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8/13/2019 The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science
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Home> Philosophy> 1997 After Postmodernism Conference> Heelan (background)
After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science
Patrick A. Heelan*
Philosophy Department
Georgetown University
Washington, D.20057
Section: Science, Logic, Mathematics, Well Formulated Theories, Empirical Research
Copyright: based on forthcoming article in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge)
ABSTRACT
Hermeneutics or interpretation is concerned with the generation, transmission,
and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld and was the original method of
the human sciences stemming from F. chleiermacher and !. "ilthey.
Hermeneutic philosophy refers mostly to #. Heidegger$s. %his paper addresses
natural science from the perspecti&e of Heidegger$s analysis of meaning and
interpretation. 'ts purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those
aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are a(sent from the traditionalanalysis of theory and e)planation, to re*orient the current discussion a(out
scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and
to esta(lish some relationship (etween the current philosophy of natural science
and hermeneutical philosophy. %he paper has particular rele&ance to the history
and social studies of science and technology.
+Patric A. Heelan is the !illiam A. -aston Professor of Philosophy at
-eorgetown ni&ersity. He was formerly a research physicist in high energy
physics and seismology.
Introduction
%he title of Heisen(erg$s momentous paper of 19/0 that presented uantum
mechanics to the world was $A(out the uantum theoretical re*interpretation of
inematical and mechanical relationships$ 2Heisen(erg 19/03. %he title reflected
Heisen(erg$s &iew that uantum mechanics was not a new solution within the old
mechanics, (ut a new mechanics that was sensiti&e to the intrinsic dependence of
uantum o(4ects on measurement interactions and where measuring instruments,
unlie the uantum o(4ects they measure, followed $classical physics$ rather than
the new uantum physics. %his, he said, was a re-interpretationinspired (y the
way 5instein in 1960 sol&ed the orent8 and Fit8gerald pro(lem of apparent
length contraction and apparent time dilation (y the apparently simple e)pedient
of re*interpreting the character of space and time, taing the apparentlengths
and inter&als to (e the reallengths and inter&als.213 ' am not going to defend
Heisen(erg$s or 5instein$s notion of interpretation, (ut to e)plore at a
philosophical le&el the sense in which interpretation is at wor in all of physics
and other e)perimental science, and to contri(ute to opening up a new
philosophical**and metaphysical** perspecti&e on physics that was possi(ly
foreshadowed (y 5instein and Heisen(erg in their attempt to mae sense of their
disco&eries.2/3
Interpretation--alternati&ely, hermeneutics--(elongs to the method and thining
of those other sciences, the human sciences, among which are to (e counted
history, classics, philology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, sociology,
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(i(lical theology, 4urisprudence, and philosophy. #ost of these sciences ha&e
di&ersified o&er time, (ut ' mean them insofar as they ha&e retained their original
focus on cultural meaning and its transmission, rather than on physics$
e)planation, prediction, and control. 'n 5urope the human sciences ha&e always
(een as re&ered as the natural sciences and were included in any listing of the
sciences in -erman, they were 'Geisteswissenschaften,$ in French, 'les sciences
humaines.$ %his descri(es a tradition of scholarship oriented towards the $space$
of shared and transmitted meanings within the conte)t of the social historicallifeworld, its characteristic method (eing that of the 2so*called3 hermeneutical
circle 2or spiral3 with multiple foci, 1. on the disco&ery, articulation, and
fulfillment of meaning in the lifeworld, /. on the historical transmission of
meaning, and :. on the transformation of meaning under the historical conditions
of its transmission.2:3 ' aim to loo at the natural sciences from the philosophical
way of thining originally de&eloped to support the human sciences.
%he hermeneuticorientation is contrasted with the explanatorytradition which in
the 5nglish*speaing world is simply called $science.$ 5)planatory method aims at
the construction of a mathematical model comprising measura(le 2theoretical3
&aria(les, to (e accepted or re4ected (y reason of its a(ility under la(oratory
circumstances to predict and control the causal outcomes of assigned initial
conditions. uch is in general the methodological profile of the natural sciences.
;ot that the human sciences ha&e to (e e)clusi&ely interpretati&e, nor the natural
sciences e)clusi&ely e)planatory. 'n fact, during the past fifty years, the human
sciences ha&e taen a strong turn towards the e)planatory orientation under the
name of $empirical$ or $cliometric$ social sciences, though with disappointing
accomplishment on the whole in relation to predicti&e power. As for the natural
sciences, the search for an inherent cultural meaning has come predominantly
2(ut not e)clusi&ely3 from outside the sciences, in particular from religiousinterests looing for traces of di&ine action in the world, large and small.
'n recent years, howe&er, scholars ha&e (egun to use (oth hermeneutic and
empirical social science methods to study the actual and historical profiles of
acti&ity of communities of scientific researchers.
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laid out (y the (est scholarship in the empirical social and historical sciences.273
%he story they tell a(out the natural sciences can hardly (e reconciled with the
no(le ideals of nowledge and reality stemming from the philosophical tradition
4ust mentioned. !hence comes an em(arrassing dilemma either natural science
is not worth the name of 'knowledge' and deserves no more than to be called
'useful opinion,' or the philosophical analysis of knowledge and reality needs to be
revisited and reviewed.
