the time.24 In contrast, Malenkov appeared in aprominent position; he was shown at the center of a group of officials re-viewing the traditional parade, and walking to Red Square with Stalin andothers.25

Malenkov’s orientation now enjoyed very positive coverage in the press.On the same day that he was pictured as a member of Stalin’s inner circle,(November 10, 1939) Pravda implied that “practice” was more significantthan the study of theory in the education of cadres and that the VKP(B)’s“vanguard role in production” was more important than its inspirational role.On November 12, 1939, Pravda’s editorial lauded the Central Committee’sdecree of November 9th on party officials’ role in the coal industry, and onNovember 16, 1939, the Central Committee issued a decree on the educationof new members of the VKP(B) that implied that their “practical” educationwas as significant as their ideological education.26

Malenkov’s most important victory came on November 29, 1939, when thePolitburo secretly reestablished industrial and transport departments in the


Central Committees of the republican parties, in kriakom, obkom, and gorkomin order to “strengthen the party’s direction of industry and transport.” Thenew departments were made responsible for assuring the implementation ofparty directives, the supervision of the fulfillment of the five-year plans byenterprises and the system of socialist competition and the Stakhanovitemovement, and to help the PPOs implement their pravo kontrolia.27 Thisrestoration of the industrial departments was a major victory for those whoevidently believed that the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the administrationof individual enterprises had not provided party officials with sufficient con-trol over the administration of industry.

On November 30, 1939, the Red Army attacked Finland. Zhdanov, as theleader of the Leningrad party organization, was deeply involved in the con-duct of the war over the next few months. Zhdanov and others probably ex-pected an easy victory over the Finns, but in the initial phase of the war, theUSSR’s armed forces, sapped by the purges of its military command in thelate 1930s, were unable to overcome fierce Finnish resistance.

Zhdanov’s absence from the capital during the winter war also seemed todiminish his role as the leadership’s authority on questions of theory and ide-ological education. Two weeks before the war, on November 14, 1939,Pravda had explicitly praised him in its editorial on the first anniversary ofthe Central Committee’s decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs. But Zh-danov seemed to be eclipsed with the publication of a collection of essays byStalin’s “closest comrades in arms” published to mark his birthday in earlyDecember. The collection included an article by Malenkov on Stalin’s “bril-liant contributions to cadre management” but did not include any contributionby Zhdanov. A. S. Shcherbakov, the head of the Moscow party organization,contributed an article on the role of the VKP(B) that made no reference to theimportance of Marxism-Leninism for the activity of the VKP(B).28

Although Zhdanov was described as “one of the closest disciples and com-rades in arms of Stalin” in the authoritative political dictionary issued at thevery end of the year,29 Shcherbakov was selected to give the report markingthe anniversary of Lenin’s death in January 1940, an honor traditionally givento the official responsible for ideological issues. His report ignored the ques-tion of study of theory and instead urged agitprop workers to focus on “masswork” to foster strict labor discipline and respect for socialist property.30 Inthis context, Bol’shevik muted its usual enthusiasm for the study of Marxism-Leninism as the key to Communists’ every success.31

But the USSR’s success against the Finns in February 1940 apparentlyprompted a restoration of Zhdanov’s previous influence. In mid-FebruaryPravda insisted once again that the “mastery of Bolshevism” was essentialfor practical success and assailed those members of the party whose concen-

36 Chapter Three

tration on “immediate problems” had made them neglect their study of theoryand become “insensitive” to the demands of the VKP(B).32 Later that monthPravda seemed to criticize Malenkov and his allies by condemning “partyleaders who imagined that organizational work was possible without theoret-ical knowledge” and who had allegedly forgotten that the VKP(B) had longsince repudiated such “narrow-minded practicality.”33 Furthermore, Pravdaignored the newly restored departments of industry and transport in localparty organs, and stressed the importance of the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia in sup-porting the factory administration’s immediate priorities and strengtheningthe state’s economic institutions.34

With the defeat of Finland, Zhdanov evidently regained his prominence inthe leadership. He participated in the negotiations that ended hostilities onMarch 20, 1940,35 Pravda warmly endorsed his views on the importance ofstudying theory,36 and the meeting of the Central Committee of March 26–28,1940, indirectly lauded Zhdanov by its overt approval of the conduct of thewar.37 Moreover, Zhdanov was not only selected to present the report to theSupreme Soviet in late March on the Finnish lands incorporated into theUSSR, but was shown sitting between Stalin and Malenkov at its session.38

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Zhdanov’s efforts to limit party offi-cials’ intervention in the administration of the economy was supported by atleast some of the Politburo/Commissars who sought to bolster the govern-ment’s control over administration to counterbalance the newly restored in-dustrial departments in the local party organs. In March the Central Commit-tee had strengthened the authority of the Ekonomsovet (composed of thechairman and the deputy chairman of the Sovnarkom), over the administrationof industry. In particular, the Central Committee had approved the formationof specialized councils headed by the deputy chairmen to coordinate the ac-tivities of the various peoples’ commissariats in various sectors (metallurgy,construction, defense, energy, consumer goods, and reserves.)39

Pravda praised this reform for strengthening the Sovnarkom’s capacity todevelop a “real economic plan,” to coordinate the activities of the variouspeoples’ commissariats more effectively, and to assure the introduction ofnew technology more quickly.40 Pravda also seemed to imply that Zhdanovwas associated with these changes. On the eve of the publication of the de-cree establishing the specialized councils, Pravda cited Zhdanov’s warningin 1939 that PPOs’ pravo kontrolia did not allow them to “direct” the econ-omy, endorsed the principle of one-man management and stressed the au-thority of the state over both industry and industrial personnel.41 This em-phasis on the Sovnarkom’s prerogatives was accompanied by a vigorousrevival of the campaign in support of study of Marxism-Leninism that hadbeen stalled during the war with Finland. Shortly after the reform of the


Ekonomsovet, Bol’shevik resumed its campaign for the study of theory inparticularly vigorous terms.42

But in the summer of 1940 this campaign came to a dramatic halt. In Juneand July 1940 the leadership of the USSR, evidently distressed by the rapidcollapse of French resistance to Germany, imposed a system of draconic statecontrol over both labor and management. In late June the working day waslengthened, job transfers prohibited without the express permission of the di-rector of the factory, and the directors were themselves threatened with harshreprisals for any violation of the new statute. In July a new people’s commis-sariat for state control was established to enforce “state discipline” and to as-sure the implementation of these decrees.43

In the face of these decrees, the ongoing discussion of officials’ prioritieswas muted at least temporarily. In July 1940 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo narrowedits previously broad definition of the PPOs’ responsibilities44 and endorsedthe principle of edinonachalie and the need for both “state” as well as Partydiscipline45 while Bol’shevik muted its support for the study of theory to fo-cus on the need for mass mobilization in support of the entire system of state-imposed discipline.46 By the end of the month, Pravda explicitly urged agit-prop workers to focus on “mass work” in support of labor discipline andproductivity,47 and Bol’shevik dropped its usual claims for Marxism-Lenin-ism’s magical property for a number of months.48 Finally, on August 20, theCentral Committee issued a decree that criticized local party officials for fail-ing to assure that the local press gave sufficient attention to immediate eco-nomic problems.49

In early September 1940 Zhdanov gave up his position as director of theagitprop directorate to his deputy, G. F. Aleksandrov. Although Pravda de-clared that Zhdanov continued to “supervise” the directorate,50 Aleksandrov’spromotion was accompanied by a serious weakening of support for Zh-danov’s orientation in the Central Committee’s daily. Pravda seemed reluc-tant to endorse his views even on the anniversary of the publication of theKratkii kurs in serial form,51 and it implied that the study of Marxism-Leninism was a matter of high priority primarily for the new citizens of theUSSR from what had been eastern Poland and the Baltic states.52 Pravdacited M. Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR, and an enthusiastic supporter of “mass educational work” rather thanZhdanov as the major authority on political education.53 Pravda’s editorial onthe anniversary of the publication of the Kratkii kurs insisted that agitpropwork should not be “academic” but related to practical matters.54 While Bo’l-shevik made a particularly vigorous defense of the study of Marxism-Leninismas essential for all practical success,55 M. Kalinin gave an address to theMoscow party organization that indirectly challenged Zhdanov’s orientation.

38 Chapter Three

Kalinin explicitly declared that the increase in labor productivity was theoverriding goal of Communist educational activities. At the same time he im-plied that agitprop workers should shift their attention from training membersof the party in Marxism-Leninism to the cultivation of respect for socialistproperty, the development of Soviet patriotism, and a sense of collective re-sponsibility among the masses.56

In the last months of 1940, the press’s coverage of the leadership’s publicappearance seemed to indicate that Zhdanov had suffered a decline in status.Pravda’s reports on the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the Bolshevikrevolution showed him in Leningrad while Malenkov remained in Moscow asa member of Stalin’s inner circle.57

This pictorial evidence of Malenkov’s authority coincided with increasedpublished support for his orientation. In early November 1940, PartiinoeStroitel’stvo called for an extension of party officials’ industrial responsibili-ties. G. Popov, the second secretary of the Moscow gorkom denounced theleaders of PPOs for their “superficial and general approach to industry,” theirpassivity toward the shortcomings of factory directors, and their alleged in-difference to technological backwardness.58 The journal now gave belatedpublic recognition to the secretaries for industry and transport that had beenappointed in 1939. It emphasized their capacity to supervise enterprises ef-fectively through their corps of trained inspectors and to make recommenda-tions to both party officials and the people’s commissariats.59

The revival of support for an extension of party officials’ responsibilities inindustry also seemed to influence the discussion of the study of Marxism-Leninism. Pravda and Bol’shevik marked the anniversary of the Central Com-mittee decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs by complaining about theneglect of the study of theory, but did not attribute these failings to the partyofficials’ “preoccupation with practical affairs.”60

Support for an extension of party officials, role in industrial administrationseemed to intensify as the USSR’s relations with Germany deterioratedsharply in the winter of 1940. On December 8, 1940, Pravda sharply criti-cized party officials at the level of both obkom and gorkom for their ostensi-ble failure to provide “concrete guidance” to enterprises and attributed allsuccess in industrial development to a combination of leadership by thegorkom and effective use of PPOs’ pravo kontrolia. Pravda did not refer toone-man management, an omission that seemed to imply that state disciplineunder the direction of the Sovnarkom was not that important for successful in-dustrial production.

On December 20, 1940, Pravda announced that the oft-postponed 18thConference of the VKP(B) would be convened in order to discuss the “tasksof Communist party organizations in industry and transport.” The response of


the major journals of the CC to the forthcoming conference reflected the deepdivision between the leaders of the two major directorates. While PartiinoeStroitel’stvo gave extensive coverage to local party organizations’ enthusias-tic discussion of the forthcoming conference,61 Bol’shevik ignored the event,which probably indicated that Zhdanov and his allies were not particularlyenthusiastic about the agenda.

Moreover, in the last month before the conference, the leadership of theagitprop directorate gave more attention to the inculcation of Soviet patriot-ism. In January 1941 A. S. Shcherbakov adopted this position in his reportmarking the anniversary of the death of Lenin,62 and Bol’shevik dutifully fol-lowed suit.63

The 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941 proved to be a majortriumph for G. M. Malenkov in the same way that the 18th Congress of theVKP(B) in March 1939 had been a major victory for Zhdanov. Malenkov’s re-port coupled a sharp critique of the Sovnarkom’s administration of the five-year plan with a brief for broadening party officials’ responsibilities for indus-trial production and for transport. Malenkov charged that the people’scommissariats’ bureaucratic methods, their ignorance of local economic con-ditions and administrative personnel, their failure to introduce new technology,and their waste of raw materials and misuse of existing equipment had pro-duced massive shortfalls in production that threatened both the pace of eco-nomic development and the defense capacity of the USSR’s armed forces.

Most important, Malenkov claimed that party officials at all levels of thesystem had ignored these problems because they “incorrectly thought thatthey did not bear responsibility for the work of industry and transport.”64 Heclearly implied that the dismantling of the industrial and transport depart-ments of the apparatus by the 18th Congress and its stress on the primacy ofparty political work were the major sources of the shortfalls of production invital areas. To rectify the situation, he called for the appointment of “sev-eral” secretaries for industry and transport at the gorkom, obkom, kraikom,and republican level to permit them to “share” responsibility with the peo-ple’s commissariats. Malenkov’s outline of the new secretaries’ broad pre-rogatives indicated that the restored departments for industry and transportwere to become the major instrument for the supervision of production byparty officials.

The discussion of Malenkov’s report at the Conference revealed consider-able resistance to his proposals among leading officials in the Sovnarkom andof the VKP(B). First of all, the agenda of the Conference was changed at thelast minute to include a report by N. A. Voznesenskii, a vice chairman of Sov-narkom, the director of Gosplan and generally regarded as one of Zhdanov’smost important allies. Voznesenski challenged Malenkov’s critique of the

40 Chapter Three

Sovnarkom’s administration of industry by repeatedly dramatizing its varioussuccesses. While he agreed rather vaguely that party organizations shouldgive “more attention” to the problems in industry and transport, he did not en-dorse Malenkov’s recommendation to appoint “several” specialized secre-taries at each level of the apparatus.65

Zhdanov may not have approved of Malenkov’s recommendations either;although he appeared on the rostrum at the Conference with Stalin and Molo-tov, he did not address the Conference and his silence may have reflected hisopposition to Malenkov’s proposal. Furthermore, A Kuznetsov, the secondsecretary of the Leningrad gorkom, and generally regarded as an ally of Zh-danov, implied that the Politburo had not given unanimous support toMalenkov’s recommendations.66 But whatever the extent of opposition fromZhdanov and his supporters, Malenkov’s suggestions were incorporated intothe resolution adopted by the Conference that held both party and state agen-cies responsible for shortfalls and charged that party organizations had failedto assure the fulfillment of orders either because they were preoccupied withthe procurement of agricultural products or because they did not “understand”their responsibilities for industry and transport.67

The resolution insisted that gorkom and obkom could no longer “standaside” from industrial questions and ordered them and the newly appointedsecretaries to become concerned with all the details of enterprise activity in-cluding plan fulfillment, effective use of resources, labor discipline, the in-troduction of new technology, and the struggle against absenteeism. Secre-taries were told to foster personal ties with the leaders in each enterprise, tovisit them on a regular basis, to become sufficiently knowledgeable to assurethe promotion of qualified personnel, and to make recommendations abouthiring and firing.68

The resolution did not refer at all to the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis theadministration, an omission that seemed to imply that the new secretaries forindustry and transport were now to be regarded as the most important level ofauthority for party organizations. Zhdanov’s effort to focus party officials’control on the enterprise per se was thus at least temporarily cast aside in fa-vor of the authority for the local specialized secretaries.

Immediately after the Conference, Malenkov’s status in the leadership im-proved; he was made a candidate member of the Politburo along with Vozne-senskii and Shcherbakov.68 In the months between the 19th Conference andthe German attack on the USSR in June 1941, the Central Committee’s pub-lications continued to endorse Malenkov’s definitions of officials’ prioritiesas essential for accelerating the defense production of the USSR.70 AlthoughPravda marked the anniversary of Lenin’s birth by attacking the new indus-trial secretaries’ tendency to override the decisions of factory directors,71 and


Bol’shevik stressed the authority of Sovnarkom at about the same time,72 theCentral Committee’s publications did not provide any sustained support forZhdanov’s conception of priorities in the last months before the German as-sault on the USSR.

In the subsequent debate over party officials’ priorities and responsibilitiesMalenkov and Zhdanov made very few public statements. However, their al-lies and spokesmen repeatedly cited both Stalin’s pronouncements and the re-ports and resolutions made in the years from 1937 until 1941 to provide le-gitimization for their respective positions. Zhdanov’s supporters repeatedlycited Stalin’s assertions about the importance of the study of Marxism-Leninism, his declaration that economic success was ultimately dependent onsuccessful “internal” party work, and his injunction against party officials“replacement” of governmental authorities under their supervision to bolstertheir periodic efforts to limit party officials’ industrial responsibilities. Zh-danov’s supporters also repeatedly cited the Central Committee’s decree ofNovember 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs and the decree of Au-gust 1939 condemning local officials’ neglect of the study of theory in theirefforts to assure continued stress on party members’ mastery of Marxism-Leninism. Zhdanov’s supporters and spokesmen never referred positively tothe decisions of the 18th Conference in 1941 and sometimes directly assailedthem for leading to the neglect of knowledge of theory and fostering a ten-dency toward “practicality.”

In direct contrast, Malenkov and his spokesmen and supporters ignoredStalin’s comment that the success of economic work was ultimately dependenton “internal” party work and instead cited his statements about the interde-pendence of the two spheres of party work. Malenkov’s supporters also con-sistently ignored Stalin’s admonitions about the importance of the study of the-ory for practical success and instead repeatedly cited his formulations on theimportance of Soviet patriotism. Finally, particularly during the first years ofthe war, they referred repeatedly to the decisions of the 18th Conference as es-sential to the war effort, and sometimes assailed the decisions of the 18th Con-gress for undermining officials’ capacity to cope with problems of industry.

NOTES

1. Pravda, March 30, 1939, 1; April 3, 1939, 1; April 11, 1939, 1. For a particu-larly strong endorsement of Zhdanov’s views see the editorial marking the anniver-sary of Lenin’s birth. Pravda, April 22, 1939, 1.

2. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Bolsheviki obiazany znat zakony razvitiia obshchestva,”Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9 (1939), 24–30. Approved for publication April 27,1939.

42 Chapter Three

3. “Velichestvennaia programma bor’by za kommunizmu,” Bol’shevik, no. 8(1939), 5. Approved for publication April 29, 1939.

4. “Vpered ko kommunizmu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9 (1939), 6–9. Ap-proved for publication April 27, 1939.

5. Pravda, May 3, 1939, 1. Boterbloem, 191.6. “V tsentral’nom komitete VKP(B),” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1939),

50–53. The decree was not dated and was summarized. Approved for publication May13, 1939.

7. The evidence is indirect. See the claims in “Bol’she konkretnosti I operativnostv rukovodiaishchei rabote,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1939); Pravda, May 15,1939, 1–2.

8. Pravda, May 15, 1939, 1–2.9. Pravda, May 15, 1939, 4; May 17, 1939, 2; May 18, 1939, 4; May 19, 1939,

2; May 21, 1939, 1.10. “Osnova ekonomicheskaia zadach SSSR,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1939), 10–11.

Approved for publication May 21, 1939.11. Politicheskii Slovar’, 268. The Central Control Commission was evidently re-

named the Commission of Party Control in May 1939. See KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol.7 (1985), 109.

12. Pravda, June 3, 1939, 1; June 6, 1939, 2; June 10, 1939, 2.13. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (London: Oxford University

Press, 1949), Vol. 2, 255.14. Pravda, July 20, 1939, 1; July 21, 1939, 1.15. Malenkov did not appear for the traditional review of the participants in phys-

ical culture day. Pravda, July 19, 1939, 1. Zhdanov appeared by himself on the fol-lowing days. Pravda, July 20, 1939; July 26, 1939.

16. “Bolshe organizovannosti v propagandistskoi rabote,” Bol’shevik, no.11/12(1939), 1–8. Approved for publication August 7, 1939.

17. “Postanovlenie TsK VKP(B), Avgt.16, 1939,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15(1939), 47–50.

18. N. Patolichev, “O sochetanii partiino-politicheskoi I khoziaistvennoe,” Parti-inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 14 (1939), 33–36. Approved for publication August 5, 1939.

19. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 134. 20. Pravda, September 7, 1939, 1; September 9, 1939, 1.21. “Za usilenie partiinogo rukovodstva promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 19 (1939), 1–7. Approved for publication October 23, 1939.22. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 135–38.23. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 139–41.24. Boterbloem, 200; Pravda, November 7, 1939, 1.25. Pravda, November 9, 1939; November 10, 1939, 1.26. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 142–44.27. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol 7 (1985), 145.28. G. M. Malenkov, “Stalin on Cadres,” Stalin (New York: International Publish-

ers, 1940), 117–18. A. S. Shcherbakov, “The VKP(B)-An Impregnable Fortress,”Stalin, 167–68.


29. G. F. Aleksandrov, V. Gal’ianov, N. Rubinshtein, Politicheskii Slovar(Moscow:1940), 189–90.

30. Pravda, January 22, 1940, 2.31. “Leninsko-stalinskoi put k kommunizmu,” Bol’shevik, no. 2 (1940), 2–6. Ap-

proved for publication January 19, 1940.32. Pravda, February 11, 1940, 1; February 13, 1940, 1.33. Pravda, February 24, 1940, 1.34. Pravda, March 2, 1904, 1.35. Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1961), 250.36. Pravda, March 19, 1940, 1.37. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 426. 38. Pravda, March 30, 1940, 1; April 1, 1940, 1.39. Towster, 282–83.40. Pravda, April 18, 1940, 1.41. Pravda, April 16, 1940, 1.42. “Velikii prodolzhatel’ dela Marksa-Engelsa,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1940), 26–29.

Approved for publication April 20, 1940; F. Konstantinov, “Lenin o kommunistich-eskom vospitanii trudiashchikhsiia,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1940), 80–81; “Bol’shevist-skuiu propaganda na vyshuiu stupen,” Bol’shevik, no. 10 (1940), 3–9. Approved forpublication June 9, 1940.

43. James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, eds. Materials for the Study of the So-viet System (Ann Arbor, Mich., Wahr Publishing Company, 1953), 356–63.

44. “Vozglavit trudovoi pod’em mass dobitsiia zheleznoi distipliny trudy,” Parti-inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11/12 (1940). Approved for publication July 4, 1940; A.Tsegolov, “V tsentr vnimaniia -voprosy ekonomiki,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.11/12(1940), 37–39; F. Limno and B. Fridland, “Vyshe uroven khoziaistvennogo rukovod-stva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1940), 40–43. Approved for publication July 29,1940.

45. I. Kapustin, “Vsemerno ukrepliat edinonachalie,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.15/16 (1940), 27–30; A. Liapon, “Lenin I Stalin o edinonachalie,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1940), 7–10. Approved for publication October 1, 1940; “Edi-nonachalie I pravo kontrolia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 18 (1940), 34–36. Approvedfor publication October 21, 1940; “Gosudarstvennaia I partiinaia ditsiplina,” Parti-inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1940), 3–5.

46. “Strana sotsializma dol’zhna stat vo mnogo raz sil’nee I moguchestvennee,”Bol’shevik, no.11/12 (1940), 14–17. Approved for publication July 9, 1940.

47. Pravda, July 30, 1940, 1.48. Bol’shevik, no.11/12–15/16 (1940).49. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh,Vol. 7 (1985), 175–77.50. Pravda, September 7, 1940, 1.51. Pravda, September 9, 1940, 1.52. Pravda, September 20, 1940, 1.53. Pravda, September 24, 1940, 1.54. Pravda, October 1, 1940, 1.

44 Chapter Three

55. “O krugozore partiinogo I gosudarstvennogo rabotnika,” Bol’shevik, no. 17(1940), 8–14. Approved for publication October 10, 1940.

56. M. Kalinin, O kommunisticheskom vospitanii. Zbrannye rechi I statii(Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946), 74–91.

57. Pravda, November 9, 1940, 5; Pravda, November 11, 1940, 1.58. G. Popov, “Partiinyi organizatsii I tekhnologicheskaia ditsiplina na proizvod-

stve,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19/20 (1940), 34–39. Approved for publication No-vember 4, 1940.

59. G. Shitarev, “ O stile rukovodsta gorkom partii promyshlennosti,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no.19/20, 52–55; A. Rozhkov, “Promyshlennyi otdel obkoma,” Parti-inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1940) 53–56. Approved for publication November 20,1940.

60. Pravda, November 14, 1940, 1; “Rashiriat I uglubliat propaganda marksizma-leninizma,” Bol’shevik, no. 21 (1940), 7–13. Approved for publication November 29,1940.

61. “Za dal’neishii pod’em sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1940), 9–13. Approved for publication December 30, 1940.

62. Pravda, January 22, 1941, 1.63. “Pod znamenem leninizma,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1941), 2–5. Approved for pub-

lication January 30, 1941.64. G. M. Malenkov, “O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblaste promyshlen-

nosti I transporta,” Bol’shevik, no. 3/4 (1941), 15.65. N.A.Voznesenskii, “Khoziaistvennyi itog 1940 I plan razvitiia narodnogo

khoziaistva,” Bol’shevik, no. 3/4 (1941), 36–55.66. Pravda, February 18, 1941.67. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 460–63.68. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 460–63.69. Pravda, February 22, 1941, 1.70. Pravda, February 28, 1941, 1; March 7, 1941, 1; “Povernut vnimanie partiinykh

organizatsii v storonu promyshlennosti I transport,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4/5(1941), 3–8. Approved for publication February 26, 1941.

71. Pravda, April 22, 1941, 1.72. “Prevratit vse predpriiatiia v peredovie-boevaia zadacha partiinykh organizat-

sii,” Bol’s shevik, no. 7/8 (1941), 12–20. Approved for publication April 29, 1941.


47

In May 194l Stalin became the Chairman of the Council of People’s Com-missars without giving up his position as General Secretary of theCC/VKP(B). As a result, he became the leader of both the “inner party” offull-time officials and the “outer party” composed of the Communists whomanned the Soviet state. At the same time, he named Zhdanov to be the “sec-ond secretary” and shifted his responsibility for the agitprop directorate toShcherbakov, the head of the Moscow party organization.1

The sudden and successful German assault on the USSR in June 1941 had adevastating impact on the political system of the USSR. Stalin’s frantic effortsto save it from collapse influenced the relative standing and political authorityof the two junior Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B). In July 194l Stalin establishedthe so-called emergency state defense committee (GOKO) to coordinate the ac-tivities of the armed forces, the political police, the governmental structure, andthe party’s apparatus. The GOKO was composed of Stalin, Molotov,Voroshilov, Beria, and Malenkov.2 Stalin’s failure to name Zhdanov to theGOKO clearly reduced his direct influence in the leadership of the USSR whilethe appointment of Malenkov as the only Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) besidesStalin in GOKO clearly bolstered his authority in Stalin’s inner circle.

Furthermore, the rapidity of the German advance against Leningrad threat-ened Zhdanov’s political future. Stalin reportedly held Zhdanov andVoroshilov responsible for the initial failure of the USSR’s armed forces tostem the German advance, for their allegedly unauthorized establishment ofa local defense council and local defense units in Leningrad, and their allegedfailure to report military setbacks.3

In August 1941 Stalin sent a special commission headed by Molotov andMalenkov to Leningrad to consider the possibility of a full evacuation of the

Chapter Four

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

city, replaced Voroshilov with Zhukov, and may have reduced Zhdanov’s au-thority in the military council in Leningrad.4 Henceforth, Zhdanov wasclearly preoccupied with the defense of Leningrad; although he did play someadvisory role in agitprop work in the armed forces, he was apparently unableto give much attention to the agitprop directorate and its activities until some-time after the end of the siege of Leningrad in early 1944.

The rapid German advance not only seriously threatened Zhdanov’s posi-tion within the leadership but also produced major changes in the structureand ideological stance of the agitprop directorate. Stalin’s first public pro-nouncement during the war in July 1941 had prompted a major shift in offi-cial ideology. Stalin charged that Hitler’s regime sought to destroy the “na-tional culture and national statehood” of both the Russian and non-Russianpeoples in the USSR, and he did not mention either the VKP(B) or Marxism-Leninism as a source of inspiration or orientation.5 Shortly after Stalin’sspeech, the leaders of the agitprop directorate gave increased attention toStalin’s prewar definition of the “driving forces” of Soviet society, i.e., the“moral-political unity of Soviet society, the friendship of peoples of theUSSR, and Soviet patriotism.”

This formulation had not been given much attention since the 18th Congress,but it became the central theme of the agitprop directorate in the first ninemonths of the war. The leaders of agitprop elaborated on Stalin’s definitions ina series of essays published in the first issue of Bol’shevik that was publishedafter Stalin’s address. G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, declared thatthe “friendship between the peoples of the USSR” was the basis for the unityof the USSR and the dynamism of its war effort; M. Iovchuk, a deputy directorof agitprop praised the “progressive nature” of Russian patriotism, and E. M.Iaroslavskii, a veteran Stalinist historian who specialized in the history of theVKP(B), praised the Slavic peoples’ struggle against fascism.6

While Stalin’s pronouncements set the tone for wartime propaganda, theinitial collapse of resistance and the demands of the war effort led to a totaltransformation of the agitprop structure. Agitprop personnel were directlymobilized into the armed forces in order to counter the rapid deterioration ofmorale, and the various institutions established in 1938 and 1939 to foster thestudy of Marxism-Leninism by all members of the party were either elimi-nated or modified. Leading personnel from the directorate were assigned di-rectly to the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, which was re-sponsible for all the “political work” within military units, the local partyschools were transformed into political schools for the military, the numerousseminars and lectures on ideological questions came to a halt. The partkabi-net that had been designed to help party members engaged in the “indepen-dent study” of Marxism-Leninism were transformed into agitpunkt for “mass

48 Chapter Four

work” in support of the war effort,7 and the rank-and-file propagandists whohad not been mobilized into the armed forces were assigned to “mass work”to accelerate defense production.8

While the institutions designed to support party members’ study of Marx-ism-Leninism were either dismantled or modified, the party officials subor-dinate to the cadres directorate were given vast new responsibilities for theadministration of industry. Stalin seems to have attempted initially to extendthe Sovnarkom’s control over defense production,9 but the rapidity and depthof the advance of the German armed forces evidently made it increasinglydifficult for the Sovnarkom to assert its authority. The German occupation ofmajor centers of industrial production in the Western regions of the USSR andthe rapid evacuation of industrial plants to the east disrupted the links be-tween the individual commissariats and “their” subordinate enterprises andplaced a premium on the regional coordination of industrial activity and theeffective use of local raw materials and labor.

In response to these pressing needs, the network of specialized secretariesfor particular sectors of industrial production that had been established by thedecisions of the 18th Conference expanded tremendously. The history of theCheliabinsk obkom reveals that there were eighteen specialized secretaries re-sponsible for various critical areas of industrial production and transport es-tablished between July 1941 and December 1942 in accordance with the de-crees of the CC/VKP(B), GOKO, and the Sovnarkhom.10 While the details ofthis expansion are shrouded in secrecy, it undoubtedly occurred in everyoblast.

While it is impossible to determine Malenkov’s role in this extraordinaryexpansion of the apparatus, during the following year the Central Commit-tee’s publications repeatedly endorsed the position he had outlined in his re-port to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941. In September1941 Pravda praised local party officials’ successful coordination of indus-trial production and hailed the decisions of the 18th Conference of theVKP(B) for preparing them for these responsibilities.11 In December 194lPravda declared that the officials in both obkom and gorkom were more at-tuned to local economic needs than the people’s commissariats and shouldtherefore work directly with Gosplan,12 and by early 1942 Pravda explicitlypraised local officials’ effective coordination of production and the solutionof manpower problems.13

The Central Committee’s publications continued to extol local party offi-cials’ intervention in the details of industrial administration throughout the firsthalf of 1942. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo (which resumed publication sometime inearly 1942) lauded party officials who had solved problems in industrial pro-duction, criticized those who had not yet shown sufficient operativnost toward

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943 49

lagging enterprises, and had failed to follow the 18th Conference’s admoni-tions to “penetrate deeply” into the activities of every industrial enterprise.14

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo declared that the decisions made by the 18th Conferencewere the key to the successful war effort; they had not only prepared officialsto cope with the immense problems of production created by the war, but hadalso enabled them to deal effectively with the alleged “narrow departmental-ism” and the “technological conservativism” of the Sovnarkom’s officials.15

Partiinoe Stroitel’svto now not only provided extremely detailed and posi-tive coverage of the activities of the secretaries for industry, but also sharplycriticized those who merely “signalled” shortcomings to the higher authori-ties without taking remedial action themselves.16 Furthermore in May andJune, Pravda applauded the decisions of the 18th Conference,17 and explic-itly cited Malenkov’s report to the Conference as a source of inspiration anddirection for the officials of the VKP(B).18

While praising the formulations of the 18th Conference, the publications ofthe Central Committee almost totally ignored the decisions and definitionsadopted by the 18th Congress of the VKP(B). In the desperate atmosphere ofthe first months of the war, Pravda virtually ignored local officials party-political work19 and made no reference to Marxism-Leninism as a source ofinspiration or a “guide to action” or to the party members’ study of theory.Stalin reiterated his patriotic stance in the winter of 1941; his report in No-vember 1941 on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, which was pre-sented in the midst of the desperate battle for the control of Moscow, was par-ticularly chauvinistic in tone.20 Pravda dutifully represented Soviet patriotismrather than Marxism-Leninism as the basis for Soviet citizens’ actions at thefront and in the rear.21

But in February 1942, soon after the Red Army had thrown back the Ger-man assault on Moscow, Stalin changed his characterization of the VKP(B).In February 1942 he publicly recognized that the VKP(B) played a “leadingrole” in his address on Red Army Day and he concluded his address with theslogan “Long live the Bolshevik party, leading us to victory.”22

Stalin’s reference to the Bolshevik party in these terms was accompaniedby a serious effort to rebuild the apparatus of full-time officials of theVKP(B), which had been badly disrupted by the outbreak of the war.23

Shortly after his address, the journal Propagandist, the organ of the party or-ganization in Moscow, was evidently assigned to the agitprop directorate andit launched a concerted campaign to restore party members’ study of Marx-ism-Leninism. From 1942 until its abrupt demise in mid-1946 Propagandistconsistently endorsed the restoration of the study of Marxism-Leninism in ac-cordance with the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the

50 Chapter Four

proper use of the Kratkii kurs and other resolutions on agitprop work adoptedbefore the war.

The first issue of Propagandist to appear as an “organ of the CC/VKP(B)”(March 13, 1942) included Stalin’s address on Red Army Day, and an essayby Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) A. S. Shcherbakov that implied that Stalinhad now sanctioned a revival of party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism.Shcherbakov explicitly argued that it was the source of party members’ ori-entation and defined Propagandist as a “militant organ of Marxist-Leninistinterpretation” that would help the workers of agitprop enlighten both mem-bers of the party and all Soviet citizens.24

A few weeks later, G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, spelled outthe implications of this campaign for the party’s officials. He now held themdirectly responsible for improving their own and their subordinates’ knowl-edge of Marxist-Leninist theory, sharply attacked those whose alleged “pre-occupation with practical work” had made them neglect their own study oftheory, and supported his critique by citing Stalin’s assertion that all practicalsuccess was dependent on a Marxist-Leninist consciousness.25

Following Aleksandrov’s lead, other spokesmen for the agitprop direc-torate insisted that the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) adopted before the war,which were clearly identified with Zhdanov’s leadership of the directorate,were still binding. M. Makhanov, a member of the editorial board of Propa-gandist, declared that the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 onthe proper use of the Kratkii kurs, the rules of the party adopted by the 18thCongress in March 1939, which had held party members responsible for the“independent study” of Marxist-Leninist theory, and the Central Committee’sdecree of August 1939, which had criticized local party officials for their neg-lect of the study of theory, remained the basis for agitprop work. Makhanovurged members of the party to resume their “independent study” of the Krak-tii kurs, and of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and called forthe immediate restoration of lectures and the activities of the partkabinet.26

The campaign for the study of theory received a major impetus from themassive influx of new members into the VKP(B) during the first year of thewar.27 In the spring and summer of 1942 the agitprop directorate began to re-build its war-torn internal educational program28 and Propagandist urged thethousands of new members of the party to study the Kratkii kurs.29 Zhdanovmay have played some role in the decision to give renewed attention to partymembers’ ideological education; Propagandist’s advocacy coincided with abrief burst of positive coverage of his activities. In June 1942 he appeared inpublic with other leading officials at a session of the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR and he was named to a new council on agitprop in the armed forces


that was established in the Main Political Administration of the ArmedForces.30

Whatever Zhdanov’s exact role, the formation of this council seemed togive greater impetus to the campaign for the restoration of the agitprop di-rectorate’s prewar status. In late June 1942 E. M. Iaroslavskii, a leading Stal-inist historian and a member of the new council, made a particularly vigorousappeal for the immediate revival of lectures on Marxism-Leninism, support-ing his position with repeated references to the Central Committee’s decreeof November 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs and to Stalin’s warn-ings about the dire results produced by neglect of the study of theory.31 Mostimportant, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) of July 14, 1942 explicitly endorsedthis campaign. The decree sharply attacked the obkom in Penza for allegedlypermitting its agitprop workers to serve as “agents in economic campaigns”rather than providing the necessary lectures on the history of the VKP(B)andMarxist-Leninist theory for new members of the party.32

But in the second half of 1942, this campaign came to an abrupt halt andboth Bol’shevik and Propagandist rather suddenly gave more attention to So-viet patriotism.33 The timing of this shift suggests that the leadership soughtto appeal to Soviet citizens’ patriotism during the military crisis caused by themassive German offensive against the city of Stalingrad in the latter half of1942. In fact, the campaign to restore the study of theory did not resume un-til shortly after the defeat of the German forces and Stalin’s remarks markingRed Army Day in February 1943.

The battle for Stalingrad may also have influenced the relative standing ofthe two junior secretaries of the Central Committee and the public discussionof the relative importance of party officials’ economic and party politicalwork. In mid-July 1942, Malenkov was dispatched to the Stalingrad frontwhere he reportedly remained until December 20, l942.34

On July 15, 1942, the day after the decision to send Malenkov to Stalin-grad, Pravda suddenly gave far more attention to party officials’ “internalwork” than it had since the beginning of the war. In the following weeks italso gave more stress to their “educational work” and to the industrial role ofthe Sovnarkom.35 Most important, in mid-September 1942, PartiinoeStroitel’stvo openly criticized party officials for their “excessive” concernwith the details of production and charged that “the narrow economic orien-tation” of some of the specialized secretaries responsible for industry andtransport had made them “lose their taste” for, or “underestimate” the signif-icance of “internal party work.” The journal now declared that Stalin’s asser-tion that “party-political and organizational work” was the basis for economicsuccess was particularly important in wartime, and assailed local officials forassigning workers from agitprop and the org-instructional department to act

52 Chapter Four

as agents in economic campaigns (particularly in rural areas) rather than al-lowing them to carry out their own responsibilities.

