The Run-Up is CompleteBy S. V. (Steve) Dedmon, Editor in Chief

Welcome to the inaugural edition ofFlorida Aviation Law Vectors.Withoutbreak-ingmyarmpattingmyselfontheback,buttryingnonetheless, the conceptof gettingthisofftheground,sotospeak,wastotallymyidea.Thinkingaboutthat,ifthiscrashesandburnsweknowwherein theprobablecausewilllie! Asaremanyofyou,Iamamemberofvariousassociationswhichprovideanalysisof legal issuesandattendexcellentsemi-narswheremanyknowledgeablespeakerskeepusupdatedonthelatestaviationlegalissues. We also attend quality seminarswhich originate here in Florida, such asEmbry-Riddle’sAviation Law and Insur-anceSymposiumandourquarterlyaviationbar committee meetings where our ownmembershipbringrelevantandinformativepresentations.ItisthatexpertiseIhopetobringinwrittenformtothosewhoareunabletoattendourmeetingsandtoothersbothinandoutofstatewhomayhaveaninterestinaviationrelatedissuesandlaw As always, there are people to recog-nizeandthankfortheirparticipation.First,IpitchedthisideatoourpastAviationBarCommittee chair, Greg Popp, who beganto sayyesbefore Iwasable to finishmysentence.As usual his enthusiasm wasimmediateashewassendingane-mailtoour committee colleagues while we werestilldiscussingthemeritsoftheidea.Also,our present chair Elisabeth Kozlow, vicechair Harry Coe and Board liaison BrianBurgoon—whomIhope tomeetatsome

point—spoketoalltherightpeopletomake

this happen.You, the members, also got

personallyinvolvedwhichisatestimonyto

respondingtomycallforhelp.

Second,Igotthisideawhileperusingthe

standingcommitteessectionofTheFlorida

Bar’s website.The Education Committee

hasbeendoing this forquitea fewyears

andtheydoitwell.Ultimately,ifthispublica-

tionisfavorablycomparedwiththeirsIwill

consideritasuccess.Tohelpwiththelayout

anddesignofourpublicationYvonneSher-

ron,DirectorofProfessionalDevelopment

lenther talentandexpertise.Also, thanks

toConnieStewartforcontactingYvonneon

ourbehalf.

Finally,Iwanttothankinadvancethose

ofyouwhotakeyourtimeandcontributear-

ticlesyoubelievewouldbeofinteresttoour

members.Remember,whenIsayarticlesof

interest,theydonothavetobelegal,they

canbefunaviationstuff!Thisisourjournal

andalthoughacliché,itwillbeonlyasgood

asthosewhocontribute.Assuch,Iexpect

greatthings,asthequalityoflegalaviation

expertiseonourcommitteeisextensive.

Withyourhelpwewillnavigateweather

deviations,expectfurtherclearancetimes,

holdingpatterns,andwithqualityVECTORS

ultimatelyourflightintolegalairspacewillbe

rewardedwithasuccessfulconclusion.We

areclearedtoGO!

Editorial Board:

S. V. (Steve) Dedmon, Editor-in-Chief

Dan Anderson

Committee Officers:

Elisabeth DaireKozlowChair

Harry Lee Coe IVVice Chair

Brian David Burgoon Board Liaison

Florida Aviation Law Journal

A Publication of The Florida Bar Aviation Law Committee To Promote Education in the Florida Aviation Community

Volume I, Issue 1 November 2007

IN THIS ISSUE:Just In Case You Missed It ................................2

Aviation Security: Are People More Dangerous Than Bombs? .....................3

Committee to Meet in Conjunction With Florida Bar Midyear Meeting.......4

Litigating Insurance Coverage Issues Under Aircraft Liability Policies ..7

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet” – How New Noise Modeling Methodology and Noise Impact Assessment Could Affect Airports and Airlines Nationwide .....................18

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Just In Case You Missed It... AtourSeptember7,2007meetinginTampaouragendaincludedupdatesandpresentationsfromthecertificationchair of theAviation Bar Certificationcommittee, the Eilon Krugman-KadiFoundationandtheAviationLawCom-mittee Journal,aswellasguestspeak-ersKent JacksonofJackson,Wade&Blanck,LLCandDr. Richard Karl fromtheUniversityofSouthFloridaSchoolofMedicine. The certification committee reportconsisted of reviewing the standardsto take theboardcertification test in-cludingtherequiredCLEsinthepast3yearswhichmustberelatedtoavia-tionlaw.Therewasalsoadiscussionregarding teaching a review class inconjunction with the ERAUAviationLawandInsuranceSymposiumtobeheldinJanuary. ThenextupdatewasinregardstotheendowmentscholarshipatERAUinthenameofformergraduateEilon Krugman-Kadi. Greg Popp encour-aged those members who have notyetcontributedtodoso,remindingusofEilon’sfaithfulnesstothecommittee

and itsmembership.At thispoint theuniversityhasreceivedaboutone-thirdofthenecessaryfunds Steve Dedmon wasthenextupdaterastheJournalishisproject.Aprototypeof the cover page was distributed tothecommitteefortheirperusal.Therewas then a lengthy discussion aboutcontentandpossibleexpansiontoin-cludeavarietyoftopics.Thecommitteediscussedavarietyofissues;however,sincethisarticleisnowinVECTORS, fortunately the discussions regardingpublicationissuesarenowMOOT! Kent Jackson then presented“Challengesfor theCharterIndustry.”His emphasis was the relationshipbetween aircraft owners and aircraftoperatorsinPart135operations.TheFAAappearstohaveissueswithwhoexercises“operationalcontrol,”atermwhichappearstohavebroadimplica-tionsyetavaguedefinition.SomeoftheissuesofconcerntheFAAisfocusingon include non-employee pilots, air-craft/pilotscomingfromthesameentity,advertisement/booking/billing by themanagementcompanyandcertificate

franchising.Aprimary focus isonan

entity having one owner but several

managementcompanies.

Dr. Richard Karl,surgicaloncologist

professorattheUSFmedicalschool,

and contributing editor for Flying

Magazine discussedAviation Safety

MeasuresforuseinOperatingRooms,

CathLabsandEndoscopysuites.His

emphasis was essentially bringing

CRM procedures to medicine as a

meanstoreduceinstancesofsurgical

and medical mistakes. He provided

somechillingstatisticsofmedicalmal-

practice which included wrong site

operations,missingsurgicaltools,and

even instances of operating on the

wrongpatient.Throughvideoandflow

sheets he compared operating room

procedures to those required to turn

onthecoffeepotofa747,extremely

simple to complex, respectively. He

saidtheAMAdoesnotaddresstheis-

sueofsurgicalsafetymeasuresnordo

M&Mconferences.Literally,medicine

stillseesthedoctorastheDC3captain

ofold,beyondreproachandquestion.

Be a contributor to this newsletter.For more information, or to submit comments and

articles, contact Steve Dedmon at:stephen.dedmon@erau.edu

Get in on the “action!

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Aviation Security:Are People More Dangerous Than Bombs?

By Timothy M. Ravicha*

Introduction The“freedomtotravelthroughouttheUnitedStateshaslongbeenrecognizedasabasicrightundertheConstitution.”2

Airline travel particularly has becomesuchausualmodeoftravelthatmanyAmericanssimplypresumetheir free-domtoit.Infact,airlineservice,notair-linesecurity,wasthetopicthathadtheattention of transportation lawmakersthroughout the1990s.Airlinepassen-gers—amongwhomaremembersofCongress—fumedatairlineoverbook-ing practices, delays, and congestionatairports.3September11thjoltedthenation’sfocusfromservicetosecurity. IntheaftermathofSeptember11th,aviation security officials relentlesslyhunt for bad things.They continuallydevelop,contractfor,anddeployvari-ous high- and low-tech anti-terrorismmeasures,i.e.,thermalneutronanaly-sis, computerized tomography, X-raydevicesandelectromagneticradiation,tracedetectorsor“sniffers,”bomb-sniff-ingdogs,airlinepersonnelscreening,and automated passenger profiling.Terroristscontinuallyfindnewwaystothreaten commercial aviation despitethesesecuritydevices.4

OnAugust 10, 2006, British intel-ligence prevented a terrorist plot toblow up ten airplanes by detonatingcommon liquids. The United StatesTransportationSecurityAdministration(“TSA”)subsequentlybannedcarry-onitems; today, passengers may carryononly3-ounceorsmallercontainersofshampoo, toothpaste,skincreamsandthe like inazippered,one-quart,clearplasticbag.InMay2007theTSAunveiled“FIDO,”ahand-heldscannercapableofdetectingliquidexplosivesinsidesealedbottles.Whileprovidinganimportantlayerofsecurity,carry-onrestrictions and explosives-detectingequipment exemplify why profiling isnecessary to safeguard commercialaviation. Reaction-based nationalaviationsecuritypolicy focusedmyo-pically on objects instead of people

is backward-looking and flawed, “theequivalentoffightingthelastwar.”5 Profiling airline passengers shouldbeavitalpartofcommercialaviationse-curitybecausescreeningforbadpeopleis at least as important as screeningfor bad things.This article amplifiesanargumentthatreceivessurprisinglyscantpublicattention:“The‘magic’at-tributedto isolatedtechnologicalfixesmustbejettisonedinfavorofsystemsperspectives including the humanelement.”6Peoplewarrantat leastasmuchattentionasputativelydangerousobjects.7Biometric,psychometric,andsociometricprofilingfacilitatesthisreal-itybyfocusingonpeopleandtheirideasandbehaviors,notjusttheirweapons.

What is Airline Passenger Profiling? Terrorismhasalwaysshadowedcom-mercialairlinetravel.Thefirstdocument-edairlinehijackingoccurredasearlyas1931, when Peruvian revolutionariesovertook a domestic flight to distributepropaganda.Hijackerssincehaveseizedcommercialairplanestobargainfortheexchangeofpoliticalprisonersortoes-capetoaparticulardestinationlikeCuba.ThegoaloftheSeptember11thhijack-erswasdifferent,tokillAmericansandto destroy national icons of economic,military,andpoliticalpower. This shift in objective exposed er-roneous assumptions upon whichnationalaviationsecuritypolicyoper-atedfordecades.WhereastheSovietUnioncreated“things”duringtheColdWarthatcouldbeobservedandcoun-tered, a threat from non-sovereignslikealQaedaisanindefinitethreat,as“terroristsonlycreatetransactionsthatcanbesiftedfromthenoiseofeverydayactivityonlywithgreatdifficulty.”8Inthisnewcontext,airlineprofilingsystemsofferapreemptiveandforward-lookingmechanismtorelatehistoricalterroristconducttonewterroristplots. The need for airline passengerscreeningwaspresentedafterJuly17,

1996whenaBoeing747,TWAFlight800fromNewYorktoParis,explodedsoonafter it tookoff.Adefective fueltankcausedthetragedy.Initially,how-ever, government officials suspectedthe tragedy was terrorist-related.Consequently, onAugust 22, 1996,President Bill Clinton announced thecreationofthe“WhiteHouseCommis-siononAviationSafetyandSecurity.”9Thisbody,whichalsowasknownasthe“GoreCommission,”waschargedwith“develop[ing] and recommend[ing] tothePresidentastrategydesignedtoim-proveaviationsafetyandsecurity,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.”10OnFebruary17,1997,theGoreCommis-sionissuedafinalreportrecommend-ingtherevitalizationandreformulationofthe1960sAnti-AirHijackProfile. Thefirst-generationcomputerairlinepassenger profiling system to followthe Gore Commission’s report wasdeveloped by NorthwestAirlines in1996underagrant from theFederalAviationAdministration(“FAA”).Knownasthe“Computer-AssistedPassengerPre-Screening System” (“CAPPS”),thegovernment’sinitialprofilingdevicewaspresentedasa“managementtool”whosegoalwas“nottopickaneedleout of thehaystack, but tomake thehaystack smaller.”11 CAPPS collectsapproximately39piecesofpre-board-ingdataaimedatidentifyingtravelerswhoshouldbesubjectedtoheightenedsecurityprocedures.TheprecisedatathatcomposeaCAPPSprofilearenotpubliclyknown,butsomeairlinesecu-rityobserversdiscernCAPPSfocusesonspecificfeaturessuchasthemethodof payment for an airline ticket (i.e.,cashorcredit);thetimingofapurchase(i.e., immediatelybeforedepartureormuchearlier);theidentityoftravelers,including with whom, if anybody, thepassenger is traveling; theactivity atthedestination,includingwhetherthepassenger intends to rent a car; theflightitinerary,includingwheretheflightoriginatesanditsultimatedestination;thepassenger’sspecific travelplans,

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including ultimate destination whendifferentthantheflightuponwhichthetraveler is aboard; and whether theflightisroundtriporone-way. After September 11, 2001, thefederalgovernmentsought toupdateCAPPS with “CAPPS II.”This modi-fiedsystemwouldhaveauthenticatedtheidentityofcommercialairlinepas-sengersbycomparingeachtraveler’sPassengerNameRecord(“PNR”),in-cludingfullname,homeaddress,tele-phonenumberanddateofbirth,againstgovernmental databases for securityassessment. CAPPS II would bridgelawenforcementandintelligencedata-bases.“CAPPSIIwouldhavenotifiedlaw-enforcementofficialswheneverthescreeningprocessturneduppassen-gerswithoutstandingwarrantsagainstthem,evenfornon-travel-relatedinci-dents.”12Controversially,then,CAPPSIIexploitedcommercialdatabasesforcounterterrorismpurposes. TodefeatCAPPSII,civillibertyandprivacy proponents publicized opera-tionalfailuresofCAPPSI.Theynotedthatprofilingoutsideoftheaviationare-nahadbeenunsuccessful,forinstance,the United States Customs Servicehasnotstoppedthedrugtradeusingprofiling.13Profilingsystemcriticsalsopublicizedthehighriskof“falsenega-tives,”wherecrucialpeopleoreventsaremissed.Forexample,inSeptember2004,BritishpopstarCatStevens(whobecame a Muslim in the 1970s andis known today asYusuf Islam) wasremoved from an international flightbound for theUnitedStatesbecausehis name was on the government’s“No-Fly” list.14 CAPPS I also identi-fiedUnitedStatesSenatorEdwardM.Kennedy(D-Mass.)andUnitedStates

RepresentativeDonYoung(R-Alaska)for extra security scrutiny. Finally,CAPPS critics cautioned against thedissemination of CAPPS profiles toothergovernmentalagencies forpur-posesunrelatedtoterrorismoraviationsecurity, so-called “mission creep.”Theefforttoroll-outCAPPSIIwassetbackbythesecriticisms,andultimatelywasdefeatedwhenitwaslearnedthatsomeairlinesvoluntarilyprovidedtheTSAwithlistsoftheirrespectivepas-sengers for testing in the CAPPS IIsystem–withouttheconsentofthosepassengers.15 The TSA abandonedCAPPSIIonJuly13,2004,after theUnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOf-ficereportedthattheTSAfailedtomeetrelatedprivacyconcerns. TheTSAfolloweditsabortedCAPPSIIprogramwith“SecureFlight,”inAu-gust,2004.SecureFlightwasintendedto improve government “No-Fly” and“automatic selectee” lists by reduc-ing the number of domestic airlinepassengers pulled aside for morerigorous screening. More specifically,Secure Flight would shift passengerpre-screeningresponsibilitiesfromtheprivatizedairlinestothefederalgovern-ment.TotestSecureFlight,therefore,theTSAorderedmorethan70domesticairlinestosubmitPNRsforthemonthof June,2004.Thedata theTSA re-quested“varie[d]fromairlinetoairline...andmayalso[have]include[d]thenamesofotherstravelinginthesameparty, meal preference, whether thereservationwaschanged,themethodofpaymentandcommentsofalltypesby airline employees on matters likewhether a passenger was drunk orbelligerent.”16This prompted privacyadvocates to contend Secure Flight

wasmoreinvasivethanCAPPSII. On September 19, 2005, SecureFlightwasdealtaserioussetbackastheAviation SecurityAdvisory Committeeforwarded a report of a nine-memberpanel of security and privacy experts(i.e., Secure Flight Working Group) totheTSA,withoutrecommendation,stat-ing: “First and foremost,TSA has notarticulated what the specific goals ofSecureFlightare.Basedonthelimitedtestresultspresentedtous,wecannotassesswhethereven thegeneral goalof evaluating passengers for the riskthey represent toaviationsecurity isarealisticorfeasibleoneorhowTSApro-posestoachieveit.”17TheseandotherunresolvedconcernsabouttheintentandarchitectureofSecureFlightdoomedtheprogramin2006.However,theDepart-mentofHomelandSecurityisworkingtoreducemistakes,protectprivacyrights,andachievereliabilityinordertoreleasearevampedformofSecureFlightsome-timebetween2008and2010.

