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The Roman Empire IIThe Monarchy Page 1 of 44 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy ). Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 27 May 2015 Print Publication Date: Feb 2013 Subject: Classical Studies, Ancient Roman History, Greek and Roman Law, Social and Economic History Online Publication Date: Jan 2013 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195188318.013.0016 The Roman Empire IIThe Monarchy Peter Fibiger Bang The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean Edited by Peter Fibiger Bang and Walter Scheidel Oxford Handbooks Online Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines the transformation of the Roman Empire from a republican to a monarchy system of government, explaining that the republican system was replaced because its political institutions were too small to manage the growing social power brought about by military expansionism. It discusses how the first emperor Augustus consolidated his monarchy by creating an institutional infrastructure that sought to regularize the retirement of the soldiery, and also considers the source of stability of the monarchy and the emergence of empire- wide aristocracy. Keywords: Roman Empire, monarchy, political institutions, military expansionism, social power, Augustus, institutional infrastructure, soldiery, aristocracy Four times I helped the public treasury so that I provided 150 million sesterces to those who were in charge of the public treasury and when Marcus Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius were consuls I paid out of my own patrimony 170 million sesterces into the military treasury which had been founded on my advice and from which bonuses were paid to those who had served for twenty or more years. Augustus, Res Gestae 17 Prosaic and dry, these sentences may nevertheless be said to encapsulate the secret, perhaps even the wonder, of the Roman imperial monarchy: a stable institutional arrangement had been created to finance the cost of the army and the discharge of soldiers. This claim appears in the summary of his life’s achievements, which Augustus, the first emperor (r. 27 B CE–14 CE), drafted and gave instructions posthumously to publicize on bronze plaques in front of his mausoleum on the Campus Martius in Rome (Witschel 2008). Nevertheless, a paragraph toward the end of the document has received far more attention during the last century of scholarship. In what would be chapter 34 of modern editions of this text, Augustus notoriously, and disingenuously, claimed to have restored the Roman republic to the control of the people and senate after his decisive and final victory at the battle of Actium in (p. 413) the civil wars of the 40s and 30s B CE. From then on, it was alleged, Augustus had participated in republican political life according to the constitutional precedents, not arrogating to himself greater powers than his colleagues in holding office but only “surpassing everyone else in personal authority” (cf. the emphasis on politics and culture in Galinsky 2005). The image of Augustus ruling the Roman empire in godfather-like fashion on the basis of his personal authority is alluring; it has taught historians to throw into sharper relief the ties of patronage and clientage, which in life around the Roman court organized relations between monarch and aristocracy (von Premerstein 1937; Saller 1982). But it is also misleading; it leaves a false impression of a monarchy underwritten by feeble institutional supports and forced to rely on the individual authority and charisma of the ruler (Lo Cascio 2000, 8; Flaig 2011, 76–78). The claim to have restored the republic was, as the historian and senator Tacitus pointed out with his unerring

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    PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All RightsReserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in OxfordHandbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 27 May 2015

    PrintPublicationDate: Feb2013 Subject: ClassicalStudies,AncientRomanHistory,GreekandRomanLaw,SocialandEconomicHistory

    OnlinePublicationDate: Jan2013

    DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195188318.013.0016

    TheRomanEmpireIITheMonarchy PeterFibigerBangTheOxfordHandbookoftheStateintheAncientNearEastandMediterraneanEditedbyPeterFibigerBangandWalterScheidel

    OxfordHandbooksOnline

    AbstractandKeywords

    ThischapterexaminesthetransformationoftheRomanEmpirefromarepublicantoamonarchysystemofgovernment,explainingthattherepublicansystemwasreplacedbecauseitspoliticalinstitutionsweretoosmalltomanagethegrowingsocialpowerbroughtaboutbymilitaryexpansionism.ItdiscusseshowthefirstemperorAugustusconsolidatedhismonarchybycreatinganinstitutionalinfrastructurethatsoughttoregularizetheretirementofthesoldiery,andalsoconsidersthesourceofstabilityofthemonarchyandtheemergenceofempire-widearistocracy.Keywords:RomanEmpire,monarchy,politicalinstitutions,militaryexpansionism,socialpower,Augustus,institutionalinfrastructure,soldiery,aristocracy

    FourtimesIhelpedthepublictreasurysothatIprovided150millionsestercestothosewhowereinchargeofthepublictreasuryandwhenMarcusLepidusandLuciusArruntiuswereconsulsIpaidoutofmyownpatrimony170millionsestercesintothemilitarytreasurywhichhadbeenfoundedonmyadviceandfromwhichbonuseswerepaidtothosewhohadservedfortwentyormoreyears.

    Augustus,ResGestae17

    Prosaicanddry,thesesentencesmayneverthelessbesaidtoencapsulatethesecret,perhapseventhewonder,oftheRomanimperialmonarchy:astableinstitutionalarrangementhadbeencreatedtofinancethecostofthearmyandthedischargeofsoldiers.Thisclaimappearsinthesummaryofhislifesachievements,whichAugustus,thefirstemperor(r.27BCE14CE),draftedandgaveinstructionsposthumouslytopublicizeonbronzeplaquesinfrontofhismausoleumontheCampusMartiusinRome(Witschel2008).Nevertheless,aparagraphtowardtheendofthedocumenthasreceivedfarmoreattentionduringthelastcenturyofscholarship.Inwhatwouldbechapter34ofmoderneditionsofthistext,Augustusnotoriously,anddisingenuously,claimedtohaverestoredtheRomanrepublictothecontrolofthepeopleandsenateafterhisdecisiveandfinalvictoryatthebattleofActiumin(p.413) thecivilwarsofthe40sand30sBCE.Fromthenon,itwasalleged,Augustushadparticipatedinrepublicanpoliticallifeaccordingtotheconstitutionalprecedents,notarrogatingtohimselfgreaterpowersthanhiscolleaguesinholdingofficebutonlysurpassingeveryoneelseinpersonalauthority(cf.theemphasisonpoliticsandcultureinGalinsky2005).

    TheimageofAugustusrulingtheRomanempireingodfather-likefashiononthebasisofhispersonalauthorityisalluring;ithastaughthistorianstothrowintosharperreliefthetiesofpatronageandclientage,whichinlifearoundtheRomancourtorganizedrelationsbetweenmonarchandaristocracy(vonPremerstein1937;Saller1982).Butitisalsomisleading;itleavesafalseimpressionofamonarchyunderwrittenbyfeebleinstitutionalsupportsandforcedtorelyontheindividualauthorityandcharismaoftheruler(LoCascio2000,8;Flaig2011,7678).Theclaimtohaverestoredtherepublicwas,asthehistorianandsenatorTacituspointedoutwithhisunerring

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    perceptionoftheoperationofpower,afacade,apretense(Annals1.910;Syme1958).ThiswastheconcessionthatAugustusmadetothelingeringrepublicansentimentsthatoncehadconspiredtoassassinateJuliusCaesar,hisadoptivefather.Suspectedofharboringmonarchicalambitions,thelatterhadfamouslyfallenvictimtotheattemptonhislifemastermindedbyBrutusandCassiusinthenameofliberty.Havingnointentionsofsufferingasimilarfate,Augustuschosetoupholdmanyoftherepublicaninstitutionsandinsteadtriedtoharnessthemtoservehisnewmonarchy(Eder1990).Inthishewasonlypartiallysuccessful.Preservingtheoldrepublicanmagistraciesmadeitpossibletosatisfytheambitionsandhungerforofficeofthearistocracy.But,eveniffewwerefooledbythisdisposition,theattempttodressupthenewmonarchyinrepublicangarbstillcomplicatedandoftenstrainedtothebreakingpointrelationsbetweenrulerandnobility(HopkinsandBurton1983b,170;Flaig1992;Winterling2003).Thegoryspectacleofearlyimperialhistory,sovividlypresentinthepublicimagination,bearstestimonytothetorturedcareerofthefirstcenturyoftheAugustanmonarchy.

    Thesecretofthestabilityofthemonarchyshouldbesoughtelsewherethanintheinformalarrangementsoftheso-calledprincipate,andtheopeningquotationinthischapterpointstheway.Thepersonaldimensionofruleisnolessarticulated,butitsbasisisrevealedtobepatrimonial.Statefinancesandthehouseholdoftheemperorhadbecomeinextricablylinked(Veyne1976,534568;LoCascio2000,97176;Speidel2009,5385).Moreover,andfromastateformationperspectivethisisthecrucialdevelopment,thefirstemperordrewontheresourcesthathecontrolledtoputthefinancingofthemilitaryonastablefooting.ThearmywasbyawidemarginthebiggestbranchandinstitutionoftheRomanstate.Duringtheageofrepublicanconquests,theRomanarmyhadgraduallyevolvedfromacitizenmilitiaintoacorpsofprofessionalsoldiers.Perennialwarfare,increasinglydistanttheatersofengagement,andagrowingstrainonmanpowerresourcescombinedtomakeimpossiblethearmysoldrelianceonself-supportingcitizensoldiersdrawnfromtheyeomanpeasantryofItaly.Tofilltheranksofthelegions,growingnumbersofrecruitshadtobeadmittedwithoutindependentmeans,thatis,landless(p.414)membersofthecountrypopulation.Ondischargethesecametodependonthestate,andinparticulartheirgeneral,tosecureforthemasmallplotoflandforsustenance.ThisdevelopmentturnedthearmyofthelastcenturyoftherepublicintoanincreasinglypotentweaponinthepoliticalstrugglesandrivalriesofcompetingfactionsoftheRomanaristocracy(Brunt1962;Gabba1976;Erdkamp2006).Thepoliticalinstitutionsoftherepublicweretoosmall,asdemonstratedbyMouritseninthepreviouschapter,tomanageandabsorbthisnewlymobilizedsourceofsocialpowerintotheregularchannelsofpoliticallife.Insteadfollowedasuccessionofcivilwars,dictators,andmilitarymenastherepublicdeclinedintoastateofunstablepraetorianpoliticstousethetermcoinedbyHuntingtoninhisclassicstudy(1968)ofmilitarycoupsandpoliticalinstabilityinmodernizingthirdworldcountriessimilarlyexperiencingaperiodofrapidtransition.

    Intheprocessofconsolidatinghismonarchy,Augustussetaboutterminatingthissocialconflictbycreatinganinstitutionalinfrastructurethatsoughttoregularizetheretirementofthesoldiery(Alston2007,177189).Thereformcombinedseveralelements.Tofinancedischargepayments,apermanentfundwasestablishedthatwouldreceivetheproceedsfromtheintroductionoftwonewtaxes.Thelandallotmentstotheveteranshadcausedconsiderabletensionanddiscontentduringthefinaldecadesoftherepublic.ItwasimpossibletofindsufficientunoccupiedarablelandinItaly.Confiscationandforcedpurchasesonanextensivescalehadbeeninevitable.DuringhisreignAugustusgraduallydiscontinuedthismuch-hatedpractice.Ifgivenlandonretirement,thelegionarieswouldnowreceiveitinnewlyfoundedcoloniesintheprovinces.TheretheveterancommunitiesmightevenhelptoconsolidateRomanruleaspropsoftheimperialorder.Butinthelongterm,itwasmoreimportantthatincreasinglythesoldiersbegantoreceiveacashbonusinsteadofaplotofland.Finally,theburdenonstatefinanceswasmademoremanageablebyfurtherextendingthetimeofservicerequiredbeforeretirement.Armystrengthwaskeptupbyfewerpeopleservinglongerandnumbersneedingdischargepaymentwerecutback.

    ThemostpowerfulinstitutionoftheMediterraneanworld,theRomanarmy,hadinlargemeasurebeentamedandtheinterestsofthesoldierytiedintothecontinuationoftheimperialmonarchy.Forlongperiods,rivalryandconflictatthecourtwerecontainedwithouteruptingintofull-blowncivilwar.Duringitsfirstcentury,themonarchysurvivedboththewithdrawalfromRomeofanagingandalienatedTiberius,theassassinationofCaiusCaligula,thedeathpossiblybypoisonofClaudius,andthedesperatesuicideofNero.Thesecretofstableimperialmonarchywaslodgedintheinstitutionalstabilityofoneofthelargeststandingprofessionalarmiesofrecordedpreindustrialhistory.ThiswastheextraordinaryachievementoftheRomanemperorsandonethatinvitedemulationwhenEuropeanstate-buildersduringthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturieswerefacedwiththeneedagaintomobilizevastinfantryarmies.Fromstudyoftheancients,humanistscholarssuchasLipsiuswouldteachgeneralsthe

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    importanceofdrillandexercisetoenablecomplexmaneuversonthebattlefield(1598,355366withconcludingcomparison;Parker1988,1920).But,apartfromtheobviousdifferencein(p.415) gunpowdertechnology,early-modernandRomanwarcraftdifferedinoneimportantrespect.ThelatterwasconsolidatedbytheimpositionofaMediterranean-wideempire,withfewrealrivalslefttochallengethemightofRome(seeMap15.1);theformerwasrelentlesslydrivenoninanarmsracefueledbyintensifyingcompetitionofevermorecompactregionalmonarchiesinastatesystemwhereeveryattempttoestablishhegemonyfailed(Tilly1992;vanCreveld1999).Then,whereaspost-NapoleonicEuropebroughttheDarwinianmilitarystruggleofstatestoitslogicalconclusioninthemassmobilizationofnationalarmies,theRomanimperialarmywasincreasinglyrecruitedfromtheempireatlarge,ratherthan,ashistorically,fromItaly.Theexploitationofextensiveandhegemonicempirewouldchartanalternativetothepathofinternalbuildupdictatedbytheunabatingpressuresofforeigncompetition.ConsolidationratherthancontinuousintensificationiswhatcharacterizesRomanstateformationundertheruleoftheCaesars.FromthelatefirstcenturyBCEtillthebeginningofthefifthcenturyCE,thehistoryoftheimperialmonarchymaybemappedbetweenasetofcoordinatesmarkedoutbyanumberofcivilwarsleadingtodynasticshiftsandoneprolongedperiodofinternaldivision,ratherthanbyexternalconflict.