The editorial urged local officials to focus on the cultivation of socialistcompetition, the improvement of workers’ living and working conditions, therecruitment of the “best people” into the party, and the mobilization of the lo-cal members of the aktiv to engage in mass political work to inspire the work-ers. But Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not challenge the primacy given produc-tion or criticize Malenkov’s definitions. In fact, it claimed (ratherinaccurately) that the decisions of the 18th Conference embodied the “correctcombination of economic and party political work.”36

This shift in emphasis was also expressed in decrees passed by both localparty organizations and the Central Committee. Local party organizations re-portedly passed a series of resolutions urging greater concern with “internal”work in September,37 and a decree of the Central Committee (September 24,1942) on the status of “party work” in the Kuzbass coal regions also urged amore balanced approach to the question of officials’ priorities. On the onehand, it assailed obkom and gorkom officials for their alleged failures to avertthe decline in coal production allegedly caused by the “drift” of the local eco-nomic administrators and it ordered the appointment of secretaries for thecoal industry in both the Novosibirsk obkom and its subordinate gorkom todeal with production problems and to restore the needed discipline. On theother hand, the CC decree sharply attacked local officials for their neglect ofthe basic elements of party political work, i.e., the recruitment of new mem-bers of the party from among both the workers and intelligentsia, the devel-opment of local agitprop activities, and the proper concern with the substan-dard working and living conditions of the miners. The Central Committeedispatched a delegation that included representatives of all three major divi-sions of the apparatus to the scene to improve local officials’ activities.38

The campaign in support of party political work received a major stimulusfrom two decrees that were issued in October and November 1942. In Octo-ber 1942 a decree of the CC/VKP(B) granted the professional military offi-cers in the armed forces complete authority (pol’noe edinonachalie) overtheir units and demoted the political commissars to deputy commanders forpolitical affairs (zampolit).39 Pravda praised the decrees for distinguishingbetween the commanders’ “operational” responsibilities and the zampolit’s“political” role and declared that it would improve the level of political workin the armed forces.40

The Politburo adopted the same position in its decree of November 1, 1942,on the politotdel assigned to the Kuibishev and Southern-Ural railroads. ThePolitburo charged that they had interfered in administrative and economicmatters and that their neglect of party political work had weakened the party


bodies on the railroads, undermined agitprop work among the key workers,and had made the meetings of the primary party organizations both “superfi-cial and bureaucratic.” The Politburo not only ordered the directors of poli-totdel to improve party political work but also sharply attacked the transportsecretaries and their departments at the obkom level, who had been given re-sponsibility for the politotdel by the 18th Conference of the VKP(B), for theirfailure to monitor and supervise their activities.41

The following week Stalin presented his report on the anniversary of theBolshevik revolution. He emphasized the “operational” responsibilities of theagencies of the Soviet government by praising the Sovnarkom and its com-missariats for their effective administration of industry, their successful evac-uation of industrial sites to the east, and the establishment of new centers ofindustrial development.42 Stalin’s positive references to the Sovnarkom’s ad-ministrative capacity seemed to imply that it enjoyed direct and primary re-sponsibility for the management of industry and that party officials had amore limited role.

In the aftermath of Stalin’s speech, the publications of the Central Com-mittee gave ever more stress to party political work. On November 22, 1942,Pravda’s lead editorial called for a “decisive strengthening of party politicalwork” in the mining regions around Moscow, urging party officials to im-prove agitprop work, to show greater concern for workers’ living conditionsand to help educate new workers, as well as continue to deal with the variousshortcomings in mining operations. On December 11, 1942, Pravda declaredthat many party officials in coal regions had not yet understood that effectiveparty political work was the key to the solution of economic problems.

Most significant, in mid-December Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo reversed its posi-tion on party officials’ economic responsibilities; it now characterized them as“extraordinary” developments caused by the war rather than as the logical out-growth of the decisions adopted by the 18th Conference! Furthermore, it nowexplicitly recognized that party officials’ “preoccupation” with industrial pro-duction had sapped their capacity to act as “political leaders” responsible forthe mobilization and education of members of the party43 and it sharply con-demned the “narrow economic approach” of the secretaries for transport.44

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s support for party political work became even moreexplicit at the end of the year. The lead editorial in its last issue of 1942 or-dered party officials in the Urals to teach their subordinates how to combineeconomic and party political work, to play a more direct role in the “ideolog-ical” life of party organizations, and not merely delegate these questions tothe departments for propaganda and for organizational-instructional work.45

A survey of meetings with PPO secretaries published in the same issue urgedthem to follow suit.46

54 Chapter Four

In early 1943, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo intensified its campaign against partyofficials’ “preoccupation” with the details of industrial management. In mid-January it chided their alleged willingness to act as “pushers” who sought tohelp hard-pressed enterprises seeking scarce labor and material resources.47

Later that month, it called for a major shift (povorot) toward party politicalwork and branded those who gave exclusive attention to industry as apoliti-cal “deliagi.”48

In February 1943, the siege of Stalingrad was lifted and the USSR’s armedforces launched a massive counterattack. In his remarks on Red Army Day,Stalin once again defined the VKP(B) as the “inspirer and organizer of theRed Army’s victories.”49 Stalin’s overt reference to the “inspirational” role ofthe VKP(B) was evidently interpreted as permitting the resumption of thecampaign to restore party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. The day af-ter Stalin’s address, G. F. Aleksandrov (who had stressed the overriding im-portance of “mass work” in November 1942)50 declared that the study ofMarxism-Leninism was more important in time of war than during peace-time! In support of this position, Aleksandrov cited Stalin’s statement of 1939that the mastery of Marxism-Leninism was essential for progress in everyfield of activity, sharply criticized those technically trained personnel who os-tensibly had ignored such study, and reminded members of the party that itsrules had defined Marxism-Leninism as the basis for all activity.51

The revival of the agitprop campaign to foster the study of Marxism-Leninism was accompanied by Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s growing attention toparty political work in the primary party organizations (PPOs). In March1943 it published materials that criticized both the secretaries of the primaryparty organizations (and the party organizers assigned to major industrial en-terprises) for their reluctance to provide personal leadership of both organi-zational and agitprop work and their delegation of these activities to their sub-ordinates.52 The leaders of the PPOs were told to improve their capacity tomobilize the workers by extending their personal contacts with them andlearning about their actual standard of living.53

The PPOs’ party political work was also discussed at a conference of thedirectors of the local org-instruction departments held in Moscow sometimein March 1943. One of the reports presented to the conference defined partypolitical work as the “main content” of the activities of primary party organ-izations and urged their secretaries to act as “political leaders” who “workedwith people.”54 A second report ordered local party officials to make full useof the local org-instruction departments that were responsible for the super-vision of the leaders of subordinate party organizations, for the verification oftheir fulfillment of previous decrees, and the provision of instruction on prob-lems of party political work.55


The importance of party political work was also stressed in a series of de-crees issued by the CC/VKP(B) on May 31, 1943, abolishing the politotdel intransport agencies, state farms, and Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). The de-cree on the transport agencies charged that the politotdel had not only “du-plicated” the work of government officials but also had undermined localparty organs’ supervision of primary party organizations. It asserted that theabolition of the politotdel would help to “strengthen edinonachalie in trans-port, to raise the responsibility of economic-administrative leaders and to im-prove party-political work.” The decrees on politotdel in state farms and MTSadopted the same position.56

Immediately after the appearance of these decrees, important party officialsjoined the campaign in support of party political work. In early June Secre-tary Shcherbakov urged the Moscow party organization to improve the ideo-logical-political level of all of its members.57 Pravda’s comment on his meet-ing with the Moscow aktiv (June 4, 1943) charged that the neglect of partypolitical work had produced shortcoming in the “leadership of the economy.”

This campaign evidently eased the way for those who sought the restora-tion of ideological education. In the summer of 1943, Stalin’s wartime pro-nouncements were published in the form of a pamphlet, and Propagandisttook the lead in portraying their study as essential for all members of theVKP(B).58 Both Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Bol’shevik quickly followedsuit.59 This campaign also provided excellent opportunities for those whosought to improve the living and working conditions of the industrial work-ers. These issues had been given sporadic attention during the previousmonths, but in July 1943 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo defined them as an extremelyimportant component of party political work.60 It now reported that obkommeetings had been convened throughout the USSR to discuss the issue andthat PPO secretaries, secretaries for industry, and officials of the organiza-tional instruction department had been ordered to give it far more attention.61

In the midst of this campaign the Politburo acted to limit local party offi-cials’ capacity to “interfere” in the details of industrial management. The of-ficial history of the VKP(B) reports that in August the Politburo reduced theauthority of specialized secretaries for industry in order to prevent their “ex-traordinary methods” from “taking root,” to limit their involvement with“economic-administrative” questions, to increase their concern with “inter-nal” work and to broaden the Sovnarkom’s responsibilities for the adminis-tration of industry.62 The official history of the Cheliabinsk obkom reports thatits industrial department was eliminated and that the secretaries for varioussectors of the economy were demoted to deputy secretaries.63

Simultaneously, the economic responsibilities of the Sovnarkom were ex-tended. In August 1943 a joint decree of the Central Committee and Sovnarkom

56 Chapter Four

established a special governmental committee to supervise the reconstruction ofthe newly liberated territories of the USSR. The decree implied that the people’scommissariats enjoyed direct responsibility for reconstruction and that localparty officials were obliged to monitor the state officials’ implementation ratherthan direct the recovery efforts themselves. G. M. Malenkov was named to chairthis committee.64 There is no way to determine whether or not Malenkov con-tinued to endorse an assertive role for local party officials at this juncture.

NOTES

1. O.V. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro: mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930 gody(Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), 254.

2. Pravda, July 1, 1941, 1.3. Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 255–59.4. Istoriia KPSS, 219–20.5. I. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 5–6.6. Bol’shevik, no. 13 (1941).7. G. D. Komkov, Ideino-politicheskaia rabota KPSS v 1941–1945 (Moscow:

Nauka, 1965), 110–16; I. Petrov, Stroitel’stvo politorganov partiinykh I komso-mol’skikh organizatsii armii I flota (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), 276–77.

8. Pravda, July 17, 1941, 1; “Partiinyi organizatsii v usloviiakh otechestvennoivoiny” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1941), pp.1–6. Approved for publication August 11, 1941.Kommunisticheskaia partiia v periode velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: 1961),445–46.

9. SSSR v velikoi otechestvennoi voine 1941–1945: Khronika (Moscow: 1970),16–27.

10. Partiinaia organizatsiia cheliabinskoi oblasti v velikoi otechestvennoi voine1941–1945 (Cheliabinsk: 1967), 12–13.

11. Pravda, September 15, 1941; September 27, 1941.12. Pravda, December 3, 1941, 1.13. Pravda, February 26, 1942, 1.14. “Obespeschivat front vsem neobkhodimym-glavnaia zadacha partiinykh orga-

nizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1942), 3–8. Approved for publication Febru-ary 3, 1942.

15. L. Gershberg, “Zhiznennaia sila reshenii XVIII svesoiuznoi partkonferentsii,”Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1942), 7–13. Approved for publication April 8, 1942.

16. M. Zelikson, “Rabota sekretarii gorkom po promyshlennosti,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no.8 (1942), 21–25. Approved for publication May 11, 1942.

17. Pravda, May 25, May 28, June 18, 1942.18. Pravda, June 17, 1942, 1.19. Pravda’s editorial of November 19, 1941, was the only one published in the

first six months of the war that criticized the “obliviousness” (zabvenie) to “partypolitical work.”


20. I. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 11–31.21. Pravda, January 1, 1942, 1.22. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 44.23. On January 4, 1942, the Central Committee had ordered the restoration of the

Advanced Party School for party organizers, which had been placed at the disposal ofthe people’s commissariat for defense at the beginning of the war. The school was totrain younger party officials (under forty years of age) for more responsible positions.KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 276.

24. A. S. Shcherbakov, “O nekotorye zadachakh propagandistskoi raboty,” Propa-gandist, no. 1 (1942), 8–11. Approved for publication March 13, 1942. The editorialboard included G. F. Aleksandrov, P. Fedoseev, L. Kuzmin, A. Makhanov, P. Pozdeev,and G. Vastskii. The journal included a section “In the agitprop directorate” that pub-lished decisions and circulars. It was never officially defined as an agitprop journalbut was labeled as the organ of the Moscow party organization and the CC/VKP(B).

25. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Velikaia sila bol’shevistskikh idei,” Propagandist, no. 2(1942), 13–14. Approved for publication April 3, 1942.

26. M. Makhanov, “Ustnaia propaganda v dni otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagan-dist, no. 3 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication April 20, 1942.

27. For the official figures on the growth of the party during the war see IstoriiaKPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 370–72.

28. “Programma po kursu propaganda I agitatsiia v usloviakh voennogo vremeni,”Propagandist, no. 4 (1942), 52–59.

29. P. Fedoseev, “Ob izuchenii kratkogo kurs istorii VKP(B) v usloviiakh otech-estvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 5/6 (1942), 14–21. Approved for publicationJune 16, 1942.

30. For his address to the Supreme Soviet, see Pravda, June 19, 1942, p. 3. For thecomposition of the new council see Petrov, 364–65.

31. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “Lektsionnaia rabota v usloviakh voiny,” Propagandist, no.7/8 (1942), 50–52. Approved for publication June 29, 1942.

32. The text of this decree has never been made public. For comment on its im-portance see K. Kuznetsov, “V chem prichiny slaboi raboty lektorskoi penzenskogoobkoma VKP(B),” Propagandist, no. 9 (1942), 49–50. Approved for publication July28, 1942.

33. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “O tekyshchem momente,” Propagandist, No. 9 (1942),3–9. Approved for Publication July 28, 1942; G. F. Aleksandrov, “Tekushchi momentotechestvennoi voiny I zadachy agitatorov,” Bol’shevik, no. 13 (1942), 23–40; N.An’iev, “Velikaia sila nerushimoi druzhby narodov SSSR,” Propagandist, no. 11/12(1942), 16–21. Approved for publication September 3, 1942; G. F. Aleksandrov,“Sovetskii narod otstoit velikie zavovevaniia oktiabriia,” Propagandist, no. 15/16(1942), 10–16. Approved for publication November 4, 1942; E. M. Iarosvaksii,“Vsemirnoe istoricheskoe znacheniia bor’by narodov SSSR protiv gitlerovskikhrazboinikov, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15/16 (1942), 20–25.

34. The official history of the party reports a decision to this effect on July 14,1942. See Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 334. Aleksander Werth reports that Malenkov

58 Chapter Four

was in Stalingrad most of the time from September 12, 1942 until late December. SeeAleksander Werth, The Stalingrad Year (London: A. A. Knopf, 1947), 462.

35. Pravda July 19, 24, 1942, 1; August 6, 7, 8, 1942, 1.36. “Umelo sochetat rabotu khoziaistvennuiu I partiino-politicheskuiu,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication September 14, 1942.37. See an excerpt from a resolution of the Cheliabinsk obkom in Istoriia KPSS,

Vol. 5, book 1, 439.38. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 43–48.39. See KPSS v velikoi otechestvennoi voine. Dokumeny I materialy

(Moscow:1970), 85–86.40. Pravda, October 11, 1942, 1.41. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 50–54.42. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 60.43. “My mozhem I dol’zhny ochistit sovetskuiu zamliiu ot gitlerovskoi nechestiu,”

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication December 15,1942.

44. “O partiino-politicheskoi rabote na zheleznodorozhnom transporte,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1942), 12–17.

45. “Zadachi bol’shevikov Urala,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1942), 3–8.Approved for publication December 28, 1942.

46. “Kak dol’zhen rabotat sekretar zavodskoi partorganizatsii,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1942), 14–19.

47. “Pod znamenem lenina:za nashu sovetskuiu rodinu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,no. 1 (1943), 5–6. Approved for publication January 19, 1943.

48. “Vpered za razgrom nemetskikh okkupantov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2(1943), 6–8. Approved for publication January 30, 1943.

49. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 94.50. G. F. Aleksandrov, “O nekotorykh zadachakh propagandistskoi I agitatsionnoi

raboty,” Propagandist, no. 19/20 (November 27, 1942), 3–10.51. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Ob izuchenii marksistko-leninskoi nauki v usloviiakh

otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 5 (February 23, 1943), 2–15.52. G. Shitarev, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 3 (1943), 7–10. Approved for publication March 13, 1943.53. Shitarev, 13–14.54. B. Borisov, “Voprosy partiino-politicheskoi raboty na predpriiatii,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 7 (1943), 13–14. Approved for publication April 21, 1943.55. Ia. Storozhev, “Voprosy raboty organizatsionno-instruktorskikh otdelov parti-

inykh komitetov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 8 (1943), 19. Approved for publicationApril 29, 1943.

56. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 412–17.57. Pravda, June 4, 1943, 1. 58. “O nekotorykh ocherednykh zadachakh agitatsiono-propagandistksoi raboty,”

Propagandist, no. 11/12 (1943), 9–10. Approved for publication July 2, 1943.59. “Vospitanie partiinykh kadrov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12(1943),

10–11. Approved for publication July 7, 1943; M. Medvedev, “Partiinost’ v rabote


khoziaistvennika,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12 (1943), 13–17; “Kniga tovar-ishcha Stalina, ‘O velikoi otechestvennoi voine sovetskogo soiuza,” Bol’shevik,no.13 (1943), 3–15. Approved for publication August 3, 1943.

60. “Partorganizatsii I voprosy byta trudiiaishchikhsiia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,no. 13/14 (1943), 3–8. Approved for publication July 27, 1943; V. Andrianov,“Zadachi nashei raboty v massakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1943), 9–13.

61. “Voprosy material’no bytovogo obsluzhivaniia naseleniia na plenumakh obko-mov I gorkomov partii,” 23–25.

62. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 363–64.63. Partiinaia organizatsiia cheliabinsk oblast, 47.64. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 65–104.

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61

The reform of the apparatus in August 1943 clearly obliged the officials of theVKP(B) to give more attention to their party political work but it did not endthe dispute over the range and scope of their responsibilities. In fact, the RedArmy’s liberation of German, occupied territory in the years between 1943and 1945 provided both the supporters and opponents of more emphasis onparty political work with excellent opportunities to press their own respectivedefinitions. The opponents argued that party officials should retain the exten-sive authority over the administration of industry that they had gained at thebeginning of the war in order to accelerate the country’s reconstruction. Theytherefore opposed the view that officials’ direct intervention in the details ofindustrial administration was an “extraordinary” development demanded bythe exigencies of wartime. At the same time, they expressed little or no en-thusiasm for the immediate restoration of the ideological education of partymembers and tended to portray Soviet patriotism as the basis for Soviet citi-zens’ actions.

In contrast, those who sought to restore the study of Marxism-Leninismwere emboldened by the growing stress on the significance of party politicalwork. They insisted that all members, but particularly the new members of theVKP(B), were obliged to study Marxism-Leninism to assure that they devel-oped the sense of vision and purpose essential to the vitality of the party as awhole. These officials could hardly attack the emphasis on Soviet patriotismin the midst of the war but they repeatedly insisted that the neglect of thestudy of Marxism-Leninism had baleful consequences.

During this period, Stalin’s own brief comments on the role of the VKP(B)and the “driving forces of Soviet society” seemed to have a direct impact onthe public discussion of party officials’ priorities and official ideology. At first

Chapter Five

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

glance, this linkage seems to be preposterous, but the materials published inthe organs of the CC/VKP(B) in the wake of his comments suggest that hissubordinates regarded his every word as politically significant. Whenever hepublicly stressed the “inspirational” role of the VKP(B), the organs of theCentral Committee quickly gave attention to the study of Marxism-Leninism.But when he muted or discarded this formulation and referred instead to theimportance of the “moral-political unity of soviet society, the friendship ofpeoples of the USSR, and Soviet patriotism” as the “driving forces of Sovietsociety” the campaign for the restoration of ideological education invariablystalled and party officials’ responsibilities for industrial production weregiven greater attention.

Stalin’s shifts produced frequent and confusing zigzags in the public dis-cussion of ideology in 1943–1944. In his address in November 1943 markingthe anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin defined the “leadership ofthe VKP(B)” as but one of the sources of the USSR’s strength. Shortly after-wards, the publications of the Central Committee gave more attention to So-viet patriotism, reduced their support for the study of Marxist-Leninist theory,and gave renewed support to party officials’ responsibilities for industry. InFebruary 1944 Stalin reversed field to once again stress the “inspirational”role of the VKP(B). Immediately afterward, published support for the studyof theory revived and a series of decrees lambasted particular organizationsof the party for their ostensible neglect of such study. But this was not tolast—in November 1944 Stalin once again stressed the importance of Sovietpatriotism and the campaign in support of the study of Marxism-Leninismcame to a temporary halt.

As noted above, the publication of Stalin’s wartime speeches in the sum-mer of 1943 had been followed by increased support for the restoration ofparty members’ ideological education. After the reform of the apparatus inAugust 1943, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed suit. In early September 1943,it published an essay by S. Zadionchenko, the secretary of the Kemerovskiiobkom, charging that “theoretically backward” members of the party who hadjoined during the war had undermined the principle of one-man managementby incorrectly encouraging the leaders of PPOs in industrial enterprises to in-terfere in the details of production beyond their authority. Zadionchenko in-sisted that members of the party should study Marxism-Leninism in order toend such “practicalism.”1

In the fall of 1943 the campaign to restore ideological education and otherelements of party political work was reflected in both the decrees and publi-cations of the Central Committee. In early September, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvonot only acknowledged that internal work had been neglected but also recog-nized that it was the basis for economic success.2 A decree of the CC/VKP(B)

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(September 13, 1943) established a new crash program under the agitprop di-rectorate to train editors and other officials for the newspapers being reestab-lished in the republics, regions, and cities in all of the newly liberated territo-ries of the USSR.3 A decree of the CC/VKP(B) of September 21, 1943,stressed the responsibility of the organizational-instruction department for theverification of the fulfillment of the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) by local partyunits and reemphasized the power of its local representatives to investigateand to recommend remedial action when necessary.4 In the wake of this de-cree, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo called on party officials to act as “political lead-ers” who should “work with people,” improve their own ideological level,and foster the local aktiv’s “taste for theory.”5

In this context, Propagandist resumed its campaign to restore the study ofMarxism-Leninism. In September 1943 it published an essay by S. Ignatiev,the secretary of the Bashkir obkom, charging that many local officials wereideologically ignorant and that raikom secretaries had completely ignoredtheir responsibilities for agitprop work. He supported his call for a restorationof rigorous study of Marxism-Leninism with direct references to Stalin’s re-port to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939.6 The following month Pro-pagandist pressed on by singling out particular party organizations for directcriticism. It charged that the indifference of the obkom in Kuibyshev and theBashkir oblast to the study of theory had allowed many members of the partyto lapse into “practicalism” and urged the agitprop officials to restore theproper concern with political consciousness.7 Moreover, Propagandistseemed to identify Zhdanov with this campaign by linking its praise forMarxism-Leninism with a particularly positive portrayal of his role in the de-fense of Leningrad.8

The campaign evidently led to improvements in the institutional basis forthe teaching and study of Marxism-Leninism. A decree of the CC/VKP(B)(November 4, 1943) ordered the Advanced Party School to establish a pro-gram to reeducate instructors of Marxism-Leninism and political economyfor the country’s institutions of higher education. The curriculum for all in-structors included courses in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the his-tory of the VKP(B), the history of the war, dialectical and historical material-ism, political economy, and international relations. The instructors in politicaleconomy were to take additional courses on the political economy of social-ism and the basic elements of industry, transport, and agriculture. The agit-prop directorate and local party officials were held responsible for selectingthe participants in the program.9

But in the winter of 1943–1944, the campaign to restore the study of Marx-ism-Leninism came to a temporary halt. The timing of this shift suggests thatit was prompted by Stalin’s brief comments on the role of the VKP(B) in his

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945 63

address in November 1943. Stalin did refer to the VKP(B)’s leadership of theUSSR, but only as one of the many sources of the strength of the SovietUnion, gave particular stress to the ideology of “friendship of peoples,” andfailed to refer to the VKP(B)’s leadership role in the closing set of slogans.Moreover, the printed text of his address capitalized the references to the con-tributions made by the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and thetransport agencies but did not capitalize the reference to party leadership.10

Stalin’s address was followed by renewed emphasis on Soviet patriotism.Propagandist lauded Stalin’s analysis of the “sources of Soviet strength,”11

and marked the introduction of a new patriotic national anthem in Decemberwith a barrage of praise for the Soviet state and the Russian people’s “leader-ship” of other nationalities in the USSR.12

In this context, those who championed the primacy of party officials’ eco-nomic work and “mass work” resumed their own campaign. The day after thepublication of the USSR’s new national anthem in December 1943, Bol’she-vik praised local party officials as the “main instruments” of GOKO in the ad-ministration of industry, criticized those who ostensibly remained indifferentto these questions,13 and highlighted the success in the aviation industry.(Since this sector of the defense industry was under Malenkov’s supervision,this reference may have been an indication of support for his orientation.)14

In January 1944 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo sponsored a conference on politicaleducation that repeatedly stressed the overriding importance of “mass work”in support of war production where M. Kalinin, who had acted as a counterspokesman to Zhdanov before the war, presented the case for “mass work” inhis address.15

Patriotic themes were particularly evident in January 1944 during thecommemoration of the anniversary of Lenin’s death. Pravda’s editorial onthe occasion stressed Lenin’s and Stalin’s personal leadership of VelikiiRus16 (sic) rather than their contributions to Marxism-Leninism and Secre-tary Shcherbakov’s address represented Soviet patriotism as the ideologi-cal basis for action.17 Later that month, the Central Committee of theVKP(B) met for the first time during the war to approve the new nationalanthem for the USSR. (“The International” was retained as the anthem ofthe CC/VKP(B.)18

But this campaign of patriotic sloganizing collapsed shortly after Stalin’scomments on the VKP(B) in his address on Red Army Day in February 1944.Stalin now returned to a more orthodox definition of the role of the VKP(B);he ignored Soviet patriotism, implied that the intelligentsia deserved specialattention because of its effective leadership of the workers and peasants dur-ing the war, and he ended his address with the slogan, “Long live the VKP(B),the inspirer and organizer of the Red Army’s great victories.”19

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The agitprop campaign for the restoration of study of Marxism-Leninismrevived shortly after Stalin’s speech. In mid-March, Bol’shevik published anessay that attributed the intelligentsia’s leadership of the workers and peas-ants to its “mastery of Marxism-Leninism,” and declared that the agitprop di-rectorate’s activities were based on Stalin’s address to the CC/VKP(B) in1937, the decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs in November 1938, andStalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B).20 In early April 1944 theCentral Committee restored its “Lenin courses” to train the secretaries ofgorkom and raikom for positions of higher authority and to raise their theo-retical level.21

In April Bol’shevik editorially endorsed the ideological education of newmembers of the party,22 and at the end of the month Propagandist resumed itscampaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism with a vengeance. Itcharged that party members’ “preoccupation” with immediate practical mat-ters had produced widespread “theoretical backwardness” and reminded offi-cials that the Central Committee’s decree of August 1939 had held them re-sponsible for their subordinates’ political knowledge. It also called for theimmediate restoration of lectures on questions of theory, of all of the activi-ties of the partkabinet, and urged those who had completed the Kratkii kursto begin “independent study” of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, po-litical economy, and the history of the USSR.23

At this juncture, Zhdanov once again began to play a more important rolein the national leadership. In January 1944 the German blockade of Leningradhad been lifted, and in April 1944 the Leningrad gorkom and obkom convenedfor the first time since the beginning of the war. In his report to the meeting,Zhdanov criticized the extension of party officials’ responsibility for industrythat had developed during the first years of the war. The resolution on his re-port declared that the gorkom could now give up its “extraordinary” respon-sibilities for industry and restore the “normal forms and methods of partyguidance of industry.” It also recognized the responsibility of the people’scommissariats for the administration of industrial production.24

The growth of Zhdanov’s authority may help to explain the assault on the al-leged ideological errors of G. F. Aleksandrov, who has often been regarded asan ally of Malenkov,25 and his closest colleagues in May 1944. In May 1944 adecree of the Central Committee (reportedly composed with Zhdanov’s help)26

sharply attacked a new text on Western philosophy edited by Aleksandrov,Iudin, and Mitin for a wide range of ideological sins. The decree charged thatthe editors had underestimated the differences between Hegelian and Marxistdialectics, between Hegel’s “progressive dialectical method” and his politicalconservatism, had failed to cite Stalin’s own work on dialectical and historicalmaterialism, and to explicitly recognize the contradictions between “proletarian”


and “bourgeois” world views. The CC decree also claimed that the editors werenot sufficiently patriotic—they had allegedly failed to show that German phi-losophy reflected the “reactionary” character of the Prussian monarchical sys-tem, to denounce Hegel’s views on war, his chauvinist views on the Germanpeople, his support for colonialism, and his hostility to Slavs. The decree orderedthe editors to produce a new text that could provide a “correct Marxist-Leninistanalysis of the role and nature of German philosophy.”27

Aleksandrov reportedly was able to deflect this assault by shifting theblame for these errors onto Iudin and Mitin,28 but the official condemnationof his text seemed to give new impetus to the campaign to restore the studyof Marxism-Leninism. A decree of the Central Committee (May 20, 1944)established an educational program to train new instructors in Marxism-Leninism and political economy for institutions of higher education,29 Bol’-shevik now acknowledged that these errors had been produced by the generalneglect of ideological education during the war30 and admitted that partymembers “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the basis for the success of theVKP(B)’s leadership of society.31 In June 1944 Secretary A. S. Shcherbakovfollowed suit; he called for the restoration of the evening “universities ofMarxism-Leninism,” the establishment of special courses on the history ofthe VKP(B) for full-time officials and secretaries of the PPOs and the restora-tion of the full range of support programs for all those engaged in “indepen-dent study.”32 Propagandist adopted the same position with enthusiasm. 33

But while Zhdanov’s views on ideological education were given wide sup-port, his views on the primacy of party political work were not. The publica-tions of the Central Committee ignored his call for a return to “normal meth-ods” of party leadership of the economy in his report to the Leningrad party inthe spring of 1944, and during the summer of 1944 Pravda urged party offi-cials to focus on their “practical work,” to cultivate a “taste for economics” inorder to overcome the alleged “technological conservatism” of state officials,and once again praised the decisions of the 18th Conference of the VKP(B).34

Furthermore, Zhdanov and his opponents continued to clash over the rela-tive importance of “mass work” and the study of Marxism-Leninism. Thesedifferences were particularly apparent in the decrees of the Central Commit-tee dealing with agitprop work in the newly liberated territories of the USSRthat were issued in the summer of 1944. The content of these decrees seemedto be linked with the relative influence of Zhdanov at a particular time. Whenhe was away from Moscow the CC issued decrees that did not endorse hisviews. For example, in June when Zhdanov was in Leningrad, the CC issueda decree on agitprop work in the Moldovan republic that gave priority to“mass work,” stressed patriotic themes, and did not even discuss the ideolog-ical education of party members.35

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In July Zhdanov returned to Moscow for a few months36 where he was ac-tively engaged in ideological and cultural matters. He reportedly criticizedBol’shevik for its excessively patriotic tone and recommended changes in itseditorial board,37 and sponsored an official discussion of the ideological ori-entation of Soviet literary journals sometime in August 1944.38 At this junc-ture, his views were directly incorporated into the decrees of the CC/VKP(B)(August 9, 1944) on the activities of agitprop in the Belorussian republic andthe Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic. The first decree repeated verbatimmany of the formulations that had appeared in the decree on the Moldovanrepublic, but it also ordered local officials to revive cadres’ “independentstudy” of Marxism-Leninism, to provide lectures and consultations on thehistory of the party, political economy, the history of the USSR and of theBelorussian republic, philosophy, and literature.39 The decree also orderedthe appointment of a secretary for propaganda to the gorkom in Minsk andthe establishment of new educational programs for the gorkom and the sec-retaries of primary party organizations in order to eliminate the “capitalist at-titudes toward work and property” ostensibly fostered by the German occu-pation authorities.40

The decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the obkom in the Tatar ASSR also re-flected Zhdanov’s views. It sharply criticized local Communist officials forundermining “political work” by assigning propagandists and newspaperworkers to act as special representatives on missions to the collective andstate farms. It also declared that the careful study of the Kratkii kurs was theonly means to counter the local party officials’ wide range of ideological er-rors, including the “belittling” of the role of the Red Army in the struggleagainst fascism, “undue admiration” for the USSR’s bourgeois allies, and “se-rious shortcomings and mistakes of a nationalist character” such as the glori-fication of the Golden Horde and the “misrepresentation” of Tatar-Russian re-lations in historical and literary works. The decree ordered party members tostudy the Kratkii kurs section by section and told the agitprop directorate tosend a delegation to help the Tatar obkom to overcome these dangerous “na-tionalist” tendencies.41

During Zhdanov’s stay in Moscow, the advocates of the study of Marxism-Leninism attacked their opponents with particular vigor. In September 1944Propagandist sharply criticized those party officials who had allegedly ig-nored the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use ofthe Kratkii kurs.42 At the same time, those skeptical of the need for ideologi-cal education modified their position. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo belatedly recog-nized that Aleksandrov’s text on philosophy had blurred the vital distinctionbetween the proletarian and bourgeois “world view” and had thus opened theway for the penetration of hostile ideology into the USSR! Partiinoe


Stroitel’stvo condemned the “loss of taste for ideological work,” and urgedparty officials to give far more attention to all aspects of local cultural pro-duction (publishing, the press, theatre and films, secondary and higher educa-tion, the local unit of the writers union, scientific institutions) and to the Marx-ist-Leninist education of the entire intelligentsia.43

In September 1944 Stalin assigned Zhdanov the responsibility for con-ducting the negotiations with representatives of the Finnish government overthe end of the war.44 This assignment seems to have reduced Zhdanov’s in-fluence on the decrees of the CC on agitprop issued later that month. In par-ticular, two decrees of the CC/VKP(B) of September 27, 1944, on agitpropwork in the Ukraine gave far less attention to the restoration of party mem-bers’ study of Marxism-Leninism than the decrees on the Belorussian repub-lic and Tatar obkom discussed above.