Is Common Sense Illegal? Inarguably, profiling requires dis-crimination. Both “profiling” and “dis-crimination” have acquired strongnegative connotations.18Yet, profilinganddiscriminationarecommon,lawfulfeatures of economic life inAmericatoday.Thisissobecauseofthecom-moditization of personal information.Banks and supermarkets have longusedprofilingasmarketingandstra-tegicplanningtools.Businessestodaysegmenttheircustomersonthebasisof buyinghabits andpatterns,wherefrequentcustomersearnbenefitssuchasgiftcardsorgiveaways.Airlinescer-tainlyprofileandcategorizetheircus-tomers throughcomputer reservation

Committee to Meet in Conjunction With Florida Bar Midyear MeetingThe next meeting of the Aviation Law Committee will be Friday January 18, 2008 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, in downtown Miami, from 2:00 - 6:00 p.m.

Aviation Security

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andyieldmanagementsystems,alongwith frequent flyer reward programs.Instateandfederalcourtsacrossthenation, too, lawyers profile potentialjurorsduringvoir direanddoingsoisanimportantandlegitimatepartofthejudicial process. (Of course, lawyersmay profile potential jurors on thecondition theydonotdiscriminateonthebasisof race,color, religion,sex,nationaloriginoreconomicstatus.19)Inthemarketplaceandinthecourtroom,then,profilingcanberationalconductand discrimination can entail nothingmore than differentiating individualsonpermissiblegroundsforappropriateends. Likeprofilinganddiscrimination,sur-veillanceisanactivitywhoseconnota-tionandlegitimacyarecontextbased.From its founding, the United Statesgovernmenthassurveilleditsownciti-zensinresponsetoexternalthreats,al-ternativelyjustifyingitsactionsaseithercareorcontrol.In1798,forexample,CongresspassedtheAlienandSedi-tionActs,whichallowedPresidentJohnAdamstodeportnon-citizensidentifiedasthreatstothecountry,withoutdueprocessofthelaw.20Later,duringtheCivilWar,PresidentAbrahamLincolnsuspendedthewritofhabeascorpuson eight occasions; and, in 1875, inTotten v. United States, the UnitedStates Supreme Court upheld Presi-dentLincoln’sauthoritytoenterintoacontractwithaprivatecitizentospyonConfederatetroops.21 In1917,duringWorldWar I, federalauthoritiespros-ecutedopponentstothewarundertheEspionageAct.22Most infamously,onFebruary19,1942,PresidentFranklinD.RooseveltauthorizedtheintermentofJapaneseAmericanstodesignatedmilitaryareas,adecisionupheldbythenowdisgraceddecisionofKorematsu v. United States.23The legacyof “us-against-them” domestic and foreignpolicybringsintofocusthebroadques-tionwhether legitimateendssuchasnational security are justified by anymeans,includingthedeprivationofcivillibertiesandotherrightsforparticulargroupsofpeople.The topicofairlinepassengerprofilingencapsulates thisanalytictension,touchinguponthenar-

rower,disturbingquestionofwhetherreasonandracismaresymbiontsandnotmutuallyexclusivewhenitcomestoprotectingcommercialaviationfromterrorism. AmericansresistedprofilingbeforeSeptember11th,butlaterwelcomeditasacommonsensesolutiontoavia-tion terrorism.Followingthe thwartedliquid-bomb plot ofAugust 10, 2006,moreover,theWall Street Journalcriti-cizedtheTSA’srefusaltousereligiousorethnicfactorsasevenminorfactorsinscreening:

Nobodyissuggestingusingeth-nicityorreligionastheonly–oreventheprimary–factorsinpro-filingterrorists.Butitalsomakesno sense to take zero accountofthefactthateverysuicideat-tackagainstU.S.aviationtodatehasbeenperpetratedbymenofMuslimorigin.WhilealQaedaisno doubt seeking recruits whodon’t obviously display suchcharacteristics,thatdoesn’tmeanwe should ignore the likeliestcandidates...

The lawon this issettled,and in theotherdirection.Onmultipleoccasionsthe federal courts have upheld pro-gramsthattreatgroupsdifferentlywhena “compelling” public interest can beidentified: affirmative action, minorityset-asides, composition of Congres-sionaldistricts,and theall-maledrafthave all met that legal test.Yet thesamepeoplewhoallocatejobs,federalcontracts and college admissions byraceorethnicityobjecttousingthemmerelyasonefactorindecidingwhomtoinconvenienceforafewminutesatan airline checkpoint. Surely aviationsecurityisafarmorecompellingpublicinterest than theallocationof federalset-asides.24

Profilingproponentsdonotdiscountthe Constitution. Rather, they arguethatcommonsenseisnotinconsistentwith the Constitution. Yet, equatingArabs,MiddleEasterners,Muslims,oranyothergroupwithterrorismisinequi-tableandcontrarytolaw.Sociologically,too, marginalizing passengers alongdemographiclinesignoresthefactthatpassengers selected for heightened

screening probably are law abidingcitizensposingnothreattoanyfacetofsociety.Inthisrespect,someobserv-ersofaviationsecuritypolicyperceiveairlinepassengerprofilingtobeovertlyracist,where“flyingwhilebrown”and“flyingwhileArab”isasriskyanactivityas“drivingwhileblack.”25

Profilingintermsofethnicity,politicalagenda, race and/or religious affilia-tionislogical.26Aviationsecuritypolicymakers must imagine precedentedand unprecedented threats from allpassengers, not least of whom arepassengerswhosebackgroundfitswiththosewhohaveterrorizedcommercialairline travel historically.The federalgovernment’s systematic targeting ofa substantial subset of its population(i.e.,airlinepassengers)nodoubtchal-lengesidealsexpressedintheConsti-tutionandtheBillofRightsparticularly.Therefore, the paramount questionsforaviationsecuritypolicymakersarewhetherandhowitispossibletobal-ance— not exchange— airline safetywithcivilliberties.Thesequestionsarelikelytoendureaslongasanyterroristthreattocommercialaviationpersists.

Conclusion Privacy,liberty,andsecuritypropo-nentsareequallyblameworthyinpre-sentingtheirargumentsfororagainstairlinepassengerprofilingsystems inabsolute terms.Thestartingpoint formany libertarians and privacy advo-catesisBenjaminFranklin’suncompro-misingstatementin1759that“[t]hosewho would give up essential libertyto purchase a little temporary safetydeserve neither liberty nor safety.”27Oppositely,onewell-knownairlineCEOgavethisultimatum:“Youwanttotravelontheairlinesystem?Yougiveupyourprivacy.Youdon’twanttogiveupyourprivacy? Don’t fly.Your privacy isn’tequaltothesafetyoftherestofus.”28Whereemotionsrunhigh,sometimesitisbestjusttorelatefacts:Tenofthe19September11thhijackerswereidenti-fiedforfurthersecurityscreeningbyacomputerpassengerprofilingsystem.29Howthisdatawasmanagedbyhumanbeingsisanothermatter.

Aviation Security

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Endnotes:1 * Theauthor,aMiami,Floridacommercialtrial lawyerandAdjunctProfessorofAviationLawat theUniversityofMiamiSchoolofLaw,welcomescommentsat ravicht@bellsouth.net.ThisarticleexcerptsTimothyM.Ravich,Is Airline Passenger Profiling Necessary?,62U.MIAMIL.REV.(forthcoming2007).2 UnitedStatesv.Guest,383U.S.757,758(1966).3 See,e.g.,TimothyM.Ravich,Re-Regula-tion and Airline Passengers’ Rights,67J.AIRL.&COM.935(2002).ToreviewongoingfederaleffortstolegislateairlineserviceseeAirlinePas-sengerBillofRightsActof2007,S.678,110thCong.(2007)andAirlinePassengerBillofRightsActof2007,H.R.1303,110thCong.(2007).4 A recentexampleof terrorismbypeopleconsideredtobecaregiversoccurredonJune30,2007,whenseveralphysiciansputintoactionaplottodriveapropane-laden,suicidecar-bombintothearrivalterminalattheairportinGlasgow,Scotland.See, e.g.,AditiKhannaetal.,Doctors of Terror, INDIATODAY,July16,2007,at40;OlgaCraig,‘The People Who Cure You Will Kill You,’SUNDAYTELEGRAPH(London),July8,2007,at20.5 ShaunWaterman&JessicaTaylor,Analysis: TSA Liquid Ban to Continue (Aug.14,2006),

available at http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerror-ism/view.php?StoryID=20060813-060440-5694r.See also MichaelA.Hiltzik,How Did U.S. Airport Security Break Down?L.A.TIMES,Sept.23,2001,atA1(“Forthreedecades,[aviationsecu-rity]hasbeenpreoccupiedwithlookingforgunsandexplosivesratherthanfordangerouspeople....U.S.Securityeffortsaimtocatchthebomb,ElAl’sistocatchthebomber.”).6 Outline on Status of Post-9/11 Aviation Se-curity Initiatives,INT’LBULL.POL.PSYCHOL.,May3,2002,http://security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&article_volume=12&article_issue=16&article_title=Special%20Article%3A%20Outline%20on%20Status%20of%20Post-9%2F11%20Aviation%20Security%20Initiatives%2C%20Part%20I.7 Theargumenttoscrutinizeairlinepassengerbehaviorthroughprofilingorotherwiseisnotanargumentfordiminishedscreeningofdangerousobjects. In thisvein, theTransportationSecu-rityAdministration’sdecision todiscontinue itsprohibitionofbutanelightersasacarry-onitem(effectiveAugust4,2007)ispuzzling.See, e.g.,MichaelJ.Sniffen,TSA Eases Carry-On Rules for Lighters, Breast Milk,ORLANDOSENTINEL,July21,2007,atA7.8 See PaulRosenzweig,Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism,42DUQ.L.REV.663,679(2004).9 E.g.,WHITEHOUSECOMMISSIONON

AVIATION SAFETYAND SECURITY, FINALREPORT (1997),available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html.10ExecutiveOrder13,015,61Fed.Reg.43,937(1996).11 BillDedman,FAA Looking to Expand Sys-tem,BOSTONGLOBE,Oct.12,2001,atA27.12 TSA Extends Registered Traveler Program to Reagan National, CMPTECHWEB,Sept.3,2004,at2004WL64587874.13 See, e.g., GregoryT.Nojeim,Aviation Se-curity Profiling and Passengers’ Civil Liberties,13-SUM.AIR&SPACEL.3,4(1998).14 SomeairlinepassengershavechallengedtheNo-Flylist(unsuccessfully)infederalcourt.See,e.g.,Gilmorev.Gonzales,435F.3d1125(9thCir.2006).15 See, e.g.,InreJetblueAirwaysCorp.PrivacyLitigation,379F.Supp.2d299(E.D.N.Y.2005).16 MatthewWald,U.S. Airlines Forced to Give Data on Travelers for Antiterror Screen, INT’LHERALDTRIB.(Paris),Sept.23,2004,at1.17 REPORTOFTHESECUREFLIGHTWORK-INGGROUP,Sept.19,2005,at5.18 E.g.,BenWinograd, ‘Profiling’ Not a Dirty Word in Israel,REC.,May10,2007,atA21.19 See, e.g.,28U.S.C.§§1862,1870.See, e.g.,Batsonv.Kentucky,476U.S.79 (1986)(making illegal patternorpreemptory strikesexercisedagainstminorities).20 SeeAnActConcerningEnemyAliens,5thCong.,2dSess.,1Stat.577-78(theAliensActs);AnAct for thePunishmentofCertainCrimesagainsttheUnitedStates,5thCong.,2dSess.,1Stat.596-97(theSeditionAct).21 92U.S.105,106(1875).22 ActofJune15,1917,40Stat.228-30(codi-fiedat18U.S.C.§§611-33(1925)).23 323U.S.214(1944).24 The ‘Profiling’ Debate,WALLST.J.,Aug.19,2006,atA10.25 See e.g.,EllenBaker,Flying While Arab - Ra-cial Profiling and Air Travel Security,67J.AIRL.&COM.1375(2002);CharuA.Chandrasekhar,Comment, Flying while Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10ASIANL.J.215(2003).26 See, e.g.,R.RichardBanks,Racial Profil-ing and Antiterrorism Efforts,89CORNELLL.REV.1201(2004);StephenJ.Ellmann,Racial Profiling and Terrorism,46N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV.675(2002-2003);R.SpencerMacDonald,Note,Rational Profiling in America’s Airports,17BYUJ.PUB.L.113-138(2002);DavidA.Harris,Racial Profiling Revisited: “Just Common Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?,17CRIM.JUST.36(2002);JohnDerbyshire,In Defense of Racial Profiling,53NAT’LREV.38-41(2001).27 6THEPAPERSOFBENJAMINFRANKLIN242(LeonardW.Labareeed.,1963).28 Robert L. Crandall, Airline Security and Economic Symposium – Freedom Versus Fear: The Future of Air Travel,67J.AIRL.&COM.1,19(2002).ac See 9/11COMMISSIONREPORT;FINALREPORTOFTHENATIONALCOMMISSIONONTERRORISTATTACKSUPONTHEUNITEDSTATES451n.2(2004)(Authorizededition).

Aviation Security

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Litigating Insurance Coverage IssuesUnder Aircraft Liability Policies

By James B. Denman*

This article was presented at the Aviation Law and Insurance Sympo-sium at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida in January, 2000.

Ananalysisandevaluationofacov-eragedefenseassertedbyanaviationinsurershouldbeginwithanexaminationofthepolicylanguageasawholeinclud-ing the declarations, insuring agree-ments,exclusions,limitations,conditionsand sometimes definitions togetherwith the circumstances surrounding aparticular lossresulting inbodily injuryand/or property damage.Themateriallanguageoftheinsuringagreementandcircumstancessurroundingalossshouldbeexaminedinlightofestablishedrulesofconstructionandinterpretationandtheapplicablelaw.

I. Applicable Law. The law of theplace where a contract of insurancewasenteredintogovernsitsconstruc-tion. Florida will apply its own lawsto interpret insurance policies whichare purchased and delivered in thisstate.1II. Construction and Interpretation of the Aviation Insurance Policy.

A.Plain Meaning Rule - Undefinedtermsinaliabilitypolicyaretobecon-strued inaccordancewith theirplain,ordinary, popular and natural mean-ing.2 In Insurance Company of North America v. Maurer, 505S.W.2d931(Tex. Civ.App. 1974) the Court con-cluded that thephrase“valid pilot’s certificate” since it was singular,referred only to one certificate, thisbeingthepilot’scertificateandnotthemedicalcertificatewhichhadexpired.Theadditionalphrase“asrequiredbythe FederalAviationAdministration”the Court concluded simply requiredthepilothaveavalidpilot’scertificateasrequiredbytheFAA.Thelackofacurrent medical certificate was foundnot to preclude coverage under thislanguage.

Similarly, inFireman’s Fund Insur-ance Company v. McDaniel, 18 F.Supp.614(Dist.Ct.Miss.1960),affd289F.2d926(5thCir.1960)thetype-writtenprovision inanaircraft liabilitypolicy providing that the persons au-thorizedtooperatetheinsuredaircraftin flight included “T. H. McDaniel oranycurrentlycertifiedcommercialpilothavingaminimumof500loggedsoloflyinghoursincludingatleast50hoursasfirstpilotofmulti-engineaircraft”wasfoundtomeanthatMcDanielcouldpilottheaircraftinflight,withorwithoutpas-sengersaboard,andthatthecoveragewouldthenbeineffect,whetherhewascertificatedorratedasapilotornot.