    TheperiodfromAugustustillthemurderofAlexanderSeverusinalegionarycampontheGermanicfrontierin235CEisconventionallyreferredtoastheprincipate.Thenfollowfiftyyearsofcontinuousinternalwarfare,exacerbatedinthedarkesthoursbyforeigninvasionsfromtheeastandthenorth,beforecentralizedimperialpowerisagainconsolidatedunderDiocletianin284CE.Butreconstitutedunitywashardwonandtenuous.Diocletiangraduallycametoappreciatethathehadtoappointcolleaguestorulepartsoftheempireforhim.Duringthelongperiodofinternaldivision,thecityofRomehadfinallyceasedtobethecenterofpoliticalpowerwhileemperorsbegantosetupcourtinregionalcapitals.Powerhadirreversiblygravitatedtowardtheprovincesandthearmiesstationedthere.InthecourseofthefourthcenturyCE,thetendencytoaregionalizationofimperialpower,withseveralco-emperors,alternatedwithbriefinterludeswhereparticularlysuccessfulemperorsmanagedtounitegovernmentundertheirauthority.TheDominateisthelabeltraditionallypinnedtothemonarchyforthisperiodandreflectsthefactthathistorianshavethoughttoseethearrivalofamoreabsolutiststyleofrulethanwasthepracticeundertheprincipate.

    ClicktoviewlargerMap15.1. TheRomanEmpirearound70CE.AftermapinM.T.Boatwright,D.J.Gargola,N.Lenski,R.J.A.Talbert,TheRomans:Fromvillagetoempire.AhistoryofRomefromearliesttimestotheendofthewesternempire,2nded.OUP2012.

    Yet,thesideliningofRomethecityandthetendencytowardaregionalizationofgovernmentbespeakamorecomplexdevelopmentthanisimpliedbythenotionofanincreasinglyabsolutist,distant,andcentralizedformofrule.Afterall,fewemperorsofthelateantiqueworldheldcommandofthewholeempire;thiswasafeatureoftheprincipate.Butbytheturnofthefirstcentury,particularlysuccessfulprovincialfamilieswerebeginningtocontributeemperors.Spain,NorthAfrica,andSyriaallsawmembersoftheirnobleeliteselevatedtotheimperialpurple.Thisriseoftheprovincescontinuedwithundiminishedvigorinthethirdandfourthcenturies.ItwasMachiavelli,thestudentofRenaissancepowerandpoliticsthroughRomaneyes,whoprobablyfirstmadetheobservationthatthemilitaryforce,whichenabledconquest,wasinsufficientasatoolofgovernment.(p.416) (p.417) Provincialsocietieshadtoberuledbyothermeans(IlPrincipe,chap.3).Locallandowningeliteshadtobeco-optedtoadministertheRomanpeaceandcollecttheimperialtaxes.However,ifthesegroupscoulddomostoftheworkofgovernmentontheground,thentheymightalsobeabletotakeovertheempire.Evenmorethantheminimalistrepublic,themonarchyhadbeensuccessfulinaligningsuchelitesaroundtherealmtothecauseofempire.ItwasnotonlytherankandfileofthearmythatwasincreasinglyrecruitedoutsideItaly;thesame

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    graduallycametobetrueoftheimperialaristocracy.ThisdevelopmentculminatedinthefifthandsixthcenturiesCEwhen,afterthedivisionoftherealmbetweenthetwounderageheirsofTheodosius(d.395CE),thewesternpartgraduallyflakedapartduringthenexthalf-centurywhileimperialruleintheGreekeastremainedstableandwasevenstrengthened.ItwastheGreekRomanempirethataccomplishedthecodificationofLatinRomanlaw;anditwasfromherethattheemperorJustinian(r.52765CE)wasabletolaunchanattempttorecoupsomeofthelostterritoriesinthewesternMediterranean(Maas2005).

    Thehistoryofstateformationundertheimperialmonarchy,then,maybeseenasaprocesswherebytheexplosivemobilizationofsocialforcesoftheRomanrepublicwastamedandconsolidatedintoamorewidelybased,moreextensiveformofimperialgovernment.Itisthisprocessthatwillbeanalyzedinmoredetailbelow.Itscoursewillbetrackedbychartingthedevelopmentofitsthreemaincomponents:themilitaryorganizationofMediterraneanhegemony,theemergenceofacourtaroundtheimperialhousehold,andtheco-optationofprovincialelitesintothegovernmentoftheempire.AfourthandfinalsectionthenexploreshowtherisingimportanceofprovincialelitesaffectedtherenewedeffortsatstateformationfromthethirdcenturyCEonwardastheequilibriumachievedundertheprincipatebecameunstableandgavewaytothelateantiqueworld.

    TheMilitaryOrganizationofMediterraneanHegemonyThevictoryatActiumin31BCEandthesuicideofhisdefeatedopponent,Antony,togetherwithCleopatra,allowedCaesarsheirOctavianustocompletehismetamorphosisfromrevolutionaryleadertoAugustus,thesolemnandpaternalworldruler.Hewasleftwithapressingproblemonhishands.Hewasnowincommandofamilitaryforceofstaggeringsize,thearmiesrecruitedbybothsidestowagethecivilwar.Intotal,thenumberlaybetweenfiftyandsixtylegionsofRomancitizensandanunknowablequantityofauxiliaryforces.Thelevelofmilitarymobilizationhadbeenextremeandunrivaled;itwasalsounsustainableandunnecessary.ItalianmanpowerresourceshadbeenstretchedtothebreakingpointtofillthemanylegionsrequiredbytheRomancivilwareffort.Notalloftherecentlycreated(p.418) regimentshadbeenmannedexclusivelybycitizens;ithadnotbeenuncommontofilltherankswithprovincialsubjects(Brunt1971;Hopkins1978;Keppie1983,140).

    Inalong-termperspective,itisremarkablethatthelevelofmilitarycapacitythattherepublichadhadtobuilduptodefeatCarthageintheSecondPunicWar(218201BCE)wasmorethanenoughtotranslateintoapan-MediterraneanhegemonyduringthesecondcenturyBCE.NootherforeignpowercouldpressureRometoasimilarlast-ditcheffortagain.Maintainingarmiesathalfortwo-thirdsthesizeofthepeaklevelsreachedduringtheconfrontationwithHannibal,therepublicwentonfromtriumphtotriumph,acquiringasteadilyexpandingempirewithonehandtiedbehindtheback,sotospeak.Theacquisitionofprovincialterritoriesdidundoubtedlyproduceaslowunderlyingtrendforthenumberoftroopstoaccumulate.Newprovincesrequiredgarrisoning.However,thenextphaseofsignificantexpansioninstatecapacitywasinextricablyboundupwithinternalconflictsoverthecontroloftheempire.Itwasinthe80s70sBCEandthenagaininthe40s30sBCEthatdramaticincreasesinarmysizeoccurred,andinthelatterperiodmorethantheformer.The80s70sBCEwerethedecadesoftheSocialWar,theimpositionofSullasdictatorship,theSpartacusuprising,SertoriussrenegadegovernmentinSpain,andthewarsagainstMithridates,thekingofPontus.Mostoftherecordedexpansion,however,wascosmetic.ThetroopsoftheformerItalianallies,whichhadalwaysconstitutedaboutagoodhalfofthearmiesfieldedbytherepublic,hadnowbecomecitizensoldiers.Arealandsubstantialupwardleap,ontheotherhand,wasachievedduringtheconfrontationsofthegeneralissimosthattorethestateapartinthecivilwarsofthelasttwodecadesoftherepublic.Exactfiguresareunobtainable,butaplausibleestimateenvisagesadoublingofthenumberofcitizensenrolledinthelegions,fromsome120,000inthelate50sBCEto240,000bytheendofthecivilwar(Hopkins1978,33).Internalstrugglesovercontroloftheempirehadbecomeamoresignificantspurtotheprocessofstateformationthanimperialconquestandexpansion(seeTable15.1).

    Withnocrediblerivalleftandmanylegionarieslookingtoretirement,Augustushadlittleincentivetomaintainthearmyatitslaterepublicanpeaklevel.Itwasfartoolargeforhispurposes,toocostlytoretainanyhow,andthereforeneededtobedisbanded(Keppie1983,chaps.57;JacquesandScheid1990,chap.4;LeBohec1994;Rankow2007).OfforeignpowersParthiawastheonlysubstantialrivalofRome.ButtheIranianthreatcouldbecontainedwithfarfewertroops,andtheemperorhadnoappetiteforriskinghisnewlywonauthorityonaParthianadventure.Quitethereverse,redressforthedevastatingdefeatsufferedbyCrassusatCarrhaein53BCEwassoughtthroughanegotiatedpeaceratherthanavengedbyabloodycampaign.Thedealwassealedbythereturn

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    ofthelegionarystandardsthathadbeensoignominiouslylost(CassiusDio53.33;Campbell1993:22123).AugustusadvertisedthisasagreattriumphandconspicuouslydedicatedtheregainedlegionaryeaglesinthetempleofMarsinhisnewsplendidforuminthecapital(Zanker1987:188217;HendersonandBeard2001:16575;Schneider2012:8283).Romehadnowreachedapositionofastable,unrivaled,ifnotquiteunchallenged,territorialhegemonyinthegreaterMediterraneanworld;theempire(p.419) hadacquiredanearmonopolyinthemarketforviolenceandprotection,toborrowthetermsofFrederickLane.

    Table15.1RomanandEarly-ModernMilitaryMobilization

    No.oflegions Realisticstrength Notionalstrength

    218201BCE2ndPunicWar

    2025 50,00080,000(Bruntsestimate) 110,000137,500

    20091BCE 510 22,00044,000(80%) 27,50055,000

    9062BCE 2035 88,000154,000(80%) 110,000192,500

    6159BCE 15 66,000(80%) 82,500

    44BCE 3436 149,600158,400(80%) 187,000198,000

    4331BCE 5166 224,400290,400(80%) 280,500363,000

    31BCE161CE 2528 110,000123,200(80%) 137,500154,000

    MarcusAurelius 30 132,000(80%) 165,000

    SeptimiusSeverus 33 145,200(80%) 181,500

    Note:Thefiguresgivenaboveinevitablysimplifyamorecomplexrealityanddispelwithmanydetailswhoseinclusionwouldhavemadethetablemoreexact,butalsolessclear(Brunt1971,404,418,424,43233,449,480512;Hopkins1978,33;Rankov2007,7172).Forinstance,the510legionsgivenforthesecondcenturyBCEindicatesthenormalrange,whileafewexceptionalyearssawafewmorelegionsputintoservice.Forallperiods,Ihaveusedafigureof5,500asabaselineforcalculatingthenotionalstrengthofthelegion,thusignoringhistoricalvariation.Inpractice,legionswouldoftenhavebeenstaffedatless.Scheidel(1996,132137)hasarguedforaplausiblerangeof5,000to4,600.Brunt(1971,appendix27)foundlegionsofthelaterepublicanperiodtobecloserto4,000.Perhapsthiswasduetotheurgencyandhastewithwhichthelegionsofthecivilwarshadtoberaised.Ontheotherhand,thecontendershadeveryincentivetocramasmanymenintotheirarmiesaspossibleandsoBruntsestimatemaybeclosertothenormthansometimesthought.Preindustrialarmiesseemgenerallytohavefallenshortofthetheoreticallypossible.IseenoreasonwhyRome,existingundersimilarorganizationalandtechnologicalconstraints,shouldhavemarkedanexceptiontothisrule,so80%ofnotionalstrengthhasbeenadoptedtoestimatetheplausiblenumberoflegionaries.Finally,asourmostcertaintime-seriesinformationontheRomanarmyrelatestothenumberoflegions,noattempthasbeenmadetoincludeauxiliarieswhosenumbersnormallymatchedorevenexceededthoseofthelegionaries.Atanyrate,allthatispossibleisroughestimatesofthesizeoftheRomanarmy.Addingmoredetails,ormorecarefulattemptstoestimatesizeatspecificpointsintime,wouldnotaltertheconclusions,butonlyproduceanillusionofunwarrantedhistoricalexactitude.Themainresult,though,isclear:AftertheSecondPunicWaritisespeciallythecivilwarperiodsofthefirstcenturythatdriveupnumbers.