The first decree restored the local agitprop structures and the appointmentof secretaries for propaganda in the gorkom in Lvov and Odessa, but did notdirectly order the study of Marxism-Leninism.45 The second decree, whichdealt with the serious “shortcomings” of existing political work in the West-ern Ukraine, was based on reports provided by G. F. Aleksandrov and by lo-cal officials in the Ukraine. Its discussion of agitprop work gave equal weightto the provision of basic information about the Soviet order, the USSR’s con-stitution, the obligation and responsibilities of citizens, and the ideologicaleducation of party members and the intelligentsia.46

On October 5, 1944, Zhdanov was dispatched to Helsinki to head theUSSR’s Allied Control Commission in Finland. With Zhdanov away from thecapital, sharp differences reappeared in the discussion of ideology and officials’priorities. Bol’shevik now declared that the decree of the CC/VKP(B) on theproper use of the Kratkii kurs of November 1938 was the only basis for agit-prop activity,47 but Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo published essays by party officialsthat were less enthusiastic. For example, an essay on “work with the intelli-gentsia” by N. Gusarov, the secretary of the Molotov obkom, combined supportfor ideological education with a Great Russian position on cultural matters. Onthe one hand, he cited Stalin’s reference to the intelligentsia’s leadership ofworkers and peasants as the basis for the obkom’s efforts to raise the intelli-gentsia’s ideological level, chided those officials who had mistakenly believedthat this objective had lost its force during the war, and cited Stalin’s report tothe 18th Congress to support his conclusion. On the other hand, he also claimedthat the neglect of the Marxism-Leninism had led teachers of both literature andhistory to underestimate the importance of Russian culture and overestimate thesignificance of Western European culture! He reported that the CC/VKP(B) hadcondemned the publishing house in his region for publishing works with insuf-ficiently patriotic portrayals of Ivan the Terrible and General Kutuzov.48

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With Zhdanov in Helsinki, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s discussion of party of-ficials’ priorities became confused. For example, its lead editorial on the“party spirit” of economic managers was completely contradictory. On theone hand, it charged that their failure to engage in “independent study” hadled to undesignated “shortcomings” in their work, called on all obkom,gorkom, and raikom to assure that factory directors, chief engineers, and otherleading personnel engaged in independent study, urged the obkom to conductperiodic seminars for the directors of factories on theoretical questions, andquoted Stalin’s warning about the need to combine practical work and thestudy of theory. On the other hand, the same editorial urged both local partyofficials and the PPOs to play a larger role in economic affairs, criticized fac-tory directors for ignoring the suggestions of the PPOs in their enterprises,and attacked obkom and gorkom officials for their failure to provide more ef-fective supervision of the factory directors.49 To add to the confusion, thesame issue of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo included a report by an agitprop officialcharging that officials’ obsession with production had led to their neglect oftheir “political leadership,” their “work with people,” and of “theoretical is-sues” and demanded discussion of these issues in the newspapers’ sections on“party life.”50

At this juncture, Stalin reverted to a more patriotic stance. In his address inNovember 1944 marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalinmade no reference to the “inspirational role” of the VKP(B), declared that So-viet patriotism had united all classes and nationalities in the USSR against theenemy and therefore was to be regarded as the basis for the country’s wartimesuccess.51 Stalin’s renewed enthusiasm for Soviet patriotism had an immedi-ate impact on the discussion of ideology in all of the publications of theCC/VKP(B). Pravda’s editorials on ideological questions suddenly becamehopelessly garbled,52 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo quoted repeatedly from Stalin’saddress, urged agitprop officials to cultivate Soviet patriotism and the friend-ship of peoples, and did not mention the study of Marxism-Leninism in itsdiscussion of party organizations’ educational activities.53 Both Bol’shevikand Propagandist once again gave renewed attention to patriotic themes.54

This shift was accompanied by a revival of positive coverage of the activi-ties of industrial and transport departments of the local party organs. Leadingparty officials now explicitly called for increased cooperation between thePPOs and the local industrial departments on the pages of PartiinoeStroitel’stvo. V. Zimin, the director of the Central Committee’s department oftransportation, criticized those party secretaries of primary party organizationswho “incorrectly” concluded that the war had eliminated their pravo kontro-lia vis-à-vis the factory’s administration and therefore had reduced their legit-imate criticism of the factory administration. Zimin insisted that PPOs should


address all problems of production at their meetings and work closely with thelocal departments of transportation.55 M. Malakhov, the deputy secretary ofthe department of defense production of the Moscow party organization,praised the extensive cooperation between primary party organizations andthe industrial departments in the capital and urged them both to become moreinvolved in the most important questions of production.56 Pravda joined in bybalancing its support for “work with people” with explicit praise for the 18thConference’s decisions on officials’ industrial role.57

During this period Zhdanov’s responsibilities as the head of the USSR’sAllied Control Commission in Finland seemed to limit his authority at theapex of the political system. He was the only member of the Politburo whodid not attend Stalin’s dinner for the visiting Charles de Gaulle on December9, 1944,58 in mid-January 1945 he gave up his position as the leader of theparty organization in Leningrad to his wartime deputy A. A. Kuznetsov, with-out explanation,59 and he did not attend the ceremonies in Moscow in Janu-ary 1945 marking the anniversary of Lenin’s death. Moreover, the report onthe anniversary by G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, gave shortshrift to the study of Marxism-Leninism. Following the lead of Stalin’s re-marks of November 1944, Aleksandrov emphasized the power of the Sovietstate, the importance of “friendship of peoples” and declared that the VKP(B)“included the most conscious and steadfast patriots,” who had educated thepeople of the USSR “in the spirit of love for their motherland,” and made noreference to the ideological education of party members.60

But the major organs of the Central Committee did not automatically fol-low Aleksandrov’s lead. Bol’shevik published his report, but its editorial onthe anniversary in the same issue concluded with a vigorous appeal to partyand Soviet cadres to study Marxism-Leninism.61 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvoadopted much the same position. It also published Aleksandrov’s address, butits lead editorial stressed the importance of studying particular works ofLenin and Stalin and explicitly insisted on the continued relevance of theCentral Committee decree of November 14, 1938, on the proper study of theKratkii kurs. While it did seem to qualify its enthusiasm for the study of textsby references to Kirov’s assertion that the entire life and activity of the partywas a “huge Marxist-Leninist school” it did not refer to the importance of pa-triotism, friendship of peoples, etc.62

Continued differences over ideological education were also expressed intwo decrees of the CC/VKP(B) on the party’s “political work” issued inJanuary 1945. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) on January 20, 1945, on theshortcomings of political work in the Western oblasts of the Belorussian re-public gave more emphasis to patriotic themes than to the study of Marxism-Leninism.63 In direct contrast, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) of January 27, 1945,

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on the Bashkir obkom explicitly endorsed the study of Marxism-Leninism inno uncertain terms.64

Important party officials were equally divided. M. Bagirov, the Secretaryof the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, carefullystraddled the issue. On the one hand, he called for improved ideological train-ing for those new members of the party who had already achieved positionsof authority despite their inadequate education in Marxism-Leninism. On theother hand, he also argued that it was essential to support the ideology of“friendship of peoples” against the threats posed by both “great power na-tionalism and local nationalism” and gave particularly fawning praise to thesuperiority of the culture created by the “great Russian people” and its lead-ership in the construction of socialism in his republic.65

N. Patolichev, the Secretary of Cheliabinsk obkom who had given vigoroussupport to the role of local industrial departments in 1942, recognized thegrowing importance of organizational party and party political work, butshied away from overt support for the study of particular texts.66 G. Fedotov,the director of the org-instruction department of the Moscow gorkom waseven more resistant. He did recognize the need to improve the primary partyorganizations’ organizational and ideological work and that party officialshad sometimes “duplicated” the work of the directors of enterprises. But herefused to admit that party officials’ preoccupation with economic questionshad hampered their party political work and insisted that the two areas were“inseparable.”67

The disagreements over ideological education seemed to intensify duringthe last two months of the war in Europe. In early April Propagandist indi-rectly criticized Malenkov’s orientation by charging that the educational pro-grams for factory directors established at the 18th Conference in 1941 had ig-nored basic Marxist-Leninist teachings on political economy!68 Thefollowing issue of Propagandist published a report by M. Iovchuk to the Ad-vanced Party School charging that the Tatar officials’ “preoccupation witheconomic affairs” had led to their neglect of Marxism-Leninism. He explic-itly demanded the full restoration of agitprop activities outlined in the CC de-cree on the Kratkii kurs of November 1938.69

In contrast, both Bol’shevik and Pravda straddled the issue by bracketingtheir support for the study of Marxism-Leninism with greater attention to theimportance of Soviet patriotism. Bol’shevik quoted directly from the Kratkiikurs and from Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress to stress the importance ofMarxism-Leninism, and defined the VKP(B) as the “inspirer of all of our suc-cesses.” But it also defined Lenin as a “great patriot of our homeland,” andgave equal weight to Stalin’s view on the centrality of the state, the impor-tance of “friendship of peoples,” and the “moral unity” of the people.70


Pravda followed a similar path. On April 22nd and 23rd it published a sur-vey of Lenin’s legacy by P. Pospelov, the editor in chief of Pravda since Sep-tember 1940. The first installment declared that the VKP(B)’s success had beenbased on the “sure compass of the advanced theory of Marxism-Leninism”71

but the second part gave similar stress to the importance of friendship of peo-ples and Soviet patriotism! 72 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed suit. In an edito-rial marking the last weeks of the war, it described Leninism as the “highest ac-complishment of Russian culture” and argued that the major objective of partyorganizations was the strengthening of the Soviet state.73

But Stalin’s own brief comments in May 1945 may have once again en-couraged the proponents of the study of Marxism-Leninism to press theircase. In his May Day decree Stalin noted that the restoration of the areas lib-erated by the Red Army was the result of the heroic efforts of workers andpeasants, intelligentsia, women, and youth “inspired and led by the great Bol-shevik party.”74 Shortly after Stalin’s address, Propagandist made a particu-larly vigorous plea for the restoration of party members’ “independent study”of Marxism-Leninism.75

NOTES

1. S. Zadionchenko, “Zadachi partiinoe rabote v ugol’nom kuzbasse,” Partiinoe-Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1943), 12–13. Approved for publication September 9, 1943.

2. “Zadachi partiino-organizatsionnoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16(1943), pp. 4–10. Approved for publication September 9, 1943.

3. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 474.4. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17/18 (1943), p. 36.5. “Partiinyi rabotnik-politicheskii rukovoditel,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, No.

17/18 (1943), 5–9. Approved for publication October 2, 1943. 6. S. Ignatiev, “Ob ideinom vospitanii kadrov I massogo politicheskoi rabote

sredi trudiiashchikhsiia v bashkirskoi SSSR,” Propagandist, no. 15/16 (1943), 9–14.Approved for publication August 31, 1943.

7. “Kniga millionov sovetskikh patriotov,” Propagandist, no. 18 (1943), 3–7. Ap-proved for publication October 12, 1943.

8. M. Mitin, “Partiia lenina-stalina: vdokhnovitel’ I organizator bor’by za pobedunad nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami,” Propagandist, no.19/20 (1953), 7–15.Approved for publication October 28, 1943.

9. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 480–81.10. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 127.11. Propagandist initially had characterized Stalin’s address as a contribution to

Marxism-Leninism but shifted quickly. Compare “Doklad I prikaz Stalina-pro-gramma nashei bor’by pobedu nad vragom,” Propagandist, no. 21 (1943), 30–34. Ap-proved for publication November 30, 1943, with “Istochniki sily I nezyblemosti

72 Chapter Five

sovetskogo gosudarstva,” Propagandist, no. 22 (1943), 17. Approved for publicationDecember 16, 1943.

12. “Pod znamenem lenina, pod rukovoditel’stvom Stalina’ vpered na pol’nyi ra-grom nemetskikh zakhvatchikov,” Propagandist, no. 1 (1944), pp.1–7. Approved forpublication January 15, 1944; A. Gorkin, “Ukreplenie leninsko-stalinskoi druzhbynarodov SSSR v khode otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 1 (1944).

13. “Partiia leninina-stalina:vdokhnovitel’ I organizator vsenarodnoi bor’by protivfashistskikh zakhvatchikov,” Bol’shevik, No. 22 (1943), 8–9. Approved for Publica-tion December 23, 1943.

14. “Nashei boevyi zadachi v tylu,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1943), 1–9. Approvedfor publication January 10, 1944.

15. M. Kalinin, “Neskol’ko slov o propaganda I agitatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,No. 1 (1944).

16. Pravda, January 21, 1944, 1.17. Pravda, January 22, 1944, 1. Zhdanov did not appear in Pravda’s pictures of

the assembled officials, but the blockade of Leningrad was not lifted until January 27,1944.

18. KPSS v rezoliutsiikah., Vol. 6 (1971), 105.19. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 142.20. Kaftanov, “Sovetskaia intelligentsia v velikoi otechesvennoi voine,” Bol’she-

vik, no. 5 (1944), 19–20. Approved for publication March 17, 1944.21. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 491.22. “Vospitanie molodykh kommunistov-odna iz osnovnykh zadach partiinykh or-

ganizatsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1944), 3–5. Approved for publication April 11, 1944.23. “O samostoiatel’nom izuchenii kadrami marksistsko-leninskoi teorii,” Propa-

gandist, no. 7/8(1944), 6–12. Approved for publication April 28, 1944.24. Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968),

655. Istoriia KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), Vol. 5, Book 1, 364.25. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Ran-

dom House, 1971), 508; G.V. Kostyrchenko, Tiana politika Stalina: vlast Ianti-semitism (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001), 212.26. Kostrychenko, 257.27. The decree was not published in full but summarized in Bol’shevik’s editorial

commentary. “O nedostatkakh I oshibkakh v osveshchenii istorii nemetskoi filosofiikontsa xviii I nachal xix veka,” Bol’shevik, no. 7/8 (1944), 14–19. Approved for pub-lication May 14, 1944.

28. Kostrychenko, 254–55.29. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 499.30. N. Fedoseev, “Protivpolozhnost’ idealisticheskoi deialektiki gegeliia I mark-

sistskogo dialekticheskogo metoda,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1944), .8–9. Approved forpublication June 5, 1944.

31. “O marksistsko-leninskoi vospitanii kadrov sovetskoi intelligentsia,” Bol’she-vik, no. 9 (1944), 3–7. Approved for publication June 5, 1944.

32. A. S. Shcherbakov, “Ocherednyi zadachi moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii,Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1944), 11–18. Approved for publication June 17, 1944.


33. “Lektsii-vazhny metod propagandy marksizma-leninizma,” Propagandist, no.10 (1944), 2–6. Approved for publication June 20, 1944; “Pomoshch samostoiatel’noizuchiushchim marksizma-leninizma: glavnaia zadacha partiinykh kabinet,” Propa-gandist, no. 11/12 (1944), 7–13. Approved for publication July 11, 1944.

34. Pravda, June 15, 1944, 1; June 17, 1944, 1; July 6, 1944, 1.35. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), pp. 501–3.36. Kostrychenko, 257.37. Boterbloem, 248.38. D. L. Babichenko, Literaturnyi front: Istoriia politicheskoi tsenzury, 1932–1946:

Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Entsiklopediia rossiiskikh dereven, 1994), 153.39. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh. Vol. 7 (1985), Vol. 7 (1985), 506–8.40. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, 506–8.41. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 513–20.42. “Vyshe uroven ideino-politicheskoi raboty,” Propagandist, no. 15/16 (1944),

3–5. Approved for publication September 13, 1944.43. “Ob ideologicheskoi rabote partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15/16

(1944), 1–5. Approved for publication September 14, 1944.44. Boterbloem, 249.45. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 524–25. 46. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 526–31.47. “Usilit ideino-politicheskuiu rabotu partiinykh organizatsii,” Bol’shevik, No.

17/18 (1944), 1–8. Approved for publication October 11, 1944.48. N. Gusarov, “O rabote s intelligentsia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1944),

7–11. Approved for publication October 7, 1944. 49. “Partiinost’ v rabote khoziaistvennogo rukovoditeliia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 18 (1944), 1–7. Approved for publication October 23, 1944.50. B. Borisov, “O nedostatkakh osveshcheniia voprosov partiinoi zhizne v

pechati,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 18 (1944), 22–27.51. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 160–70.52. Compare Pravda’s lead editorials of November 17, 1944, November 23, 1944,

December 3, 1944.53. “Zhivotornaia sila sovetskogo patriotizma,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21

(1944), 14–17. Approved for publication December 6, 1944. “Kniga I vospitanienashikh kadrov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1944), 1–6. Approved for publicationDecember 20, 1944; “Vospityvat kadry v dukhe bol’shevistoskoi printsipal’nost,”Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 1–5. Approved for publication January 13,1945.

54. “Doklad I prikaz stalina: boevaia programma bor’by okonchatel’nym razgromvraga,” Propagandist, no. 21 (1944), 15–17. Approved for publication November 27,1944; “Neistanno povyshat ideino-teoreticheskoi uroven partiinykh I sovetskikhkadrov,” Bol’shevik, no. 22 (1944), 1–5. Approved for publication December 12,1944; “Plenum MGK VKP(B) o propagandistskoi rabote,” Propagandist, no. 22(1944), 32–33. Approved for publication December 28, 1944.

55. V. Zimin, “Nekotorye osobonnosti partiinoi raboty na transport,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 24–28.

74 Chapter Five

56. M. Malakhov, “Promyshlennyi otdel obkom I partiino-politicheskaia rabota napredpriiatii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 29–32.

57. Pravda, December 13, 1944; December 30, 1944, 1.58. Pravda, December 10, 1944, 1.59. Ocherkii istorii leningradskoi partii KPSS, 657–58.60. Pravda, January 22, 1945, 2. Aleksandrov had adopted a more positive view

of ideological education in Marxism-Leninism in an address to students at MoscowState University the previous month. Pravda, December 10, 1944, 2.

61. “Velichie leninsko-stalinskikh idei,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1945), 1–7. Approvedfor publication January 24, 1945.

62. “Vesti neistannuiiu propagandy leninizma v riadakh partii,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication February 1, 1945.

63. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh., Vol. 7 (1985), 534.64. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh., Vol. 7 (1985), 540–41.65. M. Bagirov, “Nekotorye voprosy rukovodstva khoziastvom I partiino-politich-

eskoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 3/4 (1945), 23. Approved for publicationMarch 3, 1945.

66. S. N. Patolichev, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinoi raboty v oblasti promyshlen-nosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1945), 25. Approved for publication April 30,1945.

67. G. Fedotov, “Zametki o partiinoi rabote na predpriiatiiakh,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1945), 27–31.

68. “O propagande ekonomicheskoi znanii,” Propagandist, no. 6 (1945), 1–6. Ap-proved for publication April 9, 1945.

69. M. Iovchuk, “Propaganda marksizma-leninzma:vazhneishee sredstvo ideino-politicheskogo vospitaniia kadrov I intelligentsia,” Propagandist, no. 7/8 (1945),12–25. Approved for publication April 16, 1945.

70. “Torzhestvo idei leninizma v nashe strane,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1945), 1–8 Ap-proved for publication April 16, 1945.

71. Pravda, April 22, 1945, 2.72. Pravda, April 23, 1945, 1–2.73. “Znamia lenina-stalina vedet nas k okonchatel’noi pobede,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1945), 11–13. 74. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol 2 (XV), 192.75. “Ob organizatsii samostoiatel’noi raboy kadrov po izucheniiu marksistsko-

leninskoi teorii,” Propagandist, no. 9 (1945), 11–14. Approved for publication May14, 1945.


77

SUMMARY

The year between the end of the European war and Stalin’s decision to fireMalenkov as Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) in May 1946 was particularlyeventful. The death of Secretary Shcherbakov in May 1945, the need to re-store the ideological health of those who had lived under German occupationand to educate the new members of the party provided an excellent contextfor the restoration of Zhdanov’s influence. Nonetheless, criticism of his viewsand support for Malenkov’s definitions continued to appear particularly dur-ing Stalin’s extensive absence from the capital in the fall of 1945. His returnin December seemed to restore support for Zhdanov’s views. In March/April1946 Stalin strengthened the authority of the Council of Ministers over theadministration of the economy and reformed the apparat to assure that partyofficials gave primacy to party political work. On May 6, 1946, Stalin re-moved Malenkov from his position. This change initially produced immenseconfusion in the discussion of officials’ priorities, but by mid-July Zhdanovand his supporters had regained their ascendancy.

In early May 1945 the war in Europe came to an end; during the next fewweeks Stalin adopted a particularly chauvinistic tone in his public comments.On May 9, 1945, he extolled the Slavic peoples’ contribution to the defeat offascism and a few weeks later he lauded the leadership role of the Russianpeople in the multi-national USSR in the war against Germany.1 Stalin’schauvinism led to a temporary halt in the campaign to restore the study ofMarxism-Leninism. Propagandist muted its emphasis on the study of theoryand both Pravda and Bol’shevik adopted a particularly chauvinistic tone.2

Chapter Six

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

At this point Stalin lapsed into almost complete silence; while he did issuevarious orders of the day and letters of congratulation over the next eightmonths, he did not discuss the USSR’s internal development and internationalposition until his well-known “election speech” in February 1946. This si-lence presented problems for his subordinates. Up until this time, they had ev-idently regarded his pronouncements as guidance on a wide range of issuesincluding the definition of ideology and party officials’ priorities. Circum-stantial evidence suggests that when Stalin fell silent, the decrees of the Cen-tral Committee became the major source of guidance for his subordinates andseemed to set the tone and direction of the discussion in the journals of theCentral Committee.

As noted above, Stalin’s chauvinism in May 1945 had led to a temporaryhalt in the campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism. This lull co-incided with an important change in the leadership of the VKP(B) promptedby the death of A. S. Shcherbakov who had been responsible for agitpropsince May 1941. During the war, he had held a number of important posts si-multaneously; he had served as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B), first secretaryof the Moscow obkom and gorkom, the head of the Main Political Adminis-tration of the Soviet Army and of the Soviet Information Bureau, and a deputypeople’s commissar for defense.3

The ceremonies marking the celebration of May Day and Shcherbakov’sfuneral in mid-May indicated that Malenkov clearly outranked Zhdanov inthe leadership. While Zhdanov had appeared at the May Day celebrations,4

Malenkov had been shown as a member of Stalin’s inner circle and a ma-jor participant in the funeral ceremonies for A. S. Shcherbakov held laterthat month. Malenkov was ranked far above Zhdanov in the Politburo’stribute to Shcherbakov and guarded his coffin along with Stalin andVoroshilov while Zhdanov was not shown at the ceremonies.5 Most strik-ing, Shcherbakov’s successor seemed to endorse Malenkov’s conceptionof party officials’ priorities. G. Popov, who had served as second secretaryof the Moscow gorkom, replaced Shcherbakov as a Secretary of theCC/VKP(B) and the first secretary of the Moscow obkom and gorkom.Popov’s eulogy clearly implied that party officials should always be con-cerned with problems of production and gave short shrift to Marxist-Leninist theory.6

But in the end, Shcherbakov’s death allowed Zhdanov to regain his role inthe direction of the agitprop directorate. In June he reappeared in public withother leading officials7 and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo demonstrated greater sup-port for his views by balancing its praise for “friendship of peoples” with therecognition that the party’s policy flowed from its knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory.8

78 Chapter Six

Zhdanov’s views were also reflected in a series of decrees of the CentralCommittee issued later that month. The first, which ordered the establishmentof a series of new periodicals for the non-Russian republics and a number ofoblasts and krai within the RSFSR, reminded party officials that these “mili-tant organs of political education” were essential for party leadership of themasses.9 The second decree called for more intensive agitprop work withrepatriated citizens of the USSR.10 The third decree was the most explicit; itcharged that the instructors of Marxism-Leninism at Saratov University hadfailed to emphasize the fundamental differences between “proletarian” and“bourgeois” world views and demanded an immediate improvement in thelevel of ideological education.11

This decree obviously made it impossible for party officials to ignore thesubject. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo now gave equal weight to the importance of“theory” and “practice” in the education of Communists in primary party or-ganizations,12 and G. F. Aleksandrov gave equal weight to the cultivation ofSoviet patriotism and ideological education in Marxism-Leninism. In a majoraddress to the leaders of university faculties in social and economic science(August 1, 1945) he quoted at length from the decree of the CC/VKP(B) onSaratov, cited the centrality of the Kratkii Kurs for ideological education, andendorsed the decree of the CC/VKP(B) in May 1944 exposing the errors inthe history of philosophy!13 But he also adopted a Great Russian position bychastising Russian historians for underestimating the unique nature of theRussian historical experience and attacking non-Russian historians for the ex-cessive glorification of their own national heroes.14

Despite Aleksandrov’s equivocations, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) on theagitrop activities of the Kuibyshev obkom (August 22, 1945) fully endorsedZhdanov’s position on party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. Itcharged that the obkom and its subordinate gorkom and raikom had not pro-vided adequate lectures for those Communists and members of the intelli-gentsia engaged in the “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism, that thelecturers’ preoccupation with current problems and international affairs hadled them to neglect the history of the party, philosophy, and political econ-omy.15 In addition, the decree claimed that the party’s officials had failed toeffectively utilize those party workers and members of the intelligentsia whowere sufficiently trained in Marxism-Leninism to extend the scope of agit-prop work. The decree ordered the officials in Kuibyshev to establish groupsof specialized lecturers to work with different audiences and to appoint anobkom secretary to supervise their activities. It also called on the agitprop di-rectorate to prepare a series of model lectures that could be presented by lo-cal officials throughout the country, and to send a delegation to Kuibyshev tohelp to establish the local program.16

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946 79

But this decree did not end expressions of opposition to Zhdanov’s viewson party officials’ role in industrial management. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvoseemed to shift away from Zhdanov’s position; in early July it had urged partyofficials to stop “usurping” the responsibilities of soviet and economic agen-cies and to return to “normal” leadership based on the “verification of fulfill-ment” of previous orders and decrees by these bodies.17 But in August 1945it published essays that not only praised their economic work but also insistedthat their wartime experience was essential to the needs for postwar recon-struction. O. Kozlova, the secretary of the Moskvoretskii raikom in Moscow,insisted that its detailed knowledge of the productive capacities and the man-agement of individual enterprises gave it expertise that was essential to guidethe process of reconstruction. Kozlova insisted that the raikom should play acentral role in decisions about product mix, the shift to an eight-hour day, thelevel and type of wages, the technical education of personnel, and virtually allother aspects of the transition to peacetime industrial activity.18

Kozlova’s position may have reflected the relative authority of the two jun-ior Secretaries in the leadership. During the summer of 1945 Secretary of theCC/VKP(B) Malenkov continued to wield vast authority in all areas includ-ing those that were ostensibly under Zhdanov’s supervision. In early August,Malenkov ordered A. M. Egolin, a deputy director of agitprop, to provideMalenkov with a detailed survey of the Soviet literary scene. (Egolin’s reportproved to be highly critical of individual authors.)19 Pravda’s coverage of theassembled leadership of the VKP(B) on August 13, 1945, suggested thatMalenkov retained his predominance over Zhdanov.

Moreover, in the second half of August 1945, Pravda endorsed Malenkov’sdefinitions by urging party officials to provide “concrete aid” to “flounder-ing” industrial enterprises. Its editorial on the preparation of the rail systemfor winter conditions (August 23, 1945) charged that the local party organi-zations’ failure to deal with immediate problems had led to serious disruptionof rail traffic. It insisted that the officials at obkom, gorkom, and kraikom levelhad to move beyond mere “supervision” (kontrol) to assure the supply ofspare parts, to improve workers’ living conditions, and to assure that the sys-tem as a whole worked “smoothly.”Pravda adopted the same position in itsdiscussion of problems in the coal and machine tools sectors on August 26and 29, 1945.

At approximately the same time, the leadership began to the restore theprewar system of state planning. On August 19, 1945, Pravda had publisheda joint decree of the CC/VKP(B) and the Sovnarkom calling on Gosplan, thepeoples commissariats, and the republics of the USSR to work out a five-yearplan for the reconstruction of the economy and submit it to the Central Com-mittee and Sovnarkom for approval. With the end of the war with Japan, the

80 Chapter Six

GOKO was disbanded on September 4, 1945, and its powers transferred tothe Sovnarkom.20 Two days later, Stalin issued a decree as Chairman of theSovnarkom that bolstered the control of the leading Politburo/Commissarsover its specialized divisions. The decree established one bureau headed byMolotov to supervise the commissariats responsible for military develop-ment, agriculture, and financial agencies and a second bureau to supervisethose agencies responsible for industry and transport headed by Beria asChair and Malenkov as his deputy.21

This bolstering of the Politburo/Commissars’ control over the administra-tion of the economy raised a critical question for the party’s full-time offi-cials. Would they retain the extraordinary authority they had acquired duringthe war or should they return to the “normal methods” of leadership sup-ported by Zhdanov and his allies? The joint decree of August 19, 1945, hadnot referred to party officials’ role in the process of planning, an omission thatseemed to hint that their role would be limited. Whatever the case, articlespublished in both Pravda and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo suggests that some lead-ers of the party sought to assure that party officials would not be excludedfrom the planning process.

On September 15, 1945, Pravda insisted that locals party officials’ vastknowledge about the capacity of various enterprises and the proper use of localresources that had been acquired during the war had immense significance forthe entire process of planning. In the same spirit, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo reportedthat those obkom that had included their own departments of industry and trans-port in the planning process had already made significant contributions to thecountry’s overall plans. The editorial claimed that the regional economic plansformulated with the aid of party officials would be forwarded to Gosplan andcoordinated with the sectorial plans worked out by the commissariats.22

While Pravda and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo endorsed a larger role for officialsin planning, Propagandist pressed on with its campaign to restore the studyof Marxism-Leninism with particular vigor. In September 1945 it argued thatthe ideological errors at Saratov University, which had been sharply con-demned in June 1945, had cropped up at other institutions of higher educa-tion, and urged local officials to make sure that the courses in Marxism-Leninism did not “underestimate” the differences between “proletarian” and“bourgeois” world views.23 At this juncture, Propagandist published the Cen-tral Committee’s decree on the shortcomings of lectures provided by theKuibyshev obkom24 and attributed its errors to the misuse of lecturers for“economic work.”25 This formulation was probably an indirect assault onMalenkov and his allies.

With the publication of this decree the director of the agitprop directorate andPravda supported Zhdanov’s views on the study of theory. On September 24,


1945, G. F. Aleksandrov acknowledged the importance of Marxism-Leninismin an essay marking the anniversary of the publication of Pravda. 26 On Sep-tember 26, 1945, Pravda insisted that the decree provided guidance for all otherlocal party organs and quoted from Stalin on the importance of the study ofMarxism-Leninism for Communists in all spheres of work. (But Pravda wasunwilling to endorse Propagandist’s swipe at Malenkov. While it did condemnthe use of lecturers for “inappropriate” functions it did not report their allegeduse for “economic work.”)

But these endorsements did not end resistance to Zhdanov’s views on thecontent of official ideology. On October 1, 1945, Pravda published a lengthyessay by L. Kuzmin, the director of a department of agitprop27 that balancedits praise for study of the Kratkii kurs and Stalin’s essay on dialectical andhistorical materialism with the insistence that Stalin’s discussion of the Sovietstate in his report to the 18th Congress, his wartime comments, his assertionthat the “friendship of peoples” was the basis for the state’s strength, and hisdesignation of the Russian people as the leader of the USSR, were in them-selves major contributions to Marxism-Leninism.

Moreover, at this juncture Bol’shevik remained oddly silent on ideologicalissues. It had not appeared in print since mid-August and when it resumedpublication in early October its editorial board had been enlarged and modi-fied to include some of Zhdanov’s major allies and to remove some of his op-ponents. (P. N. Fedoseev was the new editor in chief. Iovchuk joined the ed-itorial board and Iudin and Mitin were excluded.)28 But despite this shakeup,Bol’shevik did not participate in the debate over ideological issues until theanniversary of the Bolshevik revolution the following month.

The ongoing debate may have been influenced by Stalin’s departure for aprolonged vacation in the fall of 1945. On October 10, 1945, Pravda an-nounced that Stalin had left the capital and on October 11, 1945, it publishedtwo essays that directly challenged Zhdanov’s definitions. The first, a lengthydiscussion of official ideology by B. Leontiev (whose position was not iden-tified) stressed the “patriotic” nature of the party and its appeal. Leontievcharacterized the Bolsheviks of October 1917 as “real patriots,” representedthe revolution itself as serving the “national interests” of Russia, and laudedthe Communist party for cultivating Soviet patriotism, loyalty to the socialistfatherland, and the desire to work for the homeland. While he made a briefreference to Marxism-Leninism, he did not discuss the need for the ideologi-cal training of members of the party and the intelligentsia.

The second essay by V. Klimenko, secretary of the Stalinsk gorkom in theUkrainian republic, provided a thinly veiled critique of Zhdanov’s views onparty officials’ role in the administration of industry. Klimenko’s detailed re-port on his gorkom’s vigorous and effective response to shortfalls in coal min-

82 Chapter Six

ing forcefully endorsed direct intervention by specialized party officials in thesolution of problems of industrial production. He revealed that the gorkom’sofficials had organized meetings to mobilize both miners and technical staff,had set specific targets for production that were then monitored and verifiedby the heads of departments and instructors in both the raikom and gorkom,and highlighted the role of the gorkom’s specialized secretaries in the solutionof immediate problems of production. He reported that the gorkom’s deputysecretary for the coal industry had directly investigated the shortfalls of pro-duction in a particularly important mine, and that his findings had allowed thegorkom to make specific recommendations for technological improvementsand to locate and assign the most appropriate enterprise to produce the neededmodern equipment.

In October 1945 the campaign for elections to the soviets at all levels of thepolitical system in early 1946 began in earnest. In this context, PartiinoeStroitel’stvo ignored Zhdanov’s definitions and urged agitprop workers to en-gage in “mass work” with Soviet voters to explain the principles of theUSSR’s constitution as well as the advantages of the socialist system and itssuperiority to the “bourgeois democracy” of the capitalist world.29

Furthermore, support for Zhdanov’s views was meager during the celebra-tions of the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. The slogans issued tomark the anniversary did not refer to ideological education30 and Bol’shevikdid not fully support his views despite the recent reorganization of its edito-rial board in his favor. Its lead editorial on ideological work carefully bal-anced its support for the study of the Kratkii kurs and a list of essential worksby Lenin and Stalin with equal praise for “mass work” designed to cultivateSoviet patriotism and in support of the five-year plan.31

In addition, the same issue of Bol’shevik also published two essays thatmarked a retreat from Zhdanov’s priorities. P. Pospelov, the editor of Pravdaand a member of Bol’shevik’s editorial board, who had defended the primacyof Marxism-Leninism with vigor in April 1945, now produced a paean to So-viet patriotism.32 N. Nauvoma (whose position remains unknown) claimedthat practice and experience were the only sure basis for the development oftheory and criticized unnamed “dogmatists” who used “dead abstractions”and had lapsed into “schematicism.”33

Finally, Pravda’s coverage of the anniversary celebrations seemed to indi-cate that Zhdanov was not in particularly high standing. He did not appear onthe rostrum with other members of the Politburo (he evidently remained inHelsinki),34 and the leaders who did appear seemed to cluster around a nu-cleus of Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria, the veterans of the wartimeState Defense Committee.35 Moreover, V. M. Molotov’s report on the an-niversary was hardly encouraging to those who favored the restoration of


party members’ ideological education. Molotov made no reference to Marx-ism-Leninism, implied that agitprop officials should give priority to masswork rather than the ideological education of the intelligentsia, and definedSoviet patriotism as the basis for the Soviet peoples’ heroic exploits.36 Pravdafollowed Molotov’s lead; its discussion of the intelligentsia in late Novemberfocused exclusively on mass work in support of the forthcoming elections tothe Soviets.37 In December Pravda simply repeated the slogans about the su-periority of the USSR’s brand of democracy over the “bourgeois democracy”in the West.38

But published sources suggest that Stalin may have come to Zhdanov’s res-cue. His return to Moscow on December 17, 1945,39 was followed by a burstof support for Zhdanov and his definitions. On December 21, 1945, Pravdadeclared that the Bolshevik party’s leadership of the state was based on theteachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and Zhdanov attended the firstpostwar meeting of the Politburo on December 29, 1945.40 On the followingday Pravda explicitly recognized the vital importance of the ideological edu-cation of the intelligentsia,41 and on December 31, 1945, Propagandist re-sumed its enthusiastic support for the ideological education of party membersand intelligentsia.42

Most important, Zhdanov’s views were incorporated into a decree of theCentral Committee on the ideological education of local party officials thatwas issued sometime at the end of the year. It ordered the obkom, kraikom,and Central Committees of republican parties to establish separate educa-tional programs for party workers and for propagandists to train and retrainsecretaries of primary party organizations and workers for the raikom andgorkom over a term of one year and ordered the agitprop directorate to pre-pare the appropriate programs of study. Admissions were to be controlled bythe directorates for cadres and agitprop and local party organs.43

By early 1946, support for Zhdanov’s priorities had evidently increased.He was ranked slightly before Malenkov in Pravda’s reference to the leader-ship on January 3, 1946, and the first issue of Bol’shevik published in 1946abandoned its eclecticism to insist that “mastery of the Kratkii kurs” was es-sential for all new members of the party and that the Central Committee’s pre-war decree on its proper use was the basis for agitprop activity.44 The sameissue published an essay by Pospelov on the “leading role” of the VKP{B)that retreated from his fulsome praise for the cultivation of Soviet patriotismto argue that the study of Marxism-Leninism was appropriate for the intelli-gentsia and that “mass work” should be based on patriotic themes.45

Nonetheless, resistance to Zhdanov’s views continued in the first monthsof 1946. First of all, G. F. Aleksandrov’s report on the anniversary of Lenin’sdeath was laced with patriotic references. It stressed the overriding impor-

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tance of the Russian people’s leadership of the USSR and provided particu-larly slavish praise for Stalin’s views on socialism in one country, his “bril-liant” contributions to Soviet military thought, and his conception of the So-viet state. Aleksandrov concluded that Stalin’s stress on the strengthening ofthe state’s power and authority was a major theoretical contribution to Lenin-ism that assured the continued development of a powerful modern army.46

Secondly, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo now seemed bent on avoiding support forZhdanov’s definitions. Its first issue for 1946 included a series of essays byparty officials that sidestepped the dispute over the relative importance ofparty political and economic work in various ways. N. Gusarov, the secretaryof the Molotov obkom, argued that it should play a key role in regional plan-ning,47 and officials in the org-instruction department ignored the dispute intheir assault on the failure of various obkom to respond to the needs of the lo-cal population. A. Kozlov, the head of a sector in the department, charged thatthe departments for construction, communal economy, industry, trade, andcommunity catering of the Briansk obkom had ignored serious shortages ofbread and fuel because they had uncritically accepted the “inaccurate” infor-mation provided by people’s commissariats and factory directors on localconditions. Kozlov urged party officials to visit enterprises and institutions todetermine the actual state of affairs, rather than rely on the information pro-vided by state agencies.48

V. Liatnikov, identified as a “responsible organizer” of the org-instruc-tion department, ordered the Saratov obkom to give as much attention toshortages of bread as it had given defense production during the war. Healso sharply criticized the gorkom in Saratov for its failure to improve thetrolley system and urged both obkom and gorkom to provide more vigorous“verification of fulfillment” of previous orders rather than to simply discussthe issue at party meetings.49 F. Serzhantov, a “responsible organizer” in theorg-instruction department, criticized the obkom in Gorky for similar lackof attention to the problems encountered in housing and the provision of ba-sic necessities.50

In early February 1946, all of the members of the Politburo, who had beennominated as candidates for election as deputies to the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR, spoke briefly to their constituents. While Malenkov and Zhdanov didnot directly discuss their responsibilities as Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B)they did seem to clash over the importance of ideological education. Zhdanovdid not refer openly to Marxism-Leninism or to ideological education of partymembers, but he did stress the overriding importance of “consciousness” forthe development of the USSR. In contrast, Malenkov indirectly criticizedboth Zhdanov’s enthusiasm for the restoration of ideological education andhis belief that party officials’ wartime experience was inappropriate for the


solution of postwar problems. Malenkov criticized unnamed “pedants” wholived by old formulations instead of acting on the basis of contemporary ex-perience, insisted that practice was the only legitimate basis for correct ac-tion, and suggested that personnel with wartime experience should be pro-moted to positions of greater authority.51

Pravda’s coverage of these two addresses suggested that Malenkov’sstanding in the leadership was higher than Zhdanov’s. Pravda reported thatZhdanov’s address was allegedly met with “stormy applause,” andMalenkov’s address was reportedly greeted by “ a stormy prolonged ovation”and cries of “long live Comrade Malenkov—the loyal comrade-in-arms of thegreat Stalin.”52 At the same time, there was considerable official support forZhdanov’s definitions. On February 8, 1946, the Institute of Marxism-Leninismof the CC/VKP(B) announced that Stalin’s entire works, which were to bepublished over the next few years, were essential reading for all those partymembers who sought to “master” Marxism-Leninism.53

The following day Stalin gave his own “election” speech but it providedlittle coherent guidance for those seeking a definition of officials’ priorities.In his analysis of the international situation, Stalin seemed to revert to ortho-doxy by declaring that “Marxists” had long maintained that both World WarI and World War II were the outgrowth of the inherent contradictions of “con-temporary monopolist capitalism.”54 In his discussion of domestic politics, hedefined the VKP(B) as the “driving force” of the society and insisted that itsprewar policy of industrialization and collectivization had been responsiblefor the USSR’s victory in World War II and would therefore be restored with-out change. His discussion of the party’s plans for the future focused almostexclusively on the five-year plans to reconstruct the country’s economy.Stalin promised that rationing would be ended soon and that the productionof consumer goods, reduction of prices, the establishment of a wide range ofresearch institutes to bolster scientists’ contribution to the economy deservedthe highest priority. Stalin claimed that the party hoped to double prewar out-puts of iron, steel, and oil during the next three or more five-year plans in or-der to protect the homeland from “any eventuality.”55

While Stalin’s address indicated that he regarded the institutions estab-lished before the war as sacrosanct, it did not seem to provide officials withclear guidance beyond the obvious need to assure the fulfillment of the five-year plan. Nonetheless, the published response to his address suggested thatparty officials interpreted his remarks in different ways. Some leading offi-cials seemed to interpret Stalin’s reversion to orthodoxy in the analysis of im-perialism (however qualified) and his praise for the Soviet state’s economicrole as an endorsement of Zhdanov’s views on the study of Marxism-Lenin-ism and the proper division of labor between party officials and the state’s ad-

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ministrators. L. Slepov, the head of Pravda’s department of party life, laudedStalin’s statements in 1937 about the need to “master Bolshevism,” praisedthe 18th Congress’ decision to foster party political work, and concluded that“the Soviet state organizes and directs the economy while party officials pro-vided “political leadership.” Furthermore, Slepov challenged Malenkov’s as-sertion that war-trained cadres should be quickly promoted by insisting thatmany party members were still “insufficiently armed” with the “theoretical,organizational, and political experience of the party.”56

But other officials refused to adopt this position. The lead editorial in Par-tiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946) provided but half-hearted editorial supportfor Zhdanov’s views on officials’ priorities. It did recognize a “certain weak-ening” of internal work during the war and generally acknowledged its im-portance for economic success. But it did not cite Stalin in support of this po-sition or criticize party officials for excessive interference in theadministration of the economy.57 The same issue included reports by impor-tant party officials that adopted much the same position. Most striking, A.Kuznetsov, Zhdanov’s successor as the head of the Leningrad party organiza-tion, totally ignored ideological education in his report to the aktiv of theLeningrad party organization (February 25, 1946). Instead, he paraphrasedStalin’s remarks on the importance of reconstruction, focused almost exclu-sively on Leningrad’s role in the coming five-year plan, and on the electoralactivities of agitprop.58

M. Shamberg, the director of the org-instruction department of the CentralCommittee (who has been identified by Western scholars as an ally ofMalenkov),59 qualified his support for Zhdanov’s views by giving equalweight to the importance of “theory” and “practice” in the education of newmembers of the party. Shamberg made a strong case for the study of Marx-ism-Leninism, but declared that party members’ direct participation in partymeetings, social political work, and production was the most important ele-ment in their education.60

In the midst of this debate, the growing tension between the leaders ofthe USA, UK, and USSR broke into the open. On March 5, 1946, WinstonChurchill, the wartime prime minister of Great Britain, assailed theUSSR’s domination of Eastern Europe in his address in Fulton, Missouri.On March 14, 1946, Stalin denounced Churchill’s speech as a direct threatto continued allied cooperation and to world peace, as an attempt of An-glo-American “reactionaries” to dominate the world, and indirectly threat-ened to meet any Western assault on Eastern Europe with force.61 Facedwith this growing sense of threat, the Politburo decided to strengthen theauthority of the central government and to reform the composition of theleading bodies of the CC/VKP(B). In the following weeks, the Politburo


bolstered the authority of the Politburo/Ministers over the administration ofindustry and restored the prewar division of labor between them and thePolitburo/Secretaries responsible for internal party matters. The extension ofthe authority of the Politburo/Ministers was reflected in a change in thename of the government to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the ap-pointment of a new Politburo dominated by the Politburo/Ministers.