B.Typewritten vs. Printed Provisions-Whenthereexistsaconflictbetweenprintedprovisionsandtypewrittenpro-visions,thetypewrittenprovisionsmusttakeprecedenceandsupersedecon-flictingprintedmaterialinthepolicy.3 1. Typewritten provisions con-tained in a rider or a typewrittenendorsement to an aircraft liabilitypolicyhasbeenfoundtoprevailoverconflictingpilotcertificationprovisionsinthemainprintedbodyofthepolicy. InLeBlanc v. American Employers Insurance Company, 155 F.2d 969(5thCir.1946)theprintedpolicyprovi-sionsprovidedthattheaircraftshouldbe operated only by instructor pilotsintheemployoftheinsuredwhoheldcommercialpilotcertificates.However,ariderattachedtothepolicyprovidedtheinsuranceshouldapplyonlywhiletheaircraftwasoperatedforpurposesincidental to and in accordance withrequirementsofthecivilianpilottrainingprogrambyaflightinstructororastu-dentnamedinanattachedschedule.Thepilotoftheaircraftwaskilledwhileflyingtheinsured’sairplanebutwasnotoneofthepilotsapprovedintheriderandtheaircraftwasnotbeingoperatedfor purposes incidental to the civilianpilottrainingprogram.TheCourtstatedinfindingnocoveragethateveniftheprintedprovisionsofthepolicyafforded

coverage,itwouldbeindirectconflictwiththetypewrittenriderprovisions,inwhichevent,theriderprovisionswouldprevailandsupersedetheprintedprovi-sionsofthepolicy.4

C.Strict Interpretation in Favor of Insured and Against the Insurer-Aircraft insurance policies will beinterpretedinfavoroftheinsuredandagainsttheinsurertogiveeffecttothebroadpurposesofthepolicytoaffordcoveragewhenthiscanbedonewith-outdoingviolencetothelanguageofthepolicy.5By failing todefine termsortoincludeanyadditionalqualifyingor exclusionary language, an insurermaynotsuccessfullyinsistuponanar-rowandrestrictiveinterpretationofthecoverageprovided.6

D.Policy to Be Read as a Whole-Aprovision in an aircraft liability policydefiningtheword“insured”hadtobereadinconnectionwithotherportionsofthepolicy,includingthepilotexclusionclause.7

E.Irreconcilable and Inconsistent Provisions of an Insurance Policy Will Result in a Construction Fa-voring the Most Coverage -Whereseparateprovisionsofapolicyareirrec-oncilableandinconsistent,theCourtswilladopttheconstructionofthepolicywhichprovidesthemostcoverage.8

F. Ambiguous Terms Are Construed Against the Insured - In construingpoliciesofaircraftinsurance,thegen-eral rule is applicable that doubts astocoveragedue toambiguouspolicyprovisionsaretobeconstruedagainstthe insurer who drew the contract orchose the language used.9Althoughambiguitiesshouldberesolvedagainstthe insurer, thisprincipleonlyapplieswhenthereexistsagenuineinconsis-tency,uncertaintyorambiguityinmean-ingafterresorttotheordinaryrulesofconstruction.10

1.Ambiguity Defined-Anambiguityexists only when the language of an

�

insurancepolicymakesitsusceptibletotwodifferent,reasonableinterpreta-tions, one resulting in coverage, andoneresultinginnocoverage.Aninsur-ancepolicy is not ambiguousmerelybecausesomeanalysisisrequiredinordertointerpretit.

2.Parol Evidence Admissible -Parolevidence isadmissible inordertochange,addtoorsubtractfromaninsurancepolicyoraffectitsconstruc-tion where the writing is ambiguous,uncertainordoesnotshowan intentto embody the complete agreementbetweentheparties.11

3.Agent’s Interpretation-Ifthetermsoftheinsurancepolicyareambiguous,the insurermaybeestoppedtodenythecorrectnessofaninterpretationputuponthepolicybytheinsurer’sgeneralagent.

III.The Causal Connection Test(A Method of Defeating a Denial of Coverage) -The Issue Doesthelackofacausalconnectionbetween a breach of a “policy provi-sion”(exclusion,condition,declarationand/orwarranty)andalosspreventanaircraftinsurerfromsuccessfullydeny-ingcoveragebaseduponthebreach?

A.Introduction-Aircraft Accidents Rarely Occur Without Either the Pilot or Aircraft Itself Being in Violation of the FARs- The FederalAviationAdministration(FAA)haspromulgateda broad and comprehensive array ofrules and procedures which governthe certification, maintenance, andoperation of aircraft called FederalAviationRegulations.Agreatnumberoftheseregulationsaresafety-oriented.Aviationinsurancepolicieshavelargelyincorporated one or more provisionsthat exclude coverage if the aircraftisbeingoperatedinviolationoftheseFARs.Therefore,aircraftaccidentsareunlikelytooccurwithouteitherthepilotor theaircraft being in violationof atleastoneormoreoftheseFARs.

B.If Loss Causally Related to Breach of Policy Provision - No Coverage-Iftheaircraft related lossor lossesarecausally related to a violation of the

FARsandbreachofapolicyprovisionthe causal connection test does notbecomeanissuetoattempttodefeattheinsurer’scoveragedefense.

C.The Problem-If the Aircraft Loss is Not Causally Related to a Breach of a Policy Provision, Many Courts Refuse to Enforce The Insurer’s Cov-erage Defense - Very frequently anaircraftlosshasnocausalrelationshiptotheFederalAviationRegulationsandpolicyprovisionallegedtohavebeenbreached.Courtshavebeenreluctanttoenforcesuchpolicyprovisionsandtherefore to deny coverage, oftenfinding it unfair or unconscionable to do so on public policy grounds.Therefore,inmanyjurisdictionsithasbeenheldthattheremustbeacausalrelationshipbetweenthebreachofthepolicyprovisionandtheaccident.Thishasoccurredintwoways.First,appel-latecourtshaveimposedbycase lawthecausalconnectionrequirement todefeatadenialofcoverageforatechni-calbreachofaircraftpolicyprovisions.Second,antitechnical statuteshavebeenpassed insomestatesseekingtoprevent insurancecompaniesfromavoidingcoveragebasedonatechnicalpolicyviolationorviolationofaFederalAviation Regulation (FAR) which didnotcauseorcontributetocausingtheaccident.

1.Causal Relationship Required by Case Law-Manycasesrequireproofofacausallinkbetweenthebreachofthepolicyprovisionreliedupontodenycoverage and the accident. Most ofthesecasesutilizethesamereasoningthatitwouldbeunfair or unconscio-nable and therefore against public policy to enforce a policy provisiontodenycoveragewhenthebreachofthatpolicyprovisiondidnotcauseorcontribute to causing an aircraft ac-cident.Thisviewhasbeenreferredtoasthemodern trendalthoughthereisaclearsplitofauthoritybetweenthosecasesapplyingthecausalconnectiontesttoavoidacoveragedefenseandthose cases that do not apply it.12Acausalconnectionhasbeen requiredtopreventadenialofcoveragewhenthe following typeofbreachofpolicy

provisionswasinvolved:

a. Invalid Airworthiness Certifi-cate (Annual Inspection)-Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance,678S.W.2d936(Tex.1984) holding that the insurercould not use the lack of a requiredannual inspection to deny coverageunlessitwascausallyconnectedtotheloss.

b.Invalid Medical Certificate–SeeGlades Flying Club v. Americas Aviation and Marine Insurance Company,235So.2d18(Fla.3rdDCA1970).13Casesrequiring a causal connection beforetheinsurercandenycoverageincludeBayers v. Omni Aviation Managers,510F.Supp.1204(D.Mont.1981),Avemco v. Chung, 388 F. Supp.142 (D. Haw.1975),andSouth Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C.1977).

c. Breach of Pilot Warranty – InAmerican States Insurance Company v. Bylerly Aviation, Inc.,456F.Supp.967(S.D.Ill.1978)thecourtheldtheinsurercouldnotdenycoverageeventhoughanunnamedpilotflewtheair-craftabsentashowingthatthebreachcontributed to the loss. In Firemans Fund Insurance Company v. McDaniel,187 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Miss 1960),Aff’d289F.2d926(5thCir.1961)theinsurercouldnotdenycoverageduetotheinsured’sfailuretohaveapilot’slicenseabsentashowing that itcon-tributedtotheloss.

2.Causal Relationship Required by Statute -Aviation insurance policiesgenerally include one or more provi-sions which exclude coverage if theaircraft is being operated in violationof the FederalAviation Regulations.However,thegovernmentregulationsaresocomprehensive that it isprob-ably impossible for an accident tooccur without the pilot of the aircrafthavingallegedlyviolatedoneormoreof theFederalAviationRegulations.14Inresponsetothis,somestateshavepassedantitechnical statuteswhichseektopreventinsurancecompaniesfromavoidingcoveragebasedontech-nical violations of “policy provisions”and/or federal regulations.The stat-

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utesgenerallyprovidethatinorderforcoveragetobesuspendedbasedonabreachofapolicyprovision,theremustbeacausal relationshipbetween thebreachand theaccident.Floridahassuchastatute.15The followingcasesrequiredacausalconnectionbetweenthebreachofthepolicyprovisionandthelossbasedupontheapplicationofanantitechnicalstatute:

a.Lack of Airworthiness-Pickett v. Woods,404So.2d1152(Fla.5thDCA1981) applied Florida’s antitechnicalstatute,§627.409(2)andheld(1)thatit was applicable to an aircraft liabil-ity insurancepolicy,(2) that theword“provision”inthestatutewasintendedto include any material provision ofthepolicyand(3)thatapriordecisiondecided before the enactment of thestatuterequirednocausalconnectionbetweenthebreachofthepolicyprovi-sionandtheloss,wassupersededbyFlorida’santitechnicalstatute.16

b. Antitechnical Statute Can-not be Utilized to Created Coverage Where None Existed in the First Place - In the case of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Sunray Airline, Inc.,543So.2d1309(Fla.5thDCA1989)Unitedbroughtadeclara-toryjudgmentactionseekingadeclara-tionthattheinsurancepolicyinsuringSunray which provided through anendorsementtothepolicythatitdid notcover turbine powered aircraft.Theinsuredairplanecrashedasaresultoffuelstarvationandtheaffidavitsoftheinsured’sexpertsopinedthat thefuelstarvation was caused by pilot errorand would have occurred under thesamecircumstancesregardlessoftheturbinepowerednatureoftheaircraft’sengines. United urged the Fifth District torecede from Pickett v. Woods17 andespecially from its holding that Fla.Stat. §627.409(2) applies to aviationinsurance policies. In refusing to ad-dress that issue, the Court held thatthe causalconnection requirement will not serve to extend or create coverage where none existed in the first place. In distinguishing Pickett,theCourtinSunray,characterizedthe

operativeprovisioninPickettprohibit-ingtheoperationoftheinsuredaircraftwhile itsairworthinesscertificatewasnotinfullforceandeffectasacondi-tion subsequent.TheCourtcharacter-izedtheprovisionintheSunraycaseasanexclusion.TheCourtstatedinpartasfollows:

“Clauses which provide that apolicy shall become void or itsoperationdefeatedorsuspended,or the insurerrelievedwhollyorpartially from liability upon the happening of some event, or the doing or omission to do some act, are not conditionsprecedent,butconditionssubse-quentandaremattersofdefensetobepleadedandprovedbytheinsurer.A condition subsequentis to be distinguished from anexclusionfromthecoverage;the breach of the former is to termi-nate or suspend the insurance while the effect of the latter is to declare that there never was insurance with respect to the excluded risk.”

Inexplainingitsholdinganddistin-guishingPickett theCourt held therewasno“technicalomission”sincetheaircraft was never insured under thepolicy and the Court saw nothing inPickettnorintheantitechnicalstatutewhich indicated an intent to supplycoveragewherenoneexistedpriortothelossinquestion.Thecourtwentontoexplainasfollows:

“Wedonotbelievethatthelegis-latureintended,bytheenactmentof§627.409(2),togiveaninsuredcoveragewhichisexpresslyex-cludedfromthepolicyortoresur-rectcoverageunderapolicyoranendorsementwhichisnolongerineffectsimplybecauseaninsurerfailstocomplywiththetermsoftheaforementionedstatute.”

C.If Aircraft Loss Was Not Casually Related to A Breach of A “Policy Provision” (Insurer’s Coverage De-fense) Many Courts Will Still Enforce the Provision and Deny Coverage - Many courts have agreed that acausal link between the breach andtheaccidentneednotbeprovenwhere

there is a clear breach of a specificandunambiguouspolicyprovisionthatvoidscoverage.1.Lack of Airworthiness -O’Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Company, 661P.2d1181,Aff’d,enbanc696P.2d282 (Colo. 1982) held that since theaircraft involved in the accident hadnot received its annual inspection, itwasoperatedinviolationofthetermsof its airworthiness certificate andwithin an exclusion in the insurancepolicy rendering the insurance policyinapplicableeventhoughtherewasnocausalrelationshipbetweenthefailuretoinspectandtheaccident.18In Hol-lywood Flying Service, Inc. v. Compass Insurance Company,597F.2d507(5thCir.1979)theCourtinapplyingFloridalawheldthatapolicyexclusionforanaircraftwhoseairworthinesscertificatewasnotinfullforceandeffectappliedeventhoughtherewasnoshowingofacausallinkbetweenthelackofavalidairworthiness certificate and the lossof the aircraft.19 In Security Mutual Casualty Company v. O’Brien,99N.M.638,662P.2d639(N.M.1983)itwasheld the lack of a causal connectionbetween the breach of an insurancepolicyexclusionrequiringacurrentair-worthinesscertificateandanaccidentdidnotprecludedenialofcoverage. Similarly,inOchs v. Avemco Insur-ance Company, 54 OrApp 768, 636P.2d421 (Or.1981), itwasheld thatno causal connection between theaircraft accident and the policy ex-clusion requiring a valid and currentairworthinesscertificatewas requiredto invalidate coverage. The policylanguage excluded coverage for anyaircraft in flightwhichdidnothaveavalidandcurrentlyeffectiveairworthi-nesscertificate.

2.Lack of Valid and Current Medical Certificate-InGlades Flying Club v. Americas Aviation and Marine Insur-ance Company, 235 So.2d 18 (Fla.3rd DCA 1970) it was held that thepilot’sfailuretohaveacurrentmedicalcertificate as required by the insur-ancepolicy, resulted inasuspensionofcoverageeventhoughtherewasnocausalrelationshipbetweenthelackof

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medicalcertificateandtheloss.20

TheCourtheld:

“An aircraft insurance policymay validly condition liabilitycoverage on compliance with agovernmental regulation and,while noncompliance with sucharegulationcontinues,theinsur-ance is suspended as if it hadneverbeeninforce.Thereneedbenocausalconnectionbetweenthenoncomplianceandthelossorinjury.”

Other decisions holding similarlyinclude:

Grigsby v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company,113Ga.App.572,148S.E.2d925 (Ga.1966);Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Company,204N.W.2d 162 (1973); Baker v. Insurance Company of North America,179S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1971); Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co.,540N.W.2d644(S.D.1995);National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Estate of Meyer,237Cal.Rptr.632(Cal.Ct.App.1987);andSecurity Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246(Ariz.1988).

3. Improper or Illegal Use of Aircraft-ItwasheldinGlobe Indemnity Com-pany v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895 (8thCir. 1956) that the use of an aircraftfor aerobatics within the insurancepolicy’sexclusionvoidedtheinsurancecoverage.The Hanson Court furtherheld the excluded use need not bethecauseofthelossfortheinsurancecompany to successfully deny insur-ancecoverage. Theoperationofanaircraft foranunlawful purposewithin thepolicy’s exclusion clause prohibiting aero-batics served to suspend the policyas if ithadneverbeen in forceeventhoughtherewasnocausalconnectionbetween the breach of the exclusionclauseandtheaccident.21 In Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company v. Bright, 106 CalApp 3rd282, (4thDist. 1980) it was apparentfrom the crash site that the aircrafthadbeen used to illegally smuggle

marijuanaintotheUnitedStatesfromMexicoinviolationofanexclusionaryclauseprohibitingunlawful useoftheaircraft.TheCourtheldthattheinsurercould lawfully limit its liability by ex-cludingcertainrisksandhazardsfromcoverage and that while the insuredwas engaged in excluded conduct,coveragewassuspended.TheCourtfurtherheldthattheinsurerdidnotneedtoshowacausalconnectionbetweentheforbiddenconductandtheresultinglosstosuccessfullyavoidliabilityunderthepolicy.

