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Primary funding is provided by
The SPE Foundation through member donations and a contribution from Offshore Europe
The Society is grateful to those companies that allow their professionals to serve as lecturers
Additional support provided by AIME
Society of Petroleum Engineers Distinguished Lecturer Programwww.spe.org/dl
Society of Petroleum Engineers Distinguished Lecturer Programwww.spe.org/dl 2
Duane A. McVayTexas A&M University
The Value of Assessing Uncertainty(What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You)
Overview
• You don’t know as much as you think you know
• Consequences of underestimating uncertainty are substantial
• Industry performs below expectations• Look-backs can improve assessments
and financial performance
3
E&P Has Underperformed Due toPoor Uncertainty Assessment
4
Author Industry Performance Reasons Cited
Capen (1976)
Low industry returns Underestimation of uncertainty
Brashear et al. (2001)
In 1990s, large U.S. E&P returned less than cost of capital
Evaluations did not account for “full” uncertainty
Merrow (2011)
Success of large E&P projects declined from 50% to 22% since 2003
Overconfident and optimistic project scheduling
Why Does Underestimation of Uncertainty Persist?
• We don’t fully understand uncertainty• We don’t appreciate the value of
assessing uncertainty• We don’t know how to reliably assess
uncertainty
5
Humans Are Poor at Assessing Uncertainty
• Almost universal tendency for overconfidence– Tversky and Kahneman (1974), “Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”– Capen (1976, SPE 5579), “The Difficulty of Assessing
Uncertainty”
• General tendency for optimism – Weinstein (1980), “Unrealistic Optimism About Future
Life Events”– Merrow (2011, OTC 21858), “Oil Industry
Megaprojects: Our Recent Track Record”
6
Result: Decisions Made With Wrong Distributions
7
true
estimated
k, Φ, qi, reserves, price
Experts Are No Better at Assessing Uncertainty
California Energy Commission Delphi Oil Price Forecasts
Polled international panel of financial, academic, industry, consulting, and government experts
8
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Oil
Pric
e (1
997
$/bb
l)
Year
Pessimistic
Optimistic
Actual
9
Also Overconfident, Optimistic in Production Forecasting
10
Expectation
81% Mean
80% 100% 120%40% 60%
Percent Attainment of Planned Production
Modified from SPE 145437 (IPA, 2011)
147 Projects, 1992-20082nd 6-months production
Underestimating Uncertainty Has Economic Consequences
• Poor decisions– Incorrect selections– Incorrect rejections
• Reduced value– McVay and Dossary (2014, SPE 160189)– Ran portfolio selection experiments – Determined quantitatively the value of
assessing uncertainty 11
Modeling Overconfidence
12
Modeling Directional Bias (Pessimism or Optimism)
OC = 0 0.5 0.9
trueestimated
DB = -1 -0.5 0.50 1
All with confidence of 0.5trueestimated
0.1 1
True and Estimated Project Distributions
13
• Confidence = 0.5 and Directional Bias = 0.5• PVOCF = Present Value of Operating Cash Flow (NPV+CapEx)• CapEx = Capital Expenditures
Assessment of Portfolio PerformanceWith Overconfidence and Optimism
Estimated NPV
14
EstimationError(+)
Decision Error(+)
Disappointment(+)
Best Possible NPV
Actual NPV
Select: EstimatedValue: Estimated
Select: TrueValue: True
Select: EstimatedValue: True
Distributions used to select projects and value portfolio
From SPE 116525 (2008)
Confidence
Expected Disappointment is Large for Moderate Overconfidence and Optimism
15Unconstrained Budget Case
Complete Overconfidence
No Overconfidence
Complete PessimismComplete Optimism
Est NPV – Actual NPVEst NPV
Maximize Value Only When No Overconfidence and No Directional Bias
16Unconstrained Budget Case
Actual NPVBest Possible NPV
Pleasant Surprise Comes at the Cost of Large Decision Error
Is Actual Industry Performance Consistent With Simulations?