    Whenweemphasizethemilitarydimensionofitsactivities,astatemaybeconceptualizedasaviolence-producingenterpriseor,toputitdifferently,andperhapsmoreaccurately,asellerofprotection(Lane1958;Steensgaard1981;alsoabove,chapter1).Inreturnforthepaymentoftaxes,itoffersprotectionagainstthepredationsofother

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    militaryestablishmentsanditself.Fewstate-formsfitthistemplatebetterthananempirebuiltonconquest(cf.Tacitus,Histories4.74).Militaryvictoryanddominancewasusedtodemandtaxesfromdefeatedcommunitiesandpreventrivalsfromdoingthesame.Butwithfewoftheseleft,theRomanEmpireofAugustushadcometoenjoyarelativemonopoly.Imperialgovernmentcould(p.420) takeadvantageofthissituationintwoways.Itmightcutcosts,reducethesizeofitsmilitary,andthuscashinapeacedividendor,moreprecisely,pocketamonopolyprofitandclaimatribute(cf.Hopkins2009:196).Alternatively,itmightmaintainanoversizedarmy.Inasense,itisthearmythatisthemonopolistandsothereislittletopreventitfromfeatheringitsownnest.Militaryjuntashaveregularlyexploitedtheirmonopolytoswelltheranksofthearmy,lookingtotheinterestsofthemilitaryinstitutionmorethanthoseofothergroups(Lane1958,406;cf.Eich2009ontheRomanimperialmonarchy).Thesetwoalternatives,however,arenotnecessarilymutuallyexclusive,butmayusefullybeseenasoppositeendsofaspectrum.TheAugustanprincipatearguablycombinedelementsofbothstrategies.Yet,wheretolocateitonthespectrumisdifficulttodeterminewithexactness.Thelackofpreciseinformationonmanpowernumbersisamajorobstacle.

    Table15.1.2(early-modernmilitarymobilization)

    Year Spain France OttomanEmpire

    1470 20,000 40,000 103,500

    1550 150,000 50,000 118,000

    1600 200,000 80,000 140,000

    1700 50,000 400,000 140,000

    Note:Needlesstosay,thistabletoo,basedonTilly(1992,79),Kennedy(1988,71),Inalcik(1994,8889),andMurphey(1999,41,45,49)isagrosssimplificationofacomplexhistoricaldevelopmentandignoresimportantdifferencesintypesofrecruitmentandformsofmilitarytenure.Thefigures,thoughlessuncertainthantheRoman,arerounded,broad,inpartimpressionistic,estimatesorconstructs.Theyrevealthesteadilyexpandingscaleofearly-modernEuropeanwarfare.Betweenthem,thethreepowersincludedinthetablecontrolledmostoftheformerRomanworld.Intermsofmobilizationforwarfare,theseventeenthcenturyappearsasawatershedwheretheearly-modernexperiencebeginstooutstriptheRoman.Forindividualcampaignsnopowerevermobilizeditsentirepotentialarmystrength.

    EventuallyAugustussettledfortwenty-eightlegions(+aguardinRome).WhenthreeofthesewereeradicatedbyacoalitionofGermanictribesintheTeutoburgForestin9CE,noattemptwasmadetoreplacethem.Formostoftheprincipatethenumberoflegionslayinthisrange,risingslightlytowardtheendoftheperiod.Theseareouronlycertaincoordinates.Alegion,atfullstrength,seemstohaveheldbetween5,000and6,000men.Proceedingfromameanof5,500,thelegionscouldhavecomprisedsome140,000to165,000citizensoldiersatfullstrength.Mostofthetime,however,thefigureislikelytohavebeenlessorevensubstantiallyless(Brunt1971,appendix27;Scheidel1996,121).Moststatesinpreindustrialhistoryhavedemobilizedmuchoftheirarmiesinpeacetime.TheRomanrepublichadbeennodifferent.Themonarchychangedthissomewhatbytransformingtherepublicanmilitaryintoastandingarmy.Evenso,thearmywasbyfarthebiggestexpenseontheimperialbudget(CassiusDio52.28withMattern1999,129)andthetemptation,nottosaytheneed,tosaveinpeacetimemusthavebeenirresistible.Indirectconfirmationofthispracticecomesfromreportsthatactivecampaigning(p.421) significantlyincreasedthecostsofthemilitary,nodoubt,albeitnotsolely,becausemoretroopswererecruitedtofilluptheranks(paceBirley1981,39;cf.Tacitus,Annals13.7;CassiusDio56.16.4;Isaac1986;Mattern1999,142143).

    Thisconsiderationappliesevenmoretotheauxiliarytroopsoftheimperialarmies.TacituscommentsthatunderTiberiustheirsizecorrespondedmoreorlesstothatofthelegions(Annals4.5).Thisshouldbetakenasnomorethananindicationofveryroughordersofmagnitude.NeitherTacitus,northeGreekhistorianCassiusDio(55.24.5),whowroteacenturylater,wasabletoprovidedetailedinformationontheauxiliariesastheywereonthelegions.Manyauxiliaryregimentscertainlymaintainedacontinuousexistenceoverseveraldecadesascanbe

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    seenfromthesurvivingepigraphicrecord.Nevertheless,whenin66CEVespasianwassentwithanarmytoquelltheJewishrebellion,muchoftheauxiliarycontingentwasprovidedbyRomesNearEasternclientkingsratherthandrawnfromthestandingimperialarmy(Josephus,JewishWar3.4.2).Considerableflexibilityinthenumberofauxiliariesislikelytohavebeentheorderoftheday,atleastformuchoftheprincipate,justasitwasinlateantiquitywherewearewell-informedabouttheemploymentoffederatedGermanictroops.ThereisaquestionaboutthesecondcenturyCEwhereinformationaboutauxiliaryregimentsbecomesmuchdenserduetothepreservationofdischargediplomasgrantingRomancitizenshiptotheirveterans(Spaul2000).Theseveralhundredsmallunitsknownfromtheserecordshaveledsometothebeliefthattheyheavilyoutnumberedthelegionariescomprisingperhapssome224,000extratroops.Asaresulttheyestimatethetotalsizeofthearmyas415,000to450,000(Birley1981,3943;Holder2003;Rankow2007,71).Butthatseemsunrealistic.WhentheFranceofLouisXIVfeltcompelledtoexpanditsmilitaryforcestosome400,000undertheWaroftheSpanishSuccession,itfacedcompetitionfromseveralotherverysubstantialpowersacrossEurope.NotincludedinTable15.1.2focusedontheMediterraneanworld,England/Walescouldmustersome292,000,theNetherlands100,000,andRussia170,000(Tilly1992,79).TheRomanempiredidnotnearlyfacethesamesortofpressuresanditisdifficulttoseewhichconstellationofenemiescouldhavenecessitatedsuchabuildup.Butofcoursethepremiseofthemaximalistargumentisdoubtful.Itassumeslegionsandauxiliaryregimentstohavebeenmaintainedatfullstrength.Incidentallythelargertheestimateofthearmythelesslikelyasageneralpropositionthisbecomes.Allarmiesfaceproblemsoffinance,desertion,depletionthroughloss,officerskeepingdeadmenontherollstopockettheirsalary,andsoon(Parker1988,Murphey1999).Thebiggerthearmy,however,thebiggerinabsolutetermsthechallengebecomes.ItisonethingtocredittheRomangovernmentwiththeabilitytoavoidthisprobleminrelationtoarelativelyrestrictednumberofsoldiers,forexample,aneliteguardofafewthousandmen;itisquiteanothertostatethisasageneralpropositioninrelationtowhatwouldineffectverylikelyhavebeenthebiggeststandingarmyinEuropeanhistorybeforetheNapoleonicWars.WhenitcomestothesizeoftheRomanarmyingeneralandthenumerousandwidelydispersedcontingentsofauxiliarytroops,eachmuchsmallerthanalegion,inparticular,wereallyaretreadingonverythinice,andeverythingdependsonconjectureandextrapolation.(p.422) Inthissituation,analyticalcontrolsonourquantitativespeculationarederigueur.RealizingthattheRomanempire,evenonaconservativeestimate,possessedanunusuallylargepermanent,standingforce,speaksinfavorofadoptingacautiousestimateofitssize.Assumingparitybetweenlegionariesandauxiliaries,apeacetimeestimateofsome230,000270,000,plusanotinsignificantfleet,wouldnotbeatallsurprising,evenifitmayseemcontroversialbysomestandards(cf.Table15.1;slightlyhigherare,e.g.,Luttwak1976;Goldsworthy2007,118;Hopkins2009).

    Evenso,bykeepingupthestrengthofthearmyattwenty-fivetotwenty-eightlegions,theAugustansettlementdidnotquiteseeareturntothelowerlevelofstatecapacitybeforethemobilizationofthelasttwotothreewar-torndecadesoftherepublic.Inthatrespect,theimperialmonarchyclearlyremainedboundtothemilitary.Majorconquestscontinuedasanimportantaspectofwhatitmeanttoruletheempire:ItwasnotacoincidencethatthereignofAugustussawsomeofthemostdramaticterritorialexpansioninRomanhistory.ThedefeatofAntonyalsobroughtdestructiononhisally,thePtolemaicqueenCleopatra.ThisleftAugustusincontrolofEgypt,afabulousprize,themostproductiveagriculturalregionintheRomanworld.Butthatwasnotenoughtosatisfythenewemperor.Allthroughhisreign,Romanarmiescontinuedtopushoutwardandonward.Mostofthiswarfaretookplaceinmuchlesspromisingtheaters.NocomparablerewardscamewiththeclosingoftheimperialfrontierinnorthernSpainanditsextensionacrosstheBalkanstoreachtheDanube;territorialcontrolwashereestablishedinmuchmorethinlypopulatedregions.However,inhisattempttoreducetheareabetweentheRhineandtheElbetoaprovince,Augustusreachedthelimitsoftheexpansivepotentialofhisarmies;theseplanshadeventuallytobeabandoned.Theunderlyingimperialistambition,though,didnotdie.AnnexationinBritainandDacia,absorptionoflong-servingclientkingdoms,andslowbutsteadyexpansionintheNearEastbeartestimonytotheenduringvalueattachedtoconquestsinRomanstateideology.Duringtheprincipateenlargementoftheempireremainedcentraltothelegitimacyofthemonarchy,andemperorsconsequentlypreservedtheaggressivepotentialofthearmy(Isaac1993;Whittaker1994;Sommer2005).

    Understandablythereforetheimperialarmyremainedsubstantialinabsolutenumbersandinexcessofthebareminimumrequirementsofpeacetimeobligations(Eich2009).Nonetheless,relativetothevast,evenextraordinaryexpanseofterritoryunderRomancontrolmuchlargerthanatanytimeundertherepublicthearmyremainedonlymoderatelysized(cf.BreezeandDobson1993,120).Itstillleftenoughroomtoallowtheemperorstocashinonapeacedividend.FortheimpositionofRomanhegemonyonthegreaterMediterraneanworlddidinalllikelihood

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    causeafallintheoverallmilitarycostsbornebytheregion,notonlyinrelationtothelaterepublicancivilwarpeakbutalsoinmoregeneraltermsasthearmiesofrivalsandenemiesweredismantledfollowingdefeatandthefrequencyofwarfaredecreasedinsidetheenormousimperialterritory.Theothersideofthecoinwasthatresourceshadtobehusbandedcarefullytomakeendsmeet.Substantialwarfareonmorethanonefrontatatimewaslikelytooverstrainthecapacityoftheimperialgovernment.Arigideconomyofforcegoverned(p.423) andconstrainedthedeploymentoftheRomanmilitary;itwasnottobewastedindiscriminately(Luttwak1976,50andchap.2;Mattern1999,9498;Bang2007;Hopkins2009,196).Hencewefind,forinstance,thatmostroutinepatrollingandcombatoflow-levelthreatsfrombrigandsandothersuchenemiesofthepeacehadtobelefttolocal,independentmilitias(Brunt1990,chap.11;Brlaz2005).