4.Conversion - InGelder v. Puritan Insurance Company, 100 N.M. 240,668P.2d1117(N.M.1983) theCourtupheldthegrantingofasummaryjudg-mentinfavoroftheinsurerholdingthatnocoveragewasaffordedwhere thepolicycontainedaprovisionexcludingcoverageforconversioneventhoughtheconversionoftheaircrafthadnoth-ingtodowiththeaccident.

5.Pilots Other Than Named Pilots-InRoberts v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London,195F.Supp.168theCourtgrantedtheinsurancecompany’ssum-maryjudgmentbasedonexclusioninthe aircraft insurance policy statingthatthe policy did not apply unless the aircraft was piloted by certain named pilots.TheCourtheldthattheinsurancecompanywasnot requiredtoshowacausalconnectionbetweentheexclusionandtheresultinglosstosuccessfullyavoidcoverage.

a.Inaffirmingasummaryjudgmentfortheinsurancecompanyandappar-entlyapplyingFloridalaw,theCourtinElectron Machine Corporation v. Ameri-can Mercury Insurance Company,297F.2d212(5thCir.1961)saidthatsincethe aircraft was being used contraryto the insurance policy provision specifying only three individuals as covered, the insurance was notinforceanditwasimmaterialthattheexcludedusewasnotacauseoftheloss.The Court explained since theairplanewasbeingusedforapurposewhichremoveditfromthecoverageofthepolicy,itwouldnotholdtheinsur-ancecompanytothecoverageofriskswhichitexpresslyexcluded.Therefore,

eventhoughtherewasnocausallinkbetween the excluded use and theloss,therewasnocoverageunderthepolicy.22 InDes Marais v. Thomas,147NYS2d 223 (NY 1955) the aircraft waspiloted by an individual who was notanamedpilot.Thepolicystated thatitdidnotcoverany lossarising frompiloting of the aircraft by any personotherthanthepilotsnamedtherein.Itwasheldthat theexclusionclause inthepolicyrelatingtopilotsimposedacondition precedentupontheinsured,andtheinsurerneednotshowacausalconnectionbetweentheaccidentandnoncompliance with the condition inordertoavoidcoverage.

b.Lack of Required Pilot Qualifi-cations-InLineas Aereas Colombianas Expresas v. Travelers Fire Insurance Company,257F.2d150(5thCir.1958)thecourt,apparentlyapplyingFloridalaw,heldtheinsuredwasnotentitledto recover for the loss because thepolicy requirements were violatedeventhoughthelosswasnotcausedbytheviolations.Theairplanecrashedwhilebeingused inoperationswhichbreachedaprovisionoftheinsurancepolicyrequiringtheaircraftbeoperatedbypilotswithvalidcertificatesfromei-thertheUnitedStatesortheRepublicofColombia.Atthetimeoftheaccidentthe airplane was being piloted by a Mexican pilot who had neither a Unit-ed States nor a Colombian certificate and who was carrying passengers in violation of the Colombian registra-tion certificate.The policy providedtherewasnocoverageforoperations which were unlawful and that vio-lated civil air regulations. Infindingtheinsuredwasnotentitledtorecoverfortheloss,theCourtstatedtheclearandplainmeaningofthepolicywasthattheriskwasexcluded if the losswascausedby theoperationof theplanewhileitwasbeingusedinviolationoftherequirementsofthepolicy. In Grigsby v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 113Ga.App. 572, 148 S.E. 2d 925 (Ga.1966) it was held that the insurancecompanycouldavoidcoveragebased

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on a policy exclusion from coverageoflosseswheretherewasanexistingviolation of any regulation pertainingto airman’s certificates, even thoughtheviolationinnowaycausedthelosswhen the pilot failed to have made the required number of takeoffs and landings within the 90 dayspreced-ing the flight in violation of FederalAviationRegulations. InJohnson v. The Security Insurance Company of Hartford,135Ill.App.3d690,481NE2d1263(Ill.1985)itwasheldtherewasnoinsurancecoveragewhenastudent pilotviolatedthetermsofanaviationinsurancepolicyendorse-mentby carrying a passengereventhoughacausalconnectiondidnotex-istbetweentheexcludedconductandthecauseofthelossoftheaircraft. The denial of insurance coveragebasedonapolicyexclusionforlosseswhiletheaircraftwasinflightduringorasaresultofitsoperationinviolationofgovernmentregulationswasupheldonappealwherethepilot was flyingthe aircraft in weather conditions which were less than the minimums prescribed for visual flight rules but without a required instrument rat-ing.23 InKilburn v. Union Marine and Gen-eral Insurance Company, 326 Mich.115, 40 NW 2d 90 (Mich. 1949) theCourtheldthelackofacausalrelationbetween theaccident anda student pilot operating the aircraft with a passenger in violation of the insur-ance contract was not relevant totheavoidanceofinsurancecoverage.Theexclusionsectionoftheinsurancepolicy contained a provision statingthat thepolicydidnotcoverany losswhiletheaircraftwasoperatedbyanypersoninviolationofthetermsofhispilot’scertificate.Similarly,inMacalco, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Company, 550S.W.2d883(Mo.App.1977)thepilotof the airplane violated provisions ofthepolicywhileflying with a student pilot’s certification without approval and supervision of an instructor and by carrying passengersinviola-tion of FederalAviation Regulations.The Court held the excluded activity,suspendedcoverageasifithadnever

been in force and proof of a causalconnectionbetweenthecasualtyandthepilot’scertificationandratingasastudentpilotwasunnecessary.Asimilarresult was reached in Des Marais v. Thomas,147NYS2d223(NY1955). Apilot’s failure to have a current biennial flight reviewasrequiredbytheinsurancepolicywasheldtobeabreach of a condition precedentandtherefore the insurer’sobligationwasterminatedeventhoughtherewasnocausallinkbetweenthepilot’squalifica-tionsandtheloss,asheldinEdmonds v. United States,642F.2d877(1stCir.1981). Whenthepilot failed to have the specified number of hoursas pilot in commandasrequiredbyacondition precedentoftheinsurancepolicy,theinsurercouldavoidliabilitywithoutanyshowingthatthepilot’sfailuretomeetthoserequirementswasacauseoftheinjuriesanddamageresultingfromtheaircraftaccident.24Similarly,inDi Santo v. Enstrom Helicopter Corporation,489F.Supp.1352(E.D.Pa.1980) itwasheldtheabsenceofacausallinkbe-tweenthefailure of the pilot to have the required number of hours in ahelicopterinviolationofthepilotexclu-sionresultedinafindingofnocoverageeventhoughtherewasanabsenceofacausallinkbetweenthepilotqualifica-tionprovisionandtheaccident.

D.Practical Note - In analyzing thecasesdealingwiththecausalconnec-tiontest,itwouldappearthatifa“policyprovision”relieduponbyaninsurertodenycoveragecanbecharacterizedasanexclusion or condition precedentso that inapplyingunambiguousandclear “policy provisions” there is nocoverage from the outset, then mostcourtswillenforcethepolicyprovisionand find no coverage regardless ofwhether there isacausalconnectionbetweentheaircraftaccidentandthepolicyprovisionreliedupon.Theratio-naleutilizedbythecasesisthatcourts will notcreate coverage where none existed in the first place.However,if the “policy provision” relied uponfor denial of coverage by the insurercanbecharacterizedasacondition

subsequent then many courts whenthere is no connection between theaircraftlossandthe“policyprovision”willfindbycaselaworbyapplyinganantitechnicalstatutethattheprovisiondoesnotinvalidatecoverage.

IV.Common “Policy Provisions” (Ex-clusions, Conditions, Declarations and/or Warranties) Relied Upon for Denial of Coverage Thefollowingoutlinessomeof themorecommonpolicyprovisionsaffect-inginsurancecoverageunderaviationliabilitypolicies.Thecasescitedarenotintendedtobecomprehensiveincover-ageofthecasesdealingwiththesetypeofpolicyprovisionsbutratherutilizedforillustrativepurposesonly.

A.Pilot Warranty Clause-Everylightaircraftinsurancepolicycontainsa“pi-lotwarrantyclause”limitingcoverageinflightonlywhencertainnamedand/orpilots with certain specified qualifica-tions are operating the aircraft. The“pilotwarrantyclause”maylimitin-flightcoverageoftheaircraftonlywhiletheaircraftisoperatedby(1)certainspe-cificallynamedpilots,(2)acombinationofcertainspecificallynamedpilotsandadditional pilots with specified pilotqualifications,or(3)whileoperatedonlybypilotswithatleastcertainspecifiedqualifications(commonlyreferredtoasan“openpilotwarrantyclause”).25Mostoften the pilot clause containing thepilotwarrantyisstatedasadeclarationorconditionaswellasanexclusioninthepolicy.26

1.Student Pilots-Studentpilotscar-ryingpassengers,andwhilenotunderthedirectsupervisionofaflightinstruc-tor,orwhoseflightisnotapprovedbyacertifiedflightinstructorisacommonexclusioninaircraftliabilitypolicies.27

a. Students With Passengers28-Othercasesthathavefoundnocov-erage due to a student pilot carryingpassengers in violation of the policyexclusionsareJohnson v. The Security Insurance Company of Hartford, 135Ill.App.3d690,481NE2d1263(Ill.1985).; Kilburn v. Union Marine and General Insurance Company, 326 Mich. 115,

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40NW2d90(Mich.1949);Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Company, 550SW 2d 883 (Mo.App. 1977). DesMaraisv.Thomas,147NYS2d223(NY1955);Chapman v. Ranger Insurance Company, 485 P.2d 1168 (Ariz.App.1971);andEastern Aviation and Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Gilbertson, 379N.W.2d567(Minn.Ct.App.1985);ForaresultfindingcoveragewhileaStu-dentPilotwascarryingpassengersseeRanger Insurance Company v. Philips,544P.2d250(Ariz.App.1976)(findingthepilotclausetobeambiguous).

B.Students Without CFI Direct Su-pervision or Approval - In United States Aviation Underwriters v. Mack Van Houtin, 453 So.2d 475 (Fla. 2dDCA 1984) the pilot clause requiredMack Van Houtin to hold a studentpilot certificate and to be “under thedirectsupervisionorhavethespecificapprovalofapilotholdinganFAAflightinstructorrating.”MackVanHoutinheldonlyastudentpilotcertificateandwas not operating the airplane under the direct supervision of, or with the specific approval of a pilot holding an FAA flight instructor rating as required by the pilot clause at thetimeof theaccident.The insuredar-guedthatthepilotclausedidnotapplytothephysicaldamagecoverage.TheSecondDistrictCourtofAppealsheldthat since Mack Van Houtin did notmeettherequirementsofthepolicyatthe timeof theaccident, theairplanewas not covered. The Court furtherindicatedthatalthoughtheprovisionsofthepolicymightappearcomplicated,theircomplexityshouldnotbeconfusedwithambiguity. In Ranger Insurance Company v. Harrell, 286So.2d261 (Fla. 2dDCA1973) the aircraft liability policy pro-vided coverage only where a flight was under the direct supervision of, and was specifically approved by, a Certified Flight Instructor.TheSec-ondDistrictCourtofAppealsheldthatcoveragedidnotexistwhentheflightinstructor had not been consulted inadvanceoftheflightinquestion,eventhoughhehad,forseveralmonthsbe-foretheaccident,generallyauthorized

the student to make unsupervisedcrosscountrysoloflights.

2.Flight Time-InUtica Mutual Insur-ance Company v. Emmco Insurance Company,14AVI.17,130(Minn.1976)theaircraftpolicyrequired“aminimumlogged flying time of 5,000 hours aspilot in command.” It was stipulatedthat the pilot, Bennett, had not flownaspilotincommandintheliteralsensefor the requisite 5,000 hours. Whatwasdisputedwastheextenttowhichotherflyingtimecouldbe“logged”aspilotincommandtimeforpurposesofsatisfyingthepolicy’spilotqualificationendorsement. It was stipulated thatif 50%ofBennett’s co-pilot timewascountedaspilotincommandtimethathe would have had 5,007 hours asloggedflyingtimeaspilotincommand.TheMinnesotaSupremeCourtfoundthattheterm“loggedflyingtimeaspilotincommand”wasambiguousandthatextrinsic evidence was admissible tosupportthefindingthatthepilotquali-fiedforcoverageundertheopenpilotwarrantyclause. In Security Mutual Casualty Com-pany v. Luthi,13AVI.17,685,226NW2d 878 (Minn. 1975) the MinnesotaSupremeCourthadpreviouslyheldtheterm“loggedflyingtime”tobeambigu-ousincomputingrequiredhoursoffly-ingtimeandresolvedthatambiguitybydeterminingthat the “block-to-block” method, whereby time was comput-ed from the moment that the wheels moved until they stopped at the end of the flight,ratherthanthe“time-in-service”methodwhichcomputedflyingtime as the time the aircraft wheelsleavethegrounduntiltheytouchdownagain as the appropriate method ofcomputingflight timeunder theopenpilotwarrantyclause.

3. Instrument Rating- In Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick v. Insurance Company of North America,15AVI.17,536(Iowa1978) the pilot endorsement (amongother things) required, “ratings andcertificates appropriate for the flightandtheaircraftasrequiredbytheFed-eralAviationAdministration.”Thepilot,Hawk,didnotholdarating forinstru-ment flights. It was held that when

Hawkflewtheaircraft intoinstrumentconditions, coveragewassuspendedandtherewasnocoveragefortheair-craftaccidentinvolved.ItshouldalsobenotedthatsinceaflightbyaVFRpilotininstrumentconditionsisillegalundertheFederalAviationRegulations,theremayalsobeaviolationoftheunlawfulpurposeexclusionofanygivenaircraftinsurancepolicy. InGlover v. National Insurance Un-derwriters,14AVI.17,540(Tex.1977)itwasheldthat“theflight,”asusedina pilot warranty clause of an aircraftliability insurancepolicy, refers to theentire time the aircraft is in flight. Incharacterizing “the flight” as VFR orIFRthecourtheldthatitmustbelookedatasawholeratherthaninsegmentsinmaking thatdeterminationand thecharacterof“theflight”mustbedeter-mined at its inception.Accordingly, apilotwhoembarksonaVFRflight(socharacterized from its inception) butduringtheflightencounteredIFRcon-ditions without holding an instrumentratingwasheldnottoexcludecoverageunderthepilotwarrantyclause.

4.Medical Certificate-Lackofavalidand current medical certificate mayresult in a suspension of coverageduring the period after it expires (ortimeitissuspendedorrevoked).Thetypical pilot clause requires a “validmedicalcertificate”ora“validandef-fective medical certificate.”This areahasspawnedmuchoftheinitiallitiga-tionthatresultedinthedevelopmentofthecausal connection testdiscussedabove. If the jurisdiction in questiondoesnotrequireacausalconnection,thefailuretohaveavalidandeffectivemedicalcertificatewillsuspendcover-age.

B.Airworthiness29-Aircraft liabilitypolicies generally exclude coveragewhentheairworthinesscertificateoftheaircraftisnotinfullforceandeffect.30

Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 152(Fla.5thDCA1981)and United States Underwriters, Inc. v. Sunray Airline, Inc.,543So.2d(Fla.5thDCA1989)inwhichbothdiscussedtheaboveinconnectionwiththecausalconnectionrequirement.AlsoseePuckett v. U.S.

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Fire Insurance Company,678SW2d936(Tex.1984)holdingthatacausalconnection is required between thelackofavalidairworthinesscertificateandtheaircraftaccident.Othercasesenforcing the policy exclusion areO’Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Company, 661 P. 2d 1181,Aff’d, enbanc696P.2d282(Colo.1982);Hol-lywood Flying Service, Inc. v. Compass Insurance Company,597F.2d507(5thCir.1979);The Security Mutual Casu-alty Company v. O’Brien,99N.M.638,662P.2d639(NM.1983);andOchs v. Avemco Insurance Company,54Or.App.768,636P.2d421(Or.1981).

