The Role of the UN in post-CW environment

Chapter 12; Some view it as an essential tool for peacekeeping and diplomacy, useful for putting pressure on aggressive states and for managing international crises. Others, however, see it as a weak organization that puts the self-interest of its member states above humanitarian concerns, and a body that has been unable to prevent some of the worlds worst violations of human rights.

UN up to 1988 Key objectives included:

To maintain international peace and security, and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

CW constrained UNs effectiveness as a peacekeeper as powers had ability to veto UN intervention which was exploited.

There were only 12 interventions because of ability to veto. There was a profound shift in UN interventionism once CW ended and

is indicative of the new attitudes adopted towards int. peacekeeping.

CW paralysed UN interventionism; peacekeeping operations could only taken under unanimous agreement of the Sec Council and they still needed consent of conflicting parties.

They were strictly impartial and its peacekeepng forces couldnt take sides.

UN and the end of CW Gorbachev announced a new Soviet relationship with the UN in

1988 as he was committed to cooperating in managing int. conflicts.

This offered the USSR a way out of the liability that was Afghanistan.

Triggered shift in US policy as Reagan praised UNs role as int. peacekeeper; announced that through General Assembly that UN had opportunity to live and breathe.

Both US + USSR agreed to pay financial debts to UN so that it can effectively function.

Superpower cooperation seemed to be expanding and UN appeared to benefit from the end of CW.

UK & France acknowledged that they can maintain their own int. status and influence through UNs revival and US similarly accepted that it was more productive to use UN to settle disputes and as basis of int. co-op than to use force to achieve its objectives.

But challenges facing UN in post-CW era were very different from challenges faced from 1945; USSR and Yugoslavia had given birth to new states and Haiti and Somalia ceased a coordinated/organized government by 1993 and new world order that emerged (US) was complicated by int. terrorism led by al-Qaeda.

UN ACTION DURING 1990S

Involvement in 1991 Gulf War UN Sec Council passed 12 resolutions aimed at forcing Iraq to

withdraw from Kuwait in August 1991 when it invaded Kuwait. Resolution 678 allowed member states to use w/e action necessary to

remove Iraq from Kuwait. Iraq failed to withdraw by Jan 1991 so a 28-power UN coalition force

was formed which removed Iraq from Kuwait, bombing Iraq too. This UN action raised concerns mainly because the coalition was

dominated by US forces to it is argued that US created an anti-Iraq coalition to serve US interests so UN was presented as a tool to promote US influence.

US used its political + econ power in Sec Council to ensure that its own agenda was fulfilled.

US promised financial packages to loads of developing countries and political concessions to both USSR and China.

US led coalition forces in Kuwait and thus determined strategic aims/methods of that force.

UN Sec Council was left to assume the role of a bystander; this UN enforcement action in Persian Gulf was the first in new post-Cold War era; it revealed limited powers of the Sec Council in the face of US determination to implement its own regional agenda.

UNs role exceeded peacekeeping in Persian Gulf 1991 as UN moved towards enforcement under the US.

Cambodia, 1992-93 February 1992: Sec Council established UN Transition Authority in

Cambodia, whose role was to produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodian conflict based on free elections within 18 months.

This also involved disarming Khmer Rouge guerrillas (Communist movement who wanted to regress society) and gov. forces.

By May 1993: UN successfully managed national elections so it began to withdraw personnel; managed to bring democracy.

Although it developed slowly in 10 years after UNs withdrawal, it did shift from repressive political system, with greater openness and criticisms tolerated.

Historians Berdal and Leifer: Cambodia is much more usefully seen as an example of the possibilities as well as the limitations of the UNs role in transplanting democracy and political stability to countries.

But there were some shortcomings e.g. Cambodia remained unstable after UNTACs departure which illustrated limitations faced by UN in post-CW climate; end of CW meant that UN could carry out its role without superpower interference BUT the problem was that because superpowers didnt have any specific interests, the didnt influence their former client states.

So end of CW brought an end to the positive impact superpower involvement had in the work of UN.

In terms of Cambodia, the UN was effective in establishing administrative framework for democracy + stability but the absence of superpower influence undermined the chances of that process being translated into a long-term and lasting one.

Somalia, 1992-95 Superpower interest in Somalia faded but during CW Somalia was strategic in that

it was positioned on the Horn of Africa so it was useful for US when USSR were backing revolutionary regime in neighboring Ethiopia in 1970s-80s.

So in turn US had supported Somali regime of Siyad Barre but by 1991, this regime collapsed and government in Somalia didnt exist, causing internal chaos.