    AnimportantaspectofthetransitiontoapeacetimearmytheexpressionofBrianDobsonwasthattheimpactofmilitarymobilizationwasreducedanditseffectsonsociety,moreparticularlyonItaly,stabilized.Undertherepublic,citizenshadbeenliabletomilitaryserviceforuptosixteenyears.Thoughthelengthofservicehadbeengrowing,mostrecruitsdidnotanticipateservingthemaximumterm.WithAugustus,theoldmaximumbecametheminimum.Theresultwasasignificantreductioninthenumberofrecruits,thoughevensostateresourceswerestretched.Manyhadtostayintheranksforlonger,andsoontwenty-fiveyearsbecamethestandardservicerequirement(Scheidel1996,132137).InthecourseofthefirstcenturyCE,Italiansceasedtoconstitutethemajorityinthelegions,andsoldierswereincreasinglyrecruitedintheprovinceswheretheywerestationed.AllthiseasedpressureonthepopulationofItalyandspreadtheburdenofmilitaryserviceonawidersegmentofthepeoplesoftheempire(Forni1953).Theoldrepublicanarmyhadmadeextensiveuseofauxiliarytroopssuppliedbyvarioustypesofalliesandsubjectstosupportthelegions.Underthemonarchy,thenetwascastevenmorewidelysothatcontributionsweresoughtfromanextraordinaryrangeofdifferentcommunities,fromBataviansontheRhinetoPalmyrenes(whoprovidedarchers)outoftheSyriandesert(Spaul2000,209216,434436;Nesselhauf1936,no.69).

    Militaryconsolidationrestedoninstitutionalstabilizationandcontinuity.Withthetransitiontoastandingarmy,legionsacquiredpermanence.OfthelegionsinserviceunderAugustus,eighteenwerestillinexistencewhenCassiusDio(55.53.36)waswritinghisRomanhistoryundertheSeverans(BreezeandDobson1993,chap.7).Manyofthenoncitizenauxiliaryregimentsalsograduallytookonamorelastingexistence.Theinstitutionalcontinuityofthearmywasanimportantpillaroftheimperialorder;ithelpedfosteraseparateidentityforthesoldierywho,tosomeextent,constitutedacommunityapartoratleaststoodonthemarginsofregularsociety.Thesoldiersenjoyedspeciallegalprivilegesbutwerealsosubjecttoparticularconstraints.Abanonmarriage,probablyintroducedalreadyunderAugustus,wasintendedtopreventthewarriorsofthestatefromforminglocalattachmentsandensurethatthearmywouldremainmobileanddeployable.Inpractice,itwasoftentoleratedthatsoldierswouldformmorelastingliaisonswithwomeninthelocalitieswheretheywerestationed.ButtillSeptimiusSeverusfinally,inanostentatiousgestureofgoodwill,bestowedtherightofmarriageontheservicemen,suchfamiliesexistedinajuridicaltwilightzone(Campbell1978).Thearmywasafraternity,atotalsocialinstitution,differentiatedtoaremarkabledegreefromtherestofsociety(Shaw1983,144150;MacMullen1984;Haynes1999;Phang2001;Scheidel2007b;contra:Alston1995).Drillandextensiveexercisesservedbothtoensurecombatefficiencyandtofirmupdisciplineandthecohesionofmilitaryregiments(Lendon2005,chaps.1011;Phang2008).

    (p.424) Theloyaltyofthisformidablebodywasdirectedtowardtheemperorbynumerousceremoniesandoccasionalactsofbenevolence(Campbell1984).Thesoldierswererequiredtopledgepersonalallegiancetotheemperor;thereligiouscalendarofthevariousregimentswaspunctuatedbyamonotonousstreamofculticsacrificeforandtotheemperors,livinganddeified:Onthe3rdIdesofMarch:BecausetheEmperor,CaesarMarcusAureliusSeverusAlexanderwasnamedemperor,toJupiteranox.OntheKalendsofAugust:ForthebirthdayofthedeifiedClaudiusandthedeifiedPertinax,tothedeifiedClaudiusanox,tothedeifiedPertinaxanox(Fink1971,no.117,col.I,2326,col.II,2324).Thespecialrelationshipbetweenemperorandarmywascementedbycashdonativesonspecialoccasionssuchasaccessionandjubilees.Byandlarge,emperorssucceededinkeepingcontrolofthearmy,nottotheextentofcompletelydepoliticizingitbutenoughtocontainthelegionsforlongstretchesoftime.InstrumentaltothisremarkableachievementwasthedecisiontogarrisonmuchofthearmyinthefrontierregionsawayfromItaly.Geographicallydispersedanddividedunderseparatemilitarycommanders,theprovincialarmieswereunabletoactinunisonandweretoofarfromthecenterofpowertoinfluencepoliticsatcourtdecisively(Hopkins2009,190195;balancedbyBirley2007andFlaig1992).However,

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    interferenceofthefrontierlegionsalwaysremainedalatentpossibility.ThiswasthesecretofempirethatTacitus(Histories1.4)sawrevealedintheyearofthefouremperorswhenarebellionbyagovernorinGaulhadsetinmotiontherapidcollapseofNerosreignandunleashedabriskcivilwarbeforeVespasian,thegeneralsenttoquellthefamousJewishrebellion,wasabletoplacehimselfsecurelyonthethrone(69CE).Butsuchreenactmentsofthecivilwardramawererare.Agoodindicationofthedependenceofthearmyonthemonarchyisthefactthatannuallegionarypaywaskeptstableforacentury,thenraisedfrom225to300silverdenariibyDomitianandretainedatthatlevelforanothercenturyuntilthetimeofSeptimiusSeverus.

    Onegroupofsoldiers,though,wasexceptionallywellsituatedtoaffectthecourseofpolitics.WithmostofthearmystationedsafelyawayfromItaly,theemperorsretainedinRomeahorseguardandtheso-calledpraetorianguard,acorpsmadeupofspeciallyprivilegedinfantrycohorts.Thesewerekeyplayersinthepoliticsoftheprincipate(Absil1997).Tiberius,thesuccessorofAugustus,issaidtohavesecuredthesupportoftheseguardsforhisaccessionbeforethatoftheRomansenate(Tacitus,Annals1.7).WhenCaligulawasassassinated,itwasthepraetorianguardthatelevatedClaudiustothepurpleanditwasfromtheprotectiveshieldoftheircampthathethenwentontonegotiatetheacceptanceofhismonarchywiththesenate.AstheonlysizableandstrongmilitaryforceleftinItaly,theguardwasprotectorofthemonarchybutmightalsoturnagainstthereigningemperor.LaterinhisreignTiberiuswasalmostsidelinedasthecommanderoftheguard,Sejanus,arrogatedtohimselfincreasingpoliticalpower.Theleadershipoftheguardseemsinvariablytohavebeeninvolvedinsuccessfulattemptsatrulerassassination.Emperorsattemptedtocontrolthispotentialking-makerbydividingthecommandoftheguardbetweentwoprefectsandselectingtheincumbentsnotfromamongtheirpeersinthesenate,butfromthesecondtieroftheRoman(p.425) aristocracy,theequestrianorder.Ittookmorethantwocenturiesoftheimperialmonarchyforsuchpersonstobecomecrediblecandidatesforthepurple,withtheill-fatedusurpationofMacrinusin217CEleadingtheway.Thepraetorians,inshort,hadgreaterleverageoverthegovernmentthanthearmyingeneralandwereabletosecuremanymoregiftsfromtheemperorsattemptingtobuytheirloyalty.Withastrongvestedinterestinthecontinuationofthemonarchy,theguardremainedafirmbulwarkofthethrone,albeitnotalwaysofitscurrentincumbent.

    Akeycomponentofthearmyandtheimperialstateapparatuswastheofficercorps,manyofwhomwereappointeddirectlybytheemperor.Legionarycommanderswouldreceivetheircommissionsasabeneficefromthemonarch.Sowouldmanyofthearistocratichigherjuniorofficers,forwhomthereweresome600positions(Devijver19762001;1989),thoughoftenontherecommendationofthelegionarycommander.Imperialinterestinappointmentsreachedrightdowntothelevelofcenturions(Statius,Silvae5.1.9498).TheseofficerscommandingthebasicorganizationalunitsofsomeeightymeninthelegionsconstitutedthebackboneoftheRomanarmy.Asubstantialnumber,thoughfarfromthemajority,ofthecloseto2,000centurionsowedtheirpostorapromotiontotheemperor.Othershadreceivedtheirrankattheinstigationofthelegionarycommanders.Buteventhen,thecentralimperialgovernmentseemstohavekeptrecordsonthosetrustedjuniorofficers.Manyofthemwouldseeservicewithdifferentregimentsandunitsastheywerepromotedandmightondischargebeabletosportacareermarkedbystationingindistantandwidelydispersedregions.Theirwidercirculationhelpedtopreservethemobilityandloyaltyofaninfantryarmy,manyofwhoseunitswouldoftenremaingarrisonedinthesameareafordecadeswithalltherisksthisentailedofputtingdownstrongrootsinthehostsociety(E.Birley1988,206220;JacquesandScheid1990,136137;BreezeandDobson1993,129217).Theorganizationalstrengthandinstitutionalintegrityofthemilitarywasfirmedupby,relativetotherestofsociety,anextensiveuseofwrittenrecordsanddocumentation.Armyunitswouldkeepdetailedaccountsofsoldierspay,spending,savings,andlengthofservice.Theyalsomaintainedregularlyupdatedrostersofmanpowerresourcesdetailingwhowereavailableforactiveduty,ill,fallen,awayonspecialmissions,orsimplyabsent(Stauner2004).

    MilitaryhistorianshaveoftenapproachedtheRomanarmywithanimageofthebureaucraticarmiesofthenineteenthcenturyintheirminds.Asaconsequence,theytendtooverstatethelevelofstandardizationanduniformityaspiredto,letaloneachieved.Nomilitaryacademiesorgeneralstaffexistedtopromotesuchprogramsofmodernization.Inthehighestranks,theRomanarmyremainedundertheleadershipof,forlackofabetterword,amateurs,thatis,aristocratswhointermittentlyinterruptedtheirlifeofleisureandpoliticstodoatourofthecolors(Campbell1975;Saller1982,chap.3).NoneoftheseobservationsareintendedtobelittletheinstitutionalachievementrepresentedbytheRomanarmy.Toaremarkabledegreetheemperorssucceededinforginganinstrumentofwarthatcouldbedeployedeffectivelyinshiftingtheatersaroundtheempire.IfwemayborrowtheterminologyofSchmuelEisenstadt(1963,part1),itwasafree-floating(p.426) resource,atleasttoalarge

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    extent;itwasauniversalinstitution,notinextricablytiedtoanylocalcommunity.AssuchtheappropriatecomparisonprobablyliesratherwiththemilitaryestablishmentsofthecomplexpremodernAsianempires,suchastheMughalarmiesfieldedbythemansabdariservicearistocracy,apatrimonialaristocraticcadre(AtharAli1997;Gommans2002),andinparticularthefabledOttomaninfantrycorpsofthejanissaries(Murphey1999)constitutedbyasoldieryformallymarkedofffromtherestofthepopulationasthesultansslaves,supposedlywithoutfamilyattachments(andasintheRomancase,inpracticeoftennotquitesodetachedfromsociety).

    Thesearmiesfunctionedasthepropofimperialhegemonyoverdiversepopulationsandcompositeterritories.Theirmobilityandeffectivefunctioningwere,intheRomancase,aidedbytheconstructionofanetworkofimperialhighwaysthatevolvedtospantheempirelikeahugecobweb(Rathmann2003;furtherKolb2000).SometerritorieswerestabilizedbythefoundationofcoloniesofRomanveteransoldiers.Suchcommunitiesofloyal,privileged,and,presumably,militarilycapablemencouldbereliedupontorallytothesupportofgovernmentintimesofunrest.ItiswelltorememberthattheRomanmilitarydidnotonlyservetoprotectthefrontiersoftheempire,itneverreallyceasedtobealsoanarmyofoccupation,asafeguardofimperialdomination(Isaac1993;Woolf1993).Fewreignsdidnotseeonekindofrebellionoranotherflareup(Thompson1952;Dyson1971).Ofthese,thedisastrousJewishrebellion,whichendedwiththesackofJerusalem,thedestructionoftheTemple,andthesiegeofMasada,isthemostfamous(Goodman2007).Itisalsoquiterepresentativeinonecrucialrespect:itwasalocalizedaffair.Rebelsmightscoreanearlyvictoryonthefieldofbattle.Despitethelegionssuperiortraining,organization,andequipment,theywouldoccasionallyexperiencedefeatatthehandsofaramshackle,butspiritedpeasantarmy.Inthelongrun,however,suchinitialsuccesseswerenormallyunsustainablebecauserebelslackedanykindofsupraregionalorganizationandinfrastructureofpowertomatchthatoftheimperialgovernment.Astheemperorwasabletopullinreinforcementsfrommoresubduedareas,rebellionswereregularlygrounddown.Hegemonywasrestoredbecausetheuprisinghadbeenorganizationallyoutflanked(cf.Mann1986,7).