C.Unlawful Use or Purpose -Al-though almost any FederalAviationRegulationthatisviolatedinconnectionwithanaircraftlosscouldbecharacter-izedasan“unlawfuluse”or“unlawfulpurpose,” antitechnical statutes andcases requiring a causal connectionbetweenthelossandtheunlawfulusemaypreventunfairnessandanuncon-scionableresult.31

InArnold v. Globe Indemnity Com-pany,416F.2d119(6thCir.1969)theaircraftinsurancepolicyexcludedcov-erageforlossesduringoperationofanaircraft“inviolationofanygovernmen-talregulationforcivilaviationapplyingto instrumentflying.”Thepilotheldaprivatepilotcertificateandwasquali-fiedtoflyunder“visualflightconditionsonly”butwasnotaninstrumentratedpilotorqualifiedtoflyunderinstrumentconditions.Itwasheldthatthepolicylanguagerelatingtounlawfulpurposeexcludedcoveragefortheaircraftac-cident.

D.Rental Pilots-Therentalpilotexclu-sion is another of the most commonpolicydefenses.32Althoughmostfixedbase operators renting aircraft haveinsurance coverage for their aircraftinsuringtheirfacility, it iscommonforthepolicytocontainarentalpilotexclu-sion.Intheeventofanaircraftaccidentorlosstheinsuredfixedbaseoperatorwillbecovered,butshouldtherentalpilotbesued,theinsurermaydenybotha defense and indemnification to therentalpilotshouldtherebeajudgmentagainst that pilot. The Non-owners

Rental Pilot Liability Policy has beendevelopedtoprovidecoveragetopilotsunderthesecircumstances.Thereareasubstantialnumberofcasesdealingwiththisexclusion. In Wzontek v. Zurich Insurance Company,418Pa.30,208A.2d861(Pa.1965)atypewrittendeclarationofaflyingservice’sliabilitypolicyextendingcoverageto“anyprivateorcommercialcertificated pilot” was held to coverthe operation by the renter pilot not-withstandingaprintedprovisioninthepolicyexcludingoperationbya“renterpilot.” InSaliba v. American Policyholders Insurance Company,385A.2d328(NJ1976)theaircraftpolicyprovidedthatpermissible uses would be restrictedto “limited commercial” purposeswhichwasdefinedas including stu-dent instructionand rental to pilots but excluding passenger carrying for hire or reward.Thepolicyprovidedthattheterm“insured”underthepolicydidnotincludeapersonoperatingtheaircraftunder the termsofany rentalagreementprovidingcompensationtothenamedinsuredforuseof theair-craft.Underthesepolicyprovisions itwasfoundthatthelesseewhooperatedtheaircraftpursuant toanoral rentalagreementwasnotinsuredunderthepolicy. Foracollectionofcasesdealingwithaircraft accidents and the rental pilotprovisionssee86A.L.R.3d118.

E.Crop Dusting and Spraying-An-other common exclusion in aircraftliabilitypolicies is foractivities involv-ing aerial seeding, spraying, dustingandotheractivitiesrequiringlowlevelflying.33

In Brown v. Lee County Mosquito Control District,352So.2d116 (Fla.2dDCA1977)theMosquitoDistrict,inanefforttocontrolthemosquitopopu-lation,causedanexcessiveamountofpesticideandalargeamountoffueloiltobesprayedover the landused forgrazingofcattle,causingthecattletocontractpneumoniaanddie.TheAir-craftHullandLiabilityPolicyexcludedcoveragefordamageoccurring“while the aircraft is being used for or in

connection with any... crop dusting, spraying, seeding, fertilization..”It was argued that the exclusionarylanguagewasambiguousbecausetheactivity involveddidnot involve “cropdusting, crop spraying, crop seedingandcropfertilization,”andsincedam-agesresultedfrom“mosquitospraying”ratherthan“cropspraying”,theactivitywasnotexcluded.Summaryjudgmentwasgrantedtotheinsurer inthetrialcourt.Onappeal, theSecondDistrictCourt ofAppeal found theexclusion-arylanguagetobeunambiguousandrefusedtogiveitthemeaningclaimedtobeapplicablebytheinsured,andaf-firmedthesummaryjudgmentinfavoroftheinsurer.

F. Territorial Limitations-Aircraftlia-bilitypoliciesinvariablycontainclausesthat limit coverage to a geographicalterritory.34Someterritorialgeographicallimitationsclausesinaircraftinsurancepolicieslimitcoveragebythedistancetheaircraftisfromlandaswellasbydescriptionof theterritoryoverwhichtheaircraftwillbeflownandstillcov-ered.

G.Flights Requiring Special Permits or Waivers- Frequently an aircraftwill requirea ferrypermitorawaivertodoaerobaticsfromtheFAA.Otheractivitiesforwhichtheaircraftisutilizedmayrequireaspecialpermitorwaiveras well.These activities are typicallyexcluded under aircraft liability poli-cies.35

H.Seizure, Confiscation, Restraint or Detention of the Aircraft- It hasbeen a frequent occurrence in theBahamasforthegovernmenttoseizeaircraftutilizedforunlawfulpurposesinviolationofthatcountry’slaws.Aircraftliability policies do not cover loss ofaircraftordamagetothemasaresultof such activities.36Aviation insurersprovide coverage under War RisksAircraftInsurancepoliciestocoverthepossibilityofsuchgovernmentalactiv-ity.

V. “Lienholders Interest Endorse-ment” or “Breach of Warranty Lien-holders Endorsement” are not

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Invalidated by Any Applicable and Enforceable Exclusions Resulting in Denial of Coverage to the Insured Frequentlyaircraftownerswillpur-chaseanaircraftandsecurefinancingto do so.Abank or other lender fre-quentlywillrequestalienholder’sinter-estendorsementorbreachofwarrantylienholder’s endorsement containingprotective language. Such endorse-mentsresultinthepaymentofanad-ditional premium and is consideredto be a separate contract between the lienholder and the insurercov-eringonlythefinancial interestofthelienholder in the aircraft in the eventofphysicaldamagetoitandtypicallyprovides that “any Physical DamageCoverageofthispolicyshall not be in-validated by any act or neglect of the Named Insured.”Theseprovisionsaregenerally enforceable, notwithstand-ing the application of an enforceableexclusionor condition resulting innocoveragetotheinsured.

VI. Procedures for Litigating Cover-age Issues Available procedures for litigatingaviation insurance coverage issuesnotonlyvarybetweenjurisdictionsbutalsobasedupontheparticularcircum-stances surrounding a given aircraftaccident.

A.Action for Declaratory Relief-Moststatesprovideforsubjectmatterjurisdiction in the Court of GeneralJurisdiction to declare the rights ofclaimants,theinsuredorinsurerunderan insurance contract.37 None of theabovepartiesarerequiredtowaituntiltherehasbeenabreachoftheinsuringagreementbeforebringinganactionfordeclaratoryrelief.38

1.Advantages v. Disadvantages

a. Expeditious Resolution of Coverage Issues-Byemployingthisprocedure a plaintiff in an action fordeclaratory relief need not wait for apersonal injury or a wrongful deathaction to be filed before seeking adeterminationofthecoverageissues.Aclaimantorinsuredneednotwaitfortheinsurertodenycoveragebeforefil-ingsuchanactionandfurthermorean

insurerneednotdenycoveragebeforebringingsuchanactioneither.39

B. Binding Outcome (Collat-eral Estoppel) -Theoutcomeof thecoveragedisputewillbebindinguponallpartiestotheactionfordeclaratoryrelief.Intheeventthatpersonalinjuryand wrongful death claims are laterfiledinseparateactions,theoutcomeofthecoveragedisputewillbebindingprovided that there is an identity of partiesintheactionfordeclaratoryre-liefandthesubsequentpersonalinjuryorwrongfuldeathaction.Totheextentthat the parties are not identical theissueofcoveragemaybere-litigatedbyapartynotpreviouslyjoinedintheactionfordeclaratoryrelief.40

c.Avoidance of Jury Confusion-Ifthepartieschose to try thecoverageissueswith the issuesof liabilityanddamages,itislikelythatthejurywouldbeconfusedbycomminglingthecover-ageissueswiththeissuesassociatedwith the liabilityanddamageaspectsofapersonalinjuryorwrongfuldeathaction.

d. Uniform Results- In the eventthat there are likely to be multiplewrongfuldeathand/orpersonal injuryclaims arising out of a single aircraftaccident, one action for declaratoryrelief joining all claimants, insuredsandtheinsurerwillresultinabindingdisposition of the coverage issue byonecourtononeoccasion.Otherwise,thecoverageissuewouldberequiredto be raised in each personal injuryandwrongfuldeathcasethatwasfiled,potentiallyresultingindifferingresultsastocoverageineachcase.

e. Cost Savings- By litigating thecoverageissueintheactionfordeclara-toryrelief,multiplecoveragetrialsandcostsassociatedwithrepeatedlyput-tingonthesameevidenceineachcasecan be avoided. From the claimant’sstandpoint, substantial costs associ-ated with preparing and trying theliabilityanddamageissuesarisingoutofanaircraftaccidentmaybeavoidedifthereisafinaldeterminationthatnocoverageexistsfortheaircraftaccidentinquestion.

f.Attorneys’ Fees are Recoverable by the Insured-Iftheinsuredoranom-nibusinsuredunderanaircraftliabilitypolicyissuccessfulinestablishingcov-erage,attorneys’feesmaybeaward-abletocounselfortheinsured.41

B.Severance of Coverage Issue from Case in Chief-An insured under anaircraftliabilitypolicy,afterbeingsuedby a claimant seeking damages forpersonalinjuryorwrongfuldeath,mayimpleadtheinsurerraisingthecover-age issuesandrequest that the thirdpartyactionbeseveredfrom the case in chief.Aclaimantmaynotbringsuchanactionuntilafterjudgmentinmostjurisdictions.42Ifthetrialjudgecanbeconvincedtotrytheseveredcoveragecase separatelyandbefore the caseinchief,manyoftheadvantagesofadirectactionfordeclaratoryreliefcanberealized.

C.Litigating Insurance Coverage Issues Along With Liability and Damage Issues-Inmanyjurisdictionswherethereisnoseveranceprocedurebywhichtheinsurancecoverageissuecanbelitigatedinaseparatetrialfromthe issues of liability and damages,the choice is between an action fordeclaratoryrelieforlitigatingtheissueinatrialalongwiththeissuesofliabilityanddamages.Thisistheleastprefer-ablemethodoflitigatingthecoverageissues.

VII. Attorneys’ Fees are Awardable to a Named Insured or Omnibus In-sured Securing a Judgment Against an Insurer Fla.Stat.§627.428(1)provides foran award of reasonable attorneys’fees to a named insured or omnibusinsured securing a judgment againstan insurer.43A claimant’s attorney isnotentitledtoanawardofreasonableattorneys’ fees against the insurer insuccessfullypursuingacoveragecaseunlesstheclaimantcansecureanas-signmentoftheinsured’srightsundertheinsurancepolicy.Inthelattercase,theclaimantisviewedas“standingintheshoesoftheinsured”andthereforehavingallof therightsof the insuredagainst the insurer includingtheright

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toreasonableattorneys’fees.

A.Effect of Offer of Judgment-WhateffectdoesanOfferofSettlement44bythe insurerhaveupontheclaimbyaprevailinginsuredinacoveragecasewhosecuresjudgmentagainstaninsur-erbutdoesnot“beat”theinsurer’sOfferofSettlement?AccordingtoScottsdale Insurance Company v. DeSalvo,24Fla.LawW.S422(Fla.Sept.9,1999)45theprevailinginsuredisentitledtorecoverattorneysfeesundersection627.428(togetherwithcostsandprejudgmentinterest) through the date of the firstOfferofSettlementwhichexceedstherecovery amount.Also included aredamageawards,attorney’sfees,costs,and interest the insured would havereceived if the insured had acceptedthatOfferofSettlementonthedateitwasmade.

VIII. A Liability Insurer is Not Permitted to Deny Coverage Based on a Policy Defense Without Taking the Prescribed Action as Required in Fla. Stat. §627.426 The claims administration statuterequires a liability insurer denyingcoveragetogivewrittennoticeofres-ervationofrightstothenamedinsuredbyregisteredorcertifiedmailwithin30daysaftertheliabilityinsurerkneworshould have known of the coveragedefense. In addition within 60 days,or within 60 days after receipt of asummonsandcomplaint,whicheverislater,theinsurermustdooneofthreeadditionalthings:(1)givewritten no-ticetothenamedinsuredbycertifiedmailoftheinsurer’srefusaltodefendtheinsured,or(2)obtaina non-waiver agreementafterfulldisclosure,or(3)retain independent counselmutuallyagreeable to theparties (presumablytorepresenttheinsured,althoughthestatutedoesnotclearlysoprovide).46

IX. The Burden of Proof In the Cover-age Case Shifts Counselinvolvedinasuittodeter-minecoverageunderaviation liabilitypoliciesshouldbeawareoftheshiftingburdenofproof.

A.Theinsuredorclaimantattempting

toestablishcoveragebearstheinitialburdenofprovingthattheaircraftlosswas covered by the aircraft liabilitypolicy.

B.Once there is a prima facie caseestablishing coverage, the burdenshifts to theaviation insurer toprovethatthelosswassustainedundercir-cumstanceswherebycoveragewouldbeexcludedordefeatedbythe“policyprovisions.”

C.Iftheinsurerissuccessful inprov-ing that a “policy provision” defeatscoverage,theninsomejurisdictionstheinsuredorclaimantattemptingtoestab-lishcoveragemayattempttoprovethatbasedonpublicpolicyconsiderations,thereisnocausalconnectionbetweenthe “policyprovision” and theaircraftloss.

*Jim Denman is a graduate of Cum-berland School of Law and received a B.S. degree in Business Administra-tion from California State University at Fresno. Jim is a commercial, multi-engine, instrument rated pilot. He is a member of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. He has been an ac-tive member of the Aviation Law Com-mittee of The Florida Bar continuously since 1977 and a former Chairman of the Committee. Jim is admitted to the Florida, Colorado and District of Colum-bia Bar and is a member of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida and admitted to the Trial Bar of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He is also admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court. He is “AV” rated by the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. Jim is Board Certified as an Aviation Lawyer by The Florida Bar Board of Education and Specialization and has lectured in the fields of tort and aviation law on behalf of The Florida Bar CLE Pro-grams and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in the past. His practice, The Denman Law Firm is located at 1885 E. Oakland Park, Blvd., Suite 105, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33306, and he can be reached at 954/938-9777 or on the web at http://www.DenmanLawFirm.com

Publications include “Litigating Insur-anceCoverageIssuesUnderAviationLiability Policies,” published in TheInsuranceLawJournalbyCommerceClearing House and as co-author ofMatthewBender’sFloridaTortsTrea-tise, chaptersonDefamationandAt-torneyLiability.