In mid-March the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the change in thename of the government62 and Stalin and others had made it clear that thiswas not simply a cosmetic change; Stalin had told the Central Committeemeeting (March 14, 1946) that it reflected the maturation of the political sys-tem 63 and N. M. Shvernik, a candidate member of the Politburo and chair-man of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, told the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR that the new title dramatized the government’s increased responsibil-ity for industrial administration.64

The Central Committee had been convened at the same time and on March19, 1946, it approved Stalin’s nominations for membership in the party’sleading bodies. The Politburo/Ministers dominated the new Politburo. Stalinremained as Chairman of the Council of Ministers while Molotov, Beria, An-dreev, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich were all deputy chairmen of theCouncil. The Politburo also included three Politburo/Secretaries (Stalin,Malenkov, and Zhdanov) one regional party and republican leader (N. S.Khrushchev was at this time both first secretary of the Ukrainian Communistparty and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic)and Kalinin, the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Stalin now enlarged the existing Secretariat (Stalin, Malenkov, Zhdanov)to include A. A. Kuznetsov, the leader of the Leningrad party, who proved tobe an ally of Zhdanov and G. M. Popov, the leader of the Moscow party or-ganization who had replaced Shcherbakov in May 1945, and proved to be anally of Malenkov. Stalin also announced that the Orgbureau would be en-larged by the inclusion of regional party officials with considerable experi-ence. The Orgbureau was officially responsible for the “overall leadership oforganizational work” of the party,65 and it was probably the major source ofthe decrees subsequently issued in the name of the Central Committee.66

While the Politburo/Ministers dominated the Politburo, the leaders of theapparat of the Central Committee dominated the Orgbureau. It includedStalin, the General Secretary, the four Secretaries of the Central Committeeof the VKP(B) (Malenkov, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, and Popov), G. F. Aleksan-drov, the director of agitprop, and Shatalin, the deputy director of the cadresdirectorate. Stalin also named regional secretaries to the Orgbureau in mid-March but did not assign them responsibilities until the following month.They included N. S. Patolichev, the secretary of the Cheliabinsk obkom, V. M.

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Andrianov, secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, M. I. Rodionov, secretary ofthe Gorkii obkom, and M. A. Suslov, the chairman of the Central Committee’sbureau for Latvia. The Orgbureau also included two government officials—N. A. Bulganin, the deputy minister of defense, L. I. Mekhis, the minister ofstate control, and two leaders of “public” agencies, N. A. Mikhailov, theleader of the Komsomol, and V. V. Kuznetsov, the secretary and chairman ofthe central trade union federation.67

In the last week of March 1946 Stalin bolstered the control of the Polit-buro/Ministers over the Council of Ministers’ specialized ministries. The twobureaus of the Council of People’s Commissars that had been established inlate 1945 were replaced by a single bureau of the new Sovministrov chairedby Beria with Voznesenski and Kosygin as his deputies and including thedeputy prime ministers, each of whom was held directly responsible for acluster of related branch ministries.68 The bureau was convened immediately(March 27, 1946) and henceforth played a central role in the administrationof the first postwar five-year plan.69

The first postwar five-year plan, which was published in late March withimmense fanfare, had an immediate impact on the activities of agitprop andon the characterization of the Sovministrov in the Central Committee’s publi-cations. First of all, Stalin and Zhdanov70 composed a decree of the CentralCommittee (March 27, 1946) that portrayed “mass political work” in supportof the five-year plan as the equivalent of party members’ study of the Kratkiikurs! It ordered agitprop personnel to organize socialist competition in in-dustrial enterprises, to sponsor lectures and discussion of the new five-yearplan, and to establish study circles and “independent study” of the plan’s de-tails.71 Propagandist and Pravda immediately followed suit.72

Secondly, both Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Bol’shevik explicitly recog-nized that the Sovministrov enjoyed primary responsibility for the admin-istration of the economy. The lead editorial in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.5/6 (1946) lauded the new five-year plan for its capacity to strengthen theSoviet state,73 explicitly recognized that the newly formed Sovministrovenjoyed far greater responsibility and competence than its predecessor, andimplied that it had equal status with the “party” under the direction of the“leader and teacher of the party and people, comrade Stalin.”74 The edito-rial demanded that party officials improve their organizational and propa-ganda work to assure the fulfillment of the plan, and to cultivate socialistcompetition.75 The same issue also included a detailed outline of the newfive-year plan by N. Voznesensky, the Chairman of Gosplan, and the fullversion of the law on the state plan itself. Bol’shevik also portrayed theSovministrov as the embodiment of the Soviet state, stressed its immenseprerogatives in the administration of industry, and asserted that its broadened


authority was a direct outgrowth of Stalin’s definition of the role of thestate in his report to the 18th Congress.76

With the Sovministrov restored to its prewar position, the Politburo turnedto the reorganization of the leading organs of the party’s apparat. On April 13,1946, the Politburo issued a decree defining the division of responsibilitiesbetween the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) and between the Secretariat andOrgbureau. The decree named Malenkov chairman of the meetings of theOrgbureau and responsible for preparation of its agenda, and for supervisingthe activities of the Central Committees of the Communist parties of the re-publics in the USSR. It must be emphasized that this particular assignment ofresponsibility actually limited the scope of his authority. Since the RSFSR didnot have its own Communist party organization, Malenkov’s supervisory au-thority did not include the Russian republic.

The decree granted Secretary Zhdanov full responsibility (rukovodstvo) forthe agitprop directorate and all agitprop work of party and soviet organiza-tions (press, publishing, film, radio, art, oral propaganda) and named him thechairman of the new department of the CC/VKP(B) on foreign policy. Thedecree ordered Zhdanov and Aleksandrov to improve the work of the agitpropdirectorate, to establish a newspaper to provide guidance for the country’scultural life, and to improve Pravda by establishing more specialized depart-ments and by hiring specialists in foreign affairs.

The newly appointed Secretary A. A. Kuznetsov, (who is generally re-garded as Zhdanov’s ally by Western scholars), was given the most extensiveassignment. He replaced Malenkov as the director of the cadre directorate,was ordered to improve its operation, and to establish a new system of edu-cational institutions to train and retrain both party and soviet officials. He wasnamed chairman of the meetings of the Secretariat and made responsible forthe preparation of its agenda, and for the leadership of the obkom in the RS-FSR that had been excluded from Malenkov’s purview. Popov was not givenany specific assignment in light of his role as leader of the Moscow party or-ganization.

The decree made the Orgbureau responsible for the verification of thework of subordinate party committees and the adoption of measures to im-prove their performance and made the Secretariat responsible for the assign-ment of personnel. The Orgbureau would meet once a week, and the Secre-tariat when necessary. Patolichev was named director of the org-instructiondepartment, and the agricultural and transport departments of the CentralCommittee were abolished.77

These arrangements were a setback for those who favored a more directrole for party officials in the administration of the economy. The eliminationof the departments for transport and agriculture in the Central Committee lim-

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ited the authority of their local counterparts in the republican and lower partybodies throughout the USSR and bolstered the authority of the deputy primeministers responsible for these sectors (Andreyev for agriculture andVoroshilov and Beria for transportation).

Furthermore, the decree probably undercut Malenkov’s role in the man-agement of personnel. While he retained some ill-defined supervisory re-sponsibility for this sector as the chairman of the Orgbureau and member ofthe Secretariat, his replacement by Kuznetsov as the director of the cadres di-rectorate undercut his more direct hold on subordinate personnel. Moreover,the assignment of Patolichev (who later clearly identified himself with Zh-danov in his own memoirs dealing with this period) to replace Shamberg asthe head of the org-instruction department also threatened Malenkov’s capac-ity to control personnel.

In the first days after the Politburo’s decree, Zhdanov moved swiftly to im-prove the level of agitprop work. On April 18, 1946, he convened his subor-dinates to report that Stalin had become deeply dissatisfied with many of thecountry’s leading “thick journals,” with the level of criticism in literature andother cultural fields, and wanted the agitprop directorate to lead and controlthis sphere of activity.78

The restoration of Zhdanov’s full authority over the agitprop directorateclearly bolstered the campaign to improve the ideological education ofparty members, but it did not eliminate the public expression of resistanceto his views. While Propagandist quickly resumed its campaign for therestoration of party members’ “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism,79

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed the lead of the Central Committee decreeof March 27, 1946. It focused on the importance of “mass work” in supportof the five-year plan, urged party organizations to foster socialist competi-tion, and to cultivate soviet patriotism to improve workers’ attitudes towardlabor.80

While Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not endorse Zhdanov’s view on ideologi-cal education, it could not ignore the extension of the authority of the Sovmin-istrov. It now explicitly recognized that the extension of its role demandedthat the party officials end their “duplication” and instead provide “politicalleadership” based on a “principled party position.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo de-fined political leadership to include the mobilization of people to solve eco-nomic questions, the broadening of the responsibilities of soviet and eco-nomic organs for economic questions, the verification of the fulfillment ofprevious decrees, the correction of errors, and “work with people.” To achievethese objectives, “internal” work had to be vastly improved—party meetingshad to be convened on a regular basis, raikom had to give more attention toprimary party organizations, and the PPOs had to use their pravo kontrolia


more effectively. The editorial cited Stalin’s formulation that party politicalwork was the basis of economic success in support of this position.81

In this context, Secretary Popov, who had endorsed party officials’ activeintervention in economic administration in the spring of 1945, now movedcloser to Zhdanov’s orientation. In a report to the Moscow party organization,he portrayed party organs and “economic leaders” as sharing the responsibil-ity for the fulfillment of the plan, and explicitly recognized the critical roleplayed by state ministries in vital sectors such as construction.82 Popov alsoemphasized the centrality of internal and party political work, explicitly crit-icized meetings of the party aktiv for their failure to engage in real discus-sions of these matters, and warned that party officials who sought to squashlegitimate criticism could be dismissed. But Popov did not fully endorse Zh-danov’s views on the significance of the study of Marxism-Leninism; he gaveequal weight to the ideological education of party members based on study ofthe Kratkii Kurs and Stalin’s works and to mass political work in support ofthe five-year plan.83

In early May 1946 Stalin suddenly shook up the Secretariat in dramaticfashion. On May 6, 1946, he fired Malenkov from his position as a Secretaryof the Central Committee on the grounds that as the “shef” of the airplane in-dustry, he had been “morally responsible” for its production of defectiveplanes.84 Malenkov reportedly did not participate in the meetings of the Org-bureau until July 16, 1946,85 and Stalin named Patolichev to take Malenkov’sposition as Secretary. He ordered the remaining Secretaries (Zhdanov,Kuznetsov, Patolichev, and Popov) to work out a new division of responsi-bilities for his approval.

In the process of preparing this proposal, Zhdanov composed a memo onthe baneful effects of party officials’ excessive involvement in economicadministration. His formulations were repeatedly incorporated, without at-tribution, into the subsequent public discussion of officials’ priorities. Zh-danov charged that party officials’ acceptance of “material rewards” fromthe economic administrators under their supervision had blurred the linesbetween the party apparat and the state administration, had underminedparty officials’ independence, and had reduced them to the playthings ofeconomic administrators. He also claimed that party officials’ neglect of“party work” had fostered a “one-sided enthusiasm for economic problemsat the expense of party issues” and undermined the local party officials’ ca-pacity for verification and instruction. He assailed the “serious lag” in ide-ological and educational work, the widespread neglect of “independentstudy” of Marxism-Leninism, the inadequate circulation of Pravda andother papers, and their failure to become “militant organs” of political andorganizational education.

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Zhdanov urged both Orgbureau and Secretariat to improve “party organi-zational and party educational work” to help local party organs to play the“leading role” in relation to state and economic organs. He also called on theOrgbureau to improve cadres’ theoretical knowledge through both formalschools and independent study, and to establish clubs of leading party work-ers in various areas to discuss the theoretical issues of the day. Finally, Zh-danov recommended that G. F. Aleksandrov be demoted to the position of di-rector of the department of schools of the Central Committee.86

On May 9, 1946, Zhdanov and the other Secretaries prepared a draft decreefor Stalin on the proper division of responsibilities between the Orgbureauand Secretariat and among the Secretaries but he did not act upon it until Au-gust. This prolonged delay may help to explain the extraordinary confusionin the discussion of ideology and officials’ responsibilities in both Bol’shevikand Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo in the spring and summer of 1946.

First of all, the lead editorial in Bol’shevik (no. 9, 1946) on ideological worktotally ignored the ideological education of members of the party and focusedexclusively on cultural policy.87 Secondly, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo simply didnot appear for the entire month of May and the first week of June. When it re-sumed publication with a double issue (No. 9/10) approved for publication onJune 10, 1946, it proved either unwilling or unable to present a coherent defi-nition of officials’ priorities. The lead editorial sidestepped the issue to focuson the significance of “criticism and self-criticism” as a “driving force” in allspheres of party life,88 and it published reports by regional party officials anda “consultation” on the subject that were completely contradictory.

The report by N. S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Com-munist Party, gave qualified support to Zhdanov’s views on the relative im-portance of party-political and economic work but did not endorse his viewson ideological education. Khrushchev acknowledged party leaders had un-derestimated the importance of “party-organizational and party politicalwork” during the war, insisted that these errors could be easily overcome byrestoring regular party meetings, improving the links between raikom,gorkom, and the primary party organizations. But he clearly implied that theideological education of new party members was no more important thantheir active participation in the life of the PPOs.89

In contrast, P. S. Popkov, who had replaced Kuznetsov as the leader of theobkom and gorkom in Leningrad, fully endorsed Zhdanov’s views on theproper division of labor between the Sovministrov and party officials. Popkovsharply criticized those officials who had evidently claimed that the changein the name of the government was merely “cosmetic,” underlined theSovministrov’s vast authority and spelled out its implications for the party of-ficials. Popkov insisted that party officials should now provide “political


leadership” and supervise the state’s economic administrators without inter-fering in their “operational economic activity” and condemned those indus-trial departments at the obkom and gorkom that continued to do so.90

But other regional officials generally sidestepped the issue of officials’ pri-orities. C. M. Tikhomirov, the first secretary of the Gorky obkom, insisted thatthe propaganda in support of the five-year plan was a long-term effort andurged the leaders of party, soviet, and economic organizations to play a moreactive role in the process. The Secretary of the Stalingrad gorkom, Piksin,called for greater attention to socialist competition. Secretary N. I. Gusarovof the Molotov gorkom urged greater attention to the workers’ need for hous-ing and cultural amenities and argued that party officials should hold eco-nomic administrators accountable for their failure to provide housing. TheSecretary of the Cheliabinsk obkom Beloborodov claimed that his own partyorganization had already shown greater concern for such matters.91

In this context, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo could hardly provide officials withcoherent guidance. The same issue published an anonymous “consultation”on the decisions of the VKP(B) on party organizations’ “leadership of eco-nomic work” that was completely contradictory. On the one hand, it declaredthat party officials should not take on operational responsibilities of economicorganizations, should strengthen the authority of economic organs and focuson their supervision, acting as “political leaders” rather than as “narrow eco-nomic officials.” On the other hand, it stressed the need to “combine eco-nomic and political work” and cited Stalin’s conclusion in 1937 that the twospheres were “intertwined” in support of its position. Its discussion of the de-cisions of the 18th Conference in 1941 was particularly confusing. It reportedits decisions to extend party organizations’ responsibility for industry andtransport but did not mention the departments for industry and transport thathad been created by the Conference to assure the implementation of these de-cisions.92

While the editors of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo were evidently confused byMalenkov’s demotion, the leaders of agitprop were not. In late June 1946 thedirectorate, in accord with the Politburo’s earlier decree, began to publish itsown newspaper, Kultura I Zhizn’. The lead editorial in its first issue reiteratedthe Politburo’s injunction to improve the party press, to provide direction ofthe cultural life of the country, sharply attacked local party organizations fortheir failure to provide adequate ideological education to their members,called for the development of new texts and resources to support this activity,and made no reference to the cultivation of Soviet patriotism.93 This first is-sue also announced the publication of a huge new edition of the Kratkii kursand of Stalin’s work and other “classics of Marxism-Leninism.”94

94 Chapter Six

The publication of the first volume of Stalin’s collected works in July 1946evidently helped to bolster the agitprop campaign for ideological education.Indeed, Stalin’s own brief preface to the first volume provided the classic ra-tionale for this effort. Stalin recalled that he and other “practical workers” hadbeen so ill-informed on theoretical issues that they had not fully understoodsome of Lenin’s most important generalizations about the nature of the Rus-sian revolution.95 Pravda’s own editorial (July 7, 1946) on Stalin’s first vol-ume followed suit. It insisted that the study of this text would help Commu-nists to solve practical problems, raise their ideological consciousness,overcome the intrusion of hostile ideology, and cited Stalin’s comments onthe study of theory to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in support of this po-sition. Pravda now agreed that party organizational and party political workprovided the basis for economic success.

From this point onward until the winter of 1946, the journals of theCC/VKP(B) lined up behind Zhdanov’s definitions without equivocation. OnJuly 10, 1946, Kultura I Zhizn’ assailed the leaders of three obkom for allow-ing their local papers to ignore the ideological education of new members, orto provide materials essential for those members of the party engaged in “in-dependent study” of Marxism-Leninism.96

In mid-July 1946, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo overcame its earlier confusion andendorsed Zhdanov’s views in its lead editorial, in essays by party officials,and its commentary on Stalin’s first volume. The editorial charged that thewidespread neglect of party members’ ideological education had allowed theformation of insidious “family circles” of governmental officials that soughtto avoid party officials’ supervision and demanded the restoration of more ef-fective supervision and concern with individual members’ ideological educa-tion to overcome this problem. It also reiterated Zhdanov’s charge (in his un-published memo) that party officials’ acceptance of bribes had made themsubordinate to economic administrators and indifferent to their corrupt prac-tices, assailed gorkom and raikom for their failure to eliminate these activi-ties, and urged them to restore “verification of fulfillment” and the PPOs’ “su-pervision” of economic administrators.97

The same issue included an essay by A. Larionov, the first secretary of theIaroslav obkom that repeated this argument in much sharper form. He con-demned those party officials who had allowed themselves to become trans-formed into “deputy directors” of industrial enterprises and insisted that theSovministrov’s ministries and their subordinate enterprises had the capacityand trained staff to solve questions of supply, transport, the distribution of theworkforce, technology, and technique on their own. Larionov also argued thatthe primary party organizations, rather than the local departments for indus-


try and transport, were responsible for providing the necessary “politicalleadership” and supervision of the administrative personnel.

Larionov also charged that the organizational instruction departments(headed by M. Shamberg generally identified as an ally of Malenkov) hadbeen responsible for obkom officials’ undue stress on economic questions andpersistent neglect of the various elements of internal work, including the ide-ological education of party members. He concluded that it was the very“heart” of internal work and urged party officials to provide more effectivesupervision of party members’ education in Marxism-Leninism.98

The same issue also included a “consultation” by S. Abalin on the “leadingrole of the party of Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet state” that endorsed Zh-danov’s views. Abalin condemned the widespread confusion of the functionof the “party apparatus” with the function of state and soviet organs, insistingthat party officials had to retain their “independence” from state agencies inorder to provide the appropriate verification of fulfillment and supervision.He reiterated Larionov’s position on ideological education.99

Finally, the same issue also included a detailed survey of the first volumeof Stalin’s writings that insisted that they were as important as Lenin’s, an es-sential primary source for the study of theory and history of the party, and a“massive contribution to the Marxism-Leninism” essential for Soviet peoplein the struggle for communism.100 At this point Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo ceasedpublication without explanation.

Shortly afterwards, Zhdanov’s views on internal party work and ideologi-cal education were incorporated into the decrees of the Central Committee.The decree of July 26, 1946, on the “growth of the party and measures to im-prove party-organizational and party political work with new members of theVKP(B)” charged that the ideological education of new party members wasinadequate and that the continued indiscriminate admission of new membersthreatened to swamp the party with ill-prepared personnel. The decree de-manded a temporary halt to new admissions, the application of more rigorousstandards, the recruitment of more industrial workers and technical personnelin the country’s major industrial centers, and a massive improvement of thevarious elements of internal party work including the ideological education ofmembers of the party.

The decree ordered the restoration of regular meetings of the party organi-zations at all levels, insisted that they focus on the education of the new partymembers, and outlined the shortcomings of the existing system of ideologicaleducation and the means to improve it in some detail. The decree charged thatlocal party officials had failed to establish coherent systems to supervisethose engaged in independent study of Marxism-Leninism, to develop an ef-fective network of party schools and study circles for those without sufficient

96 Chapter Six

background to engage in independent study of the Kratkii kurs and other ma-terials, or to train sufficient number of teachers to lead these programs.

The decree ordered the agitprop directorate to establish and to staff a net-work of local political schools, to prepare new texts for those engaged in in-dependent study (including new editions of Marxist-Leninist classics), and todevelop a set of lectures that could be used by local officials by the fall of1946. The decree urged local party officials to organize discussions and meet-ings with all members of the party engaged in independent study, to establishpolitical schools in the primary party organizations in all enterprises, collec-tive farms, institutions, and military units for those Communists with insuffi-cient background to study theory independently and to assign propagandistsfrom raikom and gorkom to direct them. The decree also ordered Pravda andother journals to publish more materials dealing with questions of Marxism-Leninism.101

A second decree (July 30, 1946) dealt with the shortcomings found in thethree oblast party newspapers (Rostov, Kuibyshev, and Kursk) that had beensharply criticized by Kultura I Zhizn’ three weeks earlier. It charged thatobkom officials’ ideological laxity had allowed the editors of local papers toignore local party and soviet organs, to give inadequate coverage of basicquestions of party political work, economic, and cultural construction, and toavoid effective criticism of local party organizations. The decree also chargedthat the editors had failed to publish materials to help those engaged in thestudy of theory and the history of the party, did not provide effective propa-ganda about the five-year plan, or to publicize the experience of advancedworkers to bolster and publicize socialist competition. Finally, the decreesharply attacked the obkom in Rostov for allowing a state agency to financethe paper, a policy that allowed state officials to avoid appropriate criticism.It ordered the agitprop directorate to work with the local officials in changingthe structure of the editorial boards of the papers and provide instruction fortheir editors to assure the elimination of these errors as soon as possible. Thedecree was distributed to all obkom in the USSR.102

NOTES

1. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 203–4.2. Propagandist muted its enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism the day of Stalin’s

address. “Velikaia pobeda krasnoi armii I sovetskogo naroda nad germanskim impe-rializmam,” Propagandist, no. 10 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication, May 24,1945; B. Ponomarev, “Partiia lenina-stalina: vdokhnovitel’ I organizator naroda,”Propagandist no. 10 (1945), 14–23. Approved for publication May 24, 1945. On May16, 1945, Pravda had stressed the importance of theory, but moved away from this


position in its editorials of May 25, June 4, and June 16, 1945; Bol’shevik was themost explicitly chauvinist. “Russkii narod-rukovodiashchaia sila sredi narodov nasheistrany,” Bol’shevik, no. 10 (1945), 3–12. Approved for publication June 9, 1945.

3. O. V. Khlevniiuk, Politburo: Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-gody(Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), 254

4. Pravda, May 2, 1945, 1.5. Pravda, May 12, 13, 1945, 1–26. Pravda, May 12, 1945, 2.7. Pravda, June 6, 23, 25, 1945, 1.8. “Partiia lenina-stalina-organizator nashei velikoi pobedy,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1945), 7–14. Approved for publication June 4, 1945.9. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 135–37.

10. See Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1945), 39–40.11. “O nedostatkakh v prepodavanii osnov marksizma-leninizma v saratovskom uni-

versitite” Propagandist, no. 14 (1945), 10–11. Approved for publication July 31, 1945.12. B. Borisov, “Pervichnaia partorganizatsiia I voprosy vospitaniia kommunistov,”

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12 (1945), 16–22. Approved for publication July 21, 1945. 13. G. F. Aleksandrov, “O nekotorykh zadachakh obshchestvennykh nauk v sovre-

mennykh usloviiakh,” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1945), 22–23.14. Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1945), 13–14.15. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 555.16. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 558.17. M. Domrachev, “Zametki o proverke ispolneniia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.

11 (1945), 40–41. Approved for publication July 3, 1945; I. Boitsov (first secretary ofthe Kalinin obkom), “Vydviizhenie I rost kadrov v gody voiny,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1945), 37.

18. O. Kozlova, “Zametki o rabote raikoma v novykh usloviiakh,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1945), 6–8. Approved for publication August 7, 1945.

19. Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodni fonddemokratiia, 1999), 535–45.

20. For the decree see O.V. Khlevniiuk and others (ed.) Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) Isovet ministrov SSSR, 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002), 21.

21. Khlevniuk, 22–23. The decree had been proposed by a group including Molo-tov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Voznesenskii.

22. “Pered novoi piatiletkoi,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1945), 4–7. Approvedfor publication September 19, 1945.

23. “Uluchshit kachestvo prepodavaniia osnov marksizma-leninizma v vuzakh,”Propagandist, no. 16 (1945), 2–3. Approved for publication September 10, 1945.

24. “O sostoianii I merakh uluchsheniia lektsionnoi raboty v kuibyshevskom oblaste,”Propagandist, no. 17 (1945), 18–19. Approved for publication September 24, 1945.

25. “Vyshe uroven lektsionnoi propagandy,” Propagandist, no. 17 (1945), 5–9.Approved for publication September 24, 1945.

26. Pravda, September 24, 1945, 3.27. Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat

of Moderation, 1946–1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 212.

98 Chapter Six

28. Bol’shevik, no. 16 (1945). Approved for publication October 9, 1945.29. “Vybory v verkhovnyi soviet SSSR I zadachi partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 19 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication October 24, 1945.30. Pravda, October 29, 1945, 1.31. “Ob ideino-politicheskoi rabote partiinykh organizatsii v sovremennyi uslovi-

iakh,” Bol’shevik, no.17/18 (1945), 1–10. Approved for publication November 4,1945. Bol’shevik adopted this balanced position even though it reported that a decreeof the CC had condemned its ostensible neglect of Marxism-Leninism.

32. P. Pospelov, “O sovetskom patriotizme,” Bol’shevik, no.17/18(1945).33. M. Naumova, “Rol’praktiki v razvitii teorii,” Bol’shevik, no. 17/18 (1945), 46–48.34. Boterbloem, 264.35. Yoram Gorlizki, “Stalin’s Cabinet, the Politburo and Decision Making in the

Post War Years,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, no. 2 (2001), 293.36. Pravda, November 7, 1945, 2–3; November 8, 1945, 1.37. Pravda, November 24, 1945, 1.38. Pravda, December 12, 1945, 1.39. Pravda, December 19, 1945, 1.40. Boterbloem, 264.41. Pravda, December 30, 1945, 1.42. “O rabote seminarov propagandistov,” Propagandist, no. 23 (1945), 2–3. Ap-

proved for publication December 31, 1945.43. The decree was published undated in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1945),

31–33. 44. “Deistvennaia sila marksistsko-leninskoi teorii,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1945),

2–6. Approved for publication January 5, 1946.45. P. Pospelov, “Partiia Lenina-Stalina-politicheskii rukovoditel’ I vospitatel’ nar-

oda,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1945), 23.46. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Pod velikim znamenem Lenina-Stalina,” Bol’ shevik, no. 1

(1946), 6–10.47. N. Gusarov, “Ob izuchenii proizvoditel’nykh sil oblasti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 1 (1946), 16–23. Approved for publication January 19, 1946. Gusarov claimed thatlocal officials had developed immense expertise as a result of its conference on the re-gion with members of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

48. A. Kozlov, “Neispol’zovannye mestnye vozmozhnosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,no. 1 (1946), 25–27.

49. V. Liatnikov, “Operativnyi kontrol’ I proverka ispolneniia,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946), 27–29.

50. F. Serzhantov, “O vnimanii k melocham byta,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1(1946), 29–31.

51. Pravda, February 8, 1946, 2.52. Pravda, February 8, 1946, 2.53. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1946), 45–48. Approved for publication Febru-

ary 8, 1946.54. Stalin qualified his characterization of World War II by portraying his wartime

allies in a more positive light. See Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 2–4.


55. Stalin, Vol. 3 (XVI), 19–20.56. L. Slepov, “Lenin I Stalin o bol’shevistskikh kadrakh,” Propagandist, no. 3/4

(1946), 38–48. Approved for publication February 26, 1946.57. “Rabotat tak kak uchit tovarishch Stalin,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946),

5. Approved for publication March 12, 1946.58. A. Kuznetsov, “Rech tovarishcha Stalina I zadachi leningradskoi partorgani-

zatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946), 14–16. 59. Hahn, 41–42.60. M. Shamberg, “Nekotorye voprosy vnutripartiinoi raboty,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946), 31–33.61. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 35–53.62. Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) I Sovet Ministrov SSSR: 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen,

2002), 25.63. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 25–26.64. Zasedaniia verkhovnogo soveta, pervaia sessiia, 12–19 marta 1946 (Moscow:

Gospolitizdat, 1946). The government’s control of economic administration was rec-ognized many years ago by Timothy Dunmore in his The Stalinist Command Econ-omy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy 1945–1953 (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1980), 1–2. For a more recent recognition of the importance of thischange in the government’s name see Yoram Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism: theCouncil of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946–1953,” The Journalof Modern History, 74 (December 2002), 700.

65. Politicheskii Slovar’, 39366. This clearly was the case in regard to cultural policy. See the documents in

Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia, 587–604.67. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 26–27. 68. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 29–30.69. For the details of the agenda of each meeting in the period under review, see

Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 464–526.70. Boterbloem, 268–69.71. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 150–52.72. “Boevaia zadacha propagandistov I agitatorov,” Propagandist, no. 6 (1946),

3–8. Approved for publication April 5, 1946; Pravda, April 10, 1946, 1.73. It claimed that it was based on the “granite base” of Marxist-Leninist science

about the development of human society, on the laws of the development of socialistsociety, and the capacity of Lenin and Stalin to use these laws for the good of the So-viet people. “Programma novogo pod’ema sil sovetskogo gosudarstva,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 8–9. Approved for publication March 31, 1946.

74. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 13.75. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 11.76. “Istoricheskii resheniia verkhovnogo soveta SSSR,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1946),

4–10. Approved for publication April 9, 1946.77. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 32–34.78. For an excerpt from his report see Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia,

549–50.

100 Chapter Six

79. “O samostoiatel’nom izuchenii marksiststsko-leninskoi teorii,”Propagandist,no. 7/8 (1946), 6–12. Approved for publication April 27, 1946.

80. “Novaia piatiletka I voprosy politicheskoi raboty partorganizatsii,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 9. Approved for publication April 30, 1946.

81. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 6–8.82. G. Popov, “Zadachi Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii v sviazi s novym pi-

atletnim planom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 12–13. Approved for publi-cation April 30, 1946.

83. Popov, 20–21.84. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 205–6.85. A. A. Danilov, “Stalinskoe Politburo v poslevoennye gody,” Politicheskie

partii Rossii: stranitsy istorii (Moscow: 2000), 202.86. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 37.87. “Znachenie ideologicheskoi raboty v sovremennykh usloviiakh,” Bol’shevik,

no. 9 (1946), 5–11. Approved for publication May 28, 1946.88. “Samokritika-vazhneishaia sila dvigiushchaia vpered nashe razvitie,” Parti-

inoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 9–10. Approved for publication June 10, 1946.89. N. Khrushchev, “O nekotoryh voprosakh vnuterpartiinoi raboty,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 13–1890. P. S. Popkov, “Novaia piatiletka I zadachi partorganizatsii. Sobranii aktiva

gorodoskikh partorga nizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 19–20.91. P. S. Popkov, 21–23.92. “Resheniia o rukovodstve partiinykh organizatsii khoziaistvennoi raboty, Par-

tiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 38–43. Approved for publication June 10, 1946.93. “Vyshe uroven’ ideologicheskoi raboty,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 1 (June 28,

1946), 1.94. “10 millionov eksempliarov kratkogo kursa istorii VKP(B)”; “Izdanie

proizvedenii klassikov marksizma-leninizma v 1946 gody.” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 1.95. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1, xiii–xiv.96. “Gazety dol’zhny stat’ podlinnymi tsentrami politicheskoi raboty,” Kultura I

Zhizn’, no. 2 (July 10, 1946), 1.97. “Za vysokuiu printstipal’nost v rabote partiinykh organizatsii,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 1–4. Approved for publication July 16, 1946.98. A. Larionov, “O nedostatkakh partiinoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh,” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 20–21.99. S. Abalin, “Rukovodiashchaia rol’ partii Lenina-Stalina v sovetskom gosu-

darstve,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 37–40.100. “Pervyi tom Sochinenii I. V. Stalin,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946),

6–19.101. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 24–30.102. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 31–38.


103

SUMMARY

Zhdanov’s influence seemed to be immense during the second half of 1946. InAugust 1946, he was named the chairman of the Orgbureau,1 his views on theoverriding importance of the ideological education of party members were em-bodied in a major reform of internal party education, his report on the allegedideological errors of Leningrad’s leading literary journals set the tone for themassive campaign to restore the agitprop directorate’s control over the culturallife of the country. In the fall of 1946 he was indirectly identified as Stalin’sright-hand man in the Secretariat, his definition of priorities were incorporatedinto decrees of the Central Committee dealing with both industry and agricul-ture, and in November 1946 he presented the report on the anniversary of theBolshevik revolution. However, the first issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’, the newCentral Committee journal that began publication in mid-November, did notendorse all of his views. In the last month of the year, Zhdanov left the capitalfor an extended vacation and he reportedly did not return until just before Jan-uary 24, 1947.2 In his absence, public support for his definitions began to wane.

On August 2, 1946, the leadership made three decisions that influenced theconflict over officials’ priorities. First of all, the Politburo approved the de-cree on the responsibilities of the Orgbureau and Secretariat that the Secre-taries of the Central Committee had proposed to Stalin in May 1946 afterMalenkov had lost his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). Second, adecree of the Central Committee introduced a new system of internal politi-cal and ideological education for party and soviet officials. Finally, the Polit-buro named Malenkov a deputy chairman of the Sovministrov responsible for

Chapter Seven

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

the supervision of the Ministry of Electric Industry, the Ministry of Commu-nication Production and the Ministry for Communications.3 As a result, onAugust 8, 1946, he became a member of the Bureau of the Council of Minis-ters that dealt with immediate problems of economic development at its peri-odic meetings.4 In sum, although Malenkov had been fired from his positionas a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) he became a Politburo/Minister with a pow-erful position in the inner circle of the government of the USSR with respon-sibilities in keeping with his priorities.

The Politburo’s decree on the responsibilities of the Orgbureau and Secre-tariat (August 2, 1946) bolstered Zhdanov’s authority. He was named Chair-man of the Orgbureau, which was now defined as the “directing organ of theCentral Committee dealing with party and party-organizational work” andheld responsible for the verification of the activities of all subordinate partyorganizations, for improving their performance, and for the review and ap-proval of all orders dealing with party organization and party educationalwork.

The Politburo’s decree explicitly subordinated the Secretariat to the Org-bureau and made the Secretariat responsible for working out the Orgbureau’sagenda, for the verification of the fulfillment of the decrees of both Orgbu-reau and Politburo, and the assignment of leading cadres in party, soviet, andeconomic agencies. The Politburo decree declared that both Orgbureau andSecretariat should improve local organs’ capacity to provide “real supervi-sion” of local state and economic agencies, and the work of the press.