' suppose that most philosophers of science thin they will e&entually find a way
out of this dilemma that preser&es for the natural and other theoreticDempirical
sciences a pri&ileged epistemological and ontological status. #uch of the
enormous cultural prestige of natural science in modern societies has come from
its Faustian powers, (ut e&en more deri&es from the no(le** perhaps, mythic**
(elief that science helps us to see ;ature, perhaps as -od sees it, in a way
unmi)ed with human error, construction, or superstition. 'f the dilemma can (e
resol&ed, it surely will (e done with the (rilliance of the talent a&aila(le.
#y goal, howe&er, in this paper is to re&isit and re&iew the natural sciences from
the perspecti&e of hermeneutic philosophy in order to get a clearer or at least adifferent assessment of the status of theoretical e)planatory nowledge and its
relation to the lifeworld, and possi(ly also to get some sense of how the current
logical empiricist and the hermeneutic traditions relate to one another with
respect to the short term e)planatory goals of science and the long term goals of
nowledge.
Eust as the philosophy of science has its own fundamental literary corpus, so
interpretati&e or hermeneutical philosophy has its own (asic corpus. %his
comprises wors (y F. chleiermacher, 5. Husserl, #. Heidegger, !. "ilthey, #.
#erleau*Ponty, H.*-. -adamer, P. @icoeur, and only in part, their structuralist,post*structuralist, and critical theoretic successors who remain strongly tied to
the empiricDtheoretical tradition.23 %he principal author used in this essay is
Heidegger. ' include a woring (i(liography here (ecause Heidegger is not often
found cited in the philosophy of science.293 %hough these writers may (e
relati&ely unfamiliar to philosophers of physics, their approach and concerns ha&e
long (een the (usiness of the human sciences. %hey ha&e, howe&er, recently
(ecome rele&ant to the philosophy of science (ecause of the dilemma mentioned
a(o&e.
cientific nowledge, lie all e)pert nowledge, is a domain of common meaning
that finds fulfillment in the e)perience of local communities of researchers sharing
a common scientific culture. =nowledge such as this is transmitted synchronically
from local community to local community and also diachronically in the historical
chain of transmission and reception. !hat is transmitted is not** to use E.
"ewey$s term** a museum piece, (ut the product of human understanding in
action, re*creating and re*constructing meanings from the sources of meaning
that are transmitted. %his process is called $interpretation,$ and out of it, a certain
di&ersity of understanding is ine&ita(le among different local e)pert communities
and, of course, among different generations of researchers.
%urning in particular to historical transmission, what is handed on (y pastresearchers to their successors is not always what is recei&ed (y these
successors, for changes occur (oth in the transmission of common meanings and
in the cultural matri) in which the recei&ed meanings find fulfillment. !e
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scientists are today -alileans in a way in which -alileo himself was not a -alilean.
' am not referring to episodic 2say, =uhnian3 paradigm shifts, (ut to the general
conditions under which any tradition of nowledge is historically transmitted.2163
;ot only do such changes occur, (ut they must occur in any chain of nowledge
transmission, let alone in any progressi&e research program. %he interpretati&e
character of science shows itself then historically in two ways 213 in the way the
meaning-fieldof the lifeworld is continually (eing refined, replaced, or
transformed (y scientific theori8ing **an enterprise that is easily misconstrued ifthe role of interpretation is misunderstood and 2/3 in the way meaning-
fulfillmentin the lifeworld changes as the lifeworld is transformed (y a succession
of new technological pra)es 2among them, a&aila(le instrumentation3 em(odying
new or re&ised scientific theories.
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II. Interpretation and meaning
Human understanding functions (y interpretationand its product is meaning.
#eaning is nothing physical it is not a te)t, a (eha&ior, a neural networ, a
computation, not e&en a sign or a medium, nor any relationship among things,
though all of these may (e generated (y and producti&e of meaning. ;or is it a
pri&ate $domain$ accessi(le only (y some ind of introspection. @ather meaning is
a pu(lic $domain$ where people share the products of human understanding first
(y common ha(its of action 2in which di&erse networs are recogni8ed3 and then
through the use of language and language*lie media. #eaning is the $domain$ in
which people understand one another, argue with one another, gi&e reasons,
esta(lish goals, set up norms, define inds, etc.** more or less effecti&ely
according to the purpose, intelligence, language sills, and education of the
parties in&ol&ed. #eaning is historical (ecause language is constituti&e of history
it is also deeply affected (y human temporality213 and historical forgetfulness
(ecause the communityDlifeworld milieu in which it is transmitted has gains and
losses o&er time it is local and social, (ecause it is the product of acti&e local
interests and social communities and constituti&e of their interests it is then
neither once*and*for*all fi)ed, nor e&er perfect and unchanging. Finally, thoughsu(4ect to change under transmission, it is not on this account de&oid of truth,
rather is meaning the instrument through which truthfulness maes its
appearance in the lifeworld.
III. Scientific traditions or the historical transmission of scientific meanings
#eaning, howe&er, is articulated and transmitted only through the medium of
language, actions, and other pu(lic e)pressi&e signs. %hese ser&e as the $conduit$
for meaning, (ut do not constitute meaning, for meaning is not a transporta(le
su(stance lie (rics or water. #eanimg has to (e re*created from its transmitted
sources (y readers of the recei&ing community and there is no guarantee that the
meaning deri&ed from these sources (y readers from one community will (e the
same as the meaning deri&ed from the same resources (y readers from a
different community separated from the first (y history and cultural en&ironment.