Endnotes:1 30AFla.Jur.2nd,Insurance,§1679.2 Appleman, InsuranceLawandPractice,§7486;Ranger Insurance Co. v. Harrell, 286So.2d261(Fla.2dDCA1973). 3 Ideal Mutual Insurance Company v. C. D. I. Construction, Inc.640F.2d645(5thCir.1981).4 AlsoseeInsurance Company of North Amer-ica v. Butte Aero Sales and Service,243F.Supp.276(D.Mont.1965).(Typewrittenendorsementtoaircraftliabilitypolicy).5 72A.L.R3d525.6 30AFla.Jur.2d,Insurance,§1697.7 Appleman, InsuranceLawandPractice,§7487.Matthews v. Ranger Insurance Company,281So.2d345,348(Fla.1973).8 Matthews v. Ranger Insurance Company, 281So.2d345,349(Fla.1973);Seealso,30AFla.Jur.2d,Insurance§1692.9 Peerless Insurance Company v. Son Line Helicopters, Inc.,180So.2d364(3rdDCA1965);31Fla.Jur.2d,Insurance,§2540.10 Denman Rubber Manufacturing Company v. World Tire Corporation,396So.2d728(Fla.5thDCA1981).11 31AFla.Jur.2d,Insurance,§3628.12 Avemco Insurance Company v. Chung,388F.Supp.142(D.Hawaii1975).13 SeealsoPickett v. Woods,404So.2d1152(Fla.5thDCA1981).14 See14C.F.R.§91.13.15 Fla.Stat.§627.409providesinpartasfol-lows:“627.409 Representations and applications;warranties...(2)Abreachorviolationby the insuredofanywarranty,condition,orprovisionofany...trans-portationinsurancepolicy,contractofinsurance,endorsement,orapplication therefordoesnotvoidthepolicyorcontract,orconstituteadefensetoalossthereon,unlesssuchbreachorviolation increased the hazardbyanymeanswithinthecontroloftheinsured.”16 SeeGlades Flying Club v. Americas Aviation & Marine Insurance Company, 235So.2d18(Fla.3dDCA1970)(invalidmedicalcertificate)&Hollywood Flying Service, Inc. v. Compass Insurance Company,597F.2d507(5thCir.1979)(invalidairworthinesscertificate).InPickett theairworthinesscertificatewasinvalidinviolationofanexclusion in thepolicyproviding that thepolicydidnotapply toany insuredwhooper-atedorpermitted theoperationof the insuredaircraftwhile inflightunless theairworthinesscertificatewasinfullforceandeffect.Failuretohaveavalidairworthinesscertificate,however,didnotcontributetotheaccident.TheCourtinPickettstated“thestatuteisdesignedtoprevent

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theinsurerfromavoidingcoverageonatechnicalomissionplayingnopartintheloss.17 404So.2d1152(Fla.5thDCA1981).18 Therealbasisfortheholdingwasthattheinsuredsfailedtocarrytheirburdenofprooftoshowthattheviolationofthepolicyexclusionwasnotacauseoftheaircraftaccident.TheSupremeCourtofColoradoclearlyenunciatedaruleoflawthat theapplicationof theexclusionshouldbeprecludedbypublicpolicyonlywhentheinsuredcanshowthattheviolationoftheregulationwasnotacauseof theaccident.For the foregoingreasons,manywritersandcommentatorsplacethiscaseinthecategorywiththemoderntrend.However,thiscaseseemstoplacetheburdenofproofof lackofcausalconnectionupon theinsuredwhileothercasesfollowingthemoderntrendonthisissueseemstoplacetheburdenofproofontheinsurer.19 This case is superseded by Fla. Stat.§627.409(2).However, should the foregoingstatuteeverberepealedthelawsetforthinthiscaseandGlades Flying Club v. Americas Avia-tion and Marine Insurance Company,235So.2d18 (Fla.3rdDCA1970)wouldonceagainsetforththelawinFloridaprovidingthatnocausallinkbetweenthebreachoftheinsurancepolicyprovisionand the loss is required to invalidatecoverage.20 ThiscasehasbeensupersededbystatuteandisofdoubtfulprecedentialvalueinFloridasincethepassageofFla.Stat.§627.409.Pickett v. Woods,404So.2d1152(Fla.5thDCA1981).21 Bruce v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Com-pany,222F.2d642(4thCir.1955).22 ThiscasewouldappeartobeofcontinuingprecedentialvalueundertheSunrayexceptiontotheholdingofPickett v. Woods,supra.Hencetheexclusionofthepolicyapparentlymadeitclearthattherewasnocoverageundertheinsurancepolicy tobeginwithwhenan individualotherthanoneofthosenamedonthelistofcoveredstudentswasoperating theaircraftcontrary tothepurposeoftheuseclauseinthepolicy.23 Arnold v. Globe Indemnity Company,416F.2d119(6thCir.1969).24 United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc.,409Mass.694,568NE2d1150(Mass.1991).25 A typicalpilotwarrantyclausecontainingcoverageforbothnamedpilotsandpilotsmeet-ingcertainminimumqualificationsprovidesasfollows:“ITEM6.Pilot:Wheninflighttheaircraftwillbepilotedonlybythefollowingpilots,providedeachhasavalidpilot’scertificate includingmedicalcertificateappropriatetotheflightandaircraft:JohnDoeorpilotsholdingaprivatepilotcertifi-cateorcommercialpilotcertificatewith loggedflying timeofat least500hours total time,50hours in the make and model of aircraft in-suredherein,and25hours inretractablegearaircraft.”26 Atypicalexclusionprovides:“Thispolicydoesnotapply:2.Toanyinsuredswhiletheaircraftisinflighta. Ifpilotedbyotherthanthepilotorpilotsdes-ignatedinthedeclarations;b. Ifpilotedbyapilotnotpropertycertificated,qualifiedandratedunderthecurrentapplicableFederalairregulationsfortheoperationinvolved,

whetherornotsaidpilot isdesignated in thedeclarations;”27 Atypicalexclusionprovidesasfollows:“Thisinsurancedoesnotapply:3.Inflight,ifpilotedbyaStudentPilot:(i) Whenthereisapassengerinyouraircraftun-lessthatpassengerisaCertifiedFlightInstructorteachingthestudentpilot;or(ii)WhentheStudentPilotisnotunderthedirectsupervisionofaCertifiedFlightInstructorfortheflightinvolved.”28 Studentpilotsareprohibited fromcarryingpassengersbysection61.89(a)(1)ofTitle14C.F.R.29 Section91.203(a)ofTitle14C.F.R.providesinpart: “nopersonmayoperateacivilaircraftunless it has....[a]n appropriate and currentairworthinesscertificate.”Section91.409(a)(1)ofTitle14C.F.R.furtherprovidesthatanaircraftmaynotbeoperatedunlessanannualinspectionhasbeenperformedwithintheprecedingtwelvemonths.30 AtypicalexclusionfromtheAIGLightAircraftPolicyprovidesasfollows:“Thisinsurancedoesnotapply:(d) if theaircraft isnotcertificatedby theFAAunderastandardAirworthinessCertificate;”AsimilarexclusioncontainedintheOldRepublicInsuranceCompanypolicyissuedthroughPhoe-nixAviationManagersprovidesasfollows:“Thispolicydoesnotapply:2. toanyinsuredswhiletheaircraftisinflight(c)iftheairworthinesscertificateoftheaircraftisnotinfullforceandeffect;(d)iftheaircrafthasnotbeensubjectedtoap-propriateairworthinessinspection(s)asrequiredundercurrentapplicablefederalairregulationsfortheoperationinvolved”31 Atypicalinsurancepolicyexclusionforun-lawfulpurposeisasfollows:“Thisinsurancedoesnotapply:(c)whentheaircraftisinflight:(i) withyourknowledgeandconsentforeitheranunlawfulpurposeorforotherthantheapproveduse;”32 A typicalpolicyexclusion for rentalpilotsprovidesasfollows:“Thispolicydoesnotapply:...(a)toalossordamage...byanypersoninpos-sessionoftheaircraftunderabailment,lease,rentalagreement,conditionalsale,...or foranylossordamageduringorresultingtherefrom;”33 A typicalpolicyexclusionprovidesas fol-lows:“Thisinsurancedoesnotapply:(h)iftheaircraftisbeingusedfor:(i) aerialseeding,spraying,dusting,towingorphotography;”(ii)hunting,herdingorspottingofanimals,birdsorfish;(iii)patrolorsurveillanceofpower lines,pipe-lines,trafficorfires;”34 Atypicalprovisionprovidesasfollows:V. POLICY PERIOD, TERRITORYAll Coverages“Thispolicyappliesonlytobodilyinjuryorproper-tydamagewhichoccurs,andtophysicaldamagelossestotheaircraftwhicharesustainedduring

thepolicyperiod,whiletheaircraftiswithinTheUnitedStatesofAmerica,CanadaorMexico,orwhilebeingtransportedbetweenportsthereof.”35 Atypicalprovisionisasfollows:“Thisinsurancedoesnotapply:(c)whentheaircraftisinflight:(ii)whenaspecialpermitorwaiverisrequiredbytheFAA;”36 Anexampleofsuchanexclusionisasfol-lows:“Thispolicydoesnotapply:...(d)tolossordamagearisingfromcapture,con-fiscation,seizure,arrest, restraintordetentionortheconsequencesthereoforofanyattemptthereat,orany takingof theproperty insuredor damage to or destruction thereof by anygovernmentorgovernmentalauthorityoragent(whethersecretorotherwise)orbyanymilitary,navalorusurpedpower,whetheranyofthefore-goingbedonebywayofrequisitionorotherwiseandwhetherintimeofpeaceorwarandwhetherlawfulorunlawful;”37 SeeChapter86,Fla.Stat.38 See§86.031,Fla.Stat.39 See§86.031,Fla.Stat.40 Pickett v. Woods,360So.2d45 (Fla.4thDCA1978).41 §627.428Fla.Stat.Thestatuteprovidesasfollows:“627.428Attorney’sfee.(1)Upontherenditionofajudgmentordecreebyanyof the courtsof this stateagainst aninsurerand in favorofanynamedoromnibusinsured...underapolicyorcontractexecutedbytheinsurer,thetrialcourtor,intheeventofanappeal inwhich the insured...prevails, theappellatecourtshalladjudgeordecreeagainsttheinsurerandinfavoroftheinsured...area-sonablesumas feesorcompensation for theinsured’s...attorneyprosecutingthesuitinwhichtherecoveryishad.”42 ThetextofFlorida’snonjoinderstatuteissetoutbelow:“627.4136Nonjoinderofinsurers.(1)Itshallbeaconditionprecedenttotheaccrualormaintenanceofacauseofactionagainstaliabilityinsurerbyapersonnotaninsuredunderthetermsoftheliabilityinsurancecontractthatsuchpersonshallfirstobtainasettlementorver-dictagainstapersonwhoisaninsuredunderthetermsofsuchpolicyforacauseofactionwhichiscoveredbysuchpolicy.”Alsosee§627.7262Fla.Stat.43 Thestatuteprovidesasfollows:“627.428Attorney’sfee.(1)Upontherenditionofajudgmentordecreebyanyofthecourtsofthisstateagainstaninsurerandinfavorofanynamedoromnibusinsured...underapolicyorcontractexecutedby the in-surer,thetrialcourtor,intheeventofanappealinwhichtheinsured...prevails,theappellatecourtshalladjudgeordecreeagainsttheinsurerandinfavoroftheinsured...areasonablesumasfeesorcompensationfortheinsured’s...attorneypros-ecutingthesuitinwhichtherecoveryishad.”44 AlsoknownasanOfferofJudgmentdepend-inguponthejurisdictionandifthecaseispendinginstateorfederalcourt.Florida’spresentlawonthissubjectisfoundinRule1.442oftheFlorida

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RulesofCivilProcedure.45 Seealso748So.2d941(Fla.1999).46 Theapplicabletextprovidesasfollows:“627.426Claimsadministration.(2)A liability insurershallnotbepermitted todenycoveragebasedonaparticularcoveragedefenseunless:(a)Within30daysaftertheliabilityinsurerkneworshouldhaveknownofthecoveragedefense,writtennoticeofreservationofrightstoassertacoveragedefenseisgiventothenamedinsured

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by registeredorcertifiedmail sent to the lastknownaddressoftheinsuredorbyhanddelivery;and

(b)Within60daysofcompliancewithparagraph(a)orreceiptofasummonsandcomplaintnam-ingtheinsuredasadefendant,whicheverislater,butinnocaselaterthan30daysbeforetrial,theinsurer:

(1)Giveswrittennoticetothenamedinsuredbyregisteredorcertifiedmailofitsrefusaltodefendtheinsured;

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18

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”How The Evolution of Aircraft Noise

Management in National Parks Could Affect Commercial Aviation Nationwide1

By Daniel W. Anderson2

Airports,airlines,and aircraft manu-facturersarealltoofamiliarwithaircraftnoise impacts andtheresultingopera-tional and designchanges that haveoccurred since theFederalAviationAd-ministration first is-suednationalnoisestandards pursuanttotheFederalAvia-tionAct of 1958.3Whatwouldlikelybemore surprising tothoseinvolvedinthecommercialaviationindustry,however,ishowtheevolutionofaircraft noise man-agementatnationalparks may affectcommercialaviationnationwide.

Grand Canyon National Park: A Case Study in Aircraft Sound Mitigation In the late 1980s, environmen-tal groups began advocating flightrestrictions at GCNP in an effort toreduce increasing noise impacts onpark visitors.4 In response to noiseand safety concerns, Congress en-acted the National Parks OverflightsAct (OverflightsAct) in 1987.5 TheOverflightsActrequirestheSecretaryof the Interior, through the NationalParkService(NPS),tostudyoverflightimpactsatGCNP,CumberlandIslandNationalSeashore,YosemiteNationalPark,HawaiiVolcanoesNationalPark,HaleakalaNationalPark,GlacierNa-tionalPark,MountRushmoreNational

Memorial, “and at no less than fouradditional units of the National ParkSystem, excluding all National ParkSystemunitsintheStateofAlaska.”6TheOverflightsAct also requires theNPS,and theFAA, to reportback toCongressontheresultsof thestudy,andmakerecommendationsregardingfurther regulatory and legislative ac-tiontoaddresstheissuesdiscoveredthroughthestudy.7

The most controversial provisionof the OverflightsAct, however, andonewhichhasresulted insubstantiallitigation, is the requirement that theNPS make recommendations to theFAAwhich“shallprovideforsubstantial restoration of the natural quietandex-perienceofthe[GCNP]andprotection

ofpublichealthandsafetyfromadverseeffects associatedwith aircraft over-flight,” and that theFAAdevelopappro-priate regulationsto implement suchrecommendations,withoutchange,un-less the FAA de-termines that therecommendationswill adversely im-pactaircraftsafety.8At first blush, onemight think suchprovisions to berelatively harmless,ifnotlaudable.Uponcloser inspection,however,itbecomesclear that the pro-verbial “devil is inthedetails.” The issues pre-sentedbytheGCNPrelatedrequirementsoftheOverflightsAct

aremyriad,andtodate,havenotbeencompletelyresolved.TheproblemfortheNPS,FAA,airtourcompanies,en-vironmentalgroups,andevenanIndiantribe,hasbeenansweringthemulti-partquestionof:whatis“substantial,”whatis “restoration,” and what is “naturalquiet.”Basedonitsinitialdefinitionoftheseterms,anditsinitialstudies,theNPStransmitteditsrecommendationstotheFAAin1987asrequiredbytheOverflightsAct.9 In1988, theFAA is-suedSpecialFederalAviationRegula-tion(SFAR)50-2,which,amongotherthings,provided for limitationson theroutesandaltitudesairtouroperatorscouldfly.10TheNPSthenbeganmoni-toring aircraft sound throughout theGCNPinpreparationforthesubmission

19

ofitsreporttoCongress. In late 1994, the NPS submittedits report toCongressasrequiredbytheOverflightsAct.11AccordingtotheNPSreport,andasubsequentEnviron-mentalAssessment,theNPSandFAAdeterminedthat:

1.Aircraft“noise”isbestquantifiedbymeasuring the percentage of timethataircraftareaudible.12

2.Audibility results when the soundemanatingfromtheaircraftincreas-estheambientnoiselevelbythree(3) decibels, the smallest changeperceptibletothehumanear.13

3.“Natural quiet” means that no air-craftareaudibletothehumanear,and that “substantial restoration”willoccurwhen50%ormoreoftheparkachievesnaturalquietfor75to100%oftheday.14

On December 31, 1996, the FAAissued a final rule that: adopted thedefinitionscontainedinthe1994NPSReport; established new flight-freezones;institutedflightcurfews;and,setacaponthenumberofaircraft(notthenumberofflights)thatcouldflyoverthepark.15 Inaddition to issuing thefinalrule,theFAAalsoproposednoiselimi-tationsforcertainaircraftoperatinginthevicinityofGCNPinaccordancewiththe“aircraft’snoiseefficiencyquotient.”

pUnlikethenoisestandardsapplicabletomostcommercialjetaircraft(whichdoes not factor in size or carryingcapacity), the FAA’s “noise efficiencyquotient”employedthenovelconceptofmeasuring“therelationshipbetweenthecertificatednoiseleveloftheaircraftandthenumberofpassengerseatsonthetypicalconfigurationofthataircrafttype”toplaceaircraftinthreedifferentcategories of “noise efficiency,” andsuggestedthreecorrespondingcatego-riesoflimitation.17

Grand Canyon I Not surprisingly, both air tour op-erators and environmental groupsfiledsuit,theformerclaimingthenewregulationswent to far,and the latterclaimingthattheregulationsdidnotgofarenough.18InthefirstGrandCanyon

case(GrandCanyonI),airtouropera-tors asserted that the NPS/FAA haderredintheirinterpretationofthestatu-toryphrase,“substantialrestorationofthenaturalquietandexperienceofthepark,”andthattheNPS/FAAinterpre-tation “is overly restrictive of aircraftoverflightsbecauseitiscontrarytothe‘plain meaning’ of the statute and itslegislativehistory.”19Insupportofthisproposition, the operators contendedthat the agencies erred by: definingtheterm“naturalquiet”withoutregardtoothersoundsinthePark;“equat[ing]‘quiet’withtheabsenceofdetectablesound, rather than with the absenceof‘noise’thatwoulddisturbvisitorsordisrupt theirexperiencesof thepark;defining “natural quiet” based on thedecibel level a human ear can hearwithoutregardtowhethersoundatthatlevel would be disturbing; attemptingtoensurequietin50%oftheparkfor75-100%ofthedaywithoutregardto“‘whethertherewillbeanyvisitorspres-ent tobedisturbed’ in [theprotected]areas.”20At the opposite end of thespectrum, environmentalists claimedthattheregulationswere“toolittletoolate,”andthattheterm“substantial,”byitsverydefinition,requiredtheagenciestoimplementrulestoprotectmorethanhalf(50%)ofthepark.21

Employing the well-known prac-ticeof givingdeferential treatment toagency interpretation of statutes, asoutlinedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-ral Resources Defense Council, 467U.S. 837 (1984), the Circuit Court ofAppealsrejectedtheargumentsofairtour operators and environmentalistsalike.22Because thestatutoryphrase“substantial restoration of the naturalquiet” is ambiguous, the court con-cluded,theFAAregulationsshouldbeupheld because the NPS/FAA inter-pretationofthephrasesisreasonable,and the resulting regulations are notinconsistentwiththeOverflightsActoritslegislativehistory.23Accordingly,theFAAmayimplementrulesdesignedtoreduce ambient sound levels withoutnecessarilyprotectingtheexperienceofparkvisitorssolongastheregula-tionsareconsistentwith thepurpose

and language of the OverflightsAct.Likewise,theFAAregulationsmayalsofail to reducesound impacts inmorethan half of the park without runningafoulofthestatute.