    Imperialstateformation,then,didnotproducethatcleardistinctionbetweenaninternalpacifiedterritorysubjectonlytopolicingandoutsidemilitaryactivity,whichwehavecometoexpectfromthepost-Hobbesianstatecraftthatdevelopedduringtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies(Giddens1986).Thearmyalwaysremainedathreattothesubjectpopulation.Havingimperialtroopsmarchingthroughonesareawasamixedblessing.Civiliansighsofwoeandcomplaintsoverabusesandpredationsusuallyfollowedintheirtrail(Mitchell1976;Pollard2000,104110).Moreimportantly,asapoliticalsystem,theempirehadnoclearlydefinedborder.Ratheritcomprisedterritoriesunderdifferentdegreesandmodesofsubmission.AtthecenterwasItaly,privilegedandtax-exempt,thenthebulkoftheempiredividedintosomefortytofiftytaxpayingprovinces,and,finally,afluctuatingnumberofclientkingdomsandtribalchieftains.Notclearlybounded,theempirehasaptlybeendescribedashavingamobilefrontierzonewherecontrol(p.427) graduallypeteredout(Whittaker1994).Wemayextendthisimagetocovertheexistenceofaninternalfrontieraswell.Someareas,difficultofaccess,lowinpopulation,orpoorinresources,continuedaspocketsbeyondthereachofgovernment(Shaw1984;2000).AcrosstheRomanworld,muchoftheday-to-daymaintenanceoforderandpeacewaslefttotheinitiativeofamotleycollectionoflocalmilitias.Palmyra,thecaravancityinthemiddleoftheSyriandesert,regularlyfoughtoffnomadraidstokeepopenthetradingroutes(Drexhage1988;Young2001,chap.4).TheintensityofthethreatfacedbyPalmyra,andtheleveloforganizationmusteredtomeetit,maywellhavebeenabnormallyhigh.Butthebasicchallengeofcombatingbrigandsandotherlow-levelthreatsexistingonthemarginsofcivilizedsocietywasnotunusual.Thiswasamatterthateverycityintheempirehadtodealwithmoreorlessonitsown,sometimeseventotheapplauseoftheemperor.Ipraisedyouforyourzealandbravery,CommoduswroteinalettertothecityofBouboninLycia,thatyouhastenedwithsuchgreatenthusiasmtothearrestofthebandits,overcomingthem,killingsome,andcapturingothers(trans.quotedfromLendon1997,137).Everynowandthen,however,suchlocalresourcefulnessandmilitary/organizationalcapacitygotoutofhand.InRomanNorthAfrica,aborderdisputebetweenthecitiesofLepcisandOeaspiraledbadlyoutofcontrolearlyduringthereignofVespasian.[F]romsmallbeginnings,itwassoonconductedwithweaponsandbattles,wereadinthetersereportageofTacitus.ThecitizensofOeahadcalledtheso-calledGaramantestotheirassistance.ThisfrontiertribewentontoravagetheterritoryofLepcis,whosepopulationhadtoberescuedbytheimperialarmybeforeorderandbusinessasusualcouldberestored(Tacitus,Histories4.50;cf.Annals12.54;Gutsfeld1989,8186).Underneaththemilitaryhegemonyoftheemperor,localsocieties(andsomemorethanothers)preservedameasureofindependentcapacity,howevercurtailedandlimited.Itisnomereformalitytonotethatbelowthelevelofimperialgovernment,therealmconsistedofsometwothousandcity-stateswithcouncilsandannuallyelectedmagistrates.Theempirewasacomposite

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    medleyofsubject,butneverthelesslargelyself-governingcommunities;theirpoliticallifemattered(Nrr1969;1979;Galsterer2000).

    TheCourtCenteroftheWorldPresidingoverthiscomplexamalgamofcity-states,clientkingdoms,andalliedtribes,theemperorsreignedasuniversalmonarchs(cf.BangandKolodziejczyk2012).Romanemperorslikedtocutanawe-inspiringfigureassolemnrulersoftheworldandboastedoftheinfinitevarietyofcommunitiesthatsentembassiestotheircourtfromnearandfarinrecognitionoftheirboundlessmight.WithaterritoryofsomefourmillionsquarekilometersandstretchingfrommodernScotlandtoIraq,todaythehomeofsomefortycountries,thestaggeringdimensionsoftherealmmadecredibletheconceitthattheempireequaledtheworldandRomewas(p.428) itsnavel(Nicolet1991;Whittaker1994,chaps.12;Sidebottom2007;seemap.15.1).AssuchtheempiremayperhapsbestbelikenedtoaninternationalsocietywheretheRomanmonarchclaimedpreeminenceamongsubjectpeoplesaswellasrivalkingsandstates(cf.Watson1992).ThiswasaposturethattheRomansincreasinglybegantoadoptastheycametodominatetheMediterraneanduringthesecondcenturyBCE.ThedynastsofthelateRomanrepublichabituallycomparedthemselvestothegreatestconquerorsinhistory,viedwiththem,andmeasuredtheirvictoriesagainstthemostdazzlingexploitsofthepast.AlexandertheGreatbecamesomethingofafavorite,anemblemofgrandeurwhosevirtueswerepraisedforemulationandfaultscriticizedtobeavoided.Theimperialmonarchycontinuedtoelaboratethispatternofroyalty(Spencer2002).TheCaesarwouldbowtonoone,nordidheacceptanyequal;hewasinaleagueofhisown.WhenPliny,aprovincialgovernor,attemptedtorecommendtoTrajananambitiouscanal-buildingproject,leftunfinishedbytheerstwhilekingsofPontus,headdedatellingpieceofexhortatoryflatterytoticklethevanityofmajesty:Ilongtoseecompletedbyyouwhatkingscouldonlybegin(Letters10.51.4).Theemperor,Plinyimplied,wasmorethanamereking,hewasarulerofrulers(Bang2011a).Sovereignty,inshort,wasconstructed,notonthebasisofequality,butashierarchical,graded,andcontentious.Frequentwarsandperennialrivalrylayattherootofthisphenomenon.Somerulersandstateswereablebettertoassertthemselvesinthecompetitionandhadproventhemselvestobegreaterthanothers;aloneatthetopwasRome(Isaac1993;Mattern1999).AsJuliusCaesarsoughttojustifyhiswaragainsttheGermanickingAriovistus,anofficiallyrecognizedfriendofthepopulusRomanus,hepresentedhimtothepoliticalclassesinthecapitalashavinghadtheaudacitytothinkhecoulddealwithRomeanditsrepresentativeonequalterms.Surelysuchintolerablebehaviordeservedalessoninhumility.Thiskingneededtobebroughtlowajobforthearmy(Caesar,GallicWar1.3436,4246;Brunt1990,chap.14).

    Buthowwascontinuityofruletobeachieved?Thearmy,aswehaveseen,wasaguarantorofimperialandmonarchicalhegemonyandpreeminence,anditwasinaddition,byawidemargin,thebiggestandmostextensiveinstitutionofruleavailabletotheemperors.Butasameansofgovernmentitwasinadequate,itsusefulnessseverelylimited.Thiswasafundamentalparadoxofimperialpower.Smallcontingentsofsoldierswereoccasionallyallocatedtoassisttaxcollectorsoraccompanyimportantandinfluentialpersonsonthemove.Sometimes,thoughtechnicallyillegal,centurions,asmenofauthority,wereevenapproachedtoadjudicatecivildisputes(Campbell1984,appendix1;Alston1995,8196;Pollard2000,chap.3).Nevertheless,Romanterritorywasmuchtooextensiveandsoldiers,whoforthemajorityhadtowalkontheirfeet,werenotmobileenoughtomakegovernmentthroughthearmyevenaremotepossibility(cf.Mann1986,chaps.5and8).Inaddition,divertingtoomanysoldierstosundryadministrativeandgovernmentalchoresriskedjeopardizingthefightingcapacityofthearmy.Itsresourceswereinsufficienteventoprotectthepopulationfromitself,exceptforaveryselectfewcommunities,asTrajaninsistedinaresponsetoanothermissivefromhisgovernorPliny(Letters10.7778;Bang2007).Therequirementsofgovernmentdemanded(p.429) thatalternativeinstitutionsbefoundtoputcivilruleonastablebasis.Butanextensiveandelaborateadministrativebureaucracywasnotreadilyathand,norevenagenuineoption.

    Aswasthenorminancientsocieties,therepublicanditsempirehadbeengovernedbyagroupofso-calledhonoratiores,anaristocraticelitewhoemployedtheirownvasthouseholds,retinues,andwealthinserviceofthecommonwealth.Theemperorhademergedoutofthisgrouptoclaimleadership.Thismeanttwothings:theimperialhouseholdnowcametofunctionasthecenterofgovernmentandtheoldpluralistrepublicansystemhadtobetailoredtofittheneedofthemonarchyforstablerule(VonPremerstein1937;Giliberti1996).Toachievestability,theemperorhadtogiveattentiontothreesourcesofdisturbanceandvolatilityundertherepublic:taxation,thepopulaceofRome,andpoliticalcompetitionamongtheelite.Nexttothearmy,largecompaniesoftaxfarmershad

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    emergedasapowerfulanddestabilizingforceoflaterepublicanpolitics.Enormousconcentrationsofaristocraticlandedpropertieshadbeentiedupunderthese.Thispotentialsourceoforganizedopposition,alternativecenterofpower,andcauseofprovincialdisaffectionwassignificantlycurbedwhenthechoicestprovincesweretakenawayfromthemandgovernmenttookoverresponsibilityforcollectingthelandtaxesfromthenumerouscommunitiesoftherealm.Fromnowon,taxfarmingwasmostlyrestrictedtotheimperialcustomsandexcisedutiesaswellaspublicandimperialproperties(Brunt1990,chap.17).Undertherepublicaninfluxofplunderandtribute,RomehadgrowndramaticallytobecomethebiggestcityoftheMediterraneanworld.Thecapitaloftheempiredwarfedthesurroundings(Morley1996).Feedingitwasamajorchallengeanditsurbanmasses,hungryandvolatile,apotentialsourceofinstability.Theemperorstookresponsibilityfororganizingthefoodsupplyandcontinuedthelaterepublicanpractice(since58BCE)ofdistributingafreegraindoletosome150,000to200,000people(Garnsey1988,chap.14;Erdkamp2005,chap.5).Coupledwithextensiveprogramsofmonumentalbuildingandelaboratedisplaysofpublicpageantry,thiscombinedformulaofbreadandcircusestransformedRomeintoasplendidmetropolitanstageforthemonarchy.Theunparalleledlevelofconspicuousconsumptionmademanifestandprojectedtothesubjectsandtheworldtheunmatchedpoweroftheruler(Veyne1976,630693;Zanker1987).

    Atthecoreofthissystemwastheimperialhouseholdstaffedbyamultitudeofslaves,freedmen,andeunuchs.Allthesewere,inaverydirectsense,theemperorsmen.Markedbytheignominyandsocialopprobriumofservitude,thisgroupwouldneverbeabletoconstituteanaristocracythatcouldcompetewiththeemperorinitsownright.Quitethereverse,themorefortunateandtrustedoftheseretainersdependedontheirpositionintheimperialhouseholdtoaffordthemwithstatusandprivilegesthatwouldraisethemabovethecommonlotofservantsandordinarypeople.Thismadetheimperialslavesandfreedmeneminentlysuitedtomanagethecentraladministrativetasksofgovernment(Boulvert1970;Weaver1972;Dettenhoffer2009).Tobesure,asalltrustedagents,theytoowouldoccasionallymanipulatetheirmasteranddivertresourcesandpoliciesto(p.430) servetheirownpurposesratherthanthoseofthemonarch.Buttheunrestrainedabusethathasbeenheapedonthesehouse-servantsbygenerationsofaristocraticcommentatorswasill-deservedandsayslittleoftheirloyalty,letaloneability.Thecritiquewasbornofresentmentamongthesocialelitesthatpeopleoflowlystatuscouldserveinpositionsofinfluenceandexercisepower,alsooverthoseofhigherrank(e.g.Pliny,Letters7.29;8.6;CassiusDio73.10.2;73.1214).Sociallygelded,toborrowanexpressionofErnestGellner(1983,chap.2),morethanmostothergroupstheslave-domesticsoftheimperialhouseholdcouldbereliedupontoidentifywiththeinterestsoftheruler.Thiswastheirraisondtre,butalsotheirgreatlimitation.Governmentthroughsuchinstrumentsalonewouldhavebeenreducedtoafeebleandficklebusiness,lackinginlegitimacyandwithlittlesupportinsociety,asMuslimrulerswerelatertoexperienceattheendoftheAbbasidCaliphate(cf.Crone1980).