August 1992: Sec Council establish UNOSOM which aimed to provide humanitarian aid.

December 1992: Small UN force couldnt contain violence so US offered 27,000 troops to provide security for UN aid to Somalia.

Sec Council set up UNITAF under US operational control, which the US labeled as Operation Restore Hope; UNITAF/ORH were successful in opening a door for humanitarian aid but Somalia still did not have central government.

May 1993: Sec Council authorized UNOSOM II which was under UN control, not US. Period of bloody violence followed as UN forces clashed with Mohammed Aidid,

a warlord. So UN operation in Somalia were faced with two problems: 1) objectives shifted

from humanitarian aid to nation-building and 2) US became reluctant to continue its action so by May 1994, Clinton reverses US attitude towards assertive multilateralism (which was crucial).

March 1995: last UN forces left Somalia. The operation had turned into one of enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Somalia had not been a consenting state to UN intervention. The UN faced continuous military opposition from the many warring factions. This made a peacekeeping role almost impossible. The worst of the humanitarian crisis had been resolved but by 2003 Somalia still

remained without a viable central government.

Former Yugoslavia, 1992-95 UN faced failure in intervention in f.k.a

Yugoslavia. Int. community faced with contradiction:

was committed to sanctity of state frontiers + right of self-determination but also protecting rights of ethnic minorities.

First step to peacekeeping for UN was the existence of a responsive host state; the most effective interventions during CW where those where the conflicting sides were organised and wanted a solution; this wasnt the case for fka Yugoslavia.

Basic question facing international community was whether intervention should aim to lessen humanitarian suffering or if it should be based on principle of the sanctity of frontiers.

Frontier issue was an enforcement issue in Yugoslavia.

UN also didnt know if problems in Yugoslavia could be dealt through EU and NATO as Euro agencies.

February 1992: UN established UNPROFOR whose immediate mandate was to create the conditions of peace and security required for the overall settlement of the crisis.

UNPROFORs role was based on a traditional interpositionary one.

August 1992: mandate extended to deliver humanitarian aid and force

empowered to use all measures necessary to achieve this aim.

UNPROFOR mandate was extended to include the creation of safe areas for refugees in Bosnia and using NATO to enforce sanctions.

UNs role expanded from a fairly traditional peacekeeping presence to a much more complex and demanding one.

First time it cooperated w/ NATO as a regional organization.

Significant failures for UN which determined its more complex role in post-CW Yugoslavia: July 1995, Srebrenica Massacre with 7500 Bosnian Muslims killed by Bosnian Serbs.

Little evidence of political will by UN to set up enforcement action against this group.

November 1995: Dayton Peace Accords established through US which effectively ended UNs peacekeeping role in Bosnia & Croatia; introduced IFOR that consisted of 60000 troops, 20000 were American.

So UNs role was made harder by the fact that it did not get consent from those in conflict.

Enforcement role became more prominent and more urgent in fka Yugoslavia

Rwanda, 1993-96 April-June 1994: 800,000 dead, mainly Tutsi minority. Killed by majority of Hutus after the death of Hutu Rwandan President

Habyarimana. Further 2mil displaced and 2mil others fled as refugees into

neighbouring countries. By May 1994: UNAMIR (UN force) was in Rwanda for 8 months; meant

to facilitate Arusha Peace Accords between Hutu + Tutsi but this UNAMIR was believed to be poorly prepared.

UNs response to Rwanda: indecisive and inadequate; no swift response from a substantial force deployed by a strong military power (Sec Council reduced UN military forces after attacks against Belgian peacekeepers).

No significant concerted international pressure. June-August 1994: French-led Op. Turquoise designed to stabilize SW

part of Rwanda; French managed to protect some of their Hutu allies in this region.

US set up Op. Support Hope which provided some humanitarian relief. UN failed to establish sec. environment in Rwanda as int. community

feared that involvement in Rwanda could lead to hopeless long-term involvement.

Rwanda thought to be the biggest flop of UN; Kofi Annan (Secretary General) said that int. community and UN couldnt muster political will to confront Rwanda; UN force at the time was neither mandated nor equipped for forceful action that would prevented genocide.

Kosovo, 1999 UNs traditional approaches became more irrelevant in the 1990s and

issue of Kosovo illustrate this. UN didnt intervene in Kosovo until a ceasefire was established. Its argued that Sec. Council was ignored by Western powers that

used NATO to fulfill their own interventionist aims so credibility and authority of Sec. Council was undermined.

Serbia began ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanian in 1999 which was conducted by Serbian and Yugoslav milit.

Prior international attempts at diplomacy designed to change Serb policy towards ethnic cleansing had failed.