• Brashear et al. 2001 (SPE 73141)– Large U.S. E&P in the 1990s– Returned 7% with 9-12% capital costs– Disappointment > 150%
• Nandurdikar 2014 (October JPT)– Average E&P development over last 15 years– Delivered only 60% of value promised at sanction– Disappointment = 40%
17
Low oil prices
High oil prices
What Should We Do?
• Eliminate overconfidence (and optimism)
• Have to measure them first• Conduct look-backs and calibration• Account for “unknown unknowns”
18
Calibration is Key to ReliableProbabilistic Estimation
Calibration Score = measure of distance from unit-slope line
19
Underconfidence
Overconfidence
Actual
We want perfect calibration
Benefits of Calibration
• Awareness of problem
20
Can Measure Overconfidence and Directional Bias
21
Confidence = 1 – m = 0.5DB = 1CompleteOptimism
DB = -1CompletePessimism
DB = 0Neutral
All Confidence = 0.5
Calibration of IPA Analysis Shows High Overconfidence and Optimism
22
OC ≈ 0.72DB ≈ 0.92
Modified from SPE 145437 (2011)
Benefits of Calibration
• Awareness of problem• Improve forecasts with internal
correction
23
Calibration and Feedback Improve Internal Assessments
Student predictions of football game scores (P10, P50, P90 for Texas A&M – opponent)
24
Time Period Calibration Score
1st half of season 0.039
2nd half of season 0.015
2012 Season
Benefits of Calibration
• Awareness of problem• Improve forecasts with internal
correction• Improve forecasts with external
correction
25
Application of ExternalForecast Correction
• Problem: production forecasts are long-term• Solution: calibrate short-term forecasts to adjust long-term• 187 Barnett shale wells, median 82 months production
26Time: 3 yrs
External Adjustment Improves Forecast Reliability
• Externally adjust long-term forecasts using short-term calibration results
27
Time: 6-7 yrs
10% 200 44% 200 10% 9850% 250 56% 250 50% 22390% 350 72% 350 90% 623
AdjustedFittedOriginal
Production Values in MMscf
Method proposed by Capen 1976
Recommendations: Train Individually
• Train to become well calibrated• Formal or self training• Capen, 1976, “The Difficulty of
Assessing Uncertainty”• Hubbard, 2014, How to Measure
Anything28
Forecast Probabilistically
• Do not have to use complex, expensive methods
• Calibration, not complexity, is key• Simple methods with calibrated
uncertainties better than complex methods with biased uncertainties
29
Record Frequently
• Record as many forecasts as possible
• Record forecast when make it• Start tracking forecasts now to
reap benefits later
30
Track Centrally
31Fondren et al., 2013 (SPE 166422)
Calibrate Periodically
• Look back and calibrate at predetermined frequency
• Do not calibrate on an individual project basis
32
Incentivize Properly• Incentivized to be overconfident and
optimistic• No accountability for unreliable forecasts• Recipe for chronic disappointment• To change behavior, change incentives• Track and calibrate throughout company• Make factor in employee compensation
33
Summary
• Industry is overconfident and optimistic• Poor decisions; large disappointment• Best decisions made when uncertainty is
reliably quantified• Reliable uncertainty assessment can add
value to the bottom line• Calibration key to reliable uncertainties• If don’t change, problems will continue
34
Acknowledgements• Texas A&M students involved in uncertainty research
• Mubarak Dossary, Mark Fondren, Raul Gonzalez, Xinglai Gong, Alejandro Valdes, Houda Hdadou, Carlos Morales, Hisham Almohammadi, Zhenzhen Dong, Yao Tian, Chang Liu, Yueming Cheng, Chih-Ming Tien, Chile Ogele, Ahmed Daoud, Jesus Salazar, Gulcan Turkarslan, Rubiel Ortiz, Sara Martin, Kun Cheng, Wenyan Wu, Yuhong Wang, Jay Holmes, Ashish Mendjoge, Grant Olsen, Festus Fariyibi, Nasir Akilu, Martin Alvarado, Ozgur Senel
• Other collaborators in uncertainty research• John Lee, Walter Ayers, Steve Holditch, Sam Noynaert, Eric
Bickel, Rick Gibson, Jeffrey Hart, Stephen Pickering
35
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