    InRomansociety,andtheempireatlarge,aristocraticlandownersrepresentedasourceofsocialpowerthatcouldnotbeignored.Theirenormousaccumulatedwealth,commandofvastretinues,andtraditionalauthorityconstitutedaconcentrationofpowerwithoutandagainstwhichgovernmentcouldnoteasilyfunction.Theyhadtobeadmittedtoshareinthegovernmentofthemonarch.Indeed,theRomanpoliticaleliteexpectedthisasitscustomarybirthright;ithadbeendefinedandformedbyitshistoricalrecordofoffice-holdingwithintherespublica(Afzelius1935;HopkinsandBurton1983a;1983b).JuliusCaesarhadfallenvictimofaconspiracyofnoblesfearfulthathisdictatorshiporsolerulewouldmonopolizehonorandleavenoroomfortherestofthenobilitytoseekdistinctionintheserviceoftheRomanpeople(Rosenstein2006,379380).Thiswasanimpulsewhichhisheircametounderstandwellandknewhowtotap.Asuccessfulmonarchy,asMontesquieupointedout,hadtosubstitutehonorandgloryforrepublicanpoliticalvirtue(DeLEspritdeslois1.3.6).Romancontemporariesexplainedthecivilwarsasanexampleofhowambitionhadbrokenthroughtheboundsofvirtue.Nolongerhadtheprotagonistsinthepoliticalcompetitionbeenwillingtobowtotheinterestsofthecommongoodandthepatria.Themonarchy,therefore,embarkedonanostentatiousprogramfortherestorationofpublicvirtue(Livy,HistoryofRome,preface;Edwards1993).Butwhatiteffectedwasareaffirmationofthenecessarypreconditionsforthestateofmonarchy:preeminence,rank,andevenahereditarynobility.ThisisthechecklistprovidedbyMontesquieutowhichheaddedthedemandforpreferencesanddistinctions(DelEspritdeslois1.3.7).AllthesewerelifebloodtotheAugustanmonarchy.Honorwasharnessedandthecombativerepublicanorderdomesticatedtoservetheemperors(Lendon1997).

    ThetwoaristocraticordersofRomansociety,thetimocraticequestrianandthepoliticalsenatorial,receivedfirmerdemarcationasthecriteriaforinclusionweremademoredemandingandtheformalinsignia,privileges,and

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    ceremonyofranksuitablybrushedup.Neverbeforehadthetwoordersappearedwithsuchadignifiedpublicposture(Rowe2002).Senatorialstatuswasevenmadehereditarythroughthreegenerations.Butmostimportantwasthedistributionofoffices.Asmembersofthesecondtierofthearistocracy,prominentequestriansfromamong(p.431) thehigh-rankingofficersinthearmywerepickedtoserveinasmall,butslowlyexpandingnumberoftrustedpositionswithintheimperialadministration.Bythemid-secondcenturyCE,thetallyhadrunto110rankedinahierarchydefinedbyfourlevelsofpay(Pflaum1950;19601961;Devijver1999).Themajorityofthesepositionswereprocuratorshipscreatedtomanagethemanyimperialestatesscatteredaroundtherealmandoverseethecollectionoftaxesinsomeoftheterritories.Inaddition,theequestriansheldthepositionofgovernorinanumberofminorprovincesPontiusPilateforinstancewasinchargeofJudea.Intime,theyalsotookoverfromtheimperialfreedmenthemostsignificantsecretarialpositionswithintheemperorshouseholds,overseeingaccountsandcorrespondenceamongotherthings.Finally,butnotleastimportantly,theywerealsogiventhethreemajorprefecturesofEgypt,Romesgrainsupply,andthepraetorianguard.Thestrategicsignificanceofeachofthesethreemadeitinexpedienttotrustthemtosenatorswhoformallycountedastheemperorspeersandthereforeinprinciplecouldturnintorivalsforthethroneiftheywereabletoaccumulatetoomuchpower(Tacitus,Histories1.11)howtohandlethemightyservant,theproverbialgrandvizier,hasbeenaperennialheadacheofmonarchs.Whiletheseequestrianpositionswereaninnovation,andapersonalserviceoftheemperor,themonarchyalsorestedconspicuouslyonaclaimtohavingrestoredthetraditionalrepublicanconstitution(Syme1939;RaaflaubandToher1990).Thekeytothiswasthesenate.Theoldrepublicanhierarchyofmagistracies(seeabove,chapter14)wasmodifiedandgearedtokeepthesenatorsactivelyengagedinrulingtheempire.Aftertheirtermsofoffice,senatorscontinuedtobeemployedabroadasgovernorsandcommandersoflegionsandathomeinadministrativeposts.Inthemiddleofthesecondcentury,approximately160somesuchpositionsexisted(HopkinsandBurton1983b,160161;Eck2000,227;1974).Asthenumberofconsulshipswassignificantlyincreasedwiththeadditionofsuffectconsulstothecustomarytwowhogavetheirnametotheyear,theprospectsfortheaveragesenatorofreachingthehighestranksevenimprovedunderthisregime.Butinsteadofpopularassemblies,itwasnowtheemperorwhofunctionedasthearbiterofsenatorialcareers.Mostofthepositionsreservedforthisclasswereintherulersgifttobestowandnosenatorcouldhopetomakemuchprogressagainsttheexpressortacitwilloftheruler.

    Thecharacterofthisorderhaseludedgenerationsoflegalscholarstryingtosystematizeandbringordertoourunderstandingoftheimperialmonarchy(e.g.,Mommsen1887,748;Bleicken1995,83;Drinkwater2007).Therewasapretensethattheempirewasshared,theprincepsholdingdirectcontrolofprovinceswithlargemilitarycontingentswhilethesenateandRomanpeoplewereresponsiblefortherest.Somescholarshavethoughtintermsofamovetowardamoreconstitutionalformofmonarchyastheyearsofinnovationandexperimentunderthemagnatesofthecivilwarandthefirstemperorsgavewaytoroutineandtradition(Lucrezi1982).ButthereareobviouslimitationstotheideaofaRomanconstitutionalmonarchy.Confusionhasbeencaused,notleast,bythelexdeimperioVespasiani,eversincethemillenarianandrepublicanrevolutionary,ColadiRienzo(13131354),usedthislargebronzeinscriptioninsupportofhisclaimthattheRomanpeople(p.432) hadtherighttoelectitsleadersandthe(HolyRoman)emperor(Collins2002,chap.2;Musto2003,chap.5).ThislawtextspellsoutthenumerousconcretedetailsofVespasiansimperialinvestiture:heshallbepermittedtomakeatreatywithwhomhewishestoholdameetingofthesenateandtomakesenatorialdecreesjustaspermissionwasgiventothedeifiedAugustus,toTiberiusJuliusCaesarAugustus,andtoTiberiusClaudiusCaesarAugustusGermanicus(Dessau18921916,no.244/Sherk1988,no.82).Buttheillusionofamonarchyregulatedbylawsandasenateisdispelledbythepresenceofadiscretionaryclauseauthorizingthemonarchtodowhateverhedeemsnecessaryforhisgovernment(Brunt1977;furtherCapogrossiColognesiandTassiScandone2009).Althoughasacouncilthesenatewaspeopledbytherichestandmostpowerfulmenintherealm,itwasneverabletoplaytheroleofadeliberativebodystandinguptothemonarchandmonitoringhisgovernment.Astrongidentityderivingfromitsproudhistorywaslittlehelpinthis(Talbert1984).Theprincepsalreadyhadavailablealargestandingarmyandtaxesinvastquantitiespaidbytheprovinces;hedidnothavetonegotiateforcontrolanddispositionofthesevitalsinewsofpower(cf.Brewer1988).Deprivedofthetwomostimportantleversthatparliamentswerelaterabletouseduringtheearly-modernagetoassertthemselvesagainstEuropeankings,thesenatehadtoplayadifferentrole.

    Thelexdeimperioisacuriousdocument.Stricteconomyandreasonwouldnothaverequiredmorethantheblanketauthorizationoftheactsoftheruler.Legitimacy,however,flowsfromthesuperfluousandactsofreassurance.Sothedocumentarticulatesthepowersoftheemperorasanaccumulationofspecificprerogatives.

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    Inthissocialuniversecustomwaskingandhistoricalprecedentall-important(cf.Peachin2007).Rightswererarelythoughtofasgeneralized,butmoreoftenspecificandparticular,akintoabundleofprivileges(cf.Matthews2000,6970;Humfress2007,121132).ConcernforthepreservationoftraditionalrightsandtheetiquetteofoldformswasidentifiedbyNorbertEliasasatypicalcharacteristicofcourtsocieties.Attemptsatradicalreformarerarelypursuedbecausethecancellationofoldinstitutionsinvariablyunderminesthedignityandranksofestablishedgroupswithinthearistocracy(Elias1969,132133).Changehadtobeaccumulativeandgradual.Thepoweroftheemperorshouldnotbeseenasunitaryanddefinedbytherepublicanconstitutionbutasacomplexcomposite(LoCascio2000,1316).Theheritageoftherepublicwascompoundedwiththeothersourcesofmonarchicalpower,particularlythehouseholdandthearmy,toformanewpoliticalconfiguration:theimperialcourt(Wallace-Hadrill1996;Winterling1999;2003;Pani2003;Paterson2007;Bang2011c).

    Atthecenterwastherulerwhohadtoappealtothediverseconstituenciesofhiscourtsocietyandthewiderrealmtokeepopenthelinesofcommunicationandensuresupport.EgonFlaig(1992)hasspokenoftheimperialmonarchyasanacceptance-system.Theprincepshadtocurryfavorseparatelywiththreegroupsinsociety:thesoldiery,thepopulationofRome,andthesenate.However,tothepersonaofthemilitarycommander,thebenefactoroftheurbancrowd,andtheleaderofthesenatorialaristocracy,theprinceps,othersmaybeadded.Precisely(p.433) becausetheemperorwasnotsolelydefinedwithintherepublicanorder,buthoveredaboveit,hewasabletoreachoutbeyondtheconfinesoftheinstitutionsoftheRomancity-statetoaddresshiscomplexandcompositerealm.TotheHellenizingelite,firmlyentrenchedacrosstheeasternMediterraneanworld,theemperorwashappytoappearasaGreekbasileus,asaviorkingorevenOlympianZeus(Oliver1970,no.50,line10;DioChrysostomus,Orations15;Millar1977),availabletooassponsorofthetemplecultoftheJewsinJerusalemorguarantoroftheage-oldritesofthepharaohthatwereperformedinhisnameundertheeyesofthetraditionalpriesthoodofEgypt(Grenier1995;Herklotz2007;Philo,EmbassytoGaius153,157;Josephus,JewishAntiquities16.14,3157).Allthesevariousgroupsclaimedtherulerastheprotectoroftheirtime-honoredtraditions.

    Theemperorwaspolyvalent,meaningdifferentthingstodifferentmenatthesametime(Beard,North,andPrice1998,vol.1,chap.7).Hismultipleidentitiesareneatlyrefractedasseparateraysintheprismofaretrospectiveprophesytypicalofthosewhichtendedtocirculateaboutstrangeomensthoughttohaveheraldedthefutureruleofthisorthatemperor.ThemotherofAugustus,Atia,wassaidtohaveclaimedthatwhileasleepinthetempleofAsclepiusshehadbeenimpregnatedbyasnakeandgavebirthninemonthslatertoasonwhowasclearlytheoffspringofApollo.Shehadfurtherdreamedthatherintestineshadbeenliftedtotheskyandspreadoutacrossearthandheaven.Inamatchingdreamherhusbandhadseenthesunrisingfromheruterus(Suetonius,Augustus94.4).Thelegendpicksupseveralmythologies;itisafamiliarfactthatAugustusinhisrelationswiththeRomanpubliccarefullycultivatedaclaimtoenjoyprivilegedconnectionswithApollo,thegod.Thesnake,meanwhile,echoessomeofthetalesrelatedaboutthedivineconceptionofAlexandertheGreat;whilethewholenotionofthemothersintestinesstretchedacrosstheskyandthesunrisingfromherwombrecallstheEgyptiangoddessNut.Inshort,theprophesywasconstructedtospeaktoseveralaudiencesatthesametime:Egyptian,Hellenic,andRoman(Grandet1986;Herklotz2007,21321).FirstrecordedinDiscoursesontheGodsbytheHelleno-EgyptianintellectualAsclepiadesofMendes,itcirculatedandwaslaterincludedbytheimperialsecretary,Suetonius,inhisearlysecond-centuryLatinbiographyoftheemperorandsubsequentlyinthehistoryofRomewritteninGreekbyCassiusDiointheearlythirdcentury(45.1.23).