The Politburo decree also upgraded the org-instruction department into adirectorate for the verification of party organs headed by Secretary Patolichevand staffed by a group of “inspectors” with sufficient experience to providereal guidance to subordinate party organs. Finally, the Politburo decree reem-phasized the division of labor between the Secretaries by reaffirming Zh-danov’s leadership of the agitprop directorate and the department of foreignaffairs of the Central Committee, Kuznetsov’s leadership of the cadre admin-istration, and Patolichev’s leadership of the new directorate for verification.5

On August 2, 1946, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) established an elaboratesystem of educational institutions to provide ideological-political training forboth party and soviet officials. It charged that the existing training programshad shown greater concern for the quantity rather than the quality of theirgraduates, that many unqualified students had been admitted into the existingschools, that the instruction was well below par, and that many party and so-viet workers had stopped their own independent study of Marxism-Leninismand needed to be retrained.6

The decree also claimed that the existing program had not trained a suffi-cient number of specialists in Marxism-Leninism, law, international relations,

104 Chapter Seven

and philosophy to staff the local departments of propaganda, the institutionsof higher and technical education, and journals. In order to meet this objec-tive, the existing Advanced Party School was renamed the Academy of SocialScience, placed under the direct control of the agitprop directorate andcharged with the training of specialists in the fields of political economy, for-eign economic institutions, theory of state and law, international relations,history of the USSR, history of the VKP(B), dialectical materialism, philoso-phy and literary criticism. Graduates would be placed in the directorate, localparty organizations, journals, and higher educational institutions.

The CC decree also called for the establishment of a wide network ofschools under the direct control of the cadre directorate that would attempt toretrain all leading cadres over the next three to four years.7 This program washeaded by the newly formed Advanced Party School and included subordinateschools for party officials at every level of the party’s hierarchy. The AdvancedParty School included sections for organizational party work, propagandawork, and for editors of newspapers. Candidates for the party school had to beunder forty years old, have completed secondary school education, and haveexperience as secretaries and heads and deputy heads of departments at thegorkom, obkom, kraikom, or Central Committee of union republics. Similarprograms were established at the republican, krai, and oblast levels for long-termstudy and retraining with sectors for the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,history, economic science, Russian language and literature.8 A parallel systemof education was established for workers in soviet agencies.

While the agitprop and cadres directorate raced to establish this program,the agitprop directorate enjoyed a temporary but significant advantage in pub-licizing its views. As noted above, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo had ceased publica-tion in mid-1946, the agitprop directorate had begun to publish its own jour-nal Kultura I Zhizn’, and the CC/VKP(B) had announced the forthcomingpublication of Partiinaia Zhizn’. But Partiinaia Zhizn’ did not appear untilmid-November 1946, and in the interim Kultura I Zhizn’ pressed vigorouslyfor the restoration of ideological education at all levels of the VKP(B). Itslead editorial of August 10, 1946, provided a vigorous defense of new mem-bers’ ideological education, paraphrased the Central Committee decree ofJuly 26, 1946, and gave particular stress to the supervision of party members’“independent study” of Marxism-Leninism.9

Pravda adopted the same position. It cited Stalin’s warning in his report tothe 18th Congress that those who remained indifferent to the study of theorycould become mere “mechanical implementers” of party decisions,10 andurged technically trained personnel to study theory to avoid the danger oflapsing into practicalism (deliachestvo).11 In contrast, Bol’shevik remainedsilent on the issue until mid-September 1946.

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946 105

In the midst of this campaign, the decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the ideo-logical errors of the Leningrad literary journals Zvezda and Leningrad (Au-gust 14, 1946) was made public on August 21, 1946. The decree was the out-growth of the Orgbureau’s discussion of Soviet literature held on August 9,1946, and it had been composed by a large commission including all themembers of the Orgbureau.12 Stalin reportedly helped to produce the finalversion of this decree and two others decrees highly critical of alleged short-comings and errors in Soviet film and theatre.

The terminology of the decree suggests that it was not an outgrowth of theagitprop campaign to restore party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism.The decree did not refer to it as a source of direction or inspiration, made noreference to the VKP(B)’s educational role, to the prewar decree of theCC/VKP(B) on the use of the Kratkii kurs, or to the leadership’s formulationson the study of theory at the 18th Congress. The decree reflected the leader-ship’s concerted effort to eliminate ostensible “bourgeois” influence from So-viet culture, to bolster Soviet citizens’ pride, and to assure agitprop controlover the cultural life of the entire society.

The decree attacked the journals Zvezda and Leningrad for publishing a va-riety of “ideologically hostile works” including the work of Zoshchenko andAkhmatova. It portrayed Zoshchenko as “anti-Soviet” for allegedly charac-terizing the people of the USSR as primitive, uncultured, and stupid,13 andcriticized the editors of Zvezda for publishing these materials and also ignor-ing the criticism of his work in the journal Bol’shevik in 1944. The decree as-sailed Akhmatova for her pessimism, her support for the “bourgeois-aristo-cratic aesthetic and decadent concept of art for arts sake” and charged that thepublication of such works had “cultivated a spirit of servility before Westerncontemporary culture” and had seriously disoriented Leningrad’s writers. Thedecree assailed the journal Leningrad in much the same terms, accusing it offostering a “servility toward everything foreign” and insulting the city thatbore its name.

In explaining these errors, the decree did not refer to the VKP(B) and itsideology but adopted a strikingly statist stance; it complained that the editorsof the offending journals had forgotten that “our journals are an important in-strument of the Soviet state in the task of educating the Soviet people and par-ticularly its youth” and that Soviet literature should fulfill this objective. Theeditors were charged with a loss of their sense of responsibility “before thepeople, before the state, and before the party.”

The decree held three officials responsible for these mistakes. While it at-tacked the head of the union of writers (Tikhonov) for fostering these devel-opments, the brunt of criticism fell on Kapustin, the second secretary of theLeningrad gorkom, and Shirokov, the secretary for propaganda and head of

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this department for allowing Zoshchenko to join Zvezda’s editorial board andto publish positive reviews of his work. The CC decree also criticized the ag-itprop directorate for inadequate supervision of the journals.

The decree closed down the journal Leningrad, named the deputy directorof agitprop Egolin the new editor in chief of Zvezvda, assigned the Secretariatthe task of appointing a new board under his leadership, reprimanded Ka-pustin for his errors, and fired Shirokov. The leadership of the journal wasshifted to the obkom, whose Secretary (Popkov) was held responsible for tak-ing measures to improve “ideological political work” among Leningrad’swriters, and Aleksandrov was held responsible for assuring that appropriatemeasures were taken. Stalin added one last point to the decree dispatchingZhdanov to Leningrad to explain the decisions.14

The published version of his report (an edited version of two different re-ports given in Leningrad in mid-August) did not deviate from the decree. Zh-danov’s report was extraordinarily eclectic—he not only savagely attackedAkhmatova and Zoshchenko for depicting Soviet life in negative terms, butalso combined patriotic slogans, a plea for greater partiinost in literaturewith the characteristic charge that party officials’ preoccupation with indus-trial production had made them neglect ideological questions. Zhdanov in-sisted that the USSR’s cultural life was superior to that in the West, reiter-ated the decree’s assault on any manifestation of “servility” to bourgeoisculture, referred to himself and his audience as “Soviet patriots,” stressed theimportance of the “interests of the motherland,” and endorsed Russian dom-inace of the USSR’s cultural life. Zhdanov explicitly attributed the ideolog-ical errors of the journals to the Leningrad party leaders’ preoccupation withproduction:

“How could it happen that the Leningrad gorkom adopted such a policy onthe ideological front? Obviously, it was carried away with the immediateproblems of the city’s reconstruction, with an upsurge in its industrial devel-opment, and forgot about the significance of ideological work. This oblivi-ousness cost the Leningrad party organization dearly; we must not forget ide-ological work; the spiritual richness of our people is no less important thanthe material. It is impossible to live blindly, ignoring the future either in therealm of material production or in the ideological sphere.”15

The published version of his report did not refer explicitly to the restorationof ideological education as an antidote, but the resolution of the Leningrad ak-tiv on his report in August 1946 suggests that he had called on writers to studyMarxism-Leninism to prevent a repetition of these mistakes.16

Zhdanov’s authority in the leadership was so extensive at this juncture thathis definition of officials’ priorities was incorporated into a decree of the Cen-tral Committee on agriculture. The decree on the agricultural policy of the


Sal’skii raikom (August 17, 1946) charged that its “substitution” (podmena)for the local executive committee and land organs had made it ignore the eco-nomic weakness of the collective farms, the flagrant violation of the charteron collective farms, the excessive turnover among their chairmen and had en-couraged the leaders of the collective and state farms and MTS to appeal tothe raikom for direct orders rather than attempt to solve their own problems.17

As a result, the raikom had avoided its responsibility for the overall leader-ship and supervision of local soviet, economic, and land organs as well as se-rious shortcomings in its party organizational and party political work.

In particular, the decree charged that the leaders of the raikom had notgiven sufficient attention to the role and development of the PPOs in thecollective and state farms and MTS, had ignored the local aktiv, carried outpro forma inspection visits, mismanaged the assignment of personnel,failed to recruit new members of the party from among the workers and in-telligentsia, neglected both their own and other party members’ study ofMarxism-Leninism, and “political work” with the masses. The decree alsocharged that the raikom had failed to dispatch local leaders to visit the farmsto explain the importance of their work for the five-year plan, and had neg-lected the development of local clubs, libraries, reading rooms, and moviehouses. Finally, the decree charged that the obkom in Rostov had simply ig-nored these errors because the farms had been relatively successful in fulfill-ing their production targets.

The decree ordered the raikom to end its excessive supervision of sovietand economic agencies and to grant them greater responsibility for the ful-fillment of the plan, to give more attention to “party organizational and partypolitical work” by working more closely with the PPOs and their secretaries,informing them of leadership decisions, and demanding accounting fromthem before the raikom bureau.

The decree gave particular attention to the improvement of the study ofMarxism-Leninism. It ordered the raikom to survey party members to deter-mine the level of their knowledge of theory, to establish more schools andstudy circles led by well-trained propagandists, and improve its own newspa-pers. The decree also made demands on higher party organs; it ordered theRostov obkom to help to provide lectures and to dispatch a group of consult-ants to the raikom’s department of propaganda to help those engaged in thestudy of theory; it ordered the agitprop directorate to send a delegation of spe-cialists in propaganda to the region and ordered the raikom to improve itsnewspapers. Finally, the decree urged the raikom to appeal to the Council ofMinisters of the RSFSR to provide funds for the construction of local culturalinstitutions, ordered the ministry of cinematography, the state committee onradio, and OGIZ to provide films, radios and books to the region.18

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At this juncture, Zhdanov’s views on ideological education were warmlyendorsed by Kultura I Zhizn’ and Pravda. On August 20, 1946, Kultura IZhizn’ published excerpts from the Central Committee decree on Zvezda andLeningrad and from the Central Committee decree announcing the end ofPropagandist and the forthcoming publication of Partiinaia Zhizn’. It alsoprovided surveys of party meetings held in Belorussia, Georgia, and theUkraine that “exposed” the various shortcomings in the ideological educationof party members under the watchful eyes of officials from the agitprop di-rectorate. The same issue included an essay by N. Mitronov, the rector of theAdvanced Party School established earlier that month, that endorsed thestudy of Marxism-Leninism, and cited the appropriate sections of Stalin’s ad-dress to the 18th Congress in support of his position. (Mitronov also made itclear that party officials in the new educational program would be trained tounderstand industry, transport, agriculture, trade, and finance.)19

In late August and early September Pravda endorsed Zhdanov’s orienta-tion in every respect. Its editorial of August 23, 1946, lauded the new sys-tem of internal party education, on August 24, 1946, it paraphrased Zh-danov’s assault on the baneful effects of party officials’ acceptance of“material” awards from those under their supervision, and on August 29,1946, it lashed out at those party officials whose preoccupation with eco-nomic detail had undermined their capacity to act as effective “political lead-ers.” On September 7, 1946, it attacked the party organization in Moscow,generally regarded as one of Malenkov’s strongholds, for neglecting theideological education of its members.

But for reasons that are obscure, Bol’shevik remained reluctant to supportZhdanov’s views. It did not comment on the Central Committee’s decree ofJuly 26, 1946, until September 13, 1946, and its editorial on the subject bal-anced its endorsement of party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism withalmost equal attention to the educational value of actual practice, active par-ticipation in party meetings, and the cultivation the personal characteristicsnecessary to be a member of the VKP(B).20

But these reservations had no impact on Zhdanov’s high standing in theleadership. On September 19, 1946, Stalin complimented him on his report onthe ideological errors in literature and suggested that it be published as a pam-phlet,21 and on September 22, 1946, Pravda defined it as of “immense signif-icance for all workers on the ideological front” and insisted that Marxism-Leninism was the basis of the entire activity of the VKP(B).22 On the sameday, Pravda published a joint decree of the Council of Ministers and CentralCommittee of the VKP(B) on violations of the collective farms’ charter thatwas signed by Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and by Zhdanovas Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(B).This clearly implied that


he was to be regarded as the leading Secretary of the Central Committee andStalin’s virtual second in command.

But this decree was a Pyrrhic victory for Zhdanov; it implicitly repudiatedthe Central Committee decree of August 17, 1946, that had condemned partyofficials’ “substitution” for state and soviet agencies as the major source ofshortcomings in the agricultural sector and had called for a clear division oflabor between party and state officials as an antidote. The decree of Septem-ber 19, 1946, failed to make this distinction and instead lumped them togetheras “party-soviet workers” who had ostensibly ignored the widespread over-staffing of the administration of the collective farms, the peasant families’ en-croachment on the collectives’ land, the local officials’ outright theft of col-lective farm property, and the violation of the norms of “internal democracy”on the farms. The decree established a Council on Collective Farm Affairs un-der the Council of Ministers to assure the implementation of the decree.

While Zhdanov’s views on officials’ responsibilities in agriculture weredisregarded, his views on the role of PPOs in industrial enterprises were in-corporated into a decree of the Central Committee (September 30, 1946) onthe errors of primary party organizations in the textile industry. This decreecharged that the PPOs in three major textile combines had made “serious mis-takes and shortcomings” in their party political and party organizationalwork. Its recommendations for remedial action echoed Zhdanov’s outline ofthe primary party organizations’ pravo kontrolia in his report to the 18th Con-gress of the VKP(B) in 1939 and totally ignored the industrial departments oflocal party organs.23

The CC decree charged that the “duplication” of the work of the factory ad-ministration of the Ivanovskii combine by the PPO had made it ignore themajor difficulties in the factory (the low level of productivity of the factory’sequipment, inadequate labor discipline, the high labor turnover, and the inad-equate provision of food and other services to the workforce) and the press-ing need for more effective party political work. According to the CC decree,the PPO had failed to develop the workers’ awareness of the significance ofthe five-year plan, had ignored the shift-level party units, had conducted partymeetings at very low level, and had ignored the ideological education ofCommunists so badly that one-third of them remained politically illiterate!

Similar accusations were leveled against the PPOs in two other textilecombines, and all three were ordered to “combine party political and eco-nomic work,” to retain their independence from the factory administration,and warned that the acceptance of any material rewards from the directorswas tantamount to bribery. The decree ordered local party officials tostrengthen the primary party organizations, improve living conditions, recruitagitators from among the more educated segments of the population to im-

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prove mass work, and to provide better support for those engaged in the in-dependent study of Marxism-Leninism as spelled out in the Central Commit-tee decree of July 26, 1946. The decree held the appropriate obkom responsi-ble for monitoring the party organs’ success.24 Pravda’s editorial comment onthe decree (October 7, 1946) stressed the PPOs obligation to provide “politi-cal leadership” and to supervise the administration without duplicating its ac-tivities or undermining the economic apparatus.

In the fall of 1946 the regime was faced with massive shortfalls in agricul-tural production and it adopted increasingly stringent measures to avoid acomplete collapse. On October 9, 1946, Pravda ordered party and soviet of-ficials into the field, to help collect, store, and transport the grain in order toassure deliveries to the state. On the same day, it announced the appointmentof the Council on Collective Farm Affairs. Its hybrid composition suggeststhat the leadership of the party had little sympathy for Zhdanov’s views on theproper division of labor between party and state officials.

The chairman of the Council was A. A. Andreev, a deputy chairman of theSovministrov and his deputies were N. S. Patolichev, the director of the newlyformed directorate for the verification of party organs and his own deputy,V. M. Andrianov. The majority of its members were chairmen of collectivefarms, but it also included important state planning officials, regional leaderssuch as N. S. Khrushchev, and leaders of republican and regional party or-ganizations. The Council had its own networks of agents independent of lo-cal party and state organs.25

As the collection of grain lagged, the leadership turned to more draconicmeasures. A joint decree of the Sovministrov and the Central Committee (Oc-tober 25, 1946) accused local party and soviet officials of failing to preventwidespread theft and embezzlement of grain and demanded stringent mea-sures by the judiciary and local police organs to deal with it.26 Stalin dis-patched his closest colleagues to the provinces to assure compliance.Malenkov was dispatched to Siberia, Mikoyan to Kazakhstan, Beria andMekhlis to Krasnodar krai, Kaganovich to Kurgan oblast and then with Pa-tolichev to the Ukraine.27

But the apparent rejection of Zhdanov’s approach to agriculture did notslow the agitprop directorate’s campaign to improve the ideological educationof party members. On October 10, 1946, Kultura I Zhizn’ published the cur-riculum of the evening raion party schools that included heavy doses of theKratkii kurs along with courses on the five-year plan, geography, and a sur-vey of all major spheres of party and soviet work.28 On October 20, 1946, itdirectly cited Zhdanov in its call for an improvement in the work of lecturers.It now complained that they had not provided sufficient attention to Marxist-Leninist theory, had been reluctant to discuss historical developments after


the October revolution, and blamed local party officials for failing to recruiteffective lecturers.29

But in November 1946 support for Zhdanov’s stress on ideological educa-tion began to weaken. First of all, serious disagreements over this issueemerged among the leading officials at the opening ceremonies for the newAdvanced Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences on November 1,1946. Secretary A. A. Kuznetsov defended Zhdanov’s view that the study oftheory was more important than either technical or general education, and thatthe VKP(B)’s effectiveness was totally dependent on its members’ knowledgeof the “laws of social development.”30 In direct contrast, G. F. Aleksandrov,the director of agitprop, repeatedly stressed the importance of practice as thebasis for cadres’ education, emphasizing the overriding need to “translate thetheoretical propositions of Marxism into daily organization and practicalwork,” and reiterated his earlier critique of unidentified “dogmatists.”31

Secondly, Bol’shevik proved reluctant to endorse the need for ideologicaleducation. Its editorial on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution por-trayed Stalin’s formulation on the “moral political unity of the USSR, thefriendship of peoples and Soviet patriotism” in his report to the 18th Congressas “a brilliant contribution in the theory of scientific socialism” and ignoredhis comments on the importance of Marxism-Leninism in the same address.32

While the editorial concluded by citing the importance of “educating themasses of the population in the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism,”33

this was hardly a ringing endorsement of the ideological education of mem-bers of the VKP(B).

Finally, the ceremony marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolutionseemed to indicate that Zhdanov had little support in the leadership. While hisselection to give the report on the anniversary was an immense honor, he wasthe only full member of the Politburo to appear with other officials to reviewthe traditional parade.34 In Stalin’s absence, the failure of the other full mem-bers of the Politburo to appear surely created the impression that Zhdanov didnot have much support.

Zhdanov’s address on the anniversary suggests that he was “back-pedaling.”He concentrated on the role of the state and its five-year plan, the various ob-stacles that had to be overcome in both industry and agriculture, and madefew references to the role of the VKP(B). He did stress the importance of po-litical consciousness for the society as a whole and young people in particu-lar, and underlined the significance of the decrees on literature, theatre, andfilm of August 1946, but he did not refer to Marxism-Leninism as the basisfor action and as an object of study. He also singled out the decree on agri-culture that he had signed with Stalin as of particular significance and laudedthe activities of the new Council on Collective Farm Affairs.35

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A week after Zhdanov’s address, the first issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’ was ap-proved for publication.36 At first glance it seemed to endorse Zhdanov’s ori-entation, but a closer examination revealed that it rejected some of his views.On the one hand, it published the decrees of the Central Committee that hadincorporated his definitions of officials’ priorities and his views on ideologi-cal education, its lead editorial implied that the new journal would concen-trate on the improvement of the various elements of “internal” party work,and it included essays by leading officials endorsing Zhdanov’s position. Onthe other hand, a second editorial (unusual in itself) on the agricultural sectorrejected his views.

The lead editorial lashed out against those party officials who had acceptedawards from economic agencies, who “duplicated” their work, or had allowedthemselves to become their “supply agents” and insisted that the Central Com-mittee decree on the Sal’skii raikom (August 17, 1946) provided a guide tocorrect these errors. The editorial also charged that party officials’ “underesti-mation” of ideological work (Leningrad and Ukraine were cited as examples)had been responsible for the errors exposed by the decrees of the Central Com-mittee in literature, film, and theatre, and that these decrees had made politicalconsciousness a major source of energy for the society as a whole. The edito-rial urged party officials to provide “constant and concrete leadership” to thelocal publishing houses and the media to help overcome and eliminate the“vestiges of capitalist consciousness” within the society as a whole.

The editorial concluded that party officials’ excessive focus on economicand administrative matters had seriously damaged internal party work andcalled for the regular convocation of party meetings and the revival of criti-cism and self-criticism to overcome these errors. It urged party members tostudy Marxism-Leninism in accord with the Central Committee decree ofJuly 26, 1946, and ordered officials to monitor those engaged in independentstudy of Marxism-Leninism.37

But a second editorial on the crisis in agriculture directly challenged thelead editorial’s insistence that the decree on the Sal’skii raikom, which hadstressed the need for a coherent division of labor between party officials andsoviet and land organizations, was a “guide to action.” The editorial heldparty organs at all levels fully responsible for the fulfillment of the govern-ment’s planned targets; it blamed the obkom directly for the lags in collectingthe harvest, criticized the kraikom for issuing orders without assuring theirimplementation, and urged the primary party organizations to become moredeeply engaged in the processes of harvesting, collecting, and storing thegrain.38

In contrast, the same issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’ also published two articlesby party officials that vigorously endorsed Zhdanov’s orientation. N. Gusarov,


a newly appointed inspector for the new directorate for verification of party or-gans, charged that the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party(headed by N. S. Khrushchev) had committed serious errors in both personnelmanagement and ideological work. He claimed that its “formal” approach to“work with cadres” had allowed the appointment of unqualified personnel andexcessive turnover among the officials in the newly liberated areas of the re-public. He also charged that its abject “underestimation” of ideological workhad weakened many members’ knowledge of theory, that officials had failedto supervise those engaged in “independent study,” and that the party schoolswere so badly staffed that many “practical workers” had lost their taste for ide-ological questions.

Most important, Gusarov charged that this neglect had allowed “bourgeoisnationalist conceptions” to creep into the writing of the history of theUkraine. He claimed that the agitprop department of the Ukrainian CentralCommittee had not realized that the writings of the historian Grushevskii andhis “school” of historians had ignored class divisions, had incorrectly charac-terized Kievan Rus as a Ukrainian state, were hostile to Russians, had de-clared that Ukrainian culture had developed independent from Russian cul-ture, and had completely ignored the “friendship of peoples of the USSR.”

Finally, Gusarov charged that the Ukrainian leadership had failed to im-plement an earlier decree of the CC/VKP(B) that had ordered improvementsin ideological work, personnel management, and the elimination of the“merging” of party and state economic structures produced by party officials’acceptance of material awards from state administrators.39

The same issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’ also included an essay by S. Kovalev, thedirector of the department of propaganda of the agitprop directorate, that out-lined the desired program of ideological education in detail. He repeatedly in-sisted that party officials at all levels were obliged to improve their own ideo-logical knowledge, to assure the ideological education of their subordinates,and the proper supervision of all those engaged in independent study. He ex-plicitly stressed the continued importance of the Central Committee decree ofAugust 16, 1939, that had called on the secretaries of raikom and primary partyorganizations to hold discussions with individual Communists about their ide-ological level, to have conferences on the question of independent study, and toraise the issue at party meetings. He urged those who had mastered the Kratkiikurs to move on to individual study of the works of Lenin and Stalin and to readwidely in political economy and other subjects, and called for the organizationof a series of lectures and periodical “consultations” with specialists in Marx-ism-Leninism to supplement and engage those involved in independent study.

He also reiterated the demand of the CC decree of July 26, 1946, to estab-lish political schools at primary party organizations in all enterprises, collec-

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tive farms, institutions and military units for those Communists with insuffi-cient background to study theory on an independent basis and provided anoutline of the proper subjects to be addressed in these particular programs. Healso called for improved training of propagandists at all levels of the system,the strengthening of the evening party schools for those with limited knowl-edge and the so-called universities of Marxism-Leninism for more advancedstudents of theory.40

In the last weeks of November Zhdanov was suffering from ill health andpublished support for his views on the centrality of ideological education be-gan to dissipate. On November 30, 1946, the Politburo granted him an ex-tended holiday that reportedly lasted until around January 24, 1947.41 WhileZhdanov was on leave, both Partiinaia Zhizn’ and Pravda qualified their sup-port for his views. The lead editorial in the second issue of Partiinaia Zhizn,(approved for publication November 29, 1946) balanced its enthusiasm forthe study of Marxism-Leninism with equal emphasis on the educational valueof correct practice. It now declared that cadres developed most effectively byfocusing on the solution of the most immediate problems facing the system(such as the campaign to end the violations of the collective farm charter) andlearning from their mistakes. In the same spirit, its criticism of party officials’“duplication” of state officials’ activities was balanced with the insistence thatlower party bodies learn about the details of economic and cultural construc-tion and provide this information quickly to their superiors.42

Similar “balance” appeared in an essay by M. Medvedev, the director of anunidentified department in the cadres directorate, and the journal’s survey ofparty meetings’ discussion of the Central Committee decree of July 26, 1946.Medvedev’s discussion of the responsibilities of PPO secretaries balanced hiscriticism of their acceptance of “material rewards” and their interference in “op-erational questions” with praise for their close supervision of “error prone” ad-ministrators. He insisted that the PPOs’ supervision of enterprise directors wasessential to overcome their resistance to technological progress, their indiffer-ence to the living and working conditions of their workers, and their attemptsto deceive the state with inaccurate information. Medvedev praised a particularPPO that had organized a conference on technology to assure that its factory in-troduced the latest methods, and concluded that the PPO had the right to rec-ommend the removal of the directors who avoided their obligations.43

The journal’s survey of the discussions of the decree of July 26, 1946, heldby local party meetings adopted a similar position. On the one hand, itstressed the need to end the incorrect policy of “non-interference” in partymembers’ independent study of Marxism-Leninism and sharply chastised thelocal industrial departments for their obsession with production and their in-difference toward the activities of the primary party organization and internal


party matters. On the other hand, the survey also criticized those “insuffi-ciently politically experienced workers who had not understood” (sic!) thatthe stress on internal work did not imply any reduction of concern with eco-nomic questions, and directly attacked those officials who had been unwill-ing to even discuss them. It declared that “political and economic questionswere inseperable,” that economic affairs deserved even greater attention thanin the past, and that any attempt to counterpose party work to the fulfillmentof the plan threatened both the development of the economy and the properupbringing of party members.44

On December 1, 1946, Pravda adopted the same position. It cited Stalin’sassertions that it was impossible to “separate politics from economics,” thatthe distinction was “methodological” and artificial, and his sharp criticism ofthose who had given undue stress to either economic or political work.Pravda portrayed his comments as a brilliant example of “revolutionaryMarxist-Leninist dialectics,” and criticized both those party officials who hadbecome so obsessed with economic details that they had become indistin-guishable from economic administrators and those who sought to avoid eco-nomic questions and limited themselves to “pure party work.”

A few days later, G. F. Aleksandrov directly challenged Zhdanov’s viewson ideological education in an address “On Soviet democracy” to theAcademy of Sciences of the USSR. Aleksandrov’s elaborate discussion ofthe alleged superiority of Soviet democracy to “bourgeois democracy,”made no reference to Marxism-Leninism, and highlighted Stalin’s defini-tion of the “driving forces” in Soviet society—its moral political unity, thefriendship of the peoples of the USSR, and Soviet patriotism. His talk wasgiven massive attention in the press and immediately published as a sepa-rate brochure.45

Furthermore, party officials who had explicitly endorsed all of Zhdanov’sdefinitions now modified their position. On December 14, 1946, Pravda pub-lished a wide-ranging discussion of local party officials’ responsibilities by L.Slepov, the head of its department of party life that balanced support for their“political leadership” with greater stress on their responsibilities for the econ-omy and gave short shrift to ideological education. He now defined ideolog-ical work as designed to eliminate “capitalist survivals” in people’s con-sciousness and to foster a communist attitude toward labor in the youngergeneration without any reference to the importance of theory or to the ideo-logical education of members of the VKP(B).

At this juncture, the campaigns for the election of deputies to the SupremeSoviet in the republics and autonomous republics in the USSR began inearnest. In this context, Partiinaia Zhizn’ stressed party officials’ role in thisprocess46 and it published a detailed gloss on this subject by the secretary for

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propaganda of the Moscow gorkom that totally ignored the question of ideo-logical education.47

As support for ideological education waned, public sources seemed to en-dorse Malenkov’s orientation. First of all, renewed attention to the impor-tance of “mass work” appeared in the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) on the col-lective and state farms. A decree of the Central Committee (December 10,1946) assailed the leaders of the Ulianovsk obkom and oblispolkom for theirfailure to explain the decree on the violations of the charter of the collectivefarms to general meetings of the collective farms.48 Shortly afterwards, Kul-tura I Zhizn’ published a Central Committee decree (undated) that assailed theChkalovskii obkom in the same way.49

As the year drew to a close, both Kultura I Zhizn’ and Bol’shevik began tobalance their support for ideological education with greater attention to So-viet patriotism. Kultura I Zhizn’ (December 20, 1946) included an essay bythe director of the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin on the overriding impor-tance of the study of the Kratkii kurs and Stalin’s own works50 and a lead ed-itorial that stressed Stalin’s definition of the “driving forces” of Soviet soci-ety and the cultivation of a vaguely defined “soviet world view” within thepopulation as a whole.51

Bol’shevik adopted the same stance. On the one hand, it published Alek-sandrov’s lengthy report on Soviet democracy and made no editorial com-ment on the question of ideological education. On the other hand, it publisheda lengthy essay on the education of Soviet youth by N. Mikhailov, the firstsecretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol and a member of theOrgbureau that gave equal attention to the study of Marxism-Leninism, thecultivation of Soviet patriotism, the “friendship of the peoples of the USSR,”the growth of professional knowledge, and the fostering of positive personalcharacteristics in the education of youth.52

Finally, Partiinaia Zhizn’s lead editorial at the end of the year on the re-sponsibilities of primary party organizations muted its support for ideologicaleducation and highlighted the alleged errors in agricultural policy of theobkom in Novosibirsk. This reference may have been designed to underlineMalenkov’s success in coping with the agricultural problems.53 N. S.Khrushchev provided more explicit support for Malenkov’s position in hisown report on the role of party officials in the Donbas region that was pub-lished in the same issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’. Khrushchev explicitly endorsedparty officials’ economic role and cited the decisions of the 18th Conferenceof the VKP(B) in the same breath. Khrushchev praised those party officialswho had provided specific advice on the proper use and maintenance of coalmining machinery ostensibly neglected by the state’s administration, explic-itly criticized those who had not provided sufficient supervision of economic


organs, and urged the secretaries of raikom and primary party organizationsto introduce daily supervision of each mine. He condemned secretaries at theraikom and gorkom level who engaged in what he called “general leader-ship,” and he had nothing but sarcasm for those who knew nothing of work-ers’ working and living conditions. Finally, he explicitly praised the decisionsof the 18th Conference designed to eliminate the policy of “storming” by thestate’s administrators.54

NOTES

1. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 35.2. Boterbloem, 288, 292.3. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 374. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 474.5. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 35–36.6. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 39.7. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 40.8. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 42–43.9. “Organizovat’ bol’shevistiskoe vospitanie molodykh kommunistov,” Kultura I

Zhizn’, no. 5 (August 10, 1946), 1.10. Pravda, August 11, 1946, 1.11. Pravda, August 12, 1946, 1.12. For the details see Boterbloem, 279–82; Vlast I khudozhestvennaia in-

teligentsiia, 565.13. For the text see Vlast I khuodozhestvennaia intelligentsia, 587.14. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 229; Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia,

590–91.15. Doklad t. Zhdanov o zhurnalakh Zvezda I Leningrad (Moscow: Ogiz, 1946), 33.16. Pravda, September 21, 1946, 2.17. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 50.18. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 53–54. 19. N. Mitronov, “Vysshaia partiinaia shkola pri TsK VKP(B),” Kultura I Zhizn’,

August 20, 1946, 4.20. “Bol’ Eshevistskoe vospitanie molodykh kommunistov,” Bol’shevik, no. 16

(1946), 1–11. Approved for publication September 13, 1946.21. Politbiuro I sovetministrov, 229.22. Pravda, September 22, 1946, 1. 23. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 62–65.24. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 69–70.25. Pravda, October 9, 1946, 1.26. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 76–78.27. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 227.

118 Chapter Seven

28. “Uchebnyi plan raionnykh vechernikh partiinykh shkol,” Kultura I Zhizn’, Oc-tober 10, 1946, 1.

29. “Lektsionnuiu propaganda na uroven novykh zadach,”Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 12(October 20, 1946), 1.

30. Kultura I Zhizn’, November 7, 1946, 5.31. Kultura I Zhizn’, November 7, 1946, 5.32. “Istoricheskie rezul’taty velikoi oktiabriaskoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii,”

Bol’shevik, no. 20 (1946), 7–8. Approved for publication November 6, 1946.33. “Istoricheskie rezul’taty,” 13.34. Pravda, November 8, 1946, 1. Zhdanov was joined by Voznesenskii, who was

an alternate member of the Politburo, the Secretaries of the Central Committee, andmany other lower-level officials.

35. Pravda, November 8, 1946, 1.36. The members of the editorial board remained secret until mid-1947. Its lead

editorial seemed to hint that the journal was a “house organ” for the cadres directorateheaded by Kuznetsov and/or the directorate for the verification of party organs headedby Patolichev. Both are generally regarded as allies of Zhdanov.

37. “Zadachi partiinoii raboty v sovremennykh usloviiakh,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no.1 (1946), 18–23. Approved for publication November 15, 1946.

38. “Po bol’shevistski rukovodit khlebozagoitovkami,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 1(1946), 25–29.

39. N. Gusarov, “O rabote s kadrami v Ukrainskoi partorganizatsii,” PartiinaiaZhizn’, no. 1 (1946), 39–45.

40. S. Kovalev, “Voprosy organizatsii propagandistskoi raboty,” Partiinaia Zhizn’,no. 1 (1946), 46–52.

41. Boterbloem, 288.42. “Za vysokuiu ideinost vo vsei nashe rabote,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 2 (1946),

4–6. Approved for publication November 29, 1946.43. M. Medvedev, “Partiinyi kontrol na predpriiatiakh,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 2

(1946), 23–26.44. “Rukovodstvo priemom v VKP(B) I vospitanie novykh chlenov partii s plenu-

mov TsK kompartii soiuznykh respublik, kraikomov, I obkomov VKP(B),” PartiinaiaZhizn’, no. 2 (1946), 29–35.

45. Pravda, December 5, 6, 1946.46. “Vybory v verkhovnye sovety soiuznikh I avtonomnykh respublik I zadachi

partorganizatsii,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 3 (1946), 1–6. Approved for publication De-cember 18, 1946.

47. N. Danilov, “Massovo-politicheskaia rabota v period izbiratel’noi kampanii,”Partinaia Zhizn’ no. 3 (1946), 38–42.

48. Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 3 (1946), 43–44. 49. Kultura I Zhizn’, December 31, 1946, 1.50. S. V. Kruzhkov, “Proizvedeniia klassikov marksizma-leinizma-moguchee sred-

stvo idenogo vospitaniia kadrov,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 18 (December 20, 1946), 1.51. “Velikaia sila idei lenina-stalina,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 18, 1.


52. N. Mikhailov, “Kommunisticheskoe vospitanie molodozhi-glavnaia zadachakomsomola,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1946), 11–24. Approved for publication January6, 1947.

53. “Vsemerno uluchshat rukovodstvo pervichnym partorganizatsiiami,” Parti-inaia Zhizn’, no. 4 (1946), 1–7. Approved for publication December 29, 1946.

120 Chapter Seven

121

SUMMARY

In the first half of 1947 published support for Malenkov’s definitions in-creased dramatically. Zhdanov’s absence from the capital at the beginning ofthe year, the growing crisis in agriculture, and an increasingly tense interna-tional situation led the leadership to give renewed stress to party officials’economic responsibilities. In early February 1947 Malenkov was named tohead the bureau for agriculture subordinate to the Bureau of the Council ofMinisters and later that month a decree of the Central Committee repudiatedZhdanov’s views of officials’ responsibilities in agriculture. In April 1947Stalin seemed to distance himself from Zhdanov’s orientation by declaringthat he was “not a propagandist but a man of practical affairs,” and in JunePartiinaia Zhizn’ suddenly endorsed Malenkov’s orientations without reser-vation. But in the same month Zhdanov launched an effective counterattackagainst G. F. Aleksandrov that forced him from his position as agitprop di-rector in September 1947. In the same month, Malenkov unexpectedly en-dorsed Zhdanov’s orientation, with important qualifications, in his report onthe activities of the CC/VKP(B) to the first meeting of the Cominform. How-ever, Zhdanov’s illness and Stalin’s extended absence from the capital in thefall limited Zhdanov’s capacity to take full advantage of Malenkov’s shift.But Stalin’s return to the capital and the publication of Malenkov’s report inDecember 1947 was followed by renewed support for Zhdanov’s orientation.