Slobodan Milosevic (Yug. President) consistently showed disregard for int. opinion over Kosovo.

By late January 1999: US began shifting from diplomacy to military solution but diplomacy wasnt completely abandoned.

February 1999: further attempt made; at Rambouillet, int. community (Russia, France, UK, US, Germany, Italy) attempted to broker settlement between Yug. & Albanian Kosovar delegation; talks collapsed due to Milosevics unwillingness.

So further diplomatic efforts appeared pointless so in March, NATO forces began 77-day bombardment of Serbian targets; thought to be breach of int. law because it wasnt approved by UN but Javier Solana (NATOs Sec. General) believed that it was justified in human terms and thus was a legitimate action; emphasized that Serbs shouldnt get away with genocide.

Kosovo, 1999 (part 2) But int. response was different; Russia and China thought it was

illegal but UN was ambivalent. Serbs stepped up ethnic cleansing programme after NATO

bombings; circa 1.8mil Albanians displaced. NATO bombings intensified so Milosevic finally agreed on 3rd

June to end ethnic cleansing; withdrew Serb forces. 10 June: Sec. Council adopted Resolution 1244 as UNMIK to

undertake administrative role in conjunction with NATO (UN had taken minimal role until this point; the role was new).

49,000 NATO troops were to maintain security but UNMIK was to have authority over people and territory and civil administration of Kosovo; UNMIK to establish self-gov in Kosovo.

But there were issues with the resolution e.g. placed vast task on UN admin, with 800,000 refugees needing to be repatriated; Serb action devastated housing and public buildings e.g. schools so UNMIK was responsible for returning Kosovo to normal.

Further problem was lack of clear division between NATO and UNs responsibility at NATO was responsible for security.

Also Albanians wanted independence but UN mandate required respect for Yugoslavias sovereignty and for protection of Serbs in Kosovo so overall UN was out of its depth.

East Timor, 1999-2002 Plebiscite held in East Timor in August 1999 by UN Sec-General. Issue was whether East Timorese people would accept/reject special autonomous

status within Republic of Indonesia. June 1999: UN established UNAMET with the mandate to consult the consultation. 30 August 1999: vote held, resulted in 78.5% of people wanting independence. Violence ensued; 500,000 had to flee E.T. September 1999: Indonesia accepts UN force that was authorized to take all

necessary measures to achieve three tasks: 1. To restore peace & security in E.T. 2. To protect & support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks. 3. To facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

October 1999: UN established UNTAET (UN Transitional Admin in E.T.) once violence subdued; aimed to establish and maintain law & order and to prepare state for self-gov. and sustainable development.

But issue was that National Consultative Council (which served as a forum for East Timorese political and community leaders to advise the Transitional Administrator and discuss policy issues) was under-representative and not transparent enough in its deliberations.

So UN was only offering limited and confused consultation to Timoerese people. East Timorese Cabinet complained that NCC had no power, no control and no

resources to function adequately. But UNTAET succeeded in organizing elections and paved way for full

independence. 20 May 2002: E.T. declared independent and UNTAET was replaced by UNMISET

which remained with a scaled-down peacekeeping force until 2004. Elections were successful and peaceful; UNTAET fulfilled its started role; created

laws and negotiated treaties.

Interpretations of UNs role UN founded on idea of collective security(states work together to maintain

int. peace because its in their best interests) but reality became different because UN could only be a peacekeeper during CW if superpowers cooperated together.

This co-op depended on whether it was beneficial to superpowers or not. So throughout CW, UNs effectiveness was constrained by whether CWs

impact. So end of CW shouldve brought an end to these constraints but this is still

debatable. General agreement that int. society consists of sovereign, independent states

that were willing to support UN as agent of int. peacekeeping despite being concerned with defending their own interests.

Some argue that UN cannot be effective ever because national self-interest still drives actions of most states who will not accept UN interference in their own domestic affairs/domestic affairs of other states; explains failings of Rwanda; so UN is always ineffective as its power to intervene will be restricted by dominance of state sovereignty.

Others argue that because globalization has progress and int. society becomes more integrated, its inevitable that sovereign status of states declines and UN can be more effective as a result; evidence of 1990s suggests that theres an increasing need for UN intervention and limitations on non-interventionist thinking linked to sovereignty.

Sierra Leone, 1999+

March 1991: Civil war erupted. By 1998: war intensified; showed no signs of peaceful

conclusion. July 1998: Sec. Council established UNOMSIL whose

role was to monitor military + economic situation in SL. January 1999: UN Observer Mission began to

evacuate as rebel forces approached Freetown (capital).