As historians of science well now, this is as true for natural science as it is for
literature and politics.
#eanings are adopted from traditions of interpretation, or constructed or
re*constructed in eeping with the responsi(ilities, constraints, and presumptions
of rational hermeneutical method 2see (elow3.2103
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to (e used for scientific research communities** (ut no one use or $ownership$
need go unchallenged either (y logic or (y e)perience nor should any one use
(ecome the sole property of 4ust one interested group.2193
Howe&er, it is not the case that anything goes. @ational hermeneutic inuiry
acnowledges the e)istence of traditions of interpretationthat gi&e today$s
readers and inuirers a culturally pri&ileged &ersion of past sources, shaped
always to the goals of the linguistic and cultural en&ironment of the communitywith special $ownership$ rights in the su(4ect matter.2/63 !ithin the sciences such
traditions of interpretation appro)imate to what =uhn called $paradigms.$
'n addition to meanings construed on the (asis of a common tradition of
interpretation 2with its presumption of historical continuity3, legitimacy can (e
gained (y other meanings independently of any presumption that there e)ists a
historical continuity of meaning with the source through a common tradition of
life, action, and interpretation. uch discontinuities of meaningwithin the
sciences are at the heart of what =uhn called $re&olutions$ in which old
$paradigms$ are replaced (y new ones.2/13 'n the wor of hermeneutics,
howe&er, a radically new meaning need not e)pel the old, (ecause each, thoughdifferent, may (e a &alid historical and cultural perspecti&e. 'ndeed, despite some
sense of discomfort, we often find in the sciences the old flourishing side (y side
with the radically new, uantum mechanics with ;ewtonian mechanics, statistical
thermodynamics with phenomenological thermodynamics** though with respect
to their formal models they are mutually incompati(le** and so on. 5ach acting
within its own hori8on of research purposes is in dialogue with rele&ant data
through its own empirical processes of testing and measurement.
%he appropriate philosophical approach to the method or process of interpretation
is the $hermeneutical circle 2or spiral3.$ ?riefly, following Heidegger 2Heidegger199B, 106*1013, any inuiry is initiated (y the (readown of a tas and (egins (y
calling on the deep structure of pre*theoretical pre*categorial understanding2//3
of ?eing which is found in the lifeworld 2orhabe3. Heidegger$s name for the
human inuirer is $Da-sein$ Da-seinis $e)istence,$ the em(odied understanding of
?eing, a $there*ness$ 2Da3 in the domain of ?eing 2!ein3.2/:3 'nuiry is awaened
when Da-seinposes a directed uestion 2orsicht3 which, lie all directed
uestions, already implicitly contains an outline of a search and disco&ery
strategy aiming at unco&ering a solution. %he uestion so construed in this case is
not yet in an articulated form only later will it achie&e an adeuate e)pression in
2what philosophers of science call3 an $e)planation.$ %here follows an acti&edialogue (etween orsichtand orhabe, accompanied (y actions seeing practical
fulfillment in the awareness that the sought*for understanding 2die!ache selbst3
has presented itself and made itself manifest to the inuirer 2orgriff3. 'f on first
trial the sought*for understanding is a(sent, something ne&ertheless has (een
learnt, and the search resumes, dipping again into the a&aila(le resources of
orhabe, orsichtand orgriff. %his hermeneutical circle of inuiry is repeated
until a solution presents itself within a new cultural pra)is in the lifeworld.
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possi(ly elsewhere at an earlier time. %his is the method of the hermeneutical
circle "or spiral#. 'nterpretati&e wor of this ind is clearly historical, cultural, and
anthropological, multidisciplinary in character and in need of a philosophical
foundation which hermeneutical philosophy tries to pro&ide. 'n this wor lies the
significance and power of hermeneutic method and hermeneutic philosophy for
the history and philosophy of science. And not 4ust for these, (ut also for
understanding how uantitati&e empirical methods gi&e meaning to empirical
contents, how theory*laden data depend on the pu(lic self*presentation of themeasured entity as a pu(lic cultural entity and, in particular, how measurement
euipment plays a dou(le role creating and refining (oth theoretical and cultural
meanings. %hese are topics that will (e addressed (elow.
IV. The furniture of the lifeworld
%he lifeworld has a furniture that comprises those physical and em(odied cultural
o(4ects, (oth $natural,$ lie trees, and $cultural,$ lie institutions or technologies,
which ha&e names or descriptions in the language among them are perceptual
o(4ects. All of these are 2to use Heidegger$s term3 onticbeings.
V. Hermeneutics of theory-ladenness: theoretical understanding as explanation
ince in the age*old tradition going (ac to Aristotle the characteristic goal of all
scientific or scholarly inuiry is theoretical understanding, it is important to
understand what theory does in modern science. A theory e)plains why some
e&ent occurs 2or does not occur3 (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions
that control its occurrence 2or non*occurrence3 its goal is e)perimental prediction
and control. Alternati&ely, a theory may e)plain a lawful regularity among
empirical e&ents (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions that, if fulfilled,
necessitate the lawful regularity among these e&ents.
