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TheRuleofLaw,JudicialIndependenceandJudicialDiscretion

20January2016

TheHonourableJusticeMatthewPalmerJudgeoftheHighCourtofNewZealandKwaGeokChooDistinguishedVisitorNationalUniversityofSingapore

Engāwaka,engāmana,engāreo, tēnākoutou, tēnākoutou, tēnākoutoukatoa.

Justice Coomaraswamy, fellow judges, Dean Chesterman and faculty, ladies and

gentlemen,friendsandcolleaguesandmyfamily.

Iamhonouredtoaddresssuchadistinguishedandinterestingaudience. AndIam

honouredtodosoastheKwaGeokChooDistinguishedVisitoratNUS.In1936at16

yearsofageMadamKwaGeokChoowasthetopstudentacrossallofMalayainthe

seniorCambridgeexamswhereshewentontostudylaw,gainingfirstclasshonours

in twoyears. Shewasawell-knownpartner inLeeandLee. Shehelpeddraft the

PAPconstitutionandthewater rightsagreementbetweenSingaporeandMalaysia

afterseparation.Shewasapublicchampionforwomen’srightsinSingaporeaswell

asamuchlovedwifeandmother.Iknowsomethingoftheinfluencethatwivesand

mothers can have on public officers; in providing firm, trusted but different

perspectives on all sorts of issues. I am quite sure thatMadam Kwa contributed

significantlytotheshapeofthenationstatethatisSingapore.

Mytopictonightstartsandendswiththeruleof lawand judicial independence. I

offer you a concept and applications to four different topics: international

commercialdisputeresolution;judicialreview;judicialdiscretionandconstitutional

dialogue.Thisissomewhatinthenatureofasmorgasbordoratapasmenu.Ihope

everyonewillfindsomethingtotheirtaste–sometopicsmightbeswallowedwhole,

somemightbealittlepiquant,othersratherchewyandatleastoneamealinitself.

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TheRuleofLaw

FirstIshouldsaywhat,forme,istheruleoflaw;andwhatitisnot.

I emphasise “for me” because the rule of law is simultaneously ubiquitous and

uncertain. It is ubiquitous in its appeal; not only to lawyers and judges but to

academics and media commentators, and to politicians of all stripes. Professor

TamanahaquotesRobertMugabeofZimbabweasstating“[o]nlyagovernmentthat

subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral right to demand of its citizens

obedience to the rule of law.”1 Professor JeremyWaldron, an eminent jurisprude

who is from New Zealand though based in the US, discussed the appeal to the

rhetoric of the rule of lawbyboth sides ofUS legal and political debate over the

2000electionandthecaseofBushvGore.2

Perhaps thewideappealof the ruleof law is related to theuncertaintyabout the

concept. Waldron suggests the rule of law is “an essentially contested concept”

whichcanbeusedtomeanlittlemorethan“hoorayforourside”.3Certainlythere

aresignificantdifferencesinthecontentoftheruleoflawasitisenvisagedbylegal

theorist Joseph Raz compared to Ronald Dworkin or, say, that great British judge

Lord Bingham. In what has been chararacterised as a “formal” conception, Raz

suggests that the ruleof lawmeans that lawsmustbepassed in the correct legal

mannerandshouldbecapableofguidingone’sconductinorderthatonecanplan

one’slife.4Fromthishederivesafamiliarlistofspecificattributesoftheruleoflaw

suchasprospectivity,stability,clarity,anindependentjudiciary,accesstocourtsand

therequirementthatadministrativediscretionshouldnotunderminethepurposes

oflegalrules.

1 Brian Z TamanahaOn theRule of Law:History, Politics, Theory (CambridgeUniversity Press,

Cambridge,2004)at2.2 JeremyWaldron“Istheruleoflawanessentiallycontestedconcept(inFlorida)”(2002)21(2)

Law&Philosophy137.3 At141.4 JosephRaz“TheRuleofLawanditsVirtue”(1977)93LQR195;seealsoJosephRazEthicsinthe

PublicDomain,EssaysontheMoralityofLawandPolitics(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1994).

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By contrast, the late Lord Bingham’s elegant 2006 David Williams lecture,

subsequentarticleandthenbookidentifyeightprincipleslyingbehindthe“core”of

theprincipleoftheruleoflawthat“thatallpersonsandauthoritieswithinthestate,

whetherpublicorprivate, shouldbeboundbyandentitled to thebenefitof laws

publiclymade,takingeffect(generally)inthefutureandpubliclyadministeredinthe

courts”. 5 One of these principles, for example, is that “the law must afford

adequateprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights”.

In my previous academic writings I have espoused an approach to constitutional

theory based on legal realism. This is an approach to the description and

understandingoflegalphenomena,nottotheirnormativevalue.Butasarealist,at

thispoint,Ioughttodeclaremyownconceptionoftheruleoflaw.

AsInotedina2007article,anda2008book,mydefinitioncentresoncertaintyand

thefreedomfromarbitrarinessinthelaw.6Itinvolvestakingseriouslythewordsof

thephrase“theruleof law”andattemptstohone inonthefunctionalpurposeof

theruleoflawinconstitutionaldesign.AsajudgeIcannowassertauthoritatively

thatsuchanapproachmarriesbothtextandpurpose. Iseekthecoreelementsof

thedoctrinethatarecommontomostothers’accounts,thatarelikelytobewidely

accepted,andthatcanbesimplyandcoherentlystatedsothattheruleoflawcan,

relativelyeasily,begraspedandapplied.