October 1999: UN implemented a more sizeable and effective peacekeeping force known as UNAMSIL whose deployment was huge (17,500 UN soldiers; included Nigerian and British troops).

UN forces being much more militarily forceful against warring parties.

The impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks: Iraq In Resolution 1368, Sec Council recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-

defence in response to terrorism. US invoked this self-defence approach against terrorism and declared a military campaign in

Afghanistan and focused on Iraqs supposed weapons of mass destruction; sought legitimacy for its actions through UN.

By late 2002, Bushs admin was anxious to get Sec Council to accept that only a military solution was appropriate to address the issue of Iraqs links with international terrorism and the countrys failure to comply with UN disarmament resolutions.

US faced growing lack of support within UN members; only UK and Spain were willing to back US demands for Iraq intervention.

Ironically, Sec Council had endorsed US military attacks against Afghan Taliban gov. Neither France and Russia were convinced that the USA had shown a sufficient link between

Iraq and terrorist attacks against the USA. End of the Cold War hadnt brought guaranteed end to fundamental disagreements in the

Sec Council. Bush admin argued that Saddams regime mightve cooperated with anti-US terrorists. UN opponents were unwilling to accept Bush Doctrine which promoted that US must carry

out pre-emptive/anticipatory self-def; meant that the basis of US international relations in this new age of aggressive anti-American terrorism was to be founded on idea that Washington would decide what government, through its perceived links with terrorism, would be targeted.

Sec. Council had already created a weapons inspection system, UNMOVIC, whose role was to verify the existence of chemical and biological weapons.

But US didnt want to place faith in these agencies because it believed that lengthy diplomacy would only undermine US military pressure on Iraq.

Some argue that the reason countries opposed US in UN over Iraq was because of national self-interest e.g. France wanted to be seen as a global superpower despite econ. & military limitations whilst Russia believed that US hadnt backed their quest for a post-CW role in int. relations and Russians also had econ. Interests In Iraq.

The impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks: Iraq (part 2) Domestic politics appeared to dominate the German stance against America; domestic

German public opinion was against a war with Iraq. There was a popularly held view that the USA was never really interested in multilateral

diplomacy. Washington wanted to operate from an unfettered unilateral position & be free to use its

power against any rogue state that it felt threatened US interests. Perception of threat was sufficient and there was little need to prove a substantial link with al-

Qaeda for example. USA could not turn to NATO to legitimize its intentions in Iraq because NATO was also divided

over its response. Iraq issue raised the fundamental problem that continued to face the UN as a peacekeeping

organization. There had to be a collective authorization for force to be used; Bush Doctrine in 2003 was

profoundly inconsistent with the UNs commitment to regulate force through international agreement.

USAs policy of conducting a war against terrorism did great damage to the UN; it caused significant divisions among the international community; clear that the Sec Council in 2003 wasnt prepared to endorse decisive preventive action.

Substantial links between Iraq and al-Qaeda were not established, nor did Iraq have large amounts of chemical or biological weapons that were operational; no active nuclear weapons programme in place.

So Iraq did not present a danger to US security nor did it appear to be closely linked to those who did.

As always, the USA was always the most important state in the UN; remained true after the Cold War had ended and at the height of the Cold War; militarily/economically USA was dominant world power.

By the start of the 21st century there was increasing opposition within the UN towards US unilateralism; US invasion of Iraq led to an intensification of this opposition to unilateralism; a major problem for the UN and the consensus upon which it depends.

Darfur, 2003-2004 Fighting between government forces and rebels from Sudanese

Liberation Army. 1000s of people became refugees. By 2004: 100,000 refugees and 1mil displaced. May 2004: Sec. Council finally called on Sudanese gov. to disarm the

Janjaweed which was a futile request and went unheeded by Sudanese authorities; more robust Sec. Council action was prevented when China and Russia abstained in a Security Council vote; illustrated a particular problem that faced the UN; both Russia and China had economic interests in the Sudan and therefore opposed any UN enforcement measures there.

Even US displayed its clear self-interest &did nothing significant to push for more substantial UN intervention; USA didnt want to undermine cooperation it needed from the Sudanese in its own struggle against international terrorism.

Equally, Islamic states werent willing to put pressure on other Islamic states; view was that the Islamic world was already under pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Darfur crisis illustrated that there was a clear lack of political will to stop the humanitarian crisis in the Sudan.

Equally there had been no concerted attempt to prevent it in the first place. Despite this fundamental shortcoming by the UN, there had been a growing recognition in the Sec Council that humanitarian crises were also threats to international peace and security.