    Elevated,august,andnuminous,supremeauthoritytranscendedindividualtraditions;itwasalignedwiththeforcesofthecosmosandthingsdivine(Woolf2001;Gradel2002;Rehak2006;cf.Bayly1996:1827).AmongthemanystrangemarvelsandmiraclesofhumansocietyrecordedinhisNaturalHistory,Plinyalsolistedexamplesofexceptionalpoliticalandmilitarypower.TheintellectualvigorofaJuliusCaesarorthetriumphsofPompeyevokedwondernolessthanahippocentaurormenwithdogsheads(7.2.23;7.3.35;7.25.9126.99).Ashighpriests,theemperorshadtoinvestconsiderabletimeandresourcesinthemanifoldritesandactsofdivinationoftheRomanstateculttoguaranteethattheirrulewasinaccordancewithgodlyorder.Fromallcornersoftherealm(andbeyond),peoplebroughtbacktotheCaesarsstoriesofstrangeoccurrences,extraordinarycreatures,(p.434)andwonderfulobjects(Galen,DeAntidosis1.4;Phlegon,BookofMarvels14.23;3435;Lucian,EssaysinPortraiture22;Edwards2003;Murphy2004;Naas2011);theemperorscherishedsuchgiftsasproofthattheirrulewasfavoredbythepowersaboveandsometimesputthemonpublicdisplaytosharethisknowledgewiththepopulation(Pliny,NaturalHistory37.7.19).Fewsubjectswouldhavebeentoucheddirectlybyallthisceremonial

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    activity.Butitformedpartofthatsymbolicalwebexpressingthefactthat[themonarch]isintruthgoverning(Geertz1983,124).Theartsofprophesyandastrologywere,astheDominicanfriarandauthoroftheutopianclassicTheCityoftheSun,TommasoCampanellawouldteach,centraltoolsofgovernment(1993[1637]:184).Theyconfirmedtotherulerthathishumanrealmwasinharmonywiththewidercosmos.Intheimperialpalacecouldbefoundexpertastrologersaswellasthevenerablecollectionofancientpropheticlore,theso-calledSibyllineOracles.RuleoftheCaesarswastobeprovidential(Suetonius,Augustus31.1;98.3;Nero36.1;Mommsen1872,no.1871;LAnnepigraphique2001,2083).Undertheirpaternalcare,sowastheclaim,theworldwasmadenewagainandmankindblessedwithareturnofthegoldenage,aneraofpeace,justice,andabundance.Betweenemperorandrealmlayamysticaffinity,aphysicalsympathy.Hispersonalhealth,moralaswellasbodily,wasdirectlymirroredintheconditionoftheempire.Hewasthebenefactorofhumanity,theclementfountainofjustice,hisbountyinexhaustible(e.g.,Horace,CarmenSaeculare;VelleiusPaterculus2.12426;Seneca,DeClementia;Beranger1953;Veyne1976;Zanker1987).

    Thisalmostparadisiacalconstructionofkingship,celebratedincascadesoflaudatoryspeechesandsumptuousfloralimagery,leftsubjectsfreetoprojecttheirwishes,dreams,andclaimsontotheemperor(e.g.,Philo,EmbassytoGaius814).Acrosstheprovincestheregraduallydevelopedthepracticeofcultivatingtherulerasaformofgod.Provincialinitiativeseemstohavebeennolessbehindthisphenomenonthancentralizedcommand(Price1984).Byorganizingthecult,localeliteswereaffordedwithanopportunitytobaskinimperialgloryandmarkthemselvesoutasfavoredsharersintherulingorder.Tobegrantedtheprivilegeoferectingatemplededicatedtotheemperorcouldbeusedbythehostcommunityanditselitetobolsteritsstatusandstandingwithinprovincialsociety(Friesen1993).ThedistantandloftyfigureoftheCaesarwas,sotospeak,appropriatedbysuchgroupsandmobilizedstrategicallytofashiontheiridentityaspreeminent.RomanhistorianshavebeentaughtbyFergusMillar(1977)tothinkofthegovernmentalstyleoftheemperorasfundamentallypassive.Intheabsenceofavastelaboratebureaucracy,theprincepscouldnotnormallyaspiretopursueactiveandreformistpoliciesinrelationtothecivilianpopulation;ratherhehadtowaitforthesubjectstodotheworkandcometohim.Oncepetitionedhemightthenrespond.Thisisapatternthatisrecognizableinmostpreindustrialmonarchies.However,theintrusiveandrecurrentdemandfortaxesshowsthat,atleastintheRomancase,somemodificationofthispictureisrequired.Andthereareotherconsiderationstoo(Elias1969,197;Hopkins1978b;Bleicken1982).Iftherulercouldstrikeanimpassivepose,itwasbecausehemadepeopleseekhimout.Theattractionofthecourtasaninstrumentofgovernmentwasbasedonactiveappropriation.Theruler(p.435) assertedhimselfthroughhiscommandofkeyresourcesofsocialpower.Bytheircontroloftheempire,thestateapparatus,andthewealthoftheimperialhousehold,theCaesarscouldplacethemselvesasthearbitersofrankandprivilege;theyhadintheirhandsahuge,diversified,andunrivaledstoreofpatronageresources.Subjectshadtoapproachthecourtiftheywantedtoshareinthedistributionoffavors.Highoffice,greathonors,taxprivileges,landedestates,aswellasjustice,evenlifeitself,allthisandmorewasintheemperorsgifttobestow(Millar1977,chaps.48;Saller1982,chap.2).Anemperorruledbyactivediscrimination,privilegingsome,dismissingothers;thatproducedthegravitationalpullofhiscourt.

    Theoldsenatorialaristocracyhadrelativelyfeeblemeansofresistingthismechanismandpreservingtheintegrityofthegroup.Office-holdinghadalwaysbeenitsdefiningfeature.Butasthiswasnowverymuchanhonordistributedbythemonarch,thenobilitycametodependonimperialfavor.Studentsofcourtsocietiesrefertothisprocessasoneofdomesticationofthehighestreachesofthearistocracy:thereductionofproud(unruly)noblementogrovelingandcalculatingcourtiers(Elias1997,2:388395;Harris2001,chaps.910).CloselyconnectedwiththisisanotionofthemonarchasaMachiavellianmastermindruthlesslymanipulatingandoutmaneuveringthearistocraticelitetostayontopinthegameofpower.Thereistruthinthispicture,butitisalsoone-dimensional.Romanemperorscertainlyfromtimetotimeterrorizedsectionsoftheelite.Anumberofprominentcasessawleadingnoblesmercilesslycutdowntosizebecausetheyhadoversteppedtheboundsofthatproprietywhichdemandedthattheirquestforhonoranddistinctiondidnotinanywayovershadowtheimperialmajesty(Syme1939,308310;CassiusDio51.2425.3;53.2324;Suetonius,Augustus66.12;Eck,Rufino,andGmez1996).However,thesystemalsoentailedseriousrisksfortheruler.Acourtfunctionsbystagingacontestbetweencourtiersforaccesstothefavorsofthemonarch.Thepotentialgainswerehighandsowerethestakes:competitionwasfierce.Manymorecontendersenteredthefraythanthemonarchcouldpossiblyhandlepersonally.Complexandfluidnetworksofpatronageemerged,structuredonthebasisofproximitytotheruler.Thosewhohadtheemperorsearwereabletousethisadvantagetocarveoutapositionforthemselvesasbrokersbetweentherulerandthethrongsofsupplicants(Saller1982,7478,168187);aroundthemoreinfluential

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    ofthesepersons,factionscrystallizedcontendingwitheachotherforthespoilsofempire.Theconsequencesofdefeatcouldbedevastating,withthewinningfactionmovingintocannibalizetheresourcescontrolledbythelosers.Chargesoftreasonfollowedbydeathsentences,exile,andconfiscationofpropertyperiodicallyhauntedtheRomancourt(Rutledge2001).Threatenedwiththedireconsequencesoffailure,ordrivenbyplainambition,othersmighttakepreemptiveaction.Attemptsatassassinationofemperorsorrebellionsorchestratedbyhigh-rankingmembersoftheelitehappenedoftenenoughinRomanhistory.Thereweremanyfailures,butalsoanumberofsuccesses.Fourrulingdynastiesmanagedtoestablishthemselvesinthespanof250-plusyearsfromtheaccessionofAugustustothefalloftheSeverans.Theemperorwaslockedasmuchintothevigorouslyagonisticpoliticsofthecourtaswasthearistocracy.Socialenergieswerechanneledupwardandconcentratedonthemonarch;thisenabledthe(p.436) emperor,evenamediocreone(Elias1969,197200),torulebutmightalsoseehimcrushed(Winterling2003).

    Thecourttookitstollonallparticipants.Severalimperialdynastiescameandwent,whilemostsenatorialfamilieswereunabletotakethestrain.Despitethefactthatsenatorialstatushadbeenmadehereditary,surprisinglyfewfatherswerefollowedbytheirsonsintothesenate.Thelevelofhereditarysuccessionwaslowinabsoluteterms,andevenlowerthanundertheopenpoliticalsystemoftherepublic(HopkinsandBurton1983b).Ineachgeneration,theranksofthesenatehadtobereplenishedwithasubstantialcohortofentrantsfromnewfamilies.Suitablecandidatescameincreasinglytobesoughtoutfromamongtheprominentandpropertiedofprovincialsociety.Bythemiddleofthesecondcentury,closetohalfofthesenatorshailedfromoutsideItaly;bytheearlythird,asmallmajority(Hammond1957).Itwasalong,slowhaul,butthecourtsteadilybroadeneditsgeographicalreachtoeffectarefashioningofthesenatorialeliteandintegratetheforemostprovinciallandownersintheaffairsoftheemperor.Theformationofanew,moreempire-widearistocracy,however,wasanunevenprocess,reflectingtheoperationofpatronage.SouthernSpainandsouthernGaulmadeanearlycontribution,followedbytheHellenizedeast,andthentheNorthAfricans(predominantlyfromLibyatoeasternAlgeria)(Lambrechts1936;1937;Eck1970;Halfmann1979;Talbert1984,2939).Otherareasweremuchlesswellrepresented,ifatall.Atanyrate,itbearsemphasisthatinabsolutenumbers,thetotalsweresmall,amountingtoafewhundredprovincialaristocratsoutofapopulationofsomesixtytoseventymillion.Thesenatehadatotalmembershipof600andtheequestrianservicewasrecruitedfromwhatmusthavebeenacomparablenumberoffamilies.Thecourtonlyskimmedtheverycreamofprovincialsocieties.Nothingmorewasneeded.

    Courtgovernmentwasnotdeeplypenetrative;itoperatedaselectionmechanismthatwastailoredtoadmitthefewtotheambienceoftherulerthosewhorepresentedthemostpowerfulgroupsinsociety(Bang2011c).Theyweretheoneswhocouldbestaffordthelongandarduousjourney,oftenoverhundredsofmiles,toarriveattheseatofthemonarchandthenelbowtheirwaythroughthecrowdsofcourtiersandsupplicants.Atcourt,mightysubjectscouldseekacareerforthemselveswhileothersmightstrivetobettertheirpositionathomebyobtainingprivilegesorafavorableverdictinjudiciarymatters.Themain,nitty-grittybusinessofgovernmenttookplaceelsewherethaninthecenter.Accompaniedbyonlyarelativelysmalladministrativestaff,anemperorsuchasHadriancouldspendyearstravelingfromoneendoftherealmtoanotherwithoutvisibledamagetothesystemofrule.Whileplayingtheroleasarbitersofaristocraticsociety,theemperorsdependedontheorganizationalcapacityofsuchelitegroupstoruntheempireonthegroundbymanningthecouncilsandperformingthemagistraciesofthenumerouscitiesthatmadeupmostoftheempire.Toassistthisbroaderaristocraticelite,comprisingperhapssome100,000adultmalesandtheirfamilies(ontheroughassumptionthatonaveragetheapproximatelytwothousandcitieswouldhavehadfiftymembersoftheircouncils),theemperorssentintotheprovincesgovernorsasdelegatesofthecourt.Equippedwiththelanguageofmodernbureaucratic(p.437) administration,studentsofprosopographyandepigraphyhavechartedwithpainstakingcarethedevelopmentoftheimperialserviceanditspersonnel(Hirschfeld1905;Pflaum1950;196061;Eck2000;1974).Butwiththesenatorialandequestrianbranchoftheimperialadministrationrunningtoalittlelessthan300positionsintotalbythemiddleofthesecondcentury,ofwhichagoodhalfwerepostedtotheprovincesforshorttenuresnormallyofonetothreeyearsduration,theconceptualizationwasandisanachronistic.Wehavecometomeetyou,allofusgreetingyouwithjoy,allwelcomingyouwithcriesofpraise,callingyouoursaviorandfortress,ourbrightstar.Nowthesunshinesbrighter,nowweseemtobeholdahappydaydawnoutofdarkness(MenanderRhetor2.381,trans.RussellandWilson1981).Theseexuberantphrasesofgreeting,suggestedassuitableinaGreekmanualofrhetoricforsomeonehavingtowelcometheRomangovernor,arenotthoseofferedtoanewbureaucraticadministrator,buttoanaristocratarrivingintheprovincetoruleasasmallreplicaoftheemperor,moreinthenatureofaviceroyorPersiansatrap.Toperformtheroleasthedecorousleaderofprovincialsociety,thegovernorcouldgetbywitha

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    surprisinglyleanestablishment.Accompanyingthegovernorwouldbeaselectionofhisownhouseholdservantsandjuniorpoliticalfriendstogetherwithnormallyoneofficiallyappointedsenatoriallegateordeputy.Inaddition,onewouldfindeitherasenatorialorequestrianfinancialofficerpresentaswellasasmallnumberofimperialslavesandfreedmen.Leavingoutvariationinthedetails,suchinbroadtermswerethecivilcontoursofRomangovernmentalauthorityintheprovinces.Forpartsoftheyear,thegovernorwouldtourhisprovincetoholdassizesordurbarswherehewouldsetupcourttohearthecomplaintsofprovincials,regulatetheirconflicts,giveverdicts,andconfirmoldandgrantnewprivilegesandhonors(Burton1975;Meyer-Zwiffelhoffer2002;Eich2005:352).