I consider that the phrase itself suggests there is some distinctly separate or

objectivemeaningtolawthatisindependentofhumaninterests.Itislawitselfthat

rulesandthatshouldrule.Isuggestthisdefinition:

Theruleoflawrequiresthatthemeaningofalawasitisappliedis:

• Independentoftheinterestsofthosewhomadethelaw;and

5 TomBinghamTheRuleofLaw(PenguinBooks,London,2010)at8.6 MatthewSRPalmer“NewZealandConstitutionalCulture” (2007)22NZULR565at586-589;

Matthew S R Palmer, The Treaty ofWaitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (VUP,Wellington,2008)at285-289.

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• Independentoftheinterestsofthosewhoapplythelaw;and

• Independent of the interests of those to whom it is applied; and, Ithink,

• Independentofthetimeatwhichitisapplied.

Thisformulationemphasisesthattheruleoflawisanideal–whichmayexplainthe

contestover its content. All law is,of course,ahumanconstruct– formulatedby

humans, applied by humans, to humans. Wemust all accept by now that giving

meaning to words is inherently an interpretative exercise by an interpretive

communitycomposedofhumanactors.

But Isuggestthatthe idealforwhichtheruleof lawstrives istoremove,asfaras

practical,the influenceofthe interestsofparticularhumanactors. Theessenceof

theconceptoftheruleoflawseekstoadvancejusticebyinvokingaRawlsianveilof

ignoranceofone’sparticularinterestsinrelationtothecontentoflaw.7Removing

humaninterestsfromdecisionsmadethroughhumanagentsmustbeanideal–like

a limit approached but never reached through differential calculus. But aworthy

idealisworthattemptingtoapproach,aswellastoencapsulateclearly.

Itcanalsobeseenhowthisconceptionoftheruleoflawisintimatelyboundupwith

theseparationofpowersandjudicialindependence.Theseparationofpowersisa

necessary(butnotsufficient)conditionfortheruleof law. Ifa lawmakernotonly

makesbutalso interpretsandapplies the law then themeaningof the law that is

interpreted and appliedwillmore likely reside in the lawmaker’s intention at the

timeitisapplied.Thelawmaker/interpretercanretrospectivelyidentifyinthelaw

“whatImeantatthetime”evenifthatwasnotpresentorevidentinthelegaltextat

the time. It is this aspect of the combination ofmaking and applying law that is

contrarytotheruleoflaw–themeaningofthelawwouldbecomethatwhichthe

makerandapplier laterdeems,potentiallyarbitrarily, tobecorrect - ratherthana

7 JohnRawlsATheoryofJustice(BelknapPress,Harvard,1971).

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meaning that resides in the law itself. Law would not rule; it would have no

independentmeaning.Thelawmakerandapplierwouldrule.

I do not imagine that the separation of powers doctrine is controversial either in

New Zealand or Singapore. I do, though, propose to consider tonight what that

separation really requires. Does the separation of powers require only that the

identityof the individualswhomakeandapply lawbeseparateanddifferent? Or

doesitrequirethattheirperspectivesormindsetsarealsoseparateanddifferent?I

returntothislaterinmyaddress.

Fornow,Isimplysuggestthatmyconceptionoftheruleoflawzeroesinonessential

underpinningsthatarecommontothemostinfluentialcommentators.Itistherule

oflaw,notmanorwoman.Andnomanorwomancanbeabovethelaw,torecall

Professor Albert Venn Dicey. It requires that laws be public so that all those to

whomitisappliedhaveequalopportunitytoobservelaw.Itrequiresthatlawsbe

prospective for the same reason. It requires that laws are applied through a fair

hearing so as to be independent of the interests of those who apply them.

Generality,certaintyandfreedomfromarbitrarinessarecoretotheconcept.

Butobservealsowhattheruleoflawisnot,accordingtomyconception.Iyieldto

nooneincommitmenttohumanrights.ButImostrespectfullydisagreewithLord

Bingham.Idonotconsiderthathumanrights isanecessaryelementoftheruleof

law.Itisaseparateconceptwithaseparatejustificationandbasis.Iacceptthat,as

such,theconceptionIoffer,followsRazasbeingmoreinthetraditionofthe“formal”

rather than “substantive” theories of the rule of law, according to the dichotomy

analysedbyPaulCraigandothers,8orDworkin’s“rulebookconception”ratherthan

his“rightsbased”theorywhichmergestheruleoflawwithhistheoryoflawitself.9

8 PaulCraig“FormalandSubstantiveConceptionsoftheRuleofLaw:AnAnalyticalFramework”

[1997]PL467(thoughIsuggestthatmyconceptionisnot“formalist”inthesenseofrelatingonlytoprocedure,becauseitisconcernedwiththesubstanceofalaw).Similarly,itismoreofa“formalist”idealthana“historicist”,“legalprocess”or“substantive”idealintermsofafour-part classification proposed by Richard H Fallon “’The Rule of Law’ as a Concept inConstitutionalDiscourse”97ColumbLRev1(1997).

9 RonaldDworkinAMatterofPrinciple(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1985).

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Imaintainthat,fortheruleoflawtoremainausefulconcept,itshouldbeconfined

to itsessence. Otherwise Iworry that,becauseof theapparentgenericappealof

the term there is a great temptation to freight it with aspects of all those other

fundamental legal concepts that are also appealing. This will end in messy

incoherence, as perhaps it has already. Further, such doctrinal incoherence risks

constitutional incoherence in systems where, as Lord Hope said of the United

Kingdom,““[t]heruleoflawenforcedbythecourtsistheultimatecontrollingfactor

onwhichourconstitutionisbased.”10 InNovember2015,Singapore’sChiefJustice

Menon reiterated this in a judicial review judgment challenging the legality of an

orderdetainingan individualwithouttrial -TanSeetEngvAttorneyGeneral.11He

said:

Theruleoflawisthebedrockonwhichoursocietywasfoundedandonwhichithasthrived. The term, the rule of law, is not one that admits of a fixed or precisedefinition.However,oneofitscoreideasisthenotionthatthepoweroftheStateisvested in the various armsof government and that suchpower is subject to legallimits.But itwouldbemeaninglesstospeakofpowerbeing limitedweretherenorecourse to determinewhether, how, and inwhat circumstances those limits hadbeen exceeded. Under our system of government, which is based on theWestminstermodel,thattaskfallsupontheJudiciary.Judgesareentrustedwiththetaskofensuringthatanyexerciseofstatepowerisdonewithinlegallimits.In2012,at theRuleof LawSymposium thatwasheld inSingapore,ProfBrianZTamanahaobservedthatjudgeshavethespecifictaskofensuringthatthearmsofgovernmentareheldtothelaw,andinthatsense,theultimateresponsibilityformaintainingasystemwhichabidesbytheruleoflawlieswiththeJudiciary.12

It even risks legal incoherence in systems, such as New Zealand, where law

practitioners are under a statutory duty imposed by s 4(a) of the Lawyers and

ConveyancersAct2006 to “comply”with the “fundamentalobligation” to “uphold

the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice in New Zealand”. I

understand there is no equivalent statutory duty in Singapore's Legal Profession

Act.13But advocates and solicitors in Singapore's legal profession might well be

foundbythejudiciarytohavethesameduty.AsthepresentAttorney-Generaland

10 JacksonvAttorney-General[2005]UKHL56,[2006]1AC262at[107].11 TanSeetEngvAttorneyGeneral[2015]SGCA59at[1].12 CitingTamanaha"TheHistoryandElementsoftheRuleofLaw"[2012]SJLS232at244.13 LegalProfessionAct(Cap161,2009RevEd).

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formerJusticeVKRajahsaidinPublicTrusteeandanothervByProductsTradersPte

Ltd:14

Inthefinalanalysis,solicitors,asofficersofthecourt,mustintheirdealingswiththecourt, acknowledge that their obligations to the court reign supreme, over andabove their client's and their own interests. When they enter the profession,solicitorsacceptaresponsibilitytoassist inupholdingtheruleof law.Tofulfil thatresponsibility, theymust be committed to ensuring the sanctity and soundness ofthelegalsystemandtheadministrationofjustice.Solicitorsmustaidandassist,andneverimpairthecourt'sabilitytodischargeitsimpartialadjudicatoryresponsibilities.

Forme,theriskofincoherenceofthenotionoftheruleoflawisgreatenoughthat

(withasmallcaveatIneednotpausetoexplain)IjoinJosephRazwhosaysthat:15

..theruleoflawisjustoneofthevirtuesbywhichalegalsystemmaybejudgedandbywhichitistobejudged.Itisnottobeconfusedwithdemocracy,justice,equality(beforethelaworotherwise),humanrightsofanykindorrespectforpersonsorforthedignityofman.

Democracy, justice and human rights stand on their own feet, with their own

meanings.Asdoestheruleoflaw.Theseconceptsmustbedistinctinordertobe

useful,eveniftheyareinter-related.

InternationalCommercialDisputeResolution

Somuchfortheoreticalthroat-clearing. Letmemovenowtosomeapplicationsof

myconceptionoftheruleoflaw.

First, and relatively briefly, international commercial dispute resolution – a topic

withwhichSingaporeiswellfamiliar.

Economicactivityrequiresaframeworkofstablebehaviouralexpectationsinorder

tofunctionmosteffectivelyandefficiently. Inthelanguageof lawandeconomics,

unpredictability of behaviour, especially of the legal frameworks that govern

behaviour,causedbytheabsenceor lackofclarity in thedefault rulesofproperty

14 Public Trustee and another v By Products Traders Pte Ltd and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 449;

[2005]SGHC103at[57].15 JosephRaz“TheRuleofLawanditsVirtue”(1977)93LQR195at196.

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and liability,causetransactionscostsand informationasymmetriesthatcan inhibit

efficienteconomicexchange.

This iswhythedoctrineoftheruleof law is importantnotonly inaconstitutional

but in an economic sense. The rule of law, manifested in the concept I have

advancedtoday,militatesagainstthelawmeaningsomethingthatdependsonwho

madeit,orwhoappliedit,ortowhomitisapplied,orthatdependsonthetimeat

whichitisapplied.

Ina very realway the ruleof law is a countervailing forceagainstarbitraryuseof

executiveandlegislativepower.Wearefamiliarwiththeconstitutionalreasonsfor

that.Butmypointhereisthatarbitraryuseofeitherexecutiveorlegislativepower

can also be directly detrimental to the stability of the behavioural expectations

necessary for efficient economic exchange. That is as true of the rule of

internationallawasitisoftheruleofdomesticlaw.

Theprincipleoftheinternationalruleoflaw,inthesenseIhavedefinedit,iscrucial

to the regulatory framework for international commercial dispute resolution

becauseoftheimportanceofstabilityinbehaviouralexpectations:

• Uncertaintyoverwhethersovereigndebt lendingcanbeenforcedagainsta

reluctant sovereign, wielding the power of domestic Parliamentary

sovereignty,willonlybereflectedinahighersovereignriskpremium.Andit

willbecontrarytotheruleoflaw.

• Ifaclauseofaninternationalinvestmenttreatyfavoursorunfairlytargetsa

particularnation,ormulti-nationalcorporation,internationalinvestmentand

developmentwillbeinhibited.Anditwillbecontrarytotheruleoflaw.

• If an international tribunalappliesa rule inanewway, retrospectively, the

internationalhorsesoffinancewillbefrightened.Anditwillbecontraryto

theruleoflaw.

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• If a rule of a bilateral investment treaty is applied differently because it is

appliedornotappliedtoaparticularnation,forexampletheUnitedStates,

capitalaswellashorseswillbefrightened,fleeandbecomemoreexpensive.

Anditwillbeinconsistentwiththeruleoflaw.

This is why I suggest that it is in the interests of both sovereign nations and the

internationalcommercialcommunitytocommitthemselvestointernationaldispute

resolutionmechanismsthatcomplywiththeruleoflaw.Moreparticularly:

• Theoutcomeof adisputemustnotdependonwhohasmade the law– it

must favour all parties equally. There must not be a systemic bias, for

instance,againstdevelopingstates.

• Theoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependonwhohasappliedthelaw–we

must be able to have confidence in the independence of those resolving

disputes,suchastribunalsbeingindependentoftheincentivesonpart-time

arbiters who are otherwise international commercial litigators with a

particularongoingfinancialinterestincertainoutcomes.

• Theoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependontowhomthelawisapplied–

allborrowersandlendersmustbeequalbeforethelaw.

• Andtheoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependonwhenthelawisapplied–

law,includingthelawgoverningexpropriation,mustapplyprospectivelynot

retrospectively.

Investment treaties are international law that should conform to the same

expectationswehaveofanyformofeconomiclaw.Breachofanyoftheaspectsof

the rule of law in relation to international investments will increase the cost of

capital forus all. And just as, if notmore importantly, itwouldnotbe consistent

withafundamentalbuildingblockofourconstitutions–theruleoflaw.

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Finally on this topic I pause only to compliment the creation of the Singapore

InternationalCommercialCourtwhichIhadthepleasureofobservinginactionthis

month. Its independence appears directly to address rule of law concerns raised

about other international commercial dispute resolutionmechanisms – and I look

forwardwithinteresttoitscontributionstointernationalcommercialjurisprudence.

JudicialReview

The secondbrief application ofmy conception of the rule of law is to the judicial

reviewofadministrativeaction–atopicwithwhichNewZealandhashadextensive

experience.IdonotpurporttobefamiliarwithjudicialreviewinSingapore.

By judicial review I do not mean the judicial review of legislation by which the

judiciary may strike down legislation for inconsistency with some constitutional

instrument. The Singapore judiciary has that power under its constitution though

theNewZealandjudiciarydoesnot.

RatherImeanthejudicialreviewofadministrativeaction–or,perhaps,ofpubliclaw

decisions – the review by the judiciary of decisions by Ministers, officials or

sometimesotherbodies toexercisepublicpower. The lawof judicial reviewgrew

significantlyinthe1970sto1990sinNewZealand.Currently,NewZealandlawasit

isappliedhas littlerequirement forstanding inordertoentitlesomeonetotakea

caseanditdeploysawideconceptionofwhatdecisionsmaybechallenged.

Although there has been less development of judicial review principles in recent

years16 there appears to have been an increasing use of existing principles by

litigants.AsDeputySolicitor-GeneralandatthebarIdefended,tookandintervened

in judicial review actions against the Crown and other entities in relation to, for

example:

16 Matthew Palmer “Judicial Review” in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (eds) The

SupremeCourtofNewZealand2004-2013(ThomsonReuters,Wellington,2015)158.

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• a decision by a private television channel not to allow two political party

leadersparticipateinapartyleaders’debate;

• thenon-establishmentofaUniversitybyaMinister;

• animmigrationdecisionoftheDistrictCourt;

• theMinisterofHealth’sdecisiontosackaDistrictHealthBoard;

• asecondaryschool’sexpulsionofastudent;

• Customs’impositionofcostrecoveryfeesonaninternationalairport;

• The Minister of Commerce’s placement of a number of companies into

statutorymanagement;

• theCommissionerofInlandRevenue’simpositionoftax;

• theMinistryofPrimaryIndustries’relaxationofbiosecurityregulationofthe

importationofporkproducts;

• Customs’proposedimpositionofmillionsofdollarsofexcisedutyonapetrol

importer;

• the Environmental Protection Agency’s determination that a particular

techniquetomodifygeneswasnotgeneticmodification;

• Ministers’ decisions regarding the residential red zone created in

Christchurchfollowingtheearthquakes;

• TheAucklandCouncil’sdecisiontoextendawharfintotheharbor;and

• alocalbody’simpositionofratesonratepayersonthebasisofretrospective

Parliamentaryauthority(whereIinitiallysoughtaformaldeclarationthatthe

Actwascontrarytotheruleoflaw).

Irrespective ofwhich side I acted for I consider that the availability of the law of

judicial review to test the legality of exercises of public power is a direct

manifestationoftheruleoflaw.Ifapublicbodypurportstoexercisepublicpower

in a specific instance those concerned with that exercise must be able to ask an

independent body – the courts – whether the exercise of public power accorded

with law. If it did, no harm is done by testing the question and, indeed, public

confidenceinlawandgovernmentisenhanced.Ifanexerciseofpublicpowerwere

notmadeaccordingto lawthentheruleof lawrequiresthatbeaddressed,as it is

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whenanyotherdecision-makeracts inconsistentlywith law. To leavethedecision

totheexecutivebranch,untested,istoleavetheeffectivedeterminationofthelaw

–ajudicialfunction–totheexecutive.

AsformerJusticeSirJohnMcGrathsaid,speakingforhimselfandChiefJusticeElias

intheNewZealandSupremeCourtin2011:17

Judicialreviewisthecommonlawmeansbywhichthecourtsholdsuchofficialstoaccount.18Itprovidesthepublicwithassurancethatpublicofficialsareactingwithinthelawinexercisingtheirpowers,andareaccountableiftheydepartfromdoingso.Statutes limiting recourse to judicial review to challenge statutory decisionsaccordingly raise issues of constitutional concern. This concern is reflected in thepresumption of the courts, when interpreting such legislation, that it was notParliament’spurposetoallowdecisionmakerspowerconclusivelytodetermineanyquestionoflaw.19

Legislation which does not on its terms prohibit judicial review, but restricts itsavailability, can nevertheless interfere with full supervision by the courts of theconformityofactivitiesofgovernmentwiththeruleoflaw.Thecourtsarereluctantto read legislation in amanner that impairs their ability to hold public officials toaccountinthisway.

JudicialDiscretion

InapreviousaddressinNewZealandIoutlinedmyconceptionoftheruleoflawand

applied it to legislation inNewZealand.20 I called for the independent andpublic

assessmentofdraftlegislationasitprogressesthroughtheNewZealandParliament

forconsistencywiththeruleoflaw.Suchanideamayormaynotbeofinterestin

Singapore but I do not pursue it tonight. And of course the rule of law,which is

intimatelyboundupwithjudicialindependence,isoftencharacterisedasintension

with that other primary constitutional doctrine in New Zealand – Parliamentary

17 TannadyceInvestmentsLtdvCommissionerofInlandRevenue[2011]NZSC158,[2012]2NZLR

153at[3].18 Recognisedins4oftheJudicatureAmendmentAct1972.(citationintheoriginal)19 BulkGasUsersGroupvAttorney-General[1983]NZLR129(CA)at[133].20 Matthew S R Palmer “Assessing the Strength of the Rule of Law in New Zealand” (paper

presented to Unearthing New Zealand’s Constitutional Traditions Conference, New ZealandCentre for Public Law, Wellington, 30 August 2013). Available at:http://works.bepress.com/matthew_palmer/38/

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sovereignty. The ruleof law isoften“prayed inaid”as itwere,of the judiciary in

thatinstitutionaltension.

However, the third applicationofmy conceptionof the rule of law that Iwant to

discusstonight isto judicialreasoningratherthantoParliamentaryenactments. It

seems tome that judges need to be just as, if notmore alive, to the nature and

implications of the rule of law as do Parliamentarians. In particular, I want to

examinetheimplicationsoftheruleoflawforjudicialdiscretioninaparticularlegal

contextinNewZealand.

My interest in thiswas sparkedbya case Iheard last year. Iwon’tmention itby

nameas thedoctor in thecasewasappealingadisciplinarypenaltyand refusalof

namesuppressionandtheappealperiodhasnotyetexpired.21

I was surprised to find that counsel for the doctor and the relevant Professional

Conduct Committee did not agree on whether New Zealand law regarding the

approachtoappealsofprofessionaldisciplinarypenaltieswassettled. Counsel for

thedoctorsubmitteditwassettled–bythe2007SupremeCourtjudgmentofAustin,

Nicholsthatfoundthatanappellatecourtinageneralappeal“hastheresponsibility

of arrivingat itsownassessmentof themeritsof the case.”22And indeedAustin,

Nicholshadfoundjustthat.Itstatedthat:23

Those exercising general rights of appeal are entitled to judgment in accordancewiththeopinionoftheappellatecourt,evenwherethatopinionisanassessmentoffact and degree and entails a value judgment. If the appellate court’s opinion isdifferentfromtheconclusionofthetribunalappealedfrom,thenthedecisionunderappealiswrongintheonlysensethatmatters,evenifitwasaconclusiononwhichmindsmightreasonablydiffer.InsuchcircumstancesitisanerrorfortheHighCourtto defer to the lower Court’s assessment of the acceptability and weight to beaccordedtotheevidence,ratherthanformingitsownopinion.

However, there is a distinct and longstanding line of authority reiterated in a

subsequentSupremeCourt judgment,KacemvBashir in2010, that commentators

21 ThejudgmentisnowavailableasTSMvAProfessionalConductCommittee[2015]NZHC3063.22 Austin,Nichols&CoIncvStichtingLodestar[2007]NZSC103,[2008]2NZLR141at[5].23 At[16].

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accuseof sitting somewhatuncomfortably alongsideAustin,Nichols.24 InKacemv

BashirtheSupremeCourtsaidthis:25

Inthiscontextageneralappeal istobedistinguishedfromanappealagainstadecisionmadeintheexerciseofadiscretion.Inthatkindofcasethecriteriaforasuccessfulappealarestricter:(1)erroroflaworprinciple;(2)takingaccountofirrelevantconsiderations;(3)failingtotakeaccountofarelevantconsideration;or (4) the decision is plainlywrong. The distinction between a general appealandanappeal fromadiscretion isnotaltogethereasy todescribe inabstract.Butthefactthatthecaseinvolvesfactualevolutionandavaluejudgmentdoesnotofitselfmeanthedecisionisdiscretionary.

Bothcounselinmycasewereagreedthatthisapproachappliestotheappealofthe

name suppression decision, on the basis of Court of Appeal precedent (which

counsel for the doctor reserved his right to challenge). This approach to appeals

against “adecisionmade in theexerciseof adiscretion” is also theapproach that

New Zealand courts say they take to appeals of criminal sentences and bail

decisions.26

No doubt it can be difficult to determine when an appeal is susceptible to one

approachor theother.27And itmaybe that there is littledifferencebetween the

twoapproachesinpractice–adecisionthatis“wrong”or“plainlywrong”foundsa

successful appeal under either (though there is authority that there is a material

differencebetweenthosetests).

ButIconfesstofindingthelatterapproachsomewhattroubling.Theapproachtoan

appeal from a decisionmade in the exercise of a discretion appears tome to be

tantamounttojudicialreview–aprocesswhichemphasisesproceduremuchmore

than substance. Unlike theAustinNicholsapproach itdoesnotnecessarilyentitle

theappellanttojudgmentinaccordancewiththeopinionoftheappellatecourt.If

24 See M B Rodriguez Ferrere “The unnecessary confusion in New Zealand’s appellate

jurisdictions”(2012)12OtagoLR829.25 KacemvBashir[2010]NZSC112,[2011]2NZLR1at[32].26 MayvMay(1982)1NZFLR165(CA);BlackstonevBlackstone[2008]NZCA312,(2009)19PRNZ

40at[8]27 See also KJ Keith “Appeals from Administrative Tribunals” (1969) 5 VUWLR 123 cited in

OphthalmologicalSocietyofNewZealandIncvCommerceCommission[2003]2NZLR145(CA)at[37].

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mindsmightreasonablydifferit isthelowercourt’sopinionwhichoughttoprevail

accordingtothisapproach;buttheappellatecourt’saccordingtheotherapproach.

Yet Parliamentwould appear to have conferred a right of general appeal in both

instances.Thedifficultyofdeterminingwhatisdiscretionaryandwhatisnotmakes

thedistinctionshakybutoneonwhichthejudiciaryfoundsimportantconsequences.

Perhaps the reluctance to require an appellate court’s substantive opinion on an

appealofanexerciseofdiscretionisbecausesuchcasesaresimplyhardtodecide.

Nodoubttheyare. ThatwasclearlyputbyLordFraser inhis1985remarksabout

theroleoftheEnglishCourtofAppealinrelationtocustodyofchildren.28

But I wonder whethermyworry about the distinction derives from a rule of law

concern.RecallRaz’sconcernthatadministrativediscretionmustnotunderminethe

purposeoftherelevantlegalrule.AndLordBingham’ssecondprincipleoftherule

of law that “questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by

application of the law and not the exercise of discretion.” And Hart’s recently

rediscoveredarticlethatstrugglestojustifydiscretionasconsistentwiththeruleof

law.29

Atfirstsight,itdoesnotappearconsistentwithmyconceptionoftheruleoflawfor

theresultofanappealtodependonwhetheronefirstinstancetribunaloranother

hearsit.Yetthatseemstobetheimplicationofanapproachthataccordsdeference

to the substance of a first instance over an appellate decision.30 I’m not sure

whetherthat isexacerbatedormitigatedbythediscretion involved indetermining

whetheranappealisfromanexerciseofdiscretion!

TheSupremeCourt’sapproach inAustin,Nicholstowhat isrequired inacasethat

Parliamenthasdeemedworthyofageneralappealrequiresasubstantiveopinionof

the appellate court. Using the same approach in relation to a relatively wide

28 GvG[1985]2AllER225(HL)at228.29 HLAHart“Discretion”(2013)127HarvLRev652andseeGeoffreyCShaw“HLAHart’sLost

Essay:‘Discretion’andtheLegalProcessSchool”(2013)HarvLRev693.30 RodriguezFerrere,aboven22.

16

discretion exercised by a first instance tribunal could simply require the appellate

courttobeclearaboutthenatureoftherelevantlaw-therelevantsubstantivelaw

andrelevantlegalmethodologyorstepsoflegalreasoning.Thatseemstometobe

whatusuallyhappensinsentencing,bailornamesuppressionappealsanyway.

Ifoundtheapproachinthecasebeforemerelativelystraightforwardtoresolve.But

Ididsaythis:31

Intheabstract,“discretion”asaconcept,and itsrelationshipwiththeruleof law,hasbeen the subjectofextensive jurisprudential consideration [here I citedDworkin,Hartandother academics–which I hasten toadd isnot thenorm inmyorotherNZHighCourt judgments].

In practice, of course, there are elements of discretion in many

aspects of the judicial enterprise, including the identificationofwhich law is relevant,the identification of which facts are material, and in the interstices of the law’sapplication to the facts. At a basic level, I consider the rule of law requires that theapplicationoflawinimposingapenaltymustinvolveatleastamodicumoftransparency,certainty and predictability. That, in turn, favours the explicit application of identifiedlegalmethodology andprinciples to shapewhatmayotherwisebecome the relativelyarbitrary exercise of discretion. Suchmethodology and principles constitute law. Theymeanadecision-maker’sreasoningcanbemoreeasilyidentifiedandanalysedonappealwhereanappealisprovidedforbylegislation.Thisappearstometoenhancetheruleoflaw.

AsI’msureyouwillunderstand,Ioffermyquestionstonightaboutalongstanding

lineofNewZealandauthoritytentatively,asanewjudge,andinaspiritofinquiry.

ThelawinNewZealandasithasbeendeterminedbytheSupremeCourtisrelatively

clear;fornow. IftheCourtdecidestorevisitthetopic, itwillbeinterestingtosee

whetherandhowtheruleoflawfiguresinthecourt’sreasoning.

ConstitutionalDialogue

Finally, I turn to a larger constitutional canvas to explore a further final question

abouttheruleof law. HereIreturntothequestionofwhatexactly isrequiredby

theruleoflawandseparationofpowers.Isitenoughthatthepowertomakelaw

and toapplyand interpret law is exercisedbydifferent, separate, institutions. Or

should these powers also be exercised by institutions with different or separate

mindsetsorperspectives?

31 At[15].

17

Thisquestionderivesfromtheconfluenceoftwoareasofinterestofmine.Thefirst

is the subject of the course I am teaching here at the National University of

Singaporethismonth.Iamteachingagroupofverygoodstudents“LawandPolicy”;

acourseIhavetaughtbefore,atHongKongUniversity,andatopiconwhichIhave

writteninthepast.32Mycorethesisisthatthedisciplinesoflawandofpublicpolicy

areverydifferentintheirformsofreasoningordisciplinarymethodology.

The paradigm of the discipline of law in a common law system is defined by the

methodologyofthecommonlaw.Commonlawyersandjudgesapproachanopinion,

anargumentora judgmentby identifying the issue, identifying thematerial facts,

outliningtherelevantlaw,examiningtheargumentsfromboth(i.e.onlytwo)sides

andapplyingthelawtothefacts.Thisisaninductiveformofreasoning–fromthe

particularsofindividualcasestowardsthegeneralrule.Itpaysattentiontospecific

factualcontextofparticularcases.Itlookstopastprecedentsforguidance.

Theparadigmofthedisciplineofpublicpolicyanalysis,however, isquitedifferent.

Policy analysts typically start with the government’s general objectives. They

identify theproblem tobe resolved. They identifynot just twoargumentsbut all

possibleoptionsforaddressingtheproblem.Theyanalyse,orshouldanalyse,allthe

options in terms of which will best achieve the general objectives, in terms of

financialimplications,andallothersetsofimplications.Thisisdeductivereasoning

– from the general to the particular. It is more abstract. It is less interested in

factualcircumstances. Itsevidencederivesfromgeneralsocialscienceanalysisnot

anecdotesfromaparticularfactscenario.Itlookstothefuturenotthepast.

Mypointisnotthateitherpolicyorlegalanalysisisbetterthantheother–justthat

they are different. And, if they are undertaken for long enough they affect the

mindsets of their practitioners – each imparts to its practitioner different biases,

presumptions, prejudices and tendencies. The paradigms of law and policy, as

32 Matthew SR Palmer “Thinking about LawandPolicy: Lessons for Lawyers” (presentation to

Crown Law Office & Law Commission, Wellington, December 2006). Available at:http://works.bepress.com/matthew_palmer/10.

18

disciplines, carry with them differentmethodologies, differentmindsets, different

perspectives.Iconceiveofthemasdifferent“languages”–evendifferentcultures.

Lawyers are good at problem identification but can forget about objectives. They

revel in factual contextbutget impatientwithgeneralisations. Policyadvisersare

goodidentifyingallpossibleoptionsbutcanforgettotesttheiranalysisinpractical

applicationstospecificscenarios.Theytheoriseandgetimpatientwithanecdotes.

I should say also that I regard politics as a third language – one of bargaining,

negotiatingandlogrolling–persuasion,compromiseandpragmatism.

I then apply this construct to the second area of interest: constitutional dialogue.

Constitutionaldialoguetheoryderivesfromthe1997articlebyPeterHogg,another

NewZealandacademicthistimebasedinCanada,andAllisonBushell.33Thetheory

isthattheoldbinary(dareIsayparadigmaticallylegalapproach)ofaskingwhether

the judiciaryor legislatureshouldbesupremeshouldgivewaytoamoredynamic,

iterativeunderstandingofconstitutional interactions. There’saclue in the titleof

their first article: “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or

PerhapstheCharterofRightsIsn’tsuchaBadThingAfterAll)”.So,iftheCanadian

Supreme Court strikes down a statute for being unconstitutional, that does not

constitute judicialsupremacybecausethat isnottheendofthestory. In67of89

cases to 2007 they found that the Canadian Parliament responded by re-enacting

anotherstatutetoaddressitsobjectiveinadifferentway.

Rather thanaone shotgamewhichdetermines “supremacy”, thedevelopmentof

constitutionallawandpolicyismoredynamic.Eachbranchofgovernmentreactsto

each other – as in conversation or dialogue – through their Acts and judgments

respectively to explore and clarify themeaning of law and policy iteratively, over

time. My friend Dr Yap Po Jen has recently published an excellent book entitled

33 PeterWHoggandAllisonABushell, “TheCharterDialoguebetweenCourtsandLegislatures

(OrPerhapstheCharterofRightsIsn’tsuchaBadThingAfterAll)”(1997)35OsgoodeHallLJ75.

19

Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia, applying this theory to Singapore,

MalaysiaandHongKong.34

Thesamedynamicoccursinrelationtolawandpolicyatasub-constitutionallevel.

When a court interprets a statute it gives it meaning in a specific instance. If

Parliamentdoesn’tlikethatmeaningitcanchangeitbylegislativeamendment.This

isinter-institutionaldialogueaboutthemakingandapplicationoflawandthepolicy

underlyingit.

Andmy suggestion is thateachof thebranchof governments speak in theirown,

different,language–viatheirownmethodologiesorperspectives.35So:

• the public service in the executive branch of government in New Zealand

speaks the language of policy – focusing on objectives, identifying options

andprovidinganalysesthatarereasonablygenericandabstract.

• Ministers and Parliament speak the language of politics –mediating policy

recommendationsthroughtherealityofbargainingandnegotiatinginorder

topasslegislation.(ThoughgoodMinisterseventuallybecomebilingual.)

• And the judiciary interprets legislation and makes common law in the

languageofthecommonlaw–byfocusingonthefactualcontextofspecific

cases.

Perhapshereisaclueastowhyacommonlawjudiciaryisrelativelymoreassertive

ininterpretationofsomesubjectmattersthanothers.Anapproachthatemphasises

the factual context of specific cases basedonpast precedent is notwell-suited to

analysingissuesofsocialandeconomicpolicywhich,ofnecessity,requireempirical

34 Po Jen Yap Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford,

2015).35 MatthewSRPalmer“OpentheDoorsandWherearethePeople?ConstitutionalDialogue in

the Shadow of the People” in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight (eds)We, The Peoples:ParticipationinGovernance(VictoriaUniversityPress,Wellington,2011)50.

20

social sciencedataandconceptual frameworksofanalysis. Butsuchaapproach–

thecommonlawapproach–doesfeelmoreconfidentinanalysingspecificcasesof

injusticefocusingonthe“rights”ofindividualsvisaviseachotherandvisavisthe

state.

But more generally I say that the dynamics of constitutional life of a nation, as

characterised by this framework, is determined by what languages each of the

branchesofgovernmentspeak,andhowloudlyeachofthesevoicesareempowered

tospeaktoeachother.

And it seems to me that the normative constitutional health of New Zealand

government is improved by having the different branches of government which

exercise public power thinking and speaking in different languages. You want

institutionsthinkingbothabstractlyabouttheformulationofgeneralpolicyandlegal

principlesandcontextuallyabouthow thoseprinciplesapply, and shouldapply, to

themessy realityof specific factsofparticular cases. Eachperspective checks the

other. As that doyen of American constitutional scholarship, Alexander Bickel,

said:36

TheCourtoftenprovokesconsiderationof themost intricate issuesofprinciplebythe other branches, engaging them in dialogues and “responsive readings”; andthereare timesalsowhentheconversationstartsat theotherendand isperhapslesspolite.Ourgovernmentconsistsofdiscreteinstitutions,buttheeffectivenessofthewholedependsontheirinvolvementwithoneanother,ontheirintimacy,evenifitoftenisthesweatyintimacyofcreatureslockedincombat.

Thesamesortofchecks,bringingdifferentperspectivestobear,arepresentinother

specificaspectsofconstitutionaldesign–suchasthedifferenceintheUnitedStates

between the very short term local perspective of Congressmen in the House of

Representatives and the longer term state wide perspective of Senators. New

Zealand institutionalises the presence ofMāori voices in the electoral system and

Parliament. Singapore,as Iunderstandit,doesthesamewithoppositionMPsand

minoritygroups.36 AlexanderMBickelTheLeastDangerousBranch:TheSupremeCourtattheBarofPolitics(2nd

ed,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1962)at261.

21

And here, finally, is my link to the rule of law, separation of powers and judicial

independence. Try to conceive of a constitutional system inwhich the executive,

legislatureand judiciaryall speak the same language–allhave the samemindset,

thesameprejudicesandassumptions,thesamebiases–allthinkandapproachlegal

andpolicyissuesinexactlythesameway.ThisisclearlynotthecaseofSingaporeor

NewZealandwhere the languageof common law iswellentrenched in thecourts

and quite different from what is spoken within the political branches. But

theoretically–ifitwerethecase–woulditbeaconstitutionalproblem?

Perhapsnot. Afterall ifeveryone isspeaking indifferent languages inanordinary

conversationtherewouldbechaosiftheydon’tunderstandeachother.Indeed,in

New Zealand, one might sometimes wish for a bit better understanding by the

branchesofgovernmentofthelanguagestheothersspeak.

But, in the hypothetical extreme, I think I would worry about a uniformmindset

acrossallbranchesofgovernment.Thegreatadvantageofthecommonlawmethod

seemstometobethecross-check itprovidesonthegeneralityof legislation–by

examining theeffectofgenerallydrafted law in specific factual circumstances. By

doing justice in the individual case, courts test the formulation of legislation and

themselvesformulatethecommonlaw.Ifallbranchesapproachissuesinthesame

waythenlawsandpolicies,includingconstitutionallaw,wouldnotbenefitfromsuch

cross-checking.Therewouldbelittlepointinconstitutionaldialogue.Whyneedthe

judiciary raise its voice to the executive or the legislature if they have the same

view?

Andthisismyquestion:isthispartoftheseparationofpowersandtheruleoflaw?

In my hypothetical scenario, the same individuals would not be interpreting and

applying the law as those who make it. But if they share the same biases,

assumptionsandprejudices–iftheyhavethesamemindsetandperspective-then

theymayaswellbe.

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Myinstinct isthatthiswouldbecontrarytotheruleof law. Notonlydoweneed

our legislators and judges to be different people, we need them to be think

differently. Otherwise, it would not be the law which rules. It would be the

commonperspective,languageorculture–the“ruling”culture.

Thegeniusof thecommon lawsystem liesnot in the spiritofMontesquieu’s laws

thatwehavedifferentpeopleordifferentinstitutionsmakingandapplyinglaw.Itis

thatwejuxtaposeintheseinstitutionspeoplewhothinkintermsofgenericprinciple

andotherswho think in termsof the justiceof the individual case. Together, the

dialogue between these perspectives jointly contributes to the health of our

constitutional common lawsystems.37 Yes, ithelps if theyunderstandeachother;

butperhapsitwouldnotiftheyunderstandeachothersomuchthattheylosetheir

ownlanguage.

Thisisthemostabstractandacademicofmytapasmenuofapplicationsoftherule

oflawtonight–andtheonethatIthoughtmightbeamealinitself.Butperhapsthe

academicsherewillbestimulated.

Conclusion

Ihavecoveredarangeofdifferenttopicsatsomeriskofincoherence.Ihavedone

soinordertoofferandtoexploretheimplicationsofaconceptionoftheruleoflaw

thatmight at first sight seem relatively narrow. But I suggest it can offer useful

normativeimplicationsfor:

• essential features of the systems of international commercial dispute

resolution;

• theutilityofthelawofjudicialreview;

• therisksandlimitsofjudicialdiscretion;and

• importantaspectsofconstitutionaldesign.

37 See Philip Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ

321.

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Attheheartofallofthesediversetopicsistheimportanceoftheruleoflaw–ofthe

ideal of certainty and freedom from arbitrariness and of independence of the

application of law from human interests. I add to this the normative utility and

complementarityoffirm,trustedbutdifferentperspectivesinthejointenterpriseof

formulatingandapplyinglawandpolicy.

Nōreira,tēnākoutou,tēnākoutou,tēnākoutoukatoa.