%o pro(e what is implied (y this meaning of theory, ' follow Heidegger 2199B,
:07*:B3. He (egins with a (roen hammer and a construction pro4ect. A
hammer is a tool used in a construction pro4ect a worer generally does not as
what a hammer is until (y (ad luc he has to find a replacement for it or a
su(stitute.
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and anti-realismis often confused a(out what is percei&ed to (e at stae in
theoretical scientific research.
VI. Measurement and data
%hese conclusions ha&e important conseuences for understanding measurement,
since they illuminate the (inary &alence of empirical $facts,$ something not gi&en
(y the usual empiricist accounts.2/93 %he process of measurement in science
fulfills two different (ut coordinated functions. 't presents the ob$ect-as-measurable, this is the pra)is*laden cultural function. And it taes the data
from the presented o(4ect, this is the theory*laden data-takingfunction.2:63
%hese are the (inary &alences of scientific data. %he data*taing is usually called
$o(ser&ation$ (ut there is no o(ser&ation without the prior preparation and
presentation of the o(4ect*as*measura(le.2:13 A well*defined measuring process
does (oth 4o(s, presenting the o(4ect and recording the data. %hese in&ol&e two
different epistemological perspecti&es, a pra)is*laden cultural one 2which (elongs
to the strategy of e)perimental culture in la(oratory en&ironments3 and a
theory*laden 2or e)planatory3 one. %hese two perspecti&es can and should (e
logically, semantically, and pragmatically distinguished 2see Heidegger, 199B,:0*:093. et us consider what these two perspecti&es re&eal a(out the
measuring process, scientific entities, and data.
Consider the theory*laden perspecti&e.2:/3 ince it is the function of theory to
o&ersee the e)perimental design what will do the 4o( of presenting the o(4ect*
as*measura(leG %he ontic referent of theory as such is the measuring process
&iewed from the construction or engineering or technical point of &iew. %hin of
the theory of the hammer in relation to the cultural pra)is of hammering !ithin
the life of science, theory refers directly to the internal structure of the
2particularly measurement*presenting3 processes (y means of which $theoretical
entities$ enter the pu(lic cultural domain of science where they then pro&ide data
to o(ser&ers. %his leads to a first conclusion& what is formally theory-laden is
experimental design.
'n the pra)is*laden cultural perspecti&e, the presentation of the o(4ect*
as*measura(le is a pu(lic cultural e&ent pra)is*laden in the scientific culture of
the la(oratory, deri&ing meaning not from the o(ser&ation e&ent itself (ut from a
research program. %he o(4ect*as*measura(le is recogni8a(le as such (ecause it
comes $dressed$ in sensi(le $clothes$ pro&ided (y the e)perimental strategies
used. !hether such $clothes$ render the scientific entities percepti(le will (e
discussed (elow. %his leads to a second conclusion& observation events shouldnot be called semantically 'theory-laden'-- this appellation should be reserved for
experimental design2::3-- but rather semantically praxis-laden like all dedicated
or designated cultural ob$ects of the lifeworld presented as fulfilling experience.
%he meaning of data is also (i&alent and, lie the meaning of a hammer, su(4ect
to am(iguity. "ata (elong hypotheticallyto the theoretical perspecti&e of
measurement (ut affirmativelyto the cultural perspecti&e of the lifeworld forum
of scientific research strategy the research $narrati&es$ that @ouse2:3 speas
a(out would (elong here. %his is the special en&ironment of the e)pert researcher
and, though pu(lic, is usually closed to the understanding and e)perience of theordinary citi8en. o*called $theoretical entities,$ such as, for e)ample, electrons
and electron-data, are theory*laden (ut, for the reasons gi&en a(o&e, they cannot
(e said to e)ist as such unless locata(le in a pu(lic forum, the primary pu(lic
forum (eing that of an e)perimental scientific research program where as pu(lic
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cultural entities they are e)plicitly pra)is*laden with respect to some standard
configuration2s3 of la(oratory euipment. %hough the theory of electrons may
change, it is ne&er the case that what we call $an electron$ fails to ha&e an in
principle relationship to contingent local practical cultural milieus.
VII. Theoretical entities as cultural entities
'n addition to the pu(lic forum of scientific research, there are other pu(lic fora
within which indi&idual $theoretical entities$ and the data a(out them can (ecomecultural entities.2:03 %hese are, for e)ample, pu(lic fora featuring technology,
finance, political power, religion, art, media, and so on. All of these** lie the
scientific research forum itself** are local fora in which a scientific entity, usually
in some technological conte)t, can play the role of a dedicated cultural resource
2for the life of finance, politics, religion, art, media, etc3 and (y this means
(ecome part of the local furniture of the lifeworld. For e)ample, choosing
tele&ision as one such local technological forum, then, electrons** or, at least,
electron*(eams** can (e designated e&en to children and others unlettered in
physics as cultural entities in that forum (ecause of their role in $painting$ the %
picture. 'n all such local fora, the scientific entity and its data are meaningfully(i&alent and emulate the relationship (etween theory and pra)is in the study of a
hammer. @emo&ed from all such local fora the putati&e $data$ are not data at
all2:B3 since they do not mae manifest in the lifeworld the presence of anything
(ut $themsel&es$** (ut of $themsel&es,$ ha&ing no determinate lifeworld meaning,
they are 4ust noise.