As noted above, Zhdanov’s illness kept him away from the capital until some-time in late January 1947. In his absence, G. M. Malenkov and his allies re-gained political prominence. Malenkov had essentially disappeared from

Chapter Eight

Confusion and Compromise at theTop, 1947

public view in the fall of 1946, but in mid-January 1947 he reappeared for theelaborate state funeral for V. Vakhrushchev, the minister for the eastern coalindustry, who had probably worked with Malenkov during the war. Whileboth Malenkov and G. F. Aleksandrov played significant roles at the funeral,Zhdanov did not appear at the ceremonies. Aleksandrov was a member of thecommission for the funeral and Malenkov stood guard over the coffin withthe other deputy prime ministers Kosygin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Beria, andChairman Stalin.1 Malenkov joined other members of the Politburo and theSecretaries of the Central Committee, with the exception of Zhdanov, onLenin’s tomb.2

Nor did Zhdanov appear for the celebrations marking the anniversary ofLenin’s death later that month.3 G. F. Aleksandrov’s report gave rather half-hearted support to the campaign to assure the ideological education of partymembers. He did praise the measures taken to improve the party’s ideologi-cal work, including the publication of new editions of the works of Lenin andStalin, the Kratkii kurs, and the new biographies of Lenin and Stalin. But hebalanced these comments with repeated references to patriotism, love of thesocialist homeland, and the “unity of classes and peoples in the USSR,” de-claring that the “patriotism revealed by the people in the defense of the moth-erland is now exemplified in the labor enthusiasm of workers, peasants, andintelligentsia.”4

But the discussion of the anniversary in Kultura I Zhizn’ and PartiinaiaZhizn’ suggested that other officials did not necessarily endorse Aleksan-drov’s position. The lead editorial in Kultura I Zhizn’ on the anniversary ig-nored patriotic themes and concluded that systematic study of Marxism-Leninism was essential to resolve the problems of communist construction.Most important, it suggested that the agitprop directorate would now attemptto develop a “Marxist-Leninist” consciousness among the population as awhole as well as to assure the ideological education of party members. Iturged party organizations to use the biographies of Lenin and Stalin to makeMarxism-Leninism accessible to the workers and peasants.5

S. Kovalev, the director of the propaganda division of agitprop, elaboratedon this theme in the same issue. He insisted that the study of the biographiesprovided both the masses and members of the party with fundamental ele-ments of Marxism-Leninism and he urged party organizations to treat them asthe virtual equivalent of the Kratkii kurs. He called for the independent studyof these texts and the establishment of lectures, consultations, study circles,and discussion groups in every enterprise, farm, and institution to study thebiographies.6 The biographies of Lenin and Stalin themselves included for-mulations endorsing the ideological education of party members. The biogra-phy of Lenin had been published in 1942 in the midst of the war. While it

122 Chapter Eight

noted that Lenin had endorsed the “national pride” that inspired the struggleagainst Nazi Germany, it also had defined Marxism as the very basis for thetransformation of human society.7 The biography of Stalin, produced by a col-lective headed by G. F. Aleksandrov, quoted at length from Stalin’s commentson the importance of ideological education of party members.8

Partiinaia Zhizn’s editorial on the anniversary also repeatedly stressed theimportance of ideological education for all cadres. It reported that the CentralCommittee had recently fired an obkom secretary for his failure to improvehis own ideological education and insisted that the transition to communismhad raised the importance of improved political consciousness at all levels ofthe system. The editorial explicitly cited the recent decrees on the training andretraining of leading party and soviet cadres and endorsed greater supervisionof those engaged in self-education. While the editorial did note that ideolog-ical work was sometimes not linked to the solution of immediate problems, itmade no reference at all to Soviet patriotism.9

In late January 1947 Zhdanov returned to the capital. In his absence theleadership of the party apparently had concluded that its officials should de-vote more attention to economic questions. The leaders did not explain thisshift in public, but the timing of this decision suggests that they probablywere deeply concerned with the growing tension between the USSR and itswartime allies and the critical situation in agriculture. Whatever the case, adecree of the CC/VKP(B) (January 27, 1947) on the alleged shortcomings ofthe Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia marked the be-ginning of a campaign to make officials “combine the leadership of economicwork with the development of party-political work.”

The decree condemned party officials for a wide range of errors in theirmanagement of both industry and agriculture and in their conduct of botheconomic and party political work. It charged that officials in obkom andgorkom had failed to improve the performance of lagging industrial enter-prises, to increase the production of needed construction materials, to intro-duce new equipment, to train the workforce, and to improve labor productiv-ity at the enterprise level. The decree also claimed that party officials hadfailed to strengthen the collective farms, had permitted continued violationsof the collective farm charter, and had not overcome serious lags in agricul-tural production. Nor had they dealt with the continued presence of kulaksand the drastic drop in the actual number of collective farms in the westernregions of the republic.10

Officials at the obkom, gorkom, and raikom level were also condemnedfor their failure to develop primary party organizations, particularly in thecollective farms, to provide adequate ideological education for new mem-bers of the VKP(B) and to monitor those engaged in independent study of

Confusion and Compromise at the Top, 1947 123

Marxism-Leninism. The decree also charged that they had ignored “seriouserrors” that had crept into Belorussian literature, had not responded effec-tively to the Central Committee decree on Leningrad and Zvezda, ignorederrors in writing of history and those party newspapers that had failed tocover party life or engage in the proper level of criticism and self-criticism.Finally, the Central Committee of the Belorussian party was faulted for itslax personnel management and its “superficial” conduct of the meetings ofthe Central Committee. The decree censured P. K. Ponomarenko, the firstsecretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Minis-ters of the republic, for confusing the function of party and state organs sobadly that he had undermined the Central Committee’s capacity to super-vise the Council of Ministers and subordinate party organs.

The decree ordered the Central Committee of the Belorussian party to cor-rect these mistakes, insisting that its “main task” was the improvement of theeconomy, i.e., the fulfillment and over fulfillment of plans in industry, trans-port, agriculture, housing and cultural construction, the rapid production ofthe construction materials needed to finish the most important industrialplants, the broadening of the training of skilled workers, the improvement ofliving conditions in key industrial enterprises, and of housing in both townand country. The decree also ordered the raikom to assume the leading role inthe collective farms, and to take direct responsibility for every stage of theproduction process in order to eliminate the violations of the charter of thecollective farms.

Finally, the decree charged the Belorussian leadership with widespreadcorruption and ordered it to improve party officials’ supervision of economicand state organizations, their management of personnel, the leadership of pri-mary party organizations, and the Marxist-Leninist education of all Commu-nists. It also ordered them to translate Marxist-Leninist classics into Be-lorussian, to improve the ideological guidance of cultural affairs, theleadership of newspapers, and mass political work in support of the five-yearplans. The decree also ordered the leadership to expose the hostile activity of“bourgeois nationalists” and members of the Catholic clergy in the Westernoblasts of the republic.11

In the aftermath of this decree, G. M. Malenkov’s authority increased. OnFebruary 8, 1947, as a member of the bureau of the Council of Ministers, hewas named the chairman of the special bureau on agriculture, which wascharged with the coordination of five ministries dealing with agriculture.12

Shortly afterwards, the conflict over the nature of ideological work seemed tointensify. This was particularly evident in the discussion of Leninism in the or-gans of the Central Committee in February. Bol’shevik’s editorial on the sub-ject gave far greater stress to Stalin’s definition of the “driving forces of soviet

124 Chapter Eight

society” than to the need for ideological education in Marxism-Leninism,13

while Kultura I Zhizn’ published an essay by M. Iovchuk, the deputy directorof agitprop, that strongly endorsed the study of Marxism-Leninism and citedStalin’s Kratkii kurs in support of his position.14 Kultura I Zhizn’ also sharplycriticized two journals, Moskovskii Propagandist and Molodoi Bolshevik fortheir failure to publish a sufficient number of articles on Marxist-Leninist the-ory and cited the November 1938 decree of the Central Committee on theproper use of the Kratkii kurs to support its position.15

Moreover, Partiinaia Zhizn’ now became an arena of conflict over the is-sue. The lead editorial in the third issue (1947) insisted that the party’s “masspolitical work” was designed to cultivate Soviet patriotism, the “friendship ofpeoples of the USSR,” and to demonstrate the superiority of socialist cultureover the “bourgeois” culture of the West.16 But the same issue included a par-ticularly strong defense of ideological education by M. Iovchuk; he charac-terized the recent surge in ideological work, the series of decrees on the newsystem of internal political education, the revival of study of the Kratkii kursand the campaign against survivals of bourgeois attitudes as essential to thetransition to communism. In the process, he charged that previous neglect ofideological education had been responsible for the mistakes of writers andartists condemned in the Central Committee decrees of August 1946, the er-rors in party work in the agricultural sphere, and the nationalist deviations inhistory and literature exposed in the Ukrainian republic.17

But Zhdanov’s relative standing in the leadership seemed to weaken in thefollowing months. In late February, when the Supreme Soviet of the USSRmet to approve the state budget and the CC/VKP(B) was convened to respondto the growing crisis in agriculture, Pravda’s coverage of the leadership as-sembled at the Supreme Soviet seemed to indicate that Malenkov’s authorityhad grown at Zhdanov’s expense. On February 21, 1947, Pravda listedMalenkov directly after Stalin. While Zhdanov was listed as chairman of theCouncil of the Union, he was not shown at the rostrum.18

Furthermore, when the Central Committee of the VKP(B) convened (Feb-ruary 21–26, 1947) to deal with the crisis in agriculture, it spurned Zhdanov’sviews on the role of party officials in that sector. It issued an extraordinarilydetailed decree, based on a report by Andreev, the Chairman of the Councilon Collective Farms,19 that simply ignored the Central Committee decree ofAugust 16, 1946, that had sought to impose Zhdanov’s definitions on partyofficials working in agriculture. The decree adopted by the Central Commit-tee in February 1947 failed to distinguish between party and soviet officials,declared that the raikom would be held “fully responsible” for the collectivefarms under their supervision, and restored the political departments of theMTS ( that had been dismantled in 1943) to be manned by urban Communists


to improve their monitoring of the collective and state farms. The decree didnot even mention the need for the ideological education of those engaged inagriculture at any level.20

The plenum of the Central Committee also approved personnel changesthat may have undermined Zhdanov’s authority in its central apparatus. OnFebruary 27, 1947, the Politburo changed the leadership of the Central Com-mittee of both the Belorussian and Ukrainian Communist parties. Some of theofficials in the directorates of the CC/VKP(B) who had publicly supportedZhdanov’s orientation were now transferred to posts in the republican parties’leadership and specialized secretaries for industry and agriculture werenamed to the apparatus of the Central Committee in both parties for the firsttime. This reform clearly implied that party officials should give more atten-tion to their “economic work.”

The Politburo’s decree on the Ukrainian leadership replaced Khrushchevwith Kaganovich as the first secretary of the Central Committee of theUkrainian Communist party (Khrushchev retained his position as Chairmanof the Republic’s Council of Ministers), transferred N. S. Patolichev, who hadreplaced Malenkov as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) and had served brieflyas the head of the directorate for the verification of party organs, to the newposition as secretary for agriculture and procurement. A veteran Ukrainian of-ficial, Korotchenko, was named secretary for industry. 21

The Politburo’s decree on the Belorussian leadership replaced P. K. Pono-marenko as first secretary of the Belorussian party with H. I. Gusarov, whohad publicly endorsed Zhdanov’s orientation in his denunciation of the ideo-logical errors of the Ukrainian leadership, transferred S. D. Ignatiev, Pa-tolichev’s deputy in the directorate of verification, to the new position as sec-retary for agriculture and named V. N. Malin, a veteran official in theBelorussian party, the secretary for industry. Most striking, M. T. Iovchuk, thedeputy director of agitprop who had vigorously endorsed Zhdanov’s position,was named secretary for propaganda in the Belorussian party.22

These transfers from the central apparatus to the republican parties mayhelp to explain the sharp differences between Bol’shevik and Kultura I Zhizn’in the discussion of ideology in March 1947. On February 23, 1947, Stalinhad adopted a particularly patriotic stance in his order of the day marking RedArmy Day23and the organs of the CC/VKP(B) responded very differently. Inearly March Bol’shevik referred directly to Stalin’s order, repeatedly stressedthe overriding importance of his definition of the driving forces of Soviet so-ciety, and made no reference at all to Marxism-Leninism.24

But Kultura I Zhizn’ ignored Stalin’s order of the day and continued itscampaign to assure the ideological education of the entire population. OnMarch 21, 1947, it reported that a recent decree of the CC/VKP(B) had de-

126 Chapter Eight

fined the study of the biographies of Lenin and Stalin as essential to the de-velopment of a Marxist-Leninist world view among the population as a wholeand called for the independent study of the two biographies and the estab-lishment of lectures and consultations and study circles to support those soengaged.25 The same issue of Kultura I Zhizn’ also published reports on theefforts of local party units to foster the study of these biographies and on thetranslation of the classics of Marxism-Leninism into the languages of the peo-ples of the USSR.

But these differences seemed to evaporate at the end of the month whenboth Kultura I Zhizn’ and Bol’shevik simultaneously criticized the ideologicaleducation being provided in higher educational institutions. Kultura I Zhizn’assailed the departments of Marxism-Leninism in these institutions for theirfailure to provide adequate instruction and the Ministry of Higher Educationfor its failure to produce the necessary new texts on the fundamentals of Marx-ism-Leninism, political economy, dialectical and historical materialism, andthe history of the USSR.26 Bol’shevik now fully endorsed the study of Marx-ism-Leninism and cited both the Central Committee decree of November 14,1938, on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs and the decree of July 9, 1945, onthe shortcomings of teaching of Marxism-Leninism at Saratov University insupport of its position.27 The same issue of Bol’shevik included a lengthy es-say by S. Kovalev, the head of the propaganda department in the agitprop di-rectorate that represented the Marxist-Leninist education of party members asessential to the success of all of the elements of ideological work.28

But this apparent agreement was evidently shattered by Stalin’s publiccomments in the spring of 1947. On April 9, 1947, Stalin had an interviewwith Harold Stassen, who was regarded as a promising young leader of theRepublican party at the time. President Truman had just announced the “Tru-man doctrine” and Stalin may have sought to forestall its implementation bya conciliatory approach to the Republican party. Whatever his exact motive,Stalin was in a conciliatory mood and urged greater cooperation between theUSA and the USSR. In the process, he characterized the exchanges of criti-cism between the two countries as “propaganda” and declared that he “wasnot a propagandist but a man of practical affairs.” He added that “we must notbe sectarians” and concluded that changes in political systems would comewhen the people wanted it.29

Stalin’s interview was not published until May 8, 1947, but his identifica-tion of himself in these terms may have encouraged those who sought to ex-tend party officials’ “economic work.” Immediately after Stalin’s interview,both Partiinaia Zhizn’ and Pravda gave greater stress to party officials’ “prac-tical” responsibilities. Partiinaia Zhizn’s lead editorial of April 12, 1947, as-sailed those party officials in agriculture who had provided only “general


leadership” and insufficient “drive” in their supervision of state and economicorgans. It failed to draw the usual distinction between their responsibilities forparty political and economic work or criticize the dangers of “substitution”and urged both local party officials and leaders of the PPOs to provide farmore direct supervision of economic and state organs. Its brief reference tothe ideological education of local officials implied that experience was moreimportant than the study of texts.30

Pravda adopted a very similar position in its lead editorial of April 19,1947. In the process, it reported that the Central Committee had recently con-demned L. Brezhnev, the first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom and hisfellow officials for providing “superficial” leadership of critical constructionprojects. Pravda derided their excuse that the agricultural crisis had the high-est priority and stressed the obkom’s responsibility for close supervision ofagriculture, industry, and the cultural development of the countryside.

Stalin’s rather dismissive comments about “propaganda” seemed to reopenthe conflicts between the major publications of the CC/VKP(B) over the na-ture of ideological work. While Kultura I Zhizn’ continued its campaign to re-store ideological education, Pravda and Bol’shevik reduced their support forit and Partiinaia Zhizn’ became openly critical of existing programs. On April20, 1947, Kultura I Zhizn’ published an essay by P. Popkov, the first secretaryof the Leningrad obkom and gorkom that warmly endorsed Zhdanov’s viewson ideological education. He cited Stalin’s reference to ideological educationat the 18th Congress and provided a detailed and enthusiastic survey of theLeningrad party’s efforts to assure study of the Kratkii kurs and the immensesuccess of the elaborate system of supporting activities for those engaged inindependent study.31

In contrast, Pravda’s editorial on April 22 1947 (the anniversary of Lenin’sbirth), buried its reference to ideological education in a lengthy tribute to so-cialist competition, while the lead editorial in Bol’shevik’s issue of April 30,1947, qualified its general endorsement of ideological education with a seriesof overtly patriotic formulations. On the one hand, it stressed the importanceof the Kratkii kurs for the ideological education of the intelligentsia and gavepositive coverage to Zhdanov, noting his praise for the Kratkii kurs at the 18thCongress and his identification as a member of the “leading core” of the partyin the biography of Stalin. On the other hand, it portrayed Leninism as thegreatest accomplishment of Russian culture, claimed that the study of theworks of Lenin and Stalin and their biographies educated the masses “in thespirit of communism and Soviet patriotism,” and elaborated on the majorcharacteristics of this patriotism in its conclusion.32

While Bol’shevik straddled the fence, Partiinaia Zhizn’ now charged thatthe existing program of ideological education was often “divorced from life.”

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In mid-April it published a report by A. Skakunova, the secretary for propa-ganda of the Cheliabinsk obkom, that criticized local political schools for a“scholastic” approach to ideological education and urged them to give greaterconsideration to immediate problems.33 At the end of the month, its lead edi-torial claimed that the presentations of agitprop workers had become so “ab-stract” that they had ignored pressing production problems, the need to fosterlabor discipline, and the proper respect for socialist property, and urged thecultivation of soviet patriotism and citizens’ pride in their homeland.34

Stalin’s interview with Stassen was published on May 8, 1947, and seemedto have an immediate impact on the discussion of ideology. Kultura I Zhizn’slead editorial on the anniversary of the USSR’s victory in World War II in-sisted that patriotism had become a “driving force” during the process ofpostwar peacetime reconstruction and therefore had to be cultivated to assurethe transition to communism. Most striking, it recognized for the first timethat Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) had called for the cul-tivation of Soviet patriotism and ignored his oft-quoted comment on the cen-trality of ideological education in the same report.35 Kultura I Zhizn’ nowgave increased attention to “mass political work” in support of production. Itslead editorial of May 21, 1947, charged that the regional and city newspapershad ignored the everyday life of workers in plants and construction sites andurged local editors to highlight “advanced experience” that could be used byother enterprises, and to publish the reports of party officials to general meet-ings of workers as well as the most important decisions of party and govern-ment.36

Stalin’s identification of himself as a man of practical affairs may also helpto explain the sudden surge of published support for Malenkov’s views inPartiinaia Zhizn’ and other organs of the CC/VKP(B). In early June Parti-inaia Zhizn’ no. 10 (1947) revealed that its editorial board, which had beensecret since the appearance of the journal, included officials long recognizedas allies of Malenkov. N. S. Shatalin, who had served as first deputy directorof the cadres directorate, was the editor in chief37 and V. A. Andrianov, thedeputy director of the directorate for verification of party organs, was a mem-ber of the board.38

Partiinaia Zhizn’ published two editorials in support of Malenkov’s orien-tation—the first gave priority to party officials’ industrial responsibilities andthe second emphasized the overriding importance of Soviet patriotism. Thelead editorial criticized obkom officials for their failure to monitor enter-prises’ performance and to provide “operational aid” to lagging firms, to as-sure the introduction of new technology, the efficient use of natural resourcesand energy, and an improvement of labor productivity. Most important, it ex-plicitly declared that the obkom’s industrial and transport departments, which


had been studiously ignored by the Central Committee’s journals for morethan a year, were directly responsible for the implementation of the party’s in-dustrial decisions.39

The second editorial claimed that Soviet patriotism was the basis for theSoviet peoples’ labor, deserved an “extremely important place” in the party’sideological work, and cited Stalin’s comment on the subject in his report tothe 18th Congress to support this position. The editorial outlined the extraor-dinary achievements of Russian culture and science and gave particular at-tention to the “moral political unity” of soviet society, the friendship of peo-ples of the USSR and the superiority of Russian culture to Western“bourgeois culture.”40

The same issue also included an essay by N. Pegov, the deputy directorof the directorate for verification of party organs and a member of the edi-torial board, that sharply criticized party officials for their ostensible failureto deal with the lagging construction of new enterprises. Pegov did con-demn officials’ “duplication” of state officials’ activities but he gave fargreater stress to their responsibility for accelerating construction at all lev-els of the party organization.41 On June 10, 1947, Pravda extended this cri-tique to the entire industrial sector. It lashed out at party officials’ allegedindifference to the performance of enterprises and their alleged failure tosupervise ministerial personnel effectively, urged them to “penetrate deeplyinto economic affairs,” and did not refer to the dangers of their “substitu-tion” for those under their supervision. On June 16, 1947, Pravda onceagain assailed the leaders of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom for their ostensibleneglect of industrial construction.

Two weeks later, Partiinaia Zhizn’ continued its campaign in support of of-ficials’ economic responsibilities with the publication of an essay by G.Popov, the Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). Popov’s essay was very similar toSecretary G. M. Malenkov’s report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) inFebruary 1941! Popov combined a sharp critique of ministerial errors in theadministration of industry with lavish praise for local party officials as thechampions of the introduction of new technique and the cultivation of higherlabor productivity. He charged that the “technological conservativism” ofministerial authorities had thwarted the introduction of industrial techniquesdeveloped during the war, and he assailed those who had “mistakenly” re-garded party officials’ industrial responsibilities as extraordinary duties im-posed by the war rather than as an essential component of their normal activ-ities! He urged gorkom and raikom officials to master the details of theactivity of every enterprise and explicitly referred to the 18th Conference andto wartime experience as a major sources of inspiration for party officials.42

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But Zhdanov’s allies simultaneously launched a counterattack. On June 20,1947, Kultura I Zhizn’ published a report by N. Gusarov, the first secretary ofthe Belorussian Communist party, on his party’s successful implementationof the Central Committee decree of July 26, 1946, on the ideological educa-tion of new members of the party. Gusarov blamed party officials’ obsessionwith the solution of economic problems for the continued neglect of ideolog-ical education, urged the full restoration of ideological education at all levelsof the party, and ordered the newly formed republican agitprop department toassure that all members were fully engaged in some program of ideologicalstudy.43

Zhdanov became personally involved in this counterattack. In June hesharply criticized G. F. Aleksandrov at a conference of philosophers and ag-itprop workers convened to discuss the ideological errors of his text on West-ern European philosophy. This debate had reportedly been prompted byStalin’s conclusion that Aleksandrov had not given sufficient attention toRussian philosophy44 and Zhdanov explicitly acknowledged Stalin’s respon-sibility for the discussion in his own report to the conference. But it is notgenerally recognized that Zhdanov’s criticism of Aleksandrov’s text reiteratedmany of the charges contained in the decree of the CC/VKP(B) of May 1944denouncing Aleksandrov’s earlier work for a wide range of ideological mis-takes.

Zhdanov charged that Aleksandrov’s work had ignored the philosophicaldefinitions provided by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, had failed to utilizedialectic and historical materialism, to recognize that Marxism was a totallynew and revolutionary development and not an outgrowth of earlier philo-sophical systems. Zhdanov also claimed that Aleksandrov’s text had virtuallyignored the development of Marxism after 1848, and failed to portray thelinkage between philosophy and the existing social and political order. In theend, Zhdanov argued that Aleksandrov had not shown sufficient partiinost,had paid “excessive tribute” to Western philosophers, and had come far tooclose to “subservience” to their orientation.45

Zhdanov also claimed that the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy ofSciences of the USSR had been slow to establish a “new front” in the ongo-ing struggle against hostile bourgeois ideology at home and abroad, accusedit of “subservience” to bourgeois culture, and attributed the ostensible lack of“militancy” among younger philosophers to the insufficient “elaboration”(uiasnenie) of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.46 Finally, Zhdanovevidently felt sufficiently self-confident to engage in some ideological inno-vation of his own by declaring that “criticism and self-criticism” had becomea “driving force” of Soviet society.


Immediately after Zhdanov’s assault on Aleksandrov, S. Kovalev, the di-rector of the propaganda department of the agitprop directorate, vigorouslyattacked those local officials who had ostensibly neglected ideological edu-cation. In a sharp assault on the alleged errors of the Molotov obkom, hecharged that approximately 40 percent of the Communists in the region hadnot engaged in a systematic study of the history and theory of the Bolshevikparty, that leading officials did not participate in the various evening univer-sities of Marxism-Leninism and the subordinate party schools at the gorkomand raikom level, or conduct seminars for secretaries at the raikom level. Healso charged that the obkom had failed to provide adequate propaganda workon the fulfillment of the five-year plans and the role of the region in its ful-fillment.47

In the face of this energetic counterattack by Zhdanov and his colleagues,Partiinaia Zhizn’ retreated from its overt support for Malenkov’s definitions.The lead editorial in the twelfth issue (1947) on the education of leadingcadres discarded its previous criticism of dogmatism, balanced its support forthe cultivation of Soviet patriotism and professional knowledge and practicewith an explicit endorsement of the need to master Marxism-Leninism, andcalled for greater supervision of cadres self-education.48

Most important, the same issue published an essay by Secretary of theCC(VKP(B) Kuznetsov that directly challenged the definition of officials’priorities that had been presented by Secretary Popov the previous month.Whereas Popov had urged party officials to act vigorously against the “tech-nological conservativism” of the ministries, Kuznetsov insisted that theSovministrov could manage industry effectively without such intervention.He clearly implied that it enjoyed primary responsibility for the economy bydeclaring that Leninism called for an “active, decisive role for the state” andprovided an elaborate defense of all of the elements of officials’ party politi-cal work.49

In the aftermath of this exchange between the junior Secretaries of theCC/VKP(B), the differences between Bol’shevik and Kultura I Zhizn’ becameparticularly pronounced and Partiinaia Zhizn’ once again became a battle-ground. In mid-July Bol’shevik once again endorsed the cultivation of Sovietpatriotism as a “driving force of Soviet society” and as an “antidote” to thesubservience to various elements of bourgeois culture and thought.50 At theend of the month, it cited Stalin’s “letter to Razin” (that had criticized his “ex-cessive respect” for German military theory and his underestimation of Rus-sian military thought) as mandating the cultivation of Soviet patriotism as the“most important task of ideological work.”51

In contrast, Kultura I Zhizn’ resumed its role as the militant advocate forthe study of Marxism-Leninism. It not only defined it as the basis for the in-

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telligentsia’s leadership of the workers and peasants, but implied that Alek-sandrov’s ideological errors and the “subservience to bourgeois culture andscience” had been produced by the serious lapses in the study of Marxism-Leninism.52

In this context, Partiinaia Zhizn’ (no. 14, 1947) published contradictorymaterials in the same issue. Its lead editorial declared that the “major tasks”of party organizations included the education of the intelligentsia in the“spirit of Soviet patriotism,” the cultivation of an awareness of its obliga-tions to the soviet state, its consciousness of the superiority of Soviet cultureover the “bourgeois culture” of the West, and its professional knowledge.While recognizing major progress had been made in the study of Marxism-Leninism, it charged that ideological work was often “abstract” and notlinked to immediate problems, and cited Kalinin rather than Zhdanov as anauthority.53 In the same spirit, an essay by A. Egolin, a deputy director of ag-itprop54 insisted that Soviet literature played a crucial role in the developmentof Soviet patriotism.55

But the same issue included an essay by I. Storozhev (an unidentified partyofficial) charging that the Sverdlovsk obkom had failed to implement the de-cree of the CC/VKP(B) of July 26, 1946, on the political education of partymembers because of its excessive focus on immediate economic issues. Heclaimed that the bureau of the obkom had ignored the improper operation ofparty schools and the circles engaged in the study of the Kraktii kurs, theprimitive ideological level of lectures, the failure of primary party organiza-tions to monitor the ideological health of individual members of the party, andthe unwillingness of local leaders to participate in agitprop activities them-selves.56

Simultaneously, Kultura I Zhizn’ sharply criticized agitprop activities inother obkom,57and lashed out at local officials who had misused propagandistsas “special representatives of party units dealing with economic questions.”58

But Pravda pointedly disagreed. On August 13, 1947, it complained that ide-ological work was often “divorced” from the immediate tasks of the five-yearplan, and insisted that the lectures for the intelligentsia should foster “a spiritof Soviet patriotism” and awareness of the superiority of Soviet culture.

On August 15, 1947, Stalin left the capital for an extended vacation and hedid not return until November 21, 1947.59 On the day of his departure, Bol’-shevik changed course and endorsed a Zhdanovite position without reserva-tion. It now cited the November 1938 decree on the proper use of the Kratkiikurs and Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress and criticized those whose focuson a “narrow range of organizational-economic questions” had made themneglect their own ideological education and had become “unprincipled apo-litical practicalists.”60


After a brief flurry of support for the cultivation of Soviet patriotism inboth Pravda and Kultura I Zhizn’61 in late August, the agitprop journal re-sumed its campaign for ideological education without reservation in Septem-ber. It praised the new system of party schools62 and published an essay by N.Mitronov, the director of the advanced party school and a deputy director ofthe cadres directorate, that cited Zhdanov’s call for improved ideologicalwork in his denunciation of Aleksandrov’s errors.63

The following week, Zhdanov’s campaign against G. F. Aleksandrov fi-nally produced the desired result. On September 17, 1947, he was replaced asdirector of agitprop by M. A. Suslov, a Secretary of the Central Committee.64

On September 19, 1947, Pravda marked the first anniversary of the decree onagriculture that had been signed by Stalin and Zhdanov and the Politburo de-cided to send Zhdanov and Malenkov to represent the VKP(B) at the firstmeeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).65

Stalin’s decision to dispatch both of his lieutenants to the first meeting ofthe Cominform suggests that he may have sought to maintain a rough balancebetween them. This was reflected in the rather unusual protocol surroundingtheir respective reports. Zhdanov’s report on the international situation wasnot presented in the name of the Central Committee while Malenkov’s reporton the activities of the Central Committee was the first formal report on itsactivities to be presented since Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of theVKP(B) in 1939. Stalin’s selection of Malenkov as the rapporteuer for theCC/VKP(B), a role previously enjoyed only by the General Secretary, seemedto indicate that he enjoyed Stalin’s special favor. Furthermore, Malenkovspoke on the opening day of the conference.

Malenkov’s report was extremely surprising. He not only endorsed Zh-danov’s definition of party officials’ responsibilities (with some importantqualifications) but also recognized the importance of ideological educationwithout, however, giving it the highest priority. Malenkov now explicitly ac-knowledged that party officials’ continued direct intervention in the adminis-tration of Soviet industry, while essential during the war, had seriously un-dermined party organizational and ideological work, encouraged officials to“substitute” for state economic officials and had thereby “violated one of thefundamental principles of Bolshevik leadership.”66 But Malenkov carefullybalanced this support for party officials’ internal work with his insistence thatthey had to “raise the level of Bolshevik leadership of state and economic ac-tivity.”67

Malenkov also endorsed the need for the ideological education of partymembers. He admitted that a “gap” had developed between the size of theparty and the level of its members’ political consciousness, praised the estab-lishment of the new system of educational institutions and the importance of

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studying the biographies of Lenin and Stalin. But he was unwilling to recog-nize that the study of Marxism-Leninism was the basis for practical successin every field, balanced his support for ideological education with stress onthe need to cultivate Soviet patriotism, and cited Stalin’s comments on patri-otism to bolster his case. While he did acknowledge the importance of the es-tablishment of Kultura I Zhizn’ as an agitrop organ and the criticism of Alek-sandrov’s work, his critique of Aleksandrov was a pale shadow of Zhdanov’sfundamental assault.

While Malenkov’s endorsement of these definitions, however qualified,was a major victory for Zhdanov and his supporters, circumstantial evidencesuggests that Zhdanov’s perennial ill health may have prevented him fromcapitalizing on it. Sometime shortly after the meeting of the Cominform Zh-danov became so ill that he was granted an extended vacation until sometimein early December.68 During the the fall of 1947 with both Zhdanov and Stalinabsent from the capital, sharp conflict over the definition of Soviet ideologyreappeared between the agitprop journal Kultura I Zhizn’on the one hand, andboth Bol’shevik and Partiinaia Zhizn’ on the other.

Shortly after the meeting of the Cominform, Kultura I Zhizn marked the an-niversary of the publication of the Kratkii kurs with a fulsome editorial thatincluded a direct quote from Zhdanov’s attack on Aleksandrov.69 In dramaticcontrast, neither Bol’shevik or Partiinaia Zhizn’ marked the anniversary ofthe publication of the Kratkii kurs and both journals gave greater emphasis toSoviet patriotism.70

With the approach of the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution both Bol-shevik and Partiinaia Zhizn’ gave more balanced attention to Marxism-Leninism and Soviet patriotism in various ways,71 but this did not close thegap with Kultura I Zhizn’. It marked the anniversary with an essay by L. Sle-pov, the head of the party life division of Pravda, that praised Marxism-Leninism as the source of inspiration and guidance for both the party and thesociety as a whole, portrayed the victory in World War II as a realization ofMarxism-Leninism, and made but passing reference to the importance of“moral political unity” and Soviet patriotism.72

Furthermore, the Soviet leaders’ comments marking the anniversary of therevolution in early November indicated that these differences over the natureof ideology remained unresolved. Neither Stalin nor Zhdanov attended theceremonies and the pictures of the assembled leadership seemed to placeMalenkov and Beria at the center of the extensive lineup of leading officials.V. M. Molotov, the veteran member of the Politburo and first deputy chair-man of the Sovministrov gave the report on the 30th anniversary.73

Molotov gave equal emphasis to Soviet patriotism and Marxism-Leninismin his address. On the one hand, he declared that the “new spiritual cast and


ideological growth of the people as Soviet patriots” was a particularly signif-icant result of the October revolution, praised patriotism as a source of inspi-ration during both war and peace, and insisted that the Soviet intelligentsiawas “imbued with Soviet patriotism as never before.” On the other hand, heconcluded on a more orthodox note by insisting that Marxism-Leninism had“illuminated the party’s path through all these thirty years.”74 Pravda’s edito-rials on his report ignored this formulation and insisted that the cultivation ofSoviet patriotism demanded far greater attention.75

By November 21, 1947, Stalin had returned to the capital.76 Almost imme-diately afterwards Partiinaia Zhizn’ dropped its balancing act to endorse Zh-danov’s definitions. It directly cited the 1938 decree of the CC on the properuse of the Kratklii kurs and warned party officials that they would be held di-rectly responsible for any neglect of party political work.77 But two decreesissued in the name of the CC/VKP(B) at the end of 1947 indicated that con-flict continued over the content of ideology. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) ofNovember 25, 1947, ordered the lecturers/agitators in Stalingrad to givegreater attention to the cultivation of Soviet patriotism and national pridealong with “socialist consciousness.”78 In contrast, an undated decree of theCC/VKP(B) published in Partiinaia Zhizn’ at the end of the year sharply crit-icized the party schools of the Belorussian Communist Party for their allegedfailure to devote sufficient attention to the August 1946 decrees on art and lit-erature, Stalin’s biography, and Zhdanov’s critique of the ideological errors inSoviet philosophy.79

Sometime early in December Zhdanov returned to the capital80 In early De-cember 1947 the Soviet press belatedly published G. M. Malenkov’s reporton the activities of the CC/VKP(B) to the first meeting of the Cominform. Hissupport for Zhdanov’s position, however qualified, seemed to be a boon forZhdanov and his supporters. Zhdanov himself received increasingly positivecoverage; Partiinaia Zhizn’ belatedly endorsed his claim that “criticism andself-criticism” had become a “driving force of Soviet society,81 and revealedthat P. A. Naidenov, a secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom had been firedfor “ignoring party organizational and party-political work,” for allowingparty officials to undermine the responsibility of state officials, and for al-lowing his subordinates to become so preoccupied with immediate problemsthat they had neglected the study of Marxism-Leninism and the regular con-vocation of party meetings.82 Partiinaia Zhizn’s subsequent coverage of localparty conferences pointedly argued that “practical experience” could not sub-stitute for training in theory and clearly implied that officials who neglected“internal work” would be sacked.83

In mid-December 1947, Zhdanov’s dominant position in the Secretariatwas dramatically reaffirmed. The joint decree of the CC/VKP(B) and Sovmin-

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istrov that ended rationing and reformed the entire monetary system wassigned by Stalin as Chairman of the Sovministrov and Zhdanov as a Secretaryof the CC/VKP(B).84

NOTES

1. Pravda, January 15, 1947, 12. Pravda, January 16, 1947, 1.3. Pravda, January 22, 1947, 1.4. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Nas oseniaet velikoe znamia lenina stalina,” Bol’shevik,

no. 1 (1947), 5. Approved for publication January 31, 1947.5. “Idei lenina-stalina osveshchaiut nash put,” Kultura I Zhizn, January 21,

1947, 1.6. S. Kovalev, “Organizovat izuchenie biografii V.I. Lenin I I.V. Stalin,” Kultura

I Zhizn’, 2.7. Vladimir Il’ich Lenin. Kratkii ocherk zhizni I deiatel’nost (Moscow: 1942),

295–96.8. G. F. Aleksandrov, et. al. Stalin: Kratkaia biographiia (Moscow: 1947),

164–65, 172–74.9. “Neistanno vospityvat kadry v ideiakh leninizma,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 1

(1947), 2–6. Approved for publication January 20, 1947.10. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 81–83.11. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 86–93.12. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 41.13. “Pod znamenem idei leninizma,” Bol’shevik, no. 2 (1947), 1–10. Approved for

publication February 10, 1947.14. M. Iovchuk, “Leninizm-osnova kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia trudi-

ashchikhsia,” Kultura I Zhizn’ no. 4 (23) February 11, 1947.15. “Sovetskie zhurnaly-moshchnoe uoruzhie sotsialisticheskoi kultury,” Kultura I

Zhizn,’ 1.16. “O politicheskoi rabote partiinykh organizatsii v massakh,”Partiinaia Zhizn’,

no. 3 (1947), 1–6. Approved for publication February 22, 1947.17. M. Iovchuk, “O nasyshchnykh voprosakh ideologicheskoi raboty v sovremen-

nykh usloviiakh,” Partiinaia Zhizn, no. 3 (1947), 7–11. 18. Pravda, February 21, 1947, 1. He reportedly gave up this position four days

later. See Boterbloem, 299.19. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 98–140.20. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 144–45.21. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 47.22. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 48.23. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 71–74.24. “Za dal’neishii rastsvet sotsialisticheskoi rodiny,” Bol’shevik, no. 3 (1947),

9–17. Approved for publication March 3, 1947.


25. “Vazhneishaia sostavnaia chast propagandistskoi raboty partii v massakh,”Kultura I Zhizn’ no. 8 (27) March 21, 1947, 1. The decree on the use of the biogra-phies has never been published.

26. L. Kuzmin, M. Iakovlev, “Uluchshit prepodavanie osnov marksizma-leninizma v vyshikh uchebnykh zavedediiakh,” Kultura I Zhizn’ no. 9 (29) March 30,1947.

