9

The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

Fig. 16 Recovery crews safing Kosmos-1445.(source: Royal Australian Air Force)

Fig. 17 Kosmos-1445 being lifted from the ocean. Note personwearing gas mask. (source: Royal Australian Air Force)

Fig. 18 Kosmos-1445 being lowered to the deck.(source: Royal Australian Air Force)

Fig. 19 Kosmos-1445 on deck.(source: Royal Australian Air Force)

duty, we had collected a full barrel of waste. We didn’twant to take it to the waste container and threw all theslops through one of the portholes. We didn’t thinkanyone had noticed, but that same evening we got ascolding from the fleet commander. It turned out that theOrion, circling overhead, had seen how the Russianswere dumping some kind of waste overboard. They hadfilmed the whole process and had reported this to theirmilitary base in Australia, saying the Russians had beenthrowing overboard unidentified objects. From Australiaa telephoned telegram was sent to the United States and

from there to [NATO headquarters in] Brussels. InBelgium they cooked up a protest note saying theRussians were polluting the oceans and sent it to Moscow.Moscow then contacted Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy [thehome base of the Chumikan] and raked the commanderover the coals. The commander in turn contacted theChumikan and ordered to find out immediately whathad happened. And all this in just one day. Who couldhave guessed that an ordinary barrel of kitchen wastethrown overboard by some conscript sailors would havesuch political consequences?” [14].

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Confident enough that they could bring back the BORswith sufficient precision, the Russians decided to land thenext two BORs in the Black Sea just west of Simferopol.The first was launched on 27 December 1983 as Kosmos-1517 and the second was orbited on 19 December 1984 asKosmos-1614 (Fig. 21). During re-entry, the vehicles passedsome 60-80 km over the territory of NATO countries such asGreat Britain and West Germany, which strictly speakingwas a violation of those countries’ airspace. The TASS launchannouncements differed from the earlier ones in acknowl-edging that the satellites “had performed a controlled entryinto the atmosphere and landed in the predesignated area ofthe Black Sea”. Involved in the recovery operations werefour vessels of the Black Sea fleet, namely three recoveryvessels (the Yamal, Donbass and Sevan) and the cruiserLeningrad, as well as Beriyev Be-12 and Antonov An-26airplanes and Kamov Ka-25 helicopters. While Kosmos-1517 was successfully retrieved by the Yamal, it was laterrevealed that Kosmos-1614 was lost, having either burnedup in the atmosphere or sunk in the Black Sea. The recoveryvessels, aircraft and helicopters searched the 70 x 30 kmlanding ellipse for about a week, but to no avail. Talking

Fig. 20 BOR-4 recovery from the Russian vantage point. Orionaircraft circling overhead.

(source: Russian Federal Space Agency)

TABLE 1: List of BOR-4 Missions.

Official name Serial number Launch date + Perigee/Apogee Inclination Commentstime (GMT) (km) (°)

- 401 5 Dec 1980 - - Suborbital test. Landed near? Lake Balkhash.

Kosmos-1374 404 3 Jun 1982 190 x 229 49.6 Landed in Indian Ocean.21.30

Kosmos-1445 403 15 Mar 1983 177 x 223 50.6 Landed in Indian Ocean.22.30

Kosmos-1517 405 27 Dec 1983 179 x 220 50.6 Landed in Black Sea.10.00

Kosmos-1614 406 19 Dec 1984 172 x 222 50.7 Intended Black Sea landing,03.55 not recovered.

Orbital data and launch times are from Jonathan McDowell’s Satellite Catalog and Launch Log at http://planet4589.org/space/log/satcat.txt and http://planet4589.org/space/log/launch.html.

about the cause of the mishap many years later, State Com-mission leader Gherman Titov said that “while fixing oneproblem, engineers had created another” [15].

Despite the failure to recover the final vehicle, it was feltthat enough data had been gathered during the four orbitalflights and a fifth mission was reportedly cancelled [16]. Sev-eral of the recovered BOR-4 vehicles were later put on displayat Russian and international exhibitions (Fig. 22). The Russianslater said the missions had allowed them to test the effects ofaerodynamic, temperature and acoustic loads as well as vibra-tions on the heatshield between altitudes of 100 and 30 km andspeeds of between Mach 25 and Mach 3. Particularly helpfulhad been the temperature data obtained in critical areas such asthe nosecap and the underbelly of the vehicle. The BOR-4missions had helped to determine the ideal size of gaps be-tween the tiles, measure the “catalytic activity” of the heatshieldin real plasma conditions and also to study the risks associatedwith losing one or more tiles. The flights had also made itpossible to “outline measures to reduce the mass of Buran’sheatshield”, although there is no evidence those measures wereactually implemented [17].