!hen new theory*(ased technologies are added to the lifeworld, theoretical
scientific terms can (e introduced into e&eryday descripti&e language with new
non*theoretical cultural meanings. For instance, temperatureas a cultural entity
is endowed with non*theoretical, practical lifeworld meanings which can (e used
to create, designate, employ, and control new classes of euipment, for e)ample,
thermostats, in the lifeworld. !ith the help of these new resources, the old
cultural en&ironment can (e changed, perhaps, in re&olutionary ways. Pu(lic
space, for e)ample, was re&olutioni8ed in renaissance 'taly in the uattrocento
prior to the Copernican re&olution and the de&elopment of modern science when
it came to (e su(4ected to uni&ersal measurement, and to analysis according to
the principles of the newly disco&ered mathematical perspecti&e. 't was
transformed (y this process, from a manifold with di&erse local geometries into
one with a single measurement*(ased 5uclidean geometry. For those who looed
for a unified cosmology, the way was prepared for -alileo and the Copernican
re&olution.2:73
%he second e)ample is from medicine and illustrates how the (i&alence of
scientific descriptions can create new moral perple)ities in the lifeworld.
"udon2:3 ass, is the term $foetus,$ merely a scientific redescription of the
lifeworld entity, a (a(yG
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increasingly in the current practice in the !estG
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#oreo&er, in the search to e)plain the explicandum, the theori8ing process soon
disco&ers the e)tent to which the cultural function of the explicandumcan (e
transferred to different artifacts from the indi&idual e)emplars originally studied.
An old (oot can on occasion do the wor of a hammer %his leads to the following
2surprisingG3 conclusion what makes this or any individual hammer to be a
hammer--or what makes this or any individual thing in human experience to be
what it is perceived to be-- is not a defining permanent essence but a set of
contextual properties any one of which can be found in, or retro-fitted for, avariety of different physical hosts.
%he truth a(out things in the lifeworld then is not a classical conformity (etween
a mental representation and the o(4ect represented (ut a property of comple)
meanings with local and historical uses.263 %he meanings we entertain a(out
things are disclosed (y pra)es that are implicitly theory*laden. %hese meanings
are not permanent (ut historical, local, and changing. %hey are local, (ecause
e)pert communities of use are e)clusi&e. %hey are changing (ecause, it happens
that, when the particular theory*ladenness of the pra)es (ecomes e)plicit, new,
(etter or, at least, different, pra)es can often (e engineered with a conseuent
transformation of cultural meaning. 't can happen, say, that some old (oots
function as hammers, or that hammers e&entually disappear entirely in a world of
plastics and high tech. uch a spiral of meaning change turns endlessly within the
historicality of ?eing 2see Heidegger, 199B, 93 as such tri&ial e)amples show.
uch a process of theory*dri&en cultural change (rings new historical perspecti&es
into play and through forgetfulness ine&ita(ly puts old ones out of play. %he (ig
mistae of modernity was to commit itself to a classical static conformity notion
of truth that could only (e retained (y supposing that scientific theory could (e
separated logically or ontologically from temporality and culture. %his is what
hermeneutic reflection shows to (e contrary to e)perience.213
IX. Scientific technologies
Heidegger feared that, to the e)tent that scientific inuiry is successful in the
construction of e)planatory theories, it would turn the focus of philosophical
inuiry away from $meditati&e thining$ a(out the lifeworld as the cultural arena
for human life fulfillment, that is, away from meaning and meaning change, and
toward 2what Aristotle called3 $calculati&e thining$ ordained toward management
and control in the latter, things are treated as means to ends within Gestell, the
assumed $o(4ecti&e$ frame of $o(4ecti&e reality$ 2Heidegger, 19B, pp. :*:0 19BB,
p. B3.
;o minimi8ing is intended, howe&er, of the great (enefits that can and do flow
from the $calculati&e thining$ of scientific inuiry. ;e&ertheless, Heidegger
foresaw that such (enefits could ha&e a human cost, for they affect the way
cultural life teaches people to (e human and communicates to them the sense of
the wholeness, integrity, and goodness of the world, the self, and human
communities. %his is "udon$s point 2in the e)ample cited a(o&e3 in uestioning
the implication of using the scientific term $foetus$ e)clusi&ely in place of the older
maternally related &oca(ulary. Changing the traditional &ehicles for the
transmission of these core meanings ine&ita(ly changes how people regard
themsel&es, their personal destinies, their neigh(ors, and the world around, withconseuent riss of cultural insta(ility in all these areas.2/3
X. 'Theoretical entities' as perceptual entities
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't was argued a(o&e that $theoretical scientific entities$ are pu(lic cultural entities.
Among the latter are perceptual entities. 's it possi(le that some $theoretical
entities$ are also perceptual entitiesG
#uch depends on what perceptual o(4ects are taen to (e. 'n the empiricist
tradition perceptual o(4ects are e)plained as organi8ations of sensations, and
from this position it can (e argued that sensations recei&ed from a measuring
instrument can only (e ingredients of the scientist$s perception of the statechange of the instrument, and not of the $theoretical entity$ that caused that
change. 'n a more de&eloped &ersion of empiricism, an argument is sometimes
made for the partial o(ser&a(ility of the $theoretical entity$.2:3 %his whole line of
thining deri&es from a theory or model of perception** one incidentally that has
little supporting e&idence** and when applied to the perceptual o(4ect itself as a
cultural phenomenon, it maes no sense at all. %he perceptual o(4ect is the
explicandumand should not (e confused with the empiricist explicans.23
;e&ertheless, the empiricist theory of perception e)ercises an influence far
(eyond its weight in discussions a(out the ontological status of $theoretical
entities.$
!hat then are perceptual o(4ects as phenomena in the lifeworldG A (rief setch of
an answer would go something lie this they are su(stanti&e indi&idually
locali8ed cultural o(4ects in the lifeworld, presented to local human percei&ers in
sensory e)perience, and understood (y the character, multiplicity, and
systematicity of their sensory presentations or profiles.203 -i&en that 2on the
(asis of the argment already made3 a scientific $theoretical entity,$ say, an
electron, is a su(stanti&e cultural entity in the lifeworld, we as can it ha&e the
appearance of a perceptual o(4ectG %he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor is Ies
and this answer still holds.2B3 et me re&isit the uestion (riefly.
'n section '', ' referred to the historical influence in the uattrocentoof two
technologies, distance measurement and mathematical perspecti&e, on pu(lic
space transforming it from a di&ersity of local and mostly non*5uclidean pu(lic
spaces to one uni&ersal 5uclidean pu(lic space. uch technologies as those
mentioned a(o&e ' called $reada(le technologies,$ (ecause they made it possi(le
to mae and mar en&ironmental cues that ena(led the learning of 5uclidean
&ision. 'n general, reada(le technologies are technologies capa(le of transforming
perception.273 ome la(oratory measurement de&ices when standardi8ed ha&e
the capacity of presenting a cultural entity, such as, for e)ample, an electron or a
molecule, as locali8ed in the lifeworld and as $clothed$ with systematic sensoryprofiles that can (e taen in conte)t as an electron$s recogni8a(le signature. uch
technologies are readable technologiesand confer percepta(ility on the scientific
entity in uestion.
XI. Contextual Logic and Bivalent and Multivalent meanings
%ools, such as, for e)ample, hammers, and practically e&erything else in the
lifeworld including $theoretical entities$ ha&e multi&alent meanings. ?y $multi&ant
meanings,$ ' mean, a minimum of two synchronic meanings in different,
coordinated (ut not isomorphic, perspecti&es that are descripti&e of a pu(lic
cultural entity. uch perspecti&al multi&alence raises the further uestion Arethere articulate logically reasona(le conditions 2within the pur&iew of
hermeneutical philosophy3 that would gi&e coherence to such perspecti&esG
%he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor is still fundamentally the one ' would gi&e
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today though with some correcti&e glosses.23 %he core of the solution is that
the two complementary perspecti&al languages** theory*laden and pra)is*laden**
must (e partially ordered (y statement inclusion within a complemented
non*distri(uti&e lattice 2or context logic3.293
XII.The scope of hermeneutical philosophy for the philosophy of science
%he hermeneutic turn in the philosophy of science is necessary to study aspects
of science for which the traditional philosophy of science is not well euipped.%hese are the dynamic, narrati&e, historical, and lifeworld aspects of science. 'n
this light the traditional philosophy of science appears to (e a &ersion aimed at
fulfilling the cultural goal of supporting theoretical research with a strong interest
in management and control, and as a philosophy it is cropped of much of its
(acground in human life and history that is rele&ant for (roader and longer term
issues.2063
From what has (een said, the following are among the pro4ects and themes that
hermeneutic philosophy of natural science can fruitfully address and in some
cases has already (egun to address.
1. !cientific discovery, or how traditions begin, needs to (e studied in indi&idual
e)emplary cases, such as -alileo$s telescopic o(ser&ations of enus or
Heisen(erg$s uantum mechanical e)planation of the hydrogen atom. %he
appropriate philosophical approach and method is that of the $hermeneutical
circle$ as setched a(o&e
/. (eaning persistence or changeneeds to (e studied in the process of
transmission of a scientific tradition under ordinary and e)traordinary conditions
of di&erse and changing cultural and theoretical interests.2013
:. %he role of metaphor20/3 needs to (e studied metaphor is as fundamental for
the hermeneutical perspecti&e as literality is for traditional philosophies of
science. ince theory is mathematical and the lifeworld is empirical, it maes no
sense to predicate a(stract and mathematical theoretical properties literally of the
lifeworld at (est, the two come together in some unam(iguous way in a &ariety
of authoritati&e conte)ts each comprised of e)perts, guided (y 2what Aristotle
called3 $phronesis,$ and conscious that they are seeing a consensus a(out a set
of rele&ant solu(le issues. Among these authoritati&e conte)ts the scientific
discipline has a certain pri&ilege of $ownership$ it might (e called the $producer
ownership,$ others in contrast (eing $user ownership,$ though the notions of$intellectual ownership$ and $use$ as they relate to science is a matter that is not
to (e resol&ed here.
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ten*dimensional spaces, and -od$s #ind$s 5ye on ;ature ha&e all helped to shape
scientific theories. ;or is it possi(le to come to understand, say, modern physics
or (iology, without passing through stages of metaphor in the learning process.
As in the search for theory, so in its application, theoretical instruments apply to
real situations in socially negotiated ways, using metaphors.
0. )ow scientific traditions end needs to (e studied from the hermeneutic
perspecti&e. =uhn and others argue that the a(andonment of a tradition is notsimply a function of ha&ing failed the challenge of anomalies, (ut of a decision of
those who principally $own$ the tradition to mae the tradition &ulnera(le to
challenges. @esistance to such a mo&e is strong, (ecause what eeps a tradition
ali&e is usually some transcendental good it offers or some hope (eyond the
particular useful solutions it has generated. %hat good could (e mythic or
aesthetic. A mythic good is religious in nature, connected with the notion of
theory as a sharing in di&ine or transcendental nowledge203 this is the
spiritual good that -alileo, ;ewton, and 5instein sought in their science.
Alternati&ely, it could (e an aesthetic good lie the styles of art, music, and
cuisine that is connected with the fulfillment of human em(odied acti&ity in the
world this is a good associated more with la(oratory &irtuosity than with
disem(odied spirituality2003 one thins of some great e)perimenters, a Pasteur
or a Fermi, in this connection.
B. )ow myth as a grand narrative, understood as normative, metaphorical, and
metaphysical,20B3 operates in the transmission of scientific traditions needs to (e
studied in particular cases. For e)ample, the historical -alileo and today$s
physicists share something associated with the term $-alilean,$ (ut today$s
physicists are $-alilean$ more in a mythic than a historical sense.
7. !hile we do not as of a philosophy that it contri(ute to the successful practiceof science, science ne&ertheless continually throws up philosophical uestions
that di&ide the scientific community and constrain or limit its energies in a world
of finite resources. A sur&ey of recent literature2073 suggests that many currently
frustrating and contentious topics should (e looed at through the optic of
hermeneutical philosophy. ome of these are epistemological or metaphysical
framewor topics, such as, for e)ample, realism, relativism, constructivism, truth,
ob$ectivity, causality,purpose, and history, and some are issues that call for
liaison with the lifeworld, such as, for e)ample, space, locali*ation, time,measurement, data, explanation, macroscopicand microscopic, elementary
particles, multivalence of scientific claims, indeterminacy, and the paradoxes ofuantum physics.203
. ince theory*(ased technologies can change the lifeworld and the range of
possi(le meanings a&aila(le to human life and action, hermeneutical philosophy
should as in what way does a changing lifeworld change the playing field for
science, old or new+
9. cience also throws up epistemological uestions regarding interdisciplinary
studies of science communities of historians, philosophers, sociologists, cultural
anthropologists, etc. are deeply trou(led (y their ina(ility to communicate well
among themsel&es.2093 A common platform in a hermeneutic philosophy ofscience might ease this situation (y disclosing the different agendas and different
fundamental resources 2in te)ts, technologies, cultural ha(its, etc.3 that define
these disciplines in relation to the differing perspecti&es they engage in a
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postmodern lifeworld.
16. An important focus of interest for hermeneutical philosophy is the empirical
social, cogniti&e, psychological, neuro(iological, and medical sciences, where a
profusion of theoretical models &ie with each other and conflict with the way
people understand themsel&es in their own cultural practices.2B63
11.
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Feleppa, @. 21913 KHermeneutic interpretation and scientific truth,K hil. !oc. !ci., 11, 0:*B:.
Feyera(end, P. 21973 9arewell to 4eason2ondon erso3.
Fiumara, -. C. 219903 %he (etaphoric rocess& /onnections between 5anguage and 5ife2ondon and ;ew Ior @outledge3.
F4elland, @. 219913 K%he %heory*ladenness of
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JJJJJJJJ 21993 K-alileo, uther, and the Hermeneutics of ;atural cience,K in %. tapleton 2ed3, %he 0uestion of
)ermeneutics& 9estschrift for
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;elin, ". 2199B3 K!hat are the science wars all a(outGK /hronicle of )igher 2ducation, Euly /B, p. A0/, and ept. B, pp.
?B*7.
;icles, %. 219903 KPhilosophy of cience and History of cience,K siris, 10, /onstructing 3nowledge in the )istory of
!cience, 1:9*1B:.
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0.ee, for e)ample, the wor of ?. ?arnes, ". ?loor, H. Collins, #. Eaco(, ?.
atour, A. Picering, and . hapin, as well as the monumental wor of Crom(ie
21993.
B.Among the scholars in this field to whom ' implicitly refer in this paper are ;.
Cartwright, '. Hacing, #. Hesse, =. Popper, H. Putnam, !. Luine, !. ellars,
&an Fraassen, and E. Miman.
7.ee, for e)ample, how Cartwright 219:3 and 5arman 2199/3 address some of
these uestions.
.For an o&er&iew of the tradition see, for e)ample, ?leicher 2196, 19/3,
Heelan 219:aD193, =ocelmans 2199:3. %he -erman tradition is co&ered
#ueller*ollmer 21993 which contains (rief (i(liographies. ome of the (asic
wors of the authors mentioned are listed among the references.
9.Among the many e)cellent commentaries on Heidegger and the hermeneutic
tradition are ?ernasconi 2199:3, ?ucley 2199/3, "reyfus 219913, -rondin 2199,
19903, -uignon 219:3, -urwitsch 219BB3, =isiel 2199:3, =ocelmans 2190,199:3, #ueller*ollmer 21993,
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/.%he socio*cultural meaning then is not something that can (e dropped, lie
slag from ore when a metal is refined, (ut essential to the intelligi(ility of the
meaning. For an understanding of cultural meaning, see -eert8 2197:, 19:3.