27. “O prepodavanii marksizma-leninizma v vyshikh uchebnykh zavedeniiakh,”Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1947), 1–8. Approved for publication March 31, 1947.

28. S. Kovalev, “Kommunisticheskoe vospitanie trudiashchikhsiia I preodelenieperezhitkov kapitalizma v soznanii liudei,” Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1947), 19–22.

29. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 80.30. “Partiinyi rabotnik-politicheskii rukovoditel,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 6 (1947),

1–6. Approved for publication April 12, 1947.31. P. Popkov, “O marksistsko-leninskom vospitanii partiinykh kadrov I intelli-

gentsia,” Kultura I Zhizn’, No. 11 (30) April 20, 1947, 1–2.32. “Leninizm-uchenie I znamia millionov,” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1947), 1–9. Ap-

proved for publication April 30, 1947.33. A. Skakunova, “Iz praktiki roboty politshkol,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no.7 (1947),

35. Approved for publication April 26, 1947.34. “Za boevuiu propaganda tesno sviazanuiu zhiznuiu,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 8

(1947), 4–6. Approved for publication April 28, 1947.35. “Nepreoborimaia sila sovetskogo patriotizma,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 13 (May 9,

1947), 1.36. “Boevye zadachi massovo-politicheskoi I kulturnoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh,”

Kultura i Zhizn’, no. 14 (33), 1.37. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 602.38. Hahn, 43.39. “Boevaia zadacha partorganizatsii v oblaste promyshlennosti,” Partiinai

Zhizn’, no. 10 (1947), 1–6. Approved for publication June 5, 1947.40. “Moguchaia dvizhushchaia sila sovetskogo obshchestva,” Partiinaia Zhizn’no.

10 (1947), 7–17.41. N. Pegov, “Na vazhneishem uchastke bor’by za piatiletki,” Partiinaia Zhizn’,

no. 10 (1947), 18–27.42. G. Popov, “Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie v promyshlennosti I zadachi parti-

inykh organizatsii,” Partiinaia Zhizn , no. 11 (1947), 10–15. Approved for publicationJune 20, 1947.

43. N. Gusarov, “Partiino-politicheskaia rabota I vospitanie molodykh kommunis-tov v partorganizatsii Belorussii,” Kultura I Zhizn’ no. 17 (36) June 20, 1947, 1.

44. See Yoram Gorlizki, and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 36.45. A. Zhdanov, Vystuplenie na diskussii po knige G. F. Aleksandrova ‘Istoriia za-

padnoe-evropeiski filosofii,” Bol'shevik, no. 16 (1947), 7–2346. Bol'shevik, no. 16 (1947), 2047. S. Kovalev, “Agitatsionno-propagandistskuiu raboty-na uroven’ novykh

zadach,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 18 (37), June 30, 1947, 1.48. “Po bolshevistski vospityvat nashi rukovodiashchie kadry,” Partiinaia Zhizn’,

no. 12 (1947), 3–4. Approved for publication July 5, 1947.

138 Chapter Eight

49. A. Kuznetsov, “Ob ekonomicheskoi role sovetskogo gosudarstva,” PartiinaiaZhizn’, no. 12 (1947), 34–43.

50. “Navstrechu godovshchina velikogo oktiabriia,” Bol’shevik, no. 13 (1947),1–5. Approved for publication, July 13, 1947.

51. “Vospitanie sovetskogo patriotizma-vazhneishaia zadacha ideologicheskoiraboty,” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1947), 1–7. Approved for publication July 29, 1947.

52. “O bol’shevistskoi vospitanii sovetskogo patriotizma,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 21(40) July 31, 1947, 1.

53. “O politicheskoi rabote sredi intelligentsia,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 14 (1947),3–4. Approved for publication August 1, 1947.

54. Hahn, 218, 220.55. A. Egolin, “Sil’noe sredstvo vospitaniia sovetskogo patriotizma,” Partiinaia

Zhizn’, no. 14 (1947), 13–20.56. I. Storozhev. “Ob odnom sereznom nedostatke v rabote sverdlovskogo obkoma

partii,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 14 (1947), 29–33. 57. “Rukovodstvo partiinoi propagandoi-na uroven sovremennykh zadach,” Kul-

tura I Zhizn’, no. 22 (41), August 1, 1947, 1.58. “Porochnyi stil’ raboty otdela propaganda Chitinskogo obkoma VKP(B),” Kul-

tura I Zhizn’, no. 22 (41), August 10, 1947, 2. For similar criticism of other local partyorgans, see “Kostromskoi gorkom VKP(B) slabo rukovodit propagandistskoirabotoi,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 22 (44) 2.

59. Boterbloem, 309; Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 398. 60. “Neistanno povyshat’ ideino-politicheskii uroven kadrov,” Bol’shevik, no. 15

(1947), 2–5. Approved for publication August 15, 1947.61. Pravda, August 18, 1947, 1; V. Grigorian, “Vospitanie sovetskogo patriotizma-

vazhneishchaia zadacha pechati,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 23 (42) August 20, 1947, 2–3.Grigorian was identified as a deputy director of agitprop.

62. “Partiiny shkoly-vazhneishee sveno v sisteme podgotovki kadrov,” Kultura IZhizn’, no. 25 (44) September 10, 1947, 1.

63. N. Mitronov, “Vysshaia partiinaia shkola v novom uchebnom gody,” Kultura IZhizn’, no. 25 (1947), 1.

64. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 51, 242.65. Boterbloem, 312.66. For the text of Malenkov’s address see Soveshchaniia kominforma 1947, 1948,

1949. Dokumenty I materially (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998), 75. 67. Soveshchaniia, 76.68. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 269.69. “Moguchee ideino oruzhie bol’shevizma,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 27 (46), 1947, 1.70. P. Vyshinskii, “Sovetskii patriotism I ego velikaia sila,” Bol’shevik, no. 18

(1947), 26–37. Aapproved for publication October 2, 1947; “Nakanune velikoigodovshchiny,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 18 (1947), 1–4. Approved for publication Oc-tober 1l, 1947.

71. “30 let sovetskoi vlasti,” Bol’shevik, no. 20 (1947), 2–3. Approved for publi-cation October 31, 1947; P. Pospelov, “Partiia Lenina-Stalina-rukovodiashchaia I


napravliashchaia sila sovetskogo obshchestva,” Bol’shevik, no. 20 (1947) 30–39;“Tridtsatiletie sovetskogo gosudarstva-triumf partii Lenina-Stalina,” PartiinaiaZhizn’ no. 20 (1947), 1–9. Approved for publication November 1, 1947.

72. L. Slepov, “Velikaia sila idei lenina-stalina,” Kultura I Zhizn,’ no. 31 (50) No-vember 7, 1947, 4.

73. Pravda, November 7, 1947, 3.74. Pravda, November 7, 1947, 1.75. Pravda, November 8, 9, 1947, 1.76. Boterbloem, 315–16.77. “Uluchshit rukovodstvo marksistsko-leninskoi podgotovkoi kommunistov,”

Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 21 (1947), 28–33. Approved for publication November 22,1947.

78. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh,Vol. 8 (1985), 152–56.79. “O nedostatkakh v rabote respublikanskoi partiinoi shkoly pri TsK VKP(B)

Belorusii,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 22 (1947), 38–39. Approved for publication De-cember 6, 1947.

80. Boterbloem, 316.81. “Vospityvat kadry v duke kritiki I samokritiki,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 23

(1947), 1–7. Approved for publication December 13, 1947; Rosental, “Vazhneishaiadvizhushchaia sila razvitiia sovetskogo obshchestva,” 17–31.

82. “Nepravilny metody partiinogo rukovodstva.”83. “Rasshiriiat politicheskii I kulturnyi krugozor kadrov,” Partiinaia Zhizn, no. 24

(1947), pp. 20–26. Approved for publication December 29, 1947.84. Pravda, December 15, 1947, l

140 Chapter Eight

141

SUMMARY

In the first months of 1948, Zhdanov and his supporters seemed to regaintheir dominant position in the leadership. The publication of Malenkov’squalified endorsement of his definitions and Zhdanov’s own role in the criti-cism of the USSR’s leading composers seemed to prompt widespread, if notuniversal support for his position. But in the spring of 1948 this seemed toweaken considerably and hints of support for Malenkov’s definitions ap-peared in the journals of the Central Committee. Until recently, Westernscholars have attributed this shift to Stalin’s rift with the leadership of theCommunist Party of Yugoslavia, but the most recent scholarship based onarchival research has found no evidence of this association. Whatever the rea-son, this weakening did not last long. In June both Pravda and Bol’shevik re-sumed full support for his views. But sometime in June Zhdanov’s health de-teriorated once again and Stalin, on July 1, 1948, restored Malenkov to hisposition as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). Four days later Zhdanov wasgiven a extended leave of absence from which he never returned.

In early January 1948 Stalin selected Zhdanov to lead the assault on the mostprominent composers of the USSR for their alleged “subservience to bourgeoisculture.” Prompted by Stalin’s displeasure with the opera “The Great Friend-ship” Zhdanov played a central role in the discussions and criticism of both theopera and of the “formalism” of the music produced by the USSR’s leadingcomposers.1 Zhdanov’s activities were accompanied by broad but not unani-mous support for his definition of officials’ priorities in the publications of theCentral Committee. In January 1948 while Bol’shevik, Kultura I Zhizn’, andPravda marked the anniversary of Lenin’s death by endorsing Zhdanov’s

Chapter Nine

Zhdanov’s Last Months, January–July 1948

formulations on official ideology and officials’priorities, Partiinaia Zhizn’ con-tinued to resist them in a variety of ways.

Bol’shevik’s editorial marking the anniversary attributed all of the party’ssuccesses to its devotion to Marxism-Leninism and cited Molotov’s assertionto this effect in his report on the 30th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.It now insisted that the study of the Kratkii kurs and the works of Lenin andStalin was essential for both the members of the party and for the society asa whole and it gave far less attention to the importance of Soviet patriotism.2

Kultura I Zhizn’’s editorial on the subject made more specific claims, insist-ing that party members’ “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the basis forthe communist education of the mass of the population, for the continuedstruggle against the remnants of bourgeois ideology, and for Communists’ef-fective leadership of all sectors of economic and cultural life. It paraphrasedMalenkov’s formulation (without attribution) about the “gap” between thesize of the party and the level of its political consciousness in support of itsargument.3 Pravda’s editorials on the anniversary followed suit,4 and its pic-tures of the celebrations showed Zhdanov in attendance for the first time sincethe end of the war and standing very close to Stalin.5 The report by M. A.Suslov, the new director of agitprop, reiterated Kultura I Zhizn’’s broad claimfor party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism, and repeated, without attri-bution, Malenkov’s formulation on the need for ideological education. (But itmust be emphasized that Suslov seemed to distance himself from a classicZhdanovite position; he asserted that Soviet patriotism was at the heart of So-viet culture and that any manifestation of subservience to bourgeois culturewas a departure from Soviet patriotism.)6

Partiinaia Zhizn’ was equally ambiguous. Its first issue of 1948 includedtwo editorials; the first gave grudging support to the ideological educationof party members but the second, which introduced a new section of thejournal designed to help party members engaged in the independent studyof Marxism-Leninism, was far more positive. The lead editorial repeated(without attribution) Malenkov’s formulation, but its reference to ideologi-cal education was buried in a detailed discussion of other issues and it didnot assert that Marxism-Leninism was the basis for the party’s success inevery field.7 In contrast, the second editorial asserted that the experienceand professional training of party members were really useful only if “illu-minated” by Marxist-Leninist theory.8 The new section of the journal rec-ommended readings in the history of the party, history of the USSR, phi-losophy, political economy, and other subjects.9 But the following issue ofPartiinaia Zhizn’ moved away from this position. Its lead editorial gave pri-ority to mass political work in support of the five year plan and the cultiva-tion of Soviet patriotism, ignored the study of Marxism-Leninism, and bal-

142 Chapter Nine

anced its condemnation of party officials’ “substitutionism” with a refer-ence to Stalin’s criticism of party officials who provided nothing more thangeneral “verbal” directions.10

On February 10, 1948, a Central Committee decree denounced V. Mu-radeli’s opera “The Great Friendship” for its dissonance, its failure to usepopular melodies, and its break with the traditions of Russian opera. In theprocess, the decree condemned a group of the USSR’s leading Soviet com-posers (Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Katchaturian, and others) as “formalists”for their failure to eliminate the “remnants” of bourgeois ideology that hadbeen so roundly condemned in other artistic fields in August 1946. Zhdanovhad reportedly drafted the decree that ordered the agitprop directorate and theState Committee for Art of the Council of Ministers to set the situation right.11

The decree seemed to encourage Zhdanov’s supporters. Shortly after its ap-pearance, Kultura I Zhizn’ urged the forthcoming conferences of party organ-izations to make ideological-political work the “center of their attention,”quoted at length from Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress in 1939, ignoredSoviet patriotism, and now directly cited Malenkov’s comments on partymembers’ ideological education. It also reported that the Kiev gorkom had re-cently been condemned for its “preoccupation” with economic questions, itsfailure to supervise those engaged in independent study, to deal with ques-tions of party political work, and to provide leadership for local writers.12

Zhdanov’s definitions of officials’ priorities were once again incorporatedinto the decrees of the Central Committee on the administration of industry.On February 28, 1948, the Central Committee charged that the Stalinoobkom’s “substitution” for those who directly administered the coal minesand its neglect of “party political work” had led it to ignore the collapse ofparty members’ ideological education, the sharp deterioration of the workersliving and working conditions, and excessive labor turnover. The decree or-dered the obkom officials to end their “substitutionism,” to focus on the long-term needs of the coal industry, to improve all aspects of party political work,and called on specific ministries to provide the resources needed to improvethe miners’ living and working conditions.13

In the wake of this decree, Partiinaia Zhizn’ seemed to drop its resistance toZhdanov’s definitions. The lead editorial of the fourth issue (1948) reiterated theentire Zhdanovite rational for the primacy of “party political work”in the post-war period,14 explicitly recognized Zhdanov’s authority by citing his explanationfor party officials’ incorrect subordination of party work to economic policy (Zh-danov had explained that it was easier for officials to work with machines thanto “work with people”), and assailed the Stalino obkom for its errors.15

The following week a decree of the CC/VKP(B) (March 3, 1948) accused theleadership of the Kemerovskii obkom of the same errors made by the Stalino

Zhdanov’s Last Months, January–July 1948 143

obkom. But its criticism of party officials seemed less harsh and it gave moreattention to the cultivation of Soviet patriotism than had the decree on the Stal-ino obkom.16 This shift in emphasis heralded a weakening of support for Zh-danov’s position in March 1948 that may have have been related to the outbreakof conflict between Stalin and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yu-goslavia.17

Whatever the case, Partiinaia Zhizn’ now once again qualified its endorse-ment of Zhdanov’s formulations. On the one hand, it repeated Malenkov’s as-sertion(without attribution) that party officials’ “substitutionism” had violated“one of the basic principles of Bolshevik leadership” and criticized officialswho had incorrectly concluded that party organs operated in the same way assoviet and economic organs. On the other hand, it declared that the “libera-tion” of party organs from “inappropriate inference” in the operational func-tion of economic organs had not lessened their responsibility for the state ofthe economy.18

N. S. Khrushchev adopted the same position in his report to the CentralCommittee of the Ukrainian Communist party on March 8, 1948. (He had re-gained his position as first secretary in December 1947.) On the one hand, hecriticized those obkom officials who had “substituted” for local soviet andeconomic organizations rather than strengthen them and supervise their ac-tivities.19 On the other hand, he was equally critical of those leaders who had“mistakenly concluded” that the new emphasis on party political work hadimplied that they could shift the bulk of responsibility for economic work tothe local executive committee. He insisted that party officials were obliged tosupervise and coordinate all of the local agencies responsible for productionand that the Communists who staffed these agencies had to follow the direc-tion of the party’s officials.

Khrushchev made no reference to the ideological education of the mem-bers of the party. He insisted that local officials play a direct personal role inmass political work, that raikom leaders work directly with the primary partyorganizations within collective farms and other institutions because such “workwith people” would assure the fulfillment of the plan’s objectives. While heurged members of the local intelligentsia to play a larger role in agitationalwork and other aspects of cultural educational work, he made no reference totheir ideological education.20

Most striking, Bol’shevik now suddenly began to imply that the proponentsof ideological education were guilty of “dogmatism.” Bol’shevik’s discussionof “criticism and self-criticism” coupled an assault on the alleged dangersflowing from “dogmatism” (ostensibly based on an effort to interpret realityon the basis of “learned propositions”) with vigorous stress on the importanceof the “driving forces of Soviet society—the moral political unity of Soviet

144 Chapter Nine

society, the friendship of peoples of the USSR and Soviet patriotism.”21

Moreover, the same issue of Bol’shevik included a detailed assault on “bour-geois sociology” by G. F. Aleksandrov, who had been completely discreditedby Zhdanov in June and removed from his position as director of agitprop inSeptember 1947!

Partiinia Zhizn’ remained a battleground on the subject. On the one hand,its lead editorial in the sixth issue (1948) criticized “dogmatists” for whompolicy was only a “matter of study” and implied that ideological education initself was insufficient to assure the political loyalty of all cadres.22 On the otherhand, the same issue included a report by S. Zadionchenko on the CentralCommittee decree on the Stalino obkom and a survey of recent gorkom con-ferences that combined criticism of “substitutionism” with the defense of ide-ological education. Zadionchenko charged that the practice of joint meetingsof obkom leaders and executive committee had blurred the border betweenparty and economic organs and undermined the latter’s authority and sense ofresponsibility. He also directly criticized the industrial departments of theobkom for acting as the agents of the directors of the enterprises by working toobtain bricks, fuel, and equipment, for ignoring the secretaries of the PPOs inthe mines and their capacity for mobilization of the workers.23 PartiinaiaZhizn’’s survey of recently held gorkom conferences also urged officials to endtheir “substitution” and make a major shift toward ideological work.24

Later that month, support for Zhdanov’s orientations seemed to weakenconsiderably. On the one hand, Kultura I Zhizn’ initially continued its cam-paign in support of “ideological work,”25 and Partiinaia Zhizn’ continued topublish materials by Zhdanov’s closest allies. For example, the seventh issue(1948) contined an essay by P. Popkov, the secretary of the Leningrad obkomand gorkom, that insisted that economic success was totally dependent on thelevel of party officials “political leadership.” He reiterated the now standardcritique of their “preoccupation” with economic affairs and attacked thebranch departments at the gorkom level for acting as agents of economic ad-ministrators.26

On the other hand, the lead editorial in the same issue criticized those partyofficials who had apparently focused exclusively on “party work” and as-signed the economic work to the executive committee. It cited Stalin’s decla-ration that it was impossible to “separate politics from economics” that thedistinction between the two was simply “methodological,” and made no ref-erence to the need for the ideological education of party workers.27 PartiinaiaZhizn’ never appeared again. Its demise probably reflected the weakness ofZhdanov’s position.

Most important, Bol’shevik now suddenly endorsed Malenkov’s orientationby providing positive coverage of the decisions of the 18th Conference of the


VKP(B). Its lead editorial lauded the efforts of the 18th Conference to elimi-nate the “curse” of labor absenteeism and excessive labor mobility and its de-cision to establish local departments for industry and transport. It claimed thatthese agencies had helped to establish greater order in production, to elimi-nate “storming,” and to bolster technological discipline and one-man man-agement.28

Shortly afterwards, both Pravda and Kultura I Zhizn’ muted their enthusi-asm for the ideological education of party members and gave more stress toSoviet patriotism. Pravda’s editorial on the Stalin prizes (April 21, 1948) andKultura I Zhizn’’s editorial on the superiority of Soviet culture published onthe same day ignored Marxism-Leninism.29 The same issue of Kultura IZhizn’ also criticized teachers of Marxism-Leninism at Leningrad State Uni-versity for their alleged failure to link the study of theory to the immediatequestions of the day.30 Pravda’s lead editorial on Lenin’s birthday (April 22,1948) stressed the party’s education of technically trained personnel, declaredthat socialist construction was in itself a school of education and reeducation,and concluded that soviet patriotism was the basis for socialist competition.Bol’shevik adopted exactly the same position.31

May Day was marked in the same way. Kultura I Zhizn’’s editorial on theCentral Committee’s slogans for the holiday lauded Soviet patriotism, fo-cused on the cultural activities of “ideological workers,” and ignored the ide-ological education of either party members or the society as a whole.32

Pravda’s editorials on May Day (May 2, 1948), on the press (May 5, 1948),and on the anniversary of the USSR’s victory in World War II (May 9, 10,1948) focused exclusively on patriotic themes and the power and importanceof the Soviet state and Kultura I Zhizn’ seemed to follow suit. Its editorial onMay 1, 1948, charged that the evening universities of Marxism-Leninism hadnot given insufficient attention to the exposure of bourgeois ideology and tothe cultivation of Soviet patriotism, and that their approach to theory was notcreative or linked with practical activity.33

But in May and June the publications of the Central Committee once againendorsed Zhdanov’s position. This may well have reflected his significantrole in the preparation for and participation in the second meeting of theCominform in May–June 1948.34 On May 21, 1948, Kultura I Zhizn’ onceagain praised the publication of the works of Lenin and Stalin, of other “clas-sics of Marxism-Leninism,” and of the biography of Stalin as a major eventin the country’s ideological life,35 and in early June 1948 Bol’shevik onceagain endorsed Zhdanov’s views on both ideological education and officials’priorities. It declared that the elimination of “substitutionism” was “the mostimportant means” to improve party leadership and paraphrased Stalin’s insis-tence on the centrality of ideological education.36

146 Chapter Nine

A few days later Pravda followed suit with a barrage of editorials. On June8, 1948, it insisted that local party meetings should focus on party politicaland ideological work rather than on immediate economic campaigns. On June14, 1948, Pravda charged that the organizational-instructional departmentshad been incorrectly used to support economic campaigns and insisted thatideological education was essential to improve their effectiveness as sourcesof political guidance for local officials. On June 16, 1948, it portrayed ideo-logical education as essential to end party officials’ excessive interference inthe administration of the economy. On June 23, 1948, it reminded primaryparty organizations that they were responsible for their members’ ideologicaleducation, and urged them to focus on ideological and political work ratherthan on the immediate needs of production.

But in the midst of this campaign, Bol’shevik revealed that opposition toideological education may have been widespread within the leadership. Itssurvey of recent conferences of the party disclosed that “some party leadersand workers” had “incorrectly concluded” that it was possible to be an effec-tive party worker without a knowledge of theory! In rebuttal, it insisted thatknowledge of theory was essential to understand the party’s every decisionand demand, and cited Malenkov’s comment (without attribution) on the im-portance of ideological education.37

In the midst of this discussion, Zhdanov once again fell gravely ill. His in-capacitation had an immediate impact on the composition of the Secretariatand the discussion of officials’ priorities. On July 1, 1948, Stalin namedMalenkov a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B)38 and on July 5, 1948, Zhdanov’sdoctors recommended that he be given a two-month leave to cope with hisrapidly deteriorating health.39

Bol’shevik now rushed to repudiate Zhdanov’s definition of officials’ pri-orities. Its lead editorial (approved for publication July 5, 1948) lauded theVKP(B) for its capacity to unite and direct all organizations to reach a com-mon goal, ignored its alleged grounding in Marxism-Leninism, and insteadpraised the party for establishing the “moral-political unity” of the Sovietpeople and the “friendship and brotherhood” of the various peoples of theUSSR. Bol’shevik now attributed all of the party’s success to its alleged gen-eralization of correct practice, asserted that the Central Committee was theembodiment of the party’s “colossal, multi-faceted experience” and sup-ported this assertion by citing Stalin’s praise for the Central Committee’s in-corporation of the country’s leading specialists from many fields. Further-more, it claimed that the industrialization of the country, the collectivizationof agriculture, and the USSR’s victory in World War II had all been based onthe effective generalization of practice, and underlined the importance of ed-ucation in Soviet patriotism.


Bol’shevik did condemn officials’ “substitutionism” but this was overshad-owed by a far more pointed denunciation of those who had “incorrectly” in-terpreted the renewed emphasis on party organizational and party politicalwork as sanctioning an exclusive focus on “internal work” and a shift of fullresponsibility for the implementation of economic policy to soviet and stateofficials. Bol’shevik supported this critique by citing Stalin’s comments on the“inseparability of economics and politics.”40

Shortly afterwards, the structure of the departments of the CC/VKP(B)subordinate to the Secretariat was totally reformed. Despite his ill health, Zh-danov had presented a draft proposal designed to decentralize the manage-ment of personnel while retaining the distinction between “internal” partywork and economic work. Zhdanov called for a significant increase in thenumber of Secretaries—a single Secretary and his deputy would provide“overall leadership” and enjoy responsibility for the assignment of partycadres, the supervision of their education, and the verification of the fulfill-ment of decrees on “pure party matters.” Verification of fulfillment and cadremanagement was assigned to ten Secretaries responsible for the followingsectors—agitprop and culture, foreign Communists, industry, the verificationof decrees in the oblasts, transport, trade/finance/ and cooperation, state se-curity, military, foreign affairs, and one for Komsomol/ trade unions.41

But the Politburo did not adopt Zhdanov’s suggestions. On July 10, 1948, itrestored the production branch departments of the CC/VKP(B) that had beenestablished in 1934 and dismantled in 1939. The three major directorates werereplaced by departments responsible for agitprop, party/trade union/Komsomolorgans, foreign ties, heavy industry, light industry, machine construction, trans-portation, agriculture, administration, and plan/finance/trade. Experienced offi-cials were named to head the departments and placed under the supervision ofthe senior Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B). Zhdanov was given responsibility foragitprop and Malenkov given responsibility for the new department forparty/trade union/Komsomol organs, an assignment that restored his previousrole as the Secretary responsible for personnel management. Suslov was maderesponsible for the supervision of departments for foreign affairs, Kuznetsovfor the departments for machine construction and administration, and Pono-marenko for the departments of transport and plan/finance/trade.42

The reorganization was clearly a major victory for those who favored amore assertive role for party officials in the administration of industry. Thepublications of the Central Committee reflected this shift. On July 29, 1948,Pravda lauded the Moscow party organization for its role in the accelerationof the mechanization of the construction sector in the capital and made no ref-erence to the dangers of excessive interference in immediate details of eco-nomic development.

148 Chapter Nine

It was also reflected in the discussion of the party’s internal education sys-tem. On July 31, 1948, Kultura I Zhizn’ published an essay by A. Beloborodov,the secretary of the Cheliabinsk obkom that bragged about its efforts to im-prove cadres’ knowledge of both socialist theory of political economy andconcrete problems of production.43 Shortly afterward, Bol’shevik complainedthat the existing system of party schools had not given sufficient attention toeducation on the nature of the Soviet economy and the “leadership” of the sec-tors of the economy. Bol’shevik charged that the courses in party constructionhad not been linked sufficiently to the economic and political life of the re-gions and that the instruction on leadership of various sectors had been inade-quate. It praised those party organizations that had already begun to improvetheir educational programs in these fields. Zhdanov never returned to the cap-ital from his leave of absence and died on August 31, 1948.

NOTES

1. Alexander Werth, Musical Uproar in Moscow (London: Turnstile Press, 1949),80–84. For the documents on the discussion see Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelli-gentsiia, 626–34.

2. “Leninizm-velikoe oruzhie v bor’be za pobedu kommunizma,” Bol’shevik,no.1 (1948), 2–6. Approved for publication January 15, 1948. Bol’shevik did not at-tack Aleksandrov directly but it did praise the discussion of philosophy in mid-1947for exposing “errors on the theoretical front.”

3. “Vsepobezhdaiushchaia sila idei leninizma,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 2 (57), Jan-uary 21, 1948, 1.

4. Pravda, January 21, 22, 1948, 1.5. Pravda, January 22, 1948, 1. Zhdanov evidently enjoyed immense status at

this time. On January 28, 1948 Pravda, reported that the newly formed society for thepropagation of social and political knowledge (znanie) had elected Stalin and his“loyal comrades in arms Molotov and Zhdanov” to the society.

6. M. A. Suslov, “Idei lenina ozariaiut put k kommunizma,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no.2 (1948), 15–16.

7. “Net nichego vyshe zvaniia chlena partoi osnovannoi leninim,” PartiinaiaZhizn’, no. 1 (1948), 1–4. Approved for publication, January 17, 1948.

8. “Kazhdyi partiinyi rabotnik dol’zhen zanimatsiia samobrazovaniem,” Parti-inaia Zhizn’, no. 1 (1948), 55–56.

9. “Biblioteka partiinogo rabotnika,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 1 (1948), 59–64.10. “Za dal’neishee povyshenie urovnia partiinoi raboty,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 2

(1948), 2. Approved for publication February 2, 1948.11. Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 3 (1948), 1–5. Boterbloem, 319.12. “Voprosy ideino-politicheskoi raboty-v tsentr vnimaniia partiinykh konfer-

entsii,” Kultura I Zhizn’ no. 5 (60) February 21, 1948, 1.


13. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 165–70.14. “Rabotat’ s liud’mi, zabotit’siia o liudiakh,” Partiinaia Zhizn’ no. 4 (1948), 1.

Approved for publication March 2, 1948.15. “Rabotat,” 4–5.16. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 171–78.17. Scholars differ sharply over this association. Compare Hahn (94) with

Boterbloem who found no archival evidence of this association. Boterbloem, 326.18. “Sobliudat’ bol’ shevistskie printsipy rukovodstva partorganizatsiiamy,” Parti-

inaia Zhizn’, no. 5 (1948), 1–5. Approved for publication March 20, 1948.19. N. S. Khrushchev, “O vostanovlenii I pod’eme sel’skogo khiziaistva I partiino-

politicheskoi rabote na sele,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 5 (1948), 6–19.20. Khrushchev, 17–19.21. M. Leonov, “Kritika I samokritika-zakonomernost’ razvitii sovetskogo ob-

shchestva,” Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1948), 25. Approved for publication March 16, 1948.22. “Neistanno sovershentsvovat delo podbora I rasstanovki kadrov,” Partiinaia

Zhizn’ no. 6 (1948), p. 3. Approved for publication April 2, 1948.23. S. Zadionchenko, “Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v ugol’noii promyshlen-

nosti,” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 6 (1948), 6–10. Approved for publication April 2, 1948.24. “Povyshat’ uroven’ partiinoi raboty v gorodakh,” Partiinaia Zhizn’ no. 6 (1948),

12–17.25. “Za dal’ neishii pod’em ideologicheskoi raboty,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 10 (65)

April 11, 1948, 1.26. P. Popkov, “Povyshat uroven’partiinogo rukovodstva khoziaistvom,” Parti-

inaia Zhizn’ no. 7 (1948), 14–18.27. “Partiino-politicheskaia rabota-osnova prochnosti khoziaistvennykh uspekhov,”

Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 7 (1948), 2–5. Approved for publication April 15, 1948.28. “O distipline I organizovannosti v trude,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1948), 6–7. Ap-

proved for publication April 15, 1948.29. “Rastsvet iskusstva sovetskogo naroda,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 11 (66) April 21,

1948, 1.30. A. Voronovich, “Uluchshit’ prepodavanie osnov marksizma-leninizma,” Kul-

tura I Zhizn’, no. 11 (66) April 21, 1948, 2.31. “Rukovodstvo sotsialisticheskim sorevnovaniem-vazhneishaia zadacha parti-

inykh organizatsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1948), 2–4. Approved for publication April 30,1948.

32. “Pervomaiskie prizivi partii lenina-stalina,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 12 (67),April 30, 1948, 2–4.

33. “O rabote vechernikh universitetov marksizma-leninizma,” Kultura I Zhizn’(May 11, 1948).

34. Boterbloem, 326–27.35. “Za bol’shevistskuiu partiinost’ I vysokuiu ideinost’ v rabote izdatel’stve,” Kul-

tura I Zhizn’, no. 14 (69), May 21, 1948, 1.36. “Bolshevistskaia partiia sil’na aktivnostiu svoikh organizatsii,” Bol’shevik, no.

10 (1948), 3–8. Approved for publication June 5, 1948.

150 Chapter Nine

37. I. Pozdniak, “Voprosy ideino-politicheskoi raboty na partiinykh konferentsi-iakh,” Bol’shevik, no. 11 (1948), 26–27. Approved for publication June 18, 1948.

38. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 59.39. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 268–69. Stalin approved it the following day. 40. “Bol’shevistskaia partiia rukovodiashchee iadro vsekh organizatsii trudi-

ashchikhsiia,” Bol’shevik, no. 12 (1948), 2–7. Approved for publication July 5, 1948.41. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 59–60.42. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 60–61.43. A. Beloborodov, “Ob ekonomicheskom obrazovanii kadrov,” Kultura I Zhizn’,

no. 21 (76), July 31, 1948, 1.44. “Podgotovka I perepodgotovka rukovodiashchikh partiinykh I sovetskikh

rabotnikov,” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1948), 1–15.


153

The massive program of industrialization carried out by the Soviet govern-ment in the 1930s presented a fundamental challenge to Zhdanov and his sup-porters. They feared that the constant demand for ever higher levels of pro-duction and the emergence of a huge technically trained intelligentsia to staffthe new ministries and enterprises threatened to subvert party officials’ lead-ership of the Communists who manned this vast bureaucratic structure. Zh-danov feared, and with good reason, that party officials’ “preoccupation” withthe immediate details of production would blur the lines between them andthe party members who worked for the state, undermine the ideological edu-cation of all party members, and lead to the neglect of other elements of the“internal work” essential for the party as a whole.

Zhdanov’s antidote was quite simple—the study of the Kratkii kurs, the bi-ography of Stalin, and other materials. This ”mastery of Marxism-Leninism”would supposedly allow party officials to understand the long-range implica-tions of immediate developments, to give sufficient attention to “internalwork,” “work with people,” and “political leadership” and avoid the pitfallsof “petty tutelage,” “substitution,” and “practicalism.” At the same time, partymembers’ “independent study” of these texts would create a common ideo-logical orientation for all who were engaged in the “practical work” of ad-ministering the five-year plan.

Zhdanov’s strategy was based on the presumption that the study of partic-ular texts could actually provide a “guide to action” for all members of theVKP(B) irrespective of their professional occupations. It seems likely that itplayed such a role for the small army of secretaries for agitprop, propagan-dists, lecturers, editors, and the staff of party schools, but it could not be thecase for those millions of Communists engaged in the implementation of the

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

five-year plans. The Kraktii kurs provided a rationale for the regime’s policyof industrialization and collectivization of agriculture, for its control of all in-tellectual and cultural life, and for the elimination of Stalin’s real and imag-ined political opponents. Stalin’s essay on dialectic and historical material-ism, which was included in the text, provided a coherent sense of the Marxisttheory of historical development. But the Kratkii kurs could hardly provideguidance for those engaged in the administration of the economy.

But it was impossible to challenge the utility of such study without ques-tioning the political myths central to the maintenance of the legitimacy of the‘ruling party.” First, that its knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, which ostensi-bly gave it the capacity to determine the proper road forward, gave it the rightto rule. Second, that Stalin had the right to rule over the VKP(B) because hewas able to “creatively develop” Marxism-Leninism in response to changesin the world.

While the centrality of these myths made it dangerous to directly challengeZhdanov’s stress on the primacy of ideological education, the vacuity of theclaims for its utility made it difficult to develop support among party officialsbeyond those engaged in agitprop and those loyal to Zhdanov personally. Zh-danov’s views were consistently supported by Secretary of the CC/VKP(B)Kuznetsov and his successors in the leadership of the Leningrad party organ-ization. But the leading republican and regional party officials proved to bereluctant to fully endorse the primacy of ideological education.

These officials understood that the five-year plans provided the real day-to-day source of guidance for both officials and rank-and-file members of theVKP(B) and therefore provided party officials with immense opportunities toprovide “concrete” leadership to the party members who administered theplans. Malenkov’s stress on the party officials’ managerial prerogatives andtheir obligation to “penetrate deeply” into the activities of every enterpriseand collective farm gave them real opportunities for genuine participation inthe construction of socialism As a result, they were rightly skeptical of thecontention that the study of particular texts provided all members of theVKP(B) with a genuine “guide to action.”

Malenkov’s definitions were publicly supported by officials at all levels ofthe apparat including Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) Popov, the leader of theMoscow party organization, the first secretaries of the units of the VKP(B) inthe major industrial regions and cities of the USSR (with the exception ofLeningrad), their specialized secretaries for industry, transport, agriculture,and their own staff of inspectors. These officials probably agreed that the“mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was irrelevant to their own priorities and re-sponsibilities and that the ideological education based on the study of textswas ”divorced from life” and of little use for the “practical workers” respon-

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sible for the supervision of industry and agriculture. As a result, these officialswere receptive to the amalgam of Soviet patriotism and the glorification of“problem solving” that Malenkov endorsed during most of the 1940s.

The two competing coalitions differed sharply in their conception of thecapacity of the Sovministrov’s ministerial system. In general, Zhdanov and hisallies (including N. A. Voznesenskii, the chairman of Gosplan) regarded thespecialized ministries as fully able to implement the targets of the five-yearplans without the intervention of specialized party secretaries at the republi-can, regional, and local levels. They opposed the formation of productionbranch departments of the CC/VKP(B) and argued that the pravo kontroliagranted to the PPOs of individual enterprises and farms was sufficient to ex-pose various “shortcomings” and assure their elimination.

Malenkov and his supporters were far less sanguine about the ministries’capacity to implement the plans without the “concrete” guidance provided bythe specialized secretaries at the republic, regional, or city level. Malenkovmay have modified his views once he became a member of the Bureau of theCouncil of Ministers, which clearly was responsible for assuring the imple-mentation of the plans. But when Stalin named him Secretary of the VKP(B)in mid-1948, Malenkov immediately restored the production branch depart-ments of the CC/VKP(B).

Malenkov and his allies from among the “men of practical affairs” couldnot explicitly declare that the study of particular texts was useless (althoughsome of them evidently did so in the summer of 1948). Instead, they repeat-edly stressed the importance of practice and experience as the basis for partymembers’ education and periodically represented Soviet patriotism as the es-sential element of official ideology. The amalgam of patriotism and produc-tionism allowed the men of practical affairs to define the VKP(B) as a “unionof patriots,” to stress its “organizational” capacities and its “vanguard role inproduction” and to ignore its “inspirational” role.