    AfewEgyptiandocumentsindicatethatbusinesscouldbebriskontheseoccasions.DuringthethreedaysofoneassizethegovernorofEgyptseemstohavebeendelugedwithalmosttwothousandcasesandpetitions(Oates,Samuel,andWelles1967,no.61;Hunt1927,no.2131).Ratherthandocumentingthewidereachofcentralgovernment,thisexampleaccentuatesitslimitations(paceAndo2000,376377;Haensch1994).Withbarelyaminuteavailableonaverageforeachpresentation,thedecision,eventuallypublishedmonthslaterinAlexandria,couldhardlyhavebeenarrivedatthroughanythingapproachingathoroughjudicialinquiry.Forthegovernor,itwasoftendifficulttopenetratethethicketsoflocalprovincialsocietiesandavoidbeingdraggedintoconflictsandintriguesthathecouldnotcomprehend(Pliny,Letters10.9697).Usuallyhistenureofofficewasshort,topreventhimfromconsolidatinghispositionandbecomingarivaltocentralgovernment;hisstaffwasofmodestsize;andhistoolsofenforcementfew.Inthesecircumstances,thesensiblesolutionwouldnormallybetosidewithtradition,withthewaythingswereusuallydone(Kehoe2007;cf.Kelly2011,chap.7forthecomplementaryroleofstatelawandprivatedisputesettlement).Customcarriedtheadvantagethat,ingeneral,interestswouldalreadyhavebeenvestedinitscontinuation;therewouldbeaconfigurationofsocialpowerthatcouldbeexpectedtobackitupandensureitscontinuedfunctioningwiththeminimumofsupportthatgovernmentwas(p.438) capableof.Itischaracteristicthattheimperialrulerswouldsometimeschoosetoconfirmprivilegesclaimedbycommunities,eventhoughthebasisoftheirdemandswasrecognizedasspurious,becausetheseusurpedrightshadbecomeestablishedandcustomarypractice.Betterpragmaticallytoacceptandreinforcesuchprivilegesthanupsetorweakentheunderlyingsocialorder(Mommsen1873,no.781;Mommsen1872,no.5050).

    TheLocalizationofPower:ProvincialElites,theDialogofPrivilege,andtheFiscalConstraintsofEmpireSuchgovernmentwithoutbureaucracy,asithasaptlybeenphrased(GarnseyandSaller1987,chap.2),workedbecausetraditiontendedtoreinforcethepositionofthemostpowerfulsegmentsofprovincialsociety.WiththelaterexperienceofEuropeanstateformationinmind,wecanseethatoneofthemostnoticeableaspectsoftheRomancaseisthecreationandfinancingofalargestandingarmywithoutinitiallydevelopinganelaboratecivilianbureaucracytoadministertheimperialpossessions(Rosenstein2009).Customaryrule,however,didnotfossilizesocialrelations;inpracticeitspawnedaprocessthatsawlocal,mostlylandowning,elitesstrengthentheirholdonprovincialresourcesandenhancetheirpositioninsociety.Itwasonthesegroupsthattheimperialgovernmentreliedtotakecareofthebusinessofadministrationinthelocalcitycouncilsandthecollectionofthetributeandtaxesthatfinancedthearmyandtheotherexpensesoftheemperor.Totheimperialauthorities,backingtheorderoftraditionmeantsupportingandaddingtotheprivilegesofthefew.Divideandrulewasanironlawofempirenecessitatedbytheneedtoextractmorefromprovincialcommunitiesthanwasputintothem;noteveryonecouldbenefitequally(Brunt1990,chap.12;Bang2009).AcrosstheRomanworld,elitesrespondedtotheinvitationtoshareinthepoweroftheempireandadministeritspeaceonthegroundtobesure,somewithgreaterenthusiasmthanothers.Atbottomthealliancewas,asMichaelMann(1986,chap.9)hastaughtus,anexampleofcompulsorycooperation.Butthisalsoofferedopportunities.Allovertheempire,governingelites,sometimesaftersomeinitialfoot-dragging,graduallyorientedthemselvestowardthemodelsofaristocratichighculturepropagatedbytheimperialcourt.

    ThisprocesshasoftenbeenaddressedundertheheadingofRomanization,atermthatisnowcontroversial,butequallydifficulttoavoid.Anyhow,somequalificationandmodificationisrequired.Mostimportantly,thedevelopmentinquestionwasnottheresultofacentrallydirectedpolicy,oronlytoaverylimitedextent,butdependedasmuchonprovincialinitiative(Woolf1998).Inthatrespect,aparallelmaybesoughtintheconversionofChristianandotherprovincialelites(p.439) andpopulationstoIslamundertheAbbasidCaliphs.Here,too,thechangewasrarelyeffectedbytheactiveeffortsof,letaloneforcedby,royalgovernment,butwasrathertheresult

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    ofattemptsbytheconvertstoassertthemselves,bettertheirpositionwithintheMuslimimperialorder,getaccesstomoreofitsprivileges,andavoiddiscriminatorymeasuressuchasthepolltaximposedonnon-Muslimsubjects:emulationinsteadofcommand(Hodgson1974,1:301308;Berkey2003,117118,chap.17.Cf.Crone1980,4955).IntheRomancase,however,theculturalmodelwasbothlessfirmlydefinedandlessegalitarianinitsappeal.Nosinglebookcontaineditstruths,andnosimplesetofrulesprescribedtheproperbehavioroftheinitiates.Considerablevariationprevailed,therefore,inhowlocalelitegroupsrespondedtothehegemoniccultureandselectedfromitselaboraterepertoire,courtlyandurban(cf.Woolf2003,212215).Muchdependedonthespecificbasisoftheirpower.TribalchieftainslivingontheborderofthedesertinNorthAfrica(Mattingly1995);landownersinthethinlypopulatedandurbanizednorthwest;priestlyfamiliesofthegreattempleestatesinAnatoliaandSyria(Dignas2002);rabbisinthevillagesofPalestine;andthegentryofthedenselyurbanizedareasofAsiaMinor(Dmitriev2005)andproconsularAfrica(Lepelley1979),alldifferedwidelyinhowtheyarticulatedtheirpositionwithintheimperialorderandintheiravailableresources(Mattingly1997b;Alcock1997.Cf.Goodman1987;Roymans2005).Neverthelesssomegeneraltrendsmaybediscerned.Amongelitesinthewesternpartoftheempire,Latinlanguage,civicmonuments,and,intime,Romancitizenshipbecamemarksofattainment.Theappealofthelatter,ontheotherhand,wasalwayslessintheeasternpartoftheempire(Sherwin-White1973),whereGreekhadforalongtimeconsolidateditspositionasthelanguageofpowerandawell-establishedurbanculturealreadycommandedthepatrioticloyaltiesofitselites.HerenewdelightingladiatorialcontestsandurbanbathsmergedwithaninsistentcultofHellenicidentity.Conspicuouslyexpensivelifestyles,gracedwithpolishedspeechfromrhetoricaltraining,philosophicalstudy,athletics,andpublicservice,combinedtoproduceastarkeremphasisonrankandhierarchy.Societybecamemorearistocraticandimperial,butitdidtoasignificantextentstayGreek(Rogers1991;Woolf1994;Swain1996;Knig2005).

    Romanpowerthusgraduallyreorientedthecoordinatesofculturallifeandsocialhierarchies(Wallace-Hadrill2008).Fewgroupswereleftunaffectedbytheprocessesofempire.ButthisdidnotmakethemallpartofadiscoursebasedonasharedsenseofbeingRoman,howevervariedtheactualoutcome,asrecentlyassumed(Revell2009).NotonlywastherenoideathatpeopleneededtobecomeRomantobeloyalsubjects,themajoritypopulationdidnotevenreceiveaninvitation.Formostoftheprincipate,Romancitizenshipremainedaprivilegedstatus.WhenundertheFlaviandynasty(6996CE)citiesintheHispanicprovincesweregrantedurbanchartersontheRomanmodel,citizenshipformedpartofthepackage,butasarewardgiventomembersoftheeliteaftertheyhadheldcivicoffices(LexIrnitana21,inGonzlez1986).LaterwhenCaracalladidbestowRomancitizenshiponvirtuallytheentirefreepopulationoftheempire,heneverthelessstillfeltfreetoexpelfromAlexandriawhathedescribedwithangrycontemptasthe(p.440) Egyptians;thesewaywardmembersofthepeasantmajorityweretoreturntothecountrysideandtillthefields(PapyrusGissensis40.2.1629;trans.Johnston1936,255).Thenineteenth-centuryformulaofturningpeasantsintoFrenchmen(Weber1976)andothernationalities,whichgovernmentsandreformersworkedsohardtoputintopracticetomakethemajoritypopulationsidentifywiththestate,wouldhavestrucktheRomanworldrulersasdistinctlyodd.Theyneverdreamedoftransformingthepeasantmassesintofullmembersofimperialsociety(paceGuerberandHurlet2008,104).Theirswasaprivilegedandcity-dominatedorderthatleftmuchofthecountrysideinastateofsubjection.ThescenarioweshouldimagineisprobablynotfarfromthesituationknownfromotherextensivepremodernlandempiressuchastheOttomaninthesixteenthtoeighteenthcenturies.AsintheRomanworld,thisempiredidgeneratesomecommonculturaltrendsthataffectedthepopulationacrossregionsandtosomeextentclasses,inshortsomethingthatcouldbeperceivedasOttomanization.Butthiswasneverlinkedwithanycommon,sharedidentity.TheOttomanempirewasapolyethnicconglomeratethatsoughttoorganizeandnestmultipleidentitiesinahierarchybelowthatoftheimperialrulingclass(BraudeandLewis1982;Barkey2008).

    Bythesametoken,attemptstoseethedisseminationofhighcultureastheexpressionoftheformationofanempire-wideRomanconsensus(Ando2000;Lobur2008)needtobetemperedbythefactthatthemajorityofthepopulationwaseitherexcludedfromoronlymarginallyinvolvedinthedialogbetweencourtandlocalelites.Widespreadilliteracyandconfinementofthewrittenwordtothemediaofhandwritingandcarvedinscriptionsimposedveryreallimitsonthereachofcommunication(Harris1989).Evenbetweengovernmentandprovincialaristocracies,thedensityofthedialogwasveryunevenacrosstheempire.Agooddiagnosticindicationmaybefoundinthehabitdevelopingamongprovincialcommunitiesoferectingstatuesofreigningemperors.Fromarecentarchaeologicalsurvey,itappearsthatthevastmajoritywasputupinamerehandful(ifItalyiscountedin)oftheempiresapproximatelyfiftyprovinces.ThesmallprovinceofAchaeaalonehasyieldedalmostasmanysuchstatuesasalltheotherprovinces(exceptItaly,whichwasnotaprovince)tothenorthoftheMediterranean

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    fromtheBlackSeatoScotlandcombined(Hjte2005,658).Infact,weseemtobefacedwithanalmostideal-typicalexampleofthethinintegrationofcosmopolitanelites,cuttingacrosslocalandregionalculturalboundaries,thatErnestGellner(1983,chap.2)andBenedictAnderson(1991)identifiedascharacteristicofpreindustrialandpreprintsocieties.Ratherthanaconsensus,intheseterms,theRomanempireformedanecumene,aGreektermthathasgainedcurrencyamongworldhistorianstodenoteauniversalizingyetfracturedelitediscoursecomprisingtheworldsdiversity(Bang2010;cf.Bayly1996).OnecouldbecomeRomanandstillpreserveonespositionandrightswithintheoldlocalorder.

    Acommoncharacteristicofthisecumenicaldialogwasacelebrationofamonarchicalidealemphasizingaccessibility,moderation,andeconomy.Rulerandgovernorsweretobeattentivetothewishesoflandedaristocracies,husbandimperialresourcescarefully,andavoidintroducingnewtaxestoburdentheirloyal(p.441) subjects(CassiusDio72,33,12;72,3536;74,58;Herodian2.34;Bang2009,104105,109111;Norea2001;2011;Walker197678,vol.3).Un


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