Post Grand Canyon I Regulations and Assessment At the time Grand Canyon I wasdecided,theFAAhadalreadydiscov-eredthatithadsignificantlyunderesti-matedthenumberofaircraftoperatingat the Grand Canyon, and the FAAinformed the court at oral argumentthat it was considering a cap on thenumber of flights air tour operatorscouldconduct.24InJuly1999,theNPSannounced that it was changing theaudibilitythresholdforaircraftoperatingin the backcountry areas of the parksuchthataircraftnoisewillbeaudibleifitiseightdecibelsbelowtheaveragenaturalambientlevel.25Then,inJanu-ary2000,theNPSissuedareviewofitschangeinnoiseevaluationmethodol-ogywhichgaveadetailedexplanationof the acoustic model the NPS usedinassessingaircraftnoise impactsatGCNP,andreiteratedthedefinitionof“substantial restoration of the naturalquiet.”26

Thenextmonth,inFebruary2000,theFAAissuedaFinalSupplementalEnvironmentalAssessment (FSEA)settingforththeFAA’sanalysisofthepotentialeffectthatacaponthenumberofflightswouldhaveonaircraftnoiseatGCNP.27InitsFSEA,theFAAestab-lishedthe“averageannualday”asthestandardtobeusedinevaluatingthepercentageof“theday”inwhichnaturalquietisrestoredtoagivenlocation.28InApril2000,theFAAagainpublishedafinalrule(the“2000Rule”),thistimeimposing a cap on the total numberof flights that air tour operators mayconductover theGCNP inanygivenyear.29As the 2000 Rule explained,theFAAandNPShaddeterminedthatthe aircraft cap imposed pursuant tothe1996ruledidnotadequatelylimitgrowth in the number of flights, andNPS noise modeling “indicated thatthepotentialgrowth in thenumberofoperations could erode gains madetowardsubstantialrestorationofnatural

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”

20

quiet.”30Assuch,the2000Rulewasanecessarysteptoreduceaircraftnoiseimpacts at GCNP, though the FAAacknowledgedthatitwouldhavetodostillmore, including requiring theuseofquiettechnologyaircraft,tocomplywiththeCongressionalmandateoftheOverflightsAct.31

Grand Canyon II Airtouroperatorsandenvironmen-talgroupsagainchallengedtheFAA’sfinal rule.32Air tour operators askedtheCircuitCourtofAppealstofindthat2000Rulewasunlawfulbasedonfivearguments:“(i)[therule]waspromptedbyanimproperchangeinthedefinitionof‘naturalquiet’;(ii)theacousticmeth-odologythatjustifiestheruleisscientifi-callyflawed;(iii)theFAAarbitrarilyandcapriciouslyissuedtherulewithoutfirstpromulgatingaquiet technologyrule;(iv) inpromulgating therule, theFAAviolatedtheRegulatoryFlexibilityAct,5U.S.C.§601et seq.;and(v)therulearbitrarilyandcapriciouslyignorestheneedsoftheelderlyanddisabled.”33 The environmental groups alsoasked thecourt tofind that the2000Rule was unlawful, claiming that theFAA’s interpretation of the term “theday,”asusedinthe1994NPSreporttoCongress,tomean“averageannualday,”ratherthan“anygivenday.”34ThegroupsalsochallengedtheFAA’snoisemethodology,arguingthat:

[i]nprojectingtheamountofnoiseexperiencedbydifferentpartsofthePark,theFAA’snoisemodelonly considers noise emittedfrom air tour flights. By failingto account for noise from otheraircraft that fly over the GrandCanyon— for example, fromcommercialjets,generalaviation,andmilitaryflights--themodelar-bitrarilyoverstateshowquiettheParkreallyis.TheTrustassertsthatifnon-touraircraftnoisewereincluded in the calculation, thepercentageoftheParkinwhichnaturalquietwouldbesubstan-tiallyrestored—evenontheFAA’saverageannualday—wouldbesignificantlyless.35

ThecourtagainemployedChevron

in rejecting each of the argumentsraisedbytheairtouroperators.36Thechief issue raised by the operatorswas that the NPS had impermissiblychangedthe“noticeability”standardatissueinGrand Canyon I,toa“detect-ability” standard which finds aircraftsoundtobeaudibleifitiseightdecibelsbelow the average natural ambientlevel.37Accordingtotheoperators,sucha standard departed from the Grand Canyon I requirement that “noise”bedefinedasthatsoundwhichadverselyimpacts visitor experience, becausevisitors to the park would “not noticebelow-ambient-levelnoise.”38Thecourtdisagreed,findinginsteadthattheNPShadprovideda“reasonedanalysis”foritsdecision.39As thecourtexplained,the use of below-ambient-sound lev-els “reflects the Park Service’s newunderstandingthataudibilitydependsnotjustonvolume(loudness),butalsoon frequency (pitch).40As such, thecourtconcluded,theagencies’actionsandinterpretationsshouldbeupheldinaccordancewiththeprinciplesestab-lishedin Chevron. Thecourtfoundgreatermeritinthecontentions put forth by the environ-mentalgroups,finding that theFAA’suseofthe“averageannualday”stan-dard is inconsistentand incompatiblewiththeNPSinterpretationof“theday”to mean “any given day” when suchterm is used in determining whetherthere has been “substantial restora-tion”of“naturalquiet” toareasofthepark.41Accordingly,theFAAhadusedanimproperstandardinpromulgatingthe2000Rule,andthecourtrefusedtoupholdtheruletotheextentthatitconflictedwiththeNPSinterpretation. Thecourtalsoagreedwiththeen-vironmentalgroups’assertionthattheFAA’snoisemethodologywasflawedin that it excluded non-tour aircraft(e.g.commercial,generalaviation,andmilitaryaircraft)fromitsnoisemeasure-ments.42Asthecourtnoted,

[t]heFAAcancertainlychoosetoachieve the substantial restora-tionofnaturalquietbyregulatingairtoursalone.ButtheFAAcan-not dispute that whether or notnon-tour aircraft are regulated,

naturalquietdoesnotexistwhenthesoundtheymakeisaudible.NordoestheOverflightsActpro-videanybasisforignoringnoisecausedbysuchaircraft.Hence,thefactthattheFAAhaschosennottoregulatecertaincategoriesofaircraftdoesnot justify ignor-ingthesoundthoseaircraftmakewhendecidinghowextensivelytoregulateothercategories.Andinthe absence of any reasonablejustificationforexcludingnon-touraircraftfromitsnoisemodel,wemustconcludethatthisaspectofthe FAA’s methodology is arbi-traryandcapriciousandrequiresreconsiderationbytheagency.43

Inlightoftheforegoing,thecourtre-mandedthecasetotheFAAforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththecourt’sopinion.44

Post Grand Canyon II Regulations and Assessment InthewakeofGrand Canyon II,theFAAandNPSwentbacktothedraw-ing board in an effort to comply withthe mandate of the Circuit Court ofAppeals.TheFAAissuedanewsupple-mentalnoticeofproposedrulemaking(“SNPRM”) in which it renewed theconceptofcategorizingaircraftbytheirrelative “noise efficiency.”45The NPSissuedanoticeinwhichitclarifiedthatthedefinitionof“theday”means“anygivenday;thatis...naturalquietmustbesubstantiallyrestoredatGCNPonanygivendayoftheyear.”46Aboutthissame time, theFAAandNPSbeganworkingtogethertoresolvedifferencesintheapproachthetwoagencieshadbeenusingtowardnoisemitigationatGCNP.47Theculminationof theseef-fortswasthatinMarch,2005,theFAAandNPSjointlyannouncedthecreationof theGrandCanyonWorkingGroup(GCWG),asubdivisionoftheNationalParksOverflightAdvisoryGroup(NPO-AG)whichtheFAAcreatedafterGrand Canyon II.48The FAA simultaneouslyreleaseditsfinalruleregulatingflightsatGCNP(the“2005Rule”),thestatedpurposeofwhichistoclassifyaircraftused incommercialsightseeingflightoperations over GCNP by the noisetheyproduce.49

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”

21

Commercial Aircraft Overflights at GCNP and Other National Parks Not long after the 2005 Rule waspublished,theGCWGbeganworkingondevelopingadditionalrecommenda-tionsinanefforttoachievethehard-foughtnoisestandardsestablishedasa resultofGrand Canyon Iand II. InanticipationofthefirstGCWGmeeting,SenatorJohnMcCainsenttheFAAandNPSaletterinwhichheexplainedthatCongressdidnotintendfortheOver-flightsAct“toregulatecommercialair-craftflyingatornearcruisingaltitudes”over GCNP.50 In response, the FAAandNPSstated that the languageoftheOverflightsActgoverning“aircraft”noiseimpactsattheGrandCanyonisnotexplicitlylimitedtosightseeingair-craft,andthat“withoutspecificlegisla-tiveauthority,[theFAAandNPS]donothavetheabilitytolimittheapplicationoftheOverflightsActtoairtouropera-tors.”51Theletterfurtherstated:

“[N]PS and FAA are working tocomplete the analysis of theextenttowhichsubstantialresto-rationofnaturalquiethasbeenachievedornotachievedwhen all aircraft noise, rather than air tour noise only, is included in the analysis...[o]urresearchtodatehas indicated thatcom-mercial and general aviation aircraft in the enroute systemareaudibleatgroundlevel,giventheextremely lownaturalambi-ent noise levels in the GrandCanyon.”52

TheresultshavebeensimilaratZionNationalParkwheretheGrandCanyonTrustsuedtheFAAforfailingtoconductanEISwithrespect toenvironmentalimpactsresultingfromaproposedre-placementairportatSt.George,Utah.53TheFAAconductedafullEISaftertheD.C.CircuitCourtagainfoundthattheFAAhadfailedtocomplywiththere-quirementsofNEPA.54InJune,2006,CongressmanDonYoung,ChairmanoftheHouseCommitteeonTransporta-tionandInfrastructure,wrotetotheFAAandcommentedontheFinalEIS:

[M]uchofthenewfoundinterestin potential noise impacts from

aircraftoperations in thevicinityofnationalparksisanoutgrowthofeffortsbytheFAAandNPStodealwithsafetyandnoiseissuesrelatedtoair tour operationsoverGrandCanyonNationalParkandotherunitsoftheNPS...Unfor-tunately, due to overzealous in-terpretationsandfaultycourtde-cisions,theseeffortshavebeengreatly expanded to include allaircraftoperationsinthevicinityofaNationalPark,whichcanmeanasmuchasseveralhundredmilesawayandatallaltitudes.55

TheoneparagraphFAAresponsetoCongressmanYoungindicatedthattheFAA“believe[s]itnecessarytoconductextensivenoiseanalysispresentedintheEIStofullyandthoughtfullyrespondtothecommentsandconcernsofthecourt, other Federal agencies, thepublic,and to satisfy NEPA and other legal requirements.”56 Clearly, theFAAnowviewsNEPAasrequiringthatit consider commercial aircraft whenevaluatingandmanagingthecumula-tiveimpactofaircraftnoiseonnationalparks.

GAO Reports on Aircraft Noise In September, 2001, the GAOsubmitted itsreportentitled,“Aviationand the Environment –Transition toQuieterAircraftOccurredasPlanned,but Concerns about Noise Persist.”57Thevery titleof this report foreshad-ows its findings: public opposition toairportexpansioncontinuestoincreasedespitethefactthatfewerpeopleareexposed to aircraft noise as a resultof the transition to quieter aircraft bycommercialairlines.58TheGAOreportofferswhatwouldotherwisebeaverylaudablestatistic:thetransitiontoqui-eteraircraftresultedinadeclineinthepopulation exposed to unacceptablelevelsofnoisefrom2.7millionpeoplein1990,to444,000peoplein2000–an83% reduction.59 But the report alsostatesthatina1999-2000surveyofthenation’s50busiestcommercialairports,theGAOfoundthat35airportsreportedthat“overhalfofthenoisecomplaintsintheprecedingyearhadcomefrompersons living in areas whose noise

levelsFAAconsiderscompatiblewithresidentialdevelopment.”60

OnOctober24,2007,theGAOre-leasedareportdetailingitsmorerecentfindingthat,althoughaircraftoperationshavebecomequieter,“aviationnoiseisstillaproblemwhencommunitiesallowincompatiblelanduses,”and“airspaceredesignefforts...mayexposesomepreviouslyunaffectedcommunities tonoise,raisingconcernsinthosecom-munitiesabouthighernoise levels.”61Remarkably,theGAOcitedFAAdataindicatingthat“noisemitigationeffortsoverthelast35yearshavereducedbyover90percentthenumberofpeopleaffected by significant aviation noiselevels - defined as a 65-decible daynightlevel(DNL65dB)orgreater—de-spitenationwide increases inpopula-tionandairtraffic.”

Ramifications for Aircraft Noise Management and Commercial Aviation Taken together, the GAO findingsanddevelopmentsatGCNPandZionNational Park offer some interestinginsights with respect what the futuremay hold for aircraft noise manage-ment,andcommercialaviation:

1.Quiet is a relative term As the GCNP litigation illustrates,“quiet”canbedefinedinmanyways.Forinstance,a“quiet”citystreetmaystillhavenoise - just lessnoise thana comparatively louder city street.Similarly,ajackhammeroperatormaydefine“quiet”differently thana librar-ian.Accordingly,thedefinitionof“quiet”iscontextual,anda“onesizefitsall”approach does not apply. Moreover,“quiet” is a moving target, and whatsomemayconsider“quiet”todaymaynotmeet thatdefinition tomorrow.Assuch,onemustunderstandthat“quiet”isafluidtermofart,notalawofphys-ics.Futurenoisemanagementeffortswilllikelyfocusasmuchonarrivingatasharedsetofdefinitionsasitwillthemethodologyemployedtoensurethatthestandardsderivedfromsuchdefini-tionsaremet.