Stalin’s role in dealing with this conflict between the “propagandists” andthe “men of practical affairs” is not clear. Some of the most recent scholarlystudy of Stalin’s activities (based largely on archival materials dealing withthe 1930s), has concluded that his closest lieutenants were extraordinarilypowerful figures in their own right and that Stalin acted as the referee in theirdisputes.1 At the same time, scholars continue to disagree sharply over the rel-ative independence and relative influence of his lieutenants.2

Circumstantial evidence does suggest that Stalin shifted his support fromone orientation to the other in response to a series of crises in the period from1939 until 1948. Some of these crises were primarily in the area of ideologyand others produced by problems of production. In the aftermath of the sav-age purges that had decimated the VKP(B) in the 1930s, the leadership was

Conclusion 155

obsessed with the cultivation of correct consciousness and vigilance. TheKratkii kurs, published in late 1938, had been designed to raise the level ofparty members’ vigilance by demonstrating repeatedly that Stalin and his sup-porters had successfully “unmasked” the enemies of the party even before theBolshevik seizure of power. The publication of this text was accompanied bythe establishment of an elaborate system of internal party educational institu-tions to assure that every member “mastered Bolshevism” by study of thisnew text. Stalin emphasized the centrality of ideological education in his re-port to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) when he declared that party mem-bers’ “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the key to the VKP(B)’s everysuccess. The 18th Congress established the agitprop directorate to assure theimplementation of appropriate ideological education for all and provided thebasis for the imposition of Zhdanov’s definition of officials’ priorities.

The outbreak of World War II in the fall of 1939 prompted a shift awayfrom Zhdanov’s set of priorities. Although derided initially as an “inter-imperialist war” it stimulated the leadership’s growing concern with defenseproduction despite the protection to the USSR provided by the Nazi-Sovietpact. Stalin approved the secret restoration of some local production branchdepartments in 1939 and Malenkov’s report to the 18th Conference in Febru-ary 1941 led to the establishment of local departments to supervise industryand transport. The Nazi invasion of the USSR in mid-1941 prompted a mas-sive expansion of the number of these departments in the following two years.At the same time, the saliency of the ideological education of party memberswas reduced by Stalin’s overt appeal to the patriotism of both the Russian andnon-Russian peoples of the USSR.

The second ideological crisis was produced by the massive influx of polit-ically untrained new members of the party in 1943–1944 and the simultane-ous liberation of territory occupied by the Germans since 1941. Stalin evi-dently approved (or did not oppose) the revival of ideological education andthe other aspects of party political work deemed essential to the vitality of theVKP(B). With the end of the war, the conflict over the relative importance ofideological education and the acceleration of production revived with avengeance. The proponents of ideological education and the other elementsof party political work charged that officials had become obsessed with pro-duction during the war and that the continuation of this policy threatened totransform both party officials and rank and file into “practicalists” and un-dermine the ideological cohesion of the VKP(B). In contrast, those whowanted party officials to retain their responsibilities for production claimedthat their wartime experience would prove invaluable in guiding the country’sreconstruction and that ideological education “divorced from life” simply di-verted them from more productive activities. The surge of decrees of the

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VKP(B) in the years between 1944 and 1946 indicated that Stalin had decidedto endorse Zhdanov’s orientation.

But the collapse of agricultural production in 1946 and the growing tensionbetween the USSR and its wartime allies in 1947–1948 bolstered the legiti-macy of Malenkov’s definitions. While it is impossible to assess the impactof Zhdanov’s growing incapacity on this shift in orientation, the resurrectionof the production branch departments of the CC/VKP(B) under Malenkov’sleadership clearly marked a victory for the “men of practical affairs” over the“propagandists.”

Throughout the decade from 1939 to 1948, Stalin’s public commentsseemed to play an important role in the ongoing debate over officials’ priori-ties. During the 1930s when Stalin had spoken publicly and directly on theseissues, his lieutenants and subordinates had regarded his formulations asbinding orders and followed his lead. During the 1940s when he stopped dis-cussing these issues in public, his lieutenants repeatedly fell back on his for-mulations of the 1930s to provide ideological support for their respective po-sitions.

During the war, Stalin made no comments on the issues discussed above,but he periodically shifted his definition of the role of the VKP(B) and Sovietstate in his brief comments on holidays and orders of the day. While there isno way to determine whether or not Stalin regarded these comments as bind-ing, published sources suggest that his lieutenants evidently seized upon hisformulations to support their own orientation. His interview with Stassen in1947 seemed to have the most dramatic impact on the ongoing debate.

This study also reveals that Stalin sought to retain administrative stabilityat the apex of the system; he retained his two junior lieutenants in positionsof vast authority for the entire decade. Although the war clearly disrupted Zh-danov’s hold over the agitprop directorate, Stalin restored his full responsi-bility for agitprop in the postwar period. While Stalin fired Malenkov fromhis position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B), Malenkov never lost his broadauthority in the leadership. He remained a member of the Orgbureau, thePolitburo, and the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR until heregained his position as Secretary in the summer of 1948.

This administrative stability reflected the backward looking nature of the Stal-inist regime in the postwar period. In his address in February 1946 Stalin hadclaimed that the political and economic institutions established in the 1930s hadbeen the basis for the success of the USSR in the war and he insisted that theywould be reconstructed without any significant change. The leadership disguisedits return to the past by its claims that the five-year plans would hasten the tran-sition from socialism to communism when they were designed to restore whathad been destroyed during the war. In fact, the leadership repeatedly looked to

Conclusion 157

the past for the solution of its current problems and its discussion of officials’priorities recycled the formulations of the previous decade. Zhdanov’s strategywas based on the use of a text published in 1938 and the decisions of the 18thCongress held in 1939. Malenkov’s approach to problems was based on a returnto the arrangements detailed in his report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B)in February 1941. The reform of the apparat under his auspices in 1948 was es-sentially a return to the “tried and true” system established in 1934.

The restoration of the production branch departments and the reduction ofthe agitprop directorate to a department in mid-1948 proved to be a long-standing victory for the “men of practical affairs” over the “propagandists” inthe Secretariat of the CC/VKP(B). The agitprop department never again en-joyed the influence it had enjoyed as one of the two (or three) major direc-torates subordinate to the Secretariat. For the next forty years the leaders ofthe production branch departments of the CC/VKP(B) supervised the branchministries of the government of the USSR while the local secretaries for in-dustry and transport and agriculture were constantly engaged in the details ofregional economic development. The leaders of the CPSU did not change thisstructure until 1988 when General Secretary Gorbachev sought to reestablishthe primacy of party officials’ party political work and dismantled the pro-duction branch departments of the CC/CPSU with disastrous result for the en-tire political system.

But this structural stability did not end conflicts between the Secretaries ofthe CC/CPSU over the definition of party officials’ responsibilities. A detaileddiscussion of this continued dispute is beyond the scope of this study. The fol-lowing survey shows that it continued to rage until the collapse of the USSR.

In the years between 1948 and 1952 the discussion of officials’ prioritieswas evidently muted for reasons that remain obscure. But it resurfaced in par-ticularly dramatic terms at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952.In his report on behalf of the CC/CPSU, Secretary of the CC/CPSU G. M.Malenkov rather surprisingly endorsed the primacy of party political work inno uncertain terms. While he did repeat verbatim some of the formulationscontained in his reform to the Cominform in 1947, his report to the 19th Con-gress was strikingly similar to Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of theVKP(B) in March 1939. Malenkov explicitly recognized Marxism-Leninismas the party’s “guide to action” and admitted that party officials’ wartime neg-lect of their organizational and ideological work had undermined their capac-ity for “political leadership.” While he claimed that these shortcomings hadbeen largely overcome, he insisted that the “level of party political work”lagged behind the needs of the time.3

Malenkov now charged that officials’ preoccupation with economic issuesand neglect of ideological work had made them “forget” about the continued

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existence of capitalist encirclement and the efforts of the USSR’s opponentsto infiltrate its agents into the USSR. Most important, he implied that N. S.Khrushchev, a full member of the Politburo, a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B),and head of the Moscow obkom since 1949, and major political rival, wasguilty of these errors:

“Some of our party organizations, absorbed in economic work, forgot ques-tions of ideology. Even in such foremost party organizations as the Moscoworganization, for example, not enough attention is devoted to ideologicalwork. And this cannot but have consequences. Whenever attention to ideo-logical matters is slackened a favorable soil is created for the invigoration ofviews and ideas hostile to us.”4

N. S. Khrushchev attempted to respond to these charges in his own reportto the Congress on changes in the party’s rules. He had rarely endorsed ideo-logical education in his reports to the Ukrainian Communist party during the1940s, but he now followed Malenkov’s lead, acknowledged that the partywas “guided” by Marxism-Leninism, and that the “underestimation” of ideo-logical work among all party organizations had to end.5

But when N. S. Khrushchev became first secretary of the CC/VKP(B), hereverted to his earlier “practicalism” and explicitly endorsed the primacy ofparty officials’ economic work. In his report on behalf of the CC/VKP(B) tothe 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, he challenged the ideolog-ical basis for limitations on party officials’ intervention in economic admin-stration. He declared that Lenin had “vigorously combated every attempt tobelittle or weaken the guiding role of the party in the Soviet state system”6

and had always linked party work with economic activity. He then com-plained that party cadres had not been indoctrinated in the “spirit of high re-sponsibility for the solution of practical problems of economic construction”for many years and derided those officials who continued to distinguish be-tween their “economic” and “political work.”

He complained that, “Unfortunately, many party organizations draw an ab-surd distinction between party political work and economic activity. One stillmeets so-called party officials who consider party work one thing and stateadministration another. One can even hear complaints from such functionar-ies that they are being diverted from so-called pure party work and compelledto study economics, farming, and production. Such a conception of the tasksof party work is fundamentally wrong and harmful.”7

While Khrushchev did condemn the sins of “substitution” he insisted thatparty officials henceforth be both evaluated and rewarded on the basis of the eco-nomic performance of their respective regions and he lashed out at those whoopposed this reform: “Some say that one cannot establish this principle of payfor party officials since their duties are party-organizational and ideological and

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their work is not directly connected with the results of economic activity. But canparty organizational work be considered successful if it does not have a benefi-cial impact on production? To conduct party organizational work without link-ing it to the tasks of improving production means to carry it out to no avail.”8

Khrushchev’s preoccupation with production was linked with an immenseskepticism toward the formal study of Marxism-Leninism. He charged thatthe existing programs of ideological education were “largely divorced” fromimmediate problems of production, sharply attacked those officials who al-legedly resisted his efforts to overcome this breach, and demanded that “re-sounding speeches on the significance of Marxism-Leninism” be replaced by“detailed expositions of advanced experience.”

He declared: He who thinks that communism can be built exclusively onpropaganda without practical day-to-day efforts to increase output and raisethe well-being of the people will find himself slipping down the road of tal-mudism and pedantry.”9

Khrushchev’s efforts to extend party officials’ responsibility for industrialproduction has been well documented elsewhere and are well beyond thescope of this study. The dismantling of the bulk of the industrial ministries,the establishment of regional economic councils, the increase in the numberof Secretaries of the CC/CPSU in the Presidium at the expense of ministers,the bifurcation of the party’s apparatus into industrial and agricultural sec-tions all seemed designed to broaden party officials’ responsibilities for pro-duction at the expense of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

But at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961 Secretary of the CC/CPSUKozlov challenged Khrushchev’s definitions in his report on proposedchanges in the rules of the party. Kozlov indirectly criticized Khrushchev’shostility to ideological education by insisting that Marxism-Leninism pro-vided a guide for all members of the party in their practical activity and thatthey should therefore constantly work to improve their own theoreticalknowledge. Furthermore, Kozlov sought to limit party officials’ interventionin the administration of industry by calling for changes in the party’s rules.He declared that state and economic agencies should be freed from “pettytutelage” and he insisted that the rules should prohibit party organizationsfrom “substituting” for other agencies, the “merging” of functions of otheragencies or unnecessary parallelism in their activities.10

The coalition of officials that toppled Khrushchev in October 1964 seemedto share Kozlov’s opposition to Khrushchev’s definition of officials’ priori-ties. It acted quickly to restore some semblance of the Stalinist division of la-bor between the Politburo/Secretaries and the Politburo/Ministers. The selec-tion of Brezhnev as first secretary (General Secretary after 1966) andKosygin as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the

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restoration of a rough balance between the numbers of Secretaries and Min-isters in the Presidium (Politburo after 1966), the abolition of the regionaleconomic councils, the restoration of a unified apparat of party officials, andthe resurrection of the central ministries all seemed designed to restore a di-vision of labor between the “inner party” of full-time officials and the “outerparty” of party members who staffed the Soviet state.

Indeed, in the first three years of his reign as General Secretary, Brezhnevgave renewed attention to party officials’ party political work. His report tothe Central Committee on agriculture in March 1965 and his comments on therestoration of central ministries in September 1965 implied that the Councilof Ministers of the USSR enjoyed primary responsibility for production.Brezhnev’s report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in early 1966 made thecase for more stress on party officials’ internal work in Zhdanov-like terms.He declared that Marxism-Leninism was the source of the party’s directionand its conduct of policy, insisted that cadre management and the “verifica-tion of fulfillment” should be the major elements in officials’ work, and at-tacked their “petty tutelage” of state officials. He defined the CPSU as the“organizer, teacher and political leader of the society” rather than as the rul-ing party of the Soviet state, and thereby implied that the Council of Minis-ters of the USSR should enjoy considerable autonomy in the administrationof the five-year plan.11

But the Soviet government’s perennial difficulties in solving productionproblems in the late l960s evidently persuaded Brezhnev to support an exten-sion of party officials’ economic responsibilities in the following decade. Hisreport to the 24th Congress in 1971 represented party officials as the major in-strument to accelerate scientific and technological progress, gave renewedstress to their “suggestions” on economic matters, urged primary party organi-zations to become more involved in immediate production problems, andbroached the possibility of broadening the scope of their pravo kontrolia.Brezhnev also shifted away from his previous support for ideological educationby demanding that it be more directly linked to solving problems of productionand he seemed to show far more enthusiasm for the “scientific-technologicalrevolution” than for Marxism-Leninism as a source of inspiration.12

In his report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU in 1976, Brezhnev’s defi-nition of officials’ priorities was increasingly similar to Khrushchev’s. Brezh-nev now explicitly demanded an improvement in “party leadership” of eco-nomic development and referred to local party officials as a major drivingforce of regional economic development. He no longer criticized their “pettytutelage” of state and other agencies, and recognized the need to improvetheir capacity to intervene in administration by calling for the recruitment ofmore “specialists in the national economy” into the apparatus.13

Conclusion 161

When Gorbachev became General Secretary he launched a major cam-paign to persuade party officials to give more attention to their party politicalwork. This began in his report to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986 andintensified over the next two years when he urged them to limit their inter-vention in economic activity and to devote more time and energy to “workwith people,” political leadership, and ideological issues. This campaign cul-minated in the dismantling of the production branch departments of the Cen-tral Committee in 1988 and a rather confused effort to persuade party officialsto discard their “administrative” methods and engage in “persuasion” of otheragencies, including the newly elected all union and republican legislatures ofthe USSR. Orthodox party officials, including leading Secretaries of theCC/CPSU such as Ligachev, argued that the General Secretary’s concerted ef-fort to limit the economic responsibilities of party officials would seriouslythreaten the leadership’s capacity to control the CPSU and would lead to thedisintegration of the USSR and the destruction of socialism. Gorbachev’scritics proved to be right.

NOTES

1. J. Arch Getty, “Stalin as Prime Minister,” Sarah Davies and James Harris (ed.)Stalin: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 99.

2. A. A. Danikov, “Izmeneniia vyshikh organov vlasti v sssr v 1945–1952gg,”Stalin, Stalinizm. Sovetskoe obshchestvo: Sbornik statei (Moscow: 2000), 212–28.

3. Leo Gruliow, (editor), Current Soviet Policies (New York: Columbia Univer-sity Press, 1953), Vol I., 116–17.

4. Current Soviet Policies, 120.5. Current Soviet Policies, 133, 138.6. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. II, 55.7. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. II, 57.8. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. II. 58.9. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. II, 60.

10. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. IV (1962), 207–8.11. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. V (1967) 24–26.12. Current Soviet Policies, Vol. VI (1972), 23–26.13. 25 s’ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1976), Vol. I,

91.

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163

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vik, no. 12 (1938): 73–82.“Samokritika – vazhneishaia sila dvigiushchaia vpered nashe razvitie.” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946): 9–10.Serzhantov, F. “O vnimanii k melocham byta.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946):

29–31.Shamberg, M. “Nekotory voprosy vnutripartiinoi raboty.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.

4 (1946): 31–33.Shcherbakov, A. S. “O nekotorye zadachakh propagandistskoi raboty.” Propagandist,

no. 1 (1942): 8–11.

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Skatunova, A. “Iz praktiki raboty politshkol.” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 7 (1947): 35.Skokin, A. “Vrednaia podmena khoziaistvennykh organov.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 6 (1937): 25.Slepov, L. “Lenin I Stalin o bol’shevistskikh kadrakh.” Propagandist, no. 3/4 (1946):

38–48.———. “Velikaia sila idei lenina-stalina.” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 31 (50) (November 7,

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Zhizn’, no 5 (1948): 1–5.Stetskii, A. “Stalinskaia konstitutsiia sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva.” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1936): 56–68.Storozhev, I. “Ob odnom sereznom nedostatke v rabote sverdlovskogo obkoma par-

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(1948): 15–16.Tandit, L. “Bolshevistskoe vospitanie molodykh kommunistov.” Bol’shevik, no. 10/11

(1938): 62–79.“30 let sovetskoi vlasti.” Bol’shevik, no. 20 (1947): 2–3.“Torzhestvo idei leninizma v nashe strane.” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1945): 1–8.Tsegolov, A. “V tsentr vnimaniia-voprosy ekonomiki.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.

11/12 (1940): 37–39.“Uluchsit kachestvo prepodavaniia osnov marksizma-leninizma v vuzakh.” Propa-

gandist, no. 16 (1945): 2–4.“Uluchsit rukovodstvo marksistskoi-leninskoi podgotovkoi kommunistov.” Parti-

inaia Zhizn’, no. 21 (1947): 28–33.“Umelo sochetat rabotu khoziaistvennuiu I partino-politicheskuiu.” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1942): 1–6.“Usilit ideino-politicheskuiu rabotu partiinykh organizatsii.” Bol’shevik, no. 17/18

(1944): 1–8.“Velichestvennaia programma bor’by za kommunizmu.” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1939):

5–8.“Velikaia pobeda krasnoi armii I sovetskogo naroda nad germanskim imperializma.”

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“Voprosy ideno-politicheskoi raboty- v tsentr vnimaniia partiinikh konferentsii.” Kul-tura I Zhizn’, no. 5 (60) (February 21, 1948): 1.

“Voprosy material’no bytovogo obshluzhivaniia naselenia na plenumov obkomov Igorkomov partii.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1942): 23–25.

Voronovich, A. “Uluchshit prepodavanie osnov marksizma-leninizma.” Kultura IZhizn’, no. 11 (66) (April 21, 1948): 2.

“Vospitanie molodykh kommunistov-odna iz osnovnykh zadach partyiinykh organi-zatsii.” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1944): 3–5.

“Vospitanie sovetskogo patriotizma.” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1944): 1–7.“Vospitanie sovetskogo patriotizma-vazhneishchaia zadacha pechati.” Kultura I

Zhizn’, no. 23 (42) (August 20, 1947): 2–3.“Vospityvat kadry v dukhe bol’shevistskoi printsipal’nost.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 23/24 (1944): 1–5.“Vospityvat kadry v dukhe kritiki I samokritiki.” Partiinaia Zhizn’ no. 23 (1947): 1–7.“Vospitanie partiinykh kadrov.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12 (1943): 10–11.“Vozglavit trudovoi pod’ em mass dobitsiia zheleznoi distipliny trudy.” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 11/12 (1940): 2–8.Voznesenskii, N. A. “Khoziaastvennyi itogo 1940 I plan razvitiia narodnogo khozi-

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6–8.“Vsemerno uluchshat rukovodstvo pervichnym partorganizatsiiami.” Partiinaia

Zhizn’, no. 4 (1946): 1–7.“Vybory v verkhovnyi sovet SSSR I zadachi partorganizatsii.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

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26–37.“Za boevaia propaganda tesno sviazanuiu zhiznuiu.” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 8 (1947):

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no. 11 (1946): 1–4.“Zadachi bol’shevikov Urala.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1942): 3–8.“Zadachi partiino-organizatsionnoi raboty.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1943):

4–10.“Zadachi partiinoi raboty v sovremennykh usloviiakh.” Partiinaia Zhizn’, no. 1

(1946): 18–23.Zadionchenko, S. “Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v ugol’noi promyshlennosti.” Parti-

inaia Zhizn’ no. 6 (1948): 6–10.———. “Zadachi partiinoe rabote v ugol’nom Kuzbasse.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.

16 (1943): 12–13.Zelikson, M. “Rabota sekretarii gorkom po promyshlennosti.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 8 (1942): 21–25.“Zhivotornaia sila sovetskogo patriotizma.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1944):

14–17.Zimin, V. “Nekotorye osobonnosti partiinoi raboty na transport.” Partiinoe

Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944): 24–28.“Znamiia lenina-stalina vedet nas k okonchatel’noi pobede,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo,

no. 7/8 (1945): 11–13.“Znat istoriiu partii lenina-stalina.” Bol’shevik, no. 2 (1935): 9–12.

Bibliography 175

177

Abalin, S., 96Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 131Academy of Social Science, 105, 116administrative stability, Stalin and,

157–58Advanced Party School, 58n23, 63, 105agitprop directorate: 1930–1939, 21,

23–24; 1941–1943, 48; 1943–1945,63, 65; 1945–1946, 81–82, 90–91,94; 1946, 105, 111–12; and armedforces, 51–52; organization of, 22;Shcherbakov and, 6; split and, 158;Zhdanov and, 3

agitpunkt, 48–49agriculture, 110–11, 113, 124–26, 157agriculture department, 90–91, 107–8Akhmatova, A., 106Aleksandrov, G. F., 6, 32, 38, 145;

1941–1943, 48, 51, 55; 1943–1945,65–68, 70; 1945–1946, 79, 82,84–85, 88, 90, 93; 1946, 107, 112,116; 1947, 122–23, 131, 134

Allied Control Commission, 68, 70All Union Communist Party

(Bolsheviks) [VKP(B)], 1;1930–1939, 18; 1943–1945, 62; newmembers of, 51–52, 156; Stalin on,6, 50, 55

Andreev, A. A., 88, 91, 111, 125

Andrianov, V. M., 88–89, 111, 129apparat, apparatus: 1941–1943, 47–60;

1943–1945, 61–75; reform of, 17,23, 77, 90

Bagirov, M., 71Bashkir obkom, 63Beloborodov, A., 94, 149Belorussia, 33, 67, 123, 126, 131Beria, L. P., 47, 111; 1945–1946, 88–89,

91; 1947, 122, 135Bol’shevik, 9–10; 1930–1939, 18,

21–22; 1939–1941, 31–32, 36,38–40; 1941–1943, 48, 52, 56;1943–1945, 64–71; 1945–1946, 77,82–84, 89–90, 93; 1946, 105, 109,112, 117; 1947, 124–26, 128,132–33, 135; 1948, 141–42, 144–49

Boterbloem, Kees, 12–13Brezhnev, L., 128, 160–61Briansk obkom, 85British, 33, 87Bulganin, N. A., 89

cadres directorate: 1930–1939, 18, 23;1941–1943, 49; 1946, 105;Malenkov and, 4

campaign for ideological education:1930–1939, 2, 18–20, 23;

Index

1939–1941, 37–38; 1941–1943,50–52, 55; 1943–1945, 62–64, 67;1945–1946, 77

Central Committee of the All UnionCommunist Party (Bolsheviks)[CC/VKP(B)], 1, 126; anthem of, 64;restructuring of, 148. See alsodecrees; publications; Secretariat;split in Secretariat

Cheliabinsk obkom, 35, 49, 129, 149Chkalovskii, 117Churchill, Winston, 87Commissars (Politburo), 15;

1939–1941, 37; 1945–1946, 81. Seealso Ministers

Communist Information Bureau(Cominform), 134

consciousness, 85. See also ideologicaleducation

Council on Collective Farm Affairs,110–11

cultural criticism, 65, 67–68, 97, 106–7,125, 141–43

decrees of CC/VKP(B), 8; 1930–1939,21–23; 1939–1941, 33, 35, 38;1941–1943, 52–53, 56; 1943–1945,62–63, 65–68, 70–71; 1945–1946,78–79, 84, 89, 91, 96–97; 1946,103–8, 110–11; 1947, 123–24, 136;1948, 143–44

defense production, 1941–1943, 49–50de Gaulle, Charles, 70Dnetropetrovsk, 35, 128, 130dogmatism, 22, 144Donbas coal mining region, 34, 117“driving force” rhetoric, 6; 1941–1943,

48; 1943–1945, 61–62; 1945–1946,86, 93; 1946, 116–17; 1947, 129

economic work, split over, 153–62;1930–1939, 15–29; 1939–1941,31–45; 1941–1943, 47–60;1943–1945, 61–75; 1945–1946,77–101; 1946, 103–20; 1947,

121–40; 1948, 141–51; Malenkovon, 1–2; Stalin and, 2, 86; Zhdanovon, 25, 92

Economsovet, 37edinonachalie, principle of, 16, 38education. See ideological education;

party political workEgolin, A. M., 80, 107, 13318th Conference, 40–41, 14618th Congress, 23, 25–26, 31, 39–40, 50emergency state defense committee

(GOKO), 47, 64, 81Engels, Friedrich, 23

factory directors, 16Fainsod, Merle, 12, 17Fedoseev, P. N., 82Fedotov, G., 71Finland, 35–36, 68, 70foreign policy, Secretariat and, 7formalism, 143France, 33functional directorates, 3, 16–17

Germany, 33–34, 39, 47–48, 52, 66, 156GOKO, 47, 64, 81Gorbachev, M., 158, 162Gorky, 85Gorlizki, Yoram, 12Gosplan, 80, 155guidance, split and, 153–54Gusarov, N. I., 68, 85, 94, 113–14, 126,

131

Hahn, Werner, 12Hegel, G. W. F., 65–66historiography: 1930–1941, 2–4;

1941–1948, 4–13

Iaroslavskii, E. M., 48, 52ideological education, 153–54;

1930–1939, 17–19, 22–25;1939–1941, 32, 39; 1941–1943, 48;1943–1945, 61, 63, 65–67;1945–1946, 79, 81–82, 84–86; 1946,

178 Index

104–5, 111–12; 1947, 124–25, 129,135–36; 1948, 142, 147; Khrushchevon, 160; Kratkii kurs and, 22. Seealso party political work

Ignatiev, S. D., 63, 126industrial department: 1939–1941,

35–36, 39–40; 1943–1945, 69industrial production, 4, 153;

1939–1941, 35, 39–41; 1941–1943,49–50; 1943–1945, 61; 1945–1946,80; 1946, 110; 1947, 130. See alsoeconomic work

inner party: definition of, 1; Stalin and,47

“inspirational” rhetoric, 6, 55, 62Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin, 117Institute of Philosophy, 131Internationale, 64international situation: 1939–1941, 31,

34; 1941–1943, 47; 1945–1946, 86;1947, 127, 134; Stalin and, 7

Iovchuk, M. T., 48, 71, 82, 125–26Iudin, P. F., 65–66

Kaganovich, L., 15, 26, 26n2, 88, 111,122, 126

Kalinin, M., 38–39, 64, 88, 133Kapustin, F., 106Katchaturian, A., 143Kemerovskii obkom, 62, 143–44Khlevniuk, Oleg, 12Khrushchev, N. S., 88, 93, 126, 144,

159–60; 1946, 111, 114, 117–18Kiev, 143Kirov, S., 2, 17, 70Kiubyshev, V. I., 16Klimenko, V., 82–83Kosygin, A. N., 89, 122, 160Kovalev, S., 114–15, 122, 127, 132Kozlov, A., 85, 160Kozlova, O., 80Kratkii kurs istorii Vsesoiuznoi

kommunisticheskoi partii(Bol’shevikov), 10, 21–22, 67, 84,154, 156

Kuibyshev, 53, 79, 81, 97kultprop department, 18Kultura I Zhizn’, 9–10; 1945–1946,

94–95, 97; 1946, 105, 109, 111, 117;1947, 122–23, 125–29, 131–35;1948, 141, 143, 145–46, 149

Kursk, 97Kuzbass coal regions, 53Kuzmin, L., 82Kuznetsov, A. A., 41, 70, 119n36, 132,

148, 154; 1945–1946, 87–88, 90–91;1946, 104, 112

Kuznetsov, V. V., 89

Larionov, A., 95–96Lenin, V. I., 22; biography of, 122–23;

death observations, 36, 40, 64, 70,84–85, 122, 141; media and, 71–72

Leningrad, 47–48Leningrad (journal), 106–7Leningrad State University, 146Leontiev, B., 82Ligachev, Y. K., 162Lipatnikov, V., 85Lvov, 68

Main Political Administration of theArmed Forces, 51–52

Makhanov, M., 51Malakhov, M., 70Malenkov, G. M.: 1930–1939, 18–19,

24; 1939–1941, 31–45; 1941–1943,47, 49, 52, 57; 1943–1945, 64;1945–1946, 77, 80, 85–86, 90, 92;1946, 103–4, 111; 1947, 121–22,124–25, 134–35; 1948, 142, 147–48;background of, 6; firing of, 92; andforeign policy, 7; and PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, 8; position of, 1–2, 4,154–55, 158–59

Malin, V. N., 126management. See personnel

managementMarxism-Leninism: Stalin and, 23. See

also party political work

Index 179

mass work: 1943–1945, 64, 66;1945–1946, 83, 89; 1946, 117

McCagg, William, 12media. See publications of CC/VKP(B)Medvedev, M., 115Mekhis, L. I., 89, 111Mikhailov, N. A., 89, 117Mikoyan, A. I., 88, 111military, agitprop and, 51–52Ministers (Politburo), 88–89, 104, 124,

161. See also CommissarsMitin, M. B., 65–66Mitronov, N., 109, 134Molodoi Bolshevik, 125Molotov, V. M., 47, 83, 88; 1930–1939,

16, 21; 1947, 122, 135Molotov obkom, 85, 132Moskovskii Propagandist, 125Moskvoretskii raikom, 80Muradeli, V., 143

Naidenov, P. A., 136Nauvoma, N., 83non-aggression pact, 33–34Novosibirsk obkom, 53

Odessa, 68Ordzhonikidje, S., 16organizational instruction departments,

96, 104Orgbureau, 88, 90, 93, 103–4outer party: definition of, 1; Stalin and,

47; Zhdanov on, 3

Partiinaia Zhizn’, 9; 1946, 103, 105,113–18; 1947, 122, 125, 127–30,132–33, 135–36; 1948, 142–45

Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, 8–9; 1930–1939,19, 21; 1939–1941, 31–34, 38–40;1941–1943, 49–50, 52–56;1943–1945, 62–64, 67–70, 72;1945–1946, 79–81, 83, 85, 87, 89,91–96

party leadership: elements of, 3; term, 1

party officials, responsibilities of,conflict over, 154; 1941–1943,54–55; 1945–1946, 81, 95; 1946,107–8, 115–16; 1947, 134–35;Constitution and, 19; late, 158–61;Malenkov on, 4; Stalin on, 20;Zhdanov on, 3, 24–25

party political work, split over, 153–62;1930–1939, 15–29; 1939–1941,31–45; 1941–1943, 47–60;1943–1945, 61–75; 1945–1946,77–101; 1946, 103–20; 1947,121–40; 1948, 141–51; Stalin and,2–3; Zhdanov on, 1

Patolichev, N. S., 71, 126; 1945–1946,88, 91–92; 1946, 104, 111, 119n36

patriotism: 1941–1943, 48, 52;1943–1945, 64, 69; 1945–1946, 77,82, 84–85; 1946, 107, 117; 1947,126, 130, 134–35; 1948, 146

Pegov, N., 130personnel management: 1930–1939,

23–24; 1939–1941, 38–39; 1948, 148Piksin , secretary, 94Politburo, 161; 1941–1943, 53–54;

composition of, 15politotdel, 53–54, 56Ponomarenko, P. K., 124, 126, 148Popkov, P. S., 93–94, 107, 128, 145Popov, G. M., 39, 78, 88, 90, 92, 130,

132Pospelov, P., 72, 83–84PPO. See primary party organizationspractice: 1939–1941, 35; 1941–1943,

51; 1945–1946, 86; 1947, 127; 1948,147; split and, 155. See alsoeconomic work

Pravda, 10–11; 1939–1941, 31–39;1941–1943, 49–50, 52–54, 56;1943–1945, 64, 66, 69–72;1945–1946, 77, 80–84, 86, 92, 95;1946, 105, 109, 111, 115–16; 1947,125, 128, 130, 133–34; 1948,141–42, 146–48

180 Index

Presidium, 161press. See publications of CC/VKP(B)primary party organizations (PPO):

1939–1941, 38; 1941–1943, 55;1946, 110, 115; Zhdanov on, 25

production, 153, 157, 160–61;1939–1941, 34–35, 39–41;1941–1943, 49; 1946, 111;Sovnarkom and, 16. See alsoeconomic work

production branch departments:1930–1939, 17, 24–25; 1939–1941,35–36; 1945–1946, 90–91; 1948,148; split and, 155, 158

Prokofiev, S., 143Propagandist, 9; 1941–1943, 50–52, 56;

1943–1945, 63, 65–67, 69, 71–72;1945–1946, 77, 81, 84, 91; 1946, 109

publications of CC/VKP(B), 8–10;1930–1939, 20–21; 1939–1941,31–39; 1941–1943, 48–49, 52–56;1943–1945, 62–64, 66–72;1945–1946, 77, 79–81, 84, 91–92,94–95; 1946, 105–6, 109, 111,113–18; 1947, 122–30, 132–33;1948, 142–46; manifestations of splitin, 11–12

Ra’anan, G. D., 12raikom, 80, 83rhetoric on split in Secretariat, 6, 20;

1941–1943, 48, 54–55; 1943–1945,61–62, 64; 1945–1946, 86, 93; 1946,116–17; 1947, 129

Rodionov, M. I., 89Rostov, 97

Sal’skii, 108, 113Saratov obkom, 85Saratov University, 79Secretariat: 1930–1939, 15–29;

composition of, 147; role of, 15, 90,93, 103–4. See also split inSecretariat

Secretaries (Politburo), 15Serzhantov, F., 85Shamberg, M., 87, 96Shatalin, N. S., 88, 129Shcherbakov, A. S., 6, 15, 27n27;

1939–1941, 36, 40–41; 1941–1943,47, 51, 56; 1943–1945, 66; death of,77–78

Shirokov, I. M., 106–7Shostakovich, D., 143Shvernik, N. M., 88Skakunova, A., 129Slepov, L., 87, 116, 135Southern-Ural railroad, 53Soviet patriotism: 1941–1943, 48, 52;

1943–1945, 64, 69; 1945–1946, 77,82, 84–85; 1946, 107, 117; 1947,126, 130, 134–135; 1948, 146

Sovministrov, 89–90, 103–4, 111, 132,136–37; split and, 155

Sovnarkom: 1930–1939, 15–29;1941–1943, 49, 54, 56–57;1945–1946, 81; economicresponsibilities of, 19; andproduction, 16; Stalin and, 2

split in Secretariat, 2–4, 153–62;1930–1939, 15–29; 1939–1941,31–45; 1941–1943, 47–60;1941–1948, 4–13; 1943–1945,61–75; 1945–1946, 77–101; 1946,103–20; 1947, 121–40; 1948,141–51; literature review on, 12–13

Stakhanovite movement, 25, 36Stalin, Josef: 1930–1939, 15–29;

1941–1943, 47, 54–55; 1943–1945,61–62, 64, 69, 72; 1945–1946, 78,86, 88, 92; 1946, 106–7; 1947, 122,127, 133, 136; 1948, 141; biographyof, 122–23; essays in honor of, 36;media and, 12; publication of worksof, 86, 95, 154; and split, 2, 6,155–56

Stalingrad, 52, 55Stalinskii obkom, 35

Index 181

Stassen, Harold, 7, 127state, responsibilities of: 1930–1939, 23;

1939–1941, 38; 1945–1946, 80–81Stetskii, A., 27n27Storozhev, Ia., 133study. See party political worksubstitution, 21, 108, 143, 146, 148Suslov, M. A., 89, 134, 142, 148

Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic, 67theory. See party political workTikhomirov, C. M., 94Tikhonov, N. S., 106transport department: 1939–1941,

35–36, 39–40; 1943–1945, 69;1945–1946, 90–91

Truman, Harry S., 127

Ukraine, 68, 114, 126Ulianovsk, 117Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR): administrative stability in,Stalin and, 157–58; Constitution of,19; government reorganization in,88–90, 160–61; national anthem of,64; political myths in, 154

United Kingdom, 33, 87United States, 87

Vakhrushchev, V., 122VKP(B). See All Union Communist

Party (Bolsheviks)Voroshilov, K., 47, 78, 88, 91Voroshilovgrad obkom, 35Voznesenskii, N. A., 40–41, 89, 155

World War II, 31, 34, 39, 156;1941–1943, 47–60; 1943–1945, 61–75

Yezhov, N. I., 18–19

Zadionchenko, S., 62, 145Zhdanov, Andrei: 1930–1939, 18–20,

24–25; 1939–1941, 31–45;1941–1943, 47, 51–52; 1943–1945,65–68; 1945–1946, 77–101; 1946,103–20; 1947, 121–40; 1948,141–51; ascendancy of, 103–20;background of, 5–6; death of, 149; inFar East, 32; and foreign policy, 7;health of, 5, 115, 121, 135, 147; andKratkii kurs, 21; position of, 1, 3–4,153–54, 158; restoration of, 77–101

Zhukov, G., 48Zimin, V., 69–70Zoshchenko, M. M., 106–7Zvezda, 106

182 Index

183

Jonathan Harris is professor of political science in the Department of Polit-ical Science at the University of Pittsburgh. For the last twenty-four years, hehas served as the editor of the Russian and East European Studies Series pub-lished by the University of Pittsburgh Press. He is the author of Subvertingthe System: Gorbachev’s Reform of the Party’s Apparat, 1986–1991.

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The Split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939-1948