/9.5mpiricist accounts of measurement are legion many of them ha&e purposes
that are not strictly philosophical (ut methodological. Philosophers of science
ha&e also written on measurement (ut mostly from the &iewpoint that empirical
measures are grounded in ideal, o(4ecti&e, in the short term uniue, and realistic&alues. For a hermeneutic &iew on measurementand data, see Heelan 2199a3.
For its (acground in Heidegger, see 2199B3, :07*:B.
:6.'n physics, these are sometimes called $preparation$ or $measurement of the
first ind$ and $o(ser&ation$ or $measurement of the second ind$ respecti&ely. ee
Heelan 219:aD193, chap. 11. and Heelan 219:(, 199a, 199/3.
:1.%his is a point also made (y Hacing 219:3 (ut from a different perspecti&e.
:/.!hat follows comes from a further e)ploration and correction of Hanson$s
Ktheory*ladenness,K and is also in part a critiue of F4elland 219913.
::.How this analysis applies to a $closed$ system, that is, one that is not
interacting with its en&ironment, needs further study. %he study of $closed$ and
$open$ systems within this conte)t in&ol&es also a study of the spaceDtime notions
of $(ody,$ e.g., a (ody$s $spatial (oundaries,$ its $si8e,$ $mass,$ $uantity,$ etc. and
how the notions of $macroscopic$ and $microscopic$ apply. ome of these ha&e
(een partially addressed in recent literature, e.g., see ;eedham 2199B3 and the
references he gi&es, (ut these studies are against a philosophical (acground that
is o(4ect* and concept*oriented. ;one of these analyses addresses satisfactorily
how the meaning of these terms relate to a (ody$s lifeworld engagement, say, in
measurement.
:.@ouse 2199B3, p. /7 and in chap. 9.
:0.For the notion of culture, cf. -eert8 2197:, 19:3.
:B.
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re&iew of the former in %he ew 4epublic, eptem(er 9 /:, 199B, $... progress
for QAmericansR means almost e)clusi&ely technological impro&ement ... ?ut all
the new tools a people master cannot assure their generous use. %echnology
tra&els a different road from political sta(ility, moral well*(eing or aesthetic
achie&ement...$ 2p. :3. ee also, "udon 2199:3, for a feminist perspecti&e. Also
Heelan 219:aD3, chap. 10.
:.uch as, for e)ample, made (y Fraassen 21963.
.%his confusion can arise from the common (ut mistaen conception that the
&alue of a theoretical &aria(le is to (e identified with the ideal or limiting &alue
o(tained (y e&er more precise measurements. uch a conception does not wor,
as =ant indicated, for any singular theoretical &alue must (e postulated a priori.
;either can it (e uniuely deri&ed inducti&ely from an empirical series. #oreo&er,
as the argument a(o&e shows, empirical data (elong to the domain of the
culturally manifested o(4ect 2the explicandum3 while the theoretical &alues (elong
to the mathematical model of the measurement process 2the explicans3.
0.For a more technical account, influenced (y -i(son 219793 and Husserl219D197:, 19763, of what constitutes a phenomenological perceptual entity,
see Heelan 219:aD19, 190, 19B, 197(3.
B.Heelan 219:aD19, 19B, 1997(3.
7.For the transformation of pu(lic space in renaissance 'taly, see Heelan
219:aD193, chap. B for other rele&ant comments, see chapter 11. Putting the
emphasis on the transformation of perception effected (y instruments, this
philosophy is $hori8onal realism$ putting the emphasis on the hermeneutical
character of the processes of disco&ery and recognition in physics, this philosophy
is $hermeneutical realism.$ ' ha&e used (oth designations. For the hermeneutic
aspect of e)perimentation, see Heelan 21970(, 19:aD19, 19:(, 199a,
199/3.
.ee Heelan 219:aD193, chaps. 16 and 1:, which is (ased on Heelan
219763. %he glosses would correct the interpretation of the language lattice in the
light of the more de&eloped doctrine of this paper. %he author intends to re&isit
this topic in another wor.
9.%he author has used conte)t logic to articulate the sense of complementarity
in the uantum theory. "ata in the empirical social sciences are also su(4ect tocomplementarity conditions, which suggests that theories of the uantum type
and conte)t logic might (e useful in the social science domain. ee Heelan 21990,
1997a3.
06.%his is the su(stance of Feyera(end$s critiue of the culture of science in
Feyera(end 21973.
01.%he recent history of science contains a wealth of material a&aila(le for this
study. Among recent pu(lications should (e noted the magisterial wor of
Crom(ie 21993.
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0:.ome (rief reflections on the limits of precision the chaos situation in physics
is an anti*Cartesian phenomenon that arises when the unlimited precision of a
theory in mapping inputs and outputs (reas down 2fails in relation to the cultural
scientific goal of control3, as when small changes in practice produce large and
uncontrolla(le outcomes. Perhaps, a lie anti*Cartesian phenomenon occurs in
dielectical discourse when unlimited clarity is pursued to a point where the o&erall
cultural point of the discourse 2(etter understandingG control o&er the discourseG3
is no longer attaina(le.