On the whole the heatshield performed well on Buran’sone and and only mission on 15 November 1988. Severaldozen tiles were damaged and seven were lost altogether(compared to sixteen on Columbia during STS-1). Thesewere one black tile each on the vertical stabilizer, rudder/speed brake and body flap, three black tiles on the undersideof the left wing and one white tile near one of the overheadwindows. The three black tiles were in an area bordering onone of the reinforced carbon-carbon panels on the leadingedge of the wing. This is the only area where the underlyingsurface suffered major damage, fortunately without cata-strophic consequences. With the launch having taken placein cold and wet conditions, much of the damage sustained bythe thermal protection system is believed to have been causedby chunks of ice falling from the launch tower, Energiya’score stage and the orbiter itself. There was also some signifi-cant scorching of tiles on the vertical stabilizer and the aftfuselage of the vehicle. This was attributed not only to thethermal effects of re-entry, but also to exhaust gases imping-ing on the vehicle from the separation motors of Energiya’sstrap-on boosters [18].

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The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

6. WESTERN INTERPRETATIONOF THE FLIGHTS

The Australian Air Force’s photographs of the BOR-4 recover-ies were irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union was work-ing on some kind of shuttle programme, but at the same timeled to confusion among Western analysts. As these imagesbecame available, there was also mounting evidence that workwas underway on a big delta-wing shuttle comparable in size toits American counterpart. Rather than linking the BOR-4 mis-sions to that programme, most analysts both inside and outsidethe intelligence community were convinced that the SovietUnion was developing two different types of shuttles, a big100-ton class vehicle akin to the US Space Shuttle and asmaller spaceplane of which the BORs were believed to bescale models. Unaware of BOR-4’s roots in the Spiral pro-gramme, they quite logically concluded that the small spaceplanemodels, which were aerodynamically completely different fromthe big shuttle, must be part of an independent effort.

There are no indications from declassified reports that theUS intelligence community knew the Soviet Union was work-ing on an air-launched spaceplane in the 1960s and 1970s.While US reconnaissance assets did pick up signs of the testflights of the 105.11 Spiral atmospheric subsonic testbed in thesecond half of the 1970s, analysts wrongly concluded that thesewere tests of a delta-wing spaceplane to be orbited by the three-stage Proton rocket (Defence Department designator SL-13).In a classified assessment of Soviet space capabilities releasedto authorized persons in August 1980, the CIA listed severaldevelopmental activities that would affect future Soviet mannedmilitary space capabilities, including:

“Development of a military “space plane”, believed to

be part of a Soviet Air Force program. It is a smalldelta-wing vehicle incorporating a lifting body designfor horizontal landings on a runway. [erased] seen in1976 at the Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons andResearch Center, and has been seen [erased] under thewing of TU-95 bomber, indicating that drop tests mayhave taken place. The Soviets probably intend to usetheir largest currently operational space launch vehicle(SLV), the SL-12/13, to orbit this spacecraft. If the Sovietsuse the full capacity of this SLV their “space plane”could have a capability to orbit crews of two to sixmen.”

Analyzing the potential missions for such a spaceplane, thereport said:

“The Soviet delta-wing ‘space plane’ is probably aresearch vehicle that could be developed for militarymissions. Such missions might include reconnaissanceor satellite inspection; or the vehicle might serve as aspace weapons platform. The last potential mission isconsidered less likely because of the estimated limitedpayload capability. It also could be developed into acrew ferry vehicle to support space station operations… It seems roughly comparable to, and may have beenmotivated in part by the US Dyna Soar programme of1961-1963”.

At the same time, the report linked the construction of twonew launch pads at the former N-1 launch sites to a separateeffort to build a large shuttle: “The new SLVs will have consid-erably more lift capability than required for the new ‘spaceplane’. We believe that one variant will be capable of lifting aspacecraft comparable in size and weight to the US Shuttlevehicle to near-Earth orbit” [19].

The BOR-4 test flights in 1982-1984 only added weight tothe speculation about the spaceplane. In an analysis of futurespace station operations in November 1982, the CIA expectedthe first flight of the full-scale spaceplane as early as late 1982or 1983. However, there was still doubt about its exact mission:“The space plane could be used as a cosmonaut ferry vehicle inthe mid-1980s, reducing or eliminating the need for non-reusable Soyuz-T spacecraft. It is not clear, however, that theSoviets intend to use the space plane for this purpose” [20]. Bymid-1983 the CIA expected “prototype testing” in the 1983-1985 timeframe, adding the spacecraft was being developed“for a mission we cannot yet determine, but is likely to includereconnaissance and satellite inspection roles” [21].

Speculation about the spaceplane also entered the public

Fig. 21 BOR-4 nr. 405 (Kosmos-1517) showsthe effects of re-entry.

(source: V. Lukashevich, www.buran.ru)

Fig. 22 BOR-4 vehicle on display. (source: B. Vis)

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domain through annual Defence Department publications inthe 1980s called “Soviet Military Power” (Figs. 23 & 24). Bythis time US intelligence was aware of the development of anew medium-lift launch vehicle which it called SL-X-16 andwhich was later announced to the world as Zenit. This had afirst stage derived from the strap-on boosters of the Energiyaheavy-lift launch vehicle and a newly developed second stage.Flight testing began in April 1985. The military spaceplane wasnow linked to that booster rather than the Proton, putting it in asomewhat lighter class. The 1987 edition of Soviet MilitaryPower said:

“The SL-X-16 booster is capable of placing a payloadof more than 15,000 kilograms into low Earth orbit.This capability fills a gap in the current SLV inventoryfor an economical means of launching medium-weightpayloads. A payload candidate for the SL-X-16 is thespace plane, a different program than the spaceshuttle. A subscale version of this vehicle has beenflight-tested in orbit and a full-scale version could bein production. This small, manned spacecraft couldbe used for quick-reaction, real-time reconnaissancemissions, satellite repairs and maintenance, crewtransport, space station defense, satellite inspectionand, if necessary, negation. The SL-X-16 has beenflight-tested, placing at least three payloads into orbit,and will soon be fully operational. The Soviets arenot expected to launch the space plane until theyhave had sufficient experience with the SL-X-16.Testing of a full-scale space plane could begin in thelate 1980s” [22].

As preparations for the first flight of Buran were nearingcompletion and the maiden mission of the spaceplane hadstill not materialized, the US intelligence community wasbeginning to have some doubts about the programme’s exist-ence. In a classified assessment of the Soviet shuttle pro-gramme in September 1988, just two months before theflight of Buran, the CIA did not exclude the possibility thatBOR-4 “is only a test vehicle used to gather aerodynamic,

aerothermal and materials data for the larger shuttle orbiter[erased] The timing of the space flights, for example, isconsistent with [erased] the development of protective mate-rials for the shuttle orbiter [erased] Furthermore, the smallervehicle may have been used for tests of aerothermal materi-als because a preferred subscale orbiter and its more com-plex computer and attitude control systems could not bedeveloped in time”.

However, the overall consensus was still that a separatespaceplane programme was underway: “Several factors, how-ever, suggest that the smaller vehicle is part of an independentspaceplane development effort even though it may have beenused to conduct basic research in areas that would be applica-ble to both a shuttle and a spaceplane. First, the shape of thesubscale vehicle [erased] resembles early US lifting bodiesmore closely than it does the shuttle orbiter. With its uniqueshape, the subscale spaceplane would not be optimised fortesting the shuttle orbiter design even though it could havebeen used to test materials. Second, assessments by NASAengineers indicate that a significant effort would be requiredto design a vehicle with the aerodynamic stability characteris-tics demonstrated by the subscale test vehicle. Such an elabo-rate design is not required for a test vehicle to collect data forlimited aspects of orbiter performance. Third, tests are con-tinuing even though the Soviet shuttle orbiter configurationhas been finalised and several orbiters have been produced.Moreover, both orbital and suborbital flights would not berequired if the subscale vehicle were designed only to testshuttle materials. Suborbital flights would provide similar dataon reentry and atmospheric flight and are much less compli-cated logistically” [23].

By this time almost four years had elapsed since the lastBOR-4 mission, but the CIA evidently believed the tests werecontinuing. This would indicate that the US intelligence com-munity was not aware that the Soviet Union was testing a 1:8delta-wing scale model of Buran (BOR-5), interpreting thoseflights (five in all flown between June 1984 and June 1988) ascontinuing suborbital tests of BOR-4.

Fig. 23 Illustration from Soviet Military Power 1987. The US intelligence community believedBOR-4 was the prototype of a Zenit-launched spaceplane developed simultaneously with a SpaceShuttle look-alike vehicle. (source: US Department of Defence)