2.Quieter is not the same as quiet The commercial aviation industry

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”

22

has made a great deal of progressin reducing aircraft noise, but as theGAO reports point out, aircraft noisecomplaintscontinuetoincreasedespitetheuseofdramaticallyquieteraircraft.This apparent dichotomy should notbesurprising.Asafriendofmineoncesaid:“ifyoumadeaircrafttotallysilent,people would still complain aboutseeing them.”Although some mightconsiderthispositionabsurd,thereal-ityisthatonlytheabsenceofaircraftsound aircraft results in silence, andfor some, only silence is acceptable.Those involved in noise assessmentandmitigationwillneedtoaddresstheconcernsofindividualsandorganiza-tionsregardlessofhowextremetheirpositionsmayappear.Thequestionofwhetheritispossibletoachievesilencemayseemabsurdtosome,butitisaquestionthatmanyofthoseimpactedby aircraft noise consider worth ask-ing.

3.Sociological impacts may supple-ment acoustic measurement ThereisnoquestionthattheFAA’sDNL65dBnoisecontourhasbeenauseful tool in aircraft noise manage-mentefforts,butitmaybetimetore-considertherelevanceofthisstandardtonoisemitigationefforts. In itsmostbasic form, the GCNP litigation wasaboutcompetingvaluesbetweenusergroups.Althoughthecontextisdiffer-ent, thevaluesof those impactedbyaircraftnoiseincommunitiesadjacentto airports/heliports is at the core ofaircraftnoisecomplaints.Futurenoisemanagement efforts may include theconsideration of such values, alongwiththevaluesofthecommercialavia-tionindustry,inthenoisemanagementequation.Suchanapproachwilllikelyinvolve the evaluation of sociologicalfactors extending beyond the funda-mentalimpacts(e.g.eating,sleeping,andworking)uponwhichtheDNL65dB noise contour is based. Further,noisecontoursextendingtotheouterlimitsofaircraftaudibilityand/ordetect-ability will likely be considered, anddifferentnoisemanagementtoolswillbeappliedtoeach.

4.Aircraft “noise efficiency” is almost

certain to play a role in future noise management efforts Theaircraftnoiseefficiencycatego-ries established at GCNPmay serveasabasisforsimilarcategorizationofaircraftthroughouttheaviationindustry.Theconceptisfartoologicaltoignore:aircraftproducinglessnoiseper seatorper pound of cargoshouldbegivenpriority over “less efficient” aircraft.Putanotherway,onemightarguethataircraft producing the same amountofnoiseshouldnotbetreatedequallywheresuchaircraftdonotproduceanequalbenefittosociety.Suchunequaltreatment might result in preferentialtimeslots,flightroutes,orflightprofiles,formorenoiseefficientaircraft.

5.NEPA and other federal laws will be used to reduce aircraft noise impacts in other national parks and in areas outside of national parks TheNationalParkSystemconsistsof391unitsencompassingover84mil-lionacresinvirtuallyeverystate.62Theprecedent established at GCNP andZionNationalParkrequirestheFAAtoconsidereverytypeofaircraftoverflightwhenevaluatingthecumulativeimpactofaircraftnoiseonNationalParkunits.WithoutCongressionalintervention,itislikelythattheFAAwillconstrueNEPA,and other federal laws such as theOverflightsActandEndangeredSpe-ciesAct,asrequiringtheFAAtoassessandmanagecommercialaircraftnoiseimpactsinothernationalparks.More-over,thosewhowishtoreduceaircraftnoiseimpactsonotherprotectedlands,such as wilderness and preservationareas, will cite these federal laws incourtchallengestoairportandairwaydevelopment.

6.National Park groups offer lessons in consensus building Whateverthefuturemayholdforthecommercialaviationindustry,itisclearthatsuchafuture isdependentupontheabilityoftheindustrytosuccessfullybuildaconsensuswiththosewhohavethemostdirectstakeinaircraftnoisemanagement efforts.The concept ofconsensusbuildingisnotnewtoairportofficials who have been dealing withaircraft noise issues for years. How-

ever, themethodsemployedbynon-airport groups, such as the NPOAGandGCWG,todealwiththornynoisemanagementissuesmaybeofvaluetoairportofficialsandotherschargedwiththeresponsibilityofaddressingtheseissues.Thealternativedisputeresolu-tionmodelsdevelopedandemployedbynon-airportgroupswill likelymaketheirwayintofuturelocalaircraftnoisemanagementefforts,aswellasaircraftnoisecertificationstandards.

Conclusion Airportofficials,airlines,andaircraftmanufacturersalike,shouldrecognizethattheevolutionofaircraftnoiseman-agementnowoccurringinournationalparkswilllikelyimpact t h e c o m -mercial aviation industry nationwide.Rather thanfearsuchdevelopments,thecommercialaviationindustrywouldbe well-served to study the lessonslearned from national park aircraftnoisemanagementefforts,andtobe-ginlayingthegroundworktousetheselessonstoaddressaircraftnoisecon-cernsnationally. It isclear fromGAOreports that the problems associatedwithaircraftnoisearenotgoingtogoawayifgovernmentandindustrycon-tinueonthepresentcourseofsimplyreducingaircraftsound,changingflightprofiles,andinsulatinghomes.Anewresultrequiresanewapproach,andinnationalparksatleast,anewapproachisalreadyunderway.

Endnotes:1 Copyright©2004byAmericanBarAssocia-tion;DanielW.Anderson.Portionsofthefollow-ingarticlearereprintedhereinwithpermission:In Pursuit of ‘Natural Quiet’: The Latest On Noise For Airports And Airlines,ABAAir&SpaceLaw-yer(18-WTRAir&SpaceLaw.8).2 DanielW.Anderson isaPartneratForizs&Dogali,P.L. inTampa,Florida,andpracticesaviation lawandgeneral civil litigation.Priortobecominganattorney,Mr.AndersonservedasPresidentof theUnitedStatesAirTourAs-sociation (USATA), representing the interestsairplaneandhelicoptertouroperatorsatnationalparksthroughouttheU.S..Mr.AndersonhasnotworkedfororotherwiserepresentedtheUSATAsinceMarch,1997.3 49U.S.C.§44715.4 SeeNoise News for Week of June 26, 1994(availableathttp://www.nonoise.org/news/1994/jun26.htm)(lastvisitedOctober26,2007).5 See id.;PublicLaw100-91.

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”

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6 PublicLaw100-91at§1(a),(c);16U.S.C.A.§1a-1.7 PublicLaw100-91at§1(d)(emphasisadd-ed).8 PublicLaw100-91at§3(b)(1)-(2). In theeventthattheFAAdeterminestheNPSrecom-mendationswilladverselyimpactsafety,howev-er,theFAA’sdutydoesnotendthere.ThesameprovisionsoftheOverflightsActfurtherrequirethat,inthatevent,theFAAmustissueregulationswhichsubstantially restorenaturalquietwhileeliminatingtheadverseeffectsonaviationsafetywhichwouldotherwise result from theoriginalNPSrecommendations.TheOverflightsActalsohasabuilt-inmonitoringprovisionwhichrequirestheFAAtoreportbacktoCongressonwhetherthe regulationswereeffective insubstantiallyrestoringnaturalquiet.9 Report to the United States Congress Pursu-ant to Section 804 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21stCentury (AIR-21),FederalAviationAdministration (Au-gust2001).10 Id.11 Report on the Effects of Aircraft Overflights on the National Park System, NationalParkService,U.S.DepartmentofInterior(1995).12 Id.At60.13 Id.; Environmental Assessment: Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon Na-tional Park,FederalAviationAdministration,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation(December1996);see alsoUnited States Air Tour Association v. Federal Aviation Administration,298F.3d997,1001-02 (D.C.Cir.2002)(cert. den. ByAirStar Helicopters, Inc. v. F.A.A.,123S.Ct.1783(U.S.2003);Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA,154F.3d455,460-64(D.C.Cir.1998)(cert. den.byGrand Canyon Trust v. F.A.A.,526U.S.1158(U.S.1999)(hereinafter“GrandCanyonI”).14 Id.15 Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park,FederalAviationAdmin-istration,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation,61Fed.Reg.69302 (December31,1996);Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition,154F.3dat462-63.16 Noise Limitations for Aircraft Operations in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park,61Fed.Red.69334,FederalAviationAdministra-tion,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation(Decem-ber31,1996)17 Id.18 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition,154F.3dat559-60.Litigantsincluded13airtouroperatorsledbytheGrandCanyonAirTourCoalition,theClarkCountyDepartmentofAviation, theLasVegasConventionandVisitorsAuthority, theHualapaiIndianTribe,andsevenenvironmentalgroups ledby theGrandCanyonTrust. Id.at459.Onlytheissuesraisedbyairtouroperatorsandenvironmentalgroupsarediscussedherein.Theauthor,anon-lawyeratthetimethisactionwasfiled,wasinvolvedinobtainingcounselfortheairtouroperators,andprovidingcounselwithinformationrelatedtothislitigation.19 Id. at465-66.20 Id. 21 Id. at476.22 Id. at466-72.23 Id.at466-69.

24 Id.at464.Although theFAAhadalreadycapped thenumberofaircraft thatair tourop-eratorscouldutilizeinconductingairtoursoverGCNP,ithadnotlimitedthenumberofflightsthatoperatorscouldconduct.25 SeeChange in Noise Evaluation Methodol-ogy for Air Tour Operations Over Grand Canyon National Park,NationalParkService,U.S.De-partmentof Interior,64Fed.Reg.38006(July14,1999).26 Review of Scientific Basis for Change in Noise Impact Assessment Method Used at Grand Canyon National Park,NationalParkService,U.S.DepartmentofInterior(January2000).27 Final Supplemental Environmental Assess-ment: Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park,FederalAviationAdministration,U.S.DepartmentofTransporta-tion(February2000).28 Id.at4-12,4-18,F-4.Itisimportanttonotethat,asdiscussedsupra,theNPSdefinitionof“naturalquiet”meansthatnoaircraftareaudibletothehumanear,andthat“substantialrestora-tion”willoccurwhen50%ormoreof theparkachievesnaturalquietfor75to100%of the day.TheFAA’spronouncementof its interpretationof“theday”tomean“averageannualday”wasthereforea significant event, andonewhichwouldlaterleadtoconsiderablecontroversy.29 Commercial Air Tour Limitation in the Grand Canyon National Park Special Flight Rules Area,65Fed.Reg.17708,FederalAviationAdministra-tion,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation(April4,2000)(codifiedat14C.F.R.§§93.303-93.325).Underthe2000Rule,airtouroperatorswerelim-itedtoconductingthesameorfewerflightsintheParkthantheyconductedduringthebaseyearofMay1,1997throughApril30,1998,pursuantto14C.F.R.§93.319(a),(b).30 See 65Fed.Reg.17708at17713.31 See id.at17714.32 United States Air Tour Association v. Federal Aviation Administration,298F.3d997,1005(D.C.Cir.2002)(cert. den. byAirStar Helicopters, Inc. v. F.A.A.,123S.Ct.1783(U.S.2003)(hereinafter“GrandCanyonII”).InGrandCanyonII,litigantsincludedtheUnitedStatesAirTourAssociation,“atradeorganizationwhosemembersflyairtoursoverthePark,”andagroupofsixenvironmentalgroupsledbytheGrandCanyonTrust.Id. Theauthorwasnotinvolvedinthislitigation.33 Id.34 Id.at1015.Asdiscussedsupra,thisisthetandardfordeterminingwhethernaturalquiethadbeenrestoredtocertainareasofthepark,orinotherwords,whether50%ormoreoftheparkachievesnaturalquietfor75to100%oftheday,astheNPShaddefined“substantialrestoration”inits1994reporttoCongress.35 Id.at1018.36 Id.at1005-12.Thecourtalsostated that“[t]heSupremeCourthasrejectedtheargumentthatanagency’sinterpretationisnotentitledtodeferencebecauseitrepresentsasharpbreakwithpriorinterpretations’ofthestatuteinques-tion.”Id. at1006(citing Rust v. Sullivan,500U.S.173 (1991)) (citationsand internalquotationsomitted).37 Seeid.at1006;Change in Noise Evaluation Methodology for Air Tour Operations Over Grand Canyon National Park,NationalParkService,

U.S.DepartmentofInterior,64Fed.Reg.38006(July14,1999).38 Grand Canyon II,298F.3dat1006.39 Id.40 Id. at1007citingChange in Noise Evaluation Methodology for Air Tour Operations Over Grand Canyon National Park,NationalParkService,U.S.DepartmentofInterior,64Fed.Reg.38006(July14,1999).41 Id.at1015-1018.Asthecourtstated,“[t]heproblemfortheFAA...isthatitisnottheParkService,and ‘deference is inappropriatewhen[anagency] interpretsregulationspromulgatedbyadifferentagency.’” Id.at1015 (citing Of-fice of Pers. Mgm’t v. FLRA,864F.2d165,171(D.C.Cir.1988)andDep’t of the Treasury v. FLRA,837F.2d1163,1167(D.C.Cir.1988)).42 Id.at1018-19.43 Id.at1019.44 Id.45 Noise Limitations for Aircraft Operations in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, 68Fed.Reg.14276,FederalAviationAdministra-tion,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation(March24,2003).46 Clarification of the Term the day in the Defini-tion of Substantial Restoration of Natural Quiet for Grand Canyon NP, NationalParkService,U.S.Departmentof Interior,68Fed.Reg.216(November7,2003).Whencombinedwith thedefinitionof “substantial restoration”discussedsupra,theresultisthat50%ormoreoftheparkmustachievenaturalquietfor75to100%ofanygivenday.47 Overflights - Chronology of Significant Events,NationalParkService,U.S.Depart-mentof Interior (availableat http://www.nps.gov/grca/naturescience/airoverflights_chrono.htm)(lastvisitedNovember7,2007).48 Membership in the Grand Canyon Working Group of the National Parks Overflights Advi-sory Group Aviation Rulemaking Committee,70Fed.Reg.16327,FederalAviationAdministra-tion,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation(March30,2005);FAAOrder1110-138 (October10,2003).49 Membership in the Grand Canyon Working Group of the National Parks Overflights Advisory Group Aviation Rulemaking Committee,70Fed.Reg.16327,FederalAviationAdministration,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation (March30,2005);Noise Limitations for Aircraft Operations in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park,70Fed.Reg.1684,FederalAviationAdministration,U.S.DepartmentofTransportation (March30,2005).50 CorrespondencedatedJuly12,2005fromSenatorJohnMcCaintoMarionBlakey(Admin-istrator,FAA)andFranP.Mainella (Director,NPS).51 Id.52 CorrespondencedatedSeptember22,2005,fromSharonPinkerton(FAA)andPaulHoffman(NPS),toSenatorJohnMcCain.53 Grand Canyon Trust v. F.A.A.,290F.3d339(D.C.Cir.2002).54 Id. at347.55 Correspondence dated June 30, 2006,from Congressman Don Young to MarionC. Blakey (Administrator, FAA)(emphasis in

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original)(availableonlineathttp://www.airport-sites.net/sgu-eis/Pages_PDF/2-App%20A-RTC_8-17-06.pdf)(lastvisitedNovember14,2007).56 Record of Decision for the Final Environmen-tal Impact Statement, St. George Replacement Airport, St. George, Washington County, UT, FederalAviationAdministration, U.S. Department ofTransportation (August 21, 2006)(emphasisadded)(noticeofavailabilitypublishedat71Fed.

In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”

Reg.50497)(availableonlineathttp://www.air-portsites.net/sgu-eis/Pages_PDF/2-App%20A-RTC_8-17-06.pdf)(last visitedNovember14,2007).57 Aviation and the Environment – Transition to Quieter Aircraft Occurred as Planned, But Concerns About Noise Persist, AviationandtheEnvironment,GAO-01-1053(Sept.2001).58 Id.atp.2,13-1459 See id. atp.2.

60 Id.atp.13.61 Aviation and the Environment – Impact of Aviation Noise on Communities Presents Chal-lenges for Airport Operations and Future Growth of the National Airspace System, AviationandtheEnvironment,GAO-08-216T (October24,2007).bj Frequently Asked Questions,NationalParkService (availableathttp://www.nps.gov/faqs.htm)(lastvisitedNovember14,2007).

Design and layout: Lynn Brady, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee