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The Royal Navy: A Concept of Maritime OperationsRear-Admiral P. E. C. Berger MVO, DSC a & Major-General J. L. Moulton In the Chaira Naval Staff (P) ,Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Rear-Admiral P. E. C. Berger MVO, DSC & Major-General J. L. Moulton In the Chair (1974) The RoyalNavy: A Concept of Maritime Operations, The RUSI Journal, 119:3, 9-18, DOI: 10.1080/03071847409430978

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The Royal Navy: a Concept of Maritime Operations A lecture given at the RUSIIon 13 March 1974 by Rear-Admiral P. E. C. BERGER, MVO, DSC, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (P)

Major-General J. L. MOULTON in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It is a great pleasirre to welcotiie to the Iiistitute Adiiiiral Berger, the Assistaiit Chief of Naval Staff (Policy). Adiiiiral Berger altered the Royal Navy iii 1943 aiid served iii H M S Ajax iii the laiiditigs iii Norriiaiidy a i d the Soirtli of Frame. Iii 1949 he was iiavigatiiig oficer of HAfS Amethyst iri her ttieiiiorable escape doirii the Yaiigtse iriider Coiiiiiiioiist fire, a feat of iravigatioii for Hhicli he was awarded the Distiiigirislied Service Cross. Eleven years later he was eiitrirsted with the tiarigatioti of the Royal Yacht Britannia diiriiig Priiice Philip’s world cririse aiid the opeiiiiig of the St Lawreiice Seaway by the Qireeii. He coititiiaiided HAlS Phoebefiont 1964 to 1966, served oti the nliiiistry of Defeiice staff as Assistaiit Director of Deferice Policy from 1968 to 1971 aiid tlieri became Coniiiiodore, Clyde, before beiiig promoted Rear-Adiiiiral aiid beiiig appoitited to the Naval Staf last year. He is, therefore, nell qiralified to speak oii the sirbject of his lectirre both frotii the poiiit of view of tlie central clefeiice staff aiid the naval staff.

hfaiiy of yoir will have received iri the last f e w days the Journal f o r Afarcli 1914 arid seeii iri it the extreiiiely ititerest- iiig descr@tioii of Adiiiiral Gorslikov7s series of articles oii sea power pirblislied dirriiig the coirrse of 1912, traiislated arid sirtiitiiarised by M r P. H. Vigor of the Royal Military Academy, Saiidliirrst-Darttiioirtli will have to look to its Iairrels! Adiiiiral Gorslikov makes clear tlie itiiportaiice to Rirssia of seapower iiot oiily to fight wars, birt also to acliieve political aims iti peacetiiiie. Those 400 Rirssiaii sirbtiinriiies of the 1950s did itideed score a riotable political sirccess witlioiit, as f a r as I hwow,jriiig a torpedo iii aiiger, for they persiraded NATO arid regrettably the then Miiiister of Deferice that the oiily practicable defeiice agaiiist tlieiii ~rotrld be early resort to iirrclenr refalirrtioii, leaviiig the Royal Navy, as the 1957 Defeiice White Paper explaiiied, witlioirt aiiy clear role in the deferice of Eirrope. I look forward to heariiig fioiii Adiiiral Berger this afreriiooii a very cliyereiit doctriiie arid a concept of tiiarititiie operatioiis by which the tinvies of Eirropeaii NATO, mid particirlarly the Royal Navy, today make mi effective coritribirtioii to the secirrity of the tiiariliitie iiiterests of the Alliance.

Anyone with the title of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy) is on a hiding to nothing if he issues the usual Service disclaimer to an audience like this. Even so, let me say at once that the views I shall express are my own. I cannot of course prevent you from making any deductions you please about the influence that the concepts I put before you might have on Naval Staff policy, but I can and do stress that I speak as a private individual and not as a representative of the Naval Staff.

I propose first to discuss the position of seapower- in its broadest definition-as it stands today. I shall then develop some ideas about the particular applica- tion of seapower in the situation in which NATO might find itself. I shall toucti upon the United Kingdom’s attitude to its own maritime interests when these are not necessarily covered by the Alliance; and finally I shall say something about how the Fleet we currently plan fits in with the concepts.

What is seapower today? Has anything much changed since Mahan? You can still name some com- ponents of seapower that he would recognise: mer- chant shipping, fishing fleets, inlets and outlets for maritime trade, shipbuilding facilities and warships. Some components he would find new and perhaps disturbing: the absence of colonial mercantile systems and their substitution by trade between sovereign states; the inhibitions on the use of force between

nations-though he might perhaps note with quiet irony that these are sometimes more talked about than practised; the tendency of coastal states t.0 enclose more and more of those high seas that he called a “great common”; and, parallel with that, the exploita- tion far out at sea of the resources underlying the seabed.

Let’s have a closer look a t these factors. Take merchant shipping: let me give you three facts. First: western European ports handle 50 per cent by value, and 30 per cent by volume, of all the world’s inter- national trade. Second: oil is by far the biggest single commodity moved by sea. And third: British merchant tonnage is 30 million; NATO Europe’s 11 1 million; Japan’s 37 million, Russia’s 17 million.

Fishing gives a rather different picture. Western Europe does its share of both distant and coastal water fishing but the giants are the USSR, Japan and- in coastal zones-Peru.

Then there’s offshore oil. I don’t think I need to stress the importance of this. I t is hard to give any accurate idea of the precise stake we British have in oil on our own continental shelf, because there are so many conflicting forecasts, but i t is clearly of the first magnitude. This is one area incidentally-one of surprisingly few-where the USA has a major and direct maritime stake in proportion to its size. Perhaps I can clarify that observation by making another.

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Only 8 per cent of the USA’s Gross National Product is involved in maritime trade-that is, as exports or shipping services. The corresponding figure for the UK is 32 per cent. Economically, compared with us, the USA is thus a continental animal.

Those facts about the uses of the sea for economic and trading purposes, and the way they are develop- ing, can be summed up in one statistic. I t is this: the global doubling time in uses of the sea is about 12 years. If you compare that with any growth area of similar scope-including world population, which despite the best efforts of the family planners runs at a doubling rate of about 40 years-then you will see that it is a very rapid growth indeed.

So much for the economic facts of maritime power. How about its military arm? I think if you pick up a modern copy of Jane’s Figlitirig Sliips you will be struck by several things: first of all, perhaps, the great preponderance of the American and Soviet Navies, but almost as strikingly the surprisingly large number of countries that now have a navy of some sort. You will notice that a higher and higher proportion of these non-superpower navies have missile-armed units and submarines. You will also, no doubt, notice shrinkage in some well-established fleets.

The final aspect of seapower that I want to look at is the way its military arm can be used. I’ve sug- gested already that attitudes have changed a bit since Mahan expounded his theories. We now have the United Nations Charter, prohibiting the use of force except in self-defence, though it is remarkable how many nations since 1945 have found it necessary to defend themselves a t sea, and in what bizarre ways they have sometimes found it expedient to do so.

James Cable, in his excellent book that was rather bluntly entitled Gimiboat Diplonincy, counted over 80 cases since World War I1 and that was in 1970. He would have had some notable additions since then, including the recent ejection by the Chinese of a South Vietnamese garrison from the Paracels. This-it was said-was in self-defence of Chinese fishermen. But seriously, the rule of self-defence is important, the political-and indeed the moral-premium, on not firing the first shot is high, and the needs of low- intensity operations at sea do bulk large in the thinking of any nation which has a prime interest in the use of the sea.

The use of the sea. One comes back to that phrase over and over again. And let us remind ourselves once more that NATO’s dependence upon the sea is far greater than Russia’s. In normal peacetime use, the only area where the Soviets have a greater interest is that of distant water fisheries-and important though the protein is to Russia, no one could suggest that even a complete stoppage of supply would cause the breakdown of the Soviet economy. Whereas for NATO-and particularly European NATO-there are dozens of ways in which irreparable damage could be done.

Soviet Navy It is no wonder, then, that the Soviet Union appears

up to now to have designed maritime forces primarily for operations to deny use of the sea to others, rather

than to preserve that use for itself. The emphasis on submarines and on missile-armed units of all kinds has been marked and significant. As to whether this distinctive shape which the Soviet Navy has acquired was initially governed by a perceived need to defend the homeland, or whether it had a wider sea denial in mind, is now largely immaterial: the ability to do either exists. Moreover, the newer Soviet units are not only capable of many sorts of sea-denial operation: they are capable of carrying them out at varying levels of intensity, with far more options of range, weight and mode of attack than they used to have.

I am not, of course, suggesting that the Soviet Navy is not concerned with such matters as strategic deterrence. All the indications are that as a super- power it is much preoccupied with the operations of its own ballistic missile-submarines, and with possible counters to the western ones. The fact remains that the Soviet Navy of today is a balanced, versatile and growing force particularly well fitted for the denial of the sea areas to surface craft. Moreover, its leaders show a growing appreciation of the particular charac- teristics of the sea environment, where there is still a great deal of no-man’s land; where such frontiers as do exist are often in dispute and are likely to go on being so in spite of attempts to rationalise the law of the sea; where centres of population and industry are not directly threatened by military action. Not a bad place, indeed, in which to apply a bit of pressure, and to exert an extra twist to the internal contradic- tions of capit a I’ ism.

It is I suppose a commonplace that against an opponent with so many options, deterrence cannot be a simple matter. This doesn’t stop some people putting up very simple solutions, based usually on a sort of maritime tripwire: you clobber one of my ships, I will clobber all of yours that I can find-preferably with high-lethality, low-vulnerability forces. I t is an attractive idea, particularly as in theory it saves money. In practice the jump from a very low-key aggression to a very high-level response is unlikely to be acceptable politically (let alone in international law) and in any case how much of the opponent’s fleet or other maritime interests shall we find in such circumstances? It does not seem to me that such a concept would add up to a tenable theory of deter- rence. And so we are driven back to the view that for a nation dependent on sea use as we are, the only correct structure of maritime deterrence is one based upon a truly flexible response; the ability to block a rational opponent’s options by direct defence at the level of aggression, with the implicit threat of escalation. I used the term “a nation” just now, deliberately: for that would have to be our policy even if we were on our own. Happily we are not because we are members of the Atlantic Alliance. But if by any chance we were singled out for pressure we might need to resist nationally until it was acknowledged that an attack on one member nation was indeed an attack upon all: in most circumstances we could, I think, expect the Alliance to operate swiftly, but a precondition of this desirable cohesion is of course that we, the UK, make a full contribution.

Gentlemen, I’ve outlined to you the swiftly-develop- ing use of the sea, particularly by the Western Alliance.

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I’ve suggested that in the sea environment the present day opportunities for pressure and conflict, aimed at denying use of the sea, are numerous and diverse. I’ve indicated that the USSR is much less vulnerable to such pressures than the West, and is well equipped to exert them. And I’ve deduced that there are no easy options to counter such pressures: that a deterrent based on flexible response is needed and that this demands a wide span of capability.

I propose now to suggest to you one possible course of events which could put such theories to the test-I do not of course suggest for one moment that it is the only one but I do put it to you that it is a credible possibility. I will not call it a scenario because that would imply a lot of specific projections and these aie unprofitable when one is talking about concepts. I t is compounded rather of a series of tendencies which might lead us, as I shall indicate, to certain situations and dilemmas.

The Central Front The first tendency which, it seems to me, is currently

emerging in East-West relations is the Soviet accept- ance of a stalemate on the Central Front. They realise that this is the way to the heartland of western Europe and that overt military action there would inevitably carry very high risks, at least so long as NATO maintains a credible military posture with a substan- tial United States component. I am perhaps expressing a median view if I say that right now that posture is credible but it would not have to be weakened much more before our guard was seen to be well and truly down.

But at the moment we have de‘tenfe. We have MBFR, and we have CSCE. We have pressures acting on the American administration. The tendency is all in one direction, and whether we like it or not as military men, there may well be reductions in the numbers of ready troops-on both sides, certainly- on the Central Front in Europe.

What then will the situation be? The Warsaw Pact may well obey the letter of any agreement that is reached, That means that there will be some with- drawals and even some disbandments, and they may be numerically greater than those of the Western Alliance. They can afford to be because of the present disparity. But in the nature of the Soviet political and military system it will not be difficult to mobilise them again and it will not be difficult to transport them to the front.

If indeed that’s necessary. For the remaining Soviet forces will be faced by fewer Western forces than at present, and they may moreover have suffered a severe dilution of the United States element whose involve- ment is, in deterrent terms, so important.

In fact, the position will be a classic one of an opponent who has interior lines of communication enjoying to the full the advantage which that situation gives him. He will have the option to exert pressure in the centre, on the flanks, or-more indirectly still- in remote places, even at sea. And the military com- ponent of that pressure can be as large or as small as he cares to make it. I don’t say it is a position we want

to get into: but simply that it is a position we may well reach.

Faced with such a dilemma the Western Alliance would have to fall back on a policy of massive trans- atlantic reinforcement. The EEC may be the geograph- ical heartland of the Alliance but the USA is its military bastion, and in a situation such as I’ve described a massive effort, with all the technological backing that can be mustered, will be necessary to prepare a plan for its movement to Europe in case of need.

I doubt if anyone will dispute that however advanced the technology and however much money is spent on it, the reinforcement requirement cannot possibly be met without the use of sea transport on a large scale. Even if the direction of military pressure were easily predictable, and it certainly is not, the stockpiling which would be inherent in a policy of total reliance upon air reinforcement is expensive and indeed demands men on the ground. The Alliance will there- fore be committed to a strategy of early warning in periods of tension, of relatively rapid political decision to reinforce and of subsequent reinforcement by both air and sea at any point that may be threatened, including the flanks.

In circumstances like that it is easy enough to see what might happen. A situation could brew up in western Europe which the USSR wanted decisively to influence: let’s say, perhaps, they judged that capitalism had been given enough of a tweak to make a real shift towards the USSR, economically and/or politically, a practical possibility. Let’s say further that they judged the West to be so weak militarily that their diplomatic pressure could be backed by a strong military threat.

In such a case the Alliance would no doubt decide upon a transatlantic reinforcement. And it is just at this point-again if they judged it a logical move- that the Russians might say: “We are sorry, but your plans to transport large numbers of troops to Europe are clearly a threat to peace and are moreover against the letter of our force reduction agreements. We reserve the right to turn back any forces we find being transported on the high seas.” They might even mention a precedent that had occurred off Cuba in 1962!

The importance of maritime strength What NATO would then do, I suggest, depends on

two main factors: its political will and its maritime strength. Political will is a matter for our political masters: maritime strength is our job. And unless, in the circumstances I’ve outlined, it were compre- hensive and numerous enough to mount a large-scale protection-of-shipping operation, NATO could fall apart without a shot being fired on the Central Front. Thus, clearly, the ability to mount maritime contin- gency forces capable of protecting seaborne reinforce- ment is an integral part of any deterrent posture that includes such reinforcement.

I make no apology for stressing that deterrence is inclined to be its own worst enemy, in this context as in all others. If we have such reinforcement capabi- lities, and such maritime forces to protect them, as

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will deter the Russians from trying on anything of the kind I’ve described, then no doubt we shall come under increasing pressure to get rid of them. One can only trust to the innate good sense of the majority of people in the democracies to resist such pressure and ensure that our capabilities on land, sea and in the air don’t fall below danger level.

I would be falling into a pretty well-marked trap if I suggested that the sort of situation I have described is the only one in which maritime forces exert a decisive deterrent effect. Clearly, there are very many others. For example, the flanks of NATO are areas where a serious military imbalance on the ground might well tempt the Soviets to try military solutions to limited problems. Limited for them, that is-the Norwegians, Danes, Turks or Greeks might not think that was quite the right word. The fact that some flank coun- tries cannot accept the stationing of foreign troops on their soil increases the military sensitivity of the situation, and may diminish the chances of air-lifted reinforcement alone being fully effective. The sea offers a chance to poise the soldiery in a neutral environment, but you cannot do that in a time of tension without strong escorting and covering forces capable, one must stress, of responding at an appro- priate level to whatever violence may be offered.

Still within a NATO context, one may envisagc situations not connected directly with reinforcement: situations where disputes arose over ocean or conti- nental shelf resources, or jurisdiction in sea areas, or military exercises, or anti-terrorist measures at sea. Certainly these disputes would not necessarily involve a USSR Y. NATO confrontation; nor would they necessarily be genuine disputes a t all-one easy way to tease your opponent is to pick a legal quarrel with him.

The possibilities are endless, but one can name a few salient characteristics. First, situations of this sort are most unlikely to start with overt acts of violence. All our experience, and we have had a good deal over the last 25 years, is that the dispute tends to build up slowly and so does the use of force, even when it does finally get unleashed. So you need to be flexible in your capabilities and in the rules of engagement you employ. Second, deterrence can operate even in these relatively small-scale disputes-to the extent that often enough the opposing forces, which may amount to no more than a ship or so on either side, go about looking at each other, making whatever point their respective masters wish to make, but not committing any act of hostility at all. Physical presence, in fact constitutes a degree of deterrence. Third, the effect if such a dispute goes sour will be much more damaging to a nation that is mainly dependent on the sea than it is to one that is less so. Fourth, the effect can be cumulative: if a right or freedom is lost in one place it may quickly be lost in others.

Now I’ve said that situations of this lowlevel type can escalate if through weakness or misjudgement they are allowed to get out of hand. They could occur in the NATO area, and they could concern eitherNATO as a whole or some member nation. In the latter case it’s very unlikely that the NATO Charter will be called into play. For example, when the Russians boarded a Danish fishing boat on the high seas off Bornholm

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in 1972 to recover a defector, the world did not resound with cries of “an attack on one is an attack on all”. Nevertheless the existence of multinational Standing Naval Forces in NATO is some kind of earnest that even in these lowlevel situations, NATO reaction is not out of the question.

South Atlantic and Indian Oceans Let us now glance outside the NATO sea area, to

the south of the Tropic of Cancer which is its some- what artificial limit in the Atlantic. As everyone knows, a great deal of our commerce passes through the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans: relative to her allies, the UK has a high stake here for historical reasons, though that may balance up when the North Sea oil starts to flow and if America becomes a bigger customer for Arabian oil.

This is a vast sea area bordered by many sovereign states of great diversity, and the permutations of possible maritime turbulence are endless. They may stem from politics or different views of the law; they may affect ships of one nationality or many; they may concern the preservation of neutrality in a conflict between third parties. You name it.

But of a few things I am reasonably certain. First, it will not be all quiet and peaceful for the next 20 years. It never has been before and there is no reason to suppose that it will be now. Second, the vast majority of conflicts will be a t low intensity and conducted over a limited area. Third, NATO will be reluctant to get drawn into conflict as an alliance in this area. Fourth, we may seldom if ever be in direct conflict with the Russians; but we shall never be able to ignore their presence, and it will increase. Fifth, we shall continue to have a great deal to lose if we are forced to concede present rights and freedoms. Sixth, we know now that the supply of oil can be turned off at the well head, and in these days when inter- vention is a very dirty word there is no military provi- sion that the UK can practically make against that eventuality; but you can also turn it off on the tanker routes, and to oppose that we can make some provision through our own efforts and the potential of our Allies.

Gentlemen, the possible range of nasal operations I’ve outlined to you is very wide and diverse. They will require rather different sorts of naval forces. But they have certain features in common. They are mainly concerned with preserving the use of the sea-and there we are back with that recurring theme. They will seldom break into full intensity straight away, they will tend to escalate slowly and with a strong element of political control. And, even in the context of the NATO Alliance, the vast majority will probably con- cern the United Kingdom in one way or another.

Britain’s position For there is no doubt at all that this island nation

will continue to have interests at sea proportionately much greater than those of any of its allies.’ The emphasis may shift with the development of North Sea oil; but when that is fully operational-the armed services will have a quite new commitment looking after it-and the UK will still be a maritime trading

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nation with many of its interests bound up in distant seas.

With that in mind, and it can be backed by figures both current and projected, it is scarcely necessary to quote Britain’s present span of naval capability and expertise as a reason for her retaining the maritime leadership in European NATO. I believe that leader- ship exists and I am proud of it, but it is more to the point that its basis is founded not in an accident of history so much as in geographical and economic facts and plain commonsense. I t is quite plain to me that we should plan to retain this position; and i t is plain that soiiie western European nation should have a very wide span of maritime capability. I say this for two reasons. First, because as I have said, Europe is more dependent on the sea and economically more sensitive to pressures a t sea, than is the United States. It is no insult to the USA, to suggest that a European nation might have to be the first in NATO to react at sea (or a t the least to have the demonstrable ability to do so), because in many conflicts European interests would be more nearly and vitally involved than those of the USA. In order to react, one must possess the necessary military cover for one’s action- one needs to be able to move up the scale if need be. Second, the United States is not a natural exponent of “splendid isolation” as Britain claimed to be in the 19th century. The USA needs some allies who in their own perhaps, narrower fields can consult on equal terms and can cross-fertilise in expertise and know- how. I do not think that a withdrawal into a low military posture by the UK would be any more wel- come to the USA than it would to that white building next door in which I currently spend rather an inor- dinate proportion of my time.

But against those needs there is always the pressing requirement to exercise economy. We may want to have as wide a span of capability at sea as possible, and numbers enough to be comfortable: but can we afford both? In conditions of increasing stringency, what should be the shape of the fleet?

The nature of the fleet First, I believe for the reasons I’ve described earlier

that we cannot take out an option upon what might be called a maritime tripwire. Suppose for example you go to the limit and postulate an all-submarine fleet. You would then have to use submarines for patrol duties; for guardship duties at Gibraltar; and for any response to pressure or low-level conflict, all you could do would be to send in a submarine to sink as any of the opponent’s ships as he could find. The submarine is not capable of discriminating graduated force. It is indeed a sea denial vehicle, rather than a sea-use one. Even in my worst case projection, that of the opposed reinforcement; the submarine is not by any means the only vessel we shall need. There will be a requirement to conduct the early stages of the operation under very tight political control with careful rules of engagement and measured response-indeed if this goes right, and the Soviets are convinced, then deterrence will have worked and the higher level will never be reached at all. But all that sort of thing requires certain characteristics which the

submarine is not designed to have-constant two-way communications, comprehensive data acquisition and processing, discriminating weapon systems. What’s more, stringent rules of engagement and the need for an overt physical presence are inclined to stop it acting like a submarine. Of course in our worst case, as in very many others, the nuclear powered sub- marine is a splendid weapon system-the best-for higher level operations once the chips are down and the war is on. And because of that, our possession of it constitutes a major deterrent to any opponent who is thinking of escalating a conflict at sea. But it is not and cannot be the only vehicle we need.

Nor indeed can we make do with a combination of submarines and shorebased aircraft important though the latter are. One limitation of shorebased aircraft is that they can only go so far from their bases, though that range can of course be greatly enhanced by inflight refuelling. Apart from this, however, they have other problems. They cannot economically and indefinitely form a screen or escort for groups of vessels that are using the sea. They are not well suited to exercise control of a complex situation on the surface of the sea. Though their speed and height advantages make them splendid search vehicles against surface ships and submarines, they have some problems when it comes to identification, localisation and in the case of LRMP aircraft attack. Of course shorebased aircraft are an essential ingredient in our overall maritime capability: for anti-submarine warfare, for recon- naisance, for strike and air defence. But fundamentally the aircraft, like the submarine, is a sea-denial vehicle and a vehicle for the higher levels of warfare. We need to use the sea and we must be able to engage in conflict at all levels.

So, inevitably, we come back to the surface warship as the vehicle that, vulnerable and relatively slow though it is, is still necessary for the conduct of opera- tions to maintain our use of the sea. It is required to mount weapon systems more diverse and discriminat- ing than either aircraft or submarines; to provide communications much more comprehensive and data systems of much greater scope than any other fighting vehicles. It is required, among other things, to be visible and to stick around : involvement is deterrence.

What kind of surface ship? Having decided that we do still require surface ships,

and in sufficient numbers to produce a response to initial aggression with enough back-up to provide a credible escalation, we are left with the problem of what sort of ships-what sort of capability. This is a problem we’ve had for many years and I suppose you can sum it up as quality versus quantity. Quality means high speed, and sophisticated weapons; good nuclear and damage protection; high reliability and good accommodation. On a limited budget you cannot have a lot of ships like that. However, up to now we have done fairly well in keeping our destroyer and frigate force at a fairly high level of quality as well as keeping the shrinkage of numbers within bounds. In the latest programmes, we are accepting in the Type 42 destroyers and Type 22 frigates a certain measure of specialisation: the Type 22 frigate is a better ASW ship

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than its forerunners with hangarage for two heli- copters and a much improved sonar, and the Type 42 destroyer has the Sea Dart area defence surface to air missile; in a high level situation, with all threats operating, they complement each other. The question of a cheap frigate, capable of quantity production, is before us; such a ship obviously has many uses, for instance operations like the 1973 patrols off Iceland, but one has to weight very carefully the contribution it can make to both national and NATO operations at higher levels: It is a subject, in the inimitable language of Whitehall, that we keep under continuing review.

The Through Deck Cruiser Meanwhile there is one kind of surface ship whose

quality is not in doubt. I refer, of course, to the Through Deck Cruiser, the first of which is now building at Vickers. The history of the design is well known I think: when the decision was made to phase out the fixed wing carriers we made comprehensive studies of how we could reprovide those capabilities which could not be taken on by non-surface vehicles. The chief ones were the ability to deploy large ASW helicopters-the Sea Kings-which are highly effective machines for localising and attacking submarines- and the ability to control a complex situation at sea. Cost-effectiveness studies were quite clear: for both these tasks you wanted a biggish ship, and for the helicopter operations you wanted a flat top. A Sea Dart system was added for area air defence, and- recalling that a ship has a life of 20 years or more- some strength was included in the design so that new generations. of weapons might better be accom- modated. And that was the cruiser.

I have heard it described by our critics-and we do alas still have one or two-as a nostalgic symbol of naval megalomania, all the eggs in one basket and so on.

DISCUSSION VICE-ADMIRAL B. B. SCHOFIELD: The lecturer said in the

early part of his very excellent discourse that a number of small navies were building missile-armed fast patrol craft which we all know started with the Russians, and are generally accepted as packing a punch out of all proportion to their cost and size. Although we have the largest navy in Europe, it has always struck me as rather curious we have not gone in for some of these ships, because surely there must be areas in which they would be very valuable. I was going to suggest guarding our new North Sea oil interests by having a flotilla in the Shetlands or something like that.

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: I would have thought that we, as an ocean going navy, were not primarily interested in such craft to protect offshore oil-to protect them against what sort of attack? I am not sure I can envisage a scenario where light craft like this would be of much value if an attack were launched against offshore oil. After all, even offshore oil rigs are quite a long way off shore, and in bad weather conditions such craft could not get there.

VICE-ADMIRAL SCHOFIELD: But they can carry a powerful missile and could attack anything.

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: We would prefer to have such missiles on our frigate force, and have more flexible weapons than put money into such a craft which is rather inflexible.

LIEUTENANT COXIMANDER J. H. MALCOLhf: 1 Seem to

I’d put it differently. It is indeed likely to be the pride of the Navy but that is because it will possess in coherent form so many of the virtues of the surface ship-the diverse weapon systems, the command, control and communication capabilities, the visible presence. It is in fact a sea-use vehicle par excellence, designed to maintain the sea area around it-as a moving haven, if you like. Without it an essential piece in the overall jigsaw will be missing. The trouble with smaller surface forces, unstiffened by a unit of this sort, is that they may be defeated in detail- brushed aside. You cannot do that to a force which includes this vessl. Its reduction would have to be a major and irrevocable act of war. It is indeed optimised in the higher level of maritime operations and it will be a powerful and I believe a welcome contribution to NATO.

It is, I think, with the Alliance that I must end this talk, for it colours so profoundly the whole of our concepts of operations. However much we may plan for peacetime and purely national tasks-and I have had no time to discuss our offshore patrol problems, our minesweeping tasks and our surveying require- ments, though I can assure you that they are not only kept in mind but that material needs are being met- however much we consider these, we return to our contribution to the Alliance as the principal deter- minant of our naval forces. The Alliance may of course change; there may be specialisation, there will I hope be more in the way of common procurement, there may be more tightly organised multinational forces. What is most unlikely to change, in my view, is the demand by NATO nations, European and American alike, that the Royal Navy should continue to provide powerful and balanced forces. It would indeed be very strange if a nation situated as we are, with mari- time interests like ours, did not respond adequately to these demands.

remembx Sir Barnes Wallis advocating a submarine merchant fleet. Has the lecturer any comments on that?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: The short answer is no! Speaking off the top of my head, I should think it would be enormously expensive and not a commercially viable venture for a long time to come. I do not think that technology has yet reached the stage where it would be financially feasible.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MALcoLhi: Sir Barnes Wallis said he could design them.

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: Well, perhaps he could; but I should like to see proof before I committed myself to anything of the sort. I would not have thought that you could make such a thing commercially viable on a wide scale in peacetime.

MR A. ACHURCH: Can the lecturer say anything about the use of the hydrofoil, so far as defence is concerned?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: It is a very interesting develop- ment. We have not yet investigated it far enough to be sure ourselves that it is an ocean going craft, but I think it is a promising development.

COX~~~ANDER A. R. KHANDEKAR: The lecturer has avoided any reference to Harrier aircraft. Is that accidental?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: It was not wholly accidental! MR JOHN WILKINSON: In the context of the Indian

Ocean, would it be fair to say that the Through Deck Cruiser would have immense potential, particularly in

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view of the regrouping of Royal Naval forces, and might such regrouped naval forces be better employed in the CENTO context than in NATO, which is unwilling to operate in this ocean?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: Yes I do think that the Through Deck Cruiser has a great potential in the Indian Ocean. I should like to see CENTO and NATO with them. It has a great potential in both NATO and CENTO areas.

DR W. A. S. MURRAY: The lecturer has emphasised the need for a balanced fleet, and he has referred to different component parts such as the anti-submarine ship, the anti- aircraft ship, and so on, but he has not spoken about defence against surface forces, which might be thought important in the context of what the Russian Admiral has recently been saying. The lecturer has made no mention of any offensive capability in our fleet.

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: Offensively wc would see this as a combination of our nuclear submarines, shore-based aircraft, and our programme of fitting a very wide variety of surface ships with surface to surface missiles. We hope in due course to get an under-surface guided weapon which will enhance the capabilities of our nuclear submarine force. For the less sophisticated surface target we plan to use an air-to-surface guided weapon hooked on to heli- copters. So there is a wide range of offensive capabilities.

Imentioned the SeaDart and the Sea Wolf, both of which have a good capability against missile attack. So that whilst I accept your criticism that I did not make this clear, nevertheless, I think you can be assured we have in our planning a proper balance between offensive and defensive capability.

MR JOHN ANDREWS: May I follow that up? If in future missiles are to comprise the sole onboard offensive capa- bility, surely this will seriously .restrict one’s options? With targets such as small patrol craft or when involved in politically sensitive situations there is a significant difference between firing a guided missile and firing a conventional gun?

REAR-ADMIRAL BEREGER: 1 entirely agree with you but we do not intend to put ourselves in the position you des- cribe. We have a very wide ship fitting programme, but we do not intend to phase out the gun entirely from the fleet. At the same time, one does not necessarily need a gun of the current calibre of4-5.For themajorityof these situations take the fish war-the 20 mm gun will do. I take your point that we shall need a low level discriminating weapon, but that can easily be provided in sufficient number as well as the high level surface to surface missile, and this we plan to do.

LIEUTENANT S. B. W. B. RUXSRILL: In view of financial restrictions and the imbalance between the western European members of NATO so far as advanced technology is concerned, would the lecturer welcome an agreement between the European members of NATO to specialise in building certain types of ships? For example, with our industry and tradition, we might be invited to build fewer and larger ships and leave the building of escort ships to other countries ?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: It is a very fair question and one which has fairly considerable political connotations. I must therefore be careful in answering.

I might perhaps give you one or two thoughts. You have to be careful not to create a situation whereby pressure is applied by the Soviets, and only one NATO nation responds because that is the only one with the capability to respond. In other words, you want to demonstrate the cohesion of the alliance, and for this reason it is highly desirable that several nations are involved.

Another danger in specialisation is that alliances change. History has taught us this. Nations come into an alliance and nations go out of it. Therefore, you have to be careful

that if one nation goes out, the alliance as a whole does not lose an essential capability. So that whilst there may well be good economic arguments for specialisation, it is something which I would suggest ought to bc considered very carefully, because there are some potential military disadvantages to it as well.

MR R. B. HUNTER: Are there plans to build more than one Through Deck Cruiser?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: Yes, and I will leave you to guess how many! There is one being built at themoment.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER T. R. W. MUNDY: The lecturer has mentioned commitments to treaties. Would he see us with a permanent commitment to a United Nations force at sea?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: I think it is a possibility. For example, with all the emphasis on offshore resources, they could eventually become a target for the equivalent to hijacking in the aircraft world, and a United Nations pcace- keeping force might be desirable. I know of no such plans at the moment, but I think it is possible.

CAPTAIN P. COBB, RN: I should like to follow up the Chairman’s opening remarks about Admiral Gorshkov’s recent articles, and ask what are the lecturer’s views about them. One could take it that these were simply propaganda articles, or one could take the view that they were the genuine strategic ideas of a leading Russian sailor and maritime strategist. I t seems that he has produced some fairly firm ideas about how he would use the Russian Navy in peace and in war. I am thinking particularly about his concept of assisting political objectives by threatening the use of force, and also exploiting the use of the maritime resources of the oceans. How would such ideas fit in with your concept of maritime operations?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: I think we can accept that what Admiral Gorshkov has said, by and large, is done. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. He is using the Russian fleet world wide as a political instrument of Soviet policy. One western reaction to this is the growing realisation in NATO that NATO’s sea map does not end at the artificial boundary of the Tropic of Cancer, and that a strong Russian maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, for instance, can affect the oil interests which are of vital concern to NATO. One effect of this has been slowly to turn NATO’s gaze outside its own defined sea area.

CAPTAIN COBB: This idea of exploiting maritime resources seems to be a new concept. I wonder whether the Russians would take over an area and declare it as their’s, and in that case what sort of force we would require to dispute their claim. It seems we may need a number of small ships.

REAR-ADMRAL BERGER: No; this is one of the maritime options open to the Russians to declare a given sea area as their’s, perhaps one containing valuable undenvater resources. You can match them at that level of aggression. If they close off an area, you send ships through it, but you must do it in sufficient force, in which case they have the option either of firing or backing down, or you can escalate somewhere else.

I think the conclusion is that you do not want to be bogged down putting a great deal of precious money into capabilities which will only meet one limited threat. If you are short of money, you must have a wide span of capability which is very flexible, and which can pose a match at the sort of level of aggression that you first meet. If you cannot do that, then you raise the ante elsewhere. But to deter effectively, your initial response to aggression must carry with it the implicit will and ability to escalate, i f the aggressor does not back down. This leads to a requirement for a judicious mixture of low and high quality ships, submarines and aircraft.

MR R. H. I. GRAY: I should like to ask a simple question about nomenclature. A recent rather partisan questioner

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described the Through Deck Cruiser as a “See through”. Could the lecturer enlighten us as to the origin of this term, particularly as ships are to be named after battle cruisers which seems a rather unfortunate choice!

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER. I think you probably answered your own question to your own satisfaction and I have no further comment!

MR I. D. P. THORNE: To what extent would the cruiser be under-used without the Sea Harrier?

REAR-ADMIRAL BERGER: It would not be under-used at all. If we had the maritime Harrier its potential and capa- bility would be enhanced, but the Harrier is not an essential feature of its design. The cruiser has three primary tasks, to deploy the large Sea King anti-submarine helicopters

in cost-effective numbers, to provide facilities to command and control a major task force and to contribute to area air defence. However, as with all new construction, the cruiser was designed to have stretch and as I say its considerable capabilities would be further enhanced by the Harrier.

THE CmmiAN: I am sure you will want me to thank the lecturer on your behalf not only for the very able and interesting lecture he has given us, but also for the many answers he has given to the questions raised. It has been a great pleasure to listen to him, and we hope we shall hear many more lectures from the Admiralty such as his.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation, and the meeting then terminated.

UNEF 11-a Step Forward in Peacekeeping By MICHAEL HARBOTTLE

Brigndier Harbottle ~ i a s forinerly Chief of Staff of UNICYP, writes and lectirres on pence-keepiiig problerih arid is visiting seiiior Iectirrer at the Scliool of Peace Stiidies at tlie Uiiirersity of Bradford. This article is based 011 c1 receiit visit to the area of operations.

The United Nations peacekeeping operation mounted in the Middle East last October, was the first in ten years and only the fourth of its kind in the history of the world organisation-those of the Middle East (1956), the Congo and Cyprus having preceded it. (The Korean War is not included as it represents a unique and probably an unrepeatable U N action as explained below.) The circumstances leading to its creation, and the various factors that governed the structuring and deployment of the force, make it the most significant so far. The presence of this UN peacekeeping force (UNEF 11) in the Middle East emphasises that in certain circumstances a U N peace force is the only peacekeeping instrument that is acceptable and viable, and capable of being inter- positioned between two warring states or com- munities. To explain why this is so and what makes this latest UN peacekeeping initiative so important it is first necessary to explain the principles and procedures on which the operational structure and conduct of such forces are based. One must understand the political limitations that are, perforce, imposed to appreciate the difficulties under which U N peace- keeping forces have to operate, and also how remark- ably successful they are, as a rule, in overcoming them.

The Charter of the United Nations provides for military action in support of the maintenance of international peace and security (Chapter 7), which was relevant to the attitudes and intentions of the founder members when they drafted it in 1946, but which bears little relation to the geopolitical attitudes and concepts of UN peacekeeping interventions today. Korea is the only example of a UN enforcement and is likely to remain the only one. The necessary unani- mity among the members of the Security Council for

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enforcement action by the United Nations against recalcitrant states is not a political possibility. The pattern and principle of a peaceful third party inter- vention, acceptable to the host country or countries, as formulated for the 1956 Middle East force and thereafter followed in the Congo, Cyprus and now in the Middle East again, is the niodiis operaiidi most likely in the future.

Given this pattern U N member states maintain conflicting opinions as to how it should be fulfilled. The superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have been at variance for many years as to how the machinery for the control and direction of such operations is to work. The Americans would leave this in the hands of the Secretary-General, whereas the Russians want it to be the responsibility of a sub-organ created by the Security Council from among its members. This divergence of opinion has been at the root of much of the delay during the last ten years in arriving at an accepted working basis for peacekeeping operations, of which the question of preparatory planning and procedure represents an important aspect. For political reasons the idea of contingency planning for possible operations is an anathema within the United Nations. Although speed, coordination and operational effectiveness would benefit from pre-planning, the insistence remains that this is politically unacceptable and impracticable. Until this attitude changes all operations will continue to be mounted in an adhoc fashion as they. have been in the past. Similar reasons exist for there being no advisory body directly available to the Secretary-General to assist him with the planning, mounting and conduct of peacekeeping operations once they have been nuthorised by the Security

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